On the Internal Logic of the Atheistic Thought in the *Laozi*

In modern times, influenced by Western currents of thought, there has been much debate in academic circles over whether the *Laozi* holds a theistic position, with the focus of debate mainly concentrated on the philosophical nature of the “Way” (dao). The views that have emerged from this can be roughly divided into three types: The first type of view maintains that the *Laozi* is an idealist theist. For example, in the late 1950s, during the great debate on the philosophical nature of the *Laozi*, Messrs. Guan Feng and Lin Yushi put forward the view that “the Way is absolute spirit, not a material category,” affirming the divine essence of the thought in the *Laozi*. The second type of view maintains that the *Laozi* is a materialist atheist. For example, in this century, Mr. Yun Peiji affirmed the materialist essence of the “Way,” that is, he affirmed the atheist stance of the *Laozi*. The third type of view both affirms the materialist essence of the “Way” and acknowledges the *Laozi*’s affirmation of the existence of ghosts and spirits. For example, in the 1980s, Mr. Wang Yousan affirmed the materialist essence of the *Laozi*, holding that the *Laozi* replaced the traditional divine Heaven with the “Way,” which was anti-theological; at the same time, he also affirmed the incomplete aspect of the *Laozi*’s atheism, believing that “the *Laozi* still has not completely shaken off the mysterious nature of the Way of Heaven and ghosts and spirits, but this occupies only a very secondary position here.” The first two types of views take the philosophical nature of the “Way” as the criterion for judging whether the *Laozi* holds a theistic position—if the “Way” is spiritual, then it is theistic; if not, then it is atheistic. This criterion originates from the West and cannot be fully applied to the thought of the *Laozi*. As the third type of view maintains, the materiality of the “Way” and the existence of ghosts and spirits coexist in the *Laozi*. But how are we to correctly understand this seemingly contradictory thought? This requires combining the concrete and metaphysical realms of the *Laozi* for understanding, rather than simply focusing on the metaphysical realm of the “Way.” In the concrete realm, the dialectical view that “all things bear the yin and embrace the yang, and through the blending of qi they achieve harmony” constitutes the *Laozi*’s basic cognition of the mode of existence of the world, affirming the domination of objective laws over the operation of things, and depriving ghosts and spirits of their ability to dominate things. This further led to the thorough de-deification of the *Laozi*’s metaphysical world.

近代以来，受西方思潮的影响，学界对于《老子》是否持有神论的问题多有争论，争论的焦点主要集中于“道”的哲学性质。由此所产生的观点大致可分为三种：第一种观点主张《老子》是唯心主义有神论者。如在上世纪五十年代末，关峰和林聿时先生在关于《老子》哲学性质问题的大讨论中提出“道是绝对精神，而不是物质范畴”的观点，肯定了《老子》思想的神性本质；第二种观点主张《老子》是唯物主义无神论者。如在本世纪，贠培基先生肯定了“道”的唯物主义本质，即肯定了《老子》的无神论立场；第三种观点既肯定了“道”的唯物主义本质，也承认了《老子》对鬼神存在的肯定。如在20世纪80年代，王友三先生肯定了《老子》的唯物主义本质，认为《老子》以“道”取代了传统神性之天，是反神学的；同时，他也肯定了《老子》无神论不彻底的一面，认为“《老子 》仍没有完全摆脱天道鬼神的神秘性，但在这里只占非常次要的地位”。前两种观点将“道”的哲学性质作为评判《老子》是否持有神论的标准——若“道”是精神的则为有神，反之则为无神。这种评判标准源自于西方，无法完全适用于《老子》思想。正如第三种观点所主张的那样，“道”的物质性与鬼神的存在在《老子》中共存。可我们又该如何正确理解这种看似矛盾的思想？这就需要将《老子》的形下与形上领域结合起来理解，而不是单纯聚焦于“道”的形上领域。在形下领域，“万物负阴而抱阳，冲气以为和”的辩证观构成了《老子》对于世界存在方式的基本认知，肯定了客观规律对事物运行的支配，剥夺了鬼神对事物的支配能力，这也进一步导致了《老子》形上世界彻底的无神化。

I. The Regularity of the Dialectical View

一、辩证观的规律性

The text of the *Laozi* contains a large number of statements expressing the idea of the transformation of opposites. Some consider them to be the *Laozi*’s simple dialectics, and have thus made a great many interpretations of them in terms of dialectics. However, in the process of interpretation, they have discovered that its idea of the transformation of opposites seems to seriously neglect the necessary conditions for transformation. Thus, based on this defect, some believe that such an idea cannot be called dialectics, but should rather be called a dialectical view. For example, Mr. Zhang Maoze holds that the *Laozi*’s dialectical thought has not risen to the level of methodology; it has only a simple natural dialectical view, not dialectics. In fact, the so-called dialectics of the *Laozi* not only lacks the conditions for the transformation of opposites, but also hardly involves the laws of the transformation of quantity into quality and the negation of the negation; it merely states the fact that contradictions can transform into each other, so it can only be called a dialectical view. However, is such a dialectical view an incompleteness or defect in thought? From the perspective of modern dialectics, this is indeed the case, but from the perspective of the *Laozi*’s own thought, it is not. The enumeration of categories of contradiction in the text of the *Laozi* is only intended to reveal the contradictory nature of things themselves, and then to transcend this opposition of contradictions in order to expound its political proposition of “non-action” (wuwei). Its purpose is to solve the problem of “how to govern things that have a contradictory nature,” not to deliberately study dialectics. This simple, seemingly defective dialectical thought is sufficient for the theory of the *Laozi*; there is no need to delve deeper. At the same time, however, the *Laozi*’s dialectical view is also a cognition of the regularity of the world. We can deny that it is dialectics in the modern sense, but we cannot deny its regularity.

《老子》文本中存在大量表达对立转化思想的语句，有人认为它们是《老子》的朴素辩证法，于是对其做了大量关于辩证法的诠释。但在诠释的过程中却发现其对立转化思想似乎严重忽略了必要的转化条件。于是，基于这样的缺陷，有人便认为这样的思想并不能称之为辩证法，而应当是辩证观，例如张茂泽先生，他认为《老子》的辩证思想并没有上升至方法论的层次，只有朴素的自然辩证观而无辩证法。其实，所谓《老子》的辩证法不仅缺少对立转化的条件，还几乎不涉及质量互变与否定之否定规律，只是陈述了矛盾之间会相互转化这一事实，所以只能称其为辨证观。可是，这样的辩证观就是思想上的不完整性或缺陷吗？站在现代辩证法的角度看确实如此，但若从《老子》思想本身看却并非如此。《老子》文本中矛盾范畴的列举只是为了揭示事物自身的矛盾性，进而超越这种矛盾对立申发其“无为”的政治主张，其目的是在于解决“如何治理具有矛盾本性的万物”的问题，而非有意于研究辩证法。这种朴素的、看似有缺陷的辩证思想对于《老子》理论而言便已足够，无需深究。但同时，《老子》的辩证观也是对世界的规律性认知，我们可以否定其非现代意义上的辩证法，却不能否定它的规律性。

