The Complete Philosophical Picture and Theoretical Significance of Feuerbach’s Atheism

The academic world generally refers to Feuerbach’s philosophy as “anthropological materialism,” and the profound atheist thought contained within it received high praise and was absorbed and applied by Marx. In the “Introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” Marx points out: “The critique of religion is essentially complete; and the critique of religion is the prerequisite of every other critique.” What he refers to is precisely Feuerbach’s critique of religion, and in correspondence with Feuerbach he even directly states: “You (whether intentionally or not) have provided socialism with a philosophical foundation, and the communists have immediately understood your writings in this sense.” What is referred to here as the “philosophical foundation” includes the thought of “atheism.” Engels also gave high praise to Feuerbach’s work *The Essence of Christianity*: “The liberating effect of this book can only be imagined by those who have experienced it themselves. Everyone was excited at the time: we all became Feuerbachians for a while.” This shows the profundity and significant influence of Feuerbach’s atheist thought.

学界一般将费尔巴哈哲学称之为“人本学唯物主义”，其中蕴含的深刻的无神论思想， 得到马克思的高度评价和吸收运用。在《〈黑格尔法哲学批判〉导言》中，马克思指出： “对宗教的批判基本上已经结束；而对宗教的批判是其它一切批判的前提。” 他所指的正是费尔巴哈的宗教批判，并且在与费尔巴哈的通信中更是直接表示： “您（我不知道是否有意地） 给社会主义提供了哲学基础，而共产主义者也就立刻这样理解了您的著作。”这里所指的 “哲学基础”包含了“无神论”思想。恩格斯也给予其著作《基督教的本质》高度评价，“这部书的解放作用，只有亲身体验过的人才能想象得到。那时大家都很兴奋：我们一时都成为费尔巴哈派了。”可见费尔巴哈无神论思想的深刻和影响重大。

Academic attention to Feuerbach’s atheism often focuses on “religious alienation” — that God is the alienation of the human essence. This to a certain extent obscures the philosophical whole and rich content of Feuerbach’s atheism. Anthropological materialism is “the unity of naturalism and anthropology,” composed of two parts: naturalism and anthropology. “Religious alienation” is merely content within anthropology, neglecting the atheist thought within naturalism; moreover, “God is the alienation of the human essence” cannot fully reflect the atheist thought within anthropology. More importantly, in the study of Feuerbach’s atheism, there remain unresolved problems: Feuerbach directly states, “When I step backward, I agree with the materialists; but when I step forward, I do not agree.” [1]1 Feuerbach’s statement, often cited in discussions of his relation to materialism, appears in his *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future* (1843). That is to say, within naturalism, Feuerbach acknowledges his materialist atheist stance, but what form does this materialist atheism actually take? What is its difference from the peak of atheism at that time — eighteenth-century French atheism? Within anthropology, Feuerbach claims to adhere to an “idealist” stance; how can Feuerbach’s anthropology become atheism? And in what sense did it receive Marx’s recognition and inheritance? To address the above questions, it is necessary to sort out the complete philosophical picture of Feuerbach in order to provide answers, and thereby better understand the theoretical value and practical significance of Feuerbach’s atheism.

学界对于费尔巴哈无神论的关注往往集中于“宗教异化” ———上帝是人本质的异化。这在一定程度上遮蔽了费尔巴哈无神论的哲学整体和丰富内容。人本学唯物主义是“自然学和人本学的统一”，由自然学和人本学两部分构成，而“宗教异化”仅仅是人本学中的内容， 忽视了自然学中的无神论思想；并且“上帝是人本质的异化”也不能完全反映人本学中的无神论思想。更重要的是，在关于费尔巴哈无神论的研究中，存在着尚未解决的问题：费尔巴哈直接表明“向后退时，我同唯物主义者是一致的；但是往前进时就不一致了”②。也就是说，在自然学中，费尔巴哈承认自己的唯物主义无神论立场，但这种唯物主义无神论究竟呈现为何种形态？与当时无神论的高峰———十八世纪法国无神论有何区别？在人本学中，费尔巴哈自称坚持“唯心主义”立场，费尔巴哈的人本学何以成为无神论？又在何种意义上得到马克思的承认和继承？针对以上问题，需要梳理费尔巴哈的哲学全貌才能给予回答，进而能够更好理解费尔巴哈无神论的理论价值和现实意义。

I. Atheism in Naturalism

一、自然学中的无神论

Naturalism takes the objective material world external to humans as its object and is the most thorough expression of Feuerbach’s atheist worldview. Naturalist materialism originates from the critique of idealist philosophy, and its main content includes a materialist worldview and epistemology. The former targets the inverted worldview of “speculative metaphysics,” and the latter targets the abstract identity of “thought and being” in idealism. In terms of worldview, naturalism exposes the self-contradictions of the theological worldview, internally dismantles the legitimacy of the theological worldview, and establishes a materialist worldview with sensibility as primary; in terms of epistemology, it exposes the idealist essence of the “identity of thought and being,” philosophically denies the necessity and rationality of God in epistemology, and forms a materialist epistemology centered on perceptual intuition.

自然学以外在于人的客观物质世界为对象，是费尔巴哈无神论世界观最彻底的体现。自然学唯物主义发源于对唯心主义哲学的批判，其主要内容包括唯物主义世界观和认识论，前者针对“思辨形而上学”的颠倒世界观，后者针对观念论中“思维与存在”的抽象同一。在世界观上，自然学揭露了神学世界观的自相矛盾，从内部瓦解了神学世界观的合法性，并确立了以感性为第一性的唯物主义世界观；在认识论上，揭露“思维与存在同一”的唯心主义实质，从哲学上否认了上帝在认识论中的必要性和合理性，形成以感性直观为核心的唯物主义认识论。

In Feuerbach’s view, theology has gone through three stages: theism — pantheism — idealism. Theism conceives of God as an entity independent of the world, but with regard to the essence of God, the determinations of God are precisely the determinations of the world; hence God cannot exist independently of the world. This contradiction drives theism toward pantheism. Pantheism is the unity of reality and fantasy. In pantheism, God is the world itself; matter and thought simultaneously exist as attributes of God, which in fact acknowledges the reality of matter and makes it a “divine entity.” But matter is inherently contradictory to God; pantheism is essentially the anti-theology within theology, the materialism within theology, and its incompleteness results in a turn toward idealism. Idealism, i.e., speculative metaphysics, i.e., speculative theology, is the thorough realization and highest stage of theology. In speculative theology, God is pure reason and abstract spirit, not only excluding all sensibility and matter but dissolving them within the spirit of God, thereby making everything into God and God the sole entity.

