A Scientific Atheist Interpretation of Engels’s “Anticipated and Unanticipated” Contradiction

The “anticipated and unanticipated” contradiction is an important question raised by Engels in his later research on the conception of history. As Engels himself said, “the ends of the actions are intended, but the actual results produced by the actions are not intended.” [n1] Since people “purposively” create their own history, why then does historical development produce “unanticipated” phenomena that do not conform to purposes? Theists take this for granted and completely defer it to the gods of an imaginary world for resolution, but this does not help to truly resolve the “contradiction.” This article, grounded in real human beings and their practice, is devoted to overturning the theistic interpretation of the “contradiction,” in order to manifest the spiritual power of Marxist scientific atheism.

“预期与非预期”矛盾是恩格斯晚年在历史观研究中提出的一个重要问题。诚如恩格斯所言，“行动的目的是预期的，但是行动实际产生的结果并不是预期的”。既然人们“有目的地”创造了自己的历史，那么，历史发展为什么会出现不合目的性的“非预期”现象？有神论者对此习以为常，完全将其推给想象世界的神灵来解决，但这并不有助于“矛盾”问题的真正解决。本文立足于现实的人及其实践，致力于推翻“矛盾”的有神论解读，以彰显马克思主义科学无神论的精神力量。

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The Theistic Interpretation of the “Contradiction”

“矛盾”的有神论解读

Generally speaking, the “anticipated and unanticipated” contradiction is, in theism, often attributed to an interpretation of spirits or heavenly mandate. In their view, history is “a skilled and ever-advancing divine plan enacted on the narrow stage of this world,” and “we can only catch a fleeting glimpse of it, but every aspect of it transcends our human vision and understanding.” [n2] Thus, both the “anticipated” and the “unanticipated” are governed by mysterious divine will and fixed fate.

一般来说，“预期与非预期”矛盾在有神论那里往往被诉诸于神灵、天命的解读。他们视野中的历史是“发生在这个世界的狭窄舞台上的一个熟练和不断向前推进的神圣计划”，而“我们只能在匆匆一瞥中得到其吉光片羽的呈现，但其每个方面都超越了我们人类的视野和理解力”。因而，“预期”“非预期”都是由神秘的天意和定数主导的。

With the development of theistic thought, people’s understanding of God gradually moved from a distant heavenly kingdom closer to the secular world, eventually crystallizing into reflections on reason. At the same time, the interpretation of the “anticipated and unanticipated” contradiction also underwent a transformation from traditional theology to rational theology.

随着有神论思想的发展，人们对神的理解逐渐从遥远的天国靠近世俗的世界，最终凝结为对理性的思考。与此同时，“预期与非预期”矛盾的解读也经历了从传统神学向理性神学的转化。

Vico was the first to initiate the secularization of the philosophy of history. On the question of how to grasp the “anticipated and unanticipated” contradiction, Vico did not directly explain it through divine will, but first acknowledged individual purposes or “anticipations,” emphasizing that “the world of civil society has certainly been made by men.” [n3] At the same time, however, he pointed out that these “narrow purposes” serve “broader purposes,” namely the purposes of divine providence. The purpose of divine providence lies in “infinite good,” and therefore all its actions are necessarily higher than the “small goods” pursued by individual human beings. Hence, the world created by humanity often “exceeds those particular individual ends that people themselves pursue.” [n4]

维科率先开启了历史哲学的世俗化。在如何把握“预期与非预期”矛盾的问题上，维科没有直接用神意来解释，而是首先承认个人的目的或“预期”，强调“民政社会的世界确实是由人类创造出来的”。但同时，他又指出，“这些狭小的目的”是在为着“较广泛的目的”即天神意旨的目的服务。天神意旨的目的在于“无限的善”，因而它的一切作为必然高于人类个体所追求的“小善”。因而，人类创造的这个世界往往“超出人们自己所追求的那些个别特殊的目的”。

Kant and Hegel respectively replaced the almighty God with “Nature” and “Reason,” devoting deeper and more direct thought to the real world of life. The deified subject in Kant’s philosophical system is “Nature,” which has its own purposes, plans, and “anticipations,” regulating and guiding human behavior and historical development. Although individuals have free will and all “want to arrange everything according to their own wishes,” their actions are governed by “universal natural laws.” [n5] Although humanity hopes for “harmony and concord,” Nature, contrary to human wishes, “demands discord and conflict”; although humanity desires “comfort and satisfaction,” Nature, against human wishes, demands that people “throw themselves into labor and hardship.” [n6]

