“Research on Religion” Urgently Needs to Set Things Right; “Critique of Theology” Must Carry Out Remedial Study
“研究宗教”亟须拨乱反正 “批判神学”必须开展补课
Reporter of this journal
本刊记者
Du Jiwen, male, born in 1930, native of Qingdao, Shandong, member of the CPC. Graduated from the Department of Philosophy at Peking University in 1958; successively served as teacher, associate professor, and deputy director of the Philosophy Department at Inner Mongolia University; transferred in 1984 to the Institute of World Religions at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, where he served as director and research fellow before retiring. Currently a doctoral supervisor, honorary academic division member, vice-chairman of the Chinese Society of Atheism, and editor-in-chief of *Science and Atheism*. Major monographs include *Analysis of Qigong and Extraordinary Abilities – A New Carrier of Theism and the New Era New Religious Movement*, *Out of the Mire of Ignorance*, and *Analysis of Modern Superstition*. He also serves as executive deputy editor-in-chief of the Chinese-language *Continuation of the Chinese Buddhist Canon* under the National Publication Fund project, and has edited or co-authored *History of Buddhism* (editor-in-chief), *A General History of Chinese Chan Buddhism* (co-author), *Chinese Buddhism and Chinese Culture* (collected essays), *The Multi-Ethnic Nature and Sectarian Individuality of Chinese Buddhism*, among others. Additionally, he was a principal writer for the *Dictionary of Religion*, *History of Chinese Buddhism* (vols. 1–4), and *High Technology and Religion*.
杜继文,男,1930年生,山东青岛人,中共党员。1958年北京大学哲学系毕业,历任内蒙古大学教师、副教授、哲学系副主任等,1984年调入中国社会科学院世界宗教研究所,曾任所长、研究员,已离休。现为博士生导师,荣誉学部委员,中国无神论学会副理事长,《科学与无神论》主编,主要专著有《气功与特异功能解析——有神论的新载体和新时代新宗教运动》、《走出愚昧的迷区》、《现代迷信分析》,并任国家出版基金项目汉文《中华大藏经续编》常务副主编,编著有《佛教史》(主编)、《中国禅宗通史》(合著)、《中国佛教与中国文化》(论文集)、《中国佛教的多民族性和诸宗派个性》等。另外还是《宗教词典》、《中国佛教史》(1-4卷)、《高科技与宗教》的主要执笔人。
▲ (Interviewer, abbreviated ▲ below): This year marks the 120th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s birth and also the 50th anniversary of his instruction to establish the Institute of World Religions, which is worthy of our commemoration. As the successor to Ren Jiyu as the second director of this institute, could you discuss the significance of that instruction and its implementation in light of the overall progress of religious research in our country?
▲(采访者简称▲,下同): 今年是毛泽东诞辰120周年,也是他批示建立世界宗教研究所50周年,值得我们纪念。您是继任继愈先生担任这个研究所的第二任所长,能否结合我国在宗教研究上的总体进展谈谈这个批示的意义及其实施的情况?
● (Interviewee, abbreviated ● below): My term was from 1985 to 1988; although I served as director for a short time, I have never left religious research, so I am fairly familiar with the national situation. Nationwide, things are truly not what they were. Fifty years ago, there was only this one specialized religious research institution; today, such institutions can be found across the country, with most higher education institutions and social science research units having religious research bodies or full-time researchers. Original scriptures of various religions circulate everywhere, and there is even a state publishing house dedicated to religious books. It can be said that we have gone from a blank slate to prosperity, so some praise religious research as a “prominent field of study.”
●(被采访者简称●,下同):我的任期是1985年-1988年,任所长的时间虽然不长,但一直没有离开宗教研究,因此,对全国的情况还是比较了解的。就全国而言,真是今非昔比。50年前,专业宗教研究机构只此一家,今天可以说遍及全国,多数高等院校和社会科学研究单位设有宗教研究机构或专职的研究人员。各色宗教的原典到处流通,而且还有一个专门出版宗教图书的国家出版社,可以说是从空白走向了繁荣,所以有人把宗教研究赞之为“显学”。
▲: How did Mao Zedong give his instruction, and is today’s situation related to it?
▲ :毛泽东是怎么批示的,今天的局面与此有关吗?
●: The instruction stated: “Regarding the three major world religions, which still influence vast populations, we have no knowledge.” This judgment was made in the context of China standing up and moving toward the world, requiring a global strategy. We faced the three major religions that still influence vast populations without knowledge, and this situation had to change. The real research on religion in our country actually began with Mao Zedong’s instruction on December 30, 1963, and today’s situation is certainly related to it. However, it cannot be denied that many people and institutions in religious research today have gone astray; I will discuss this later if there is an opportunity.
●:批示是这样讲的:“对世界三大宗教,至今影响着广大人口,我们却没有知识。”——这个判断是基于中国站起来正在走向世界,需要全球战略而言的。我们面对至今影响着广大人口的三大宗教却没有知识,这种状况必须改变。我国对宗教的真正研究,实际就开端于毛泽东1963年12月30日的那个批示,今天的局面当然与此有关。但是,也不可否认,今天的宗教研究有许多人和机构走入了歧途,这个后面有机会再说。
▲: After Mao Zedong’s instruction, how was the problem of our country’s “no knowledge” of religion resolved?
▲ :在毛泽东批示之后,我国对宗教“没有知识”这个问题是怎么解决的?
●: During Ren Jiyu’s leadership of the Institute of World Religions, our institute made great efforts, including editing the *Dictionary of Religion* and *Comprehensive Dictionary of Religion*, compiling and presenting the *History of Buddhism*, *History of Islam*, and *History of Christianity* for the three major religions, which played a significant role in our understanding of religion. Subsequently, following instructions from central leadership, we organized the publication of popular reading materials on the knowledge of the three major religions, which received positive feedback. At the same time, we began to recruit graduate students in religion comprehensively and led the offering of specialized courses on religion in the Philosophy Department at Peking University, cultivating backbone forces for in-depth religious research. Soon, religious research and teaching began to develop in many universities and social science research units.
●:在任继愈先生领导世界宗教研究所期间,我所是做了很大努力的,包括主编《宗教词典》、《宗教大词典》,编撰陈述三大宗教的《佛教史》、《伊斯兰教史》和《基督教史》等,对我们认识宗教起了很大的作用;此后,还根据中央领导的指示,组织出版了有关三大宗教知识的普及读物,反映也比较好。与之同时,开始全面招收宗教研究生,并主导在北大哲学系开设宗教专业课,为全面深入地研究宗教培养骨干力量。不久,宗教研究和宗教教学就在许多高校和社科研究单位开展起来。
▲: From the current situation, has the shortage of religious knowledge been basically resolved?
▲: 从目前情况看,宗教知识短缺的问题已经基本解决了吧?
●: It cannot be seen that way. Recently, our Atheism Research Office conducted a rough survey at three universities in Beijing. Preliminary statistics show that in one university, the proportion of students believing in religion is as high as over 11%; yet most students do not know what religion is. Why are so many students religious believers while religious knowledge remains so scarce? I believe the main reason is related to changes in social conditions, where the knowledge-based dissemination of religious research has mutated into faith-based dissemination. With the opening and expansion of the market economy, a considerable number of people have turned religious knowledge into a tool for making money. The value principle of “generating revenue” and “living off religion” increasingly dominates the nature and orientation of religious research. Economic interests have led religious research and the popularization of religious knowledge to become dependent on religion itself. The effect of “taking people’s money and eliminating their disasters” quickly became apparent: scientific research, which should be objective and independent, striving to grasp the true face of religion, has to varying degrees degenerated into missionary activities that erect monuments and sing praises for religion, extolling belief in ghosts and gods. Scientific knowledge about religion has degenerated into an object of faith for some people.
●:不能这么看,最近咱们无神论研究室在北京三所大学作了一个粗略的调查,初步统计显示,有个大学的学生信教人数高达11%强;但大多数学生却不知道宗教为何物。为什么信教的学生那么多,宗教知识又那么短缺?我认为,主要与社会条件有了变化,宗教研究的知识性传播变异成了信仰性传播有关。随着市场经济的开放和扩大,在相当一部分人中,把宗教知识也当成了赚钱的工具,“创收”与“吃教”的价值法则日益支配着宗教研究的性质和倾向。经济利益导致宗教研究和宗教知识的普及对于宗教本身的依赖,“拿人钱财、为人消灾”的效果,很快显示出来:本应客观独立、力求把握宗教面貌的科学研究,不同程度地蜕变成了为宗教树碑立传,讴歌鬼神信仰的传教活动;有关宗教的科学知识,蜕变成了一些人的信仰对象。
▲: Then, what is used to determine the boundary between religious propaganda and religious research?
▲: 那么,用什么来确定宗教宣传和宗教研究的界限?
●: This boundary is indeed difficult to draw clearly, but it is by no means without principles to follow. The “Basic Views and Basic Policies on Religious Issues during the Socialist Period in Our Country” (referred to as Document No. 19) issued by the CPC Central Committee in 1982 contains many authoritative provisions. Some historical archives can also serve as references, such as the “Outline of Academic Affairs” formulated in the late Qing dynasty, and Cai Yuanpei’s “Proposal for Educational Independence” published in 1922, which should be the most valuable documents in this regard. Recently, *Science and Atheism* published a study by teachers and students from Beijing Normal University titled “Research on the Nanjing National Government’s Policy of Restricting Campus Proselytizing,” which is also quite good.
●:这个界限确实很难明确地划分,但绝非没有原则可循。1982年中共中央印发的《关于我国社会主义时期宗教问题的基本观点和基本政策》(简称19号文件)就有许多权威性规定。有些历史档案也可以供我们借鉴,譬如清末制定的《学务纲要》,1922年蔡元培发表的《教育独立议》,应该是这方面最有价值的文献。最近《科学与无神论》刊载北京师范大学师生写的《南京国民政府限制校园传教政策的研究》也很不错。
▲: So, it seems the problem is no longer a shortage of religious knowledge, but rather how to handle religious knowledge?
▲: 如此说来,现在已经不是宗教知识短缺的问题,倒成了如何处理宗教知识问题了?
●: No. What I mean is that, with the expansion of religious missionary forces in the cultural and educational fields, the historical facts and actualities of religion have been arbitrarily added to, deleted, or severely distorted. The image of religion presented to the public is confused and inaccurate, and knowledge that can reflect the actual state of religion appears increasingly lacking. Let me first discuss a few viewpoints on the guiding principles of religious research and see what information they might provide.
●:不。我的意思是,随着文化教育领域宗教传教势力的扩展,宗教的史实和事实被随意地作了增删或严重的扭曲,给予大众的宗教形象是错乱的、失实的,能够反映宗教实际的知识显得越发欠缺。我先讲几个有关宗教研究指导方针的论点,看看它们可能提供什么样的信息。
A relatively older viewpoint is that without faith in religion, one cannot penetrate deeply into it, and research becomes impossible—just as if you are not a patient, you cannot become a doctor. A viewpoint from those familiar with traditional culture is that researching religion requires adopting an attitude of “‘sympathetic resonance’ and ‘experiential understanding of the mind-nature’”; otherwise, it is “ultra-leftist.” A viewpoint close to Western thinking is that researching religion should adopt the “standpoint, perspective, viewpoint, and method of ‘Western religious studies.’” The first two of these three viewpoints set a precondition of subjective emotion: one must first have faith or harbor sympathy, so the knowledge they provide can only be selected and filtered by them. The latter is more fashionable and foreign. So-called “Western religious studies” is essentially a Christian theology born from Max Müller, which deduces from religious comparison that other religions are limited, and only God is the “ultimate” “infinite,” worthy of faith. From such religious studies, many theological philosophies have developed, such as systematic theology and religious hermeneutics, which are popular in China.