在费尔巴哈看来，神学的发展经历了三个阶段，即有神论—泛神论—唯心主义。有神论将上帝设想为独立于世界的实体，但就上帝本质而言，上帝的规定性就是世界的规定性，因而上帝不可能独立于世界而存在，这一矛盾推动有神论走向泛神论；泛神论是现实与幻想的统一，在泛神论中，上帝就是世界本身，物质和思维同时作为上帝的属性而存在，实际上是承认了物质的实在性，并使之成为“神圣实体”。但物质与上帝天然矛盾，泛神论本质上是神学中的反神学，是神学中的唯物主义，其不彻底性的结果是走向唯心主义。唯心主义即思辨形而上学，亦即思辨神学，是神学的彻底实现和最高阶段。在思辨神学中，上帝是纯粹理性和抽象精神，不仅排除了一切感性和物质，并且将其溶解在上帝精神之中，从而使一切都成为了上帝，使上帝成为唯一实体。

Hegel is the highest stage of speculative metaphysics. In the Western metaphysical tradition, the material world is regarded as a soulless, dead shell, the opposite of spirit. This theoretical tradition can be traced back to “Parmenides-Platonism.” Parmenides distinguished the path of truth — “what-is is, and what-is-not is not” — from the path of opinion — “what-is-not is, and what-is is not.” The former leads to the rational metaphysical world, the latter to the sensible, real world. In Parmenides’ view, only the metaphysical world is true “being,” while the sensible world of flux and change represents only error and opinion. Plato further developed this distinction, regarding the world of Forms as the true origin, and the real world as merely a participation in and imitation of the Forms, establishing the metaphysical tradition in which the world of Forms is higher than and creates the sensible world. This theory reached its peak in Neoplatonism. Plotinus called the ultimate origin of the world “the One.” The One is the perfect, eternal, supreme metaphysical being; all things are emanations of the highest Form. And this theory is precisely the “prelude” to Christianity; Augustine said of Plotinus that “with a few changes of words, he would be a Christian.” Hegel’s philosophy is the synthesis of the Christian spirit and speculative reason. In Hegel’s view, the essence of the world is the “Concept,” the self-movement and self-enrichment of absolute spirit. The material world is understood as the alienated moment of absolute spirit, a material world created by absolute spirit in opposition to spirit in order to realize itself, the negative moment of dialectics, whose fundamental purpose is the negation of the negation, i.e., the return to absolute spirit. Although Hegel acknowledges nature, the true “nature” is not actual nature, but the “spirit” behind nature, i.e., the philosophy of nature. Nature is merely a material shell, a “temporary dwelling” bearing absolute spirit; when absolute spirit continues to develop, the nature left behind is nothing but “the skin shed by a snake,” a lifeless, dead product.

黑格尔是思辨形而上学的最高阶段。在西方形而上学传统中，物质世界被看作没有灵魂的僵死空壳，是精神的对立面，这一理论传统可以追溯到“巴门尼德—柏拉图”主义。巴门尼德区分出“存在者存在，不存在者不存在”的真理之路与“存在者不存在，不存在者存在”的意见之路，前者通向理性的形而上学世界，后者则是感性的现实世界。在巴门尼德看来，只有形而上学世界才是真实的“存在”，而流变运动的可感世界仅仅代表谬误和意见。 柏拉图进一步发展了这一区分，将理念世界视为真正的本原，现实世界仅仅是理念的分有和摹仿，确立了理念世界高于可感世界、创造可感世界的形而上学传统。这一理论在新柏拉图主义中达到巅峰，普罗提诺将世界的终极本原称之为“太一” （ The One） ， “太一”是完满的、永恒的、至高无上的形而上学存在，万事万物都是最高理念的流溢，而这一理论正是基督教的“前奏”，奥古斯丁称他“改动几个字句，就是一个基督徒了”。黑格尔哲学是基督教精神与思辨理性的集大成者。在黑格尔看来，世界的本质是“概念”，是绝对精神的自我运动和自我丰富。物质世界被理解为绝对精神的异化环节，是绝对精神为了实现自身，创造出的一个与精神对立的物质世界，是辩证法的否定环节，其根本目的是否定之否定，即回归绝对精神。虽然黑格尔承认自然界，但真正的“自然”并不是现实的自然界，而是自然背后的 “精神”，即自然哲学。自然界不过是物质空壳，是承载绝对精神的“临时住所”，当绝对精神继续发展，遗留下的自然界不过是“蛇蜕下的皮”，是无生命的僵死产物。

In response to the intermingling of speculative philosophy and religious theology, Feuerbach pointed out that “modern philosophy starts from theology; it itself is nothing but theology dissolved and transformed into philosophy.” He argued that speculative theology packages itself as philosophy, using “reason” to explain the world, while its essence remains theology; the so-called “spirit” and “reason” are merely copies of God. Hence Feuerbach directed his attack at the culmination of speculative philosophy — Hegel. Feuerbach pinpointed the internal logical paradox of Hegel’s philosophy: if, following the interpretation of speculative philosophy, spirit is the principle of the world, God is the origin of the world, and logic is the law of the world, then why does “absolute spirit” not remain in the “realm of bliss” of the Idea? “If sensuousness itself has no meaning at all, why does the Idea still need sensuousness?” That is, since the “heavenly kingdom” is itself truth, why must it go through a superfluous process of “negation” — negating itself and proceeding to the “earthly realm”? Feuerbach believed this is because “the reality of the Idea is sensuousness, but reality is the truth of the Idea, so sensuousness is the truth of the Idea… The reason it demands the realization and sensualization of thought is only because it unconsciously assumes the reality belonging to thought — sensuousness — as a truth independent of thought.” In other words, speculative philosophy on the one hand denies sensuousness, yet on the other hand cannot do without it, because sensuousness is truth, reality, and actuality, while thought is merely abstraction; thought without sensuousness is nothing. Therefore, “only by giving actual things and sensuous things an absolutely independent, sacred, primary significance not derived from the Idea” can the internal contradiction of speculative philosophy be resolved.

针对思辨哲学与宗教神学相互交融的现状，费尔巴哈指出“近代哲学是从神学出发的， 它本身只不过是溶化和转变为哲学的神学”，认为思辨神学将自己包装成哲学，用“理性” 来解释世界，而其本质仍然是神学，所谓的“精神” “理性”都是上帝的翻版，所以费尔巴哈将矛头直指思辨哲学的集大成者———黑格尔。费尔巴哈一针见血地指出黑格尔哲学的内在逻辑悖论：如果遵循思辨哲学的阐释，精神才是世界的原则，上帝才是世界的本原，逻辑才是世界的规律，那么为什么“绝对精神”不停留在理念的“极乐世界”， “如果感性本身并无任何意义，为什么理念还需要感性呢？”也就是说，既然“天国”本身就是真理，为什么要经过一个多余的“否定”的过程———否定自身而走向“尘世” ？费尔巴哈认为这是因为“理念的实在性就是感性，但实在性是理念的真理，所以感性才是理念的真理……其所以要求思想实在化、感性化，只是因为不自觉地将属于思想的实在性———感觉性———假定为独立于思想的真理了”。也就是说，思辨哲学一方面否定感性，另一方面又离不开感性，是因为感性才是真理、才是现实、才是实在，而思维仅仅是抽象，没有感性的思维就是无，所以“只有给实在事物和感性事物以绝对独立的、神圣的、第一性的、不是从理念中派生出来的意义”，才能消解思辨哲学的内在矛盾。

Through his analysis of the internal contradictions of Hegel and all idealist philosophy, Feuerbach not only exposed the inversion of the theological worldview, but more importantly, in this “inversion of the inversion” of idealism, he found the cornerstone and starting point of materialism — that which speculative philosophy and even the entire metaphysical tradition had despised and denied: the “non-philosophy” within philosophy — sensuousness. “Only objects of feeling, objects of intuition, objects of perception, are indubitably and directly present.” Feuerbach held that philosophy “should not begin from itself, but from its opposite, from non-philosophy. This essence within us that is distinct from thought, non-philosophical, and absolutely anti-scholastic, is the principle of sensationalism.” On this basis, he established a materialist worldview with sensuousness, matter, and reality as primary, completely negated the abstract, speculative theological worldview, overturned the speculative metaphysical foundation on which theology depended for survival, and established a thorough atheistic worldview in natural philosophy.