First, this cognition of regularity includes the relationship of transformation between contradictions. Chapter 2 of the received version states: “Being and non-being give rise to each other; difficult and easy complete each other; long and short contrast with each other; high and low incline towards each other; sound and voice harmonize with each other; front and back follow each other.” Opposing categories can transform into each other, for example, “being” and “non-being.” This seems to contradict the one-way generative relationship stated in Chapter 40: “Being is born from non-being.” In fact, this is not the case; it is merely a mis-correction during the transmission of the text. The earliest Guodian bamboo-slip version reads “the things of the world are born from being, are born from non-being,” which is not contradictory. Again, Chapter 58 states: “Misfortune is that on which fortune depends; fortune is that in which misfortune is concealed. Who knows the ultimate? Is there no correctness? The correct reverts to the strange; the good reverts to the monstrous. The delusion of people has indeed lasted long.” Among this, the phrase “Is there no correctness?” in the silk manuscript version B reads “there is no correctness,” which is a declarative sentence, not an interrogative one, directly negating “correctness.” People have long been deluded by their pursuit of so-called “correctness,” neglecting the law of the transformation of opposites in all things, and not understanding that even if one establishes a “correct,” a “strange” is simultaneously produced. What is “correctness”? There is no “correctness”; there is only the objective law of the transformation of opposites.

首先，这种规律性的认识包括矛盾之间的转化关系。通行本第二章有言：“有无相生，难易相成，长短相较，高下相倾，音声相和，前后相随。”对立范畴之间可以相互转化，例如“有”和“无”，这似乎与第四十章所言：“有生于无”的单向生成关系相矛盾。其实并不然，这只是文本流传过程中的误改，最早的郭店楚简作“天下之物生于有，生于无”并不矛盾。又有第五十八章曰：“祸兮福之所倚，福兮祸之所伏。孰知其极？其无正？正复为奇，善复为妖，人之迷，其日固久。”其中，“其无正？”一句帛书乙本作“其无正也”，是陈述句而非疑问句，直接否定了“正”。人们就是长久痴迷于对所谓“正”的求索，而忽略了万物的对立转化规律，不明白即使立一个“正”，也会同时产生“奇”。什么是“正”呢？并没有“正”，只有客观的对立转化规律。

Second, there is the relationship of unity between contradictions. The transformation of opposites does not necessarily lead to a negative aspect; it depends on how the subject responds to this universal law. The *Laozi* does not adopt measures to obstruct transformation because of the transformation of opposites of contradictions, but rather regards them as a whole, responding to the transformation between contradictions from the perspective of the whole. Contradictions are originally unified within the whole of things. The latter half of the phrase “all things bear the yin and embrace the yang” is “and through the blending of qi they achieve harmony.” “Harmony” emphasizes the relationship of unity between contradictions. Fan Yingyuan of the Northern Song period said: “All things with form have the formless dwelling within them; therefore the qi of yin and yang interpenetrate and achieve harmony.” Although interpreted from the perspective of qi theory, it still advocates the relationship of unity between contradictions. Also in Chapter 58, immediately following the text quoted above is “Therefore the sage is square but does not cut.” “Therefore” indicates that the following content is deduced from the preceding text. “Square but does not cut” means not cutting apart the whole. For the sage to achieve not cutting apart the whole, in the view of the *Laozi*, it is necessary to practice “non-action.” This proposition is expressed more clearly in Chapter 2, where immediately following the content quoted above is “Therefore the sage manages affairs of non-action.” This is the same method of argumentation as in Chapter 58; both, after discussing the inevitability of the law of the transformation of opposites, deduce how the sage should respond, that is, starting from the unity of contradictions, conforming to this inevitability that exists within the whole. The so-called transformation of opposites is originally a law that exists within the whole. By looking at problems from the perspective of the whole, one can transcend the quagmire of the transformation of opposites and rise to the level of governance by the “Way.”

其次，是矛盾之间的统一关系。对立转化并不必然导向消极的一面，要看主体如何应对这种普遍性的规律。《老子》并没有因为矛盾的对立转化而采取某种阻碍转化的措施，而是将其视作一个整体，从整体的视角应对矛盾之间的转化。矛盾本就统一于事物整体之中，“万物负阴而抱阳”的后半句是“冲气以为和”，“和”即是强调矛盾之间的统一关系。北宋时期的范应元说：“凡有形之物皆有无形寓其间也，故阴阳之气交通成和。”虽是从气论角度诠释，但却依然主张矛盾之间的统一关系。还有第五十八章，紧随上文所引用文字之后的是“是以圣人方而不割”，“是以”表示后文的内容是从前文推理而得，“方而不割”即是不割裂整体。圣人要想做到对整体的不割裂，在《老子》看来就是要行“无为”。这种主张在第二章表达的更加明确，紧接着上文所引内容的是“是以圣人处无为之事”。这和第五十八章的论证方式相同，均是在论述了对立转化规律的必然性之后对圣人应当如何应对进行推论，即从矛盾的统一性入手，顺应这种存在于整体内部的必然性。所谓对立转化本就是存在于整体中的一种规律，从整体的角度看问题，便能够从对立转化的泥沼中超越出来，上升到“道”治的层面。

Additionally, it needs to be explained: the *Laozi*’s view that “the soft and weak overcome the hard and strong” does not belong to the content of its dialectical view. The dialectical view discussed above is an acknowledgment of both sides of a contradiction; it does not hold that one side is superior or stronger than the other. But “the soft and weak overcome the hard and strong” is different; it makes a clear hierarchical division between the two sides of the contradiction. Does this indicate that the theory of the *Laozi* is self-contradictory? In fact, it is not. “All things bear the yin and embrace the yang” and “the soft and weak overcome the hard and strong” are discussed at different levels: the former is relative to “all things,” that is, the ruled, and is the universal law of all things; the latter is relative to the governing methods of the ruler, that is, the ruler’s soft governing methods are superior to hard governing methods. For example, Chapter 36 states: “The soft and weak overcome the hard and strong... The sharp instruments of the state cannot be shown to people.” This means that those coercive or rigid legal provisions cannot be used to govern the people. Again, Chapter 43 states: “The softest thing in the world gallops through the hardest thing in the world. That which has no substance enters where there is no space. Thus I know the benefit of non-action.” Here, “soft” has already become a synonym for “non-action,” highlighting the benefit of “soft” through comparison with “hard.” Again, Chapters 76 and 78 use examples of people, plants, and water to illustrate the importance of “softness and weakness,” but in fact all are intended to demonstrate the rationality of “non-action.” “Non-action” is a negation of traditional power politics, requiring the ruler to reduce coercion and control, while the relationship between “softness and weakness” and “hardness and strength” is an analogy for this negation.

