The Scientific Atheist Thought in *Anti-Dühring*

*Anti-Dühring* is an important Marxist work written by the revolutionary mentor Engels to criticize the erroneous views propagated by Eugen Dühring in the fields of philosophy, political economy and socialism, to refute Dühring’s misunderstanding of Marx’s doctrine, and to eliminate Dühring’s influence within the German Social Democratic Party. Through this critique, Engels for the first time comprehensively and systematically expounded the three component parts of Marxism—namely, the basic principles of philosophy, political economy and scientific socialism—and the internal connections among them. Engels’ exposition clearly demonstrates that dialectical materialism and historical materialism constitute a scientific world outlook and methodology, and that they are also the theoretical foundation of Marxist political economy and scientific socialism.[1]1 The three component parts of Marxism—philosophy, political economy, and scientific socialism—are a standard framework in orthodox Marxist-Leninist theory, codified by Lenin in his 1913 article “The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism.”

《反杜林论》是革命导师恩格斯为批判欧根·杜林在哲学、政治经济学和社会主义领域宣扬的错误观点，反驳杜林对马克思学说的错误理解，并清除杜林思想在德国社会民主党内的影响而写的一部马克思主义的重要著作。通过这一批判，恩格斯第一次全面系统的阐述了马克思主义的三个组成部分即哲学、政治经济学和科学社会主义的基本原理以及它们之间的内在联系。恩格斯的阐述清晰的体现出辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义是科学的世界观和方法论，同时它们也是马克思主义政治经济学和科学社会主义的理论基础。[1]

Overall, the work *Anti-Dühring* is built on the foundation of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, and therefore it itself reflects standard atheist thought. Dialectical materialism and historical materialism were precisely the further development by Marx and Engels on the basis of the atheist thought of their predecessors. Since the question of theism versus atheism had already been resolved by earlier thinkers, the work of Marx and Engels was mainly to clarify and develop thought in the domain of social history. Consequently, for a Marxist, the question of atheism often lies hidden in the grand background of the Marx-Engels narrative; and *Anti-Dühring*, as a work expounding the three component parts of Marxism, is rarely interpreted from the perspective of atheism.

从整体上说，《反杜林论》这一著作建立于辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义的基础上，因此它本身反映的就是标准的无神论思想。辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义正是马克思和恩格斯在前人无神论思想的基础上进一步发展而来。由于有神无神的问题已经被前人解决，马克思恩格斯所做的工作主要是社会历史领域内的思想澄清和发展。因此，对一个马克思主义者来说，无神论的问题往往隐匿在马恩叙事的宏大背景之中；而《反杜林论》作为一部阐述马克思主义的三个组成部分的著作，也很少有人从无神论的角度对它进行解读。

In contemporary China, the official mainstream ideology is Marxism. Yet since reform and opening up, religion has revived and, over the past roughly thirty years, achieved a marked development. The five traditional religions, some new sects, and various spiritual currents are all increasingly active. At the same time, all kinds of cults, pseudo-religious swindlers and “masters” have emerged in an endless stream, seriously affecting social security and the normal life of the people; and religious extremism, because it is exploited by hostile forces abroad, has also become a major hidden danger to national security. Therefore, in the current era it is very necessary for us to reaffirm atheist thought. For historical reasons, the study of atheism once fell silent in China. So today, when we raise the issue of atheist thought again, how to propagate it and how to introduce it must be determined according to the needs of the current era.

当今中国，官方的主流意识形态是马克思主义。然而自改革开放以来，宗教得以复苏，并在近30年的时间里获得了一个明显的发展。五大传统宗教、一些新兴教派、以及各种灵性思潮都日益活跃。与此同时，各种邪教以及伪宗教的骗子、“大师”也层出不穷，严重影响社会安全和人民的正常生活；而宗教极端主义由于被境外敌对势力所利用也成为国家安全的一个重大隐患。因此，在当前这个时代我们重申无神论的思想是非常必要的。由于历史的原因，无神论的研究在中国一度沉寂。那么今天我们重提无神论的思想，要如何宣扬、如何介绍，这都要根据当前这个时代的需要。

In fact, in *Anti-Dühring*, by refuting Dühring’s thought, Engels elucidated the universal laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought—that is, the dialectical method—and expressed incisive views on questions such as truth and morality. These discussions are very helpful for people to clarify their own thinking and to identify cognitive errors. Although it does not directly address the question of theism versus atheism, its dialectical method is absolutely conducive to ordinary people adopting an objective, rational and scientific attitude toward the various religious phenomena active in society today, and also helps us to reflect on current research into atheism.

事实上，恩格斯在《反杜林论》中以反驳杜林思想的方式阐明了自然界、人类社会和思维的运动和发展的普遍规律，即辩证法思想，并对真理、道德等问题发表了精辟的见解。这些论述非常有利于人们澄清自己的思维，明辨认识上的误区。虽然它没有直接针对有神无神的问题，但是它的辩证法思想绝对有助于普通民众对当今社会上活跃的各种宗教现象采取一个客观、理性的科学态度，也有助于我们反思当前无神论的研究。

Therefore, this article attempts an interpretation of the work *Anti-Dühring* from the perspective of scientific atheism. Given that *Anti-Dühring* covers the three component parts of Marxism and has a broad scope, while our theme is only atheist thought, the analysis in this article will be limited to the “Philosophy” section of *Anti-Dühring*, that is, the content of the first component part of Marxism as expounded by Engels.

因此，本文即试图从科学无神论的角度对《反杜林论》这部著作进行一个解读。鉴于《反杜林论》涵盖了马克思主义的三个组成部分，范围广阔，而我们的主题只是无神论思想，因此本文的分析将限于《反杜林论》的“哲学编”，即由恩格斯所阐述的马克思主义的第一个组成部分的内容。

I. The Basic Content of the “Philosophy” Section of *Anti-Dühring*

一、《反杜林论·哲学编》的基本内容

*Anti-Dühring* was written between September 1876 and June 1878; it is Engels’ assessment of the new socialist theory put forward by Dühring. At that time, Dühring, as a new “convert,” received a warm welcome from some socialist publications, and his thought also brought a certain confusion to the German Social Democratic Party. While criticizing Dühring, Engels also set forth his own views on some controversial issues of general significance from a positive perspective. This book was reprinted in 1885. According to Engels, one of the reasons for the reprint was that this critique of Dühring had in fact become a relatively coherent exposition of the Marxist dialectical method and the communist world outlook, and this exposition covered quite a number of fields; therefore, worldwide—“in all countries where there are proletarians and fearless scientific theorists”—the number of people interested in this exposition was growing.[2]2 The phrase “in all countries where there are proletarians and fearless scientific theorists” is a paraphrase of Engels’ own description of the international reception of *Anti-Dühring* in the preface to the second edition (1885).