通过对黑格尔以及整个唯心主义哲学的内在矛盾的分析，费尔巴哈不仅揭露了神学世界观的颠倒，更重要的是，费尔巴哈在对唯心主义的“颠倒的颠倒”中找到了唯物主义的基石和起点———被思辨哲学乃至整个形而上学传统所轻视否定的，哲学之中的“非哲学” ———感性。“只有感觉的对象、直观的对象、知觉的对象，才是无可怀疑地、直接地确实存在着的。”费尔巴哈认为，哲学“不应当从自身开始，而应当从它的反面、从非哲学开始。我们中间这个与思维有别的、非哲学的、绝对反经院哲学的本质，乃是感觉主义的原则”。在此基础之上，他建立起以感性、物质、现实为第一性的唯物主义世界观，彻底否定了抽象的、 思辨的神学世界观，颠覆了神学赖以生存的思辨形而上学基础，在自然学上确立起彻底的无神论世界观。

On the foundation of the materialist worldview, Feuerbach further criticized the philosophical premise of idealist epistemology — the identity of thinking and being. The dualistic split between thinking and being is the theoretical premise of modern epistemology. As Hegel pointed out, since Descartes proposed “I think, therefore I am,” idealism has taken “the problem of the identity of thinking and being” as its fundamental question. The “thinking” and “being” in idealism are not actual, sensuous existence, but heterogeneous abstract ideas. Idealism presupposes their abstract opposition, thereby resorting to some transcendent “third party” to achieve the dualistic identity, which reserves a “seat” for God; in idealism, God is synonymous with “identity.” Feuerbach, however, pointed out that the dualistic split between thinking and being is itself a “pseudo-problem” of idealism. In the materialist worldview, thinking is nothing but human thinking, human conscious activity, while being is concretely existing sensuous things; the two are inherently identical. In his view, human thinking can grasp concrete things, and concrete things can be reflected by thinking; thinking and being achieve an intuitive unity within the human being. Thus, without resorting to any “god,” objective and true knowledge can be obtained directly through human “sensuous intuition,” thereby eliminating the necessity and legitimacy of God in epistemology.

在唯物主义世界观的基础之上，费尔巴哈进一步批判了唯心主义认识论的哲学前提——— 思维与存在的同一。思维与存在的二元分裂是近代认识论的理论前提，正如黑格尔所指出， 自笛卡尔提出“我思故我在”后，唯心主义就以“思维与存在的同一性问题”为基本问题。 唯心主义中的“思维”和“存在”并不是现实的、感性的存在，而是异质性的抽象理念。唯心主义预设了二者的抽象对立，从而诉诸于某种超越性的“第三者”来实现二元的同一，这为上帝预留了“席位”，在观念论中，上帝就是“同一性”的代名词。费尔巴哈则指出思维与存在的二元分裂本身就是唯心主义的“伪命题”。在唯物主义世界观中，思维无非就是人的思维、人的意识活动，存在则是具体存在着的感性事物，二者本身就具有同一性。在他看来，人的思维可以把握具体的事物，具体的事物能够被思维所反映，思维与存在就在人之中实现了直观的统一，所以无需诉诸任何“神”，而直接通过人自身的“感性直观”就能获得客观真实的知识，从而去除了上帝在认识论中的必要性和合法性。

II. Atheism in Anthropology

二、人本学中的无神论

In natural philosophy, Feuerbach carried out an “outward-directed” critique of God, eliminating the theoretical necessity of God in the material world external to humans, destroying the legitimacy of God’s existence in worldview and epistemology, and establishing an atheistic worldview. Anthropology, on the other hand, is Feuerbach’s “inward-directed” critique, taking the spiritual world internal to humans as its object — that is, analyzing and critiquing the concept of God and religious spirit. But as pointed out earlier, Feuerbach called anthropology “idealism.” Where does this judgment come from? How is this judgment to be understood? It can only be explained by grasping the complete content of anthropology.

在自然学中，费尔巴哈对上帝进行了“外向性”批判，在外在于人的物质世界中排除了上帝的理论必要性，在世界观和认识论上消灭了上帝存在的合法性，确立了无神论世界观。 而人本学是费尔巴哈的“内向性”批判，以内在于人的精神世界为对象，也就是针对上帝观念、宗教精神展开了分析和批判。但正如前文所指出，费尔巴哈将人本学称之为“唯心主义”，这一论断从何而来？如何理解这一论断？必须通过理解人本学的内容全貌才能得以解释。

Objectification and alienation are the core concepts of Feuerbach’s atheism. In anthropology, Feuerbach distinguishes between the objectification and alienation of religion: the former is the confirmation and realization of human essence, possessing positive significance and necessity; the latter is the negation and loss of human essence, possessing negative significance and contingency.

对象化和异化是费尔巴哈无神论的核心概念。在人本学中，费尔巴哈区分了宗教的对象化和异化，前者是人本质的确证和实现，具有积极意义和必然性；后者是人本质的否定和丧失，具有消极意义和偶然性。

“Object” is an important concept in classical German philosophy, a product of the inflation of subjectivity. In classical German philosophy, the object is understood as a projection of subjectivity without reality, holding that the object cannot exist independently of the subject, emphasizing that as an object of spirit, its content and meaning are endowed by spirit as subject, and it is the external presentation and confirmation of spirit. Feuerbach transformed the “objectivity” (gegenständlich) in Hegel’s philosophy into “objectification” (Vergegenständlichung), initially used to interpret the “object” in Hegel’s philosophy. With the establishment of anthropological materialism, the concept of objectification broke away from the Hegelian context and became a distinctive concept of anthropological atheism. Compared with classical German philosophy, anthropological objectification has three main aspects. First, it is based on the fundamental materialist standpoint, opposing the theoretical logic of speculative philosophy and the understanding of all things as products of the subject’s objectification, emphasizing the objective reality of sensuous things and the finitude of human subjectivity. Second, it emphasizes the particularity of the “religious object,” holding that “sensuous objects exist outside humans, while religious objects exist within humans,” and “sensuous objects are in themselves impartial objects… while religious objects are selected objects.” That is, God as a religious object, unlike sensuous things with objective reality, is a subjective creation of humans, lacking independence and reality in itself, and is thus subject to the theoretical logic of objectification. Third, it “inverts” the relationship between humans and God, pointing out that it is not God who creates humans, but humans who create God; in this relationship, humans are the subject, and God is the object. On this basis, Feuerbach proposed the atheistic view of “religious objectification,” pointing out that God is the object of humans, the objectification of human essence; the essence of God is the essence of humans; God itself is merely a fictional concept created by humans. As the object and creation of humans, God is the confirmation and realization of human essence. The perfect attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence borne by God fundamentally belong to humans themselves; it is humans who create God and objectify their own species-essence in God. “The following proposition applies unconditionally: the object of humans (i.e., the religious object — author’s note) is nothing other than their own essence that has become an object.”