康德、黑格尔分别用“大自然”“理性”取代了全能的上帝，对现实生活世界投入了更深刻、更直接的思考。康德哲学体系中的神化主体是“大自然”，它有其目的、计划和“预期”，规范、引导着人们的行为和历史的发展。虽然个人有其意志自由，都“想要一味按照自己的意思来摆布一切”，但他们的行为却受“普遍的自然律”所支配。尽管人类期冀“和睦一致”，但大自然却偏不合人意而“要求纷争不和”；尽管人类希望“舒适而满意”，但大自然却不遂人愿而要求人类“投身到劳动和艰辛困苦之中去”。

Hegel’s conception of history possesses a profound historical sense, and his exposition of the “anticipated and unanticipated” contradiction is outstanding. “Absolute Reason” is the core category of Hegel’s philosophy of history. Although it does not participate in the conflicts of individuals and nations, it secretly drives “passion” to work for it, quietly realizing the “cunning of reason.” [n7] This leads to the production of “additional results.” The so-called “additional results” refer to results beyond those of the agent’s intended ends and directly known goals. For example, in the case of “setting fire for revenge,” things are implicated “beyond what is contained in the agent’s will and consciousness.” [n8]

黑格尔的历史观具有厚重的历史感，他对“预期与非预期”矛盾的论述是卓越的。“绝对理性”是黑格尔历史哲学的核心范畴，虽然它不参与个人与民族的纷争，却在暗地里驱使着“热情”为自己工作，悄悄实现了“理性的狡计”。这就导致“附加结果”的产生。所谓“附加结果”，是指人们行动目的和直接知道目标的那种结果之外的结果。比如“放火复仇”的事例，牵连到“出于行动者的意志和意识所包含的东西之外的”若干东西。

Vico, Kant, and Hegel all perceived the “anticipated and unanticipated” contradiction. If Vico used an omniscient and omnipotent heavenly god to dominate history and interpreted the “contradiction” through divine providence, then Kant and Hegel respectively replaced the divine position with Nature and Absolute Spirit, attributing the emergence of the “contradiction” to the “plan of Nature” or the “cunning of reason.” Although Kant and Hegel expressed doubts about the existence of God and attempted to overthrow theism, “on the other hand, they revived it in their own philosophy of religion.” [n9] Whether it is Kant’s “Nature” or Hegel’s “Absolute Spirit,” both are fashioned in their respective theoretical systems into a spiritual force that dominates all things in the world, constructing a naturalized or spiritualized “God” while eliminating God. This is merely replacing the “old God” with a “new God,” ultimately restoring “the Christian doctrine of creation.” [n10] Therefore, it can be fully understood as a new form of theism, albeit more refined and deceptive. Thus, whether it is Vico’s heavenly god, Kant’s Nature, or Hegel’s Absolute Reason, all belong to a kind of “superhuman, supernatural god or divine entity.” [n11]

维科、康德、黑格尔都察觉到了“预期与非预期”矛盾。如果说维科是以全知全能的天神来宰制历史，并以天神意旨来解读“矛盾”，那么，康德和黑格尔则分别用大自然和绝对精神取代神位，把“矛盾” 的产生归结于“大自然计划”或“理性的狡计”。康德与黑格尔固然表达过对上帝存在的怀疑，尝试过推翻有神论，但他们“另一方面又在自己的宗教哲学中把它复苏了”。无论是康德的“大自然”，还是黑格尔的“绝对精神”，在各自的理论体系中都被打造成一个主宰世间万物的精神力量，在消灭上帝的同时又构建起一个自然化或精神化的“上帝”。这不过是用“新神”代替“旧神”，最终又恢复了“基督教的创世说”。因而，完全可以将其理解成有神论的新形式，不过更加精致和具有迷惑性。因此，不管是维科的天神，还是康德的大自然，抑或是黑格尔的绝对理性，都属于一种“超人间、超自然的神或神性物”。

The concept of God, as the core element of various religious prescriptions, is inevitably tied to religious idealism. “Religious theism,” like all idealist viewpoints, denies the material unity of the world and holds that historical development is the result of divine power or spirit. Attributing both the “anticipated” and the “unanticipated” entirely to God or divine entities, attempting to make reality conform to divine will, is clearly the usual approach of idealism. Theism, starting from an abstract or fictitious entity to interpret the “anticipated and unanticipated” contradiction, becomes disconnected from “real human beings” and their historical activities, causing human history to lose its real foundation and become an illusory existence. Idealism’s inversion, distortion, and illusory expression of real social life are doomed to be unable to find the true root of the “anticipated and unanticipated” contradiction.