比较旧的一种论点是,对宗教没有信仰,就不能深入其中,研究就失去可能,好比你不是病人就不能成为医生。懂一点传统文化的论点是,研究宗教必须采取“‘同情之默应’,‘心性之体会’”的态度,否则就是“极左”。亲近西方的论点是,研究宗教就应该采取“西方宗教学”的“立场、观点、视角和方法”。这三种论点中的前两种,都设置了一个主观情感的前提,或者得先有信仰,或者心怀同情,由此提供的知识只能是经过他们的选择和过滤的;后一种比较时髦、洋气。所谓“西方宗教学”,实质上是诞生于麦克思-缪勒的一种基督教神学,它从宗教比较中推出,其他宗教都是有限的,只有上帝才是“终极”的“无限”,值得信仰。由此等宗教学发展出许多神学哲学,例如在中国风行的系统神学,宗教诠释学等。
▲: These statements are somewhat abstract; could you give a few concrete examples?
▲: 这些说法有些抽象,能否举几个具体事例?
●: Take the common understanding people have today: that religion encourages people to do good. This statement seems not wrong, for example, prohibiting killing, stealing, and sexual misconduct, but this is only an appendage of doctrine. Quoting a few words from the Bible: “Whoever sacrifices to any god other than the Lord alone shall be utterly destroyed.” “Utterly destroyed” is not just a curse; countless religious massacres and religious wars follow it. Another example: “Whoever believes and is baptized will be saved, but whoever does not believe will be condemned.” The highest penalty of “condemnation” is being cast into hell; even if utterly destroyed, one must suffer endlessly. That is to say, the basis of religious reward and punishment is faith in its god; words and deeds of faith are good, while words and deeds of unbelief are evil, and killing those who should be killed according to doctrine is also good.
●:就拿眼前人们的通识来说,认为宗教是劝人为善的,这话似乎不错,譬如禁止杀盗淫之类,但这只是教义的附属。引几句圣经的话:“祭祀别的神,不单单祭祀耶和华的,那人必要灭绝。”“灭绝”不仅仅是一种诅咒,而且有数不尽的宗教屠杀和宗教战争紧跟其后。又如,“信而受洗的必然得救,不信的必被定罪”。“定罪”的最高刑罚是打入地狱,即使灭绝了,也得受苦无穷。就是说,宗教赏罚的依据是对其神的信仰与否,信的言行就是善,不信的言行就是恶,按教义该杀的杀也是善。
There are not a few high-ranking officials and prominent literati who place their hopes for social harmony and world peace on religion. As a kind of good intention and effort, this is understandable, but to define this as the inherent attribute of religion is far from the facts. Let us still cite the words of the Bible: “I came not to send peace, but a sword. For I am come to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter in law against her mother in law. And a man’s foes shall be they of his own household.” [1]1 Matthew 10:34–36, King James Version. If one can read peace and harmony out of this, then it is either lying or psychological distortion. Within Christianity there is a “Thanksgiving”; the vocabulary of “thanksgiving” is popular throughout society, but its opposite has been completely erased: “vengeance,” vengeance so thorough that even newborn male infants are to be killed without leaving a single one alive. [2]2 A reference to the biblical account of the massacre of the innocents (Matthew 2:16), in which King Herod ordered the killing of all male infants in Bethlehem. Such a serious doctrine has left no impression at all on ordinary people. This bias arises from disguising religious proselytization as religious knowledge.
有不少高官和大牌文人,把社会和谐、世界和平寄托在宗教身上。这作为一种良好的愿望和努力可以理解,但将其定为宗教的本然属性,距离事实就太远了。仍然引用圣经的话:“我来,并不是叫地上太平,乃是叫地上动刀兵。因为我来,是叫人与父亲生疏,女儿与母亲生疏,媳妇与婆婆生疏。人的仇敌就是自己家里的人。”如果说,从这里能够读出和平与和谐来,不是撒谎,就是心理畸变。基督教中有个“感恩节”,“感恩”的语汇在全社会都流行,但完全抹去了它的反面:“复仇”,复仇到连刚出生的男婴都要一个不留地杀掉,如此严重的教义在一般人中竟完全没有印象,这偏颇就出在将宗教布道伪装成宗教知识上。
▲: We often see from the media conflicts between religions abroad, but within our country, relations between religions, or between believers and non-believers, are relatively harmonious, is that not so?
▲: 我们从媒体上经常可以看到国外发生的宗教之间的争斗,但我们国内的宗教之间或者说信教的和非信教的人还是比较和谐的,是吗?
●: This first requires looking at how everyone understands the term “religion.” Usually we say that China has five major religions, and the five major religions equal China’s religions. Speaking of “religious harmony” on this basis basically conforms to the facts, because they are all legal and protected by national law. But there are also a large number of groups of ghost-and-god theories that refuse the supervision of national law and are not protected by law, such as underground churches, cults, extremists, and terrorists. None of these are within the purview of the religious affairs authorities, yet some forces at home and abroad acknowledge them. For instance, the once-fashionable “religious market theory” divides Chinese religion into three colors, advocating free competition among legal religions, underground churches, and cults within the same large social market. [3]3 “Religious market theory” is a sociological approach that treats religions as firms competing for adherents in a market; its application to China by some Western scholars classifies religious groups into “red” (state-sanctioned), “black” (underground or illegal), and “gray” (semi-legal) categories. The cults and underground churches fostered by the United States but banned by our country, as well as the Tibetan independence and Xinjiang independence they support, are also carried out under the name of religion. These are not harmony but threats. This creates ambiguity in the concept of religion, directly determining the actual meaning of discourse about religion.
●:这得先看看大家对宗教一词是怎样理解的。通常我们都说,中国有五大宗教,五大宗教就等于中国的宗教,就此而谈“宗教和谐”基本符合事实,因为它们都是合法的,受到国家法律的保护。但还有大量拒绝国家法律监督也不受法律保护的鬼神论团体存在,譬如地下教会、邪教、极端主义和恐怖主义分子等,都不在宗教主管机关的视野,可国内外有些势力则给以承认,诸如一度风行的“宗教市场论”就将中国宗教分为三色,鼓吹合法宗教、地下教会和邪教在同一个社会大市场中自由竞争;美国豢养但被我国取缔的邪教、地下教会以及他们支持的藏独、疆独,也都是在宗教名义下进行的。这些不是和谐,而是威胁。由此造成宗教概念的歧义,直接决定着有关宗教话语的实际含义。
▲: Legal and illegal are absolutely different, with clear boundaries, and the state has specialized agencies to oversee each. There shouldn’t be a problem, should there?
▲: 合法与不合法绝不相同,界限清楚,国家也各有专门机构主管,不应该有问题吧?
●: There are still problems. One problem lies in the discourse system. The relevant state departments speak of religious harmony; a certain social force also speaks of religious harmony, but the “religion” each refers to is not the same concept. The latter, taking religion as a good thing, promotes the expansion of the “three-color” theory of religion and also opens up public space for “contextual theology.” [4]4 “Contextual theology” refers to theological approaches that seek to interpret Christian faith in light of specific cultural, social, or political contexts; here it is implied as a vehicle for expanding the public role of religion. This still concerns the extension of religion. There is also the intension of religion. What is religion? Authoritative experts say: “Religion is culture,” which was all the rage for a time — but this is actually a classification of religion, not a definition. The characteristic that distinguishes religion from other cultural phenomena is the essence of religion. What characteristic is unique to religion? Universally acknowledged, it is the recognition of the reality of ghosts and gods and belief in them. Highlighting that religion is culture obscures the ghost-and-god-theory characteristic of religion, putting it on the same level as general cultural education and allowing it to flow smoothly into the higher education and scientific research systems. One of the tasks of our atheism is to expose the use of religious harmony in the official sense to peddle the religious harmony of the religious market theory. We propose implementing the separation of education from religion, mainly referring to academic proselytization. Individual clergy entering the national education field, and their promoters, do not belong to legal religion. Therefore, saying that we oppose religion and specifically limit this to legal religion is a divisive tactic, not a fact.
●:问题还是有的。问题之一就出在话语系统上。国家有关部门讲宗教和谐;社会有股力量也讲宗教和谐,但二者指谓的宗教不是一个概念。后者以宗教是个好东西,推动“三色”论宗教的扩展,也为“处境神学”开辟公共空间,——这还属于宗教的外延问题,还有宗教的内涵问题。什么是宗教?权威专家说:“宗教是文化”,风行一时——其实这是对宗教分类,而不是定义。宗教区别于其他文化现象的特征才是宗教的本质。什么才是唯有宗教才具有的特征?众所公认,那就是承认鬼神实有和信仰鬼神。突出宗教是文化,掩盖了宗教的鬼神论特性,令其与一般文化教育同格,得以流畅地进入高教和科研系统。我们无神论的任务之一,就是揭穿利用官方意义上的宗教和谐,叫卖宗教市场论中的宗教和谐;我们提出实施教育与宗教相分离,主要指的是学术传教;个别神职人员进入国家教育领域,推动者也不属合法宗教。因此说我们反宗教并特别限定在合法宗教上,这是一种离间手段,不是事实。
▲: You mean that although religious studies have made progress, in their subsequent evolution they lost the “guidance of Marxism” that Mao Zedong demanded, and deviations emerged, so it is still necessary to strengthen Marxist research and restore the true face of religion?
▲: 您是说,虽然宗教研究有了进展,但在此后的演变中,失去了毛泽东要求的“马克思主义指导”,出现了偏差,所以还需要强化马克思主义的研究,还宗教的真相?
●: That is indeed the case. However, in recent years, due to the Central Committee’s emphasis on the guidance of Marxism, the term “Marxist view on religion” has appeared in religious studies. This indicates a change in the wind, which is a good thing. Yet what the Marxist view on religion is has itself become a problem, because it can be interpreted in two ways. One case is that it refers to studying Marxist doctrines or viewpoints on religion; the Marxist view on religion is the object of study. For example, there is an article titled “The Marxist View on Religion Should Keep Pace with the Times.” [5]5 “Keep pace with the times” (与时俱进) is a standard phrase in CPC discourse, often associated with the theoretical development of Marxism in China. In this, the “Marxist view on religion” is the author’s personal object of study from the perspective of “keeping pace with the times,” so its conclusions are open to discussion; some believe it is essentially anti-Marxist. The other case is equating the Marxist view on religion with the Marxist doctrine on religion, making it the guiding ideology for studying religion, beyond doubt and beyond opposition. This difference is so great that if confused, academic issues may become matters of principle.
●:确实如此。不过近几年来,由于中央对马克思主义指导的强调,所以在宗教研究中出现了“马克思主义宗教观”的提法。这表明风向有了变化,是件好事,然而什么是马克思主义宗教观又成了问题,因为它可以做两种解释:一种情况是,指研究马克思主义关于宗教的学说或观点,马克思主义宗教观是研究的对象,例如,有名为《马克思主义宗教观应该与时俱进》的文章,这个“马克思主义宗教观”是作者个人从“与时俱进”的视角进行研究的,所以其结论可以讨论;有人认为它实质是反马克思主义的。另一种情况是,把马克思主义宗教观等同于马克思主义关于宗教的学说,乃是研究宗教的指导思想,不容置疑,不容反对。这个差别如此巨大,如果混淆起来,学术问题可能变成原则问题。
▲: This question is quite novel. Could you explain it in more detail?
▲: 这个问题很新鲜,能否解释具体些?
