Escaping Monotheistic Religion, but Not Yet Escaping Monotheism

Zhao Tingyang and the French anthropologist Alain Le Pichon first met in 1999. Fifteen years later, these old friends decided to exchange letters on the theoretical and practical issues of “cross-culture,” and thus the book *The Shadow of Monotheism: Correspondence between a Philosopher and an Anthropologist* (hereafter abbreviated as *The Shadow of Monotheism*) came into being. This book is not a mere cultural exchange modeled on that of 18th- and 19th-century European intellectuals, but rather a deep, experimental cross-cultural dialogue lasting three years. Nor does the book merely follow the great French tradition of the encyclopedia; it is driven by a strong concern for reality. Le Pichon offers a vivid metaphor: the interlocutors are like two card players, each holding a trump card—Zhao Tingyang’s is “polytheism,” and his own is “monotheism.” The two not only review the transformations of intellectual history but also attempt to “predict the future” based on the various phenomena manifested by the “perilous” world today. Although monotheism is the theme of the discussion, the book is not a purely academic text; it is a montage of thought composed of philosophy, science, history, religion, and metaphor-laden poetry.

赵汀阳与法国人类学家阿兰·乐比雄（Alain Le Pichon）相识于1999年，15年后这对老友决定以书信方式交流“跨文化”的理论与实践问题，于是便有了《一神论的影子：哲学家与人类学家的通信》（本文中简称《一神论的影子》）一书。该书不是比附18-19世纪的欧洲知识分子进行普通的文化交流，而是长达三年有深度的、实验性的跨文化对话。该书也并非仅仅沿袭法国在百科全书领域的伟大传统，而是有着强烈的现实关怀。乐比雄有一个形象的比喻，对话者如两个打牌人，每人手中有一张王牌——赵汀阳手中的是“多神”，自己手中的是“一神”。两人不仅回顾观念史的变迁，也试图依据当今“凶险”世界所表现出的种种现象来“预言未来”。尽管以一神论为讨论主题，但该书不是单纯的学术文本，而是由哲学、科学、历史、宗教和富含隐喻的诗歌构成的思想蒙太奇。

Le Pichon is accustomed to raising questions in a poetic mode of thinking, which of course also includes “critical attention.” Zhao Tingyang’s expertise is political philosophy; he is highly skilled at argumentation and reasoning, constructing theoretical systems through a set of concepts and keywords, and incorporating history, stories, and literature. Le Pichon frankly admits that his own letters are marked by a “poetic style,” often sidestepping the “rigorous logical questions” posed by his interlocutor, leaving Zhao Tingyang to “act as the vanguard in constructing philosophical arguments.” Zhao Tingyang, for his part, benefits from Le Pichon’s imagination and the new concepts rich in intellectual potential that he proposes, even though this French friend typically “proposes without elaborating” and “prefers setting problems to solving them.”

乐比雄惯于以诗性思维提出问题，当然也包含着“批判性关注”（critical attention）；赵汀阳的专长是政治哲学，他非常擅于论证说理，借助一套概念、关键词来建构理论体系，把历史、故事、文学囊括其中。乐比雄坦陈，自己的信件中“诗性风格”明显，常常回避掉对话人所提出的“严谨的逻辑问题”，让赵汀阳“充当构建哲学性论证的先锋”。赵汀阳却受益于乐比雄的想象力和他提出的富有思想潜力的新概念，尽管这位法国朋友通常“作而不述”，“喜欢出题胜过做题”。

How does monotheistic religion transform into monotheism? After modern Western ideas overturned the image and status of God, how did they construct the absolute self—a modern monotheism? How does the evolution of intellectual history influence practice, and what impact has the combination of monotheism and universalism had on the world? What are the connections between monotheism and the clash of civilizations, ideological struggles, the uncontrolled development of science and technology, and super-artificial intelligence? Reading *The Shadow of Monotheism* along this chain of questions not only helps grasp the main thread of the evolution of Western intellectual history but also provides a theoretical perspective for analyzing current global issues.

一神教如何向一神论转变，近现代西方观念在颠覆了上帝形象与地位后，如何构建出绝对自我论这一现代一神论？观念史演进如何影响实践，一神论与普遍主义结合给世界带来了何种影响？一神论与文明冲突论、意识形态之争、科技无序发展、超级人工智能有何关联？沿着一系列问题链阅读《一神论的影子》，不仅有助于把握西方观念史演变的主线，更为分析当下世界性议题提供了理论视角。

I. Core Questions and Theoretical Keywords

一、核心问题与理论关键词

As one side of the dialogue, Le Pichon’s real concern is China. Faced with China’s five-thousand-year civilization and its growing national power, “Can Judeo-Christian civilization really continue to exist and remain confident in itself?” As human history entered the twenty-first century, “What voice and message is China sending to the world?” After a long dialogue, Le Pichon summarizes his core concern as: “What exactly is China’s position, role, meaning, and function in the world?” In essence, Le Pichon is not focused on China’s current driving force in pulling the world economy out of the mire or its expanding political influence, but on how China will change cross-cultural relations and practices in the world.

作为对话一方的乐比雄真正关心的是中国。面对中国五千年的文明史和不断壮大的国力，“犹太-基督教文明真的还能继续存在下去，并对自己满怀信心吗？”人类历史步入二十一世纪后，“中国传递给世界的声音和信息是什么？”经历了漫长对话后，乐比雄总结自己的核心关切在于，“中国、中国文化在世界中的地位、角色、意义和作用到底是什么？”质言之，乐比雄关注的不是当下中国对世界经济走出泥沼的带动力与中国不断扩大的政治影响力，而是中国如何去改变世界的跨文化关系和实践。

As the other side of the dialogue, Zhao Tingyang’s concern is how the world can escape monotheistic religion and monotheism, how to escape the clash of civilizations and ideological disputes that have been placed under the “spell” of monotheism, and how to reshape the order of existence in the context of globalization. “What kind of universal order is trustworthy? What kind of universal order can both guarantee our coexistence with others and ensure our own freedom?” These concerns can be translated into a philosophical expression: how to construct an ontology of coexistence oriented toward the life-world. This seems like an “old question,” but it has never been resolved, and now faces new challenges, such as uncontrolled technological development and the possibility that super-artificial intelligence could become the master of human thought.

作为对话的另一方，赵汀阳关注的是世界如何走出一神教、一神论，如何走出被一神论施加了“魔咒”的文明冲突、意识形态论争，在全球化背景下重塑存在秩序。“什么样的普遍秩序是值得信赖的？什么样的普遍秩序是既可以保证我们与他人共在，又能够保证自身自由的秩序？”上述关切可以转化为哲学化的表达，即面向生活世界如何构建共在的存在论。这看似是“老问题”，却始终没有解决，当下又面临着新挑战，例如失控的技术发展、超级人工智能可能成为人类思维的主宰者。

A pair of keywords in this book are monotheistic religion and monotheism, which are linked both by political-social history and by intellectual-conceptual history. Monotheism originates from monotheistic religion but is different from it. Monotheistic religion is a religion, corresponding to polytheism, pantheism, and atheism, primarily derived from the Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Monotheism originates from monotheistic religion, but in the current era of increasing secularization and de-religionization, monotheism mainly manifests as a mode of thinking that integrates political, ethical, and cultural factors and is characterized by exclusivity and dogmatism. Zhao Tingyang believes that typical modern monotheistic concepts are the idea of human rights based on the absolute subjectivity of the individual, democratic politics, and the narrative of progress. Epistemologically speaking, in Zhao Tingyang’s view, monotheism represents “the boundary of knowledge,” while polytheism, pantheism, and atheism represent “an open, never-completed state of dialogue.”