《反杜林论》写于1876年9月到1878年6月，是恩格斯对杜林所提出的新的社会主义理论的一个评析。当时，杜林作为一个新的“改宗者”获得了一部分社会主义出版物的热烈欢迎，他的思想也给德国社会民主党带来了一定的混乱。恩格斯在批判杜林的同时也从正面阐发了自己对一些具有普遍意义的争论的见解。1885年这本书再版。根据恩格斯的说法，再版的原因之一就是，对杜林的这种批判事实上成为了对马克思主义的辩证方法和共产主义世界观的比较连贯的论述，而且这种论述涉及相当多的领域，因此全世界范围内——“在一切有无产者和无畏的科学理论家的国家里”——对这种论述感兴趣的人正越来越多。[2]

Marx and Engels were “the only ones who rescued conscious dialectics from German idealist philosophy and applied it to the materialist conception of nature and history.”[3]3 This is a direct quotation from Engels’ *Anti-Dühring*, “Introduction,” chapter 2, where he credits Marx and himself with this achievement. In this work, in order to establish a dialectical and at the same time materialist conception of nature, Engels conducted a general survey of fields such as mathematics and the natural sciences, attempting to prove the real effect of dialectical laws with facts from nature. Of course, these laws also run through the history of the development of human thought and are gradually becoming conscious to thinking people.[4]4 The reference to “dialectical laws” running through human thought and being gradually “conscious” to thinking people reflects Engels’ argument in *Anti-Dühring* that dialectics is the science of the general laws of motion, both in nature and in thought. Hence, “to discover these laws from nature and to expound them starting from nature” also became a characteristic of the “Philosophy” section of this book.[5]5 This is a paraphrase of Engels’ own statement in the “Introduction” to *Anti-Dühring* about the task of the “Philosophy” section.

马克思和恩格斯是“唯一把自觉的辩证法从德国唯心主义哲学中拯救出来并运用于唯物主义的自然观和历史观的人”。[3]在这本著作中，为了确立辩证的同时又是唯物主义的自然观，恩格斯对数学等自然科学的领域进行了概括性的探讨，试图以自然界的事实证明辩证规律的真实作用。当然这些规律也贯穿于人类思维的发展史中，并逐渐被思维着的人们所意识到。[4]故此，“从自然界中找出这些规律并从自然界出发加以阐发”也成为该书“哲学编”的一个特色。[5]

Fundamentally, the philosophical tradition of naturalism has always been the living source of the development of Western atheist thought, that is, a philosophical tradition that takes nature as the premise and foundation of observation and research. In the course of its development, the old philosophical tradition of naturalism put forward atheist ideas, as well as a small number of dialectical viewpoints. In modern times, this tradition of observing and researching nature has been fully inherited and developed in the natural sciences. A large number of scientific discoveries increasingly prove the dialectical character of natural processes. Therefore, the laws of dialectics are firmly established on the foundation of the natural sciences.

从根本上说，自然主义的哲学传统一直是西方无神论思想发展的源头活水，即以自然为观察研究的前提和基础的一种哲学思想。旧的自然主义的哲学传统在其发展历史中提出了无神的思想，以及少量辩证法观点。到现代，这种观察和研究自然的传统在自然科学中得到了充分地继承和发展。大量科学发现日益证明自然过程的辩证性质。因此，辩证法规律正牢固地建立在自然科学的基础之上。

However, the conclusions we draw from summarizing our experience of the natural sciences are always concepts, and the art of applying these concepts is not innate, nor is it the same as ordinary everyday consciousness. Engels believed that applying these concepts requires “real thinking,” that is, the dialectical mode of thinking.[6]6 The phrase “real thinking” (*wirkliches Denken*) is used by Engels in *Anti-Dühring*, “Philosophy,” chapter 9, to distinguish dialectical thinking from mere formal logic. Precisely for this reason, this work, whose purpose was to clarify Dühring’s system of thought, still has important guiding significance for our understanding of the world today.

然而，我们对自然科学的经验进行总结的结论总是一些概念，而运用这些概念的艺术并非天生的，也跟普通的日常意识不一样。恩格斯认为，运用这些概念需要“真实的思维”，即辩证法的思维方式。[6]正因如此，这部以澄清杜林的思想体系为目的的著作直到今天仍然对于我们认识世界具有着重要的指导意义。

In the “Introduction” to *Anti-Dühring*, Engels states at the outset the difference between the dialectical and the metaphysical modes of thinking. “Everything is and also is not, for everything is in flux, in constant change, in constant coming into being and passing away.”[7]7 This is a direct quotation from Engels’ *Anti-Dühring*, “Introduction,” chapter 1, where he cites Heraclitus’ fragment. Heraclitus’ primitive, naive ancient Greek world outlook precisely embodies a spontaneous dialectical thinking. Since the second half of the 15th century, when the natural sciences achieved marked development, the method of studying things in separate branches certainly promoted scientific progress, but it also led to a habit: isolating various natural objects and natural processes, considering individuals apart from their overall connections, examining things not from a state of motion but from a state of rest, ignoring essential changes in things, regarding them as fixed and unchanging, and examining only dead states. This method of examination was also transplanted into philosophy, forming the metaphysical mode of thinking familiar to people in modern times.[8]8 The description of the rise of metaphysical thinking from the 15th century onward is a standard historical narrative in Engels’ *Anti-Dühring*, “Introduction,” chapter 1. The metaphysical mode of thinking conforms to ordinary common sense: “Yes is yes, no is no, and anything beyond that is nonsense.”[9]9 This is a direct quotation from Engels’ *Anti-Dühring*, “Introduction,” chapter 1, where he characterizes the metaphysical mode of thinking. Certainly, within the scope of everyday application, common sense deserves respect; yet once it steps into the broad field of research, it is no longer applicable. The most famous example is the jurist’s judgment of the moment of death. In fact, every organism is, at each moment, both itself and not itself; at each moment, cells in the organism are dying, and at the same time new cells are being born.[10]10 The example of the organism simultaneously dying and being reborn is taken from Engels’ *Anti-Dühring*, “Introduction,” chapter 1, where he uses it to illustrate the dialectical nature of life. Therefore, everything in nature is in the final analysis dialectical rather than metaphysical. This can be fully verified by the discoveries of modern natural science. Subsequently, with the considerable progress of the natural sciences and the changes and developments in social history, modern materialist thought was finally able to emerge, and it is in essence dialectical.

在《反杜林论》的“引论”中恩格斯开宗明义的阐释了辩证法和形而上学这两种思维方式之间的差别。“一切都存在而又不存在，因为一切都在流动，都在不断地变化，不断地生成和消逝。”[7]赫拉克利特这种原始、朴素的古希腊世界观正体现了一种自发的辩证法思维。而自15世纪下半叶自然科学获得明显发展以来，分门别类的研究方式固然推动了科学进步，但同时也导致了一种惯性，即将各种自然物和自然过程孤立起来，撇开总体联系只考察个体，不是从运动的而是从静止的状态去考察，忽视事物本质上的变化，以为其固定不变，而且只考察死的状态。这种考察方式也被移植到哲学之中，形成了近代为大家所熟知的形而上学的思维方式。[8]形而上学的思维方式合乎一般的常识，“是就是，不是就不是，除此之外，都是鬼话。”[9]固然在日常应用范围内，常识值得尊敬，然而一旦它跨入广阔的研究领域，就不再适用。最著名的例子比如法学家对死亡时刻的判断。事实上，任何一个有机体，在每一个瞬间既是它本身，又不是它本身；每一个瞬间，有机体中都有细胞死亡，也同时有细胞新生。[10]因此，自然界的一切归根到底是辩证的而非形而上学的。这一点从现代自然科学的发现中可以获得充分的检验。而后随着自然科学的长足进步以及社会历史的变化发展，现代唯物主义思想终于得以产生，而它在本质上就是辩证的。

Engels points out that Dühring regards his own doctrine as “the final ultimate truth.”[11]11 Friedrich Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 25 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1987), p. 33. (All citations in this text are from the Chinese edition: *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, vol. 9, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009.) Yet this itself contradicts dialectical thinking. Dühring holds that philosophy is the elaboration of the highest form of consciousness of the world and of life, and, in a broader sense, also includes the principles of all knowledge and will. It is the final supplement to the system by which science is to explain nature and human society, and it has only two genuine objects of study: nature and the human world. Hence Dühring’s philosophy is divided into three parts: the general doctrine of the world schema, the doctrine of the principles of nature, and the doctrine of man.[12]12 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 33.