另外，需要说明的是：《老子》“柔弱胜刚强”的观点并不属于它辩证观的内容。上文所述辩证观是对矛盾双方的承认，并不存在一方优于或强于另一方；但“柔弱胜刚强”不同，对矛盾双方作出了明确的等级划分。这是否说明《老子》理论自相矛盾？其实并不是。“万物负阴而抱阳”与“柔弱胜刚强”是就不同层面而论：前者是相对于“万物”即被统治者而言，是万物的普遍规律；后者则是相对于统治者的治理手段而言，即统治者柔性的治理手段优于刚性的治理方式。例如，第三十六章曰：“柔弱胜刚强……国之利器不可以示人。”是说那种强制性或刚性的法令规定不可以用来治理百姓。又如第四十三章曰：“天下之至柔，驰骋天下之至坚，无有入无閒，吾是以知无为之有益。”这里的“柔”已然成为“无为”的代名词，从与“坚”的比较中突显出了“柔”的益处。再如第七十六章和第七十八章以人、草木和水举例，说明了“柔弱”的重要性，实则均是为了论证“无为”的合理性。“无为”是对于传统强权政治的否定，要求统治者减少强制、控制，而“柔弱”与“刚强”的关系则是对这种否定的比类。

In summary, the dialectical view of the *Laozi* reveals an objective law universally followed by all things; it constitutes the *Laozi*’s understanding of the regularity of the world and forms its basic comprehension of the world. When Engels elucidated the general nature of dialectics as the science of interconnection, he stated: “The laws of dialectics are abstracted from the history of nature and the history of human society. The laws of dialectics are nothing more than the most general laws of these two stages of historical development and of thought itself.” [4]4 Friedrich Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, in *Marx Engels Collected Works*, vol. 25 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1987), p. 356. The translation follows the standard English edition. Such dialectics is an objective dialectics, and moreover a scientific dialectics, distinct from Hegel’s idealist dialectics. Looking back at the dialectical view of the *Laozi*, although it is extremely naive, only preliminarily touching on the transformation and unity of contradictions while neglecting the existence of conditions, it can still be called a truthful understanding of the objective world — “all things” “carry yin and embrace yang,” meaning that all things in the world possess contradictory nature. Therefore, we can also say that its dialectical view has preliminarily acquired a scientific character. This scientific dialectical view prompted the *Laozi* to form a rationalist worldview, parting ways with traditional heavenly mandates, ghosts, and spirits — the mode of existence of all things has regularity; it is regularity that dominates and determines the operation of all things, not so-called ghosts and spirits.

综上，《老子》的辩证观揭示了一种万物普遍遵循的客观规律，是其对世界的规律性认识，构成《老子》对世界的基本理解。恩格斯在阐明辩证法关于联系的科学的一般性质时讲道：“辩证法的规律是从自然界的历史和人类社会的历史中抽象出来的，辩证法的规律无非是历史发展的这方面和思维本身的最一般规律。”这样的辩证法是一种客观的辩证法，更是一种科学的辩证法，与黑格尔的唯心主义辩证法相区别。反观《老子》的辩证观，虽然极具朴素色彩，只是初步涉及矛盾之间的转化、统一等性质而忽略了条件的存在，但亦可称之为是一种对于客观世界的真理性认识——“负阴而抱阳”的是“万物”，是世间万物具有矛盾性。所以，我们亦可称其辩证观初步具有了科学性。这种具有科学性的辩证观促使《老子》形成理性主义的世界观，与传统的天命鬼神分道扬镳——万物的存在方式具有规律性，是规律性在支配和决定着万事万物的运行，而不是所谓的鬼神。

II. The Atheization of the Empirical World

二、经验世界的无神化

The text of the *Laozi* does not contain the word “dialectics,” nor terms like “opposition” or “contradiction”; instead, it uses the two words “yin” and “yang” to summarize its thought on contradiction. The thought of yin and yang was not invented by the *Laozi*; it had already emerged before the *Laozi* — the *Yijing* (Book of Changes) took “yin” and “yang” as basic symbols representing all contradictions in the world. The *Laozi* largely inherited the methods and thought of the *Yijing*, stating “all things carry yin and embrace yang,” using “yin” and “yang” to represent the contradictory attributes possessed by all things, thereby opening up a regularized cognition of the world. At the same time, the *Laozi* was also influenced by the trends of naturalism and humanism of its time, enabling its understanding of the world to basically break free from domination by divine will. Why is it said to be “basically” free?

《老子》文本中并无“辩证”二字，亦无“对立”“矛盾”等语，而是用“阴阳”二字总括了其矛盾思想。阴阳思想并不是《老子》发明的，早在《老子》以前就已经产生——《易经》将“阴”与“阳”作为表征世间一切矛盾的基本符号。《老子》很大程度承袭了《易经》的方法与思想，其曰“万物负阴而抱阳”，以“阴阳”表征万物具有的矛盾属性，进而开启了对于世界的规律性认知。同时，《老子》亦受到了当时自然主义与人文主义思潮的影响，使其对世界的认识基本摆脱了神意支配。为什么说是基本摆脱呢？

On the one hand, the *Laozi* did not completely deny the existence of ghosts and spirits. The view in Chapter 39 that “the spirit obtains the One and becomes numinous” and in Chapter 60 that “ghosts are not spiritual … the spirits do not harm people” severely weakens the role of ghosts and spirits, yet still leaves room for their existence; this is also a reflection of traditional mystical beliefs preserved in the thought of the *Laozi*. There is no need for us to deliberately distort the text of the *Laozi* in order to affirm that it is a thorough atheist; the existence of such views does not affect the atheizing transformation of the *Laozi*’s worldview. As Mr. Wang Sanyou stated, heavenly mandates, ghosts, and spirits still occupy a place in the philosophy of the *Laozi*, but only a very secondary position. [5]5 Wang Sanyou, a contemporary Chinese scholar of ancient Chinese philosophy, has written on the *Laozi*’s attitude toward spirits. Mystical beliefs have existed since ancient times, largely arising to explain natural phenomena, such as rain gods, sun gods, moon gods, and so on. The rise of humanism and naturalism led people to discover things with greater explanatory power for natural phenomena, namely regularities such as yin-yang and the five phases. For example, during the Western Zhou period, Boyangfu explained the occurrence of earthquakes using the laws of change of the two qi of yin and yang, [6]6 Boyangfu was a Western Zhou official who, according to the *Guoyu* (Discourses of the States), explained an earthquake in 780 BCE as resulting from an imbalance of yin and yang qi, an early naturalistic explanation. thereby weakening the dominating role of heavenly mandates, ghosts, and spirits over the human world. However, the development of humanism and naturalism in the late Spring and Autumn period did not completely negate the existence of ghosts and spirits. Against this historical backdrop, it was also reasonable for progressive thinkers to leave room for the existence of ghosts and spirits; for instance, Confucius merely “respected ghosts and spirits but kept them at a distance.” [7]7 This phrase is from the *Analects* (6.22), where Confucius advises treating spirits with respect but keeping them at a distance.

