Mao Zedong’s Important Thesis on the Strategic Stalemate Stage of the War of Resistance Against Japan

After the outbreak of the nationwide War of Resistance Against Japan, Mao Zedong, in his article *On Protracted War*, scientifically predicted that the Chinese people’s War of Resistance Against Japan would go through three stages: strategic defense, strategic stalemate, and strategic counteroffensive. He particularly emphasized that the strategic stalemate stage was the “transitional stage,” the “most difficult period,” and the “pivot of transformation” for the entire war. Subsequently, as the practice of war unfolded, Mao Zedong, in his writings such as *On the New Stage*, *The Current Situation and the Party’s Tasks*, *Overcome the Danger of Capitulation and Strive for a Turn for the Better in the Situation*, and *Study and the Current Situation*, further reflected on and elaborated the strategic stalemate stage. His major theses—such as “the stalemate stage is the pivot of the war,” “prepare for a long war and endure this difficult stretch of the road,” “China will gain the strength to turn from weakness to strength during this stage,” and strive for “a greater mobilization of the dynamic forces among all strata of the entire nation and greater progress in all aspects of the Party, government, military, and civilian sectors”—powerfully revealed the status, characteristics, and tasks of the strategic stalemate stage, providing strategic guidance for steering the war. The insights and wisdom contained therein regarding the overall situation and laws of struggle still hold significant guiding importance today.

全国抗战爆发后，毛泽东在《论持久战》一文中科学预见中国人民抗日战争将经历战略防御、战略相持、战略反攻三个阶段，特别强调战略相持阶段是整个战争的“过渡阶段”“最困难的时期”“转变的枢纽”。此后，伴随战争实践的不断展开，毛泽东在《论新阶段》《目前形势和党的任务》《克服投降危险，力争时局好转》《学习和时局》等著述中，对战略相持阶段作了进一步的思考和阐述，他提出的“相持阶段是战争的枢纽”，“准备长期战争，熬过这一段艰难路程”，“中国将在此阶段中获得转弱为强的力量”，争取“全民族各个阶层中生动力量之更大发动与党政军民各方面之更大进步”等重大论断，有力揭示了战略相持阶段的地位、特征、任务等，为驾驭战争提供了战略指导。其中蕴含的对斗争全局、斗争规律的洞见和智慧，时至今日仍然具有重要指导意义。

1. Designating the special status of the strategic stalemate stage with “the stalemate stage is the pivot of the war”

1、以“相持阶段是战争的枢纽”，标定战略相持阶段的特殊地位

In response to erroneous views that existed before and after the outbreak of the nationwide War of Resistance Against Japan, such as the “theory of national subjugation,” the “theory of quick victory,” and the belief of some that China’s resistance could directly transition from the defensive stage to the counteroffensive stage, Mao Zedong, while clarifying that the War of Resistance Against Japan would be protracted and that final victory would belong to China, also pointed out, “Taking a zigzag course is the principle of the development of all things in the world. Our War of Resistance Against Japan must pass through the three stages of defense, stalemate, and counteroffensive; this too is taking a zigzag course.” He thus elucidated the internal basis for the emergence of the stalemate stage from a philosophical height. He also pointed out, “The main characteristic of the three stages lies in the inclusion of a transitional intermediate stage,” that is, the stage of stalemate between the enemy and ourselves. In this stage, “for the enemy, it is the stage of securing the occupied areas and preparing for the further annihilation of all China; for China, it is the stage of securing the unoccupied areas and preparing for the recovery of the lost territories.” On this basis, proceeding from the overall process of the war and through an analysis of the changes in the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves and their impact on the war situation, he scientifically answered major questions such as the causes of the strategic stalemate stage and its status in the war process.