恩格斯指出，杜林自认为其学说是“最后的终极的真理”。[11]然而这本身就是与辩证法思维相悖的。杜林认为，哲学是对世界和生活的意识的最高形式的阐发，在更广的意义上说，还包括一切知识和意愿的原则。它是科学要对自然界和人类社会进行解释的这一体系的最后补充，它只有两个真正的研究对象，即自然界和人类世界。因此杜林的哲学分为三个部分，即一般的世界模式论、关于自然原则的学说，以及关于人的学说。[12]

In fact, according to Dühring’s view, these so-called principles are derived from thought rather than from the external world; they are to be applied to nature and to man, and nature and man ought to conform to these principles. Here Dühring inverts the real relationship and takes the path of idealism. For principles ought to be abstracted from nature and human history, and they are correct only insofar as they conform to nature and history.[13]13 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 39. Engels hits the nail on the head by pointing out the similarity between Dühring’s entire philosophical system and Hegel’s. Dühring says, “If one tries, through the modifier ‘human,’ to exclude or even merely to doubt the supreme significance of the basic forms of consciousness and knowledge and their unconditional right to truth, then one debases these basic forms.”[14]14 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 39. The result of this line of thought is that Dühring not only separates thought from man and nature but also repeatedly foists thought—or, more directly, that which is called “God”—onto nature.[15]15 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 40. Engels holds that every system of thought in the world is objectively limited by historical conditions and subjectively limited by the physical and mental conditions of the person who proposes it. Dühring, however, regards his own doctrine as exempt from all such possible limitations, as a finally completed system. In doing so, he naturally closes off the path for the future development of science.[16]16 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 41.

其实根据杜林的观点，这些所谓的原则是从思维而非从外部世界得来，它们应被运用于自然界和人类，自然界和人类都应适应这些原则。这里，杜林颠倒了真实的关系，走上了唯心主义的道路。因为原则应当从自然界和人类历史中抽象出来，且只有在符合自然界和历史的情况下这些原则才是正确的。[13]恩格斯一针见血地指出杜林的整个哲学体系与黑格尔的相似性。杜林说，“如果想通过‘人的’这个修饰语来排除或者哪怕只是怀疑意识和知识的基本形式的至上的意义和它们的无条件的真理权，那么这就贬低了这些基本形式。”[14]这一思想的结果就是，杜林不只让思维脱离人和自然界，还一再地将思维，或者更直接地说那种叫做“上帝”的东西，硬塞给自然界。[15]恩格斯认为，世界上的每种思想体系，都在客观上受到历史状况的限制，主观上受到提出该思想的人的肉体和精神状况的限制。而杜林则自认为其学说免于这种种可能的限制，是一个最终完成的体系。他这样自然也就封闭了未来科学发展的道路。[16]

Therefore, in accordance with these three parts of Dühring’s philosophy, Engels carries out a concrete critique of the fallacies in Dühring’s doctrine from three aspects: the doctrine of the world schema, natural philosophy, and the doctrine of man. This constitutes the basic content of the “Philosophy” section of *Anti-Dühring*.

因此，根据杜林哲学的这三个部分，恩格斯分别从世界模式论、自然哲学以及关于人的学说三个方面对杜林学说的谬误进行了具体的批判。这就构成了《反杜林论·哲学编》的基本内容。

II. Critique of Dühring’s Doctrine of the World Schema and Natural Philosophy

二、对杜林的世界模式论和自然哲学的批判

The doctrine of the world schema is a judgment on the ontology of the world. Dühring continues Hegel’s doctrine of the schema of being, holding that the world is unified in being. That is, he believes: I begin from being, therefore I think being, and thought about being is unitary; thought and being must coordinate with each other to achieve agreement; therefore, in reality being is unitary. He uses the identity of thought and being to prove the reality of thought, and then infers that the world is unified in being.[17]17 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 44. Even though Dühring denies the existence of God, his mode of thinking in fact leaves room for the proof of God’s existence.

世界模式论即对世界的本体的判断。杜林延续了黑格尔的存在模式论，认为世界统一于存在。也就是说，他认为，我从存在开始，故而我思考着存在，而关于存在的思想是统一的，思维和存在必须相互协调以趋一致，因此，在现实中存在是统一的。他用思维和存在的同一性来证明思维的现实性，继而推出世界统一于存在。[17]即便杜林否认了上帝的存在，但其思维方式，却事实上给论证上帝存在留下了空间。

Engels holds that the unity of being consists only in the fact that all objects of which we speak exist, are real; and when we emphasize this, we temporarily set aside consideration of the particular characteristics of things. The fact is that the unity of the world does not consist in its being, although being is a precondition of its unity, because the world must first exist before it can be unified. However, “the real unity of the world consists in its materiality, and this materiality is proved not by a few conjurer’s phrases but by a long and protracted development of philosophy and natural science.”[18]18 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 45. Dühring simply copies Hegel’s thought and, moreover, discusses “his own” philosophy only within the framework of Hegelian theory.

恩格斯认为，存在的统一性只在于我们所说的一切对象都是存在的、实有的；而且在我们如此强调的时候，是暂时排除对事物各自特性的考虑的。事实是，世界的统一性并不在于它的存在，尽管存在是其统一性的前提，因为世界必须先存在，然后才能是统一的。然而，“世界的真正的统一性在于它的物质性，而这种物质性不是由魔术师的三两句话所证明的，而是由哲学和自然科学的长期的和持续的发展所证明的。”[18]杜林照搬了黑格尔的思想，并且还只是在黑格尔理论的框框里谈论“自己的”哲学。

Turning to the part on natural philosophy: First, Dühring holds that being is infinite; and as a measure of being, the world has a beginning in time and a boundary in space. Engels, on the other hand, holds that Dühring plagiarizes one half of Kant’s thesis and throws away the other half, namely, that “the world has no beginning in time and no end in space.”[19]19 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 49. In fact, the eternity of time and the infinity of space have no end in any direction. To posit an end or a beginning is to indicate that the world has an ultimate cause. Second, Dühring holds that before the beginning of time, the world was in a self-identical, unchanging primitive state. Then this absolutely unchanging state must be set in motion by a first impulse from outside the world. Since Dühring does not allow God as the “first mover” to enter his schema, he can only stubbornly reply: “The primitive state of the universe, or, more clearly, the primitive state of material existence without change, without any temporal accumulation of change, is a question that only someone who regards self-inflicted damage to reproductive power as the height of intelligence would deny.”[20]20 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 53. He refuses to explain how his world moves from rest to motion, merely saying that motion comes from rest, that motion arises from nothing.[21]21 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 53.