一方面，《老子》并没有彻底否定鬼神的存在。第三十九章“神得一以灵”和第六十章“其鬼不神……其神不伤人”的观点虽然严重弱化了鬼神的作用，却依然为它们的存在留有余地，这也是传统神秘信仰在《老子》思想中留存的写照。我们大可不必为了肯定《老子》是个彻底的无神论者而刻意扭曲其文本中的文字，这种观点的存在并不会影响《老子》世界观无神化的变革。正如王三友先生所讲的那样，天命鬼神在《老子》哲学中仍然存有一席之地，但却只是非常次要的地位。神秘信仰自远古而存，很大程度是为解释自然现象而生，如雨神、日神、月神等等，人文主义与自然主义的兴起使人们发现了对自然现象更有解释力的东西，即阴阳五行等规律，如西周时期的伯阳父以阴阳二气的变化规律解释地震的发生，这就削弱了天命鬼神对人世间的支配作用。但人文主义与自然主义在春秋末年的发展程度并没有彻底否定鬼神的存在，在这样的时代背景下，进步的思想家对鬼神的存在留有余地亦是合理的，如孔子也只是“敬鬼神而远之”。

On the other hand, the *Laozi* upholds a dialectical, regularized worldview, rendering heavenly mandates, ghosts, and spirits unable to function. First, the *Laozi*’s way of viewing things is no longer confined to one side, but adopts a dialectical perspective. Chapter 11 states: “Thirty spokes share one hub; it is precisely the empty space (the nothing) that provides the function of the cart. Clay is molded into vessels; it is precisely the empty space that provides the function of the vessel. Doors and windows are cut out to make a room; it is precisely the empty space that provides the function of the room. Therefore, what exists (being) provides benefit, and what does not exist (non-being) provides usefulness.” Here, three kinds of things are enumerated to discuss the dialectical relationship between “being” and “non-being.” People usually only notice the importance of “being” and thus pursue it, but the *Laozi* notices the importance of “non-being,” the opposite of “being” — without “non-being,” so-called “being” cannot fulfill its function; only when the two are unified can true function be realized. It is precisely because of such a dialectical perspective that the *Laozi* views things more comprehensively and objectively, enabling it to make holistic judgments about things, rather than being confined to one aspect of them. Of course, this is not to say that its dialectical view has already risen to the level of methodology; it only means that such dialectical thought has exerted a certain degree of influence on its way of viewing things.

另一方面，《老子》秉持一种辩证的、规律性的世界观，让天命鬼神无法发挥其作用。首先，《老子》看待事物的方式不再拘泥于一端，而是有了辩证的视。第十一章曰：“三十辐共一毂，当其无，有车之用。埏埴以为器，当其无，有器之用。凿户牖以为室，当其无，有室之用。故有之以为利，无之以为用。”这里列举三种事物，是为了讨论“有”与“无”的辩证关系。人们通常只注意到“有”的重要性，进而追求“有”，但《老子》却注意到了作为“有”的对立面的“无”的重要性——没有了“无”，所谓“有”也不能发挥其功用，两者统一才能够发挥出真正的功用。也正是因为这样一种辩证的视角，《老子》看待事物才更加全面而客观，能够对事物作出整体性的判断，而不是拘泥于事物的某一方面。当然，这里并不是说其辩证观就已经上升到了方法论的层次，只是说这样辩证的思想对其看待事物的方式产生了一定程度的影响。

Second, through a dialectical perspective, the *Laozi* discovers that society’s operation possesses its own internal logic — that is, society itself is a contradictory unified whole, and rulers should respect this contradictory nature and practice “non-action” (wuwei) governance, rather than relying on the mystical revelations of heavenly mandates, ghosts, and spirits. As a political philosophy, the *Laozi*’s political relations can be roughly divided into rulers and the ruled. Rulers include sages, supreme ones, lords, and princes; the ruled include the hundred surnames, all things, the people, the multitude, and so on. It is noteworthy that many of the appellations for the ruled appear as collective concepts, referring to a whole, not to any individual among the ruled. The ruled, as a whole, contain internal contradictions, mainly manifested at the level of values, such as “beauty” and “ugliness,” “good” and “not good” in Chapter 2, and “upright” and “crooked,” “good” and “evil” in Chapter 58. These different value orientations are in a state of contradictory transformation; if the ruler prescribes a certain value orientation, its opposite value orientation will inevitably arise as well. Therefore, the *Laozi* opposes the “action” (youwei) politics of rulers prescribing value orientations, as in Chapter 3: “Do not exalt the worthy … do not value rare goods … do not display what is desirable.” Another example is the *Laozi*’s critique of “wisdom” and “argumentation.” The first sentence of the Chu bamboo slip version A of the *Laozi* says, “Abandon wisdom and discard argumentation,” precisely because wisdom and argumentation can only attend to one side of a contradiction, not encompass the whole. Wang Bi provided an incisive explanation of this, saying: “If the ruler moves the people with clever techniques, once evil intentions are stirred, he then uses cunning methods to prevent the people’s deceit; the people, knowing his techniques, evade them as they arise. The more intricate and clever his schemes, the more deceit and hypocrisy proliferate.” [8]8 Wang Bi (226–249 CE) was a prominent commentator on the *Laozi* and the *Yijing*. This passage is from his commentary on the *Laozi*. If the ruler does not respect society’s own contradictory nature and “governs the state with wisdom,” his subjective will cannot change objective dialectical laws; on the contrary, he will fall into the quagmire of contradictory transformation, causing social chaos and strife.

其次，通过辩证的视角，《老子》发现社会的运作拥有自身的内在逻辑，即社会自身便是一个具有矛盾性的统一整体，统治者应当尊重这种矛盾性而行“无为”之治，而非依靠天命鬼神的神秘启示。《老子》作为政治哲学，其政治关系可以大致划分为统治者与被统治者，统治者包括圣人、太上、侯王等；被统治者包括百姓、万物、民、众人等。值得注意的是，被统治者的诸多称谓均是作为集合概念而出现，是指一个整体，而不是被统治者中的某一个人。被统治者作为整体包含着内在的矛盾性，且主要表现为价值层面的矛盾，如第二章的“美”与“恶”、“善”与“不善”和第五十八章的“正”与“齐”、“善”与“妖”等。这些不同的价值取向处于矛盾转化之中，统治者规定了某一价值取向，其对立的价值取向必然也会产生。所以《老子》才会反对统治者规定价值取向的“有为”政治，如第三章的“不尚贤……不贵难得之货……不见可欲”。再如《老子》对“智”与“辩”的批判，楚简甲本《老子》首句便言“绝智弃辩”，即是因为智辩往往只能兼顾矛盾的某一方面，而不能周全整体。王弼对此做出了精辟的解释，其曰：“以智术动民，邪心既动，复以巧术防民之伪，民知其术，随防而避之。思惟密巧，奸伪益滋。”统治者不遵守社会自身的矛盾性而“以智治国”，其主观意志不但不能改变客观的辩证规律，反而会陷入矛盾转化的泥沼之中而引起社会的混乱与争斗。

