An Analysis of the Theoretical Path of Empirical Research on Rural Religion

At the Central Conference on United Front Work held on 18 May 2015, General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: “At present, the number of sites for religious activities and of religious believers is growing rapidly. We must treat this issue with caution. Our Constitution and laws guarantee citizens’ right to religious belief, but we must be vigilant against the danger of religious infiltration and against religious appeals with political intent.” At the National Conference on Religious Work held on 22 April 2016, General Secretary Xi Jinping again stressed: “The religious question is always a major issue that our Party must handle well in governing the country. Religious work has a special importance in the overall work of the Party and the state. It bears on the development of the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics, on the flesh-and-blood bond between the Party and the masses, on social harmony and ethnic unity, and on national security and the unification of the motherland.” In his speech at the National Conference on Religious Work held from 3 to 4 December 2021, General Secretary Xi Jinping again stressed: “We must fully implement the Party’s theory on religious work for the New Era, fully implement the Party’s basic policy on religious work, fully implement the Party’s policy of freedom of religious belief, adhere to the direction of sinicizing our country’s religions, and actively guide religions to adapt to socialist society.” This article, after earnestly studying and implementing the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important speeches on religious work, responds to and discusses, in light of the relevant scholarly literature and reality, how to conduct good empirical research on rural religion.

在2015年5月18日召开的中央统战工作会议上，习近平总书记指出：“现在，宗教活动场所和信教群众数量增长很快。我们对这个问题要慎重对待。我国宪法法律保障公民信仰宗教的权利，但必须警惕宗教渗透的危险，警惕带有政治意图的宗教诉求。”在2016年4月22日召开的全国宗教工作会议中，习近平总书记再次强调：“宗教问题始终是我们党治国理政必须处理好的重大问题，宗教工作在党和国家工作全局中具有特殊重要性，关系中国特色社会主义事业发展，关系党同人民群众的血肉联系，关系社会和谐、民族团结，关系国家安全和祖国统一。”在2021年12月3日至4日的全国宗教工作会议上的讲话中，习近平总书记再次强调：“要全面贯彻新时代党的宗教工作理论，全面贯彻党的宗教工作基本方针，全面贯彻党的宗教信仰自由政策，坚持我国宗教中国化方向，积极引导宗教与社会主义社会相适应。”本文即是在认真学习贯彻习近平总书记有关宗教工作系列重要讲话精神后，针对学界有关文献，结合现实，就如何做好农村宗教实证研究做些回应和讨论。

I. Raising the Question

一、问题的提出

Based on attention to China’s rural non-traditional security and vigilance against the potential risk of infiltration by Western religions, and drawing on data collected through field investigations, in 2014 the Xiuyuan Foundation released *The Current State of the Spread of Western Religions in China’s Countryside – A Research Report of the Xiuyuan Foundation* (hereinafter *the Xiuyuan Report*). The report focuses on two main issues: first, the current state of the spread of Western religions in China’s countryside; second, the mechanisms by which Western religions spread in China’s countryside. Based on analysis of data from the team’s nationwide rural field investigations conducted in 2009 and earlier, the report found that, on the one hand, after nearly 30 years of development, Western religions, primarily Christianity, had replaced traditional rural religions and various forms of folk belief to become the dominant religion in China’s countryside, and that this process was accelerating at the “then” time of the team’s investigation and research; on the other hand, the spread of Western religions, primarily Christianity, in China’s countryside was not uniform but exhibited clear regional differences.

基于对我国农村非传统安全的重视和对西方宗教潜在渗透风险的警惕，根据实地调查收集的资料，2014年，修远基金会发布了《西方宗教在中国农村的传播现状——修远基金会研究报告》（以下简称《修远报告》）。该报告着重讨论的主要问题有二：一是西方宗教在中国农村传播的现状；二是西方宗教在中国农村传播的发生机制。基于团队2009年及以前在全国农村的实地调查资料分析，该报告发现：一方面，以基督教为主体的西方宗教在经过近30年的发展后，已经取代农村传统宗教和各种形式的民间信仰，成为我国农村的主导性宗教，且这一过程在该团队调查和研究的“当时”还在加速进行；另一方面，以基督教为主体的西方宗教在中国农村的传播并不是千篇一律的，而是存在明显的区域差异。

Three scholars from Peking University – Wu Yue, Zhang Chunni, and Lu Yunfeng – jointly published in *Open Times* 2020, no. 3, an article titled “Rethinking the ‘Rural Western Religion Fever’: Myth or Fact? – An Analysis Based on the China Family Panel Studies” (hereinafter *the Lu Article*). Based on data from the China Family Panel Studies for 2012, 2014, and 2016 (hereinafter “CFPS data”), the article criticizes *the Xiuyuan Report*, arguing that the “rural Western religion fever” described in *the Xiuyuan Report* is “a myth, not a fact.” The “fact” discovered by *the Lu Article* is that Western religions are not only not hot in the countryside but are weaker than traditional religions.

北京大学的吴越、张春妮、卢云峰三位学者在《开放时代》2020年第3期联合发表《反思“农村西方宗教热”：迷思还是事实——基于中国家庭追踪调查的分析》一文（以下简称《卢文》），文章基于中国家庭追踪调查2012年、2014年和2016年的数据（以下简称“CFPS数据”），对《修远报告》提出批评，认为《修远报告》所说的“农村西方宗教热”是“一个迷思而非事实”。《卢文》发现的“事实”是，西方宗教在农村不仅不热，而且还弱于传统宗教。

This article intends to discuss whether the facts about the development of Western religions in China’s countryside are truly as presented by *the Lu Article*. First, it clarifies this disputed factual issue, and then discusses how to better conduct empirical research on rural religion.

本文拟讨论的问题是西方宗教在中国农村发展的事实是否真如《卢文》所呈现的那样。首先对这一存在争议的事实进行厘清，然后讨论应该如何更好地做好农村宗教的实证研究。

*The Lu Article* raises three main issues: First, whether there is a factual basis for a Western religion fever in China’s countryside. This mainly refutes the first finding of *the Xiuyuan Report* regarding the current state of the spread of Western religions in the countryside. Second, whether the countryside is more conducive to the spread of Western religions than cities. This point is an extension by *the Lu Article* from *the Xiuyuan Report*: *the Xiuyuan Report* did not discuss the spread of Western religions in cities. In *the Lu Article*’s view, since the spread of Western religions in the countryside shows a “fever,” this implies that rural society is more conducive to the spread of Western religions. If findings contrary to this can be found in the current state of the spread of Western religions in cities, then it can disprove that rural society is more conducive to the spread of Western religions. Third, whether the characteristics of typical regions can be extrapolated to the national situation. *The Lu Article* also discusses regional differences in the distribution of Western religions in China. Using survey data from Guangdong Province and Henan Province in the CFPS data as examples, it finds that rural areas in Henan, representing the north, do exhibit a pattern dominated by the distribution of Western religions, while rural areas in Guangdong, representing the south, exhibit a pattern dominated by the distribution of traditional religions. *The Lu Article* considers this finding consistent with *the Xiuyuan Report*, but criticizes it, saying “one cannot extrapolate from the situation in rural Henan to conclude that there is a nationwide ‘rural Western religion fever.’”

《卢文》主要提出了三个问题：第一，中国农村是否存在西方宗教热的事实。这主要是驳斥《修远报告》关于西方宗教在农村传播现状的第一个方面的发现。第二，农村比城市是否更有利于西方宗教的传播。这一点是《卢文》根据《修远报告》延伸出来的问题：《修远报告》并没有讨论城市中的西方宗教传播问题，在《卢文》看来，既然西方宗教在农村传播出现“热”，就说明这背后暗含了农村社会更有利于西方宗教传播，如果能在城市西方宗教传播现状中找到与农村相反的发现，就可以否证农村社会并非更有利于西方宗教传播。第三，典型区域的特点能否推论全国的情况。《卢文》同样讨论了西方宗教在中国分布的区域差异，该文以CFPS数据中广东省与河南省的调查数据为例发现，代表北方的河南农村确实存在以西方宗教分布为主的特点，而代表南方的广东农村则存在以传统宗教分布为主的现象。《卢文》认为这一发现与《修远报告》是一致的，但又批评说“不能以河南农村的情况来推论出全国出现‘农村西方宗教热’的现象。”

Among the three aspects in which *the Lu Article* criticizes *the Xiuyuan Report* as described above, aside from the first point, which is a critique directed at the original meaning of *the Xiuyuan Report*, the second and third points belong to what they call an “extended” understanding of *the Xiuyuan Report*. Their purpose is, of course, to use these latter two points to further support the correctness of *the Lu Article* on the first point, i.e., that there is no phenomenon of a Western religion fever in China’s countryside. From the focus of the two documents, the present author only needs to discuss the first point of *the Lu Article*. However, given that *the Lu Article* touches at the phenomenal level on the urban-rural and north-south differences in the spread of Western religions, the present author will also discuss whether the “facts” derived by *the Lu Article* on these two points are indeed facts, and what further work should be done as academic research.