再看自然哲学部分。首先，杜林认为，存在具有无限性；而作为对存在的衡量，世界在时间上有开端，在空间上有界限。恩格斯则认为，杜林抄袭了康德论点的一半，而将另一半，即“世界在时间上没有开端，在空间上没有终点”扔在了一边。[19]事实上，时间的永恒性、空间的无限性，在任何一个方向上都是没有终点的。认为有终点、有开端，就是在表明世界存在终极原因。其次，杜林认为在时间的开端之前，世界处在一种自身等同的、不变的原始状态之中。那么这种绝对不变的状态，就必须借助于一个来自世界之外的第一推动，才能使世界运动起来。而杜林不允许作为“第一推动”的上帝进入自己的模式，便只好执拗的如是回答：“宇宙的原始状态，或者更明白地说，没有变化的、本身不包含变化的任何时间上积累的物质存在的原始状态，是一个只有认为自我摧残生殖力是绝顶聪明的行为的人才会予以否认的问题。”[20]他拒绝解释他的世界是如何从不动到运动的，而只是说，运动来自不动，运动从虚无中产生。[21]

So, through what means and method does the world arise? Dühring holds that matter is the carrier of all real things; outside matter no mechanical force is possible; mechanical force is a state of matter; in the primitive state where nothing happens, matter and its state, i.e., mechanical force, are unified.[22]22 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 54. Materialists before Dühring had already discussed the relationship between matter and motion. But Dühring reduces motion to mechanical force, which makes him unable to understand the real connection between matter and motion.

那么，世界到底是通过什么方式和方法产生的呢？杜林认为，物质是一切现实事物的载体，在物质以外不可能有任何机械力；机械力是物质的一种状态；在什么都不发生的原始状态中，物质及其状态即机械力是统一的。[22]杜林之前的唯物主义者已经谈到了物质和运动的关系。但杜林将运动归结为机械力，这使得他无法理解物质和运动之间的真实联系。

The fact is that motion is the mode of existence of matter. At no time and in no place has there been, nor can there be, matter without motion. All rest and equilibrium are relative; they have meaning only in relation to specific forms of motion. Matter without motion and motion without matter are equally unimaginable. Motion, like matter, can neither be created nor destroyed; motion can only be transferred.[23]23 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 55. Engels holds that Dühring is a thoroughgoing metaphysician. For according to dialectics, absolute rest and unconditional equilibrium do not exist. Dühring first digs an actually nonexistent chasm between rest—or the “self-identical primitive state”—and motion, and he has never found a satisfactory way to cross this chasm and make rest truly move, yet he is too embarrassed to appeal to the sole savior, the creator of heaven and earth.[24]24 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 56.

事实是，运动是物质的存在方式。无论何时何地，都没有、也不可能有没有运动的物质。任何静止、平衡都是相对的，只有对特定的运动形式来说才有意义。没有运动的物质和没有物质的运动，这两种同样无法想象。运动和物质一样，既不能创造也不能消灭；运动只能转移。[23]恩格斯认为，杜林是个地地道道的形而上学者。因为根据辩证法，绝对的静止、无条件的平衡是不存在的。杜林先是在不动或者说“自身等同的原始状态”与运动之间挖了一条实际上并不存在的鸿沟，而如何跨越这个鸿沟，让不动真正地运动起来，杜林一直也没有找到满意的办法，但又不好意思去求助唯一的救主、天地的创造者。[24]

Finally, regarding the origin of life, Dühring avoids a clear judgment. He says, “Nature not only knows why it creates this or that; it not only does the work of a housemaid; it not only possesses delicacy—which in itself is a very fine thing in subjective conscious thought—it also has will…”[25]25 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 62. Such a judgment of a “consciously thinking and acting nature” places Mr. Dühring in a position between pantheism (i.e., the view that God is nature itself) and deism (i.e., the view that the evidence of nature serves as the basis for God’s existence, but God does not interfere in human society).[26]26 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 62. He also opposes Darwin’s theories of natural selection and survival of the fittest. Engels holds that, basically, Dühring’s discussion of the organic world in his natural philosophy is empty and self-contradictory; on key questions it is all arbitrary nonsense, and his final conclusions are of no use. Life is in fact the mode of existence of protein bodies, and this mode of existence consists essentially in the constant self-renewal of the chemical constituents of these protein bodies.[27]27 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 78.

最后，对于生命的起源，杜林避开了明确的判断。他说，“自然界不仅知道它为什么创造这个或那个东西，它不仅要做家庭女仆的工作，它不仅具有纤巧性——这本身已经是主观的自觉的思维中的十分美好的东西，它也具有意志……”[25]这样一个“自觉地思维和行动的自然界”的判断，使得杜林先生站在了从泛神论（即认为神就是大自然）、到自然神论（即以自然界的证据作为上帝存在的基础，但是上帝并不干涉人类社会）之间的位置上。[26]他也反对达尔文的自然选择、适者生存等理论。恩格斯认为，基本上杜林自然哲学中对于有机界的谈论是空洞的并且自相矛盾，关键问题上全是信口胡说，最后的结论也没什么用处。生命其实是蛋白体的存在方式，这种存在方式本质上就在于这些蛋白体的化学成分不断的自我更新。[27]

Through his critique of Dühring’s world-schema theory and philosophy of nature, Engels exposed the incomplete materialist stance of Dühring and the metaphysical character of his mode of thinking. In Dühring’s discourse, the “shadow” of a creator, a first mover, or God can be seen everywhere. The explanation of the world’s substance and its mode of operation directly determines the analysis and judgment of human society. This foundational part of Dühring’s doctrine can be said to be the cause of the views he later derived from his analysis of human society. As Engels pointed out in the “Introduction” to *Anti-Dühring*, nature as a whole is in the final analysis dialectical, not metaphysical. The lack or incompleteness of materialist dialectical thought is the fundamental reason for the deviations in Dühring’s argumentation. And through this part of the critical analysis, Engels also displays before our eyes the power of materialist dialectics. It is a powerful tool for understanding the world, and it itself comes from the summation of the laws of nature’s operation. This part of the critique, or clarification, can be said to have laid a solid foundation for the further dissection of Dühring’s theory of humanity in the subsequent text.

通过对杜林的世界模式论和自然哲学的批判，恩格斯揭露了杜林并不彻底的唯物主义立场，以及思维方式上的形而上学特质。在杜林的论说中，处处都可以看出创世者、第一推动或者说上帝的“影子”。对世界的本体以及运转方式的阐释直接决定了对人类社会的分析和判断。杜林学说中这样一个基础部分，可以说是他后面对人类社会进行分析所得观点的原因之所在。正如恩格斯在《反杜林论》的“引论”中即指出的，自然界的一切归根到底是辩证的而非形而上学的。唯物辩证法思想的缺乏或者说不彻底，是杜林的论证出偏差的根本原因。而通过这一部分的批判分析，恩格斯也将唯物辩证法的力量展现在我们眼前。它是认识世界的有力工具，而它本身就来自对自然界运转规律的总结。这一部分的批判或者说澄清可以说为后文进一步剖析杜林关于人的学说打下了坚实的基础。

III. Critique of Dühring’s Theory of Humanity

三、对杜林关于人的学说的批判

In the human world, Dühring holds that the moral world, like the world of general knowledge, “has its constant principles and simple elements,” and that moral principles stand “above history and above the present-day differences in national characteristics… those particular truths which in the course of development constitute the more complete moral consciousness and so-called conscience, can, as soon as their ultimate foundations have been recognized, claim a validity and scope of application similar to that of mathematical knowledge and application. Real truth is generally immutable… therefore it is quite stupid to conceive of the correctness of knowledge as being affected by time and real changes.”[28]28 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Part One, Chapter IX. The citations are from Dühring’s works as quoted by Engels. Thus, “the reliability of strict knowledge and the sufficiency of everyday cognition do not permit us, upon mature consideration, to despair of the absolute applicability of the principles of knowledge.”[29]29 Ibid. Here Dühring explicitly puts forward his judgment on ultimate truth, the sovereignty of thought, and the absolute reliability of cognition.