针对全国抗战爆发前后存在的“亡国论”“速胜论”以及一些人认为中国抗战可以由防御阶段直接转入反攻阶段等错误认识，毛泽东在明确抗日战争是持久的、最后胜利属于中国的同时指出，“走‘之’字路是世界上任何事情发展的原则。我们抗日战争要经过防御、相持和反攻三个阶段，这也是走‘之’字路”，从哲学高度阐明了相持阶段产生的内在根据。他还指出，“三个阶段的主要特点，在于包含一个过渡的中间阶段”，也就是敌我相持阶段。这一阶段，“在敌人，是确保占领地并准备进一步灭亡全中国的阶段；在中国，是确保未失地并准备收复沦陷区的阶段”。在此基础上，他从战争的整体进程入手，通过对敌我力量变化以及对战局影响的分析，科学回答了战略相持阶段的成因以及在战争进程中的地位等重大问题。

The strategic stalemate stage is an inevitable stage brought about by the characteristics of both the enemy and ourselves. Mao Zedong examined the history of wars, both ancient and modern, Chinese and foreign, and classified wars according to the stages they underwent into three types: the first type is a war with only one stage, where side A attacks and side B is defeated, such as the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 and the Second Italo-Ethiopian War; the second type is a war with two stages, where side A attacks and side B defends, and then side B transitions from defense to offense, such as the ancient Chinese battles of Red Cliffs and the Fei River; the third type is a war with three stages, where side A attacks and side B defends as the first stage, the two sides are locked in a stalemate as the second stage, and side B counterattacks and side A retreats as the third stage, such as the Hundred Years’ War between England and France and the American War of Independence. The characteristic of this type of war lies in having a relatively long stalemate stage. Mao Zedong believed that China’s War of Resistance belonged to the third type, a conclusion drawn from a dialectical analysis of the forces of the enemy and ourselves. On the one hand, Japan had clear advantages in military strength, economic power, and political organizational capacity; in particular, to achieve its external expansion, it increased military expenditures, expanded its army, stockpiled materials, mobilized its people, and intensified the militarization of its industry, all of which endowed it with strong war capabilities. China, on the other hand, was temporarily inferior to the enemy in terms of weaponry, economic strength, and the organization of the people; therefore, militarily, China could not achieve a quick victory and, moreover, lacked the material conditions to immediately transition to a counteroffensive. On the other hand, Mao Zedong, with a broad perspective, placed the contest of military forces and changes in the battlefield situation within the context of the competition of national strength, changes in international forces, and the trend of historical development. That is, the enemy was a small country, in a state of regression, and with little support, while China was a large country, in a state of progress, and with much support. In particular, during the strategic defense stage, the resolute resistance of the Chinese military and civilians would inevitably cause the Japanese aggressors to extend their battle lines, disperse their forces, and sharply increase their consumption, thereby gradually causing the enemy to lose the capacity to continue launching large-scale military operations, thus forcing the enemy to halt its strategic offensive. Consequently, the war would enter a stage of stalemate between the enemy and ourselves. From the perspective of war practice, by the end of 1938, “Japan had already invested nearly one million troops on the Chinese battlefield, suffering nearly 450,000 casualties,” and “on a front of about 4,000 kilometers stretching from Suiyuan, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, to Guangdong, the Japanese army faced over 200 Chinese divisions… Behind the front lines, in an area of over one million square kilometers—nearly three times the size of Japan proper—the anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare led by the Chinese Communist Party was widely carried out, with anti-Japanese base areas and guerrilla zones spread throughout.” This disrupted the Japanese aggressors’ strategic plan to quickly annihilate China, and the momentum of their strategic offensive became unsustainable. Since at that time China’s resistance forces had not yet developed to the point of being able to completely and thoroughly expel the Japanese invaders, therefore, “although the enemy is strong, its strength has been reduced by other unfavorable factors, though not yet to the necessary extent to undermine its superiority; although we are weak, our weakness has been supplemented by other favorable factors, though not yet to the necessary extent to change our inferiority.” This created the protracted nature of the war and the arrival of the strategic stalemate stage.