在《卢文》前述批评《修远报告》的三个方面中，除了第一点是针对《修远报告》原文的意思而展开批评外，第二点和第三点则属于他们所说的“延伸”理解《修远报告》，其目的当然是试图用后两点来更进一步佐证《卢文》在第一点上的正确，即中国农村不存在西方宗教热的现象。从两篇文献的聚焦点来说，笔者只需要针对《卢文》的第一点展开讨论即可，然而，鉴于《卢文》在现象层面涉及了西方宗教传播的城乡和南北差异问题，笔者同样会讨论《卢文》在这两点上所得出的“事实”是否是事实，以及作为学术研究，进一步的工作应该做些什么？

II. The Current State of the Spread of Western Religions in the Countryside

二、农村西方宗教传播的现状问题

To grasp the current state of the spread of Western religions in the countryside, the first step in research is to clarify the basic meaning of “Western religions.” The dispute between *the Lu Article* and *the Xiuyuan Report* begins precisely here.

要把握农村西方宗教传播的现状，研究工作的第一步是要厘清西方宗教的基本含义，而《卢文》与《修远报告》的争议亦因此而始。

First, there is the dispute over whether the connotation of Western religion includes underground Christianity and heretical organizations such as cults. The Lu article defines Western religion as Christianity and Catholicism, and traditional religion as Buddhism and Daoism. The Xiuyuan Report, however, defines Western religion as religions that take the Bible as their basic doctrine, including Catholicism, Protestant Christianity, and heretical organizations (such as cult organizations like Almighty God and the Disciples Sect), and it covers all underground Western religions that have not registered with the government or do not recognize government leadership, including various Christian house churches, underground Catholicism, Christian cults, and other underground Western religious organizations. The Lu article does not include underground churches or heretical organizations such as cults; it mainly refers to Protestant Christians and Catholics who conform to the Three-Self Patriotic Movement of Christian Churches in China (hereinafter referred to as the "Three-Self Church") and are actively acknowledged by the respondents. Based on data from the CFPS survey, they estimate that there are approximately 39.97 million Christians in China, of whom about 12 million are "hidden Christians." In another article, they point out that in 2016, there were approximately 39.97 million Christians in China, of whom 28.29 million were "open Christians" and 11.67 million were "hidden Christians," with these "hidden Christians" referring to those who "profess belief in God but do not acknowledge themselves as Christians." When the Lu article criticizes the Xiuyuan Report for "exaggerating" the number of Christians in China, it says that these nearly 12 million "hidden Christians" can be removed without affecting their overall judgment or their criticism of the Xiuyuan Report. The problem here is that the 12 million people they remove account for nearly 30% of the total sample. Their rationale is: "Because existing survey data do not include practitioners of folk religion, and the scale of folk religion practitioners is likely to be much larger than that of so-called underground Christians. Therefore, ignoring folk religion practitioners in this article will not only not weaken our argument, i.e., to refute the claim that 'Western religion dominates in rural areas,' but will even strengthen our view. If folk religion could be included, it would be even more impossible for Western religion to dominate in rural areas." What is even more logically contradictory is that the Lu article at one point says there are 39.97 million Christians, including "hidden Christians," but then, to prove that the Xiuyuan Report has "exaggerated" the problem, it claims that its article does not include "hidden Christians."

第一，关于西方宗教的内涵是否包括地下基督教以及异端组织类如邪教的争议。《卢文》将西方宗教定义为基督教与天主教，将传统宗教定义为佛教和道教。而《修远报告》中关于西方宗教的定义是指以圣经为基本教义的宗教，包括天主教、基督新教和异端组织（如全能神、门徒会等邪教组织），且涵盖了所有没有在政府登记注册或不承认政府领导的地下西方宗教，包括各种基督教的家庭教会、地下天主教、基督邪教等地下西方宗教组织。《卢文》没有将地下教会、异端组织类的邪教等包括进来，主要指涉的是符合中国基督教三自爱国运动委员会（下文简称“三自教会”）且被调查者主动认可的基督新教徒和天主教徒。他们根据CFPS调查的数据推算，中国约有3997万基督徒，其中，“隐藏的基督徒”大约有1200万。而在另外一篇文章中，他们指出，2016年我国基督徒大约有3997万人，其中“公开的基督徒”有2829万人，“隐藏的基督徒”有1167万人，这些“隐藏的基督徒”是指那些“宣称信仰上帝但不承认自己是基督徒”的人。《卢文》在批评《修远报告》“夸大”中国基督徒数量时说，可以去掉这近1200万“隐藏的基督徒”，且不影响他们的总体判断以及他们对《修远报告》的批评。那么，这里的问题在于，他们去掉的1200万人占到了总体样本的近30%。他们立论的理由是：“因为现有调查数据并没有把民间信仰的实践者包括进来，而民间信仰者在规模上很可能比所谓的地下基督教徒规模要大得多。因此，本文忽略民间信仰者不仅不会削弱我们的立论，即反驳‘西方宗教在农村地区一教独大’的提法，甚至还会强化我们的观点，如果能够把民间信仰包括进来，西方宗教在农村更不可能是一教独大。” 更让人觉得逻辑上的矛盾之处在于，《卢文》一会说有3997万基督徒时是包含了“隐藏的基督徒”的，但为了证明他们所说的《修远报告》“夸大”了问题又说他们的文章不包括“隐藏的基督徒”。

Logically, this argument is open to question. Because the basis of the Lu article's argument is that the Xiuyuan Report exaggerates the fact of the spread of Western religion in rural areas, they should demonstrate how the Xiuyuan Report exaggerates. Instead, to claim that the Xiuyuan Report exaggerates, they remove nearly 30% of their own actual data, then make a speculative statement about another variable that is not directly related, using the word "likely," thereby blurring the facts into a "myth." After removing nearly 30% of the underground Christians, they do not calculate the number of Catholics or the situation of cult organizations such as the Disciples Sect and Almighty God. If it is difficult to estimate the specific number of heretical groups like the Disciples Sect and Almighty God due to their cult nature, then the number of Catholics should not be ignored. According to the

从逻辑上来说，这一立论是有待商榷的。因为《卢文》立论的根据是说《修远报告》夸大了西方宗教在农村传播的事实，那么，他们就应该论证《修远报告》是如何夸大的。而不是为了说《修远报告》夸大了，就把他们自己所得出的实际数据去掉近30%，然后再说一个与之并不直接相关的其他变量的“很可能”的推测性表述，把事实模糊成“迷思”了。在去掉近30%的地下基督徒的数量后，他们没有计算天主教徒的数量以及诸如门徒会、全能神等邪教组织的情况。如果说门徒会、全能神这类异端因为其邪教的性质而难以估计具体数量的话，那么，对于天主教的数量是不应忽略掉的。根据国务院新闻办公室2018年4月3日发布的《中国保障宗教信仰自由的政策和实践》白皮书，我国天主教徒的数量大概在600万人。这意味着加上前述被《卢文》忽略的1200万隐藏的基督徒，《卢文》实际上去掉了总体样本中45%的西方宗教教徒的数量。如果用一个简单的数学等式来表示：《卢文》所说的“西方宗教”教徒数量=基督教教徒数（公开的基督徒数+隐藏的基督徒数）+天主教徒数；《修远报告》所说的“西方宗教”教徒数量=基督教信徒数（三自教会信徒数+家庭教会信徒数）+天主教信徒数+异端类的邪教信徒数（门徒会信徒数+全能神教信徒数+其他邪教信徒数）。这两个等式中，重合的部分只有《卢文》的“公开的基督徒数”和《修远报告》的“三自教会信徒数”，两者主要都是指一般意义上符合国家三自教会政策的注册登记的信徒数。截取这一小部分来反驳包含了这一小部分的更大部分的总体，从逻辑上是说不通的。

Second, the dispute concerning traditional religion. In order to refute the facts presented in the *Xiuyuan Report*, the *Lu Article* continues to offer further criticism and supporting arguments from the perspective of traditional religion. The *Lu Article*’s reasoning is that if traditional religion is still very developed in rural areas, or even has more adherents than Western religion, then this would all the more refute the “myth” of a “rural Western religion fever.” The *Lu Article* defines traditional religion as Buddhism and Daoism. In other words, to refute the “myth” of a Western religion fever, one need only demonstrate that the number of Buddhist and Daoist adherents is still greater than the number of Western religion adherents. The weighted data for 2016 provided by the *Lu Article* shows that, among all 2,275 rural residents who claimed to have a religious belief, traditional religion accounted for 76%, Western religion only 19%, Islam 3%, and other religions 2%. Therefore, they conclude: “Western religion is not as rampant as some scholars imagine.” The *Lu Article* has a certain misunderstanding of the “fever” mentioned in the *Xiuyuan Report*. The *Xiuyuan Report* mainly emphasizes the “process of heating up,” that is, “be heating to hot,” whereas the *Lu Article* understands “fever” as “heat” in the sense of a result or state, that is, “boiling.”