在人类的世界中，杜林认为，道德的世界和一般知识的世界一样，“有其恒久的原则和单纯的要素”，道德的原则凌驾于“历史之上和现今的民族特性的差别之上……在发展过程中构成比较完全的道德意识和所谓良心的那些特殊真理，只要它们的最终的基础都已经被认识，就可以要求具有同数学的认识和运用相似的适用性和有效范围。真正的真理是根本不变的……因此，把认识的正确性设想成是受时间和现实变化影响的，那完全是愚蠢”。[28]因此，“严格知识的可靠性和日常认识的充足性，不容许我们在深思熟虑的情况下对知识原则的绝对适用性表示失望”。[29]这里杜林明确提出了他对终极真理、思维的至上性以及认识的绝对可靠性的判断。

Now, first, can human cognition or thought actually possess sovereign significance and an unconditional right to truth? Engels believes that although human thought exists as the individual thought of countless past, present, and future human beings, it is not really the thought of a single individual. Our present cognition is highly likely to be updated and corrected by our descendants, as historical development has repeatedly proven. To be sure, Dühring asserts that thought and cognition can only be manifested in individuals, and that no force can compel an individual in a healthy and sober state to accept a certain idea. However, the sovereign significance of cognition that he attributes to the thought of each individual simply does not exist.[30]30 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Part One, Chapter IX. The fact is precisely that “the sovereignty of thought is realized in a series of very unsovereignly thinking human beings; cognition that possesses an unconditional right to truth is realized in a series of relative errors; both can only be fully realized through the infinite continuation of human life.”[31]31 Ibid.

那么，首先，人的认识或者说思维究竟能否具有至上的意义和无条件的真理权？恩格斯认为，人的思维虽然是作为无数过去、现在和未来的人的个体思维而存在的，但并非真的是单个人的思维。我们现在的认识极可能被我们的后代更新和纠正，这是历史的发展屡次证明了的。固然杜林表明了一点，即思维和认识只能表现在个人身上，而没有任何一种力量能够强制处于健康清醒状态的个人接受某种思想。但是，他所谓的每一个人的思维所达到的认识的至上意义，其实根本就不存在。[30]事实恰恰是，“思维的至上性是在一系列非常不至上地思维着的人中实现的；拥有无条件的真理权的认识是在一系列相对的谬误中实现的；二者都只有通过人类生活的无限延续才能完全实现。”[31]

Engels points out a contradiction here: the nature of thought must necessarily be regarded as absolute, yet human thought is realized in individuals who think in a completely limited way. This contradiction can only be resolved in the endless succession of human generations. Therefore, only in this sense is human thought both sovereign and non-sovereign; its cognitive capacity is both infinite and finite. Specifically, the “nature, mission, possibility, and historical ultimate goal” of thought are sovereign and infinite, but its concrete realization and each of its actual manifestations are non-sovereign and finite.[32]32 Ibid.

恩格斯指出这里的一个矛盾，即思维的性质必然被看成是绝对的，但是人的思维又是在完全有限地思维着的个人中实现的。这个矛盾只能在无止境的人类世代更迭中才能得到解决。因此，只有在这个意义上来说，人的思维是至上的，同时又不至上；其认识能力是无限的，同时又有限。具体地说，思维的“本性、使命、可能和历史的终极目的”是至上的和无限的，但它的具体实现情况和每次的现实又是不至上的和有限的。[32]

Secondly, does eternal truth exist? Engels believes that if humanity were to reach the point of only applying eternal truths and the results of thought possessing sovereign significance and an unconditional right to truth, then it could be said that humanity had exhausted the infinity of the world of knowledge.[33]33 Ibid. He divides the entire field of cognition into three major parts to examine whether eternal truth exists.

其次，永恒真理是否存在？恩格斯认为，人类如果达到了只运用永恒真理以及具有至上意义和无条件真理权的思维成果的地步，那么可以说人类就穷尽了知识世界的无限性。[33]他将整个认识领域分为三大部分，分别来考察永恒真理是否存在。

The first part comprises the sciences that study inorganic nature and can be treated more or less mathematically, namely mathematics, astronomy, mechanics, physics, chemistry, geology, etc., also called the exact sciences. To be sure, we can say that something like 1+1=2 can be considered an eternal truth, but in these disciplines, hypotheses actually abound, and over time, ultimate truths become only rarer.[34]34 Ibid.

第一部分是研究非生物界并且或多或少能用数学方法处理的科学，即数学、天文学、力学、物理学、化学、地质学等，这些也叫做精密科学。固然我们可以说，像1+1=2这种，可以算是永恒真理，但是在这些学科中其实充斥着假设，而且随着时间的推移，终极真理只会愈发罕见。[34]

The second part comprises the sciences that study living organisms. In this field, because of the intricate interrelations and causal connections, not only does every solved problem give rise to countless new ones, but each problem can only be solved bit by bit, usually taking hundreds of years. We also constantly put forward various hypotheses to systematically understand the discovered connections. Therefore, it is also difficult here to find eternal, unchanging truths. Unless we content ourselves with platitudes, such as the judgment that all men are mortal.[35]35 Ibid.

第二部分是研究活的有机体的科学。在这个领域，因为错综复杂的相互关系和因果联系，不仅每个解决了的问题都会引起无数新的问题，而且每个问题都只能一点一点地、通常要耗费几百年的时间才能得到解决。我们还会不断的提出各种各样的假说，以对已发现的各种联系进行系统的理解。因此这里也难以出现永恒的不变的真理。除非我们满足于一些陈词滥调，比如说人总是要死的之类的判断。[35]

The third part comprises the historical sciences that study, in their historical sequence and present results, the conditions of human life, social relations, legal forms, and forms of the state, as well as the ideological superstructure composed of philosophy, religion, art, etc. Here it is even more impossible for eternal truths to appear. Because the cognition obtained in this field is essentially relative; it is limited to the connections and results of social formations and state forms that are specific to a certain epoch and a certain people and are, by their nature, transitory. Unless we content ourselves with commonplaces, such as the assertion that humanity is always divided into rulers and ruled.[36]36 Ibid.