神观念作为各类宗教规定的核心因素，必然与宗教唯心主义脱不了干系。“宗教的神道主义”与一切唯心主义观点一样，皆否认世界的物质统一性，而认为历史发展是神力或精神作用的结果。将“预期”“非预期”统统归因于神或神性物，企图使现实符合神意，很明显是唯心主义的惯用路数。有神论从一个抽象的或虚构的实体出发来解读“预期与非预期”矛盾，与“现实的人”及其历史活动相脱节，使人类历史失去现实根基而成为虚幻的存在。唯心主义对社会现实生活的颠倒、歪曲和虚幻表达，注定无法找到“预期与非预期”矛盾的真正根由。

In theism, God or divine entities are the highest power governing worldly change and rise and fall, the subject of action that determines and dominates everything, guiding whether and how human “anticipations” can be realized. They turn real causal relations and the inherent necessity of history into fatalism through mysterious fate and divine will. In this way, human purposes and will are firmly bound under divine will and heavenly mandate, and humans can only submit to God or divine entities. This mode of thinking, which separates human purposes from historical laws, severely damages the value and dignity of human subjectivity. Without a transformation, the resolution of the “anticipated and unanticipated” contradiction will hardly achieve fundamental progress.

在有神论那里，神或神性物是主宰人世变迁与兴衰的最高力量，是决定一切、支配一切的行为主体，主导着人的“预期”能否实现及如何实现。他们用神秘的命运和天意把现实的因果关系与历史自身的必然性弄成宿命论。如此一来，人的目的、意志被牢牢束缚在神意、天命之下，人只能屈服于神或神性物。这种把人的目的与历史规律彼此分置的思维定式，严重损害了人的主体性价值和尊严。如果不加以转变，“预期与非预期”矛盾问题的解决就难有根本性的推进。

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The “Unanticipated” Is Not the Work of Divine Will

“非预期”不是神意所为

“Although the actions of everyday life are in fact always carried out in a cyclical manner in purposive forms, in many respects social life is not the product of the intentions of the actors who compose society.” [n12] Why do “unintended consequences of action” or “unanticipated” phenomena so often appear in social life? Theism injects explanations of divine will or heavenly mandate into this. For theists, no matter what image the God in their conception takes, and no matter what form their theological conception of history assumes, their theoretical logic is always to presuppose a “God.” The reason why “unanticipated” phenomena appear in human society is that divine will is unfathomable, causing humans to inadvertently perhaps “defy” God’s purposes.

“尽管日常生活的行为事实上总是以有目的的形式周而复始地进行着，但在许多方面，社会生活并不是组成社会的行动者的意图的产物。”社会生活为何常常出现“行动的意外后果”或“非预期”现象呢？有神论对此注入神意或天命的解释。对于有神论者来说，不论他们观念中的神具有何种形象，也不论他们的神学历史观采取何种形式，他们的理论逻辑都是先在地设定一个“神”。人类社会之所以出现“非预期”现象，就在于神意难测，导致人在不经意间或许“忤逆”了神的目的。

In fact, the “divine will” described by theism is actually a mystified and virtualized expression of historical laws. They usually attribute historical necessity to some self-existing factor that transcends or is external to human beings and their practical activities. Initially, the “divine determinism” and “theory of heavenly mandate” of traditional theism used “oracles” and “revelation” to represent the necessity of the historical process; later, Vico first introduced the idea of historical necessity to explain social history, followed by Kant and Hegel who used reason to demonstrate the necessity and regularity of historical development. Regarding historical necessity, whether Vico summarized it as “divine providence,” Kant appealed to it as the “plan of Nature,” or Hegel attributed it to the “cunning of reason,” it in fact all comes from the objective laws of historical movement, only veiled by them in a layer of mysticism. Thus, theism dimly discovered and vaguely represented the ideas of historical laws and historical necessity.

事实上，有神论所述的“神意”实际上是历史规律的一种神秘化、虚拟化表达。他们通常把历史必然性归结为凌驾于或外在于人及其实践活动的某种自存因素。起初，传统有神论的“神定论”“天命说”借助于“神谕”“天启”来表征历史进程的必然性；后来，先有维科引入历史必然性思想来解释社会历史，后有康德、黑格尔借助理性论证历史发展的必然性与规律性。对于历史的必然性，不管是维科将其概括为“天神意旨”，抑或是康德将之诉诸于“大自然的计划”，还是黑格尔将其归结于“理性的狡计”，事实上都来自于历史运动的客观规律，只不过被他们蒙上了一层神秘主义的面纱。可见，有神论隐约发现和朦胧表征了历史规律与历史必然性的思想。

At the same time, human purposes also lurk beneath “divine will.” After all, “intention” is linked to “psychological needs such as human ideals, intentions, wishes, and expectations,” signifying a kind of intentionality and purposiveness on the part of the historical subject. It is precisely because of human beings and their purposes that human history possesses a specificity distinct from natural history. If we set aside human beings and their purposive activities, we cannot explain the difference between human history and natural history, still less the foundation on which historical laws “reside.” In that case, discussing the objective constraint of historical laws on human survival and development would lose its meaning. In the world of the divine, individuals do not possess, nor do they need, the right to autonomous choice; individual “intentions” can only be concealed in distorted form within various beautiful myths. The objective necessity derived from a god or other “super-entity” (heavenly deities, nature, absolute reason, etc.) always stands above human beings, controlling whether “intentions” can be smoothly realized. Theism treats the “god” external to or prior to social history as the subject of history, regarding purposive individuals merely as “means and instruments for that loftier, broader purpose.”