战略相持阶段是敌我双方特点造成的必经阶段。毛泽东考察古今中外战争史，将战争按其所经历的阶段分为三种类型：一类是只有一个阶段的战争，即甲方进攻，乙方失败，如1905年日俄战争、第二次意埃战争；一类是经历两个阶段的战争，即甲方进攻，乙方防御，然后乙方由防御转为进攻，如中国古代的赤壁之战、淝水之战；一类是经历三个阶段的战争，即甲方进攻、乙方防御为第一阶段，双方相持不决为第二阶段，乙方反攻、甲方退却为第三阶段，如英法百年战争、美国独立战争，这一类战争的特点就在于有一个时间比较长的相持阶段。毛泽东认为中国抗战属于第三类，这是基于对敌我力量辩证分析得出的结论。一方面，日本在军力、经济力、政治组织力等方面都具有明显优势，特别是其为实现对外扩张需要，增加军费、扩充军队、储备物资、动员国民、加紧工业军事化等，都使其具备了强大的战争能力；而中国在武器装备、经济实力、组织民众等方面都暂时不如敌人，故而在军事上中国不可能速胜，更不具备立刻转入反攻的物质条件。另一方面，毛泽东又以宏阔的视野，把军事力量的较量、战场态势的变化放在国家力量的比拼、国际力量的变动、历史发展的趋势中加以分析，即敌是小国、退步、寡助，我则为大国、进步、多助，特别是在战略防御阶段，中国军民的坚决抵抗势必造成日本侵略者战线延长、兵力分散、消耗剧增等，这就使敌人逐渐丧失继续发动大规模军事行动的能力，从而迫使敌人停止战略进攻，由此战争进入敌我相持阶段。从战争实践看，到1938年底，“日本已在中国战场上投入了近百万的庞大兵力，付出了近45万人伤亡的代价”，“在绥远、陕西、山西、河南、安徽、湖北、湖南、江西、江苏、浙江、广东一线约4000公里的正面，日军面对着200多个师的中国军队……在相当于日本本土近3倍的100多万平方公里的战线后方，中国共产党领导的抗日游击战争广泛开展，抗日根据地和游击区遍布各地”，这就打乱了日本侵略者迅速灭亡中国的战略计划，其战略进攻的势头难以为继。由于此时中国的抗战力量还未发展到能够完全彻底驱逐日寇的程度，因此，“敌虽强，但敌之强已为其他不利的因素所减杀，不过此时还没有减杀到足以破坏敌之优势的必要的程度；我虽弱，但我之弱已为其他有利的因素所补充，不过此时还没有补充到足以改变我之劣势的必要的程度”，这就造成了战争持久局面和战略相持阶段的到来。

The strategic stalemate stage is the key stage in which the relative strength of the enemy and ourselves undergoes change. After a comprehensive analysis of various enemy and our own factors, Mao Zedong profoundly revealed the inevitable trend of China’s War of Resistance, namely, “China from inferiority to parity to superiority, Japan from superiority to parity to inferiority, China from defense to stalemate to counter-offensive, Japan from offense to conservation to retreat—this is the process of the Sino-Japanese War, the inevitable trend of the Sino-Japanese War.” [1]1 Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War” (May 1938), Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 2. Within this developmental trend, Mao Zedong emphasized that the strategic stalemate stage is the “hub of the war.” On the one hand, this is a scientific conclusion reached by understanding the changes in the forces of both sides in struggle dynamically rather than statically. Unlike mechanists, Mao Zedong believed that the forces of the enemy and ourselves are not immutable, but develop and change continuously with the progress of the war. That is to say, the situation at the outbreak of the war, where the enemy is strong and we are weak, although objectively existing, is not static. As the war extends in time and expands in space, both the enemy’s unfavorable factors and our favorable factors will change. One developmental trend will be that the enemy’s strength and our weakness gradually transform in the opposite direction. From the perspective of war practice, although the enemy can plunder resources in the occupied areas during the strategic stalemate stage and increase its own strength, because the war still exists, especially with the development of guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines, it is very difficult for the Japanese army to obtain war supplies on the China battlefield. The strength it increases is insufficient to offset the consumption already incurred, and “continued consumption” becomes the “decisive aspect.” [2]2 Ibid. As for China, although its population, industry, land, and military forces have been considerably consumed in the war, national unity is strengthening, the people’s consciousness is rising, the combat effectiveness of the military is improving, and political, economic, and cultural progress is being made. The overall strength of China’s War of Resistance is continuously increasing in new quality and quantity. In the strategic stalemate stage, the enemy’s difficulties and our progress increase day by day. Coupled with the continuous strengthening of international anti-fascist forces, through the accumulation of quantity, the situation of the enemy being strong and we being weak, the enemy being superior and we being inferior, can gradually be changed. On the other hand, this contains the requirement for struggle that is proactive and enterprising, not passive and waiting. Mao Zedong emphasized, “What determines the counter-offensive is the strength added in the second stage,” therefore “we must use every effort to prepare all the conditions necessary for our counter-offensive; if we do not, we cannot transition to the counter-offensive stage, but will only have a perpetual stalemate.” [3]3 Ibid. That is to say, the changes in the forces of the enemy and ourselves during the strategic stalemate stage have multiple developmental tendencies. It could be the intensification of the situation where the enemy is strong and we are weak, or it could be the reversal of the enemy being strong and we being weak. To make the strategic stalemate stage the hub for achieving final victory, subjective effort is indispensable. We should adhere to being proactive and enterprising, expand the enemy’s disadvantages, grow our own strength, and, in the reversal of strength and weakness, transform the war situation from strategic stalemate to strategic counter-offensive. It is in this sense that Mao Zedong pointed out: “Whether China becomes an independent nation or is reduced to a colony is not determined by whether the big cities in the first stage are lost, but by the degree of effort of the entire nation in the second stage.” [3]3 Ibid.