第二，关于传统宗教的争议。《卢文》为了驳斥《修远报告》的事实，继续从传统宗教的角度做进一步的批评和支撑论证。《卢文》的理由是，如果传统宗教在农村仍然很发达或者数量甚至比西方宗教更多的话，那更能否证“农村西方宗教热”那样的“迷思”。《卢文》将传统宗教定义为佛教和道教。换言之，要否证西方宗教热的“迷思”，就只需要论证佛教和道教的教徒数量比西方宗教徒数量还多。《卢文》给出的2016年经加权后的数据表明，在声称有宗教信仰的所有2275例农村居民中，传统宗教占比为76%，而西方宗教只有19%，伊斯兰教是3%，其他宗教2%。所以，他们得出结论说：“西方宗教并非如一些学者想像的那样泛滥”。《卢文》对《修远报告》所说的“热”存在一定的误解。《修远报告》主要是强调“热的过程”，即“be heating to hot”，而《卢文》理解的“热”是结果或状态意义上的“热”，即“boiling”。

Third, the dispute over proceeding from numbers or from facts. Facts do not necessarily ultimately manifest as precise numbers at the research level, especially in rigorous written texts. On the contrary, so-called aggregated numbers derived from facts may even be less able to replace facts. Although the *Lu Article* discovered, in the factual dimension of religious practice, that Western religion, due to its strict management system, organizational methods, and customary characteristics, has higher visibility, which makes possible the fact of a “rural Western religion fever” as found by the *Xiuyuan Report*. For example, they found that the 2016 CFPS data shows that the proportion of organized adherents of Western religion in rural areas is 56%, while that of traditional religion is only 8.9%. Therefore, the former exhibits a higher level of organization, while the latter is loosely organized. Proceeding from this fact, the *Xiuyuan Report* attempts to understand the convenience brought to the spread of Western religion by its powerful organizational mechanisms, whereas the *Lu Article* blurs this issue numerically by stating that “a large number of traditional religion adherents who practice at home (lay Buddhists), even if devout, do not consider themselves to have joined a religious organization.” This blurring is logically erroneous. The high degree of organization of Western religion all the more proves the rural Western religion fever; the extremely loose organization of traditional religion can further highlight how intense the Western religion fever is. And this is precisely one of the issues to which the *Xiuyuan Report* attaches importance.

第三，关于从数字出发还是从事实出发的争议。事实不一定能在研究层面尤其是严谨的写作文本上最终表现为精确的数字。相反，从事实而来的所谓汇总的数字，可能更无法代替事实。《卢文》尽管在宗教实践层面的事实维度上发现了西方宗教因其严格的管理制度、组织方式和习俗特点而使得其可见度更高，才使得有可能出现像《修远报告》发现的“农村西方宗教热”的事实。例如，他们发现，2016年的CFPS数据表明，农村西方宗教的组织化信徒比例为56%，而传统宗教的比例仅为8.9%。因此，前者表现出更高的组织化水平，而后者则组织松散。由此事实出发，《修远报告》试图理解的是西方宗教强有力的组织机制为其传播所带来的便利，而《卢文》则对此从数字上以“大量在家修行的传统宗教信徒（居士）即便虔诚也并不认为自己加入了宗教组织”为由而模糊处理了。这种模糊处理从逻辑上来说是错误的。西方宗教的组织化程度如此之高，更能证明农村西方宗教热，传统宗教组织程度如此松散，更可以进一步衬托出西方宗教如此之热。而这正是《修远报告》重视的问题之一。

Based on this, the *Lu Article* has actually failed to effectively refute the facts of the *Xiuyuan Report* that they intended to address; on the contrary, it has precisely further proven the facts presented by the *Xiuyuan Report*. Of course, even regarding facts that support the *Xiuyuan Report*, caution must still be exercised with the *Lu Article*’s data, and this issue will be discussed further below.

基于此，《卢文》实际上未能有效地驳斥他们要说的《修远报告》的事实，反而恰好进一步证明了《修远报告》所呈现的事实，当然，即使是有利于支持《修远报告》的事实，对于《卢文》的数据，仍需持谨慎态度，下文将继续讨论这一问题。

III. The Issue of Urban-Rural Differences in the Spread of Western Religion

三、西方宗教传播的城乡差异问题

From a scholarly perspective, the spread of Western religion in urban and rural areas merely involves different physical spaces for propagation and cannot serve as mutually negating evidence. One cannot argue that the speed of Western religion’s spread in cities can be used to refute its speed of spread in rural areas. However, the article by Lu [卢文] devotes considerable space to arguing that the spread of Western religion in cities is not necessarily slow, thereby extending this to negate the claim that it spreads quickly in rural areas. Setting aside this logical deficiency for the moment, we turn instead to a discussion of the urban-rural data comparisons they employ in their argument.

从学理上来说，西方宗教在城市和农村的传播只是传播的具体物理空间不同而已，而不能成为互相否定的证据。不能说西方宗教在城市传播快慢与否，就可以用来否证其在农村传播的快慢状况。然而，《卢文》花了很大篇幅来论证西方宗教在城市传播并不见得慢，从而来延伸否定西方宗教在农村传播快。此处暂且搁置他们这种逻辑上的不足，转而从他们论证的城市与农村的数据对比来展开讨论。

First, in terms of the number of believers, the article by Lu claims that it cannot demonstrate that the spread of Western religious believers in rural areas is more intense than in cities. Based on the data presented, the article by Lu finds that in the 2012 CFPS data, the proportion of rural residents believing in Western religion was 0.5% higher than that of urban residents, while the 2016 data shows that rural areas were only 0.2% higher than urban areas—these percentage differences between urban and rural areas are not significant. The article by Lu states: “In the 20th century, the majority of China’s population lived in rural areas, but with the development of urbanization, by around 2010 the urban and rural populations were roughly equal, and now the urban population has surpassed the rural population. Therefore, if the proportions of Western religious believers in the urban and rural populations are comparable, this means that the absolute number of Western religious believers living in cities is higher than in rural areas.” The article by Lu does not provide the absolute numbers of Western religious believers in urban and rural areas separately, as it does for the overall population, but instead uses the vague phrasing of “comparable proportions” to obscure the claim that “the absolute number of urban Western religious believers is higher than in rural areas.” On this point, we need to clarify at least the following two issues: first, according to the calculations in the article by Lu, what exactly are the absolute numbers of Western religious believers in urban and rural areas? Second, when it comes to the highly subjective variable of religious belief, what exactly is the difference between urban and rural areas?

第一，从信徒数量上看，《卢文》认为无法说明农村西方宗教信徒传播比城市热。从数据呈现看，《卢文》发现，在2012年CFPS的数据中，农村人口信仰西方宗教的比例比城镇高0.5%，而2016年的数据表明，农村仅比城镇高0.2%，这些百分比的城乡差别并不显著。《卢文》指出：“20世纪我国大多数人口生活在农村，但随着城镇化的发展，到2010年左右城乡人口已基本相当，而今城镇人口已经超过了农村人口。因此，城乡人口中，西方宗教信徒的比重相当，就意味着生活在城镇的西方宗教信徒的绝对人数要高于农村。”。《卢文》并没有像推算总体那样给出城乡各自的西方宗教徒的绝对人数，而是用所谓比例相当的说法模糊处理为“城镇西方宗教信徒的绝对数要高于农村”。对此，我们需要厘清的至少有如下两点：其一是，按《卢文》推算，城镇和农村西方宗教徒的绝对数到底有多少？其二是，涉及宗教信仰这个非常特殊的主观变量时，城镇和乡村的区别到底在哪？

To clarify these two issues, the author examined the original publicly available CFPS data used by the article by Lu. Among them, the 2016 data indicates that in the results collected from the adult questionnaire with a “religious belief module,” the respondents were classified according to the questionnaire’s item A301, “current household registration status,” into four options: “1. agricultural household registration; 3. non-agricultural household registration; 5. no household registration; 79. not applicable.” Here, “no household registration” specifically refers to “those who have not settled in China and hold no other nationality,” while “not applicable” specifically refers to “respondents who are not Chinese nationals.” The data results show that the total sample for agricultural household registration is 24,393 cases, for non-agricultural household registration is 8,801 cases, and the total sample is 33,244 cases. This means that the sample proportion for agricultural household registration is 73.38%, and for non-agricultural household registration is 26.47%. Such a proportional match cannot be described as “roughly equal.” In other words, even if other publicly available data indicate that the urban and rural populations are already roughly equal, the sample sizes in this CFPS data are not comparable. Looking at the proportions, according to the CFPS data, in the 2016 survey sample, there were 510 Christians with agricultural household registration, accounting for 2.09%, and 110 Catholics, accounting for 0.45%. Together, Christians and Catholics—which the article by Lu defines as Western religion—account for 2.54% of the total agricultural household registration sample. Among non-agricultural household registrations, Christians account for 1.94% and Catholics for 0.40%. According to the definition of Western religion in the article by Lu, the combined proportion of the two in the total non-agricultural household registration sample is 2.35%. The calculated difference is that rural areas are 0.2% higher than urban areas, not the opposite, and this is not the same concept as absolute numbers. On the contrary, if the ratios truly reflect reality, then the absolute number of Western religious believers in rural areas is not only comparable to that in cities but actually much larger.