同时，“神意”之下还潜伏着人的目的。毕竟，“预期”与“人的理想、意图、意愿、期望等心理需求相联系”，意味着历史主体的一种意向性和目的性。正是因为人及其目的，人类史具有了有别于自然史的特殊性。倘若离开人及其目的性活动，我们就不能说明人类史与自然史的差别，更不能说明历史规律所“在”的根基。如此一来，讨论历史规律对人类生存与发展的客观制约性也就失去了意义。在神的世界中，个人不具备、也不需要自主选择的权利，个人“预期”只能以歪曲的形式隐藏在各种美好的神话之中。源自于神或其它“超实体”（天神、大自然、绝对理性等）的客观必然性始终凌驾于人，左右着“预期”能否顺利实现。有神论把外在于或先在于社会历史的“神”当成历史的主体，只把有目的的个人视为那个“更崇高、更广大的目的的手段和工具”。

Following the line of practical materialism, Engels discusses the contradiction between “intention and unintended consequences” starting from real human beings and their practice. He replaces the deities in the realm of social history with “real human beings,” expelling the root of “divine will” from which “unintended consequences” arise, thereby embodying the essential distinction between Marxist scientific atheism and theism. Practice, which continuously generates within society and perpetually flows through history, must on the one hand conform to the external measure of objective laws, and on the other hand meet the internal measure of human purposes. The contradiction between “intention and unintended consequences” runs through all stages of the historical process of humanity, always reflecting, to varying degrees and in different forms, the dual attributes of practice—the interrelationship between conformity to law and conformity to purpose.

恩格斯循着实践唯物主义的思路，从现实的人及其实践出发去言说“预期与非预期”矛盾。他用“现实的人”代替了社会历史领域中的神灵，驱走了“非预期”产生的“神意”根源，体现了马克思主义科学无神论与有神论的本质区别。在社会中不断生成、在历史中永续流动着的实践，一方面要符合客观规律这一外在尺度，另一方面要求符合人的目的这一内在尺度。“预期与非预期”矛盾贯穿于人类历史进程诸阶段，总是在不同程度上，并以不同形式映现着实践的双重属性——合规律性与合目的性之间的相互关系。

First, Engels strips away the mystical cloak of historical laws. Unlike theism, which regards them as predetermined by “divine will,” he holds that historical necessity is determined by people’s actual conditions of life. “According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life.” [13]13 Engels, letter to Joseph Bloch, September 21–22, 1890. In his view, the development of human history not only has its laws and necessity, but these historical laws are objective: they do not change because of any individual’s purposes, nor do they shift according to the will of any mysterious subject (heavenly deities, nature, absolute reason). Even if historical laws are intermingled with factors of human purpose, this fact cannot alter that. Second, Engels highlights the status of human beings as the subjects of history. Unlike theism, which treats people as “slaves” of “god,” he holds that human beings possess the identity of “playwrights.” [14]14 The metaphor of human beings as “playwrights” of history, as opposed to mere actors, is drawn from Marx’s *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. “People make their own history, but each person pursues his own consciously intended purposes.” [15]15 Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*. Human purposive activity constitutes the necessary condition for the emergence, development, and possibility of laws of social history. Human purposes are no longer detached from or subordinate to historical laws, but are embedded as a key component in every link of social historical development and its lawfulness. Historical laws and human purposes intertwine and interfere with each other, meaning that historical laws, due to the intervention of human purposes, acquire characteristics different from natural laws, such as human-relativity and value non-neutrality.

