The Contemporary Chinese Religious Ecological Landscape • Christianity • Atheism

I. The Contemporary Chinese Religious Ecological Landscape

一 中国当代宗教生态景观

In the late 30 years of contemporary China, profound changes have taken place in the social structure, forms of social organization, and the pattern of social interests. The independence, selectivity, variability, and diversity of the thinking activities of the Chinese people have markedly increased. Echoing the international backdrop of the mutual clash of various ideological cultures in the process of economic globalization, the changes in core socialist values and ideology within Chinese society have made the landscape of belief pluralism in today’s China an indisputable fact: institutionalized traditional religions and diffuse folk beliefs endure and renew themselves, aspiring to be active; new religious movements and dubious cult groups, or even evil cults, grow stealthily and stir restlessly. This landscape of belief pluralism, or religious ecological landscape, as some researchers in political and academic circles have pointed out, is mainly manifested in “the sustained growth in the number of religious believers, marked changes in the composition of believers, the impact on the religious structure, the increasing prominence of foreign influence, and the growing complexity of religious contradictions.”

当代中国晚近30 年，社会结构、社会组织形式、社会利益格局发生深刻变化，中国民众思想活动的独立性、选择性、多变性、差异性明显增强。与经济全球化进程中各种思想文化相互激荡的国际大背景相呼应的是，中国社会内部的核心价值观和意识形态的变迁使得信仰多元化景观在当今中国渐趋成为不争的事实———制度化传统宗教、弥散型民间信仰历久弥新，意欲有为；新兴宗教及可疑的膜拜团体甚或邪教潜滋暗长，蠢蠢欲动。这种信仰多元化景观或宗教生态景观，正如政界和学界的一些研究者所指出的那样，主要表现为“信教人数持续增长、教徒结构明显变化、宗教格局面临冲击、国外影响更加突出、宗教矛盾日益复杂”。

Specifically, among the five major religions commonly mentioned in China, the number of Islamic believers, i.e., Muslims, has basically grown steadily with population increase, currently numbering about 21 million; Buddhism and Taoism have numerous believers, but lay believers cannot be precisely counted; Catholicism has the characteristic of family inheritance, with about 3 million at the time of liberation [1949] and currently about 5.5 million; Protestant Christianity had about 700,000 believers at liberation and has grown rapidly in recent years, with official statistics reaching 16 million, a figure that does not include believers in “unregistered churches.” [1]1 “Unregistered churches” (未登记教会) refers to Protestant Christian congregations that operate outside the state-sanctioned Three-Self Patriotic Movement and are not registered with the government’s religious affairs bureau. The composition of religious believers was previously characterized mainly by the elderly, women, those with low education levels, rural populations, and old revolutionary base areas, border areas, poor areas, and areas with large ethnic minority populations. In recent years, there has been a trend toward diffusion and penetration into the whole society, especially among young and middle-aged groups, urban residents, new social strata, and economically developed regions.

具体说来，在我国常提到的五大宗教中，伊斯兰教信徒即穆斯林人数基本上随人口增加而稳步增长，目前约有2100 万；佛教、道教信徒众多，但在家信徒无法精确统计；天主教信徒具有家庭传承特征，解放初期约有300 万，目前约有550 万；基督教徒在解放初期约有70 万，晚近若干年来增长迅猛，官方统计已达1600 万，这一数字尚不包括“未登记教会”的信徒。宗教信徒的构成分布，过去以老年人、女性、低学历、农村人口、老少边穷地区为主要特点，近些年出现向全社会尤其是中青年人群、城市居民、新社会阶层和经济发达地区扩散和渗透的趋向。