为了厘清这两个问题，笔者检查了《卢文》所运用的CFPS公开的原始数据。其中，2016年的数据表明，在有“宗教信仰模块”调查的成人问卷所收集的数据结果中，按问卷给定的第A301条“现在的户口状况”区分，他们共区分了“1.农业户口；3.非农业户口；5.没有户口；79.不适用”四个选项，其中，“没有户口”专指“在中国没有落户，也没有其他国籍”，“不适用”则专指“非中国籍受访者”。数据结果表明，农业户口的样本合计有24393例，非农业户口的样本合计有8801例，总样本合计是33244例，也就是说，农业户口的样本量占比为73.38%，非农业户口的样本量占比为26.47%。那么，对于这样的比例匹配，是不能说成“基本相当”的。或者说，即使有什么公开的其他数据表明城乡人口已经基本相当了，但是CFPS这里的样本量却是不相当的。再看比例，按CFPS数据，2016年的调查样本中，农业户口的基督教徒有510例，占比为2.09%，天主教徒有110例，占比为0.45%，由基督教徒和天主教徒共同组成《卢文》所定义的西方宗教占全部农业户口样本的比例为2.54%。而在非农业户口中，基督教徒的占比为1.94%，天主教徒占比为0.40%，按《卢文》所定义的西方宗教，两者合计占总体非农业户口样本的比例为2.35%，推算出来的差值是农村比城镇高出0.2%，而不是相反，且这与绝对数字不是同一个概念。相反，如果比值真的符合实际的事实，那么，农村的西方宗教徒的数字在绝对数上不仅与城市不相当，反而是多出很多。

In light of this, according to the statistical classification actually used in the calculations of the article by Lu—that is, using agricultural household registration to represent rural areas and non-agricultural household registration to represent urban areas—and according to the National Bureau of Statistics, by the end of 2016, China’s mainland total population was 1.38271 billion, of which the urbanization rate of the registered population was 41.2%. Based on this, it can be calculated that the urban population with non-agricultural household registration was 569.67652 million, while the rural population with agricultural household registration was 813.03348 million. Among them, the proportion of the population aged 16 and above that year was 82.3%. Based on this, the total population aged 16 and above, corresponding to the adult questionnaire of the CFPS survey, can be inferred as: 468.843776 million for non-agricultural household registration and 669.126554 million for agricultural household registration. Then, according to the CFPS 2016 data cited by the article by Lu, among the population aged 16 and above, the number of Western religious believers under the statistical definition of the article by Lu would be 16.995815 million in rural areas and 11.017829 million in urban areas. The difference indicates that in absolute terms, rural areas have 5.977986 million more believers than urban areas. Similarly, if we follow the assumption in another paper by the same authors published in *Open Times* [开放时代] that “if we assume the religious distribution of minors in China is the same as that of adults,” then the full-scope number of rural Western religious believers would reach 20.65105 million, while urban areas would have only 13.387398 million. The comparison shows that the absolute number of rural Western religious believers exceeds that of urban areas by 7.263112 million. However, in reality, such an “assumption” cannot be made. In the age group of 0–15 years, especially when measuring religious belief, how can one “assume” they are the same as “adults”? Clearly, infants aged 0–6 do not know their religious beliefs. Such an “assumption” has no practical significance except to artificially expand the denominator when processing data in order to validate the researchers’ own “hypothesis.” In the second paragraph on page 161 of the article by Lu, the authors state: “In terms of numerical values, in 2012 the proportion of rural residents believing in Western religion was 0.5% higher than that of urban residents, while in 2016 the proportion of urban residents believing in Western religion was 0.2% higher than that of rural residents” (in reality, the 2016 data shows rural areas 0.2% higher than urban areas; the article by Lu deliberately reversed this). Then, in the second and third paragraphs on page 162 of the same article, it is stated that “the proportion of the rural population believing in Western religion is not higher than that of the urban population, nor is there a larger number of Western religious believers in rural areas,” and “in terms of the proportion and scale of believers, the development of Western religion in rural areas has not exceeded that in urban areas.” When discussing scale, the article by Lu does not provide specific numbers but instead adopts a vague approach regarding proportions. A further problem is that the proportions themselves do not support their argument.

有鉴于此，按照《卢文》数据计算所实际区分的统计口径，即按农业户口代表农村、非农业户口代表城镇，按国家统计局的统计，到2016年末，我国大陆总人口有13.8271亿人，其中，户籍人口城镇化率为41.2%，据此可以推算出非农业户口的城镇人口有5.6967652亿人，而农业户口的人数则为8.1303348亿人。其中，当年16岁以上的人口占比为82.3%，据此可以推算出与CFPS问卷调查的成人问卷所需要推论的16岁及以上的总人口数为：非农业户口的有4.68843776亿人，农业户口的有6.69126554亿人。再根据《卢文》所援引的CFPS2016年的数据推算，在16岁以上的人群中，《卢文》统计口径的西方宗教徒的数量在农村则达1699.5815万人，而城镇则有1101.7829万人，两者的差值表明，在绝对数上农村比城镇多出597.7986万人。同样，如果按照他们另一篇发表在《开放时代》的论文中“若假定我国未成年人的信仰分布与成年人相同”，那么，全口径的农村西方宗教徒的数量达到了2065.1050万人，而城镇则只有1338.7398万人。两者相比，农村西方宗教徒的绝对数量比城市多出726.3112万人。然而，实际上是不能这样去“假定”的。在0-15岁年龄组的人口中，特别是测量宗教信仰时，怎么可以“假定”他们跟“成年人”相同呢？显然，0-6岁组的婴幼儿不知道他们的宗教信仰。那样“假定”，除了处理数据时人为扩大分母以论证研究者自己的“假设”外，没有实际意义。在《卢文》第161页的第二段中，作者说：“从数值上看，2012年农村人口中信仰西方宗教的信徒比重比城镇高0.5%，而2016年城镇人口中信仰西方宗教的信徒比农村高0.2%”（实际情况是，2016年的数据中农村比城镇高出0.2%，《卢文》故意将之处理反了）。而在该文第162页第二段、第三段中却说成“农村信仰西方宗教的人口比重并不比城镇更高，也不存在数量更多的西方宗教徒”，“在信徒比重和规模上西方宗教在农村的发展并没有高于城镇”。《卢文》说规模的时候并没有给出具体的数字，而是采取了在比重上模糊的办法，进一步的问题还在于，比重其实也不能支撑他们的论证。

Second, as measured by the state of religious practice and the degree of importance of religion, the article by Lu argues that the data not only fails to support the notion of a rural Western religion fever, but on the contrary, the urban performance is more pronounced than the rural. To argue that Western religion is more likely to be “hot” in cities than in rural areas, thereby refuting the proposition of a “rural Western religion fever,” the article by Lu, in addition to the above argument based on the indicator of the number or scale of believers, also makes further measurements and arguments from the two indicators of “religious practice activity” and “importance of religious belief.” Regarding religious practice activity, the article by Lu does not specifically define what constitutes active, inactive, or completely inactive in the text; its formulation is: “At the ‘inactive’ end, the proportion of inactive believers in towns (12.9%) is significantly lower than in rural areas (23.8%); at the ‘active’ end, the proportion of active Western religion believers who attend worship at least once a week in towns (63%) is also significantly higher than in rural areas (51.8%).” Following the line of reasoning in the article by Lu, the author consulted the original questionnaire items and raw data. The corresponding measurement item is question “M602B” in the 2016 CFPS adult questionnaire: “How often do you attend worship?” It sets eight response options: “1. Never; 2. Once a year; 3. A few times a year; 4. Once a month; 5. Two or three times a month; 6. Once a week; 7. Several times a week; 8. Almost every day.” The article by Lu does not explain how the intermediate response options are distinguished in terms of activity level. However, the author believes that defining “option 1. Never” as “inactive” and “option 7. Several times a week” and “option 8. Almost every day” as “active” should be uncontroversial.