●: Let me give a relatively complete formulation: “The Marxist view on religion is an important component of the Marxist ideological and theoretical system, and it is also the guiding ideology for Marxist political parties in dealing with and handling religious issues.” More concisely: “The Marxist view on religion is the guiding ideology for Marxist political parties in dealing with and handling religious issues.” The question is, why not say “The Marxist ideological and theoretical system is the guiding ideology for Marxist political parties in dealing with and handling religious issues,” but instead go through the trouble of inserting the “Marxist view on religion” into the “Marxist ideological and theoretical system”? This is probably not a word game. It is claimed that the purpose of “upholding and developing the Marxist view on religion” is “to provide an ideological foundation, methodological foundation, and decision-making foundation for strengthening and improving religious work under the new circumstances.” We know that the so-called “new circumstances” generally refer to the circumstances since reform and opening up. Document No. 19 mentioned above was a guiding document for the socialist period. [6]6 Document No. 19 refers to the 1982 Central Committee document “The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question during Our Country’s Socialist Period,” which remains a foundational text for CPC religious policy. Now, under the name of the “view on religion,” it is to provide anew the ideological, methodological, and decision-making foundations for the Party’s religious work. Is this a continuation or a replacement?
●:这里讲一个比较完整些的表述:“马克思主义宗教观是马克思主义思想理论体系的重要组成部分,也是马克思主义政党对待和处理宗教问题的指导思想”。简练些是:“马克思主义宗教观是马克思主义政党对待和处理宗教问题的指导思想”。问题是,为什么不说“马克思主义思想理论体系是马克思主义政党对待和处理宗教问题的指导思想”,而非要费一番周折,再把“马克思主义宗教观”装进“马克思主义思想理论体系”里?这大概不是文字游戏。 据称,“坚持和发展马克思主义宗教观”的目的,是“为加强和改进新形势下的宗教工作提供思想基础、方法基础和决策基础”。我们知道,所谓“新形势”一般是指改革开放以来的形势,上文提到的19号文件就是社会主义时期的指导性文件,现在要以“宗教观”的名义重新给党的宗教工作提供思想、方法和决策基础,是衔接还是取代?
▲: So what is your view?
▲: 那您怎么看?
●: This requires comparison, and it is a long story. What I am now paying attention to is: what concept of “Marxism” has been “viewed-on-religion-ized”? You are a researcher of Marxism. Let me quote a sentence for you to look at: “The Marxist view on religion was gradually formed and established by Marx and Engels and other Marxist classical writers…” What is the “and others” after Marx and Engels about? In the history of the CPC, the Marxist classical writers are Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. Since the 1960s, Stalin has been gradually downplayed, but Lenin’s status has never wavered. In recent years, there have also been anti-Lenin voices domestically. To place this tendency within the “guiding ideology” for the Party and the state is, I believe, no small matter. Some scholars have directly asked: Does the so-called Marxist view on religion mean using Marxism to view religion, or using religion to view Marxism? The question is very profound. Marxism has three sources and three component parts; this is common knowledge. This view on religion, based on this, defines “Marxism” as three stages: “using Enlightenment and humanist thought as weapons for philosophical critique of religion, using historical materialism and dialectical materialism as weapons for political critique of religion.” Marxist philosophy is dialectical materialism and historical materialism; this is also common knowledge. How could the weapon of Marxist critique of religion become the thought of the Enlightenment movement? How could the critique of religion by dialectical materialism and historical materialism become political critique? If even the basic terminology of Marxism cannot be stated accurately, yet it is still forced to serve as the “guiding ideology,” is this not absurd? Putting Marxism into the basket of some “view” is like putting plants that grow on the earth into a vegetable basket — can they be the same thing? As for how to interpret it, the problems may be even greater.
●:这需要比较,说来话长。我现在注意的是,已经被“宗教观”了的“马克思主义”是个什么概念?你是研究马克思主义的,我引一句话请你看看:“马克思主义宗教观是马克思和恩格斯等马克思主义经典作家……逐步形成和确立起来的”。马恩之后加个“等”是怎么回事?中共党史上称马克思主义经典作家是马恩列斯;自20世纪60年代起,斯大林被逐步淡化,但列宁的地位却从未动摇过。近些年来,国内也有反列宁的声音,将这种倾向安置在给党和国家作“指导思想”里边,我认为就不是个小问题。有学者曾当面质问:所谓马克思主义宗教观,究竟是用马克思主义观宗教,还是在用宗教观马克思主义?问题提得很深刻。 马克思主义有三个来源和三个组成部分,这是常识,这个宗教观则据此将“马克思主义”确定为三个阶段:“以启蒙和人本主义思想为武器对宗教进行哲学批判,以历史唯物主义和辩证唯物主义为武器对宗教进行政治批判”。马克思主义哲学就是辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义,这也是常识,马克思主义对宗教批判的武器,怎么会变成启蒙运动的思想?辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义对宗教的批判怎么又成了政治批判?如果连马克思主义的基本用语都说不准确,还硬要作“指导思想”,岂不滑稽?把马克思主义装到一个什么观的筐里去,好比把大地上生长的植物装到菜篮子里,能是一回事么。至于如何解读,问题可能更多。
Taking the interpretation of “historical materialism” as an example, there is currently an explanation like this: social being determines social consciousness, meaning “society is bad,” hence it produces “bad” religion; Marxism saw from “bad” religion the “bad” society of Europe at that time, and this is “correct” and “objective.” The development of religion in China today has “normal,” “good,” and “positive” aspects; from “good religion” we can know that ours is a “good society.” The conclusion is self-evident: toward our country’s current religion, one can only say “good,” not “bad,” otherwise it means our society is bad. However, this “religion” is precisely a word with ambiguous meanings. What does such an interpretation have to do with historical materialism? Following this reasoning, could one also say: Marxism was produced in a bad society, so it is a bad doctrine; Marxism is a good doctrine, so the society that produced it is a good society? It can be seen that this logic is extremely absurd.
以对“历史唯物主义”的解读为例,眼下就有这样的阐释:社会存在决定社会意识,意即“社会不好”,故而产生“不好”的宗教;马克思主义从“不好的”宗教看到了当时欧洲“不好的”社会,这是“正确的”、“客观的”。宗教在今天的中国发展有“正常的”、“好的”、“积极的”方面,从“好的宗教”可知我们是“好的社会”。其结论不言而喻,对我国当前的宗教只能说“好”,不能说“不好”,否则就是说我们的社会不好。然而,这“宗教”正是含有歧义的词。像这样的阐释,与历史唯物主义有什么关系吗?按照这种推理,是否也可以这样说:马克思主义产生在不好的社会,所以是个不好的主义;马克思主义是个好的主义,所以产生它的社会是个好社会?可见这个逻辑是十分荒谬的。
In short, in responding to Mao Zedong’s call to “study religion,” although certain achievements have been made, the large amount of religious knowledge now provided is distorted and needs to be traced back to the source and set right; in advocating Marxist guidance, there are also phenomena of arbitrary misinterpretation and distorted explanation that need to be brought back to order.
总之,在响应毛泽东“研究宗教”方面,虽然取得一定的成就,但现在提供的大量宗教知识却是被扭曲的,需要正本清源;在提倡马克思主义指导上,也存在一些被妄解歪说的现象,需要拨乱反正。
▲: Mao Zedong also mentioned in his instruction the need to “criticize theology.” How are we doing in this regard today?
▲: 毛泽东在批示中还讲到要“批判神学”,现如今这方面我们做得怎么样?
●: Mao Zedong’s original words were: “If theology is not criticized, it will be impossible to write a good history of philosophy, nor a good history of literature, nor a good world history.” My initial impression of this statement was that it was quite novel, but it seemed only related to historiography, a matter of the study. So the early Institute of World Religions also paid insufficient attention to it, achieving almost nothing. Now it appears that this may have been a major error on our part.
●:毛泽东的原话是:“不批判神学就不能写好哲学史,也不能写好文学史或世界史。”这句话给我的最初印象是很新奇,但好像只与史学有关系,是书斋中的事。所以早期的世界宗教研究所也注意不够,几乎没有什么成就可言。现在发现,这可能是我们的一个很大的失误。
▲: Is it that serious? Why do you say that?
▲: 有这么严重吗?为什么这么说?
●: Neglect of theology has caused us to lose our judgment and voice on theological issues, and the consequences are very dire, extending far beyond the scope of academia. Reference works such as the *Encyclopedia of China: Volume on Religion*, the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, and the *English-Chinese Dictionary of Western Philosophy* all have explanations of theology, but the answers containing evaluations tend toward two extremes: one extreme is utter contempt, the other extreme is extreme praise.
●:对神学的忽视,使我们失去在神学问题上的判断力和发言权,那后果就非常糟糕,远远超出学术的范围。像《中国大百科全书·宗教卷》、《不列颠大百科全书》、《西方哲学英汉对照辞典》等工具书对神学都有所解释,但含有评价的答案则趋向两个极端:一端是极度的轻蔑,一端是极度的赞美。
Holbach said, “There is a science whose object is incomprehensible. Contrary to all other sciences, this science studies only things imperceptible to the human senses. Hobbes called it the kingdom of darkness,” in this kingdom, “the laws of reason are originally incorrect, and sound thought becomes absurd thought. This science is called theology, and it constantly tramples on human reason.” Engels said, “The first word of religion is a lie…; religion is hypocritical, and theology is the blueprint for all other lies and hypocrisies.” Is this the case? Let me give an example from a praiser. There is a famous Christian work *On the Flesh of Christ*, which states: “The Son of God died; this is all the more credible because it is absurd. He was buried and rose again; this is completely unquestionable because it is impossible.” The author is Tertullian, known as the “Latin Father”; he believed that theology is built on “credible because absurd” and “unquestionable because impossible,” taking pride in irrationality.
霍尔巴赫说,“有一门学问,其对象是无法理解的。和所有其余的科学根本相反,这门学问只研究人们的感官不可知觉的事物。霍布斯称之为黑暗的王国”,在这个王国里,“理性的规律原来是不正确的,而健全的思想则变成荒唐的思想。这门学问叫作神学,它不断地蹂躏着人类的理性”。恩格斯说,“宗教的第一句话就是谎话……;宗教伪善,神学又是其他一切谎话和伪善的蓝本”。事实是否如此?且举个赞美者的实例。基督教有部名著《论基督的肉身》,内称“上帝之子死了,这是更加可信的,因为这是荒谬的。他被埋葬又复活了,这完全是无可置疑的,因为这是不可能的”。作者是号称“拉丁教父”的德尔图良;他认为神学就建立在“因为荒谬而可信”、“因其不可能而无可置疑”上,这是以反理性为荣。
Mao Zedong’s attitude toward religion was to “study” it, and toward “theology” to criticize it; the reason for the difference can be roughly understood from the simple introduction above.
毛泽东对宗教要求“研究”、对“神学”要求批判,态度之所以不一样,从上述简单的介绍中可知道个大概。
▲: Doesn’t religion include theology? Why single it out?
▲: 难道宗教不包括神学吗,为什么要单独提出来?
●: I believe that Mao Zedong, as a far-sighted politician, first considered the role and status of religion in society and history; if one does not understand religion as a social-historical existence, one will fall into strategic blindness. But he was also a very sensitive thinker; religious doctrines are filled with absurdity and ignorance, and theology is absolutely unacceptable. In fact, theology is the soul by which different religious sects exist independently, the internal basis for their differentiation from each other, and the spiritual pillar for attracting believers and safeguarding their own interests. The development and changes of the world’s three major religions, their continuous divisions, disputes, or even endless hatred, conflicts, and wars, certainly have social causes, but the internal root is doctrinal theology. Today’s secular states mostly follow the principle of freedom of religious belief, treating the rise and fall, interpretation, or revision of theology as the private affair of churches and believers, protected by law, and ordinary people and different sects are not allowed to interfere arbitrarily. But if one exceeds the boundaries of the law, pushes matters of private belief into the public sphere, and propagates them everywhere as public discourse, then not only should the state manage them according to law, but public opinion also has the right to raise different opinions, including open criticism. What I call the error in “criticizing theology” mainly refers to those theological preachings that exceed legal boundaries, not to church theology itself.