本书的一对关键词是一神教与一神论，两者之间既有政治社会史的关联，也有思想观念史的关联。一神论源于一神教，但又不同于一神教。一神教是宗教，与多神教、泛神论、无神论对应，主要是源于亚伯拉罕系的犹太教、基督教与伊斯兰教。一神论来源于一神教，但在日益世俗化、去宗教化的当下，一神论主要表现为一种整合了政治、伦理和文化因素在内的、具有排他性与独断性的思维模式。赵汀阳认为，现代一神论观念的典型是基于个人绝对主体性的人权观念、民主政治与进步叙事。仅就认识论而言，在赵汀阳看来，一神论代表着“知识的边界”，而多神论、泛神论、无神论则代表着“开放的、永远未完成的对话状态”。

The world is as it is, and all things are as they are; the world and all things do not exist because of the problems humans think about. Humans raise and create problems, or rather, humans choose problems for existence. Ontology is the core field of philosophy; it does not focus on concrete things but attempts to explore the ultimate reason for the basic fact of why the world and all things exist. Western ontology is closely related to the basic assumptions of traditional metaphysics, namely, that all things have a “final basis,” the exploration of which constitutes the “ultimate question,” and exploring the ultimate question leads to the discovery of “ultimate principles.” In the history of Western thought, monotheistic religion and monotheism are the most important types of ontological concepts for understanding existence. In the book *The Fulcrum of First Philosophy*, Zhao Tingyang argues that the introduction of the concept of a creator or God into intellectual history provided an ultimate answer to existence, but the creator or God does not require human thought, only human faith; religious faith becomes “a spiritual form that is irrational yet powerful.” Religion and philosophy both compete with each other and have a structurally complementary relationship: “Religion provides questionable answers to problems, while philosophy raises questions that have no final answers.” In explaining ultimate causes, religion takes “yes” as its conclusion, while philosophy takes “no” as a provisional node. In terms of cultural identity, religion has a strong and stable influence on forming cultural identity. Religions say “no” to each other, most typically in monotheistic religion; religion more easily becomes the boundary stone of cultural borders. Although different philosophies also say “no” to each other, opposition between philosophical concepts usually does not become a boundary for cultural exchange, “unless a thought is transformed into an ideology and thus metamorphoses into a religion.”

世界如其所是、万物如其所在，世界与万物不是因为人类所思考的问题而存在的。人类会提出、制造问题，或者说人为存在选择了问题。存在论（Ontology）是哲学的核心领域，关注的不是具体事物，而是试图对世界、万物因何存在这一基本性事实探究终极理由。西方的存在论与传统形而上学的基本假设密切相关，即万物有“最终依据”，对最终依据的探究构成了“终极问题”，探究终极问题会发现“终极原理”。在西方观念史中，一神教与一神论对于存在的理解是最为重要的存在论观念类型。在《第一哲学的支点》一书中，赵汀阳认为，造物主或者上帝观念被引入思想史，为存在给出了终极答案，但造物主、上帝无需人去思考，只需人去信仰，宗教信仰成为“无理而有力的精神形式”。宗教与哲学既相互竞争，又存在着结构互补关系，“宗教为问题给出可疑的答案，而哲学提出没有最后答案的问题”。在对终极原因的解释上，宗教以“是”作为结论，哲学却以“不”作为阶段性节点。在文化认同上，宗教对形成文化认同的影响力大、稳定性强。宗教之间相互说“不”，以一神教最为典型，宗教更容易成为文化边界的界石。尽管不同哲学之间也互相说“不”，但哲学观念的对立通常不会成为文化交流的边界，“除非一种思想通过意识形态化而变性为宗教”。

Besides monotheism, monotheism, and ontology, another important theoretical keyword in the book *The Shadow of Monotheism* is transcultural. The problem-consciousness and practical purpose of transcultural research are naturally to transcend monotheism and reconstruct the world cultural order. Lévi-Strauss’s [3]3 Zhao Tingyang (赵汀阳, b. 1961), a prominent Chinese philosopher known for his work on the *tianxia* (all-under-heaven) concept and relational ontology. transcultural theory is built upon the research paradigm of “reciprocal anthropology,” which he pioneered. By means of the reversible observation of anthropological fieldwork—allowing the observer to be observed, and the questioner to also be questioned—it achieves the self-transformation of anthropology. “Both sides of the exchange construct an anthropological narrative for each other’s culture.” Westerners cannot merely be “observers”; Westerners and Western society should also become “the observed.” Distinct from the absolute self-subjectivity that emphasizes individual reason, Lévi-Strauss’s trans-subjectivity approximates a “revised version” of Habermas’s intersubjectivity. Zhao Tingyang’s transcultural theory, in contrast, is built upon a co-existential ontology oriented toward the life-world. In his view, transcultural theory should, on the basis of confirming such foundational facts as intersubjectivity and interculturality, explore further forward, taking trans-subjectivity—more precisely expressed as “conjunctive subjectivity” and “relational subjectivity”—as the philosophical basis for transcultural practice. Transcultural practice then provides a practically feasible operational model for trans-subjectivity—“co-existing with others.”

除了一神教、一神论、存在论外，在《一神论的影子》一书中，另一个重要的理论关键词是跨文化（transcultural）。跨文化研究的问题意识、实践目的自然是超越一神论，重构世界文化秩序。乐比雄的跨文化理论建立在由他始创的“互观人类学”（reciprocal anthropology）研究范式之上，凭借人类学田野工作的可逆性观察——让观察者接受被观察，让提问者也同时被提问，实现人类学的自我改造。“交流的双方都为对方的文化建立一套人类学叙事” ，西方人不能只做“观察者”，西方人、西方社会也应该成为“被观察者”。区别于强调个人理性的绝对自我主体论，乐比雄的跨主体性接近于哈贝马斯主体间性的“改良版”。赵汀阳的跨文化理论则建立在面向生活世界的共在存在论基础之上。在他看来，跨文化理论应在确认主体间性、文化间性等基础性事实的基础上再向前探索，将跨主体性（trans-subjectivity），更准确的表述是“合取主体性”（conjunctive subjectivity）与“关系主体性”（relational subjectivity），作为进行跨文化实践的哲学依据。跨文化实践则为跨主体性——“与他人共在”，提供了实际可行的操作模式。

II. The Directness or Indirectness of the Heaven-Human Relationship

二、天人关系的直接性或间接性

“The deep grammar of civilizations lies in beliefs, philosophies, histories, values, and modes of thinking, and it is precisely the differences in this deep grammar that constitute insurmountable cultural boundaries.” The differences between Chinese and Western cultural traditions or philosophical concepts can be traced back to differing understandings of the relationship between Heaven (天) and humanity. The two interlocutors live in different countries and cultural backgrounds; although they have known each other for over a decade, exchanged letters for nearly three years, and their friendship had lasted twenty years by the time the book was completed, in-depth communication still faces a vast intellectual gap. Lévi-Strauss has persistently sought to solve the core problems of Chinese philosophy. The series of questions he raises allows their discussion to deepen layer by layer, and the relevant views become more constructive; of course, the constructive answers are mostly provided by Zhao Tingyang.

“文明的深层语法在于信仰、哲学、历史、价值观和思维方式，而正是这些深层语法的差异构成了难以逾越的文化边界。”中西方文化传统或哲学观念的差异可溯源至对天人关系的不同理解。对话的二人生活在不同国度、不同文化背景中，尽管相识十余年，书信交流近三年，成书时双方友谊已长达二十年，但深入交流仍面临着巨大的智识隔阂。乐比雄一直试图求解中国哲学的核心问题，他提出的系列追问让双方的讨论逐层深入，相关观点也更富有建设性，当然建设性的回答多是赵汀阳给出的。

As a “metaphysical Catholic,” Lévi-Strauss is extremely concerned with the question: within the traditional Chinese conceptual system of the unity of Heaven and humanity (天人合一), “what kind of intermediary does the relationship between Heaven and humanity require? Or, what kind of coordinating medium is needed for Heaven and humanity to communicate?” The unity of Heaven and humanity is an unconscious conceptual presupposition for Chinese people, who take it for granted. In Lévi-Strauss’s view, however, the unity of Heaven and humanity is something that requires proof.