首先，恩格斯剥去了历史规律的神秘外衣。他不像有神论那样，将其视作“神意”的天定，而是认为历史必然性是由人们的现实生活条件所决定的。“根据唯物史观，历史过程中的决定性因素归根到底是现实生活的生产和再生产。”依他之见，人类历史发展不仅有其规律性和必然性，而且这个历史规律具有客观性，既不会因任何个人的目的发生改变，也不以任何神秘主体（天神、大自然、绝对理性）的意志为转移。即便是历史规律掺杂了人的目的因素，这一点也不能改变。其次，恩格斯彰显了人之为人的历史主体地位。他不像有神论那样，把人看成“神”的“奴隶”，而是认为人具有“剧作者”的身份。“人们总是通过每一个人追求他自己的、自觉预期的目的来创造他们的历史。”人的目的性活动构成社会历史产生、发展及其规律得以可能的必要条件。人的目的不再是游离于或从属于历史规律，而是作为一个关键要件嵌入社会历史发展及其规律性的各个环节。历史规律与人的目的相互缠绕、彼此干涉，意味着历史规律因人的目的的介入而具有了不同于自然规律的属人性、价值非中立性等特征。

So why do “unintended consequences”—things turning out contrary to expectations or even backfiring—so often appear in social history? In social reality, historical laws and human purposes are not always so well aligned; situations that are “not in conformity with law” or “not in conformity with purpose” frequently occur. On the one hand, historical laws and human purposes check and balance each other. Besides the objective constraints that historical laws impose on human purposes, human purposes also interfere with and disrupt the “normal” functioning of historical laws. In this respect, historical laws exhibit, in their mechanism of action, tendencies and statistical regularities that natural laws lack. Consequently, the historical process is no longer a simple linear development but a fluctuating, undulating, complex pattern. Moreover, when historical subjects make predictions about the future, they inevitably trigger a series of “Oedipus effects,” [16]16 The “Oedipus effect” refers to the phenomenon where a prediction itself influences the outcome, named after the Greek myth of Oedipus. leading to “uncertainty” phenomena in the social sphere. This shows that, because human purposes “participate” in the social sphere, the realization of historical “intentions” is far more complex and difficult than in natural processes. Thus, the historical process is not a necessary progression gradually advancing toward some “intention” as predetermined by deities or reason.

那么，社会历史中为何经常出现事与愿违、甚至适得其反的“非预期”现象？在社会现实中，历史规律与人的目的并不总是那么契合，“不合规律”“不合目的”的情形时常发生。一方面，历史规律与人的目的之间彼此制衡。除了历史规律对人的目的起到客观规约作用外，人的目的还干扰和搅乱着历史规律作用的“正常”发挥。就此而言，历史规律在作用机理上表现出自然规律所没有的趋向性和统计律特征。从而，历史进程不再是简单的直线式发展，而是波动、起伏的复杂样态。并且，历史主体对未来作预测，难免会引发一系列的“俄狄浦斯效应”，导致社会领域“测不准”现象的出现。这说明，社会领域由于人的目的“参与”其中，历史“预期”的实现要比自然进程更为复杂和困难。可见，历史进程不是由神灵或理性预先规定，朝某个“预期”渐序而进的必然过程。

On the other hand, the purposes of different people differ from or even contradict one another; “the will of each is obstructed by that of everyone else,” [17]17 Engels, letter to Joseph Bloch, September 21–22, 1890. and the “average” that finally emerges is not what any individual “wished for.” Human purposive activity constructs social history, so each subject participating in social life harbors their own purposes and motives. Because of differences in class and interests, there are inevitably greater or lesser antagonisms or conflicts among different individuals, groups, nations, and even states in terms of value choices, goal orientations, and actual actions. Therefore, the mutual cancellation and restraint among different “component forces” ultimately fuse into a single “resultant force,” [18]18 The “resultant force” (合力) is Engels’s term in his letter to Bloch for the overall outcome of intersecting individual wills in history. dissolving and eroding the particularity of individual wills, so that the realization of “intentions” can only occur as an exception.

另一方面，人与人的目的之间彼此相异、甚至相悖，“任何一个人的愿望都会受到任何另一个人的妨碍”，最后融合而成的“平均数”不是任何个人“希望过的事物”。人的目的性活动建构了社会历史，因而参与社会生活的各个主体，都怀揣各自的目的与动机。由于阶级、利益诉求各异，不同个人、群体、民族乃至国家之间在价值选择、目标取向与实际行动等方面必然存在着或大或小的对抗或冲突。因此，不同“分力”之间的相互抵消和牵制，最终融合成为一股“合力”，瓦解和消融了个人意志的特殊性，导致“预期”的实现只能作为一种例外出现。

Engels not only clarifies the essence of historical laws as distinct from “divine will,” but also rescues human purposes from the oppression of “divine will,” thereby transforming the root cause of “unintended consequences” from a conflict between “divine purposes” and “human purposes” into a contradiction between historical laws and human purposes.

恩格斯不仅明确了“神意”的历史规律本质，而且将人的目的从“神意”压迫下拯救出来，从而将“非预期”现象的产生根由从“神的目的”与“人的目的”之间的冲突转换为历史规律与人的目的之间的矛盾。

03

03

“Intention” Has Nothing to Do with Deities

“预期”与神灵无关

Although “unintended consequences” have their rationality and inevitability in social history, people’s ultimate goal is still the realization of “intentions,” after all, “unintended consequences” are mostly things people do not wish to see or experience. So, how should we examine the contradiction between “intention and unintended consequences,” and how can we discern and grasp “intention” from within “unintended consequences”?