●:我以为,毛泽东作为高瞻远瞩的政治家,他首先考虑的是宗教在社会和历史中的地位和作用问题;对作为社会历史存在的宗教,若不了解就会在战略上陷入盲目。但他同时又是很灵敏的思想家,宗教教义充塞的是荒谬和愚昧,神学绝对不可以接受。实际上神学是各个不同宗教教派得以独立存在的灵魂,是它们各自区别开来的内在根据,也是吸引教徒,维护自身利益的精神支柱。世界三大宗教的发展变化,它们各自的不断分化、纷争、甚或说不完的仇恨、冲突、战争,固然有社会的原因,内在的根底即是教义神学。当今世俗国家,大都遵从宗教信仰自由的原则,对神学的兴废、诠释或修正,视作教会和教徒的私事,国家给以法律的保护,一般俗众和相异的教派,不容妄加干涉。但若超出法律的界限,把属于信仰的私事,推向公共领域,当作公共话语到处宣扬,那不但国家要依法实行管理,公共舆论也有权提出不同意见,包括公开的批判。我所谓在“批判神学”上的失误,主要指向那些超出法律界限的神学布道,而不是指向教会神学。
▲: What is “theological preaching”?
▲: 什么是“神学布道” ?
●: There are roughly two situations: one is loudly promoting theology to the whole society, for example, publishing large quantities of theological papers and works; the other is entering national universities and research institutions to carry out theological education and construct new theologies. Both situations are very active, in a sense holding the dominant power and discourse in the so-called field of “religious studies.” The momentum thus created and the results obtained, to say it has shaken the Western Christian world and been regarded as an important force changing China’s cultural landscape, is by no means an exaggeration. Because the public lacks knowledge in this area, and ordinary people do not belong to that circle, most are quite unaware of it, allowing it to spread unchecked. For instance, do you know the term “cultural Christians”? Do you know about the “Sino-Christian Theology Movement”?
●:大约有两种情况:一是向全社会高调门地鼓吹神学,例如大批量地出版神学类论文和著作;二是进入国家高校和科研单位,开展神学教育,构建新的神学。这两种情况都很活跃,在某种意义上把持着所谓“宗教学”领域的主导权和话语权,由此形成的声势和获取的成果,说它震动西方基督教世界,并被当作改变中国文化面貌的重要力量,决不为过。因为公众这方面的知识不足,一般人又不属于那个圈子,所以大都对其不甚了解,致使其泛滥成灾,譬如,你知道“文化基督徒”这个词么?你知道有个“汉语基督教神学运动”么?
▲: I’m not clear. Could you please give a brief introduction?
▲: 不清楚,请您作个简要介绍吧 ?
●: The term “cultural Christians” appeared roughly in the late 1980s. It is unclear whether they are baptized Christians, but they all promote Christian culture in the capacity of cultural figures; what they promote is not the organizational level of Christianity but its spiritual level, and they adopt not a preaching style but a scholarly one. Let me quote a scholar’s description of their features.
●:文化基督徒这个称呼大约出现在20世纪80年代末,他们是否是受洗的基督徒不甚清楚,但都以文化人身份鼓吹基督教文化;其所鼓吹的不是基督教的组织层面而是精神层面,采取的也并非说教式的而是学究式的,这里且引一位学者对他们面貌的描述。
We cannot deny the great wisdom of this author (a cultural Christian), “But what kind of wisdom is this? The author recalls Voltaire’s words to Rousseau: ‘No one has ever used such great wisdom to try to turn us into beasts; after reading your book, I really want to walk on all fours.’ If we paraphrase Voltaire, we could say: Apart from foreign missionaries to China like Matteo Ricci and Nicolas Longobardi, no Chinese has ever used such great wisdom to try to turn us into Christians; after reading your book, I really want to rush to the cross.” These people have almost all received advanced theological education abroad, have numerous translations and works, especially good foreign language skills, hold positions as experts and professors, occupy prominent posts, and appear filled with holy spirit and wisdom. So cultural Christians can also be jokingly called intellectuals who spread Christian faith to the Chinese people in the guise of “great wisdom.”
我们不能否认这位作者(文化基督徒)的大智慧,“但这是一种什么样的智慧呢?笔者记起伏尔泰对卢梭说的话:从来没有人用这么大的智慧想把我们变成野兽,读了阁下的书,我真想用四个脚走路了。如果套用一下伏尔泰的话就可以说:除利玛窦、龙华民等外国来华的传教士之外,从来没有中国人用这么大的智慧想把我们变成基督徒,读了阁下的书,我真想奔向十字架了”。这批人几乎都受过外国高级的神学教育,译著等身,外语尤佳,专家教授身份,占据显要职位,显得圣灵智慧充满。所以文化基督徒也可以戏称为以“大智慧”模样向国人传播基督教信仰的知识分子。
What factors led to this phenomenon emerging in the 1980s? A doctoral student in the Philosophy Department of Peking University wrote an analysis attributing it to China’s “modern Chinese-language context”: “In this humanistic context with a strong tradition of atheism, Christians who adhere to monotheistic faith first face the problem of their own identity,” and cultural Christians emerged precisely to resolve this identity problem. Now we must first clarify what their “context” refers to. In a word: “the discursive hegemony of Enlightenment thought and the humanistic appeal of ideas in modern Chinese-language intellectual circles.” This context directly creates the predicament for the spread of Christianity in China. The author provides extensive and quite brilliant exposition of this context, which unfortunately cannot be fully recounted here. In essence, science, reason, atheism, evolutionism, Marxism, China’s humanistic tradition, and even the discourse of “progress” have all become manifestations of cultural and political discursive hegemony. In such a “Chinese-language context,” what role are cultural Christians to play? That is, in the process of “reflecting on ideologized Marxism,” “the influx and spread of modern Christian theology has played an important role.”
是什么因素导致这种现象出现在20世纪80年代?有位北大哲学系的博士生撰文分析,这与中国的“现代汉语语境”有关:“在这种具有强烈无神论传统的人本主义语境中,坚守一神论信仰的基督徒首先面临的就是自己的身份认同问题”,文化基督徒就是为解决这个认同问题产生的。现在得先弄清楚他们所处的“语境”指什么?一句话:“现代汉语思想界中启蒙主义的话语霸权与人本主义的理念诉求”。这一语境直接造成了基督教在中国传播的困境。对此语境,作者作了大量陈述,相当精彩,可惜这里不能一一复述。总其精要,是科学、理性、无神论、进化论、马克思主义,中国的人本主义传统,甚至“进步”的话语,都成了文化话语霸权和政治话语霸权的表现。在这样的“汉语语境”中,文化基督徒要担当什么角色?那就是在“对意识形态化的马克思主义的反思”过程中,“现代基督神学的涌入与传播,起了重要的作用”。
▲: Was there no objection raised against this social trend of thought?
▲: 对这种社会思潮没有人提出异议吗?
●: The current public opinion environment is very relaxed, with freedom of speech and cultural diversity. Even if someone raises differing opinions, even quite sharp ones, there is rarely any response. However, the reaction from orthodox churches may be considerable. Church figures in Hong Kong and Taiwan call them “China’s Apollos”—meaning specious. Mainland churches probably do not take them seriously either, though I am not very familiar with this. In any case, for various reasons, the name “cultural Christian” has increasingly faded, and what has emerged in its place is the “Sino-Christian Theology Movement.”
●:当前的舆论环境很宽松,言论自由,文化多元,即使有人提出不同意见,甚至相当尖锐,也很少见到反应。不过正统教会的反响可能不小,港台的教会人士称呼他们为“中国亚波罗”——似是而非的意思;大陆教会大约也不甚买账,我不大了解。总之,因为各种原因,“文化基督徒”这个名字越来越消退了,继之而起的则是“汉语基督教神学运动”。
▲: Oh, then please tell us about the current state of this movement.
▲: 哦,那就请您谈谈目前这个运动的情况如何 ?
●: It is like a play; we can only see a limited stage and part of the performance. We know nothing of the backstage planning, and even the performance is only half-understood; some parts we simply have not seen or heard. Its connections domestically and internationally, inside and outside the country, inside and outside the Party, inside and outside the church, linking all four directions, along with the privileged status of its participants—for someone of our standing to even touch its edges is wishful thinking. Let me just share some superficial impressions.
●:这像一出戏,我们只能看到有限的戏台和上演的部分戏文,对幕后的策划一概不知,即使戏文也是似懂非懂,有些干脆就没看到听到。其在国内外、境内外、党内外、教内外,上下四方的连结,加上身份之权贵,我们这个身份的人想摸到它的边际,那是妄想了。谈点皮毛印象吧。
The initiators of the “Sino-Christian Theology Movement” were cultural Christians, and its core members are without exception from this circle. But as a movement, first, it has planning and organization; second, it has the capacity for sustainable growth.
“汉语基督教神学运动”的发起人就是文化基督徒,他们的骨干也无例外地属于这个圈子。但作为一个运动,第一,它有了策划和组织,第二,它有了可持续壮大的能力。
▲: What are its planning and organization?
▲: 它的策划和组织是什么?
●: The initial planning took place in Hong Kong: in 1992, using a certain “Christian monastery” in Hong Kong as a base, together with cultural Christians from the mainland in Hong Kong, they began to deliberate. Starting in 1993, “using the facilities and resources of this institution, a series of academic projects were piloted, thereby accelerating the promotion of this nascent new academic trend.” By 1995, the “Institute of Sino-Christian Studies” was established, “with the expectation of concentrating energy and resources to formulate long-term strategies”—“we call this emerging academic trend the ‘Sino-Christian Theology Movement.’” “From the perspective of division of labor, mainland scholars are the advocates of this movement, and the Institute is its promoter; the two are both separate and united,” with the principle: “each expresses itself, each takes what it needs, separate yet complementary.” Simply put, the base is in Hong Kong, playing the role of promoter; the movement is on the mainland, playing the role of advocate; the content is to develop a theology named “Sino-Christian.”
●:最初的策划是在香港进行的:1992年,以香港的某个“基督教丛林”为基地,与大陆在港的文化基督徒共同酝酿,从1993年开始,“使用这机构的设备和资源,试办了一系列的学术工程,藉此加快推动这个渐见雏型的新学术思潮。”到1995年,设置了“‘汉语基督教文化研究所’,期许更集中精力和资源以制定长远事工策略”——“我们称这个新兴学术思潮为‘汉语基督教神学运动’”。“从分工的角度,大陆学人是这一运动的倡导者,研究所是这一运动的推动者,两者既分又合”,原则是:“各自表述,各取所需,合分相济”。简单说,基地在香港,担任推动者角色,运动在大陆,担任提倡者角色,内容是发展一种以“汉语基督教”命名的神学。
What specific measures have been taken? I will mention only two: first, the translation and introduction of Western theological works to the mainland. Some prestigious university presses and national publishing houses have published a large number of Christian theological works for them, often in batches, continuing to this day. Even the “Christian Classics Series” in Chinese translation, published on the mainland by the China Christian Council and Three-Self Patriotic Movement since 2003, has been “authorized” by Hong Kong Christian publishers for our current national publishing houses. This is truly baffling. Concurrently, all universities and social science research institutions on the mainland that operate under the banner of Christian studies have competed to send personnel to the Hong Kong base for visits, training, and research projects, all fully funded with additional bonuses. By 2008, the leading figures at the base jubilantly announced: “After years of cultivation by various academic circles, today the participating scholars in the ‘Sino-Christian Theology Movement’ have grown from just a few core figures into a considerable academic community, with a continuous emergence of young scholars of the new generation, demonstrating the tenacious vitality and sustainability of this emerging academic trend.”