战略相持阶段是敌我强弱发生变化的关键阶段。毛泽东在对各种敌我因素综合分析后深刻揭示了中国抗战的必然趋势，即“中国由劣势到平衡到优势，日本由优势到平衡到劣势，中国由防御到相持到反攻，日本由进攻到保守到退却——这就是中日战争的过程，中日战争的必然趋势”。在这一发展趋势中，毛泽东强调战略相持阶段是“战争的枢纽”。一方面，这是运动而非静止地认识斗争双方力量变化得出的科学结论。与机械论者不同，毛泽东认为敌我双方的力量并非一成不变，而是随着战争的进程不断发展变化，也就是说战争爆发之初敌强我弱的情况，虽然是客观存在，但不是静止不动的，随着战争时间的延长和空间的拓展，敌之不利的因素和我之有利的因素都将发生变化，其中一种发展趋势将是敌之强和我之弱逐渐向相反的方向变化。从战争实践看，战略相持阶段敌虽能在占领区掠夺资源，增加自己的力量，但由于战争依然存在，特别是敌后游击战争的开展，日军在中国战场获得战争补给十分困难，其增加的力量不足以抵偿已有的消耗，“继续消耗”成为“决定的一方面”。而中国的人口、工业、土地、军队等虽在战争中有较大消耗，但全国团结在增强、人民觉悟在提高、军队战斗力在提升、政治经济文化等在进步，中国抗战的整体力量不断增加着新的质与量。在战略相持阶段，敌之困难与我之进步的与日俱增，加之国际反法西斯力量不断增强，经过量的积累就能逐渐改变敌强我弱、敌优我劣的状况。另一方面，这蕴含着主动进取而非被动等待的斗争要求。毛泽东强调，“决定反攻的东西是第二阶段中增加上来的力量”，因此“必须用尽一切努力去准备我之反攻所必需的一切条件，设若不然，就不能过渡到反攻阶段里去，而只是永远的相持”。也就是说，战略相持阶段敌我力量的变化有着多种发展趋向，可能是敌强我弱局面的加强，也可能是敌强我弱的易位，要使战略相持阶段成为获得最后胜利的枢纽，离不开主观的努力，应坚持积极进取，扩大敌之劣势、生长我之力量，在强弱易位中使战争局面由战略相持向战略反攻转变。正是在这个意义上，毛泽东指出：“中国将变为独立国，还是沦为殖民地，不决定于第一阶段大城市之是否丧失，而决定于第二阶段全民族努力的程度。”

2. Elucidating the Distinctive Features of the Strategic Stalemate Stage by “Preparing for a Long War and Enduring This Difficult Stretch”

2、以“准备长期战争，熬过这一段艰难路程”，阐明战略相持阶段的鲜明特征

In the strategic stalemate stage, besides the contest on the battlefield, the struggle between the enemy and ourselves is carried out extensively in broader spaces and fields. The breadth, depth, and intensity of the struggle are extraordinary. For the side that is temporarily at a disadvantage, it must inevitably face a long-term state of high pressure. Mao Zedong clearly proposed that the strategic stalemate stage is a “difficult stretch” to warn the entire nation to prepare for a long and arduous struggle. At the same time, he emphasized that “after crossing the difficult stretch of the war, the smooth road to victory will arrive; this is the natural logic of war,” to strengthen the belief of the Chinese military and people in resisting Japan to the end and in inevitable victory.