尽管“非预期”在社会历史中有其合理性与必然性，但人们最终的目的指向终究是“预期”的实现，毕竟“非预期”多是人们不希望看到和经历的事情。那么，我们应该怎样审视“预期与非预期”矛盾，并从“非预期”中窥见和抓住“预期”呢？

So-called “intention” refers to a certain expectation constructed in the subject’s mind about the future development of things, providing a guide or reference for the subject’s activities. In theism, the realization of “intention” cannot be separated from the divine. Unless permitted and aided by a god, people can only struggle in the mire of “unintended consequences.” Hence, they merely beg for divine grace in exchange for their own “intentions.”

所谓“预期”，是指主体在观念中建构的关于事物未来发展状况的某种期许，为主体活动提供着一个指引或参照。在有神论那里，“预期”的实现离不开神。除非得到神的许可和帮助，否则，人就只能在“非预期”的泥泞中挣扎。因而，他们只会乞灵于神的恩典，以此换取自己的“预期”。

Theism interprets the contradiction between “intention and unintended consequences” through gods or divine entities, but this is actually narrating human affairs under the cloak of “god.” Fundamentally, so-called “deities” are illusory. Therefore, saying that “intention” cannot do without deities is also a vain claim. “There is no intervention here of any transcendent divine will; what truly plays a role is precisely the ‘motive force of motives’ that sets countless people in motion.” [19]19 Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*. People’s belief in gods is actually a belief in their own human power. Engels analyzes the contradiction between “intention and unintended consequences” on the basis of “human beings” rather than “gods,” and, from the standpoint of scientific atheism, eliminates the theistic nature of the interpretation of this “contradiction.”

有神论用神或神性物解读“预期与非预期”矛盾，实际上是披着“神”的外衣在叙述人自己的事情。从根本上讲，所谓的“神灵”是虚幻的。因而，说什么“预期”离不开神灵也是虚妄之谈。“这里并没有任何超越人类神灵意志的介入，真正发挥作用的恰恰是使无数人行动起来的‘动力的动力’。”人们对神的信仰实际上是对人自身力量的信仰。恩格斯基于“人”而非“神”去分析“预期与非预期”矛盾，基于科学无神论的立场祛除了“矛盾”解读的有神论性质。

Regarding the origin of gods, gods are in fact images fabricated and fantasized by people themselves. “So-called God or the world reason is nothing but a false concept that people create from their own minds according to their own image and characteristics. It is people who create God and the world reason according to their own image and characteristics, not God or the world reason that creates people.” [20]20 The author cites a Chinese source; the original English text of Engels is not directly quoted here. Vico’s “Jove,” Kant’s “Nature,” and Hegel’s “Absolute Reason” are all no exception. “All religion is nothing but the fantastic reflection in people’s minds of those external forces which dominate their daily life.” [21]21 Engels, *Anti-Dühring* (1878). When “earthly forces” cannot yet be understood and explained by people, people fantasize a mysterious “superhuman” image to represent these forces. At first, the personification of natural forces produced the earliest gods—natural gods such as the gods of heaven, earth, mountains, and rivers; later, social forces also obtained “fantastic reflection in people’s minds,” and in further development underwent extremely complex and extremely varied personifications, forming various social gods. As early as 1844, Engels pointed out clearly in his review of Thomas Carlyle’s *Past and Present* that a god is nothing but “created through the reflection of man in his undeveloped consciousness, this chaotic matter [Hyle],” [22]22 Engels, “Review of Thomas Carlyle’s *Past and Present*” (1844); “Hyle” is a Greek term for matter. thereby negating the real existence of gods or divine beings.

就神的产生来看，神实际上是人们自己虚构和幻想出来的形象。“所谓上帝或世界理性，都不过是人们从自己头脑中按照自己的形象和特性创造出来的虚假观念。是人按照自己的形象和特性创造了上帝和世界理性，而不是上帝或世界理性创造了人。”维科的“天神”、康德的“大自然”和黑格尔的“绝对理性”，莫不如此。“一切宗教都不过是支配着人们日常生活的外部力量在人们头脑中的幻想的反映。”在“人间的力量”尚不能被人理解和解释时，人就幻想出一个神秘的“超人间“形象来代表这种力量。一开始，自然力量的人格化产生了最初的神——天地山川之神等自然神；后来，社会力量也获得了“人们头脑中的幻想的反映”，并在进一步的发展中经历了极为复杂、极为不同的人格化，形成了各种各样的社会神。早在1844年，恩格斯就在《评托马斯·卡莱尔的“过去和现在”》一文中明确指出，神不过“是通过人在自己的不发达意识这个混沌物质[Hyle]中对人的反映而创造出来的”，否定了神或神性物的真实存在。