都有些什么具体举措呢?这里只讲两项:首先是译介西方神学著作到大陆。主要是一些名牌大学的出版社和国家出版社,为他们出版了大量的基督教神学著作,而且多是成批地出版,一直到今天,连中国基督教两会在大陆已经于2003年陆续出版了汉译“基督教历代名著集成”系列,也由香港基督教的出版社“授权”给我们现在的国家出版社出版。这真是匪夷所思。与此并行,是内地凡挂基督教研究招牌的高校和社科研究单位,竞相派人到香港这个基地参观、培训、做课题,全部免费接待,而且还另有奖金。到了2008年,基地的头面人物就兴高采烈地宣布了:“经过各方学界多年耕耘,今天‘汉语基督教神学运动’的参与学人由原来只有几位核心人物而增长成一个颇为可观的学术群体,其中新生代的年青学人不断涌现,表现出这个新兴学术思潮的顽强生命力和可持续性。”
I believe their declaration is well-founded, because the scale of this movement’s development has far exceeded the expectations of the Hong Kong base. Its “promotional” role has been indispensable, and the tasks it set for this movement have been quietly advancing, gradually infiltrating our religious teaching, academic research, and extending to all disciplines related to the West, even influencing the thinking of our management level, forming an almost overwhelming dominance of opinion within religious studies circles.
我认为,他们这样宣示的根据是充分的,因为这个运动发展的规模已经大大超出香港基地的预想范围,它的“推动”作用功不可没,而它为这一运动规定的任务,一直在无声地进展,逐步渗进我们的宗教教学、学术研究,旁及与西方有关的所有学科,一直影响到我们管理层面的头脑,在宗教学界形成几乎是压倒性舆论优势。
▲: They also set tasks? What are they?
▲: 他们还规定了任务?是些什么 ?
●: Among the basic problems they seek to resolve, two are key: First, “how intellectuals outside the church system and lay believers within the church system can reform the church’s theological tradition, even triggering one theological turning point after another.” Second, “after the rich intellectual resources of the Chinese language encounter the foreign intellectual resources of Christianity, how will they carry, transform, and create new ideas, thereby enriching the intellectual heritage of the Chinese language itself.” The above quotations are the original text; I need to offer some explanation.
●:在他们要解决的基本问题中,关键是两个:第一,“教制外的知识人和教制内的平信徒,他们如何革新教会的神学传统,甚至引发一次又一次的神学转捩点”。第二,“汉语的丰富思想资源与基督教这外来思想资源相遇后,将如何承载、转化和创造新的思想,从而丰富汉语自身的思想传承。”上述引号里的是原文,我得作点解释。
Let me explain the first one first. Cultural Christians take the reconstruction of Sino-Christian theology as their mission, targeting the existing church theology on the mainland. The so-called “church system” refers to the state-legalized church; the “intellectuals” outside it are cultural Christians; “lay believers within the system” refers to ordinary clergy excluding the leaders of the state church. Uniting these two groups is the reliance force of this “movement,” with the aim of “reforming the church’s theological tradition” and continuously triggering “theological turning points”—“turning point” probably means revolution. Why does this movement take the transformation of the state church’s theology as its primary task? The aforementioned doctoral student from Peking University put it in a nutshell: “to reject so-called indigenization or Sinicization of theology,” “to step out of the framework of indigenization or Sinicization and directly confront the Christ event.” In fact, “indigenization” and “Sinicization” are not entirely the same; the latter emphasizes not only freeing church positions and finances from Western control but also adapting theology to China’s soil, shedding the bias of being a “foreign religion,” and thoroughly realizing “the Sinicization of Christianity.” The so-called “directly confronting the Christ event” belongs to Christian fundamentalism, actually the theology embraced by the American Christian right—the Evangelical faction. Its manifestation in China is that religious faith is superior to secular ideas, the Bible is superior to the constitution; therefore, churches and believers can only submit to religious dogma, i.e., “the Christianization of China.” Whether it is “the Sinicization of Christianity” or “the Christianization of China” has always been a serious issue facing Chinese Christianity.
先解释第一个。文化基督徒以重建汉语基督教神学为使命,是针对大陆既有的教会神学而言的。所谓“教制”即指国家合法教会,其外的“知识人”即文化基督徒,“制内的平信徒”则指排除了国家教会领袖之外的一般神职人员。把这两种人联合起来,就是这一“运动”的依靠力量,目的是“革新教会的神学传统”,不间断地引发“神学转捩点”——“转捩”就是革命吧。这个运动为什么把转捩国家教会的神学作为首要任务?前述北大博士生的文章一语道破:“为了拒斥所谓神学的本色化或中国化”,“从本色化或中国化的思维架构中走出来,直接面对基督事件。”其实“本色化”和“中国化”并不完全相同,后者强调,不仅在教会的职位和经费上要从西方控制下解脱出来,而且也要在神学上适应中国的土壤,摆脱“洋教”的偏颇,彻底实现“基督教中国化”;所谓“直接面对基督事件”,属于基督教原教旨主义,实为美国基督教右派——福音派信奉的神学,其在中国的表现,是宗教信仰高于世俗理念,圣经高于宪法,因此,教会和教徒只能服膺宗教信条,即“中国基督教化”。究竟是“基督教中国化”,还是“中国基督教化”,一直是中国基督教面临的严重问题。
▲: What are some manifestations?
▲: 都有些什么表现?
●: Let me first introduce a bit about the similarities and differences between “non-church” theology and our country’s “church theology.”
●:那就先介绍一点“非教会”神学同我国“教会神学”的异同吧。
Since both are theology, their connotations should be identical. For instance, a catalogue of “theological” topics currently being constructed by non-ecclesiastical theology includes: “theology proper,” “Christology,” “pneumatology,” “theological anthropology,” “soteriology,” “creation theology,” “eschatology,” “ecclesiology,” “sacramentology,” and so on — these are in no way different from ecclesiastical theology. Even when efforts are made to construct a theology that is “significant in multiple respects” for China’s modernization, the so-called “concepts of original sin, salvation, transcendence, ultimacy, and universality” do not go beyond the scope of ecclesiastical theology. But why do they refuse to recognize ecclesiastical theology and insist on parting ways with it? For example, there is a proposition in Western theology called “justification by faith,” meaning that as long as a person believes in God, they can become a “righteous person.” Chinese ecclesiastical theology holds that this proposition should be used with caution, because the vast majority of Chinese people do not believe in the God of Christ; it cannot be said that among such Chinese there are no “righteous people.” That is, doing good deeds for society should also count as being “justified.” This would actually be very beneficial for expanding Christianity’s influence. But this is unacceptable; it must be reformed, returning to the basic doctrines.
既然都是神学,二者的内涵应该是相同的,像非教会神学正在构建的一种“神学”命题目录有:“神论”、“基督论”、“圣灵论”、“人性论”、“救赎论”、“创世论”、“末世论”、“教会论”、“圣事论”等,其与教会神学没有任何区别。即使着力于构建对中国现代化“具有多方面意义”的神学,所谓“原罪观、拯救观、超越观、终极观、普世观”等,也没有超出教会神学的范围。但为什么他们不认可教会神学,必须与之分道扬镳?举例来说,西方神学中有个命题,叫“因信称义”,意思说,人只要信仰上帝就可以成为“义人”;中国教会神学认为这个命题要慎用,因为绝大数中国人并不信仰基督这个神,不能说这样的中国人中就没有“义人”。也就是说,为社会做好事,应该同样是“称义”的。这其实对扩大基督教的影响是非常有利的。但这不行,需要革掉,回到基本教义上去。
In fact, the crux of the issue is whether Chinese Christianity should take root in Chinese soil and uphold a patriotic stance. “Loving the country and loving the religion” is the fundamental principle for the Chinese church in creating and interpreting theological doctrines; it is the foundation for Christianity’s survival and continuity in China, and it also reflects the aspirations of the vast majority of believers. This principle was established through the efforts of several generations of patriotic church leaders, enabling Christianity, which once played the role of an instrument of aggression, to take root in China. Yet it has consistently been subjected to vicious attacks from certain forces both at home and abroad.
其实问题的实质是,中国基督教是否需要建立在中国的土壤上,坚持爱国主义立场。“爱国爱教”是中国教会创建和阐释神学教义的根本原则,是基督教得以在中国生存绵延的基础,也反映着广大教徒的心声。这个原则经过几代教会爱国领袖的努力,才使这个扮演侵略工具角色的基督教在中国扎下根来,但却一直受到国内外某些势力的恶毒攻击。
The Sino-Christian theology movement [22]22 The “Sino-Christian theology movement” (汉语基督教神学运动) refers to an academic trend, primarily based in Hong Kong and among some mainland Chinese intellectuals, that seeks to construct a Chinese-language Christian theology independent of the official state-sanctioned church (the Three-Self Patriotic Movement and the China Christian Council). It is often characterized by its non-ecclesiastical, academic orientation and its engagement with Western theological traditions. labels itself as non-ecclesiastical, and its target is precisely “loving the country and loving the religion,” though it expresses this less crudely. Consider this passage: “‘Loving the country and loving the religion,’ with ‘loving the country’ first and ‘loving the religion’ second, has become a fixed pattern for the existence and development of religion in mainland China for decades. In today’s ‘globalized’ religious context of transnational, cross-ethnic, and cross-regional universalist demands, although many countries and regions still rely on their religions to sustain and protect their ‘country’s’ survival and development, there are also many countries and regions where a ‘universalist faith’-backed ‘love of religion’ has shown signs and trends of diluting, hollowing out, or abandoning ‘love of country.’” This implies that “globalization” brings about people’s “universality” and believers’ “universalist faith,” and that “love of religion” has already diluted, hollowed out, or abandoned “love of country.” Then it turns: “In contemporary society, which is becoming increasingly democratic, free, and equal, ‘church-state relations’ have undergone diverse transformations and grown increasingly complex. China’s past situation, where the ‘state’ dominated the ‘religion’ or the ‘state’ determined the ‘religion,’ is being challenged.” This seems to be offering advice to the authorities. On this, I would like to add two more points.
汉语神学运动标榜自己是非教会的性质,指向正是“爱国爱教”,但话说得没有那么粗鄙,举一段话看:“‘爱国爱教’且‘爱国’在先、‘爱教’在后乃成为中国内地几十年来宗教存在与发展的一种定式。在今天‘全球化’宗教跨国界、跨民族、跨地域的普世性诉求中,虽然不少国家和地区仍会靠其宗教来维系、保护其‘国’之生存和发展,但同样也有不少国家和地区出现了以‘普世信仰’支撑的‘爱教’淡化、架空或放弃‘爱国’的迹象和动向”,意谓“全球化”带来的是人的“普世性”、教徒的“普世信仰”,“爱教”已经将“爱国”淡化、架空或放弃了。接着一转:“在趋于越来越民主、自由和平等的当代社会,‘政教关系’已多元嬗变、日益复杂,中国以往以‘政’主‘教’,或靠‘政’定‘教’的局面正受到挑战。”这好像又在给当局支招。对此,我想再讲两句。
“Democracy, freedom, and equality” are slogans for ending theocratic autocracy and striving for and perfecting the constitutional system. When reflected in religious issues, they mean, first, establishing the national principle of separation of church and state, and second, establishing the citizen’s right to freedom of religious belief. The result of their implementation, except for the Vatican, is that all European and American countries have seen a situation where “the ‘state’ dominates the ‘religion’ or the ‘state’ determines the ‘religion.’” Why is the reality exactly opposite to the arbitrary assertion of Sino-Christian theology? Because this movement has interpreted the separation of church and state and freedom of religious belief in its own way.