The religious ecological landscape, due to social change and international exchange, is multicolored and motley. To take the most prominent examples: Buddhism in some regions is immensely wealthy, and in charitable donations for natural and man-made disasters it is not far behind, which is commendable in spirit, but more often it is a case of “religion sets the stage, the economy plays the show.” In some places, certain forces from religious, political, business, and academic circles collude for mutual benefit and win-win outcomes, where Buddha statues and the stench of money mingle, and superstition and corruption go hand in hand; Tibetan Buddhism is also occasionally exploited by “Tibetan independence” forces, with some monasteries becoming hotbeds of “Tibetan independence” riots (such as the Lhasa “3•14” incident in 2008), [2]2 The “3•14” incident refers to violent protests and riots in Lhasa, Tibet, on March 14, 2008, which the Chinese government attributes to “Tibetan independence” separatists. and the Dalai Lama still exerts considerable influence in Tibetan areas; Islam has clear ethnic attributes and relatively stable regional characteristics, and in recent years has spread to the southeastern coast (such as Yiwu, Zhejiang) due to the business activities of northwestern Muslims; domestic and foreign religious extremist organizations, using Islam as a cover, “recruit soldiers and buy horses” in Xinjiang, accumulate strength, and frequently create or plot “Xinjiang independence” incidents (such as the Urumqi “7•5” incident in 2009); [3]3 The “7•5” incident refers to deadly ethnic riots in Urumqi, Xinjiang, on July 5, 2009, which the Chinese government attributes to separatist and extremist forces. extreme Christian forces from abroad use religious exchanges, sending missionaries, business, investment, education, tourism, culture, sports, charity, and online proselytizing to “pioneer and sow the gospel,” aiming to “return China to the Lord” and conquer the “Chinese dragon” with the “Lamb of Christ”; domestic Christian “house churches” rely on foreign influence to assert themselves, resisting China’s “Three-Self” (self-governance, self-support, self-propagation) tradition; [4]4 The “Three-Self” (三自) principle—self-governance, self-support, and self-propagation—was established in the early 1950s as the basis for a Chinese Christian church independent of foreign missionary control. traditional religions such as Eastern Orthodoxy and Judaism, and new religious movements such as the Baháʼí Faith and Mormonism, have begun to develop followers among the Chinese people; evil cult organizations like Falun Gong [5]5 Falun Gong (法轮功) is a spiritual practice that the Chinese government officially designated an evil cult (邪教) in 1999, banning it as a threat to social order. are not dead yet and continue to struggle under the protection of foreign hostile forces; some folk beliefs are helpful for united front work across the Taiwan Strait (such as Mazu worship) [6]6 Mazu (妈祖) is a Chinese sea goddess whose worship originated in Fujian and is widespread in Taiwan and among overseas Chinese; the Chinese government promotes her cult as a tool for cross-strait unity. and for building ties with overseas Chinese compatriots (such as Guan Gong worship), [7]7 Guan Gong (关公) is the deified form of the historical general Guan Yu, worshipped as a god of wealth and loyalty; his cult is used to foster ties with the Chinese diaspora. and some can be elevated to “intangible cultural heritage,” thus receiving support from relevant authorities, but overall they can be seen as the deep social soil of the “religious fever” in recent years.

宗教生态景观因社会变迁和国际交流而五光十色、斑驳陆离，举其荦荦大端言之，如佛教在某些地区富甲一方，在天灾人祸的慈善捐助方面不遑多让，精神可嘉，但更多的则是“宗教搭台，经济唱戏”。有些地方，来自教界、政界、商界、学界的某些势力利益共谋、互利共赢，佛像与铜臭沆瀣，迷信共腐败一气；藏传佛教又不时被“藏独”势力利用，一些寺院沦为“藏独”骚乱（如2008 年拉萨“3•14”事件）的策源地，达赖喇嘛对藏区仍有不小影响；伊斯兰教具有明显的民族属性和相对稳定的地域特征，近些年因西北穆斯林经商而远播东南沿海（如浙江义乌）；境内外宗教极端主义组织以伊斯兰教为掩护在新疆“招兵买马”，积蓄力量，频繁制造或图谋策动“疆独”事端（如2009 年乌鲁木齐“7•5”事件）；境外基督教极端势力利用宗教交流、派遣传教士、经商、投资、教育、旅游、文化、体育、慈善、网络传教等方式“开荒布道”传福音，以“中华归主”、“基督羔羊”征服“中国龙”为目的；境内基督教“家庭教会”挟洋自重，抗拒中国“三自”（自治、自养、自传）传统；东正教、犹太教等传统宗教，巴哈伊教、摩门教等新兴宗教开始在我国民众中发展信徒；法轮功等邪教组织死而不僵，在国外敌对势力庇护下仍在挣扎；民间信仰有的有助于台海统战（如妈祖信仰）、海外侨胞联谊（如关公信仰），有的可升进为“非物质文化遗产”，因而受到有关方面扶持，但总体上可以视为晚近若干年“宗教热”的深厚社会土壤。

II. The International Background of the Unconventional Expansion of Christianity in China

二基督教在华非常规扩张的国际背景

Various signs indicate that the religious fever in China in recent years, especially the phenomenon of the unconventional expansion of Christianity in China, has a profound international background. The end of the Cold War, the low ebb of the international communist movement, and the end of the bipolar balance between the United States and the Soviet Union have made previously less prominent ethnic and religious contradictions increasingly salient. One of the important strategies of certain Western powers, in seeking to maximize their own national interests and to Westernize and divide China, is to exert pressure by using religious and human rights issues. They link so-called “international religious freedom” with human rights, use the new interventionism of “human rights above sovereignty” as a weapon, crudely interfere in China’s internal religious affairs, openly support dissidents both within China and in exile who are cloaked in the guise of Christians, and attempt to burden the Chinese government and the Three-Self Church with the stigma of “religious persecutors.” By creating religion-related chaos within China, they aim to contain China’s rise, posing a serious threat to China’s national security and national interests.