作为一位“形而上的天主教徒”，乐比雄极为关注在中国传统的天人合一的观念体系中，“天人之间需要什么样的中间人？或者说，天人相通需要什么样的协调媒介？”天人合一是中国人不自觉的观念预设，并视之为理所当然。在乐比雄看来，天人合一却是需要证明的。

Zhao Tingyang, a self-proclaimed pantheist philosopher, briefly reviews the conceptual system of the unity of Heaven and humanity and its branches in the history of Chinese thought: First, the most ancient and most creative explanation is represented by the thought of the Duke of Zhou’s [4]4 The Western Zhou dynasty (c. 1046–771 BCE) is a foundational period in Chinese history, associated with the development of early Chinese political philosophy and the *Book of Changes*. group, where the Mandate of Heaven reaches the people’s hearts, and the direction of the people’s hearts is the Mandate of Heaven. Second, thinkers represented by Laozi offer the most stable explanation of the unity of Heaven and humanity: humanity follows Heaven’s movement and changes in accord with Heaven. Third, represented by Han Confucians, a poetic explanation of the unity of Heaven and humanity is given: after analogizing celestial phenomena with human affairs, numerous similarities or correspondences between the two are obtained. Fourth, represented by Song-Ming Confucians, the identity and homogeneity of Heaven and humanity are directly presupposed and defined; the only difference between Heaven and humanity lies in their modes of existence. In terms of explanatory power, “the two more ancient explanations surpass the two relatively later ones, but none is yet a perfect explanation.” Within the traditional Chinese conceptual system and intellectual grammar, the above explanations also share commonalities: namely, in whichever explanation, the Heaven-human relationship possesses “immediacy,” “requiring no intermediary or medium.” This also determines a significant difference between Chinese and European traditional intellectual contexts.

自称泛神论的哲学家赵汀阳为此简要回顾了中国观念史中天人合一的观念体系及其支脉：第一，最为古老也最有创意的解释当以周公集团思想为代表，天命达至民心，民心所向即是天命；第二，以老子为代表的思想家，给出了最稳妥的天人合一解释，人随天动、顺天而变；第三，以汉儒为代表，对天人合一给出了诗性解释，类比天象与人事后，获得了两者之间的诸多相似性或对应关系；第四，以宋明儒家为代表，直接预设与定性了天人同一、天人同质，天人之间唯存在方式有别而已。就解释力而言，“两种更为古老的解释胜过两种相对晚近的解释，但仍然都不是完美的解释。”在中国传统观念体系与思想文法中，上述解释也不乏共性，即无论哪一种解释中，天人关系均具有“直接性（immediate）”，“不需要中介或称媒介（media）”。由此也决定了中国与欧洲传统思想语境的显著差异。

In the European tradition, the relationship between God and humanity is similar to the traditional Chinese Heaven-human relationship, but it must have an “intermediary” or “middleman” to communicate between humanity and God. This intermediary or middleman could be a priest, a prophet, the church, or a father. It was not until the rise of Protestantism, which opposed the Catholic Church system, advocating “only God (Christ), only the Bible, only faith (confidence),” that a new world “no longer needing an intermediary” or “abolishing the intermediary” was inaugurated. Protestant theorists could cite the political and social factors of the Catholic Church’s corruption, extravagance, decay, and depravity as evidence, but this is not a necessary reason in the metaphysical sense. The belief that the “omniscient and omnipotent” God can communicate directly with the hearts of believers is merely a new “hypothesis” proposed by Protestant theorists; the evidence comes from psychological association, empathy, or even hallucination. Discussing the reasons for the above differences, Zhao Tingyang seems to reach the limits of his intellect. He writes: in the European tradition, “why does the relationship between God and humanity require an intermediary? There is no necessary reason; it is a matter of tradition.” Similarly, in the Chinese tradition, “why does the Heaven-human relationship require no intermediary? There is also no necessary reason; it is a matter of tradition.”

在欧洲传统中，上帝与人的关系类似于中国传统的天人关系，必须有“中介”“中间人”来沟通人与上帝，这个中介、中间人可以是祭司、先知、教会、神父。直到反天主教会体系的新教兴起，主张唯有上帝（基督）、唯有圣经、唯有信仰（信心），开启了“不再需要中间人”、“取消中间人”的新世界。新教理论家可以给出天主教会敛财、奢靡、腐败、堕落的政治社会因素作为论据，但这不是形而上学意义上的必然理由；相信“全知全能”的上帝能与信众的心灵直接沟通，仅仅是新教理论家提出的新“假设”而已，论据是来自于心理学上的联想、移情甚至幻觉。论及产生上述差异的原因，赵汀阳似乎达到了智识极限，他写道，在欧洲传统中，“为什么上帝与人的关系需要中间人？没有必然理由，传统使然”；同样，在中国传统中，“为什么天人关系不需要中间人？也没有必然理由，传统使然。”

Explaining the divergence between Chinese and Western concepts of the Heaven-human relationship with “it is a matter of tradition” is not an appeal to agnosticism, but rather touches upon the more complex overall cultural differences beneath religious concepts, including profound divergences in the field of philosophy. For religious conceptual systems need to use philosophical concepts and logical argumentation to prove themselves credible and trustworthy. Closely related to core categories such as Heaven (in the Chinese tradition) and God (in the Western tradition), China and the West have developed different understandings of highly abstract concepts such as transcendence, perfection, infinity, eternity, being, and nature. These different understandings of philosophical concepts lead people to construct different “ontologies” and “histories.” “The enormous and stubborn differences in belief” are all built upon their respective cultural cornerstones.

用“传统使然”解释中西方天人关系观念的分野，并非诉诸不可知论，而是触及到宗教观念之下更为复杂的整体文化差异，包括哲学领域的深刻分歧，因为宗教观念体系需要借助哲学概念与论证逻辑来证明自己是可信的、足信的。与上天（中国传统）、上帝（西方传统）等核心范畴密切相关，中西方对超越、完美、无限、永恒、存在、自然等诸如此类高度抽象的概念产生了不同理解，而对这些哲学概念的不同理解引领着人们构建了不同的“存在论”和“历史”。“巨大而顽固的信仰差异”均建立于各自的文化基石之上。

Religion, especially monotheism, is unwilling to face questioning, and even does not hesitate to physically eliminate those who question it, because questioning implies that religion does not possess unquestionability. Yet religion cannot avoid the questioning of skepticism; it can only strive to respond to questioning, which also promotes the development of religious philosophy. But religion is ultimately not philosophy; God only served as the fulcrum of a philosophical system during a specific period (such as European medieval scholastic theology). Responding to questioning and defending faith, or raising questions and seeking wisdom—this is the conceptual basis for the divergence between religion and philosophy. From this perspective, China has no tradition of monotheism. But this does not mean that China lacks “religious” emotions and concepts, or transcendent “deep perceptions.” Among China’s traditional transcendent concepts, there is no establishment of a singular being analogous to God, nor can it accept God as the supreme being; rather, multiple divinities coexist. “Heaven is regarded as the greatest transcendent being.” Heaven covers the world, embraces all phenomena, and appears in myriad, countless forms. Heaven can refer to “all possible ways of existence for all things,” but Heaven is not an abstract, imageless God.