“民主自由平等”是终结神权专制、争取和完善宪政制度的口号,反映在宗教问题上,一是确立政教分立的国家原则,二是确立宗教信仰自由的公民权利。实施的结果,除梵蒂冈以外,欧美诸国无不出现了“以‘政’主‘教’,或靠‘政’定‘教’的局面”。为什么事实与汉语神学的武断恰恰相反?因为这个运动对政教分离和宗教信仰自由作了他们自己的诠释。
The essence of freedom of religious belief is to make religious belief “a private matter for citizens” — this is the common practice in constitutional states. Accordingly, not allowing religion to interfere in state affairs is the essence of the separation of church and state. As a right of citizens, freedom of religious belief must be protected by the state; as a form of social organization, religion must submit to state management. To interpret the separation of church and state, as Sino-Christian theology does, as a relationship of rivalry, mutual restraint, or even confrontation, is to revert to the social system of the Western Middle Ages.
宗教信仰自由的实质,是使宗教信仰“成为公民的私事”,这是宪政国家的通例;据此而不允许宗教干预国家事务,则是政教分离的实质。宗教信仰自由之作为公民的一项权利,国家必须保护;宗教作为社会的一种组织存在,必须服从国家管理。像汉语神学那样把政教分离诠释为分庭抗礼,互相制约,以至对抗,这是西方中世纪的社会制度。
▲: The so-called second basic problem that the movement to promote Sino-Christian theology aims to solve is also expressed very obscurely. Could you also interpret it?
▲: 所谓推动汉语基督教神学运动要解决的第二个基本问题,说得也很晦涩,能否也作个解读?
●: Once interpreted, their true intentions become clear. Take the first sentence: “When the rich intellectual resources of the Chinese language encounter the foreign intellectual resources of Christianity” — this describes the situation. What draws attention here is the positioning of Christianity as “foreign intellectual resources,” which clearly excludes the current Chinese church. Adding the modifier “this” before “foreign” — aside from specifically referring to the Sino-Christian theology brought by this movement — it is unclear whether it also refers to underground churches or heretical sects originating from abroad. Then, what happens “after” this encounter? This leads to the second sentence: examining how Chinese culture “will carry, transform, and create new ideas, thereby enriching the intellectual heritage of the Chinese language itself.” There is a specialized field for solving this problem, called “integrative theology.” This theology is divided into two schools: one I call the replacement school, which denies Chinese culture entirely from ancient times to the present, because China traditionally lacks the concepts of God and original sin, making it fundamentally impossible to accept Christian faith, so it can only be replaced. The other school can be called the alignment school, which argues that, given God’s omnipotence and omniscience and Christianity’s claim to be a universal religion, how could China have no possibility of hearing the gospel? For example, translating “God” as the Chinese “Tianzhu” or “Shangdi,” or arguing that the Chinese theory of innate goodness can be harmonized and complemented with the Christian doctrine of original sin — yet all of this is aimed at having Chinese culture “carry, transform, and create” the “new ideas” of Christian theology. Calling this “enriching” the intellectual heritage of the Chinese language itself is excessively modest.
●:解读出来,也就知道他们真正的意图了。比方它的第一句话“汉语的丰富思想资源与基督教这外来思想资源相遇后”——这是讲形势的:此话引人注意的是给基督教的定位为“外来的思想资源”,明显把当前的中国教会排除在外;在“外来”之前加上“这个”定语,除了特指这个运动带来的汉语神学之外,是否还指地下教会,发自境外的邪教,就不清楚了。那么之“后”如何?于是有了第二句话:看中华文化“将如何承载、转化和创造新的思想,从而丰富汉语自身的思想传承”。解决这个问题有个专门学问,叫“融贯神学”。这门神学分为两派:一派我称之为取代派,对中国文化从古至今一否到底,因为中国传统上没有上帝和原罪感,从根上就不可能接受基督教信仰,所以只能取而代之。另一派可以称作贴靠派,根据上帝全知全能的本事和基督教自称普世宗教的性质,中国岂能没有聆听福音的可能?如将God译作中国的天主、上帝,论证中国的性善说与基督教的原罪说可以协调互补等,然而这一切都是为了让中国文化去“承载、转化和创造”基督教神学的“新思想”。说这是用来“丰富”汉语自身的思想传承,是过分谦虚了。
▲: What does “excessively modest” mean?
▲: “过分谦虚”是什么意思?
●: Hong Kong may be merely a bridgehead for Western Christianity to land on the mainland, and Western colonialism has long used Christianity as a vanguard of cultural aggression. When Christianity “rode on cannon” into China, from the constant creation of missionary cases [23]23 “Missionary cases” (教案) refers to a series of conflicts and legal disputes between Christian missionaries and Chinese locals or authorities during the late Qing dynasty, often involving violence, property disputes, and cultural clashes, which were a major source of tension leading up to the Boxer Rebellion. to the Eight-Nation Alliance’s [24]24 The Eight-Nation Alliance was a multinational military coalition (Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) that invaded China in 1900 to suppress the Boxer Rebellion, resulting in the occupation and looting of Beijing. bloodbath in Beijing, the United States was particularly keen on the advantages of cultural missionary work, such as running publishing houses and founding schools, focusing on seizing the Chinese people’s “backbone” and “minds.” By the early 20th century, it launched the “Christian Occupation of China Movement,” [25]25 The “Christian Occupation of China Movement” was a campaign launched by Protestant missionary organizations in the early 20th century, particularly American ones, aiming to evangelize and establish Christian influence throughout China, often linked to broader Western imperialist ambitions. which became a long-term U.S. strategy toward China, and has now risen to a U.S. national policy — this policy is centrally reflected in its *International Religious Freedom Act of 1998* [26]26 The *International Religious Freedom Act of 1998* is a United States federal law that established the promotion of religious freedom as a foreign policy objective, creating the Office of International Religious Freedom and requiring annual reports on the state of religious freedom in countries worldwide. and the successive *International Religious Freedom Reports* [27]27 The *International Religious Freedom Reports* are annual publications by the U.S. Department of State, mandated by the 1998 Act, that assess the status of religious freedom in every country, often used to criticize or sanction nations deemed to be violating these norms. issued. The “Sino-Christian Theology Movement” promoted from Hong Kong is in fact a continuation of the “Christian Occupation of China.” Saying it only “enriches” is due to a lack of candor.
●:香港可能只是西方基督教登岸大陆的一个桥头堡,而西方殖民主义动用基督教作为文化侵略的急先锋,由来久矣。当基督教“骑着大炮”进入中国,从不断制造教案到八国联军血洗北京,美国就特别看好文化传教的优势,如经营出版和创办学校之类,着力于抓住中国人的“脊骨”和“脑袋”。到了20世纪初,发起了“基督教占领中国运动”,遂成了美国对华的长期战略,至今更上升为美国的一项国策——集中反映这一国策的是它的《1998年国际宗教自由法案》以及历次颁布的《国际宗教自由报告》。香港推动的“汉语基督教神学运动”实是“基督教占领中国”的继续,只说“丰富”,是因为不那么坦诚。
▲: Is this merely your personal inference?
▲: 这仅是您个人的推论吧?
●: Let me give a few more concrete examples. Just as this movement promoted from Hong Kong was achieving some results, in 2003 a conference called “China-Nordic Conference on Contextual Theology in China” was held in Finland, with the agenda of how to carry out a “Christian Theological Construction Movement” in the “Chinese context.” What difference is there between this “Christian Theological Construction Movement in the Chinese Context” and the “Sino-Christian Theology Movement”? The only difference is that the location shifted from Hong Kong to Europe, elevating the movement from a peripheral initiative to an “international” one. Look at the lineup: the Chinese delegates included representatives from Peking University, Tsinghua University, Renmin University of China, the Central University for Nationalities, Fudan University, and the Institute of World Religions of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences — most were leading figures from relevant academic departments and institutes. The Western participants included a uniform array of theologians from the University of Helsinki, Finland, and multiple theological seminaries in Finland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, along with personnel from American Christian organizations, the Russian Orthodox Church, the World Communion of Reformed Churches, and Singapore’s Trinity Theological College. Two universities from Hong Kong also attended, along with a few individual mainland officials stationed in Hong Kong and pastors from the China Christian Council and the Three-Self Patriotic Movement, probably as decoration. A conference like this, specifically convened for intellectuals from China’s higher education and research institutions, to focus on discussing how to develop “Christian theological construction” in China’s current context and offer advice, was a record-breaking event and certainly not an isolated one. How did they select representatives so precisely aligned with the conference theme and arrange the speaking order so deliberately? In fact, there are many more such overseas international conferences, and even more held domestically; people have come to treat them as routine.
●:让我再举几个实例。就在香港推动这个运动略见成效之际,2003年一个名为“关于中国处境神学的中国-北欧会议”在芬兰举行,议题是如何在“中国处境”下开展“基督教神学建设运动”。这个“中国处境基督教神学建设运动”与“汉语基督教神学运动”有什么差别?唯一的差别是地点从香港移到了欧洲,一举而从偏隅主导的运动升格为“国际”主导的运动。再看看那阵势:出席的中方代表有北大、清华、(中国)人民大学、中央民大、复旦、中国社科院宗教所,大多数是有关学科系所的头面人物;西方出席的有芬兰赫尔辛基大学、芬兰、挪威、丹麦、瑞典、英国以及美国等多个神学院的清一色神学家,此外还有美国基督教机构、俄罗斯东正教机构,以及世界新义宗联会、新加坡三一神学院等机构人员出席。香港也有两所大学,大陆的驻港个别官员和中国基督教两会的牧师等也被邀参加,大约是一种点缀。像这样专门为中国高教和科研单位文化人举办的会议,集中讨论“基督教神学建设”在中国当前处境下如何发展问题出谋划策,是破纪录的事件,当然不是孤立的。他们挑选的代表,为什么会那么准确地切合会议的主题,那么安排次序发言?事实上,这类海外的国际会议还有不少,在国内举行的更多,人们都当作常态了。
During the Ford administration in the United States, the withdrawal from Vietnam roughly affected the American superstition about weapons determinism. When Carter came to power in 1977, the formal establishment of “Regent University” in the United States may have marked a further strengthening of the American strategy on religion. This university calls itself “the world center of Christian thought and action”; its goal is to cultivate “leading talents who are successful in their careers and armed with Christian thought” for the world. It currently has 4,000 undergraduate and graduate students from 57 countries, with about 10,000 graduates distributed around the world. Its “mission is to integrate Christian doctrine with world-class education.” Whether coincidental or not, the theological construction movement promoted within China’s university system and social science institutions in Hong Kong and Europe is consistent with this university’s “mission.” However, from publicly available information, we have not found a single case of a Chinese person being associated with this university. Yet there is a theological seminary of the same name in North America that is another base, besides Hong Kong, most frequently visited by the Chinese Christian theological movement. This is “Regent College in Canada,” which has a special “China Studies Department” whose main task is to recruit and accept various scholars from mainland China with different backgrounds to visit, observe, or receive training there. Among the prestigious universities and research institutes that participated in that Nordic contextual theology conference, few did not send young scholars to this college to broaden their horizons and receive training. It is said that domestic institutions have now severed ties with this college.