“对象”是德国古典哲学的重要概念，是主体性膨胀的产物。在德国古典哲学中，对象被理解为没有实在性的主体性投射，认为对象不能离开主体而独立存在，强调对象作为精神之对象，其内容、意义都是作为主体的精神所赋予的，是精神的外在呈现和确证。费尔巴哈将黑格尔哲学中的对象性（ gegenständlich）改造为对象化（ Vergegenständlichung） ，一开始用以阐释黑格尔哲学中的“对象”，随着人本学唯物主义的创立，对象化概念脱离黑格尔语境，成为人本学无神论的特有概念。相较于德国古典哲学，人本学对象化有三大主要内容。 第一，立足于唯物主义基本立场，反对思辨哲学的理论逻辑，反对将一切事物都理解为主体的对象化产物，强调感性事物的客观实在性和人的主体性的有限性；第二，强调“宗教对象”的特殊性，认为“感性对象存在于人以外，而宗教对象却存在于人以内”， “感性对象自在地就是一种不倚不偏的对象……而宗教的对象，却是精选出来的对象”。也就是说，上帝作为宗教对象，不同于具有客观实在性的感性事物，是人的主观创造，其本身不具有独立性和实在性，适用于对象化的理论逻辑。第三， “颠倒”人与上帝的关系，指出不是上帝创造人，而是人创造上帝，在二者的关系中，人是主体，上帝是对象。在此基础之上，费尔巴哈提出“宗教对象化”的无神论观点，指出上帝是人的对象，是人本质的对象化，上帝的本质就是人的本质，上帝本身只是人创造的虚构概念，上帝作为人的对象和创造物，是人本质的确证和实现。上帝所承载全知全能全善的完满属性，根本上属于人自身，是人创造了上帝， 并将自己的类本质对象化于上帝之中， “下面这个命题毫无条件地适用：人之对象（即宗教对象———笔者注） ，不外就是他的成为对象的本质”。

The original meaning of alienation is “departure” or “separation.” Its use in philosophy can be traced back to the Middle Ages, when theology called humanity’s betrayal of God “alienation.” Later, English and French political philosophers such as Hobbes and Rousseau also used this concept to denote the loss or transfer of natural rights. It was classical German philosophy that raised “alienation” to a general philosophical level: Fichte used this concept to explain the “non-I” as both the object of the “I” and the negation of the “I”; Hegel used it to express the relationship of opposition and unity between “spirit” and “thing.” Feuerbach’s religious alienation is relative to religious objectification. Its basic connotation inherits from classical German philosophy, emphasizing that God, as the object of humanity and as humanity’s creation, in turn negates and deprives humanity. Feuerbach believed that in the development of religion, the relationship between humanity and God becomes “inverted”: “Man objectifies himself, but does not recognize that the object is his own essence.” In theology, God is no longer the objectification and confirmation of the human essence; on the contrary, God separates from humanity and exists independently, becoming a transcendent independent entity. In this “inverted” relationship, humanity is no longer the creator of God but instead becomes God’s slave; the human essence, as God becomes independent, becomes independent outside of humanity. The result is that, on the one hand, God deprives and appropriates humanity’s species-essence, turning it into a “divine essence” external to humanity; humanity, having lost its species-essence, can only bear “original sin” and appeal to “God” for salvation, thereby becoming the object of its own object. On the other hand, humanity, having lost its species-essence, becomes selfish “walking corpses,” falling into endless struggle and chaos. This result is religious alienation: God’s plunder and enslavement of humanity, and humanity’s self-loss and self-negation.

异化的本义是“背离”或“脱离”，在哲学中的使用可以追溯到中世纪，神学将人类对于上帝的背叛称之为“异化”；而后英法政治哲学家如霍布斯、卢梭都曾使用这一概念，表示自然权利的丧失或让渡。将“异化”上升到一般哲学高度的是德国古典哲学，费希特使用这一概念阐释“非我”既作为“自我”的对象，又作为“自我”的否定；黑格尔用这一概念表示“精神”与“物”的对立统一关系。费尔巴哈的宗教异化是相对于宗教对象化而言的， 其基本内涵承接于德国古典哲学，强调上帝作为人的对象，作为人的创造物，反过来否定人、 剥夺人。费尔巴哈认为，在宗教的发展过程中，人与上帝的关系被“颠倒”， “人将自己对象化了，却没有认识到那对象就是他自己的本质”。在神学中，上帝不再是人本质的对象化和确证，相反，上帝脱离人而独立存在，成为某种超越性的独立实体。在这种“颠倒”的关系中，人不再是上帝的创造者，反而成为上帝的奴隶，人本质随着上帝的独立而独立于人之外。 其结果导致，一方面，上帝剥夺和占有了人的类本质，使其成为外在于人的“神本质”，丧失了类本质的人只能背负“原罪”而诉诸于“神”的拯救，反而成为对象的对象；另一方面，丧失类本质的人变成自私自利的“行尸走肉”，陷入到无休止的争斗和混乱之中。这一结果就是宗教异化，是上帝对人掠夺和奴役，也是人的自我丧失、自我否定。

Based on religious objectification and alienation, Feuerbach grasped the duality of religion. On the one hand, he saw God as the objectified product of humanity; through this abstract entity, God, humanity’s species-essence moves from potentiality to actuality, which is the expression and confirmation of the human essence, and its content is positive. On the other hand, he saw the alienation of the human essence caused by God, which is the plunder and negation of the human essence and an obstacle to humanity’s true grasp of its own essence. It is precisely because Feuerbach saw the inherent duality of religion that, on the one hand, in response to God’s oppression and exploitation of humanity, he advocated the elimination of religious alienation, believing that eliminating God is the condition and result of the return of the human essence—this is resolute atheism. On the other hand, regarding the content and spirit of religion, Feuerbach believed that “religion is the essence of humanity in its childhood: the child sees its own essence—humanity—outside itself.” Although God is merely the “illusion” of humanity’s “childhood,” and its form is abstract and illusory, its content is human and real, the confirmation and presentation of the human essence. Therefore, Feuerbach advocated resolutely eliminating God, i.e., the religion of God, while preserving the religious spirit, i.e., the religion of humanity.

基于宗教的对象化和异化，费尔巴哈把握了宗教的二重性。一方面，他看到上帝作为人的对象化产物，人通过上帝这一抽象物，使类本质从潜在走向现实，是人本质的体现和确证， 其蕴含的内容是积极的；另一方面，又看到上帝所导致的人本质的异化，是对人本质的掠夺和否定，是人真正把握自身本质的阻碍。正是由于费尔巴哈看到了宗教内在的二重性，所以在一方面，针对上帝对人的压迫和剥削，费尔巴哈主张消灭宗教异化，认为消灭上帝是实现人本质复归的条件和结果，是坚决的无神论；另一方面，针对宗教的内容和宗教的精神，费尔巴哈认为“宗教是人类童年时的本质：儿童是在自身之外看自己的本质———人———的”。 上帝虽然只是人“童年”时的“幻觉”，其形式是抽象的、虚幻的，但其蕴含的内容是属人的、真实的，是人本质的确证和呈现。所以费尔巴哈主张应该坚决消灭上帝，即神的宗教； 同时保留宗教精神，即人的宗教。

It is precisely because Feuerbach preserved the positive aspect of religion and maintained the pursuit of and faith in abstract ideas such as “reason,” “free will,” and “love,” founding a “religion of love” based on the human essence, that he excluded himself from the ranks of “materialism.” As mentioned earlier, Feuerbach claimed that “one step forward is idealism,” his purpose being precisely to preserve the pursuit of and faith in “truth, goodness, and beauty.” But as Engels pointed out regarding this assertion: “Here it is nothing but calling the pursuit of ideal aims idealism.” That is to say, whether in natural science or anthropology, whether in a materialist worldview or the “religion of humanity,” Feuerbach had in fact adhered to a materialist atheist standpoint, thoroughly excluding God from his theory. However, he mistakenly regarded “reason,” “free will,” and “love” as concepts exclusive to idealism, and mistakenly regarded moral convictions and ideal pursuits as the specific content of religion. In essence, he committed a confusion of “concepts,” not an error of standpoint.