However, as stated above, such a dialectical view is not necessarily a bad one; it depends on how the ruler responds. According to the *Laozi*’s viewpoint, there is no need for a certain god or heavenly mandate to govern; instead, one should emulate the Dao and practice “non-action.” Chapter 2 from beginning to end expresses this proposition: Faced with objective laws of contradiction, the ruler should not practice “action” politics by establishing value orientations such as “beauty” and “goodness,” but should respect their objectivity and practice “governance through non-action” and “teaching without words.” However, this does not mean that the objective laws revealed by the dialectical view disappear; “non-action” does not eliminate this contradictory nature, but rather regards it as the inherent logic of the ruled as a whole or system. In this way, one transcends from the opposition of contradictions and enters a holistic, systematic perspective. When the *Laozi* views things with a contradictory nature from a holistic, systematic perspective, it has already transcended the habitual confrontational mode of thinking; to view problems from such a perspective is the perspective of the Dao.

但正如上文所言，这样的辩证观并不必然是以一种坏的辨证观，要看统治者以何种方式应对。按照《老子》的观点，并不需要某个神或天命意志进行治理，而是应当法道行“无为”。第二章从头至尾就是在表达这样的主张——面对客观的矛盾规律，统治者不应该行“有为”政治而造立诸如“美”“善”等价值取向，而是应该尊重其客观性，行“无为之治”“不言之教”。然而，这并不是说辩证观所揭示的客观规律消失了，“无为”并不会消灭这种矛盾性，而是将其视作被统治者本然所具有的、作为整体或系统自身的内在逻辑。如此便从矛盾对立中超越出来，进入整体性、系统性的视角。当《老子》从整体性、系统性的视角看待具有矛盾本性的事物时，便已经超越了人们习以为常的对待性思维方式，从这样的视角看问题，便是“道”的视角。

Finally, the *Laozi* develops a regular understanding of the occurrence of natural phenomena. The traditional “view of the Mandate of Heaven” (天命观) takes “Heaven” (天) or “the Heavenly Thearch” (天帝) as the ruler of the world, but the *Laozi* mostly pairs “Heaven and Earth” (天地) together, taking the cooperation of “Heaven” and “Earth” as the natural condition for the production of the myriad things. Chapter 5 says: “Is not the space between Heaven and Earth like a bellows? Empty yet not exhausted; when moved, it brings forth more.” [9]9 The *Laozi* (also known as the *Dao De Jing*) is a foundational text of Daoism, traditionally attributed to Laozi (6th century BCE). Chapter numbers follow the standard Wang Bi edition. Here “Heaven” and “Earth” are used in their natural sense. According to the textual research of Mr. Wang Youde, the bellows, as an ancient tool for blowing air, operates by repeatedly alternating between emptiness and fullness, opening and closing in alternation. This inexhaustible creative power does not come solely from “Heaven” or “Earth,” but from “the space between Heaven and Earth,” from the union of the two poles of “Heaven” and “Earth” that allows natural things or phenomena to occur. This mode of operation of the union of “Heaven and Earth” is, on the one hand, a naturalistic worldview; on the other hand, it is also the result of the *Laozi*’s application of the dialectical view of yin and yang—the mutual unity of “Heaven” and “Earth” is what enables the creation of the myriad things. With such a worldview, concrete natural phenomena can be explained. For example, Chapter 32’s “Heaven and Earth unite to send down sweet dew” attributes the production of rain to the result of the mutual unity of “Heaven” and “Earth,” which is still an application of its dialectical view. In this way, ghosts and spirits lose their function of controlling natural phenomena, no longer existing as the controllers of natural phenomena, replaced by a regular dialectical view.

最后，《老子》对自然现象的发生产生了规律性的认识。传统的“天命观”以“天”或“天帝”为世间主宰，但《老子》却多将“天地”并称，以“天”和“地”之合作为万事万物产生的自然条件。第五章曰：“天地之间，其犹橐龠乎？虚而不屈，动而愈出。”这里的“天”与“地”乃是就自然意义而言。根据王友德先生的考证，橐龠作为古代的鼓风工具，其操作起来本就是在虚盈之间反反复复、间互张闭。这种无穷的创造力并不是单纯来源于“天”或“地”，而是“天地之间”，是“天”与“地”之两极相合使得自然事物或现象得以发生。这种“天地”相合的运作方式一方面属于自然主义的世界观，另一方面也是《老子》对阴阳之辩证观运用的结果——“天”与“地”的相互统一才能够造就万物。有了这样的世界观，自然界的具体现象便能够得到解释，如第三十二章的“天地相合以降甘露”，将雨水的产生归结为“天”与“地”相互统一后产生的结果，依然是其辩证观的运用。如此，鬼神失去了掌控自然现象的功能，不再作为自然现象的掌控者而存在，代之以规律性的辩证观。

In summary, the *Laozi*’s dialectical view enables it to develop a regular understanding of the empirical world, thereby negating the traditional mystical view of the empirical world; ghosts and spirits thus lose their original functions. Although the *Laozi* does not completely negate the existence of ghosts and spirits, ghosts and spirits that have lost their power over the human world are nothing more than a symbolic sign of faith. In this way, the traditional “Heaven,” “Mandate of Heaven,” or “Heavenly Thearch,” which possess a providential dominance, no longer suit its basic cognition of the world. Therefore, in its transcendental realm, it can further become atheistic.

综上所述，《老子》的辩证观使其对经验世界产生了规律性的认识，进而否定了传统神秘主义对经验世界的看法，鬼神因此失去了其原有的功用。《老子》虽未彻底否定鬼神的存在，但失去了对人间掌控力的鬼神无异于一个象征性的信仰符号。如此，传统具有神意主宰性的“天”“天命”或“天帝”等不再适应其对于世界的基本认知，所以在其超验领域中，才会进一步无神化。

III. The Atheization of the Realm of Origin

三、本原领域的无神化

Some believe that the thought of the *Laozi* should be a top-down penetration, that is, first there is the “Way” (道) that has shed providential content, and only then does the negation of ghosts and spirits in the empirical world occur. Actually, this is not the case. The *Laozi*’s “Way” is not fabricated out of thin air, but is abstracted from the critique of the empirical world. Mr. Feng Youlan believes that the grasp of the “constant Way” (常道) comes from the observation of empirical things; Mr. Xu Fuguan believes that Laozi traced upward from the phenomenal world and discovered the “constant Way” that creates the myriad things; Mr. Guo Qiyong, synthesizing the views of the two preceding scholars, proposes: “Deriving constant laws of change from the observation of empirical things is one source of Laozi’s philosophical concepts; the ‘Way’ is a philosophical elevation of empirical life.” [10]10 Feng Youlan (1895–1990), Xu Fuguan (1903–1982), and Guo Qiyong (born 1947) are prominent 20th-century Chinese philosophers. The proposal of the “Way” is premised on the critique of the empirical world; it is a bottom-up philosophical abstraction. Therefore, it should be that first there is a regular understanding of the empirical world, and only then does the atheization of the realm of origin occur. This atheization of the realm of origin is profoundly embodied in the *Laozi*’s complete negation of the traditional “Heaven” that possesses providential content. The regularity of the dialectical view enables the *Laozi* to have a regular understanding of the empirical world; the metaphysical foundation established on this basis no longer requires a “Heaven” with providential content, but rather the atheistic “Way.”