在战略相持阶段，除战场上的较量外，敌我双方的角逐在更广阔的空间和领域中广泛地进行着，斗争的广度、深度、强度异乎寻常。对于暂时处于劣势的一方来说，必然要面对长期的高压态势。毛泽东鲜明提出，战略相持阶段是一段“艰难路程”，以警示全国民众做好长期艰苦斗争的准备；同时强调“跨过战争的艰难路程之后，胜利的坦途就到来了，这是战争的自然逻辑”，以坚定中国军民抗战到底、抗战必胜的信念。

The duration of the struggle is relatively long. In overall military confrontation between nations, the war capability of both sides is a comprehensive entity. The weakening or strengthening of this capability, and the consequent change in the war situation, often requires a long process of accumulation. Mao Zedong believed that China’s War of Resistance is protracted, and the length of the strategic stalemate stage “depends on the degree of change in the increase and decrease of the forces of the enemy and ourselves and on changes in the international situation. Generally speaking, we must be prepared to give it a relatively long time.” [4]4 Ibid. This means that after Japan launched its full-scale war of aggression against China, although it encountered resistance, it would not immediately lose its war capability entirely. The weakening of its overall strength would still take time. For China, although the Anti-Japanese National United Front was established and developed, guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines gradually unfolded, and the masses were mobilized and armed, the great enhancement of these forces would not happen overnight. The protracted nature of the War of Resistance determined the long-term nature of the stalemate, and determined that “only through the great efforts of the entire nation during the long stalemate stage, combined with external conditions,” could a fundamental change in the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves be achieved. [5]5 Ibid.

斗争的时间持续较长。在国家间整体性军事对抗中，双方的战争能力是一个综合体，其削弱或增强以及由此带来的战局转变，往往要经历一个长期累积的过程。毛泽东认为，中国的抗战是持久的，其中战略相持“这个阶段的时间的长短，依敌我力量增减变化的程度如何及国际形势变动如何而定，大体上我们要准备付给较长的时间”。这意味着，日本发动全面侵华战争后，虽然遇到抵抗，但不会立刻完全丧失战争能力，其整体力量的削弱还有待时日。对于中国来说，虽然抗日民族统一战线建立并发展，敌后游击战争逐渐展开，民众得到动员和武装，但这些力量的极大增强并非一朝一夕。抗战的持久性决定了相持的长期性，决定了“只有在长期相持阶段内我用全民族的极大努力，并配合国外条件”，才能使敌我力量对比发生根本性变化。