种种迹象表明，国内近些年出现的宗教热尤其是基督教在华非常规扩张现象，有着深刻的国际背景。冷战的结束、国际共运的低潮和苏美两强制衡格局的终结，使得以往不太突出的民族、宗教矛盾日趋凸显。某些西方大国为谋求本国利益最大化，对中国的西化、分化图谋的重要策略之一就是利用宗教、人权问题施加压力。他们将所谓“国际宗教自由”与人权相联系，以“人权高于主权”的新干涉主义为武器，粗暴干涉中国的宗教事务内政，公开支持中国国内和流亡海外的一些披着基督徒外衣的持不同政见者，企图使中国政府及三自教会背负“宗教迫害者”的恶名，通过在中国境内制造与宗教有关的混乱来达到遏制中国崛起的目的，对中国的国家安全、国家利益构成严重威胁。

We believe that the analytical framework of church-state relations generated in the Western context is not entirely suitable for China. On religious issues, if we do not unequivocally emphasize “Chinese characteristics,” then whether we discuss “separation of church and state” or “harmony between church and state,” we cannot escape the discursive traps and thought pitfalls of some Western countries regarding church-state relations. In the 170 years since the outbreak of the Opium War in 1840, the Chinese nation has basically solved the problems of “being beaten” and “being hungry,” but it still faces the problem of “being scolded.” [8]8 The three stages of “being beaten” (挨打), “being hungry” (挨饿), and “being scolded” (挨骂) are a common Chinese political trope referring to China’s historical subjugation, poverty, and current struggle for discursive legitimacy on the world stage. No matter what China’s rulers do on religious and human rights issues, it is difficult to meet the standards of certain countries. Only by breaking the Western discursive hegemony can we escape this predicament. The Three-Self system, the Three-Self banner, and the Three-Self model with Chinese characteristics are concrete manifestations of China’s national sovereignty in the religious field and a continuation of the patriotic tradition of Chinese Christianity. They must be upheld and consolidated.

我们认为，西方语境中生成的政教关系分析框架，并不完全适合中国。在宗教问题上若不理直气壮地强调“中国特色”，则无论是探讨“政教分离”还是“政教和谐”，都跳不出西方一些国家关于政教关系的话语窠臼和思维陷阱。1840 年鸦片战争爆发至今170 年来，中华民族基本解决了“挨打”、“挨饿”的问题，现在仍然面临“挨骂”的问题。中国的执政者在宗教人权问题上无论怎么做，都很难符合某些国家的标准。唯有打破西方的话语霸权，才能摆脱困境。中国特色的三自体制、三自旗帜、三自模式，是中国的国家主权在宗教领域的具体表现，是中国基督教爱国主义传统的继续，必须坚持和巩固。

III. Atheism in the Contemporary Chinese Context

三中国当代语境中的无神论

We find that the so-called “believing in the Lord” phenomenon or “Christianity fever” in contemporary rural China is mostly a mixture of utilitarian choices and herd behavior under conditions of poverty, illness, or lack of livelihood. Jesus Christ or God is regarded as a “savior,” becoming a substitute for Chairman Mao, the “great savior of the people,” or the “merciful and salvation-bringing” Guanyin Bodhisattva, and is even likened to “Ji Pusa” (Christ-Bodhisattva). Meanwhile, the conversion of some urban intellectuals to Christianity often serves as an expression of dissatisfaction with certain practical problems. For some dissidents, the Christian identity is both a fashionable mask of a supposed “global citizen” and, in the current context of Sino-Western relations, has an obvious umbrella effect. Thus, becoming a member of a “house church” becomes a cheap and effective survival strategy. These two types of religious belief have their own very realistic economic or political reasons. The question now is: why do they turn to or invoke a God that does not exist at all? Exploring this is a long story, but the fact that the mainstream ideology has some kind of deficiency or loss, lacking sufficient appeal, may be one important reason.

我们发现，中国当代农村的所谓“信主”现象或“基督教热”，大多是贫病或生活无着境况下的功利性选择与从众现象的混合物。耶稣基督或上帝被视为“救世主”，成为“人民大救星”毛主席或“救苦救难”观世音菩萨的替代物，甚至被比喻为“基菩萨”。而某些城市知识分子皈依基督教，常常是为了表达对某些现实问题的不满。对某些持不同政见者而言，基督徒身份既是一种疑似“世界公民”的时尚面具，在现有的中西关系情境中又具有明显的保护伞作用，于是变身“家庭教会”成员便成为一种廉价有效的生存策略。上述两种信教类型，有其各自非常现实的经济或政治原因，现在的问题是：他们为什么会求助于或乞灵于根本就不存在的上帝呢？探究起来一言难尽，而主流意识形态存在某种缺失或流失、缺乏足够的感召力可能是重要原因之一。