美国福特当政期间,从越南撤军,这大约影响到美国对武器决定论的迷信。1977年卡特上台,正式成立“美国维真大学”,有可能标志美国对宗教战略的进一步强化。这所大学自称为“基督教思想和行动的世界中心”;目标是为全球“培养事业有成,并具备基督教思想武装的领导俊才”,现拥有来自57个国家4000名本科生和研究生,约万余毕业生分布在世界各地。“使命是将基督教教义与世界一流教育界合在一起”。不论是否偶然,香港及欧洲在中国高校系统和社科单位推动的神学建设运动,都与这座大学的“使命”一致。但从公开的信息中,我们没有发现一例有中国人与这所大学有关联。然而在北美有所同名的神学院,却是除香港以外汉语基督教神学运动光顾最频繁的另一个基地,这就是“加拿大维真学院”,专门设有“中国研究部”,主要任务是招收和接纳中国大陆有不同背景的各类学者到那里参观访问或接受培训,凡参加北欧那次处境神学会议的名牌大学和研究所,没有派新进学人到此处开眼受训的大约很少。据说,现在国内已经与这个学院断绝了联系。
▲: We are indeed not very familiar with such situations.
▲: 这类情况我们确实不大了解。
●: I am not familiar with the details either; what I am talking about are things right under our noses. Let me mention another thing right under our noses: the capital the Western Christian world has invested to occupy China. In early 2007, a piece of news was posted online, roughly stating: “In the past 20 years, Western capitalism has made great progress in China, but the philosophical foundation of Western society has rarely been explored. Calvin College has received new funding from the John Templeton Foundation, which is expected to change this situation.” The funding was $2 million, implementing a project called the “Science, Philosophy, and Faith: China Scholars Program,” operated by the Nagel Institute for the Study of World Christianity at Calvin College, planned to be completed within three years. The goal was “to train scholars, strengthen education for Chinese university students, and maintain and deepen research in China.” — The “philosophical foundation” to be provided to China here is Christian theology. Why the project name begins with “science” is quite meaningful, because in their view, science holds a supreme position in the minds of Chinese people, and currently “revitalizing the country through science and education” is deeply popular. Therefore, the first obstacle Christian theology needs to clear in its expansion into China is science, and using the name of science will also greatly reduce the public’s sensitivity to the dissemination of theology. As for the specific measures and steps for implementation, the plan is as follows: “24 Chinese graduate students and 9 postdoctoral fellows will be invited to visit and study at Baylor University, the University of Notre Dame, and Calvin College”; “a series of lectures and seminars will be held in China, with 12 scholars selected by the Society of Christian Philosophers taking turns teaching. In the summer of 2008, an intensive seminar will be held at Calvin College for 24 selected Chinese scholars, where they will meet with some top Western experts in this field”; “in the summer of 2009, a major academic conference is planned to be held at Peking University, where members of the Society of Christian Philosophers will attend to introduce and discuss new work”; the conference papers will be published by Peking University Press and “will be widely adopted as textbooks.” In short, the aim is to make Chinese “intellectuals realize that their country urgently needs to find a definite method to integrate culture and provide public norms for society.” I won’t go into the implementation details. And institutions as generously funded as the John Templeton Foundation are numerous in the United States alone, and their targets are all intellectuals in universities and research units.
●:细节我也不了解,我讲的都是触到眼皮上的事。再讲点触到眼皮上的事,那就是西方基督教为占领中国下的本钱。2007年初网上公布了一则消息,略谓:“在过去20年,西方资本主义在中国取得很大进展,但西方社会的哲学基础却极少得到探讨。加尔文学院从约翰-邓普顿基金会得到一笔新资助,有望改变这一现状。”这笔资金是200万美元,实施的是个名为《科学、哲学和信仰:中国者计划》的项目,由“在加尔文的纳格尔世界基督教研究所负责具体运作”,计划三年内完成。目标是“用以训练学者,强化对中国大学生的教育,并维持和深化在中国的调研”。——此处要给中国提供的“哲学基础”,就是基督教神学。为什么项目名称要由“科学”打头,很有点名堂,因为在他们看来,科学在中国人的心目中的地位至高无上,目前“科教兴国”又深得民心,所以基督教神学向中国开拓第一个需要清除的障碍就是科学,而启用科学的名义也会大大减弱大众对传播神学的敏感性。至于实施的具体措施和步骤,计划是这样的:“将邀请24位中国研究生和9名博士后在贝勒大学、圣母希望大学和加尔文学院访问学习”,“在中国召开一系列讲座和研讨会,由基督教哲学家协会选派12位学者轮流执教。于2008年夏季,在加尔文学院为24位选定的中国学者举办密集研讨会,与在此领域的一些西方顶级专家座谈”;“2009年夏,计划在北京大学召开一个重要学术会议,届时将有基督教哲学家协会成员到场,介绍和讨论新的工作”;会议论文将由北大出版社出版,并“将作为教科书广泛采用。”总之,让中国“知识分子认识到他们的国家迫切需要找到确定的方法,用以整合文化,为社会提供公共规范”。实施的细节我就不谈了。而像约翰-邓普顿基金会这样慷慨资助的机构,仅美国就有不少,而它们的目标,都是高校和科研单位的文化人。
▲: Why did Mao Zedong say that without critiquing theology, one cannot write a good history of philosophy, a history of literature, or a world history?
▲: 为什么毛泽东说不批判神学就写不好哲学史、文学史、世界史?
●: Because theology, as an ideology, has the most prominent function of being able to penetrate to the marrow of culture. Let’s not discuss specific issues in the history of philosophy, but the fact that philosophy departments in universities across the country have hung up signs reading “Department of Religious Studies” is quite thought-provoking. As for theology’s infiltration into the history of philosophy, history of literature, and world history, that is no longer news. Emerging fields like sociology and law are already using theology to interpret our society and constitution.
●:因为神学作为一种意识形态,最突出地功能是能够深入到文化的骨髓。我们且不谈哲学史上的具体问题,但就全国高校哲学系纷纷挂上“宗教学系”的牌子就令人感悟不浅。至于神学渗透到了哲学史、文学史和世界史,早已不是新闻了,新兴的社会学、法学,有些就在用神学诠释我们的社会和宪法。
▲: Why is theology considered an ideology?
▲: 为什么说神学是一种意识形态?
●: This is, of course, related to the worldview and values that theology carries. But even so, if it were purely a matter of private belief, we would certainly not be so concerned; the current problem is that the propaganda and construction of theology have moved from the church to the national education system and social science research institutions, which forces us to pay attention. The Atheist Society and our magazine have in recent years repeatedly called for the implementation of the national legislation on “separation of education from religion,” and for not treating the constitution and laws as mere decorations on paper, precisely because of this. But it is not only that.
●:这当然与神学承载的世界观和价值观有关。但即使如此,如果属于纯粹的私人信仰问题,我们也决不会如此关切;现在的问题是,神学宣传和神学构建从教会搬到国家教育系统和社科研究机构,就不得不加注意了。无神论学会和我们的杂志,近几年不断地呼吁落实“教育与宗教相分离”的国家立法,不能把宪法和法律当成纸上的摆设,即有鉴于此。但也不仅如此。
▲: May I ask, what is your view on their claim that the theology they advocate is “academic for the sake of academia”?
▲: 请问,他们宣称自己鼓吹的神学是“为学术而学术”,您怎么看?
●: This is pure self-deception. They themselves declare that “the academic goal lies beyond academia.” In response to the reality of foreign theology infiltrating China, Chinese-language theology is called “contextual theology.” This theology, under the guise of culture, is also called “cultural theology.” To facilitate activities in academic halls, it is also called “academic theology.” “Academia” is the banner they most often wave, but their goal is by no means limited to academia, even though some claim to be “academic for the sake of academia” and “value-neutral.” So, where does the goal beyond theology lie? A more precise answer is “the public context and problems of contemporary Chinese society.” What is “the public context of society”? What are the “problems”? Are they the economic structure, the political system, the cultural form, the masses of the people? The room for interpretation here is infinite, but it cannot be confined to the scope of Christianity. On the contrary, “context” is precisely the object theology needs to examine; “problems” are the issues theology needs to raise and provide answers to. Therefore, it is emphasized: “Chinese Christian studies, including Chinese-language theology, should rightly propose Christian interpretations and propositions in response to this context.” What are the Christian interpretations and propositions? Each of them has their own background, and each performs in their own way. One of my speeches had the fortune of being published four times—because a passage was deleted and then reinstated a few years later. This passage quite clearly illustrates one faction’s “interpretations and propositions” of Christianity, so I might as well repeat it: “Recently, I saw a gentleman claiming to be Chinese offering advice to the U.S. President, including the words: ‘President Reagan became one of the greatest presidents in American history because he buried the communist systems of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Helping China undergo such a change may be the historical mission God has given to the President.’ Why should the U.S. President help China complete such a ‘historical mission’? This gentleman said: Because it ‘conforms both to God’s righteousness and to U.S. national security.’” So far, we do not know whether figures in the Chinese Christian theological movement have had the honor of being received by the U.S. President, but Chinese-language theologians expressing similar “propositions” domestically are well-known, and the “interpretations” of the current Chinese context by some other figures among them may be the logical premise for such “propositions.”
●:这纯粹是自欺欺人。他们自己就宣称“学术目标在于学术之外”。针对外来神学渗入中国的现实,汉语神学叫做“处境神学”,这种神学冠以文化的名义,又叫“文化神学”,为了便于在学术殿堂活动,也叫“学术神学”。“学术”是他们最常打的旗子,但目的绝非止于学术,尽管他们有人自称是“为学术而学术”,是“价值中立”。那么,神学之外的目标在哪里?比较精确地答案是“当今中国社会的公共处境和问题”。“社会的公共的处境”是什么?“问题”又是什么?是经济结构,政治制度,文化形态,人民群众?此中可解释的空间无限大,但就是不能限制在基督教范围。相反,“处境”恰是神学需要考察的对象;“问题”则是需要神学提出并给以答案的议题。所以强调:“中国的基督教研究,包括汉语神学,理应针对这种处境提出基督教的解释和主张”。基督教的解释和主张是什么?他们每个人各有各的背景,也各有各的表演。我的一次发言,有幸被发表过四次——因为其中有段话被删而几年后又被补进去。这段话颇能说明一派人对基督教的“解释和主张”,所以不妨再复述一次:“最近看到一位自称是中国人的先生向美国总统献策,其中有言:‘里根总统因为埋葬了苏联东欧的共产制度而成为美国历史上最伟大的总统之一。帮助中国发生这样的变化,也许是上帝给总统先生的历史使命’。为什么要美国总统帮助中国完成这样的‘历史使命’?这位先生说:因为这‘既符合上帝的公义,也符合美国的国家安全’。”迄今我们还不知道汉语基督教神学运动中的人物是否有幸被美国总统接见,但在国内表达类似“主张”的汉语神学家却是人所共知的,而他们中另一些人物对当前中国处境的“解释”,或许就是这类“主张”提出的逻辑前提。
Of course, I am not saying that everyone in this movement is anti-system, but it should accord with the facts to say that they are keen on engaging in politics. They generally believe that China’s legal churches focus only on religious faith and the churches’ own activities, and therefore they sneer at church theology as “talking to oneself.” “Sino-Christian theology” [31]31 “Sino-Christian theology” (汉语神学) refers to a theological movement among Chinese intellectuals, primarily outside state-sanctioned church structures, that seeks to engage Christian thought with Chinese cultural and social contexts. will never “talk to oneself”; rather, it aims to “express the targeted significance of its own value in the actual context, carrying a tension of heterogeneity.” For example, China’s “actual context” includes “people-centeredness,” [32]32 “People-centeredness” (以人为本) is a key concept in official Chinese political discourse, often associated with the Hu Jintao administration’s “Scientific Outlook on Development” and later incorporated into Xi Jinping Thought. while Christianity advocates “God-centeredness”; values founded on a God-centered basis are “heterogeneous” to people-centered values, and thus possess a “targeted significance” that denigrates “people-centeredness.” A clearer formulation is: “Theology must interpret the universal situation of modern people, and cannot ‘reduce religious language to a self-enclosed language game.’” To fulfill these tasks of “contextual theology,” [33]33 “Contextual theology” (处境神学) is a theological approach that emphasizes interpreting Christian faith in light of specific social, cultural, and political contexts. this “gives rise to so-called ‘public theology’”: “its discursive model can be understood, discussed, and respected by people outside the church”—to put it bluntly, it is a way of entering the public sphere of society in theological form to preach and proselytize. The key point among these is “letting theology enter the humanities field”—“contemporary Christian thought can achieve meaningful results only by moving toward the ‘public sphere’ to carry out humanistic care, and this is also the inevitable path for the humanities to resolve the multiple confusions and difficulties they encounter today.” “If theology does not attend to and resolve worldly problems, it cannot embody the spirit of God’s love for humanity”—from expressions like these, the Sino-Christian movement is also a socio-political movement, and its core members have increasingly taken on the appearance of political activists rather than scholars.