正是由于费尔巴哈保留了宗教的积极层面，保持了对于“理性” “自由意志” “爱”等抽象理念的追求和信仰，创立了以人本质为基础的“爱的宗教”，所以他将自己划出了“唯物主义”行列。前文提到费尔巴哈声称自己“前进一步是唯心主义”，其目的正是为了保留对于“真善美”的信仰和追求，但正如恩格斯针对这一论断所指出的： “在这里无非是把对理想目的的追求叫做唯心主义。”也就是说，无论是自然学还是人本学，无论是唯物主义世界观还是“人的宗教”，费尔巴哈在事实上已经坚持了唯物主义无神论立场，彻底将上帝排除在自己的理论之外，但他误将“理性” “自由意志” “爱”当作唯心主义的专属概念，误把道德信念、理想追求看作为宗教的特有内容，实质上是犯了“概念”上的混淆、而非立场上的错误。

III. The Theoretical Significance of Feuerbach’s Atheism

三、费尔巴哈无神论的理论意义

As the above exposition shows, Feuerbach’s atheism is not simply “man is the essence of God,” but a thorough atheist thought running through worldview, epistemology, and the view of religion. It possesses important theoretical value and practical significance.

经过上文的阐释可以发现，费尔巴哈无神论并不是简单的“人是上帝的本质”，而是贯穿世界观、认识论、宗教观的彻底无神论思想，具有重要的理论价值和现实意义。

From the perspective of its own theoretical value, compared with ordinary atheism, Feuerbach’s atheism not only exposes the exploitative and illusory nature of theology from a theoretical height—it is thorough atheism—but also uncovers the potential positive aspects within theology—it is more dialectical atheism. Horizontally, compared with eighteenth-century French atheism, Feuerbach possesses a higher theoretical level and richer content, and his attitude toward religious theology is more rational. Vertically, especially in terms of his influence on Marx, Feuerbach’s atheism received direct affirmation and appropriation from the young Marx; its “theory of alienation” and “method of inversion” were applied by Marx to political critique and economic critique. Although Feuerbach’s atheism, due to its own theoretical limitations, was “settled accounts with” by Marx and Engels, the intrinsic value of his atheist thought, as well as its value as a mediating link in the intellectual evolution of Marx and Engels, cannot be ignored. From the perspective of practical significance, Feuerbach’s atheism can inspire the construction of atheism in the New Era on both the theoretical and practical dimensions.

从其理论自身价值来看，相较于一般的无神论，费尔巴哈无神论不仅从理论的高度揭露了神学的剥削性和虚假性，是彻底的无神论，还发掘了神学中潜在的积极层面，是更加辩证的无神论。横向比较来看，费尔巴哈相较于十八世纪法国无神论，具有更高的理论水平和更丰富的内容，其对待宗教神学的态度也更加理智。纵向来看，尤其从对马克思的影响来看， 费尔巴哈无神论得到了青年马克思的直接肯定和借鉴，其中的“异化理论”和“颠倒方法” 被马克思运用到政治批判和经济批判之中。虽然费尔巴哈无神论由于其自身的理论局限，遭到了马克思、恩格斯的“清算”，但其无神论思想的内在价值，以及作为马克思、恩格斯思想演进中介的思想史价值是不可忽视的。从现实意义来看，费尔巴哈无神论能够在理论与实践双重维度上启发新时代的无神论建设。

First, from the perspective of theory itself, compared with ordinary atheism, which simply regards religious theology as a “mist of reason,” Feuerbach viewed religious theology with a dialectical eye. On the origin of religion, he both affirmed that religion is the confirmation and realization of the human essence and exposed the illusory nature of that “realization.” Feuerbach believed that “religion is humanity’s initial and indirect self-consciousness.” Although religious theology presents itself in an illusory, external form, its essence remains the human essence, merely presented in an indirect form. “Religion is rooted in the essential distinction between man and animal: animals have no religion,” because animals lack species-consciousness and cannot transcend their own finitude; humans not only possess species-consciousness but can also go beyond their own limits and objectify their essence—the result of this objectification of the species-essence is religion. At the same time, Feuerbach pointed out that the indirectness of religion determines that it is ultimately not a real and effective mode of realization, but an illusory, inverted “realization,” which instead leads to the loss of the human essence. On the demise of religion, he both elucidated the inevitability and actuality of religion’s demise and preserved the positive factors within religion. Feuerbach believed: “Christianity is nothing but a fixed idea, which stands in the sharpest contradiction with our fire and life insurance institutions, our railways, our steam locomotives…” He discovered that with historical development and social progress, especially the continuous development of natural science and modern society, theism increasingly loses its real basis for existence; the era of God ruling over humanity must inevitably end. At the same time, Feuerbach distinguished between the religion of humanity and the religion of God, advocating the elimination of the alienated form of religion while preserving the objectified content of religion, ultimately moving toward the religion of humanity and the religion of love.

首先，从理论本身来看，相较于一般无神论将宗教神学简单看作“理性的迷雾”的消极观点，费尔巴哈是以辩证的眼光来看待宗教神学的。在宗教的起源上，他既肯定宗教是人本质的确证和实现，又揭露“实现”本身的虚幻性。费尔巴哈认为“宗教是人之最初的、并且间接的自我意识”，虽然宗教神学是以一种虚幻的、外在的形式呈现出来，但其本质仍然是人本质，只不过是以间接的形式呈现。“宗教根源于人跟动物的本质区别：动物没有宗教”， 因为动物不具有类意识，不能超越其自身的有限性，人不仅具有类意识，并且能够超出自身的限制，将自己的本质对象化，这个类本质对象化的结果就是宗教。同时，费尔巴哈又指出， 宗教的间接性决定其归根到底不是真实有效的实现方式，而是一种虚幻的、颠倒的“实现”， 反而导致人本质的丧失。在宗教的消亡上，他既阐明了宗教消亡的必然性和现实性，又保留了宗教中的积极因素。费尔巴哈认为： “基督教不过是某种固执想法而已，这种固执想法， 是跟我们的火灾和人寿保险机构、我们的铁路、我们的蒸汽机车……处于最尖锐的矛盾之中的。”他发现，随着历史发展和社会的进步，尤其是自然科学和现代社会的不断发展，有神论越来越失去其存在的现实基础，神统治人的时代必然终结。但同时，费尔巴哈区分了人的宗教和神的宗教，主张消灭宗教的异化形式，保留宗教的对象化内容，最终走向人的宗教和爱的宗教。