第二，从宗教实践活动状况和宗教重要性的程度测量看，《卢文》认为数据不仅不能支撑农村西方宗教热，相反，城市表现比农村更突出。为了论证西方宗教在城市比农村更可能“热”从而否证“农村西方宗教热”的命题，《卢文》除了在上述教徒数量或规模这一指标上进行论证外，还从“宗教实践活跃度”与“宗教信仰重要性”两个指标上做了进一步测量和论证。就宗教实践活跃度来看，《卢文》没有在文中具体就何为活跃、不活跃、完全不活跃做出界定，其表述是：“在‘不活跃’一端，城镇不活跃信徒的比重（12.9%）显著低于农村（23.8%），在‘活跃’一端，符合每周做礼拜一次以上的活跃的西方宗教信徒的比重在城镇（63%）也要显著高于农村（51.8%）”。循《卢文》的思路，笔者查阅了问卷原题与原始数据。其中，对应测量的题目是2016年CFPS成人问卷中的“第M602B”题“您做礼拜的频率有多高”，一共设置了“1.从不；2.一年一次；3.一年几次；4.一月一次；5.一月两三次；6.一周一次；7.一周几次；8.几乎每天”8个回答选项。中间回答选项如何在活跃程度上加以区分，《卢文》没有交代。但是，笔者认为把回答中的“选项1.从不”界定为“不活跃”，把“选项7.一周几次”和“选项8.几乎每天”界定为“活跃”应是不会有争议的。

At the inactive end, the raw data results show that the number of people who chose option 1, i.e., never attend worship, is 20,584 among agricultural household registrations, accounting for 84.39% of the total 24,393 agricultural household registrations, while the number of non-agricultural household registrations who chose option 1, never attend worship, is 7,743, accounting for 87.98% of the total 8,801 non-agricultural household registrations. At the active end, the distribution of those who chose option 7, i.e., attend worship several times a week, is 111 cases for agricultural household registrations, accounting for 0.46%, and 25 cases for non-agricultural household registrations, accounting for 0.28%; the distribution of those who chose option 8, i.e., attend worship almost every day, is 165 cases for agricultural household registrations, accounting for 0.68%, and 17 cases for non-agricultural household registrations, accounting for 0.19%. Therefore, whether at the inactive end or the active end, based solely on the data, it can only be proven that rural Western religious practice activities are more active than those in towns, and it cannot be proven that the religious practice activities of urban Western religion believers are more active than those in rural areas. Furthermore, using a sample of 17 individuals to infer the religious practice of Western religion believers across all Chinese cities is also inappropriate; the vastness of China’s territory is sufficient to dilute the validity of a sample of 17 cases.

在不活跃这一端，原始数据的结果是，选择选项1即从不做礼拜的人数，在农业户口中有20584例，占全部农业户口人数24393例的比例为84.39%，而非农业户口选择选项1从不做礼拜的人数有7743例，占全部非农业户口人数8801例的比例为87.98%。在活跃一端，选择选项7即一周做几次礼拜的人数分布是，农业户口有111例，占比为0.46%，非农业户口有25例，占比为0.28%，选择选项8即几乎每天做礼拜的人数分布是，农业户口有165例，占比为0.68%，非农业户口有17例，占比为0.19%。因此，无论是不活跃端，还是活跃端，仅仅是从数据看，只能证明农村西方宗教实践活动比城镇更活跃，而无法证明城镇西方宗教信徒的实践活动比农村更活跃。此外，用17个人的样本去推论整个中国城市的西方宗教信徒的宗教实践也是欠妥的，中国幅员之辽阔足以稀释掉17例样本的效度。

As for measuring the degree of importance people attach to religious belief, the corresponding original question in the 2016 CFPS questionnaire is “Question M603”: “Regardless of whether you participate in religious activities/affairs, is religion important to you?” The corresponding response options are three: “1. Very important; 2. Somewhat important; 3. Not important.” The article by Lu does not specify whether the religious belief here refers only to Western religion adherents or to the entire respondent population. Logically, if it refers only to Western religion adherents, since they have chosen to believe in Christianity or Catholicism, it is hard to imagine that such a high proportion of respondents would answer that religion is not important. The results shown in “Figure 7” of the article by Lu indicate that the proportion of urban believers (not explicitly stated as “urban Western religion believers”) who chose to consider religion unimportant is 12.1%, while for rural believers (also not stated as “rural Western religion believers”) it is 19.4%. Even so, the proportion of urban believers who consider religion unimportant is lower than that of rural believers. Similarly, the data in Figure 7 of the article by Lu show that the proportion of urban believers who consider religion very important is 63.9%, while the proportion for rural believers is 62.4%. Such close proportions make it difficult to support the conclusion that “rural Western religion believers do not value their faith more than urban believers; on the contrary, urban believers show a higher degree of importance attached to religion.” If we look solely at the population distribution, the results shown by the raw data of the 2016 CFPS are inconsistent with the argument the article by Lu seeks to establish. That is, according to the raw data, without distinguishing whether respondents are Western religion believers, the responses to this question show that the number of agricultural household registrations who chose “religion is very important” is 1,833, accounting for 7.51%, while for non-agricultural population it is 511, accounting for 5.81%. The number of agricultural population who chose “religion is somewhat important” is 4,176, accounting for 17.12%, while for non-agricultural population it is 1,744, accounting for 19.82%; the number of agricultural population who chose “religion is not important” is 18,338, accounting for 75.18%, while for non-agricultural population it is 6,537, accounting for 74.28%. It should be said that this data also cannot overwhelmingly demonstrate that urban believers attach a higher degree of importance to religion.

至于测量人们对于宗教信仰重要性的程度，2016年CFPS问卷中对应的原题为“第M603题”：“不管您是否参加宗教活动/事宜，宗教对您来说是否重要”，对应的回答选项有3项：“1.很重要；2.有点重要；3.不重要”。《卢文》并没有说明这里的宗教信仰是仅指西方宗教徒还是全部应答人群。从逻辑上推理，如果仅指西方宗教徒，既然都选择了信仰基督教或天主教，很难想象有那么高比例被调查者回答宗教不重要的。《卢文》在其文中的“图7”给出的结果显示，城镇信徒（没有明确说是“城镇西方宗教信徒”）选择认为宗教不重要的比例有12.1%，而农村信徒（也没有说是“农村西方宗教信徒”）则有19.4%。即便如此，那也是城镇信徒认为宗教不重要的比例要比农村信徒低。同样，《卢文》图7的数据表明，城镇信徒认为宗教很重要的比例是63.9%，而农村信徒的比例是62.4%。如此接近的比例，很难支撑论证“农村西方宗教信徒并没有比城镇的信徒更重视自己的信仰，反而是城镇信徒体现出来的对宗教重视程度更高”的结论。如果单就人群分布来看，2016年CFPS原始数据显示出的结果与《卢文》所要立论的观点是不相符的。也就是说，根据原始数据，在不区分是否西方宗教信徒的情况下，这一题的回答结果显示，选择“宗教很重要”的农业户口的人有1833例，占比为7.51%，而非农业人口的人有511例，占比为5.81%。选择“宗教有点重要”的农业人口是4176人，占比为17.12%，非农业人口是1744人，占比为19.82%；选择“宗教不重要”的农业人口有18338人，占比为75.18%，而非农业人口是6537人，占比为74.28%。应该说，这个数据同样很难压倒性地说明城镇信徒对宗教重视程度更高。

Third, regarding the explanation of the degree of organization of Western religion. The data obtained by the article by Lu is: “The level of organization of rural Western religion (56.0%) is slightly higher than that in towns (51.9%).” Although the data here in the article by Lu shows that the difference in the level of organization of rural Western religion compared to towns is not particularly large, it is still more conducive to arguing that rural Western religion is hotter than urban. Regarding this data, which is unfavorable to their argument, the article by Lu only provides a vague treatment by stating that “the urban-rural difference in this proportion is not statistically significant.”

第三，关于西方宗教组织化程度的说明。《卢文》得出的数据是：“农村西方宗教的组织化水平（56.0%）要略高于城镇（51.9%）”。虽然《卢文》此处的数据表明农村西方宗教组织化水平与城镇的差值并不是特别大，但同样是更有利于论证农村西方宗教比城镇热的。对这种不利于他们论证的数据，《卢文》仅用“这一比例上的城乡差异在统计上并不显著”进行了模糊处理。

In summary, not only does the article by Lu find it difficult to refute the research findings of the Xiuyuan Report, but the actual results of the data they present can only further support the correctness of the Xiuyuan Report.