有人认为，《老子》的思想应该是一种自上而下式的贯通，即先有了摆脱神意内容的“道”，然后才有了对经验世界鬼神的否定。其实不然，《老子》的“道”并不是凭空臆想出来的，而是从对经验世界的批判中抽象出来的。冯友兰先生认为“常道”的把握来自于对经验事物的观察；徐复观先生认为，老子是从现象界中追索上去，发现了创生万物的“常道”；郭齐勇先生结合前面两位先生的观点提出：“从经验事物的观察中得出恒常的变化规律，这是老子哲学观念的一个来源，‘道’是对经验生活的哲学提升。”“道”的提出是以对经验世界的批判为前提，是一种自下而上式的哲学抽象。所以，应当是先有了对经验世界规律性的认识，然后才有了本源领域的无神化。这种本源领域的无神化深刻体现在《老子》对于传统具有神意内容的“天”的彻底否定中。辩证观的规律性使得《老子》对经验世界拥有了规律性的认识，由此而建立起来的形上根据便不再需要一个具有神意内容的“天”，而是无神化的“道”。

On the one hand, the traditional concept of “Heaven” with providential content is no longer suitable for the *Laozi*’s regular understanding of the empirical world. In the long course of historical development, “Heaven” has been burdened with too much providential content, exhibiting a strong character of intervention and dominance over the human world, with a thick “active” (有为) coloring. For example, during the Western Zhou period, people worshipped “Heaven,” and “Heaven” was endowed with various powers to rule the human world. Mr. Zhu Fenghan summarized these as three points: first, Heaven rules the rise and fall of dynasties; second, Heaven selects and establishes kings; third, Heaven sends down blessings or disasters to the world. [11]11 Zhu Fenghan (born 1947) is a Chinese historian of ancient China. Such a “Heaven,” after being impacted by the “Way of Heaven” (天道) view during the Eastern Zhou period, became a category with multiple attributes by the end of the Spring and Autumn period. For instance, Mr. Feng Youlan believed that the concept of “Heaven” in the Spring and Autumn period involved at least five meanings, namely “material Heaven,” “ruling Heaven” or “willful Heaven,” “fatal Heaven,” “natural Heaven,” “righteous Heaven” and “moral Heaven.” [12]12 Feng Youlan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*. The “Heaven” in the *Laozi*’s eyes also has multiple attributes. Although the “Heaven” it advocates is more natural, it still retains a certain personality and even dominance. For example, expressions in Chapter 59’s “in governing the people and serving Heaven there is nothing like frugality,” Chapter 67’s “Heaven will save him,” and Chapter 73’s “what Heaven dislikes” still contain a certain personality. In this way, “Heaven,” on the one hand, does not conform to the *Laozi*’s concept of “the highest, the people only know it exists,” but falls into the situation of “the next, they draw near and praise it; the next, they fear it; the next, they despise it.” [13]13 This is a quotation from *Laozi*, Chapter 17. On the other hand, as the ruler of the myriad things, it is “active”; it still cannot completely transcend the contradictory nature inherent in things themselves. Therefore, such a “Heaven,” which itself possesses divinity and is widely evaluated by people, is not suitable in the *Laozi*’s view to serve as the highest foundation of the empirical world.

一方面，传统具有神意内容的“天”的观念不再适用于《老子》对经验世界规律性的认识。在长期的历史发展中，“天”背负了太多的神意内容，表现出对人世间强烈的干预性与主宰性，有着浓厚的“有为”色彩。例如，西周时期人们崇拜“天”，“天”被赋予了各种主宰人世间的权能，朱凤瀚先生将其总结为三点：第一，天主宰王朝兴亡；第二，天选立君王；第三，天降佑或降灾于世。这样的“天”经过东周时期“天道”观的冲击，在春秋末年成为一个具有多重属性的范畴。如冯友兰先生认为，春秋时期“天”的观念至少涉及五种意义，即“物质之天”“主宰之天”或“意志之天”“命运之天”“自然之天”“义理之天”与“道德之天”。《老子》眼中的“天”也具有多重属性，虽然其所主张的“天”更加具有自然性，但依然保留了一定的人格性乃至于主宰性。比如其五十九章的“治人事天莫若啬”、第六十七章的“天将救之”、第七十三章的“天之所恶”等等表达中依然蕴含着一定的人格性。这样“天”一方面并不符合《老子》“太上，下知有之”的理念，而是陷入了“其次，亲而誉之。其次，畏之。其次，侮之”的境地；另一方面就其作为万物的统治者而言便是“有为”的，其依然不能彻底超越事物本然所具有的矛盾本性。所以，这样一个本身便具有神性，且广被人们所评价的“天”在《老子》看来并不适合作为经验世界的最高根据。

On the other hand, compared with the traditional “active” “Heaven” with divinity, the “Way” established by the *Laozi* completely negates divinity or personality, completing the atheization of the realm of origin. Since the May Fourth Movement, [14]14 The May Fourth Movement (1919) was a Chinese intellectual and cultural reform movement that promoted science, democracy, and anti-imperialism, and often involved critiques of traditional Chinese thought. the academic world has engaged in considerable discussion on whether the “Way” is idealist or materialist, but there is still no conclusion. The reason is probably, as Mr. Liu Xiaogan said, the *Laozi* never considered whether the “Way” is idealist or materialist; to forcibly inquire is a method of “reverse analogical interpretation” (反向格义). [15]15 Liu Xiaogan (born 1947) is a contemporary Chinese philosopher specializing in Daoist studies. “Reverse analogical interpretation” refers to the practice of forcing Chinese concepts into Western philosophical categories. However, if one must examine the *Laozi*’s “Way” from the perspective of Marxist philosophy, it can be said to be materialist, mainly for three reasons: first, sentences in the *Laozi* text such as “there is a thing formed in chaos” and “the Way as a thing” — this point has been discussed extensively by predecessors, such as Zhang Xiangsheng, so it will not be repeated here; second, the “Way” is abstracted from experience; the “Way” that the *Laozi* deduces from the regular empirical world should also be regular; third, the mode of action of the “Way” on the empirical world is “non-action” (无为), and it does not exhibit any personality, dominance, or providential content. This third point is also the evidence in the *Laozi* text that can demonstrate the atheization of its realm of origin, which will be discussed in detail below.