Secondly, compared with eighteenth-century French atheism, Feuerbach’s atheism surpasses French atheism comprehensively in theoretical depth, breadth of content, and critical attitude, pushing religious critique and atheism to a new theoretical peak. In theoretical depth, French atheism simply appealed to scientific theory and a materialist standpoint, waging struggle against theology in a “hedging” manner, and was unable to deliver a fundamental, theoretical subversion of theology and idealism. Feuerbach, by contrast, based himself on the entire tradition of Western speculative metaphysics, took its culmination—Hegel—as his direct object of critique, seized on the internal theoretical contradictions of speculative philosophy as his breakthrough point, dismantled the rationality of idealism and theology from within, and established a philosophical foundation of sensuousness, thereby thoroughly overturning the theoretical basis of theology. This is an atheist thought more thorough and more profound than French atheism. In breadth of content, Feuerbach’s atheism runs through worldview, epistemology, and the view of religion, excluding God from worldview and epistemology from a theoretical, philosophical height, and, on the basis of his humanism, subjects the origin, content, and disappearance of religion to philosophical analysis and critique—something French atheism lacked. In critical attitude toward religion, French atheism wholly negated religion, adopting the extreme theoretical position that theology is “a fool meeting a swindler,” and failed to see the inner rational factors and positive aspects of religious theology. Feuerbach, by contrast, based on the objectification and alienation of the “human essence,” dialectically grasped the dual significance of religion: he saw both the oppression and exploitation of humanity by theology and the inner rationality of the religious spirit; he both revealed the inverted nature of religion and extracted from it the essence and meaning of the human being.

其次，相较于十八世纪法国无神论，费尔巴哈无神论在理论深度、内容广度、批判态度上全面超越法国无神论，将宗教批判和无神论推向了一个新的理论高峰。在理论深度上，法国无神论简单诉诸于科学理论和唯物主义立场，以“对冲”的方式与神学展开斗争，并不能给予神学和唯心主义根本上的、理论上的颠覆。费尔巴哈立足于整个西方思辨形而上学传统， 以其集大成者———黑格尔为直接批判对象，以思辨哲学的内在理论矛盾为突破口，从内部瓦解唯心主义和神学的合理性，并确立感性主义哲学基础，从而彻底颠覆神学的理论根基，是比法国无神论更加彻底、更加深刻的无神论思想。在内容广度上，费尔巴哈无神论贯穿世界观、认识论、宗教观，从理论的、哲学的高度将上帝排除在世界观和认识论之外，并立足人本学对宗教的起源、内容、消亡进行哲学分析和批判，这是法国无神论所不具有的。在对宗教的批判态度上，法国无神论对宗教进行全盘否定，采取神学就是“傻子遇到骗子”的极端理论主张，看不到宗教神学的内在合理因素和积极层面。而费尔巴哈基于“人本质”的对象化和异化，辩证地把握了宗教的二重性意义，既看到了神学对人的压迫和剥削，又看到了宗教精神的内在合理之处，既揭示了宗教的颠倒实质，又从中提取出人的本质和意义。

Viewed longitudinally, Feuerbach’s atheism exerted a tremendous influence on Marx’s intellectual development, and this is the concentrated expression of its significance in the history of thought. Specifically, Feuerbach’s atheism runs through the entire process of the birth of historical materialism: it was first accepted and applied by the young Marx, then continuously advanced and deepened by Marx, and finally “settled accounts with” as Marx moved toward historical materialism. In the evolution of Marx’s thought, Feuerbach’s atheism went from being “praised” at the outset to being “criticized” at the end; this process fully demonstrates the important significance of Feuerbach’s atheism in the history of thought, and the elements that Marx inherited and those he sublated [n] fully manifest its profound theoretical value.

从纵向来看，费尔巴哈无神论在极大程度上影响了马克思的思想发展，是其思想史意义的集中体现。具体而言，费尔巴哈无神论贯穿了历史唯物主义诞生的整个过程，从一开始被青年马克思接受并运用，而后被马克思不断推进和深化，最后遭到“清算”而走向历史唯物主义。在马克思思想的演进历程中，费尔巴哈无神论在从一开始受到“褒奖”，到最后遭受 “批判”，这一过程充分体现了费尔巴哈无神论在思想史上的重要意义，其中受到马克思继承的、扬弃的内容又充分体现其深厚的理论价值。

First, Feuerbach’s atheist standpoint and humanist viewpoint were highly endorsed and fully absorbed by the young Marx, becoming a powerful weapon for the young Marx’s polemics. In “On the Jewish Question,” when Marx confronted Bauer’s reduction of the “Jewish question” to a religious question and his attempt to dissolve the opposition by religious means, Marx pointed out: “How can the religious opposition be made impossible? By abolishing religion.” [n] Against Bauer’s “Christian state,” Marx criticized its “alienated” essence, stating: “The Christian fantasy, illusion, and basic demand—that is, the sovereignty of man—but man as an alien being different from real man”; the rights “realized” by the Christian state were fundamentally illusory and inverted realizations; the Christian state itself was an embodiment of religious alienation. On the basis of Feuerbach’s humanism, Marx put forward the “democratic state,” arguing that “the democratic state, the true state, does not need religion for its political completion,” and that “the foundation of this state is not Christianity but the human foundation of Christianity.” [n] Marx carried through Feuerbach’s atheist standpoint, opposing one-sided, incomplete atheism: “Even if man has already declared himself an atheist through the mediation of the state—that is, he declares the state to be an atheist—he is still bound by religion, precisely because he acknowledges himself only in an indirect way, only through a mediator,” [n] and he advocated for the realization of thorough atheism. The Holy Family even more fully reflects Marx’s application of Feuerbach’s atheist thought. Marx directly states: “Feuerbach completed the critique of religion, because he at the same time laid down a grand, exemplary outline for the critique of Hegel’s speculation and of all metaphysics.” [n] As Engels pointed out in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy: “How enthusiastically Marx welcomed this new viewpoint and how strongly it influenced him (despite all critical reservations) can be seen from The Holy Family.” [n]

首先，费尔巴哈的无神论立场和人本学观点受到青年马克思高度赞同和充分吸收，成为青年马克思论战的有力武器。在《论犹太人问题》中，马克思针对鲍威尔将“犹太人问题” 归结为宗教问题，试图用宗教的方式来消解对立时，马克思指出“怎样才能使宗教对立不能成立？废除宗教”；针对鲍威尔所提出的“基督教国家”，马克思批判了其“异化”实质， 指出， “基督教的幻象、幻梦和基本要求，即人的主权———不过人是作为一种不同于现实人的、异己的存在物”，基督教国家所“实现”的权利在根本上也都是虚幻的、颠倒的实现， 基督教国家本身就是宗教异化的体现；在费尔巴哈人本主义的基础之上，马克思提出“民主制国家”，认为“民主制国家，真正的国家则不需要宗教从政治上充实自己”， “这种国家的基础不是基督教，而是基督教的人的基础”；马克思贯彻费尔巴哈无神论立场，反对片面的、不彻底的无神论， “人即使已经通过国家的中介作用宣布自己是无神论者，就是说，他宣布国家是无神论者，这时他总还是受到宗教的束缚，这正是因为他仅仅以间接的方法承认自己，仅仅通过中介承认自己”，主张实现彻底的无神论。《神圣家族》更加体现了马克思对费尔巴哈无神论思想的运用，马克思直接指出： “费尔巴哈完成了对宗教的批判，因为他同时也为批判黑格尔的思辨以及全部形而上学拟定了博大恢宏、堪称典范的纲要。” 正如恩格斯在《路德维希·费尔巴哈和德国古典哲学的终结》中指出： “马克思曾经怎样热烈地欢迎这种新观点，而这种新观点又是如何强烈地影响了他（尽管还有种种批判性的保留意见），这可以从《神圣家族》中看出来。”