综上，《卢文》不仅很难驳斥《修远报告》的研究发现，从所给出数据的实际结果看，反而只能更加支撑《修远报告》的正确性。

IV. North-South Differences in the Spread of Western Religion and Methods and Facts of Empirical Religious Research

四、西方宗教传播的南北差异与宗教实证研究的方法和事实

Regarding the north-south differences in the spread of Western religion, the situation in Guangdong Province, representing the south, and Henan Province, representing the north, based on the 2016 CFPS survey data in the article by Lu, is basically consistent with the judgment obtained from the field investigation of the Xiuyuan Report. The article by Lu finds that the characteristic of rural religion in the south is mainly traditional religion, while rural religion in the north presents a situation where Western religion flourishes. However, the focus of the article by Lu is not on the differences in the spread of rural religion between north and south and the underlying formation mechanisms. Their focus remains on attempting to use the differences between Guangdong and Henan, especially the situation where the proportion of Western religion adherents in rural Henan is 8.1%, far higher than the proportion of Western religion adherents in rural Guangdong, which is only 0.5%, to illustrate that “if the conclusion of ‘rural Western religion fever’ is extended to the whole country based solely on the example of rural Henan, it is incorrect both methodologically and factually.” Consequently, they draw an overall critical conclusion that the facts discovered by the Xiuyuan Report are not facts but a “myth,” and that the view positing a rural Western religion fever is a partial generalization.

在西方宗教传播的南北差异上，《卢文》关于2016年CFPS调查数据中代表南方的广东省和代表北方的河南省的情况，与《修远报告》实地调查所得出的判断基本一致。《卢文》发现，南方农村宗教的特点是以传统宗教为主，而北方农村宗教则呈现出西方宗教兴盛的状况。然而，《卢文》关心的重点并不在南北农村宗教传播的差异及其背后的形成机理上。他们关注的重点仍然是试图以广东和河南的差异，特别是河南农村西方宗教徒占比8.1%远高于广东农村西方宗教信徒占比仅有0.5%的情况，来说明“如果仅以河南农村为例将‘农村西方宗教热’的结论推广至全国农村，则无论是从方法上还是从事实上都是不正确的。”因而，他们得出总体性的批评结论，即《修远报告》所发现的事实并不是事实，而是“迷思”，那种认为农村西方宗教热的观点是以偏概全。

First, the relationship between the “partial” and the “comprehensive” in “Lu’s Article.” From the logic of argumentation, “Lu’s Article” believes that the “Xiuyuan Report” uses the “partial” to substitute for the “comprehensive.” Therefore, they should argue from the perspective of the “comprehensive” how the “Xiuyuan Report” is “partial.” Because, judging from “Lu’s Article” and another piece of literature by the same author, they have confidence and certainty in the “comprehensiveness” of the cited CFPS data. They state: “The CFPS used in this article is a social survey project implemented by the Institute of Social Science Survey at Peking University. This survey has the advantages of scientific sampling, national representativeness, comprehensive content, and a large sample size, making it suitable for analyzing the situation of rural religion in China in recent years.” “The survey subjects of the CFPS are household members in family households and sample family households across 25 provinces (municipalities directly under the central government, and autonomous regions) except Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Hainan, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. Since the population of these 25 provincial-level administrative units accounts for approximately 95% of the national total population (excluding Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan), the CFPS sample can be approximately regarded as a nationally representative sample.” It is precisely for this reason that they extrapolated that there were approximately 39.97 million Christians in China in 2016, of which 28.29 million were public Christians and 11.67 million were hidden Christians.

第一，关于《卢文》中“偏”和“全”的关系。从论证逻辑来说，《卢文》认为《修远报告》以“偏”概“全”，那么，他们就应该从全的角度来论证《修远报告》是如何“偏”的。因为，从《卢文》以及该作者的另外一篇文献来看，他们对援引CFPS数据的“全”是有信心和把握的。他们说：“本文使用的CFPS是由北京大学中国社会科学调查中心实施的社会调查项目，该调查具备科学抽样、全国代表性、内容综合性、样本量大的优点，适合于分析中国农村宗教近几年的状况。”“CFPS的调查对象为中国除新疆、西藏、青海、内蒙古、宁夏、海南、港澳台之外的25个省（直辖市、自治区）的家庭户和样本家庭户中的所有家庭成员。由于这25个省级行政单位的人口约占全国总人口（不含港澳台）的95%，因此，CFPS的样本可以近似看做一个具有全国代表性的样本。”也正是因此，他们据此推算出中国在2016年的基督徒大约有3997万人，其中2829万名是公开的基督徒，1167万名是隐藏的基督徒。

Judging from the expression in “Lu’s Article” and their other piece of literature, they seem to possess the conditions of “comprehensiveness” to analyze the issue of “comprehensiveness” and thereby refute the “partiality” of the literature they criticize. However, in the process of narration, they also say: “In the CFPS, Guangdong and Henan are two sub-populations with provincial-level independent representativeness. We use these two provinces as representatives of the south and north to analyze regional differences in rural religious development.” If they were using qualitative data from field investigations starting from the “partial” to develop their argument, this would be perfectly acceptable from a research approach perspective. The problem is that the “partiality” that “Lu’s Article” attacks is precisely because they claim to have mastered the “comprehensive.” Here, however, they do not start from the “comprehensive” but begin with the “partial” to criticize the “partiality” of other scholars. This becomes “attacking partiality with partiality.” As such, it is difficult to make the judgment that other scholars’ research “uses the partial to substitute for the comprehensive.” They say that Guangdong and Henan in the CFPS are “two sub-populations with provincial-level independent representativeness.” Since they do not state that these two are the only sub-populations, are there other sub-populations? Why are only these two representative? If other sub-populations are also representative, why are they not used together in the argument to demonstrate the advantage of the “comprehensiveness” they already possess? If there are no other sub-populations or if other sub-populations are not representative, then the claim that the CFPS can represent the whole country needs to be treated with caution.

从《卢文》以及他们另外一篇文献的表达来看，他们似乎具备“全”的条件来分析“全”的问题，以否证他们要批评的文献的“偏”。可是，在叙述过程中，他们又说：“在CFPS中，广东与河南是两个具有省级独立代表性的子总体，我们以这两省作为南北方的代表，分析农村宗教发展的区域差异。”如果说，他们运用的是从“偏”出发的实地调查的质性资料来展开论证，从研究路径上来说，当然无可厚非。问题是，《卢文》所要攻击的“偏”就是因为他们宣称掌握了“全”。这里却不以“全”出发，而从“偏”起笔，去批评别的学者的“偏”，这就成了“以偏攻偏”。如此，也就难以做出对其他学者研究的“以偏概全”的断语。他们所说的广东和河南在CFPS中的地位是“两个具有省级独立代表性的子总体”，那么，既然没有说这两个是唯一的子总体，是不是还有其他子总体？为什么只有这两个具有代表性？如果还有其他子总体也具有代表性，那为什么不一起用来论证以显示本就具有的“全”的长处？如果没有其他子总体或者其他子总体不具有代表性，那CFPS可以代表全国的说法就需要慎重。

Second, the methodological issues and factual issues in “Lu’s Article.” The regional distribution of religion in China is quite distinct, with very high heterogeneity. The north-south differences are particularly prominent, leading to different transmission mechanisms for different religions in different regions. This is precisely the theoretical issue that the “Xiuyuan Report” attempts to explain when analyzing north-south differences. The author has also frequently found in rural field investigations that in some areas, rural Christianity spreads relatively rapidly; in some areas, heterodox Christian organizations, such as cults, spread widely; and in some areas, traditional beliefs centered on ancestor worship are well preserved, making it difficult for Western religions to spread there, and so on. Because of this complexity, relying solely on statistical sampling to grasp the scale of Western religious adherents may be mathematically correct but could be factually wrong. Under current conditions, without a detailed national census on the religious situation, it is very difficult to clarify the number of religious believers, which is inherently highly subjective. Therefore, any scholar studying religious issues using questionnaire surveys must be especially cautious when drawing conclusions. Taking the data from the religious module of the CFPS used in “Lu’s Article” as an example, the above problems are clearly quite prominent. The author is not saying here that the CFPS survey data has these problems on other research topics, but is only discussing it in terms of religious surveys. Roughly speaking, the data has at least the following two fundamental issues that need improvement.