Regarding the essence of gods, gods are the reflection of human self-alienation. Engels believed that the substance of a god lies precisely in man: “God is man,” and “‘God’ is only a rather vague and distorted reflection of man himself.” [23]23 Engels, “Review of Thomas Carlyle’s *Past and Present*.” Thus, Engels maintained that “god” and man are inseparable; the so-called “god” is merely a distorted, erroneous reflection of real life under the multiple oppressions of nature and social life. Thereby, Engels negated the sanctity, eternity, and omnipotence of gods, shattered the sacred halos of the various “gods,” and unveiled their true face—the reflection of human self-alienation. Clarifying the “man-god relationship” is the key to deconstructing the theistic interpretation of the “anticipated and unanticipated” contradiction. Once the essence of “god” is recognized, the traditional man-god relationship collapses, the real relationship between man and god is clarified, the positions of man and god are rectified, and a fatal blow is dealt to theism.

就神的本质来看，神是人自身异化的反映。恩格斯认为神的实质恰恰在于人，“神就是人”，“‘神’只是人本身的相当模糊和歪曲了的反映”。可见，恩格斯主张“神”与人密不可分，所谓的“神”不过是人在自然界和社会生活的多重压迫下，对现实生活的歪曲、错误的反映。由此，恩格斯否定了神的神圣性、永恒性、万能性，打碎了诸“神”的神圣光环，揭开了它们的真实面目——人自身异化的反映。厘清“人神关系”是解构“预期与非预期”矛盾有神论解读的关键。而一旦认清“神”的本质，传统的人-神关系就会瓦解，人和神的真实关系得以澄清，人与神的位置得以摆正，进而给予有神论以致命打击。

In this way, “god” can be reduced to man, divinity can be reduced to humanity, and the sacred otherworldly realm can be traced back to the secular human society. Therefore, the study of gods is the study of man, and exploring the “anticipated and unanticipated” contradiction must be grounded in man himself and his actual life. Engels admonishes us that there is really no need “first to summon up the abstract concept of ‘God’ and to ascribe to it everything beautiful, great, sublime, and truly human.” [24]24 Engels, “Review of Thomas Carlyle’s *Past and Present*.” Affirming that “there is absolutely no god, God, creator, or any supernatural mysterious force in the world” is a basic feature of atheism. Marxist scientific atheism holds that “anticipation” is a matter of “man,” unrelated to any deity or heavenly mandate, and “there is no need to stamp ‘divine’ on truly human things.” [25]25 Engels, “Review of Thomas Carlyle’s *Past and Present*.” As expressed in Liu Ji’s [26]26 Liu Ji (1311–1375), a Chinese statesman and writer of the early Ming dynasty, known for his skeptical views on supernatural forces. view of ghosts and gods: “The Way of Heaven, ghosts and gods, together with yarrow stalks and tortoise shells, are all unworthy of reliance; what can be relied upon and cherished is only human virtue; it is man himself who makes the Way of Heaven and ghosts and gods efficacious.” [27]27 The author paraphrases Liu Ji’s thought; yarrow stalks and tortoise shells were used in ancient Chinese divination.

如此一来，“神”就可以还原为人，神性可以还原为人性，神圣的彼岸世界可以归结到世俗的人类社会。因此，关于神的学问就是关于人的学问，探索“预期与非预期”矛盾就要落脚于人自身及其现实生活上来。恩格斯告诫我们，实在没有必要“首先召来什么‘神’的抽象概念，把一切美好的、伟大的、崇高的、真正人性的事物归在它的名下”。确认“世界上根本不存在什么神、上帝、造物主以及任何超自然的神秘力量”是无神论的基本特征。马克思主义的科学无神论认为，“预期”是“人”的事情，与任何神灵和天命都无关，“没有必要给真正人性的事物打上‘神性的’烙印”。如同刘基鬼神观所表达的那般，“天道、鬼神，与蓍草、龟甲一般，都是不值得依靠的，可以依靠、亲近的惟有人的德性，能够使天道鬼神灵验的反而是人之本身”。

In summary, since Engels has already proven that the existence of gods is fictitious, then “anticipation” must be unrelated to “deities.” The realization of people’s “anticipation” depends neither on God or “Jove,” nor on “Nature” or “Absolute Spirit.” The possible path can only be that real people, based on their own practical activities, gradually realize the “anticipated” within the “unanticipated” through the process in which the dual inherent requirements—conformity to law and conformity to purpose—move from conflict toward convergence. To a considerable extent, whether people’s “anticipation” can be realized depends not only on the degree of people’s cognition and grasp of historical laws, but also on whether historical laws and human purposes can fit with each other. Not only must human purposes move closer to historical laws, but historical laws must also contain the demands of human purposes.