第三个部分是根据历史顺序和现实结果来研究人的生活条件、社会关系、法的形式和国家形式的历史科学，以及由哲学、宗教、艺术等组成的观念上层建筑。这里更不可能有永恒真理出现。因为这个领域获得的认识在本质上是相对的，它只限于一定时代和一定民族之中的、并且按其本性来说是暂时的社会形态和国家形式的联系和结果。除非我们满足于一些老生常谈，比如说人类总是分为统治者和被统治者之类的论断。[36]

However, it is precisely in this third part that we most often encounter so-called eternal truths, ultimate truths. Some people attempt to conclude from the existence of eternal truths in this field that there are eternal truths, eternal morality, eternal justice, etc., in the domain of human history, which possess a validity and scope of application similar to that of mathematical knowledge and application.[37]37 Ibid. This point will be analyzed further below. Since eternal truths do not exist in the three major fields of human cognition, it is also impossible to see the shadow of ultimate truth in the science that studies the laws of human thought, namely logic and dialectics.

但是，往往就是在这第三个部分，我们最常碰到所谓的永恒真理、终极真理。有些人试图从这个领域中永恒真理的存在得出结论：在人类历史的领域内存在着永恒真理、永恒道德、永恒正义等等，它们具有同数学的认识和应用相似的适用性和有效范围。[37]这一点下文还会深入分析。既然人类认识的三大领域都不存在永恒真理，那么在研究人的思维规律的科学，即逻辑学和辩证法中，也不可能见到终极真理的影子。

Because the stage of cognition we are now in, like all previous stages, is not final, cognition is necessarily relative and will gradually approach perfection over the long succession of generations. Therefore, we cannot measure the cognition we have obtained by the standard of immutable, final, ultimate truths. Once pushed to an extreme, truth turns into error; conversely, error may also turn into truth under suitable conditions.

由于我们现在所处的认识阶段和之前的一切阶段一样，都不是最后的，所以认识必然是相对的，并将在漫长的世代更替中逐步趋于完善。因此，我们无法用不变的、最后的终极真理的标准来衡量所获得的认识。一旦走向极端，真理就会变成谬误；反之，谬误在合适的条件下也可能变成真理。

Thirdly, does moral truth possess ultimacy? From the analysis above we can know that human cognition is always limited by certain objective conditions and is not an unconditional truth; moreover, after detailed examination, in none of the three major spheres of human cognition do eternal and unchanging truths exist. Then, in the sphere of moral truth, or more specifically, the sphere of good and evil, it is even more impossible for eternal truths to exist. Engels believed that on the question of good and evil, so-called “ultimate truths” are in fact exceedingly rare. Different nations have different concepts of good and evil, and these often directly contradict one another; different eras also have different concepts of good and evil, and it is not uncommon for mutually contradictory concepts of good and evil to replace one another as the times develop. How can we say that moral truth possesses ultimacy! For another example, what has been handed down from the age of religious belief in the past is Christian feudal morality, and here there are respectively Catholic morality and Protestant morality, and further subdivided there will be Jesuit Catholic morality and orthodox Protestant morality, and so on, each one different. By the Enlightenment era, modern bourgeois morality began to occupy the mainstream, and subsequently proletarian morality emerged. Which one is more in accordance with truth? None possesses absolute ultimacy. But the morality that represents the direction of actual change and the trend of future development, that is, proletarian morality, will certainly possess more factors that can endure for a long time.[38]38 Cf. *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 9, pp. 98-99.

再次，道德的真理是否具有终极性？经过上文的分析我们可以知道，人的认识总是受到一定客观条件的限制，并非是一种无条件的真理；而且经过详细考察，人类的三大认识领域，无一存在永恒不变的真理。那么，道德的真理，或者更具体地说，善和恶的领域，更不可能存在永恒真理的情况。恩格斯认为，在善和恶的问题上，所谓的“终极真理”恰恰是非常非常稀少的。不同的民族有着不同的善恶观念，它们甚至往往直接相互矛盾；不同的时代也有着不同的善恶观念，相互矛盾的善恶观念随着时代发展相互取代的情况也并不少见。我们怎么能够说道德这一真理具有终极性呢！再比如，过去信教的时代传下来的是基督教的封建道德，这里就分别有天主教的道德和新教的道德，再细分又会有耶稣会天主教和正统新教的道德，等等，每一个都不一样。到启蒙时代，现代资产阶级的道德开始占据主流，随后无产阶级的道德开始出现。哪一个更合乎真理呢？哪一个都不具备绝对的终极性。但是代表着现实的变革方向、代表着未来发展趋势的道德，即无产阶级的道德，肯定会拥有更多的能长久持续下去的因素。[38]

Engels further pointed out that, in the final analysis, people always, consciously or unconsciously, derive their ethical and moral concepts from the actual relations on which their class position is based, that is, from the economic relations in which they produce and exchange.[39]39 Cf. *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 9, p. 99. Therefore, one cannot dogmatize a certain morality and then impose it on people as an eternal, ultimate, unchanging law; nor can moral principles override historical and epochal changes and national differences. All moral theories in history are fundamentally products of the economic conditions of society at the time; society moves forward in the midst of class opposition, and therefore morality is always class morality, either defending the ruling class or representing the interests of the ruled. Only in a society that has abolished class opposition and has also forgotten this opposition can there truly exist a human morality that transcends class opposition.[40]40 Cf. *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 9, p. 100.

恩格斯进一步指出，归根到底来说，人们总是自觉或不自觉地从他们所在阶级地位所依据的实际关系中，即他们进行生产和交换的经济关系中，来获得自己的伦理道德观念的。[39]因此，不能将某种道德教条化进而当做永恒的、终极不变的规律强加给人们，道德原则也无法凌驾于历史和时代的变迁以及民族的差异之上。历史上的一切道德论根本上来说都是当时社会经济状况的产物，社会在阶级对立中向前运动，因此，道德永远是阶级的道德，要么为统治阶级辩护，要么代表被统治者的利益。只有在消灭了阶级对立并且也遗忘了这种对立的社会之中，才可能有真正的超越阶级对立的人的道德存在。[40]

Furthermore, Engels also analyzed and criticized Dühring’s conception of equality and his understanding of freedom and necessity. Consistent with the foregoing analysis, any conception of equality is itself a historical product, determined by the economic base of the class that puts it forward. Therefore, the conception of equality cannot be an eternal truth. Freedom of the will refers to the ability to make decisions based on the cognition of things. The freer our judgment on a problem, the greater the necessity contained in the content of that judgment; hesitation is precisely premised on ignorance. Therefore, “freedom consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature which is founded on knowledge of natural necessity”; it must be a product of historical development and cannot be an eternal and unchanging truth.[41]41 Cf. *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 9, p. 120.

此外，恩格斯还剖析批判了杜林对于平等的观念、对自由与必然的认识。与前述分析一致，任何平等观念本身都是历史的产物，由提出该观念的阶级的经济基础所决定。因此平等观念不可能是永恒的真理。而意志自由是指借助于对事物的认识来做出决定的能力。我们对一个问题的判断越是自由，该判断的内容具有的必然性就越大，犹豫不决正是以不知为前提。因此，“自由就在于根据对自然界的必然性的认识来支配我们自己和外部自然”，它必定是历史发展的产物，也不可能是永恒不变的真理。[41]

In sum, through his critique of Dühring’s doctrine of man, Engels clarified the question of whether ultimate truth exists in human society. Fundamentally, human cognition does not possess supreme significance or unconditional right to truth; in none of the spheres of human cognition do ultimate or eternal truths exist, let alone the ultimacy of morality. Dühring’s argument is built on his incomplete materialism and metaphysical mode of thinking. The belief that ultimate truth exists in human society is consistent with Dühring’s view that the world is unified in being; that the world has a beginning in time and a limit in space; that nature is absolutely static in a “self-identical primitive state”; and that there is a “consciously thinking and acting nature,” and so on. When we look at the question of ultimate truth in isolation, the affirmative tone seems somewhat deceptive; but once we deeply analyze its ideological foundation, the problem becomes clearly visible. The basic understanding of the world model and nature determines the mode of understanding human society. Ultimate truth does not exist. Therefore, the thought of dialectical materialism is a sharp weapon to ensure that our cognition does not go astray.