Contemporary Chinese society is undergoing profound changes. In an era of comprehensive reform, for those who have lost out in competition or for vulnerable groups outside the system, religious theism is admittedly an understandable and blameless option. However, we believe that scientific atheism is a more meaningful and valuable option—because atheism is a system of thought closely related to scientific rationality and one of the important intellectual achievements of the progress of human civilization. Some people believe that as long as it helps to alleviate social contradictions or create economic benefits, both theism and atheism are acceptable and usable, and they even regard religion as a kind of “social capital” that maintains the status quo. This pragmatic way of speaking and acting is not only shortsighted but also almost like drinking poison to quench thirst, which is worrying. Creating conditions so that the general public has sufficient opportunities to encounter atheism and scientific rationality is the truly responsible approach to the people, and the truly responsible approach to the nation, the country, and history.

当代中国社会正在发生深刻的变化。在一个改革纵横时期，对于竞争失意者或体制外弱势群体而言，宗教有神论固然是一个情有可原、无可厚非的选项，但我们认为，科学无神论是一个更有意义、更有价值的选项———因为无神论是与科学理性密切相关的一种思想体系，是人类文明进步的重要思想成果之一。有些人认为，只要有助于缓和社会矛盾或创造经济效益，有神论、无神论均可接受和利用，甚至将宗教视为一种维护现状的“社会资本”。这种实用主义的说法和做法不仅短视，而且几近饮鸩止渴，令人忧虑。应当创造条件使社会大众有足够多的机会接触无神论、接触科学理性，才是对人民群众真正负责任的表现，才是对国家和民族、对历史真正负责任的表现。

We believe that conducting scientific atheist education among young people, allowing a correct worldview to permeate the childhood and adolescent memories of every educated person, is in the long term equivalent to injecting a low-cost ideological “vaccine” as early as possible; conducting “mending the fold after the sheep are lost”[9]9 A Chinese idiom from the Warring States period text *Strategies of the Warring States*, meaning it is not too late to take remedial action after a loss. scientific atheist education for all Party members and even the whole of society, establishing an ideological “firewall”[10]10 A metaphor for ideological defenses, commonly used in Chinese political discourse to describe measures that prevent the penetration of harmful ideas. to help people return to common sense and rationality, undoubtedly plays an irreplaceable “root-cause” role in dispelling religious delusion, curbing religious fanaticism, and reducing the future costs of governance and chaos.

我们认为，对青少年进行科学无神论教育，让正确的世界观浸透每个受教育者的童年、少年记忆，长远来看相当于尽可能早地注射成本低廉的思想“疫苗”；对全体党员乃至全社会进行“亡羊补牢”式的科学无神论教育，建立一道意识形态“防火墙”，帮助人们回归常识和理性，对于破除宗教迷妄、抑制宗教狂热、减少未来的治乱成本无疑具有不可替代的“治本”作用。

In the contemporary Chinese context, the “invisible hand” of the market economy and the omnipresent contingencies of natural and man-made disasters push many people into the embrace of religious theism. The future and destiny of atheism are fundamentally closely linked to the rulers’ economic and social policies and corresponding institutional arrangements (such as the universal social security system). We are still far from realizing the social ideal proposed by Marx and Engels in the *Communist Manifesto* of abolishing private property and achieving a complete rupture with traditional ownership and traditional ideas. The political puzzle of “socialism and religion” raised by Lenin is far from being thoroughly solved, and the task of “criticizing theology” proposed by Mao Zedong is also far from completed. But in any case, scientific atheism should occupy its due place in the continuously improving mainstream ideology, because “there has never been any savior, nor do we rely on gods or emperors; to create human happiness, we rely entirely on ourselves.”[11]11 A line from the *Internationale*, the international anthem of the socialist and communist movements.

在中国当代语境中，市场经济条件下“看不见的手”和天灾人祸等无所不在的偶然性会把不少人推入宗教有神论的怀抱，无神论的前途命运从根本上说与执政者的经济社会政策及相应制度安排（如全民社保制度）密切相关。现在距离实现马克思、恩格斯在《共产党宣言》中提出的消灭私有制、与传统所有制和传统观念彻底决裂的社会理想还很遥远，列宁提出的“社会主义与宗教”的政治难题远未彻底破解，毛泽东提出的“批判神学”的任务也远未完成。但无论如何，科学无神论在不断完善的主流意识形态中应该占有应有的地位，因为“从来就没有什么救世主，也不靠神仙皇帝，要创造人类的幸福，全靠我们自己”。

Online editor: Jia Fei

网络编辑：嘉扉