Second, Feuerbach’s atheist thought and method were advanced and deepened by Marx, extending beyond the field of religious critique into political and economic research. In the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Marx applied Feuerbach’s “inversion method,” discovered the “mystical” essence of Hegel’s philosophy of right, pointed out the abstract and inverted character of its “state,” and advocated for “true democracy,” that is, a political system based on real, sensuous human beings—an embodiment of Feuerbach’s humanism. In the “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction,” Marx fully affirmed Feuerbach’s atheist viewpoint: “The basis of irreligious critique is: man makes religion, religion does not make man,” [n] and further developed Feuerbach’s atheism, putting forward the judgment that “religion is the opium of the people.” [n] On the theoretical foundation of Feuerbach’s atheism, Marx advanced the critique of religious alienation

其次，费尔巴哈无神论思想和方法被马克思推进并深化，不局限于宗教批判领域，而是深入到政治和经济研究之中。在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中，马克思运用费尔巴哈的“颠倒方法”，发现了黑格尔法哲学的“神秘主义”实质，指出其“国家”的抽象性和颠倒性，主张用“真正的民主制”，即以现实人、感性人为基础的政治制度，这是费尔巴哈人本学的体现。 在《〈黑格尔法哲学批判〉导言》中，马克思充分肯定了费尔巴哈无神论的观点， “反宗教的批判的根据就是：人创造了宗教，而不是宗教创造人”⑧，并进一步发展费尔巴哈无神论，提出“宗教是人民的鸦片”的论断。在费尔巴哈无神论的理论基础之上，马克思将宗教异化推

into the field of political critique, calling the illusory realization of the human essence by the political state “the self-alienation of the non-sacred image” and “the alienation of this world,” pointing out: “The task of philosophy, which is in the service of history, once the holy form of human self-alienation has been unmasked, is to unmask self-alienation in its unholy forms. Thus the critique of heaven turns into the critique of earth, the critique of religion into the critique of law, and the critique of theology into the critique of politics.” [n] In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx likewise affirmed the achievement of Feuerbach’s atheism, holding that Feuerbach “founded genuine materialism and real science.” [n] The core theory of that work—the “theory of alienated labor”—extends the critique of alienation into economics, and in its concrete exposition repeatedly draws a direct analogy between alienated labor and religious alienation: “The worker’s relation to the product of his labor is the relation to an alien object… The situation is the same in religion. The more man puts into God, the less he retains in himself.” [n] Furthermore, in the discussion of socialism, Feuerbach’s naturalistic-materialist atheist worldview is also fully reflected: “The actuality of man and nature—that man exists for man as the existence of nature and nature for man as the existence of man—has become practical, sensuously perceptible; therefore the question about an alien being, about a being above nature and man—a question that implies the admission of the unreality of nature and of man—has become impossible in practice.” [n]

进到政治批判领域，将政治国家对人本质的虚幻实现称之为“非神圣形象的自我异化” “此岸的异化”，指出： “人的自我异化的神圣形象被揭穿以后，揭露具有非神圣形象的自我异化，就成了为历史服务的哲学的迫切任务。于是，对天国的批判变成对尘世的批判，对宗教的批判变成对法的批判，对神学的批判变成对政治的批判。”在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》 中，马克思同样肯定了费尔巴哈无神论的功绩，认为费尔巴哈“创立了真正的唯物主义和实在的科学”；其中的核心理论——— “劳动异化理论”是将异化批判深入到经济学中，并在具体论述中多次将劳动异化与宗教异化进行直接类比， “工人对自己的劳动产品的关系就是对一个异己的对象的关系……宗教方面的情况也是如此。人奉献给上帝的越多，他留给自身的就越少”。此外，在关于社会主义的论述中，同样充分体现了费尔巴哈的自然学唯物主义无神论世界观， “人和自然界的实在性，即人对人来说作为自然界的存在以及自然界对人来说作为人的存在，已经成为实际的、可以通过感觉直观的，所以关于某种异己的存在物、关于凌驾于自然界和人之上的存在物的问题，即包含着对自然界和人的非实在性的承认的问题， 实际上已经成为不可能的了”。

Finally, Marx and Engels’s liquidation of Feuerbach’s atheist thought was an important link in the formation of historical materialism. In the “Feuerbach” chapter of *The German Ideology*, Marx and Engels, on the basis of historical materialism, arrived at a more scientific understanding of religious theology: “starting from the material production of immediate life, to set forth the real process of production, and to comprehend the form of intercourse connected with and created by this mode of production, i.e., civil society in its various stages, as the foundation of all history; to describe civil society in its activity as the state, and also to explain all the various theoretical products and forms of consciousness, such as religion, philosophy, morality, etc., etc., from civil society, and to trace their process of emergence.” That is to say, Marx and Engels held that religious theology is a product of history, a result of humanity’s material productive activity; it should not be understood from abstract concepts such as “human essence” or “objectification,” but rather from real, historical practical activity. As for the alienation of religion, Marx and Engels explained it through “the division of labor,” pointing out that “the philosophers have seen in the individual who no longer submits to the division of labor the ideal they call ‘Man’; they have conceived the entire process of development we have described as the process of development of ‘Man,’ thus imposing ‘Man’ on the individuals existing at every historical stage, and describing ‘Man’ as the driving force of history. In this way, the entire historical process is seen as the process of ‘Man’s’ self-alienation.” Starting from real revolutionary practical activity, Marx and Engels held that “the driving force of history, and of religion, philosophy, and any other theory, is revolution, not criticism.” Although, with the establishment of historical materialism, Feuerbach’s atheism was criticized by the more scientific Marxist view of religion and atheism, its thorough materialist atheist stance, its content-rich atheist worldview, its theoretical innovation concerning the objectification and alienation of religion, its dialectical attitude in religious criticism, and the actual influence it exerted in the evolution of Marx’s thought all demonstrate that Feuerbach’s atheist thought possesses profound theoretical value and far-reaching significance in the history of ideas.

最后，马克思、恩格斯对费尔巴哈无神论思想的清算，是唯物史观形成的重要环节。在 《德意志意识形态》的“费尔巴哈”章中，马克思、恩格斯基于历史唯物主义，对宗教神学有了更加科学的理解， “从直接生活的物质生产出发阐述现实的生产过程，把同这种生产方式相联系的、它所产生的交往形式即各个不同阶段上的市民社会理解为整个历史的基础，从市民社会作为国家的活动描述市民社会，同时从市民社会出发阐明意识的所有各种不同的理论产物和形式，如宗教、哲学、道德等等，而且追溯它们产生的过程”。也就是说，马克思、恩格斯认为，宗教神学是历史的产物，是人类物质生产活动的结果，不应该从“人本质” “对象化”等抽象概念出发，而是应当立足现实的、历史的实践活动加以理解；而对于宗教的异化，马克思、恩格斯用“分工”加以解释，指出“哲学家们在不再屈从于分工的个人身上看到了他们名之为‘人’的那种理想，他们把我们所阐述的整个发展过程看做是 ‘人’的发展过程，从而把‘人’强加于迄今每一历史阶段中所存在的个人，并把‘人’描述成历史的动力。这样，整个历史过程就被看成是‘人’的自我异化过程”。马克思、恩格斯从现实的革命实践活动出发，认为“历史的动力以及宗教、哲学和任何其他理论的动力是革命，而不是批判”。虽然随着历史唯物主义的确立，费尔巴哈无神论被更加科学的马克思主义宗教观和无神论所批判，但其中彻底的唯物主义无神论立场、内容丰富的无神论世界观、 关于宗教的对象化和异化的理论创新、在宗教批判上的辩证态度，以及其在马克思思想演进中实际产生的影响，都表明费尔巴哈无神论思想具有深厚的理论价值和深远的思想史意义。

In terms of practical significance, the distinctive philosophical viewpoints and theoretical characteristics of Feuerbach’s atheism possess value that transcends its era, and can inspire the disciplinary construction of atheism and the work of atheist propaganda and education in the New Era. Overall, Feuerbach’s atheism contains two dimensions, the theoretical and the practical, corresponding respectively to the two levels of atheist disciplinary construction and atheist propaganda and education.