The pressure of the struggle comes from all aspects. In the strategic stalemate stage, military confrontation on the battlefield persists. At the same time, to gain overall superiority over the opponent, the struggles between the enemy and ourselves in the political, economic, social, and foreign relations fields are also exceptionally fierce. Attacking cities and attacking hearts are interwoven; defeating troops and defeating diplomacy coexist. The reason why the strategic stalemate stage is “a very painful period for China” [6]6 Mao Zedong, “The Situation and Tasks in the Anti-Japanese War After the Fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan” (November 1937), Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 2. is that during this stage we must bear enormous pressure from all sides. At the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC, Mao Zedong pointed out that “most of the time” of the stalemate stage would be “more difficult,” and summarized the manifestations of this “greater difficulty.” [7]7 The Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was held from September 29 to November 6, 1938, in Yan’an. It affirmed Mao Zedong’s leadership role within the Party and discussed the strategic direction of the War of Resistance. First, the pressure from the battlefield is continuous. Because the big cities and main communication lines are controlled by the enemy, and the political power system and combat positions are divided by the enemy, this creates an extremely serious unfavorable military situation. In addition, although the Japanese army’s strategic military offensives basically ceased during the stalemate stage, it still retained the capability and intention to launch campaign-level offensives. The Battle of Nanchang, the Battle of Suixian-Zaoyang, the First Battle of Changsha, and the Battle of Zaoyi-Yichang during this stage all confirmed Mao Zedong’s scientific assessment. [8]8 These were major military campaigns fought between the Chinese National Revolutionary Army and the Imperial Japanese Army in 1939-1940, during the strategic stalemate stage. At the same time, “the stalemate on the front and the stalemate behind enemy lines are inversely proportional; when the situation of stalemate on the front appears, the struggle behind enemy lines will become tense.” [9]9 Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War.” Starting in 1939, the Japanese army’s “Public Order Pacification Plan” in the occupied areas, and the subsequent large-scale “Public Order Pacification Campaigns” and “Qingxiang” operations [10]10 “Qingxiang” (清乡, “clearing the countryside”) was a Japanese counter-insurgency campaign combining military suppression, political control, and economic blockade, particularly in the lower Yangtze region. guided by the “total war” policy in North China, Central China, and other places, all made the struggle on the enemy’s rear battlefield extremely intense. Second, pressure from the political and economic fields became increasingly prominent. After entering the stalemate stage, the Japanese army adjusted its strategy towards China, implementing “using Chinese to control Chinese” and “using war to support war,” fostering puppet regimes, plundering property in the occupied areas, carrying out enslavement education, and intensifying efforts to divide and induce surrender. The enemy’s propaganda campaigns and inducements with interests caused unfavorable situations such as division, defection, and temporary and partial compromise within China. Furthermore, Mao Zedong worried that if the enemy occupied Guangzhou, China’s main sea lines of communication might be cut off, affecting international aid to China. [11]11 Guangzhou (Canton) fell to Japanese forces in October 1938. Increased economic difficulties and the imminent danger of surrender posed great challenges to the War of Resistance. Third, the complex attitude of the international community, especially Britain and the United States, towards China’s War of Resistance brought pressure. Although Britain, the United States, and other countries had profound contradictions with Japan, they would not easily abandon the “fisherman’s” policy of “sitting on the mountain and watching the tigers fight.” [12]12 This is a Chinese idiom referring to a strategy of watching two parties fight each other in order to benefit from their mutual exhaustion. Moreover, Western countries prioritized solving the European problem, temporarily placing the solution of the Eastern problem second. This led to the possibility that Britain and the United States might adopt a policy of compromise with Japan, plotting a “Far Eastern Munich” that sacrificed China’s interests. [13]13 The “Far Eastern Munich” refers to the fear that Western powers, particularly Britain, would seek a compromise with Japan at China’s expense, analogous to the 1938 Munich Agreement that ceded parts of Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany. In fact, one important factor contributing to the danger of surrender in China during the strategic stalemate stage was the pressure exerted on the Chinese government by the capitulationists in Britain, the United States, and other countries.

斗争的压力来自方方面面。在战略相持阶段，战场上的军事对抗持续存在，同时为赢得压倒对方的整体优势，敌我双方在政治、经济、社会、对外交往等各领域的斗争也异常激烈，攻城与攻心交织，伐兵与伐交共在。战略相持阶段之所以“是中国很痛苦的时期”，就在于此阶段我们要承受来自各方面的巨大压力。在党的扩大的六届六中全会上，毛泽东指出，相持阶段的“大部分时间”将“更加困难”，并对“更加困难”的表现进行了概括。一是来自战场上的压力持续不断。由于大城市与主要交通线被敌控制，以及政权系统与作战阵地被敌分割，这就造成了军事上极为严重的不利态势。此外，在相持阶段日军战略性的军事进攻虽然基本停止，但其仍然具备发动战役性进攻的能力和企图。这一阶段的南昌会战、随枣会战、第一次长沙会战、枣宜会战等，无不印证了毛泽东的科学研判。同时，“正面相持和敌后相持是成反比例的，正面相持的局面出现，敌后斗争的局面就要紧张”，1939年起日军对占领区实行的“治安肃正计划”，以及此后对华北、华中等地大规模推行的以“总力战”方针为指导的“治安强化运动”和“清乡”等，都使得敌后战场的斗争极为激烈。二是来自政治、经济等领域的压力日益凸显。进入相持阶段后，日军调整对华战略，推行“以华制华”“以战养战”，扶植傀儡政权，掠夺占领区财物，开展奴化教育，加紧分化诱降，敌舆论上的造势和利益上的诱导，造成中国内部一时间出现分化、叛变、暂时和局部的妥协等不利情况。此外，毛泽东担心，如果敌占领广州，中国主要的海道交通有被割断之虞，国际对华援助将受到影响。经济上困难加剧、投降危险现实紧迫，给抗战带来巨大挑战。三是国际社会特别是英美对中国抗战的复杂态度带来压力。虽然英美等国与日本有着深刻的矛盾，但他们不会轻易放弃“坐山观虎斗”的“渔人”政策，而且西方国家把解决欧洲问题放在第一位，把解决东方问题暂时放在第二位，这就造成英美等国有可能采取对日妥协态度，策划牺牲中国利益的“远东慕尼黑”。事实上，战略相持阶段中国存在的投降危险，其中一个重要因素就是英美等国的投降主义者施加给中国政府的压力。