总之，通过对杜林关于人的学说的批判，恩格斯澄清了在人类社会中终极真理是否存在的问题。根本上来说，人的认识并不具有至上的意义和无条件的真理权，人类的任何一个认识领域都不存在终极的或永恒的真理，道德的终极性就更不用说了。杜林的论点是建立在他不彻底的唯物主义和形而上学思维方式之上的。认为人类社会中存在终极真理，这正与杜林认为世界统一于存在；世界在时间上有开端，在空间上有界限；自然界在“自身等同的原始状态”下是绝对静止的；以及一个“自觉地思维和行动的自然界”等等观念是一脉相承的。当我们单独看终极真理的问题的时候，肯定的论调似乎具有一定的迷惑性；而一旦深入剖析其思想基础，就可以清楚的看出问题所在了。对世界模式和自然界的基本认识决定了对人类社会的理解方式。终极真理是不存在的。因此，唯物辩证法思想是确保我们的认识不出偏差的利器。

At the end of the “Philosophy” section of *Anti-Dühring*, Engels, starting from the two dialectical laws of the transformation of quantity into quality and the negation of the negation, analyzes the fallacies in Dühring’s thought, fully revealing the defects of his metaphysical mode of thinking and his ignorance of dialectics. Since the difference between dialectics and metaphysics has already been touched upon earlier, and due to space limitations, it will not be elaborated here.

在《反杜林论·哲学编》的最后，恩格斯从量和质的相互转变以及否定之否定这两个辩证法规律出发，剖析杜林思想的谬误，充分显示他形而上学思维方式的弊端以及对于辩证法的无知。由于前文对辩证法和形而上学的差异已有涉及，且篇幅所限，这里就不再详述。

IV. Conclusion

四、结 论

In the “Philosophy” section of *Anti-Dühring*, Engels, taking Dühring’s thought as a typical case, clarified the basic content and fundamental characteristics of dialectical materialism, as well as the differences between it and metaphysical thought. The correct understanding of the laws of nature, human society, and human thinking put forward here through analysis and elucidation remains an important guide for our understanding of the world to this day.

《反杜林论·哲学编》中恩格斯可以说以杜林思想为典型，澄清了唯物辩证法的基本内容和根本特点，以及它与形而上学思想的差异所在。这里通过剖析阐释而提出的对于自然界、人类社会以及人类思维规律的正确认识，直至今天依然是我们认识世界的重要指引。

The world is unified in matter; motion is the mode of existence of matter; life is the result of the continuous evolution and development of nature; there is no ultimate truth in human society; human cognition does not possess absolute supreme significance; and there is no trace of eternal truth in the moral sphere. These judgments completely exclude the concept of “God” or “Creator” in Western civilization and also preclude the possibility of interpreting the world from a religious perspective. If we can always keep these judgments in mind, then when faced with various religious phenomena today, such as cults, pseudo-religious swindlers, “masters,” and the like, we will not be confused or deceived, and the current so-called “religious fever” can also be conducted more rationally. Only by mastering the tool of dialectical materialism can we truly see through the essence of religious extremism and then find ways to possibly resolve its harm.

世界统一于物质，运动是物质的存在方式，生命是自然界不断演化发展的结果；人类社会中不存在终极真理，人的认识不具有绝对的至上的意义，道德领域更没有永恒真理的痕迹。这些判断就将西方文明中“上帝”或者“创世神”的概念彻底排除在外，也杜绝了从宗教的角度进行世界阐释的可能。如果我们能时时牢记这些判断，那么面对今天的各种宗教现象时，比如邪教，比如伪宗教的骗子、“大师”之类，就不会迷惑或者受到蛊惑，当前这场所谓的“宗教热”也才能够进行得更理智。也只有掌握了唯物辩证法这一工具，我们才能真正窥破宗教极端主义的本质，进而找到有可能化解其危害的办法。

Social phenomena involving the religious sphere are relatively complex; scientific atheism must precisely use the thought of dialectical materialism to discern the key points and guide public opinion. In the propaganda and education of atheism, the thought of dialectical materialism is indispensable. Moreover, in propaganda and education, special attention should be paid to combining current religious phenomena and problems to introduce and study dialectical materialism, so that the target can be hit, and the role of dialectical materialist thought can be more highlighted. For example, in recent years, the argument that “the reason for the moral decline in Chinese society is the lack of religion” has frequently appeared, attempting to replace secular morality with religious morality. However, this judgment not only does not conform to historical facts but also does not conform to the laws of dialectics. Morality in Chinese history was not built on the basis of religion; there is no such cultural tradition, so how could it be that in today’s modernized and secularized society, we need to turn to religion to improve morality? The world is changing and developing; there is no ultimate truth in human society, and religious morality is not an ultimate truth, nor is it a panacea. Even if there is a phenomenon of moral decline in our society today, it is not due to a lack of religion, nor can we simply expect religious morality to truly solve the problem. Being able to see this point, we can hope to find the real cause of moral decline and fundamentally address the solution to this social problem; rather than being specious and echoing others.

涉及宗教领域的各种社会现象相对来说都比较复杂，科学无神论正要运用唯物辩证法思想来洞悉其中的关要，指导大众舆论。在无神论的宣传和教育中，唯物辩证法思想必不可少。而且在宣传和教育之时，尤其要注意结合当前的宗教现象和问题来进行唯物辩证法的介绍和学习，这样才能有的放矢，也更凸显唯物辩证法思想的作用。比如近年来频频出现的“中国社会之所以道德滑坡，是因为缺乏宗教”的论调，妄图以宗教道德来取代世俗道德。然而这个判断不仅不符合历史事实，也不符合辩证法规律。中国历史上的道德就不是建立在宗教的基础上，无此文化传统，又怎会在现代化和世俗化的今天转而需要求助宗教以提升道德呢？世界是变化发展的，人类社会不存在终极真理，宗教道德也不是终极真理，更不是万灵药。即便今日我国社会有道德滑坡现象出现，也不是因为缺乏宗教的原因，更不可以简单地期望宗教道德真的能够解决问题。能够看到这一点，我们就有望找到道德滑坡的真正原因，并从根本上着手这一社会问题的解决；而不是似是而非，人云亦云。

There are many similar phenomena and arguments involving religion; they will not be analyzed one by one here. Scientific atheism, whether in research or propaganda, must make good use of the sharp ideological weapon of dialectical materialism. And the promotion and application of dialectical materialism cannot be separated from the interpretation of the classics. This article briefly sorts out the main viewpoints of Engels’s “Philosophy” section of *Anti-Dühring*, precisely as an attempt from this perspective. Re-proposing the scientific atheist viewpoints in the Marxist classics for application in this era still requires a great deal of work from us.