宗教，尤其是一神教，并不愿面对质疑，甚至不惜在肉体上消灭质疑者，因为质疑就意味着宗教不具有无可置疑性。但宗教又不能免于怀疑论的质疑，只能努力去回应质疑，这也促进了宗教哲学的发展。但宗教终究不是哲学，上帝只在特定时期成为哲学体系的支点（如欧洲中世纪的经院神学）。回应质疑、捍卫信仰，抑或是提出质疑、寻求智慧，这是宗教与哲学分异的观念基础。就此看，中国没有一神教传统。但这不等于说中国没有“宗教性”情感和概念，没有超越性的“深层感知”。在中国传统的超越性概念中，没有确立类似于上帝的、唯一的的存在，也不能接受上帝是至高无上的存在，而是多种神圣共存。“天被看作是最伟大的超越存在”，天覆盖世界、包罗万象，以纷繁多样、不胜枚举的形象出现，天可以指代“一切事物存在的所有可能之道”，但天不是抽象的、没有形象的上帝。

Christianity and Islam are imported religions and cannot represent Chinese modes of thinking and cultural characteristics. Because the Chinese tradition does not believe in a single supreme god, Buddhism and Daoism are both polytheistic and pantheistic, actually closer to “atheism” in the context of Western religious philosophy. In comparison, Confucianism is more suitable for characterizing the spiritual world of the Chinese people. However, compared with the Christian tradition, Confucianism is overly “secularized,” extremely concerned with political-ethical issues, and “consistently silent” on transcendent questions; Confucianism is also not a “religion” in the context of Western religious philosophy. Zhao Tingyang believes that within the Chinese cultural system deeply influenced by Confucianism, “history” is the most important cultural “cornerstone.” Historical reflection or philosophy of history becomes the foundation and source of Chinese culture; from its very origins, Chinese culture has been “distant” from religion.

基督教与伊斯兰教是传入的宗教，无法代表中国思维方式与文化特质。因中国传统不信仰独一至上的神，佛教和道教都是多神论、泛神论，实际更接近于西方宗教哲学语境中的“无神论”。比较之下，儒家更适合表征中国人的精神世界。不过与基督教传统相比，儒家过于“世俗化”，极为关注政治伦理问题，对超越性的问题“始终保持沉默”，儒家也不是西方宗教哲学语境中“宗教”。赵汀阳认为，在深受儒家影响下的中国文化体系中，“历史”是最重要文化“基石”。历史性反思或历史哲学成为中国文化的基础和源头，中国文化自源头起就“疏远”宗教。

The Western Christian tradition concerns itself with necessity, unity, and being, investing emotion, faith, and intellect in a God concentrated with absoluteness, perfection, and eternity. Chinese culture places a high degree of attention on history, which instead directs Chinese philosophy toward “possibility, rather than necessity.” The core categories with which Chinese philosophy concerns itself are “becoming rather than being, change rather than eternity, flexibility rather than perfection, the uncertain Way rather than fixed law, relationships rather than the individual…” Consequently, Chinese culture and ancient Chinese philosophy left no sufficient intellectual space for religion, and the political and social space left for religion was also very limited.

西方基督教传统关心必然、唯一、存在，把情感、信仰和才智都投注到集绝对、完美和永恒于一体的上帝身上。中国文化对历史有高度关注，则将中国哲学引向“可能性，而非必然性”。中国哲学关切的核心范畴“是变在（becoming）而非存在（being），是变化而非永恒，是灵活性而非完美性，是不确定的道而非既定的律，是关系而非个人……”于是中华文化、中国古代哲学没有给宗教留下足够的思想空间，给宗教留下的政治社会空间也很有限。

III. From the Monotheistic Tradition to Modern Monotheism

三、从一神教传统到现代一神论

In his book *Four Forking Paths*, Zhao Tingyang provides a clear definition of the concept of modernity: “a complete set of modes of life and production based on the sovereign individual and the sovereign state as the fundamental units of existence.” Since the world entered modernity, with liberalism originating in Europe as its representative, the greatest change in the system of human concepts has been the shift from believing in “God or heaven and earth” to venerating individual reason and subjectivity, along with the confidence that the continuous conquest of nature can be achieved. New human myths have replaced traditional religious myths. Although most Europeans today would firmly assert that they live in a highly secularized society, rarely attend church, lack religious belief, and have even forgotten God, Zhao Tingyang has discovered that the modern and contemporary West has undergone a transformation from monotheistic religion to monotheism: “Monotheism has creatively reshaped itself and, in a more effective way, transformed into the deep structure of modernity.” Monotheism is “highly mature and deeply entrenched” within the Western conceptual system. For the intellectual development of people living within a Western cultural context, whether monotheistic religion or monotheism, it is both a shaping force and a constraint.

在《四种分叉》一书中，赵汀阳给现代性（modernity）概念一个清晰的界定，“以主权个人和主权国家为基本存在单位而展开的一整套生活和生产方式。”世界步入现代之来，以源于欧洲的自由主义为代表，人类观念体系最大的变化在于，从信仰“上帝或者天地”转向崇尚个体理性与主体性，并自信可以实现对自然的持续征服，新的人类神话取代了传统的宗教神话。尽管当下大部分欧洲人会坚称，自己生活在一个高度世俗化的社会，很少去教堂，也缺乏宗教信仰，甚至遗忘了上帝。但赵汀阳却发现，近现代西方经历了从一神教到一神论的转变，“一神论创造性地重塑了自身，以一种更有效的方式转变为现代性的深层结构”。一神论在西方观念体系中“高度成熟并根深蒂固”。对于生活于西方文化背景下的人们的心智发展来说，无论是一神教，还是一神论，既是塑造，也是束缚。

This is a historical fact that sounds absurd: medieval theological research cultivated the “gravediggers” of religious belief. Western modern concepts of subjectivity originated from medieval Christian faith. The cultural elites of the Middle Ages—priests, monks, clergy, and scholars—sought to understand God’s spirit by investigating all things created by God. However, they gradually discovered that, compared to studying all things, what was more worthy of study was humanity. This sustained research activity raised a major proposition that potentially deconstructed theology: “Humanity is the most wondrous existence among all things.” The research that pursued religious knowledge transformed into research that deconstructed religious belief. When “reflection on humanity became the core of all knowledge,” then “the question of humanity superseded all questions.” Humanity ultimately replaced God, becoming the foundation and starting point of knowledge.

这是一个听起来荒谬的历史事实，中世纪的神学研究培养了宗教信仰的“掘墓人”。西方现代主体性观念源于中世纪的基督教信仰，神父、修士、僧侣和学者这些中世纪的文化精英通过探究上帝创造的万物，来理解上帝的精神。但是他们逐渐发现，与研究万物相比，更值得研究的是人。这种持续的研究性活动提出了潜在颠覆神学的一大命题——“人是万物中最为奇妙的存在”。追求宗教知识的研究蜕变为解构宗教信仰的研究，当“对人的反思成为一切知识的核心”后，“人的问题就高于一切问题”。人最终取代了上帝，成为知识的基础和起点。

Examining the process of change in Western ontological concepts reveals that, having shed reliance on religion and dependence on nature, modernity is a history of humanity attaining individual freedom, and also a history moving toward “individualization.” In his book *The Pivot of First Philosophy*, Zhao Tingyang provides a more detailed argument for the construction process of absolute subjectivity. The atomized individual based on individual reason replaced God as the logical starting point for constructing modern values. This subversive change did not stop at the epistemological level; humanity subsequently gained a core position in the fields of knowledge, economy, and politics: the epistemological expression is “I think, therefore I am”; the expression in the economic field is “maximization of self-interest”; the expression in the political-legal field is natural rights, the supremacy of human rights. The self-person, the economic person, and the political person merge into one. Modernity grants each person their own spiritual world and sovereign world, with the body, self, property, and power respectively becoming the individual’s natural boundary, spiritual boundary, boundary of disposable space, and political boundary.