另一方面，相较于传统具有神性的“有为”之“天”，《老子》所创立的“道”则完全否定了神性或人格性，完成了本源领域的无神化。自五四运动以来，学界对“道”的唯心唯物问题做了颇多探讨，但依然没有定论。原因也大抵如刘笑敢先生所言，《老子》并未考虑过“道”是唯心还是唯物的问题，强行追问是“反向格义”的作法。但倘若非要从马克思主义哲学的角度对《老子》的“道”进行考察，可以说它是唯物主义的，原因主要有三点：一是《老子》文本中的“有物混成”和“道之为物”等句子，这一点前人已做过颇多论述——如张详生，此处不再赘述；二是“道”是从经验中抽象而得，《老子》从规律性的经验世界推求而提出的“道”应当也是规律性的；三是“道”对经验世界的作用方式是“无为”，其并没有表现出任何的人格性、主宰性或是神意内容。第三点也是《老子》文本中能够论证其本源领域无神化的论据，下文详论之。

The *Laozi* text contains relatively few direct descriptions of the “Way” (*dao*), and it does not directly tell us what the “Way” is; however, there are many expressions concerning “non-action” (*wuwei*). The governing concept of “non-action” originates from the “Way”; it was originally a major characteristic of the way the “Way” governs the myriad things—the “non-action of the Way’s nature” (*daoxing wuwei*)—which the *Laozi* discovered and then adopted as the ideal method for governing society. “Non-action” does not mean doing nothing, but rather a negation of the “action” (*youwei*) of rulers who act arbitrarily. Rulers of the past lacked a dialectical mode of thinking and were unable to see the objective mode of existence of the “unity of opposites” in all things; they always intervened in and controlled the survival of the myriad things according to their own subjective will, thereby satisfying their own selfish desires. This is precisely to fall into the quagmire of the transformation of contradictions without realizing it. The “Way,” however, is different: it respects the contradictory nature of the myriad things and the objectivity of the law of the unity of opposites, without imposing intervention, and allows the myriad things to develop freely. The “Way’s” mode of “non-action” toward the myriad things manifests its purposelessness and lack of will; it no longer, like the traditional “Heaven” (*tian*), “manifests portents in response to heavenly affairs,” [16]16 A reference to the traditional Chinese belief that Heaven manifests portents (such as eclipses, comets, or unusual natural phenomena) in response to human affairs, especially the conduct of rulers. displaying its own subjective will and value orientation, nor can people obtain some kind of mystical revelation from the “Way.” For example, Chapter 5 says: “Heaven and Earth are not benevolent; they treat the myriad things as straw dogs.” [17]17 “Straw dogs” were ritual objects made of straw and used as offerings in sacrifices, then discarded; the phrase implies that Heaven and Earth treat all things without favor or partiality. Heaven and Earth emulate the “Way” in their actions; the statement that “Heaven and Earth are not benevolent” in fact also negates that the “Way” possesses a value orientation or personhood. Another example is Chapter 38, which even ranks the “Way” before benevolence, righteousness, and ritual propriety, demonstrating its transcendence of values. The “Way” does not make distinctions between “upright” and “devious” or “good” and “not good” in the human world; rather, “the good, I treat as good; the not good, I also treat as good,” [18]18 *Laozi*, Chapter 49. and all existences that treat differences equally are embraced under the “Way.” This “Way,” which lacks personhood and subjective will, also does not require people to praise or eulogize it; rather, “the Way is hidden and nameless,” [19]19 *Laozi*, Chapter 41. and people’s cognition of it need only reach the level of “knowing that it exists below.” [20]20 *Laozi*, Chapter 17: “The best of rulers, those below merely know that he exists.” This does not mean that the “Way” is a behind-the-scenes manipulator skilled in the arts of strategy, but rather because it is closer to the existence of a law, it does not manifest purpose or selfish desire. The character *dao* itself originally contains the meaning of “law”; the *Laozi*’s use of this character to name the concept is, to a certain extent, also to borrow its connotation of “law.” That the “Way” can “stand alone and not change” [21]21 *Laozi*, Chapter 25. is precisely because it itself is close to an objective law; it is the *Laozi*’s understanding of the lawfulness of the world. Thus, starting from an empirical world with lawfulness, the ultimate origin of the world established is also a kind of lawful existence. Such a world does not require the control or intervention of some kind of divine will; rather, it achieves its own unceasing generation and regeneration through law. The realm of origins thus completes its atheization.

《老子》文本中关于“道”的直接描述并不多，且并没有直接告诉我们“道”是什么；但关于“无为”的表述却颇多。“无为”的治理理念来源于“道”，它原本是“道”治理世间万物之方式的一大特性——“道性无为”——被《老子》发现进而作为治理社会的理想方式。“无为”并不是无所作为，而是对统治者肆意妄为之“有为”的否定。以往的统治者缺乏辩证的思维方式，无法洞见万物“对立统一”的客观存在方式，总是以自己的主观意志对万物的生存进行干预与控制，以此满足自己的私欲，这即是陷入矛盾转化的泥沼而不自知。而“道”却不同，其尊重万物的矛盾本性、尊重对立统一规律的客观性而不强加干预，放任万物自由发展。“道”对万物“无为”的作用方式表现出了它的无目的性与无意志性，它不再如传统之“天”那样“天事必象”，表现出其自身的主观意志与价值取向，人们也不能根据“道”获得某种神秘的启示。如第五章曰：“天地不仁，以万物为刍狗。”天地法“道”而行，言“天地不仁”其实也是否定了“道”具有价值取向或人格性；再如第三十八章更是将“道”列于仁、义、礼之前，表现出了其对价值的超越。“道”不会对人世间进行“正”与“奇”或“善”与“不善”的区分，而是“善者，吾善之；不善者，吾亦善之”，具有对待差别的一切存在均被包容于“道”之下。这种不具有人格性与主观意志的“道”也不需要人们对其进行赞扬或歌颂，而是“道隐无名”，人们对其认知达到“下知有之”的程度即可。这并不是说“道”是一个善于权谋之术的暗箱操纵者，而是因为其更加接近于规律性的存在，所以并不会表现出目的与私欲。“道”字本就含有“规律”之意，《老子》以此字命名一定程度也是为了借用其“规律”的意蕴。“道”能够“独立不改”也正是由于它本身便近于客观规律，是《老子》对于世界的规律性认识。如此，从一个具有规律性的经验世界出发，最终所建立的世界本源亦是一种规律性的存在。这样的世界并不需要某种神意内容的掌控与干预，而是以规律实现了自身的生生不息。本原领域由此完成了无神化。