牵涉到宗教的类似现象和论调还有很多，这里就不再逐一进行分析。科学无神论不论在研究还是宣传中，都要好好利用唯物辩证法这一思想利器。而对唯物辩证法的提倡和运用，又不可脱离对经典的解读。本文简要梳理恩格斯《反杜林论·哲学编》的主要观点，正是从这个角度出发的一个尝试。将马克思主义经典中科学无神论的观点重新提出来，以应用于这个时代，还有大量的工作需要我们去做。

References:

参考文献：

[1]1 The three component parts of Marxism—philosophy, political economy, and scientific socialism—are a standard framework in orthodox Marxist-Leninist theory, codified by Lenin in his 1913 article “The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism.” *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 9, People’s Publishing House, 2009.

[1]《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年。

[2]2 The phrase “in all countries where there are proletarians and fearless scientific theorists” is a paraphrase of Engels’ own description of the international reception of *Anti-Dühring* in the preface to the second edition (1885). Wang Lei, Liang Yongzhao: “Engels’s Definition of Religion in *Anti-Dühring*,” *Cultural and Educational Materials*, Late October 2006 issue.

[2] 王蕾、梁永召：《恩格斯在<反杜林论>中的宗教定义》，《文教资料》2006年10月下旬刊。

[3]3 This is a direct quotation from Engels’ *Anti-Dühring*, “Introduction,” chapter 2, where he credits Marx and himself with this achievement. Tang Yingfu, “A Tentative Discussion of Engels’s ‘Truly Human Morality’ — Engels’s Original Insights in *Anti-Dühring·Philosophy*,” *Southern Review* 2008, no. 7.

[3] 唐英福：《试论恩格斯的“真正人的道德”——<反杜林论·哲学篇>中的恩格斯创见》，《南方论刊》2008年第7期。

[4]4 The reference to “dialectical laws” running through human thought and being gradually “conscious” to thinking people reflects Engels’ argument in *Anti-Dühring* that dialectics is the science of the general laws of motion, both in nature and in thought. Liu Yang, “What China Needs Is Secular Morality, Not Religion,” *Global Times*, January 3, 2014.

[4] 刘仰：《中国需要的是世俗道德，不是宗教》，《环球时报》2014年1月3日。

[1]1 The three component parts of Marxism—philosophy, political economy, and scientific socialism—are a standard framework in orthodox Marxist-Leninist theory, codified by Lenin in his 1913 article “The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism.” *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009), p. 1.

[1] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第1页。

[2]2 The phrase “in all countries where there are proletarians and fearless scientific theorists” is a paraphrase of Engels’ own description of the international reception of *Anti-Dühring* in the preface to the second edition (1885). *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, pp. 7–11.

[2] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第7-11页。

[3]3 This is a direct quotation from Engels’ *Anti-Dühring*, “Introduction,” chapter 2, where he credits Marx and himself with this achievement. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 13.

[3] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第13页。

[4]4 The reference to “dialectical laws” running through human thought and being gradually “conscious” to thinking people reflects Engels’ argument in *Anti-Dühring* that dialectics is the science of the general laws of motion, both in nature and in thought. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 13.

[4] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第13页。

[5]5 This is a paraphrase of Engels’ own statement in the “Introduction” to *Anti-Dühring* about the task of the “Philosophy” section. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 15.

[5] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第15页。

[6]6 The phrase “real thinking” (*wirkliches Denken*) is used by Engels in *Anti-Dühring*, “Philosophy,” chapter 9, to distinguish dialectical thinking from mere formal logic. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 17.

[6] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第17页。

[7]7 This is a direct quotation from Engels’ *Anti-Dühring*, “Introduction,” chapter 1, where he cites Heraclitus’ fragment. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 23.

[7] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第23页。

[8]8 The description of the rise of metaphysical thinking from the 15th century onward is a standard historical narrative in Engels’ *Anti-Dühring*, “Introduction,” chapter 1. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 24.

[8] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第24页。

[9]9 This is a direct quotation from Engels’ *Anti-Dühring*, “Introduction,” chapter 1, where he characterizes the metaphysical mode of thinking. Cf. *New Testament·Gospel of Matthew*, chap. 5, v. 37. Here cited from *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 24.

[9] 参《新约全书·马太福音》第5章第37节。此处转引自《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第24页。

[10]10 The example of the organism simultaneously dying and being reborn is taken from Engels’ *Anti-Dühring*, “Introduction,” chapter 1, where he uses it to illustrate the dialectical nature of life. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 25.

[10] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第25页。

[11]11 Friedrich Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 25 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1987), p. 33. (All citations in this text are from the Chinese edition: *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, vol. 9, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009.) *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 31.

[11] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第31页。

[12]12 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 33. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 37.

[12] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第37页。

[13]13 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 39. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, pp. 37–38.

[13] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第37-38页。

[14]14 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 39. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 39.

[14] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第39页。

[15]15 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 40. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 39.

[15] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第39页。

[16]16 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 41. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 40.

[16] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第40页。

[17]17 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 44. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 46.

[17] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第46页。

[18]18 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 45. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 47.

[18] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第47页。

[19]19 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 49. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 53.

[19] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第53页。

[20]20 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 53. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 58.

[20] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第58页。

[21]21 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 53. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 59.

[21] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第59页。

[22]22 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 54. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 63.

[22] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第63页。

[23]23 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 55. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 64.

[23] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第64页。

[24]24 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 56. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 67.

[24] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第67页。

[25]25 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 62. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 72.

[25] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第72页。

[26]26 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 62. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 72.

[26] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第72页。

[27]27 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 78. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 86.

[27] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第86页。

[28]28 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Part One, Chapter IX. The citations are from Dühring’s works as quoted by Engels. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 90.

[28] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第90页。

[29]29 Ibid. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 90.

[29] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第90页。

[30]30 Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Part One, Chapter IX. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 91.

[30] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第91页。

[31]31 Ibid. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 91.

[31] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第91页。

[32]32 Ibid. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 92.

[32] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第92页。

[33]33 Ibid. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 92.

[33] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第92页。

[34]34 Ibid. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, pp. 92–93.

[34] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第92-93页。

[35]35 Ibid. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, pp. 93–94.

[35] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第93-94页。

[36]36 Ibid. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 94.

[36] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第94页。

[37]37 Ibid. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, pp. 94–95.

[37] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第94-95页。

[38]38 Cf. *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 9, pp. 98-99. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, pp. 98–99.

[38] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第98-99页。

[39]39 Cf. *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 9, p. 99. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 99.

[39] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第99页。

[40]40 Cf. *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 9, p. 100. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, pp. 99–100.

[40] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第99-100页。

[41]41 Cf. *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 9, p. 120. *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 9, p. 120.

[41] 《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，人民出版社，2009年，第120页。

(Author: Doctor of Philosophy, Assistant Researcher at the Institute of Marxism, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

（作者：哲学博士，中国社会科学院马克思主义研究院助理研究员）

Online editor: Rainbow

网络编辑：彩虹

Originally published in: *Science and Atheism* 2015, no. 6.

原文发表于：《科学与无神论》2015年第6期。