考察西方存在论观念变迁过程会发现，摆脱了对宗教的庇护和对自然的依赖，现代性是人类获得个人自由的历史，也是一部走向“个体化”的历史。在《第一哲学的支点》一书中，赵汀阳对绝对主体性构建过程有更细致的论证。基于个人理性的原子化个体取代了上帝成为构建现代价值观的逻辑起点，这一颠覆性的变化不只停留在认识论层面上，人类继而获得了在知识、经济、政治领域的核心地位：认识论的表述是“我思故我在”，经济领域的表述是“自身利益最大化”，政治法律领域的表述是天赋人权、人权至上，自我人、经济人和政治人合而为一。现代性给每一个人属于他自己的精神世界与主权世界，身体、自我、财产、权力分别成为个人的自然边界、精神边界、可支配空间边界与政治边界。

The philosophical conceptual foundation of modern Western monotheism is subjectivity. The mature concept of subjectivity, taking “I think” as its starting point, includes individual reason, personal independence, moral autonomy, and other elements. This is “an achievement of modern people,” and can also be called “an invention of modern culture.” In his book *The Shadow of Monotheism*, Zhao Tingyang naturally does not need to define the meaning of subjectivity when addressing Le Pichon. In a recently published article, he provides a rough definition of subjectivity: “a thought-action terminal possessing cognitive sovereignty and moral sovereignty and having self-consciousness.” Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am” only established human subjectivity at the epistemological level. Subsequently, thinkers continuously excavated the connotations of subjectivity from humanity itself, such as Kant’s categorical imperative and the British empiricist rational strategy of pursuing individual interests. The commonality of these intellectual efforts lies in “logically and practically rejecting any concept of the good that transcends subjectivity.”

现代西方一神论的哲学观念基础是主体性。成熟的主体性观念以“我思”为起点，包含个人理性、人格独立、道德自律等内容，这是“现代人的成就”，也可以说是“现代文化的发明”。在《一神论的影子》一书中，赵汀阳面对乐比雄自然不需要界定主体性的含义。在新近发表的文章中，他对主体性做了一个大致定义，“具有认知主权和道德主权并具有自我意识的思想-行为终端”。笛卡尔的“我思故我在”仅仅是在认识论的层面上确立了人的主体性，此后思想家们不断从人本身挖掘主体性内涵，如康德的绝对命令、英国经验主义追求个人利益的理性策略，上述智识努力的共通之处在于，“逻辑和现实上拒绝了任何超越于主体性之上的善的概念”。

The process of self-subjectivity’s self-justification is a “self-referential story of proving oneself,” which shares a similar logical thinking with the Christian theological story of proving Jesus Christ as the Son of God: the Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit mutually testifies, forming a closed discursive loop. The self as subject regards the production, life, ideas, and organizational forms of others as epistemological and political problems, which is analogous to traditional monotheistic religion treating the lives of pagans as a “religious problem”: when the self as subject defines truth, truth becomes an “epistemological problem”; when the self judges value, value becomes an “ethical problem”; when the self regards itself as an independent, absolute subject, identity becomes a “political problem”; based on subjectivity, the claim of “natural rights” is generated, and it promotes the practice of related political and legal systems. The concept of “natural rights” is institutionalized and systematized, coming closer to an institutionalized quasi-religion. Viewed in this light, the absolute self-image constructed on the basis of individual subjectivity is the object of faith of modern monotheism, and the modern theology of monotheism remains the West’s “cathedral of thought.”

自我主体性证立的过程是“自己证明自己的自相关故事”，其与基督教神学证明耶稣基督为神子的故事有相似的思维逻辑，圣父圣子圣灵三位一体、相互见证，形成了话语闭环。作为主体的自我将他人的生产生活、思想观念、组织形态视为知识论和政治问题，与传统一神教将异教徒的生活视为“宗教问题”异曲同工：作为主体的自我去定义真理时，真理便成为“知识论问题”；自我去评判价值时，价值便成为“伦理学问题”；自我自视为独立的、绝对的主体时，身份认同便成为“政治问题”；基于主体性生发出“天赋人权”的主张，并推动了相关的政治法律制度实践，“天赋人权”观念被制度化、体制化，更接近于建制化的准宗教。就此看，基于个人主体性建构出的绝对自我形象是现代一神论的信仰对象，一神论的现代神学依旧是西方的“思想的教堂”。

In Zhao Tingyang’s view, modern theology constructs a self-image of humanity and canonizes itself, facing multiple paradoxes at the ontological level: First, “the absolute ego possesses an internal world of pure cogitatum qua cogitatum.” This internal world of the self exists autonomously and spontaneously, “self-secluding” (not “self-awakening”) from the external world. The self neither wants to enter the world of others or the external world, nor is it capable of describing, summarizing, or explaining the world of others or the external world. The self-world is thus fabricated as the entire world. The paradox inherent in this philosophical view of subjectivity is that “when the world is equated with the self and the other disappears, the concept of the subject itself will also lose its meaning due to the loss of contrast.” Second, the creed of modern monotheism is, “Better to believe in oneself than to believe in God.” Zhao Tingyang denounces this as “absurd.” Humanity has not provided sufficient reliable and trustworthy evidence of itself; on the contrary, the harm of human-made disasters [5]5 The *Book of Changes* (*Yijing* or *I Ching*), an ancient Chinese divination text and one of the oldest Chinese classics, central to Chinese cosmological and philosophical thought. in history has been even more severe than natural disasters. People are “almost completely ignorant” of important issues in the life-world, such as what is good, truth, and the future, although some may claim to know everything. Therefore, “believing in oneself” is extremely “unreliable.” The world dominated by self-subjectivity is at best a “self-referential world of words,” whose essence is a world that replaces real life and exempts people from mutual responsibility. Third, the conceptual system of absolute self-ontology constructed on the basis of individual reason leads individuals to claim “unconditional rights,” to crown themselves as “masters of knowledge” and “moral arbiters,” and thus “almost” attain a status “on par with God.” Zhao Tingyang bluntly calls this a “pseudo-religion.”

在赵汀阳看来，现代神学构建出人类的自我形象，并自我封圣，其面临着存在论意义上的多个悖谬：第一，“绝对的自我（absolute ego）拥有了一个纯粹所思（cogitatum qua cogitatum）的内部世界”，这个自我的内部世界自主自在地存在，“自绝”（不是“自觉”）于外在世界，自我既不想进入他人世界、外在世界，也无力对他人世界、外在世界进行描述、总结、解释，自我世界于是被拟制为整个世界。这个主体性哲学观蕴含的悖论在于，“当世界与自我等同、他者消失之时，主体概念本身也将因为失去对比性而失去意义。”第二，现代一神论的信条是，“与其相信神，不如相信自己”。赵汀阳斥之为“荒谬”，人类没有提供自身可靠、值得信赖的足够证据，相反历史上RH之害尤烈于天灾。人们对于生活世界中的重要议题，例如什么是善、真理、未来，“几乎一无所知”，尽管某些人可以标榜自己无所不知。故“相信自己”是极其“不靠谱的”。自我主体性主宰的世界充其量不过是一个“自相关的话语世界（world of words）”，其实质是一个替代了真实生活、人们之间免于相互责任的世界。第三，基于个人理性构建出绝对自我存在论的观念体系，个人主张“拥有无条件权利”、个人自我加冕为“知识主宰者”与“道德裁决者”，继而“几乎”获得“与上帝平起平坐”的地位。赵汀阳毫不客气地称其为“伪宗教”（pseudo-religion）。

IV. Monotheism Creates More Ontological Problems

四、一神论制造出更多存在论难题

Monotheism itself is an interesting story about the world, life, and history, and also “one of the most poetic traditional interpretations” of existence as a whole. Exclusivity comes from monotheistic religion, but monotheistic religion was not originally exclusive. Examining the Bible’s *Deuteronomy*, Le Pichon [1]1 François Jullien, a French sinologist and philosopher, whose work on comparative philosophy and cultural otherness is frequently cited in Chinese debates on cross-cultural understanding. finds that before the appearance of the prophet Moses, primitive Judaism, though a monotheistic religion, had no hostile relationship with other religions. In the New Testament era, Saint Paul invented the ideology of universalism and greatly promoted monotheistic religion. Thereafter, religious (Christian) universalism combined with political universalism (the Roman Empire), and medieval Europe gradually became Christianized. With the rise of modern political ideology, monotheism inherited the spiritual mantle of monotheistic religion and, as a general mode of thought, formed cultural boundaries based on civilizations.