IV. Conclusion

四、结语

Before the *Laozi*, atheistic thought consisted basically only of scattered viewpoints. For example, Zichan, [22]22 Zichan (d. 522 BCE) was a prominent statesman and thinker of the State of Zheng during the Spring and Autumn period. although he put forward the view that “the Way of Heaven is distant, while the Way of man is near,” [23]23 Attributed to Zichan in the *Zuo Zhuan* (Duke Zhao, 18th year). also affirmed the gods’ domination over natural phenomena; the traditional natural gods’ power or function over the sun, moon, mountains, and rivers still existed. Another example is Yan Ying, [24]24 Yan Ying (d. 500 BCE) was a minister of the State of Qi during the Spring and Autumn period, known for his pragmatic and critical thinking. whose thought, although it burst forth with the light of atheism—such as his refutation of superstitions like astrology, prayer for rain, and dream interpretation—also agreed that ghosts and gods were connected with human affairs. In short, they all failed to form a systematic atheistic worldview, especially failing to break through the constraints of “Heaven,” which was filled with divine content, and still preserved the highest basis for people to argue for the rationality of mysticism. However, the *Laozi* broke through the shackles of “Heaven” and established the “Way,” putting forward a systematic lawful worldview, placing the occurrence and operation of things under the domination of law, stripping the mandate of Heaven, ghosts, and gods of their power to dominate worldly things, making them merely symbolic symbols representing traditional beliefs. This was also the value of the *Laozi*’s atheistic thought at the time. It was precisely the *Laozi*’s pioneering achievement that inspired people’s path of understanding the generation of the world and the cosmos, subordinating ghosts and gods to the origin of the cosmos. For example, the *Taiyi Sheng Shui*, [25]25 *Taiyi Sheng Shui* (The Great One Gives Birth to Water) is a philosophical text discovered in 1993 among the Guodian Chu bamboo slips, dating to the late Warring States period. roughly completed in the early to middle Warring States period, clearly borrowed from the *Laozi*’s thought and constructed a sequence of cosmic generation: “Taiyi, water, Heaven, Earth, spirits and gods (*shenming*), yin and yang…” [26]26 The full sequence in *Taiyi Sheng Shui* is: Taiyi (the Great One) → water → Heaven → Earth → spirits and gods → yin and yang → the four seasons → cold and heat → moisture and dryness → the myriad things. “Spirits and gods” were incorporated into the generation sequence and subordinated. Another example is the *Huangdi Sijing*’s “Daoyuan Jing,” [27]27 The *Huangdi Sijing* (Four Classics of the Yellow Emperor) is a collection of four Daoist texts from the early Han dynasty, associated with the Huang-Lao school. which completely eliminated the shadow of ghosts and gods from its understanding of cosmic occurrence, attributing the cause of the existence and occurrence of the myriad things to the “Great Void” (*taixu*), saying: “The myriad things obtain it to live; the hundred affairs obtain it to be accomplished.” [28]28 *Huangdi Sijing*, “Daoyuan Jing” (Classic of the Way’s Origin). “It” refers to the “Great Void.” Yet another example is the *Huainanzi*, [29]29 The *Huainanzi* is an eclectic philosophical text compiled under the patronage of Liu An, King of Huainan, in the 2nd century BCE. which borrowed from the *Laozi*’s thought and constructed a sequence of cosmic generation: “The Way began in the void and expanse… Heaven has nine fields… five stars… its spirit is the year star…” [30]30 *Huainanzi*, “Tianwen Xun” (Treatise on the Patterns of Heaven). “Spirit” was still incorporated into the generation sequence and subordinated. This line of reasoning in cosmogony has continued to the present day, combining with Western philosophy to further sublimate the rational spirit of the *Laozi*’s thought. For example, Hegel understood the *Laozi*’s “Way” as “primordial reason” (*ursprüngliche Vernunft*), which also has the function of generating the cosmos. [31]31 G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, vol. 1. Another example is Chen Guying, who, from the perspective of modern philosophy, deeply elucidated the *Laozi*’s cosmogony, arguing that the “Way” is “a truly existing thing,” possessing lawfulness, and that it created Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things. [32]32 Chen Guying (b. 1935) is a prominent contemporary Chinese scholar of Daoist philosophy. In short, the *Laozi*’s rationalist worldview not only became the most systematic atheistic worldview of the Spring and Autumn period, but also had a profound influence on the development of later cosmogony, thereby opening up an additional rationalist path for people’s interpretation of the world.

在《老子》以前，无神思想基本只是一些零散的观点。例如子产，他虽然提出了“天道远，人道迩”的观点，但也肯定了神对于自然现象的支配，传统自然神掌管日月山川的权力或职能依然存在。又如晏婴思想中虽然迸发着无神论的光芒，如他对于占星、祷雨与占梦等迷信的反驳，但他同时也赞同鬼神与人间事物的关联。简言之，他们均未形成系统的无神论世界观，尤其是未能突破饱含神意内容的“天”的束缚，依然为人们论证神秘主义的合理性保留了最高依据。但《老子》却突破了“天”的桎梏确立了“道”，提出了系统的规律性的世界观，将事物的发生运作纳入规律的支配之下，剥夺了天命鬼神对世间事物的支配能力，使其成为只是代表着传统信仰的象征性符号。这也是《老子》无神思想价值在当时的价值体现。也正是《老子》的创举，启发了人们对世界宇宙生成论的理解路径，而将鬼神次居于宇宙本源下。例如，大致成书于战国前中期的《太一生水》明显借鉴了《老子》思想，并构造出“太一、水、天、地、神明、阴阳……”的宇宙生成序列，“神明”被纳入到生成序列而次居。又如《黄帝四经·道原经》对宇宙发生的理解彻底没有了鬼神的影子，将万物存在与发生的原因归结于“太虚”，其曰：“万物得之以生，百事得之以成。”“之”即指“太虚”。再如，《淮南子》借鉴了《老子》思想，构造出“道始于虚廓……天有九野……五星……其神为岁星”的宇宙生成序列，“神”依然被纳入生成序列而次居。这种宇宙生成论的理路一直延续至今，与西方哲学相结合，进一步升华了《老子》思想的理性精神。例如，黑格尔将《老子》之“道”理解为“原始的理性”，并且具有生成宇宙的作用。再如，陈鼓应先生从现代哲学的视野出发，深刻阐发了《老子》的宇宙生成论，他认为“道”是“真实存在的东西”，具有规律性，而且创生了天地万物。总之，《老子》理性主义的世界观不仅成为春秋时期最具系统性的无神论世界观，而且也对后世宇宙生成论的发展产生了深远的影响，人们对世界的解释由此多了一条理性主义的道路。

Online editor: Tongxin

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