第二，《卢文》的方法问题与事实问题。我国宗教的区域分布差异比较明显，异质性非常大，南北差异尤其突出，从而导致不同的宗教在不同地区的传播机制不一样。而这一点，正是《修远报告》在分析南北差异时试图解释的理论问题。笔者亦在农村实地调查中经常发现，有些地区农村基督教传播较迅速，有些地区则是基督教的异端类组织如邪教传播较广泛，而有些地方则由于以祖先崇拜为主体的传统信仰保存较好，从而使西方宗教难以在那些地方传播等等。正因为这种复杂情况，仅靠统计抽样来把握西方宗教教徒的规模，在数学层面虽然可能正确，但在事实层面却可能错误。在目前的情况下，只要没有国家层面的关于宗教情况的详细普查，很难搞清楚本就具有很强主观性的宗教信仰的信徒数量。因此，任何从事问卷调查研究宗教问题的学者，作出结论就尤其要慎重。以《卢文》所运用的CFPS的宗教模块调查的数据为例，上述问题显然是比较突出的。笔者此处并非是说CFPS调查数据在其他研究主题上也存在这些问题，而仅仅只是就宗教调查而论。粗略来看，该数据至少存在以下两个根本性问题有待改进。

On the one hand, although from a population perspective, the CFPS claims that the population of the sampled provincial-level administrative units covers 95% of China’s population, this does not mean it covers 95% of China’s religious adherents. For example, Xinjiang and Ningxia are excluded, which poses a problem for grasping the distribution of Islamic believers. Similarly, excluding Tibet and Qinghai makes it difficult to confidently assert an accurate judgment on the distribution of Buddhist believers. Even for those provinces not excluded at the outset of sampling but included in the overall sample, it is impossible to ensure that the “sampling” is evenly distributed across the distribution of believers in each provincial-level administrative region. Taking Shandong Province as an example, the CFPS 2016 survey data shows only 1 person in Shandong who believes in Islam. Not to mention whether the proportion represented by this 1 person can be used to infer the entire province of Shandong, even if one extrapolates, it would be found to be seriously inconsistent with the facts. Based on Shandong Province’s total population of approximately 94.46 million in 2016, extrapolating from the CFPS data would mean only about 64,126 people in the entire province believe in Islam. However, the actual situation in Shandong Province is that the Hui population alone, according to the province’s sixth national census, was 535,679, not including members of other ethnic minorities who believe in Islam. Furthermore, it is even more noteworthy that in the CFPS 2016 data, for the provinces that were not surveyed at all—Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, and Hainan—there are still samples selecting “no religious belief.” Corresponding to question M601 in the CFPS 2016 questionnaire, “What religion do you belong to?”, the output data shows that the numbers selecting option “6. No religious belief” for these provincial-level administrative regions are 41, 5, 7, 13, 21, and 11 people, respectively. If one argues that since these provinces were not surveyed, these numbers are small and insignificant, then how should one understand the situation in some surveyed provinces where the number of Christians is extremely small? For example, the number of Christians in Sichuan is 0 (while in reality, according to Sichuan Province’s 2018 published list, the 10th committee of the Christian “Two Committees” [n] alone had 57 members, and statistics show that by the end of 2009, the province had 480,000 Christian believers). The sampled Christian data for Tianjin, Chongqing, Jiangxi, Guangxi, and Guizhou are only 2 people each; Beijing 5; Hunan 8; Hubei 10; Shaanxi 11; Fujian 12; Yunnan 13; and Shandong 14. The total Christian sample for these 13 provincial-level administrative regions is only 81 people, accounting for just 11.89% of all 681 Christian samples in the CFPS 2016 data. However, when sorted by the number of Christians from high to low, in the CFPS 2016 data, Henan ranks first with 242 people, Liaoning second with 66, Shanghai third with 51, and Hebei and Heilongjiang tie for fourth, each with 41 people. The sample size for these five provincial-level administrative regions reaches 441 people, accounting for 64.76% of the total 681 Christian samples collected by the CFPS in 2016.

一方面，虽然从人口的角度来看，CFPS号称所抽样调查的省级行政区域单位人口涵盖了95%的中国人口，但这并不等于涵盖了95%的中国宗教信徒的人口。例如，新疆和宁夏被排除在外，这个数据对掌握伊斯兰教的信众分布就存在问题。同样，把西藏、青海排除在外，就很难有把握地宣称对佛教信众分布的判断很准确。而对那些即使没有在抽样之初就排除之外而含括在总体样本中的情况，也无法做到让“抽样”匀称分布到各省级行政区域的信众分布中。以山东省为例，CFPS2016年调查的数据表明，信仰伊斯兰教的山东人只有1人，姑且不说是否可以拿这1人所占的比例去推论山东全省，就算去推算也会发现与事实严重不符。以2016年山东省全省人口约9446万计算，按CFPS数据推论，山东全省只可能有64126人信仰伊斯兰教。而山东省的实际情况是，仅该省第六次人口普查时的回族人口就有535679人，这还不包括信仰伊斯兰教的其他少数民族人口。更遑论CFPS2016年本就没有调查的新疆、西藏、青海、宁夏、内蒙古、海南竟然还出现了选择“无宗教信仰”的样本，对应CFPS2016年问卷第M601题“请问您属于什么宗教？”的输出数据结果中，这些省级行政区域选择选项“6.无宗教信仰”的分别有41人、5人、7人、13人、21人和11人。如果说连没有调查的这些省级行政区域都有这些数字，且以为这些数字不大而无碍的话，那么，又如何理解抽样调查的一些省份中数量极少的基督徒数量的情况？例如，四川基督徒数量为0（而实际情况是，仅四川省2018年公布的基督教“两会”第十届委员会委员就有57人，据统计，截至2009年底，该省便有基督教信徒48万人），天津、重庆、江西、广西、贵州的基督徒抽样数据都只有2人，北京5人，湖南8人，湖北10人，陕西11人，福建12人，云南13人，山东14人。这13个省级行政区域的基督徒样本总共只有81人，只占CFPS2016年全部基督徒样本数（681例）的11.89%。可是，按照基督徒数量多少从高到低排序，在CFPS2016年的数据中，位列第一的河南却有242人，位列第二的辽宁有66人，位列第三的上海有51人，并列第四的河北和黑龙江，都有41人。这五个省级行政区域的样本数达到了441人，占CFPS2016年所收集的全部681例基督徒的64.76%。

On the other hand, if there have always been doubts and difficulties in grasping the number of Christians in Western religions, then the distribution of Catholics in Western religions should be a credible indicator that can test the validity of the data obtained. The Catholic data from the 2016 CFPS religious module survey show that Chongqing, Beijing, Jilin, and Shanxi each had 0 people, Tianjin, Yunnan, and Heilongjiang each had only 1 person, and Jiangxi, Hunan, and Jiangsu each had only 2 people. The total number of Catholic samples in these 10 provincial-level administrative regions was only 9 people, accounting for 6.21% of all Catholic samples (145 cases). In reality, as of December 2018, Chongqing had at least over 220,000 Catholics; as early as 2009, the Ninth Catholic Representative Conference held in Beijing had 230 representatives in attendance; the Sixth Catholic Representative Conference of Jilin Province in 2019 had 86 provincial representatives; and the Seventh Catholic Representative Conference of Shanxi Province in 2019 had 130 representatives in attendance. That is to say, no matter how “scientifically sampled,” the distribution of Catholics in these provinces and municipalities could not and should not have resulted in zero cases. The fundamental reason why the CFPS data cited in *Lu Wen* [n2] exhibit these problems is that the spatial distribution of Western religious adherents in our country is extremely uneven, with great heterogeneity. Traditional religions, especially those outside Buddhism and Taoism, such as ancestor worship, are like individual grains of “sand,” with higher homogeneity, whereas Islam, Catholicism, and Christianity are like lumps or blocks of “stone,” with higher heterogeneity. However, *Lu Wen* and the CFPS religious module survey it employs treat these distributions of adherents with such high heterogeneity as if they were homogeneous and uniform relationships, like “saltwater.” Making inferences and judgments about the national distribution of religious numbers and religious practice activities based on this naturally leads to the series of problems mentioned above.

另一方面，如果说对于西方宗教中的基督徒数字把握向来存在疑问和难处的话，那么，对西方宗教中天主教徒数的分布就应该是一个可以检验所获数据是否有效的可信指标。CFPS2016年的宗教模块调查所获得的天主教徒数据显示，重庆、北京、吉林、山西都是0人，天津、云南、黑龙江都只有1人，江西、湖南、江苏都只有2人。这10个省级行政区域的天主教徒样本数总共只有9人，占全部天主教徒样本数（145例）的6.21%。而实际情况是，重庆市截至2018年12月至少有天主教徒22万余人,北京市早在2009年召开的天主教第九次代表会议仅出席会议的代表就有230人，吉林省在2019年召开的天主教第六次代表会议参会的全省代表就有86人，而山西省在2019年召开的天主教第七次代表会议仅参会代表就有130人,也就是说，无论如何“科学抽样”，这些省、市的天主教徒分布都不可能也不应该出现0人的情况。《卢文》所援引的CFPS数据之所以出现这些问题，根本原因在于，西方宗教教徒在我国地域空间上分布是极不均衡的，存在很大的异质性。传统宗教特别是佛道之外的像祖先崇拜一类的，可能犹如一粒一粒的“沙子”的关系，其同质性更高，而像伊斯兰教、天主教、基督教这些则类似于石块那样一团一块的“团块”关系，其异质性更高。但是，《卢文》及其所运用的CFPS的宗教模块调查却把这些异质性如此大的教徒分布都处理成类似“盐水”这样的均质匀称的关系。据此再去对全国的宗教数量分布、宗教实践活动做出推论和判断自然也就难免出现前文所述及的一系列问题。

Of course, *Lu Wen* may also have other problems, such as the positioning of the “time coordinate.” The *Xiuyuan Report* [n3] was formally completed in 2009, and the field survey data also reflect conditions from 2009 and earlier. However, after the 18th National Congress of the CPC in 2012 [n4], due to the Party and state’s heightened attention to non-traditional security issues in the religious sphere, some situations have undergone many positive changes.