一神论本身是一个关于世界、生活和历史的有趣故事，也是对整体存在所给出的“最具有诗意的传统解读之一”。排他性来自于一神教，但一神教并非最初就具有排他性。乐比雄考察《圣经·申命记》发现，在先知摩西出现前，原始犹太教虽为一神教，与其他宗教并不存在敌对关系。新约时代圣保罗发明了普世主义意识形态，并对一神教大加推广。此后宗教（基督教）普世主义与政治普世主义（罗马帝国）结合，中世纪欧洲各地逐渐基督教化。随着现代政治意识形态的兴起，一神论继承了一神教化的精神衣钵，作为一般性的思想方法，形成了以文明为单位的文化边界。

The combination of monotheistic religion or monotheism with universalism creates an “ideological system of ideas.” Ideology is in fact a system of ideas that claims absolute leadership over culture, that is, it asserts its own supreme authority. This combination has created enormous ontological problems for the world and brought catastrophic historical circumstances to humanity. Monotheistic religion not only has the sacred mission of spreading the gospel, converting others, and expanding its flock, but also the commandment to “fight to the death for identity and authority.” This “arbitrary definition and judgment of value,” inherited as a cultural gene by modern monotheism, makes the self with absolute subjectivity an alias for the “DC-er.” [2]2 “DC-er” likely refers to “dictator” or “dominator,” a term used by Zhao Tingyang to denote a self-asserting absolute subject that imposes its will. The disasters that traditional monotheistic religion inflicted on humanity were religious inquisitions and religious wars; the disasters that modern monotheism inflicts on humanity are civilizational conflicts and ideological struggles, such as launching “holy war” in the name of “Allah,” or mobilizing for the war on terror under the banner of “human rights” and “democracy.”

一神教或一神论与普遍主义结合，形成“意识形态的观念体制”。意识形态实为一种观念体制，自我宣称对文化拥有绝对领导权，也就是断言自身拥有最高权威。两者结合给世界制造出巨大的存在论难题，也给人类带来灾难性的历史境遇。一神教不仅有传播福音、改变他人、扩大信众的神圣使命，也有为“身份和权威战斗至死”的戒律。这种对于“价值的武断定义和裁决”，作为文化基因遗传给了现代一神论，拥有绝对主体性的自我成为“DC者”的别名。传统一神教给人类制造的灾难是宗教审判、宗教战争，现代一神论给人类制造的灾难是文明冲突、意识形态之争，诸如以“真主之名”发动“圣战”，或者打着“人权”“民主”旗号进行反恐战争动员。

If, since the Middle Ages, the intellectual pursuit of religion by believers in monotheistic religion has cultivated the “gravediggers of religion,” then since the era of Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke in the 17th century, the absolute subjectivity of modern monotheism, developing according to its own logic, has likewise cultivated the “gravediggers of subjectivity.” Modern people have constructed the absolute subjectivity of the self, which Zhao Tingyang [3]3 Zhao Tingyang (赵汀阳, b. 1961), a prominent Chinese philosopher known for his work on the *tianxia* (all-under-heaven) concept and relational ontology. calls the “self-made person.” The “self-made person” is not only a subject of autonomous will and thought, but also acquires complete sovereignty in the ontological sense; it not only negates human naturalness, historicity, and sociality, but can even set the conditions of its own existence. The logical result of the development of the “self-made person” is the genetic editing of humans and the development of super artificial intelligence.

如果说自中世纪起，一神教信仰者对宗教的知识追求培养了“宗教的掘墓人”；而自17世纪笛卡尔、霍布斯、洛克的时代起，现代一神论的绝对主体性按其自身逻辑发展，也同样培养了“主体性的掘墓人”。现代人构建了自我绝对主体性，赵汀阳称其为“自造人”。“自造人”不仅是自主意志和思想的主体，同时也获得了存在论意义上的完全主权，其不但否弃人的自然性、历史性和社会性，乃至可以设定自身的存在条件。“自造人”发展的逻辑结果便是对人进行jy编辑，开发超级人工智能。

Using individual reason, freedom, equality, human rights, and so on from modern Western intellectual history as theoretical keywords, the “modern theology of subjectivity” constructed as this modern monotheistic ideology has produced multiple “logical and ontological fallacies.” For example, based on the “biological fact” of individual existence, the concept of human rights and the system of human rights institutions have become a “modern new religion.” On the issue of value critique, when individual value is regarded as absolute, supreme, and legally constructed as equal, it triggers ethical and legal dilemmas like the trolley problem. In the modern monotheistic ideology based on self-subjectivity, one person’s equal and supreme right to life equals that of five people, and can also be deduced to equal all of humanity. One equals five, one equals infinity—this not only manifests the logical paradox of modern monotheism but also highlights the ontological problems of the modern world.

以现代西方观念史的个人理性、自由、平等和人权等为理论关键词，构建出的“主体性现代神学”，这一现代一神论意识形态制造了多种“逻辑上与存在论上的谬误”。例如基于个人存在的“生物学事实”，人权观念与人权制度体系已成为“现代版的新型宗教”。在价值批评议题上，个体价值被视为绝对的、至上的、被法律拟制为平等的，则会引发电车难题这一类的伦理难题和法律难题。在基于自我主体性的现代一神论意识形态中，一个人平等且至高无上的生命权等于五个人，也可以推演为等于全人类。一等于五，一等于无穷大，这不仅是现代一神论逻辑悖论的表现，也凸显出现代世界的存在论难题。

The future world develops in the direction of systematization and technologization. Based on the “union of global capitalists,” “global systematized power” integrates financial systems, cutting-edge technology, online media, digital technology, and the representative system that falsely borrows the name of democracy into a diffuse collection of power. “Global systematized power” weakens and even deconstructs individual free will and local autonomous power, and traditional political forces based on the nation-state may also retreat to a secondary position. Since the self-made person can adhere to the consistency of the logic of subjectivity, genetic science can claim to create superhumans, and artificial intelligence can demand the creation of superintelligence. Represented by the constructive logic of artificial intelligence, frenziedly developing technology will become a “superpower with a monotheistic mode of thought.” Future monotheism will produce upgraded, detailed versions of ontological problems. The most typical problem is that information technology and artificial intelligence make digital ordering effortless; silicon-based life is best at making “optimal choices” and making itself a systematic existence that is “the one.” The “only system created by artificial intelligence no longer needs politics.” Only carbon-based life like humans can recognize that intersubjectivity, interculturality, cross-culture, and so on are basic facts in the ontological sense, and will insist on the “many” of lifestyles, linguistic cultures, and value systems, thereby giving rise to political problems.

未来世界沿着系统化和技术化方向发展，以“全球资本家的联合”为基础，“全球系统化权力”集金融系统、尖端科技、网络媒体、数字技术、冒用民主之名的代主制度等要素为一体，形成弥散性的权力集合。“全球系统化权力”削弱乃至解构了个人的自由意志、地方的自治权力，以民族国家为基本形式的传统政治力量也可能退居次要地位。既然自造人能坚持主体性逻辑的一致性（consistency），那么基因科学就可以主张创造超人，而人工智能也可以要求创造超级智能。以人工智能的构造逻辑为代表，疯狂发展的技术将成为“具有一神论式思维模式的超级力量”。未来的一神论将制造出升级版、细节版的存在论难题。最典型的难题是，信息技术与人工智能使得数字化排序易如反掌，硅基生命最为擅长做“最优选择”，并使得自身成为“唯一”（the one）的系统化存在，人工智能创造的“唯一系统不再需要政治”。只有人类这一类碳基生命会认识到主体间性、文化间性、跨文化等是存在论意义上的基本事实，会坚持生活方式、语言文化与价值体系的“多”（the many），继而引发出政治问题。

Zhao Tingyang regards the future monotheistic mode of thought as a terrifying, destructive force. Artificial intelligence, as a human creation, can make value judgments about humans and may even regard humans as “valueless lower life forms,” carrying out a merciless “final judgment” on humanity—this is “civilizational suicide.” Although quantitative inequality (of wealth, status) has been widespread in human society, it was previously tolerable. Genetic science, however, can create immortal humans, and artificial intelligence can create super artificial intelligence in thought and practical ability. A small number of people can gain immortality and advanced intelligence through high technology, while the majority are degraded to “locusts.” This “qualitative inequality”—inequality in the right to life—is unbearable.