综上，既然恩格斯已经证明神的存在是虚构的，那么“预期”必然是与“神灵”无关的。人们“预期”的实现既不仰仗上帝或“天神”，也不依赖“大自然”或“绝对精神”。可能的路径只能是现实的人基于自身实践活动，从其内蕴的双重要求——合规律性与合目的性由冲突不断走向契合的过程中，逐渐实现“非预期”中的“预期”。在相当程度上，人们的“预期”能否实现，不仅要看人们对历史规律的认知与把握程度如何，更要看历史规律与人的目的之间能否互相契合。不仅人的目的要向历史规律靠拢，历史规律也要蕴含人的目的诉求。

04 [28]28 “04” appears to be a section number or placeholder in the original text; it is translated as given.

04

Conclusion

结语

Marxist scientific atheism is a mature atheism. It opposes and rejects all forms of theism, whether this theism is traditional sacred theism or the rational theism of the philosophy of history. This is because all forms of theism explain history starting from spirit, will, or reason; they are either a concept of heavenly mandate in which divine will dominates the world, or an idealist conception of history in which reason governs the world. Engels’s atheist interpretation of the “anticipated and unanticipated” contradiction, by contrast, takes “real people” as the theoretical logical starting point, interpreting “anticipation” and “unanticipated” from the perspective of “real people” and their activities and material conditions of life. What causes the occurrence of “unanticipated” phenomena and drives the realization of historical “anticipation” can only be human practice and specific historical conditions, not any “divine will” or “heavenly mandate.” Hence, the “Gordian knot” [29]29 The Gordian knot is a classical allusion to a complex problem solved by a bold stroke, here used metaphorically. of the “anticipated and unanticipated” contradiction can only be cut by humanity itself.

马克思主义的科学无神论是成熟的无神论。它反对与拒斥一切形式的有神论，无论这种有神论是传统的神圣有神论，还是历史哲学的理性有神论。这是因为，一切形式的有神论都是从精神、意志、理性出发去解释历史，要么是神意主宰世界的天命观，要么是理性支配世界的唯心史观。而恩格斯对“预期与非预期”矛盾问题的无神论诠释，则是以“现实的人”为理论逻辑的出发点，从“现实的人”及其活动和物质生活条件出发去诠释“预期”与“非预期”。导致“非预期”现象发生，并推动历史“预期”实现的，只能是人的实践以及特定的历史条件，而不是任何“神意”或“天命”。故而，“预期与非预期”矛盾这一“格尔迪奥斯绳结”只能由人类自己来斩断。

Human history has never lacked beliefs in and legends of “gods.” Theism is sometimes “used by certain countries and certain interest groups as a means to seek political power and economic interests,” [30]30 The author cites a Chinese source; the original context is unspecified. numbing people’s determination to create a better life and rendering them inactive in the face of the “unanticipated.” Marxism, through the method of “atheism,” attributes “anticipation” and “unanticipated” to man himself, liberating people from the illusory authorities they themselves have created. Human purposes and initiative are no longer oppressed by “gods,” greatly stimulating people’s courage to transform the world and enhancing the feasibility and reality of “anticipation.” The deep-seated problem reflected in Engels’s “anticipated and unanticipated” contradiction—the relationship between historical laws and human purposes—can find a reasonable path to resolution only by eliminating any form of theistic interpretation. Undoubtedly, this not only helps deepen the study of the “contradiction” theoretically, but also helps people pursue real happiness in practice, offering important insights for the Party’s religious work and the propaganda and education of scientific atheism in the New Era.

人类历史从来不缺“神”的信仰与传说。有神论有时“被某些国家和某些利益集团，当作谋取政治势力和经济利益的手段”，麻痹人民创造美好生活的决心，使人们在“非预期”面前无所作为。马克思主义通过“无神论”的方式把“预期”“非预期”归结于人自身，把人们从自己制造的虚幻权威中解放出来，人的目的和能动性不再受到“神”的压迫，大大激发了人们改造世界的勇气，提高了“预期”的可行性与现实性。恩格斯“预期与非预期”矛盾折射的深层次问题——历史规律与人的目的之关系问题只有祛除任何形式的有神论解读，才能找到合理的解决径路。无疑，这不仅在理论上有助于“矛盾”研究的深化，在实践中还有助于人民追求现实的幸福，对于新时代党的宗教工作与科学无神论的宣传教育有重要启示。

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心