当然,我没有说这个运动中所有人都是反体制的,但说他们热衷于从政应该符合事实。他们普遍认为,中国合法教会只关注宗教信仰和教会自身的活动,所以讥讽教会神学是“自说自话”。“汉语神学”绝不会“自说自话”,而是要“带着异质性张力,在现实的语境中表达出自身价值的针对性意义”。例如,中国“现实的语境”有“以人为本”,基督教提倡“信神为本”;建立在神本基础上的价值观,对于人本的价值观就是“异质”的,也就具有了贬斥“人本”的“针对性意义”。明确些的说法是:“神学必须对现代人的普遍处境作出诠释,而不能‘将宗教语言减损为自我封闭的语言游戏’。”为了实现“处境神学”的这些任务,于是“催生出所谓的‘公共神学’”:“其话语模式可以被教会以外的人所理解、论说和尊重”——照直说,就是以神学形式进入社会公共领域宣教布道的方式。其中的重点是“让神学进入人文学领域”——“当代基督教思想只有走向‘公共领域’进行人文关怀,才能具有意义的结果,也是人文学科解决当代遇到的重重困惑和难题的必然进路”。“神学如果不去关注、解决尘世的问题,也无法体现神爱世人的精神”——从这类表述看,汉语基督教运动也是一场社会政治运动,他们的骨干成员,也从学者面目变得越来越像是政治活动家。
▲: Seen in this light, is Mao Zedong’s proposal to study religion and criticize theology even more urgent at present?
▲:如此看来,毛泽东提出研究宗教,批判神学,在当前更加迫切了?
●: Our Academy of Social Sciences has treated atheism as an “endangered discipline” [34]34 “Endangered discipline” (濒危学科) refers to a designation by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences for academic fields that have lost institutional support and are at risk of disappearing, such as the scientific study of atheism. and is rescuing it. I feel this carries profound meaning, because science and atheism are the natural enemies of theology. The support of the Academy of Marxism for the disciplinary construction of atheism, though preliminary, has achieved considerable results. Guided by the spirit of the 18th National Congress of the CPC, [35]35 The 18th National Congress of the CPC, held in November 2012, marked the beginning of Xi Jinping’s leadership and the launch of the “New Era” of socialism with Chinese characteristics. there will certainly be even greater progress.
●:咱们社科院把无神论作为“濒危学科”抢救,我感到蕴意很深,因为科学与无神论是神学的天敌。马研院对无神论学科建设的扶植,虽是初步,却大有成效。在党的十八大精神指引下,一定会有更大的进展。
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Online Editor: Zhang Jian
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Notes
- “Prominent field of study” (显学): A term from classical Chinese referring to a widely studied and influential school of thought; here used to indicate the current popularity of religious studies. ↩
- Document No. 19 (19号文件): A key 1982 CPC Central Committee document outlining official policy on religion in the socialist period, emphasizing respect for religious freedom while maintaining Party leadership. ↩
- “Outline of Academic Affairs” (学务纲要): A late Qing (1904) educational regulation that sought to limit religious influence in schools, reflecting early Chinese efforts to separate education from religion. ↩
- Cai Yuanpei (蔡元培): A prominent early 20th-century Chinese educator and intellectual who advocated for educational independence from religion, notably in his 1922 “Proposal for Educational Independence.” ↩
- Max Müller: A 19th-century German-born philologist and Orientalist, often considered a founder of comparative religious studies; his work is critiqued here as having a Christian theological bias. ↩
- “Sympathetic resonance” and “experiential understanding of the mind-nature” (同情之默应,心性之体会): A phrase associated with the Chinese historian Chen Yinke, advocating an empathetic approach to studying historical texts and ideas, here critiqued as a subjective precondition for religious research. ↩
- Matthew 10:34–36, King James Version. ↩
- A reference to the biblical account of the massacre of the innocents (Matthew 2:16), in which King Herod ordered the killing of all male infants in Bethlehem. ↩
- “Religious market theory” is a sociological approach that treats religions as firms competing for adherents in a market; its application to China by some Western scholars classifies religious groups into “red” (state-sanctioned), “black” (underground or illegal), and “gray” (semi-legal) categories. ↩
- “Contextual theology” refers to theological approaches that seek to interpret Christian faith in light of specific cultural, social, or political contexts; here it is implied as a vehicle for expanding the public role of religion. ↩
- “Keep pace with the times” (与时俱进) is a standard phrase in CPC discourse, often associated with the theoretical development of Marxism in China. ↩
- Document No. 19 refers to the 1982 Central Committee document “The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question during Our Country’s Socialist Period,” which remains a foundational text for CPC religious policy. ↩
- Mao Zedong’s instruction: A reference to Mao’s 1963 directive on strengthening research on world religions, which included the call to “study religion” and “criticize theology.”
- Holbach: Paul-Henri Thiry, Baron d’Holbach (1723–1789), a French philosopher and atheist of the Enlightenment, known for his materialist and anti-religious writings.
- Hobbes: Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), English philosopher, who in *Leviathan* described the “kingdom of darkness” as a confederacy of deceivers promoting false doctrines.
- Tertullian: Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus (c. 155–c. 220), early Christian author from Carthage, known for his formulation of the paradox “Credo quia absurdum” (I believe because it is absurd).
- cultural Christians: A term emerging in the late 1980s in China, referring to Chinese intellectuals who promote Christian culture and theology from a scholarly rather than ecclesiastical standpoint, often without formal church affiliation.
- Sino-Christian Theology Movement: An academic movement in China since the 1990s that seeks to construct a Chinese-language Christian theology, often within university and research settings, distinct from state-sanctioned church activities.
- Matteo Ricci and Nicolas Longobardi: Italian Jesuit missionaries to China in the late 16th and early 17th centuries, known for their efforts to adapt Christianity to Chinese culture.
- “文化基督徒” (cultural Christians): A term that emerged in the 1980s–1990s referring to mainland Chinese intellectuals who study Christianity academically or adopt Christian beliefs without formal church membership or baptism, often engaging with Western theology in a secular academic context.
- “中国亚波罗” (China’s Apollos): A reference to Apollos in the New Testament (Acts 18:24–28), an eloquent and learned Alexandrian Jew who taught about Jesus but only knew John’s baptism, later corrected by Priscilla and Aquila. The term implies being superficially knowledgeable but not fully orthodox.
- “汉语基督教神学运动” (Sino-Christian Theology Movement): An academic movement initiated in the early 1990s by mainland Chinese intellectuals and Hong Kong-based Christian institutions, aiming to develop a Chinese-language Christian theology independent of state-church structures.
- “基督教丛林” (Christian monastery): A metaphorical term likely referring to a Christian institution or foundation in Hong Kong that served as the base for the movement’s planning.
- “基督教历代名著集成” (Christian Classics Series): A multi-volume collection of major Christian theological works translated into Chinese, originally published by Western missions and later by the China Christian Council.
- “中国基督教两会” (China Christian Council and Three-Self Patriotic Movement): The state-approved Protestant church organization in mainland China, comprising the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (self-government, self-support, self-propagation) and the China Christian Council.
- “本色化” (indigenization) vs. “中国化” (Sinicization): In Chinese Christian discourse, “indigenization” refers to adapting Christianity to local cultural forms, while “Sinicization” (as promoted by the CPC) emphasizes aligning Christianity with Chinese national interests, law, and socialist values, including breaking from Western control.
- “基督教中国化” (Sinicization of Christianity) vs. “中国基督教化” (Christianization of China): The former is the official CPC policy of making Christianity compatible with Chinese society; the latter is a perceived goal of some Christian groups to convert China to Christianity, seen as a threat to state sovereignty and socialist ideology.
- The “Sino-Christian theology movement” (汉语基督教神学运动) refers to an academic trend, primarily based in Hong Kong and among some mainland Chinese intellectuals, that seeks to construct a Chinese-language Christian theology independent of the official state-sanctioned church (the Three-Self Patriotic Movement and the China Christian Council). It is often characterized by its non-ecclesiastical, academic orientation and its engagement with Western theological traditions. ↩
- “Missionary cases” (教案) refers to a series of conflicts and legal disputes between Christian missionaries and Chinese locals or authorities during the late Qing dynasty, often involving violence, property disputes, and cultural clashes, which were a major source of tension leading up to the Boxer Rebellion. ↩
- The Eight-Nation Alliance was a multinational military coalition (Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) that invaded China in 1900 to suppress the Boxer Rebellion, resulting in the occupation and looting of Beijing. ↩
- The “Christian Occupation of China Movement” was a campaign launched by Protestant missionary organizations in the early 20th century, particularly American ones, aiming to evangelize and establish Christian influence throughout China, often linked to broader Western imperialist ambitions. ↩
- The *International Religious Freedom Act of 1998* is a United States federal law that established the promotion of religious freedom as a foreign policy objective, creating the Office of International Religious Freedom and requiring annual reports on the state of religious freedom in countries worldwide. ↩
- The *International Religious Freedom Reports* are annual publications by the U.S. Department of State, mandated by the 1998 Act, that assess the status of religious freedom in every country, often used to criticize or sanction nations deemed to be violating these norms. ↩
- Mao Zedong: The founder of the People's Republic of China and leader of the Chinese Communist Party until his death in 1976. His statement on critiquing theology is cited here as a theoretical authority.
- “Revitalizing the country through science and education” (科教兴国): A national development strategy formally adopted by the Chinese government in 1995, emphasizing the role of science, technology, and education in economic and social progress.
- The Atheist Society (无神论学会): A Chinese academic organization founded in 1978 to promote atheist and materialist thought, often associated with the journal *Science and Atheism* (科学与无神论).
- “Sino-Christian theology” (汉语神学) refers to a theological movement among Chinese intellectuals, primarily outside state-sanctioned church structures, that seeks to engage Christian thought with Chinese cultural and social contexts. ↩
- “People-centeredness” (以人为本) is a key concept in official Chinese political discourse, often associated with the Hu Jintao administration’s “Scientific Outlook on Development” and later incorporated into Xi Jinping Thought. ↩
- “Contextual theology” (处境神学) is a theological approach that emphasizes interpreting Christian faith in light of specific social, cultural, and political contexts. ↩
- “Endangered discipline” (濒危学科) refers to a designation by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences for academic fields that have lost institutional support and are at risk of disappearing, such as the scientific study of atheism. ↩
- The 18th National Congress of the CPC, held in November 2012, marked the beginning of Xi Jinping’s leadership and the launch of the “New Era” of socialism with Chinese characteristics. ↩