赵汀阳将未来的一神论思维模式视为一种可怖的、毁灭性的力量，人工智能这一人造物可以对人类做出价值评判，并且可能将人类视为“没有价值的低等生物”，对人类毫不留情地进行“最终审判”，这是“文明的自杀”。此前人类社会中尽管普遍存在着量（财富、地位）的不平等，但其尚可忍受。基因科学却可以制造出不死的人，人工智能也可以制造出在思想和实践能力上的超级人工智能。少部分人可以通过高科技获得永生与高级智力，大部分人却被降格为“蝗虫”，这种“质的不平等”——生命权的不平等，是令人难以忍受的。

The liberal view of human rights, this modern new religion, does not directly develop into a future anti-human artificial intelligence, nor are human rights the direct cause of anti-human artificial intelligence. There is a long road from human rights to artificial intelligence, and people are misled by many signposts, among which “the most misleading sign” is liberalism’s “placing human rights and technological progress in a supremely elevated position.” Liberalism today is not a “theory” but a “prevailing ideology.”

自由主义的人权观这一现代新宗教并非直接发展出未来反人类的人工智能，人权也并非是反人类的人工智能的直接原因。从人权到人工智能之间存在着漫长路途，人们为众多路标误导，其中“最具误导性的标识”是自由主义“将人权和科技进步置于至高无上的地位”。当下自由主义不是“理论”，而是“流行的意识形态”。

V. Chinese Intellectual Resources for Reconstructing the World’s Existential Order

五、重构世界存在秩序的中国思想资源

It is precisely the current and future global ontological problems that prompt Zhao Tingyang to rediscover the value of Chinese intellectual resources. The Western ontological system takes “being” as its foundation, and Western philosophy therefore takes “necessity” as its core issue. Since the Western Zhou dynasty [4]4 The Western Zhou dynasty (c. 1046–771 BCE) is a foundational period in Chinese history, associated with the development of early Chinese political philosophy and the *Book of Changes*., originating from the *Book of Changes* [5]5 The *Book of Changes* (*Yijing* or *I Ching*), an ancient Chinese divination text and one of the oldest Chinese classics, central to Chinese cosmological and philosophical thought., Chinese philosophical ontology takes “being as becoming” as its foundation and takes “possibility” as its core issue. Zhao Tingyang, based on keywords such as relational subject (not self-subject) and relational rationality (not self-rationality), and around core propositions such as co-existence ontology (not exclusive ontology) and “co-existence precedes existence” (others and the self are equally free, free existences), constructs a “new *tianxia* system,” aiming to “replace the personal rationality of maximizing interests with the relational rationality of minimizing conflict,” to reject the world order of “the strong ruling the weak,” and to create “a compatible world ontological order.”

正是基于当下与未来的世界性的存在论难题，促使赵汀阳重新发掘中国思想资源的价值。西方存在论观念体系以“存在”（being）为本，西方哲学也因此将“必然性”作为核心问题。自西周以来，源于周易，中国哲学的存在论以“变易之存在”（becoming）为本，将“可能性”作为核心问题。赵汀阳基于关系主体（非自我主体）、关系理性（非自我理性）等关键词，围绕共在存在论（非排他存在论）、“共在先于存在”（他人与自我同为自在、自由的存在）等核心命题，构建起“新天下体系”，旨在“用冲突最小化的关系理性去替代利益最大化的个人理性”，否弃“强者统治弱者”的世界秩序，创造“具有兼容性的世界存在论秩序”。

When exploring the capacity of relational subjects and co-existential ontology to construct an order of thought, Zhao Tingyang finds that self-subjectivity disregards others who are equally autonomous and free, while traditional Chinese Confucianism focuses on the issue of interpersonal ethics — “the question of how to co-exist with a transcendent other.” Confucius, based on the concept of *ren* (仁), proposed a rational solution to the ontological problem. In the third letter, Zhao Tingyang uses Western philosophical concepts to explain the theoretical implications of *ren*. Literally, *ren* refers to the relationship “of-two-persons” (任意两人之间), and its theoretical meaning can be further elaborated: first, in a non-political state, as “the purest, most basic condition and unit,” *ren* can be used to explain any ethical norm formed between two persons; second, the relationship of *ren* can serve as “the basis on which humanity reaches consensus on mutual obligations”; third, through *ren*, it is possible to support “the co-existential conditions for universal ethical principles,” which Zhao summarizes as “Confucius’s golden rule” — mutual benefit, no one harmed; fourth, the relationship of *ren* is “a path to self-humanization through humanizing others.” In the fifth letter, Zhao uses Western philosophical propositions to explain two foundational principles of *ren*: first, the “negative formula,” nearly identical to the Christian golden rule, “Do not do to others what you do not want done to yourself” (己所不欲，勿施于人); second, the “positive formula,” significantly different from the Christian golden rule, “If you wish to establish yourself, establish others; if you wish to achieve, achieve for others” (己欲立而立人，己欲达而达人) — this is a “robust reciprocal strategy.”

探讨关系主体、共在存在论对思想秩序的建构能力这一问题时，赵汀阳发现，自我主体性无视与自我同样自在的、自由的他者，而中国传统儒家则聚焦于人际伦理问题——“与具有超越性的他者如何共在的问题”。孔子基于“仁”的观念，对存在论难题提出了理性解决方案。在第三封信中，赵汀阳使用西方哲学概念来解释“仁”的思想内涵。从字面上说，“仁”指“任意两人之间”（of-two-persons）的关系，其理论涵义可进一步阐释：第一，在非政治状态下，作为“最纯粹、最基本的条件和单元”，“仁”可用以解释二人所形成的任意一种伦理规范；第二，“仁”的关系可作为“人类对相互义务得以形成共识的基础”；第三，借助“仁”，可以支撑“普遍伦理法则的共在条件”，赵汀阳将之概括为“孔子的黄金法则”——相互增益、无人受损；第四，“仁”的关系是“通过人化他人而达到自我人化的途径”。在第五封信中，赵汀阳用用西方哲学命题解释“仁”的两项基础原则：第一，“否定性公式”，与基督教的金规则几近吻合，“己所不欲，勿施于人”；第二，“肯定性公式”，与基督教的金规则差异显著，“己欲立而立人，己欲达而达人”，这是一项“强劲的互惠策略”。

Taking the protection of human rights as another example, Zhao Tingyuan proposes changing the definition of value “based on the individual unit” to redefining value on the basis of “mutual relationship” as a fundamental ethical fact; changing the view of human rights as “unconditionally valid” rights protection claims, discarding the ideology that treats “human obligations” (人义) as “optional,” and correcting the imbalance and asymmetry between individual rights claims and the assumption of obligations; replacing the “innate human rights” (天赋人权) ideology with a “prepaid human rights” (预付人权) conceptual system, whereby “a person is entitled to human rights if, and only if, they have fulfilled their obligations as a human being and respected the human rights of others,” thereby achieving a balance and symmetry between individual rights and obligations.