The form of struggle is a crisscross pattern of interlocking. “Crisscross pattern of interlocking” is a vivid description of the two sides locked in a tangled struggle. Mao Zedong held that “the crisscross pattern of warfare” “arises from the contradictory factors of Japan’s barbarism and insufficient troops, and China’s progress and vast territory.” Mao provided an in-depth explanation of the crisscross pattern of struggle in the military domain, including interior and exterior lines, with and without rear areas, encirclement and counter-encirclement, and large and small pieces. In particular, regarding encirclement and counter-encirclement, Mao used the metaphor of “playing Go,” comparing the combat operations between the enemy and ourselves to “capturing stones” and the enemy’s establishment of strongholds and our establishment of base areas to “making eyes.” To gain an overall favorable situation, it was necessary to elevate the establishment of anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines and the launching of guerrilla warfare to the strategic level for understanding and handling. Furthermore, Mao also believed that this crisscross pattern was not only reflected in the military field but also in the political, economic, cultural, and foreign relations fields, where the enemy and ourselves were engaged in fierce struggles of offense and defense, encirclement and counter-encirclement: the enemy’s political inducement to surrender versus our counter-friction, counter-surrender, and counter-splittism; the enemy’s economic plunder versus our scorched-earth policy and establishment of economic blockades against the enemy; the enemy’s enslavement propaganda versus our use of songs, plays, newspapers, and periodicals for war mobilization; and the struggle between the international aggressor front and the peace front, etc. The enemy and ourselves were engaged in fierce offense and defense in all fields and aspects. It should be pointed out that the crisscross pattern of struggle brought pressure, but it also served as a “whetstone.” Frequent, small-scale military operations and multi-field struggle practices could enable us to further understand the enemy’s patterns of action, weaknesses, and shortcomings, hone our own struggle capabilities, strengthen our confidence in victory, and lay a solid foundation for final victory.

斗争形态犬牙交错。犬牙交错是对斗争双方扭抱缠斗的形象描述。毛泽东认为，“犬牙交错的战争形态”，“是由于日本的野蛮和兵力不足，中国的进步和土地广大这些矛盾因素产生出来的”。毛泽东对军事斗争领域犬牙交错的斗争态势进行了深入阐释，包括内线和外线、有后方和无后方、包围和反包围、大块和小块等。特别是对于包围和反包围，毛泽东以“下围棋”为喻，把敌我之间的作战行动比作“吃子”，把敌建立据点和我建立根据地比作“做眼”。要获得全局的有利态势，就需要把敌后建立抗日根据地、发动游击战争提高到战略层面加以认识和对待。此外，毛泽东还认为，这种犬牙交错不仅体现于军事领域，同时在政治、经济、文化、对外交往等领域，敌我双方也在进行着攻与守、包围与反包围的激烈斗争，敌之政治诱降与我之反磨擦、反投降、反分裂，敌之经济掠夺与我之坚壁清野、建立对敌经济封锁线，敌之奴化宣传与我之运用歌曲、戏剧、报刊等进行抗战动员，以及国际上侵略阵线与和平阵线的斗争，等等，敌我双方在各方面各领域都进行着激烈攻防。需要指出的是，犬牙交错的斗争带来的是压力，同时也是“磨刀石”，频繁的、小规模的军事行动和多领域的斗争实践可以使我进一步摸清敌人的行动规律、短处弱点，砥砺出我之斗争能力，增强我之必胜信念，为取得最后胜利奠定坚实基础。