当然，《卢文》可能还存在其他问题，比如“时间坐标”的定位。《修远报告》正式成文是2009年，实地调查的数据也是2009年及以前的情况。而2012年党的十八大以后，由于党和国家对宗教领域的非传统安全问题高度重视，因此，有些情况已经发生了许多积极变化。

V. Conclusion

五、结 语

Qualified academic dialogue must be based on facts. Especially for quantitative data research that emphasizes standardization, one should speak with scientific data, and researchers should have basic sensitivity and respect for data. From the perspective of a social science orientation in religious research, the problems that emerged in *Lu Wen* and the CFPS data regarding the use of questionnaire surveys to measure the distribution of adherents are not isolated cases. Some scholars, when citing the national sampling survey data on “the spiritual life of the Chinese people” from the Beijing Horizon Research Group, also found that if the number of Catholics collected by Horizon at that time was used to extrapolate nationwide, there would be only 3.5 million Catholics, whereas the official statistical caliber reports approximately 6 million Catholics.

合格的学术对话一定要以事实为准绳，特别是对于本就强调规范化的量化数据研究来说，更应该用科学的数据来说话，研究者尤应对数据有基本的敏感和尊重。从宗教研究社会科学的取向出发，关于用问卷调查来测量教徒分布的情况，《卢文》和CFPS数据所出现的问题事实上并非孤例。有人曾经在援引北京零点调查公司关于“中国人精神生活状况”的全国抽样调查数据时也发现，如果用当时零点调查收集到的天主教徒数量推算全国的话，只有350万天主教徒，而天主教徒在官方公布的统计口径中大约有600万。

In fact, measuring the scale of religious adherents, religious beliefs and attitudes, and religious practice activities cannot rely solely on questionnaires. Therefore, based solely on the four simply designed questions in the CFPS, there are still debatable aspects regarding the authenticity of measuring the religious belief status of the Chinese people. For example, classifying religious beliefs is a very difficult task. In rural field surveys, it was found that if you discuss religion in depth and detail with farmers and ask them whether they believe in Buddhism or Taoism, they find it hard to distinguish. However, if you talk about venerating ancestors, venerating gods, praying to Bodhisattvas, or seeking blessings from Heaven, they find it relatively easier to understand and accept. As for all cult followers, including heretical sects, without in-depth investigation and thorough analysis of the collected data, they are relatively difficult to identify. It is hard to encounter people who dare to openly admit that they follow a particular cult. Similarly, for measuring religious practice activities, the so-called “burning incense and worshipping Buddha” in the CFPS may seem unassailable, but in concrete empirical investigation, these are two different concepts. Burning incense does not necessarily mean worshipping Buddha; it could be merely venerating ancestors at home by burning incense, or temporarily praying for the protection of some supernatural force due to certain emergencies, or even just seeking psychological comfort. It is simply impossible to classify such behavior as belonging to Buddhism or Taoism. This is precisely the principle behind the common Chinese saying, “Usually do not burn incense, but clasp Buddha’s feet in times of crisis.” [n5]

事实上，对宗教信徒数量规模、宗教信仰态度、宗教实践活动等的测量，仅依靠问卷是不够的。因此，仅从CFPS中简单设计的四道题来看，其测量中国人宗教信仰状况的真实性方面也仍然存在有待商榷的地方。比如，对于宗教信仰的归类，就是非常难的一件事。在农村的实地调查中发现，如果深入详细地跟农民探讨宗教信仰，问他们到底是信佛教还是道教，他们很难分清楚。但如果说是敬祖先、敬神、祈求菩萨或上天保佑，他们反倒比较容易理解和接受。而对于那些包含异端在内的一切邪教徒，如果没有深入调查，并对调查的资料进行深入分析，是比较难以发现的。人们很难接触到有人敢于公开承认他们是信奉某一种邪教的。同样，对于测量宗教实践活动来说，CFPS中的所谓“烧香拜佛”看似无懈可击，实则在具体的经验调查中是不同的两个概念，烧香不一定拜佛，仅仅在家中敬奉祖先而烧香或因为某些突发情况需要而临时祈求某种超自然力量的保佑，甚至仅仅只是为求得心理安慰，根本就无法将之归入是佛教徒还是道教徒。中国人口头中经常说“平时不烧香，临时抱佛脚”就是此理。

Through examining and analyzing *Lu Wen* and the CFPS data it cites, it can be found that current empirical research on religion, when discussing the precise numbers of Western religious adherents, not only struggles to obtain accurate answers but also has less practical significance than might be assumed. From a sociological perspective, researchers should be concerned with trends. Significant increases or decreases indicate that certain structural factors may be involved behind the scenes, warranting attention. As for whether the precise number of Western religious adherents is “99” or “100,” this should not be the focus of attention, nor should it blur the research focus. How to conduct solid field investigations, step by step, to collect first-hand qualitative data, and then study and analyze it, is a more important path. Only on this basis, and then considering the use of questionnaires as a supplement, will it be more meaningful. Similarly, the *Xiuyuan Report* is not concerned with specific precise numbers or specific meanings of north and south, but rather with understanding the formation mechanisms of the spread of Western religions in rural areas based on facts and north-south differences, with the aim of attending to the overall meaning of China that is nurtured behind the north and south.

经过对《卢文》及其援引的CFPS数据的检视和分析可以发现，当前宗教实证研究讨论精确的西方宗教徒的数字，不仅难以获得准确答案，其实际意义也并非那么突出。从社会学来看，研究者关心的应该是趋势，大幅增多或减少都说明背后可能牵涉某些结构性因素的变化，从而需要引起重视。至于西方宗教徒的精确数字到底是“99”还是“100”，不应该是人们关注的重点，更不应据此而模糊了研究焦点。如何通过扎实的实地调查，一步一个脚印地去收集一手的质性资料，然后对之加以研究分析，才是更为重要的路径。也只有在此基础上，再考虑用问卷方式作为补充，才会更有意义。同样，《修远报告》并非要关注具体精确的数字及具体意义上的南和北，而是要从事实和南北差异出发，去理解西方宗教在农村传播的形成机制，目的是为了关照涵育于南北背后的总体意义上的中国。

The basic policy of our country’s religious work is to fully implement the Party’s policy of freedom of religious belief, manage religious affairs according to law, adhere to the principle of independence and self-governance, and actively guide religion to adapt to a socialist society. “These four sentences form an organic whole. The first three sentences speak of major policies and principles, and the last sentence speaks of the fundamental direction and purpose, which is the focus of the work.” Respecting and protecting freedom of religious belief is a basic policy that our country’s religious governance will uphold for a long time. Therefore, neither the *Xiuyuan Report* nor this article opposes freedom of religious belief that conforms to legal norms. However, while we agree that freedom of religious belief is a basic right of the Chinese people, we must also clarify that its prerequisite is that China’s religious development must adapt to a socialist society with Chinese characteristics. China is a socialist country. In terms of religious belief, it is necessary to actively guide the healthy development of Western religions in our country, while also preventing various social risks that may arise from the rapid spread of Western religions in rural areas. This is the essence of the governance of religion with Chinese characteristics under socialism.

我国宗教工作的基本方针是，全面贯彻党的宗教信仰自由政策，依法管理宗教事务，坚持独立自主自办原则，积极引导宗教与社会主义社会相适应。“这四句话是一个有机整体，前三句话讲的是重大政策和原则，最后一句讲的是根本方向和目的，是工作的重点。”尊重和保护宗教信仰自由是我国宗教治理要长期坚持的一项基本政策。因此，无论是《修远报告》还是本文，都没有也不可能反对符合法律规范的宗教信仰自由。但是，我们赞同宗教信仰自由是中国人的一项基本权利的同时，还要明确其前提是中国的宗教发展必须要与中国特色社会主义社会相适应。中国是社会主义国家，在宗教信仰方面，既要积极引导西方宗教在我国的健康发展，又要防止西方宗教在农村快速传播可能引发的各种社会风险，这是中国特色社会主义宗教治理的要义所在。

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心