再以人权保护为例，赵汀阳提议，改变“以个人为单位”来定义价值，基于“相互关系”这一基础性的伦理学事实来重新定义价值；改变视人权为“无条件有效”的权利保护诉求，摒弃视“人义（human obligations）”为“可有可无”的意识形态，矫正个人权利主张与义务承担之间的失衡和不对称状态；用“预付人权”观念体系来取代“天赋人权”意识形态，“一个人，当且仅当完成了作为人的义务，并尊重其他人的人权，才有资格享有其人权”，从而实现个人权利与义务的平衡与对称。

Judging from the content of Le Pichon’s five letters, he holds an extremely optimistic expectation of Chinese cultural influence: that the ancient Chinese language can develop into a “new global Chinese,” that a “new balanced world” is imminent, that China will become a “super hegemon,” and that this will impact the heritage of Christian civilization. However, these judgments do not conform to reality; even if classified as “outlook” or “prediction,” they are far too premature. A more realistic judgment is given by Zhao Tingyang: contemporary China is neither capable of “setting agendas or establishing rules for the world’s game” nor, as ancient China once did, “setting material and spiritual examples for other countries.” Although there was a “honeymoon period” in Sino-European cultural exchange during the 17th and 18th centuries, Chinese culture “has never truly been internalized into the mainstream of European culture.” The cultural keywords that Chinese culture has provided to and been absorbed by European culture are extremely limited, let alone theoretical propositions or conceptual systems.

就乐比雄的5封信件内容看，他对中国文化影响力有着极为乐观的预期，古老的汉语能发展成“世界性的新的汉语”，“新的均衡世界”即将到来，中国成为“超级霸主”，并对基督教文明遗产构成冲击。但上述判断不符合事实，即便归入“展望”或“预见”也实属过于超前。更符合事实的判断是赵汀阳给出的，当代中国既没有能力“为世界的博弈游戏设立议题或建立规则”，也无法如像古代中国一样，“为其他国家树立物质和精神典范”。尽管在17-18世纪中欧文化交流存在着“蜜月期”，但中国文化“从未真正被内化进欧洲文化的主体之中”。中国文化为欧洲文化所提供并为其所吸纳接受的文化关键词极为有限，更遑论理论命题或者观念体系了。

For over a hundred years, the mainstream of Sino-Western cultural exchange has been the eastward spread of Western learning (西学东渐), failing to achieve an East-West balance and remaining far from the westward spread of Eastern learning (东学西渐). Zhao Tingyang offers a clever metaphor: if Chinese cultural tradition is regarded as a “shadow,” China has sold this “shadow” to the West over the past century, although under the fierce attack of Western monotheism, China’s “soul” (way of thinking, thought grammar) has survived. The corresponding change is that modern Chinese civilization has, to a large extent, undergone Westernization while still retaining some Chinese traditions. In this sense, modern China is indeed a “cross-cultural existence,” and modern Chinese civilization has become a “cultural hybrid.” Chinese intellectual resources and Western intellectual resources coexist within modern Chinese thought, forming a “complementary” or “contradictory” internal structure. Paradoxically, in the more than forty years since reform and opening up, the Chinese people’s impulse and passion for economic development have once again encountered Western monotheism’s exclusivism: “Although it was the West that urged China to become Westernized, when China truly became very similar to the West, Western society was quite displeased.” From this perspective, modern Western monotheism is only willing to accept followers and disciples, not competitors or opponents — which once again coincides with the concept of monotheism.

一百余年来中西文化交流的主流是西学东渐，没能形成东西均衡，离东学西渐还相距甚远。赵汀阳有一个巧妙的比喻，如果把中国文化传统视为一个“影子”，百年来中国已把“影子”卖给西方，尽管在西方一神论的猛烈打击下，中国“灵魂”（思维方式、思想文法）幸存了下来。与之相应的变化表现为，现代中国文明在很大程度上已发生西化，但同时仍保存着部分中国传统。就此而言，现代中国确实是“跨文化的存在”，现代中国文明现已成为“文化混合体”。中国思想资源与西方思想资源并存于现代中国思想内部，形成是“互补性”或“矛盾性”的内在结构。吊诡的是，改革开放四十年余来，中国人发展经济的冲动和激情再次遭遇西方一神论的排他主义，“尽管当初是西方敦促中国变得西化，但是当中国真的变得很像西方的时候，西方社会却很不乐意了”。就此看，现代西方的一神论只原因接受追随者、门徒，不能接受竞争者、对手，这和一神教的观念再次不谋而合。

VI. Conclusion

六、结语

The page of monotheism’s history has not yet been completely turned, and the influence of the concept of monotheism is now spreading rapidly. Monotheism no longer relies solely on the single form of religion but makes its appearance through various new forms such as global languages, political and legal systems, market rules, technical standards, and popular culture. Monotheistic universalism, in economic, political, intellectual, and conceptual terms, exploits, enslaves, oppresses, dominates, and controls others and foreign cultures, creating antagonistic problems in economics, politics, and spirit. Escaping monotheism may only require a little time, but escaping monotheism as a concept has no foreseeable end.

一神教的一页历史尚未彻底翻过，当下一神论的观念影响力正迅速蔓延。一神论不再仰赖于宗教的单一形式，而是借助于世界性语言、政治法律制度、市场规则、技术标准、流行文化等多种新形式粉墨登场。一神教式的普遍主义在经济、政治、知识、观念上对他者、异文化形成剥削、奴役、压迫、支配和控制关系，制造了经济、政治、精神上的对抗性难题。步出一神教或只需稍加时日，步出一神论却难有预期。

Faced with the intensifying new round of trade wars and opinion wars, the “New Cold War” has become a hot topic worldwide, with the shadow of monotheism flickering, now dim, now bright, elusive yet omnipresent. The current discussion of ontology and world order is not a scholar’s talking point but a serious issue: how to move beyond the “clash of civilizations” toward a “conjunction of civilizations,” “to be with the others or not to be, to be or not to be.”

面对愈演愈烈的新一轮贸易战、舆论战，“新冷战”（New Cold War）成为全世界热议的话题，此间一神论的影子忽明忽暗、若隐若现，但又无处不在。当下对存在论与世界秩序的讨论，不是学者的谈资，而是严肃的话题，如何超越“文明的冲突”（clash of civilizations）走向“文明的合取”（conjunction of civilizations），“与他人共在与否（to be with the others or not to be），是生存还是毁灭（to be or not to be）” 。

Over the past century, China has gradually come to know the West, but the West has yet to fully understand China. The obstacle of “knowing” (知, mutual understanding) may be surmountable, but the obstacle of “heart” (心, mutual recognition and acceptance) is difficult to cross. Cross-cultural exchange can help break the “spell” of monotheism, but “faith is more fundamental than reason” — this is the real issue and key to trans-subjectivity and cross-cultural practice. As Zhao Tingyang judges, in the history of human culture, successful cases of cross-cultural exchange are extremely rare; the fusion of ancient Greek philosophy and Judaism to create Christian theology may be regarded as a rare, even unique, successful case of cross-cultural creation. Considering only the exchange of ten letters between two individuals, the communication cannot be considered fully reciprocal intellectual interaction but merely an attempt to find more cultural points of convergence — this may be seen as foundational work for the exchange and mutual learning of civilizations.

百年来中国逐渐认识了西方，但西方尚不能全面认识中国。“知”（相互理解）的障碍或可以跨越，“心”（相互认同与接受）的障碍却难以跨越。跨文化有助于破解一神论的“咒语”，但“信仰比理性更根本”，这才是跨主体性和跨文化实践的真正问题与关键所在。如赵汀阳的判断，在人类文化史中，跨文化的成功案例极为有限，古希腊哲学与犹太教混成创造出基督教神学，或可视为跨文化创造的罕见乃至唯一的成功案例。仅就两人间10封信往来而言，双方的交流不能视为充分互惠性的智识交往，而只是试图寻找到更多的文化聚点，这或可视为文明交流互鉴的基础性工作。

Online Editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心