在现实意义上，费尔巴哈无神论特有的哲学观点和理论特点具有超越其时代的价值，能够启发新时代无神论学科建设和无神论宣传教育工作。总体而言，费尔巴哈无神论包含了理论与实践两个维度，分别对应无神论学科建设与无神论宣传教育两个层面。

On the theoretical dimension, i.e., the disciplinary construction of atheism, Feuerbach’s atheism exhibits the following three inspiring characteristics. First, the characteristic of combining the justification of atheism with the refutation of theism. The thoroughness of Feuerbach’s atheism is not limited to a firm atheist stance, but is also embodied in his thorough critique of theism and religious theology. As pointed out earlier, Feuerbach’s materialism was built upon the critique and inversion of speculative metaphysics; it was a materialism that grew out of the internal theoretical contradictions of idealism, a combination of the critique of theism and the establishment of atheism. Second, the characteristic of contextual innovation. The key reason Feuerbach’s religious critique could become the peak of modern atheism and could receive full affirmation and strong endorsement from Marx and Engels lies in the fact that Feuerbach did not confine himself to the traditional Western metaphysical context, but leaped out of the idealist discourse system based on “I think” (cogito) since Descartes, thereby constructing a materialist discourse system centered on “sensuousness,” “sensuous man,” and “sensuous intuition.” Third, the characteristic of fully affirming the value of the human being. In contrast to mechanical materialism, which degrades the human being to a “machine,” Feuerbach pointed out: “Our task is precisely to prove that the opposition between the divine and the human is an illusory opposition.” That is to say, the fundamental purpose of Feuerbach’s atheism is not to reduce the human being to a “thing,” but to wrest back from the hands of the gods the value and meaning of the human being; respect for and recognition of “man” and “human nature” is its theoretical底色 [n15].

在理论维度即无神论学科建设上，费尔巴哈无神论表现出如下三个具有启发性的特点。 第一，无神论证成与有神论证伪相结合的特点。费尔巴哈无神论的彻底性不仅局限于坚定无神论立场，还体现在对有神论、对宗教神学的彻底批判上。正如前文所指出，费尔巴哈的唯物主义是建立在对思辨形而上学的批判和颠倒之上，是从唯心主义的内在理论矛盾中生长出的唯物主义，是有神论批判与无神论确立的结合。第二，语境创新的特点。费尔巴哈的宗教批判之所以能够成为近代无神论的高峰，能够得到马克思、恩格斯的充分肯定和强烈认同， 关键在于费尔巴哈不局限于传统西方形而上学语境，跳出自笛卡尔以来的以“我思”为基础的唯心主义话语体系，从而建构起以“感性” “感性人” “感性直观”为核心的唯物主义话语体系。第三，充分肯定人的价值的特点。相较于机械唯物主义将人贬为“机器”，费尔巴哈指出： “我们的任务，便正在于证明，属神的东西跟属人的东西的对立，是一种虚幻的对立。”也就是说，费尔巴哈无神论的根本目的不是把人还原为“物”，而是从神的手中夺回人的价值和意义，对“人”以及“人性”的尊重和认可是其理论底色。

On the practical dimension, i.e., the educational practice of atheism, Feuerbach’s atheism offers insights in three respects. First, propaganda and education concerning atheism must be continuously and unremittingly strengthened, actively contending with theism for ideological high ground. Feuerbach pointed out that although in practice and in fact Christianity no longer possessed the authority and control it had in the Middle Ages, in people’s minds Christianity persists in the form of philosophy, lurking within people’s conceptions; the mist of idealism still shrouds people’s spiritual world. This demonstrates the importance of education and propaganda. Second, a scientific and dialectical attitude must be adopted toward theism. Unlike naive atheism’s one-sided negation of theism, Feuerbach distinguished between the objectification of religion and the alienation of religion, acknowledging the inner rational dimension of religion. This is not a compromise with theism, but rather a correct understanding of theism, an excavation of the rational factors within theism, so as to transcend theism theoretically and enrich atheist thought. Finally, manifesting human power through practice is the fundamental path for promoting atheism. Feuerbach believed that the reason people lose their essence is precisely because their own power is too weak, so they are compelled to resort to some imagined transcendent being to satisfy the need for self-realization — albeit in an inverted, alienated form. As productive forces continuously develop, science and technology constantly innovate, and material life and spiritual life are ceaselessly enriched, human power and value will be continuously strengthened and manifested, and people will be able to fully understand and recognize themselves, thereby further enriching and developing their own power. The more people gain, the less remains for God; the illusory nature of theism becomes ever more prominent, and atheism becomes ever more deeply rooted in people’s hearts.

在实践维度即无神论教育实践上，费尔巴哈无神论具有三个方面的启示。首先，一定要持续不断加强对于无神论的宣传与教育，主动与有神论争夺意识形态高地。费尔巴哈指出， 尽管在实践上和事实上，基督教已经不再具有中世纪时的权威性和控制力，但在人的头脑中， 基督教却以哲学的形态潜藏在人们的观念之中，唯心主义迷雾还笼罩人的精神世界，这说明了教育与宣传的重要性。其次，对待有神论要采取科学的、辩证的态度。不同于朴素无神论对有神论的片面否定，费尔巴哈区分宗教对象化和宗教异化，承认宗教的内在合理层面。这并不是要向有神论妥协，而是要正确的认识有神论，发掘有神论中的合理因素，进而在理论上彻底超越有神论，丰富无神论思想。最后，通过实践彰显人的力量是发扬无神论的根本路径。费尔巴哈认为，人之所以会丧失自己的本质，正是因为自身力量过于薄弱，所以不得不诉诸于某种幻想中的超越性的存在，从而满足自我实现的需求———尽管是以颠倒的、异化的形式。随着生产力不断发展，科学技术不断创新，物质生活和精神生活不断充盈，人的力量和价值就会不断得到充实和彰显，人也就能够充分认识自身、认可自身，从而进一步丰富发展人自身的力量。人得到的越多，留给上帝的就越少，有神论的虚幻实质就愈发凸显，无神论就愈发深入人心。

(Author’s bio: Zhang Qinmin, Master’s student in the Department of Philosophy, School of Marxism, Jiangsu Normal University)

（作者简介：张芩民，江苏师范大学马克思主义学院哲学系硕士研究生）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心