The course of struggle would advance amidst twists and turns. In June 1939, when discussing the prospects of the War of Resistance at a senior cadres’ meeting in Yan’an, Mao Zedong pointed out: “The overall prospect is bright, but it will inevitably go through a long and tortuous struggle. A short and straight-line victory does not exist.” A victory in one battle, the temporary acquisition of an ally, or the strengthening of anti-Japanese forces in one region was not enough to fundamentally change the balance of power between the enemy and ourselves; it might also invite more frenzied counterattacks and suppression from the enemy. The fierce confrontation between the enemy and ourselves made the course of struggle full of twists and turns, yet it was bound to move forward. In April 1944, Mao divided the development of the anti-Japanese armed forces and base areas led by our Party into three stages: from 1937 to 1940 was the rising stage, during which our Party led the opening up of vast enemy rear areas, established anti-Japanese base areas, dealt heavy blows to the Japanese invaders, and saw significant growth in the number of Party members and troops; 1941 to 1942 was the declining stage, as the Japanese army concentrated its forces to attack the anti-Japanese armed forces and base areas led by our Party, we encountered extreme difficulties, the base areas shrank, the population decreased, and Party cadres and troops suffered heavy losses; from 1943 onward was a new rising stage, where we learned warfare through warfare, summed up experiences and lessons, overcame shortcomings and deficiencies, and achieved the renewed growth and expansion of anti-Japanese forces. Regarding this, Mao vividly likened it: “The first stage is like an open palm, the second stage is a clenched fist, and the third stage is a powerful fist thrust out again.” It can be said that during the strategic stalemate stage, the enemy and ourselves engaged in fierce struggles for the initiative in the war. The entire course was exceptionally arduous and full of twists and turns, but as long as we persisted in the War of Resistance, advanced through struggle, and struggled while advancing, we would surely achieve final victory.

斗争历程将是曲折中前进。1939年6月，毛泽东在延安高级干部会议上谈到抗战前途时指出：“总的前途是光明的，但必然经过长期的斗争与曲折的斗争。短期的与直线的胜利是没有的。”一次战斗的胜利、一时同盟者的获得、一个区域抗战力量的增强等，还不足以从整体上改变敌我力量对比，还可能受到敌之更疯狂的反扑打压。敌我双方进行着激烈的对抗，使得斗争历程充满曲折，但又必然向前。1944年4月，毛泽东将我们党领导的抗日武装力量和抗日根据地的发展划分为三个阶段：从1937年到1940年是上升阶段，在此期间我们党领导开辟了广大敌后战场，建立起抗日根据地，给日寇以沉重打击，党员人数和军队数量有了很大增长；1941年到1942年为下降阶段，由于日军集中力量打击我们党领导的抗日武装和根据地，我们遇到极大困难，根据地面积缩小，人口减少，党员干部和军队遭到很大损失；1943年起为新的上升阶段，我们在战争中学习战争，总结经验教训、克服缺点不足，实现了抗战力量的再次发展壮大。对此，毛泽东形象比喻说：“第一个阶段好比是伸开的手掌，第二个阶段是缩回的拳头，第三个阶段是再伸出强有力的拳头。”可以说，在战略相持阶段敌我双方为争夺战争主动权进行着激烈斗争，整个历程异常艰苦、充满曲折，但只要坚持抗战，在斗争中前进、在前进中斗争，就一定能够取得最后胜利。

3. Clarifying the fundamental problem to be solved in the strategic stalemate stage with the thesis that “China will gain the strength to turn from weakness to strength in this stage”

3、以“中国将在此阶段中获得转弱为强的力量”，阐明战略相持阶段要解决的根本问题

In October 1937, in his “Outline Report on the Current Situation of the War of Resistance and the Party’s Tasks,” Mao Zedong proposed that the outcome of the Sino-Japanese War depended on “China’s strength,” “Japan’s strength,” and “international strength,” among which “the decisive factor is China’s own strength.” A year later, in his “On the New Stage,” he stated even more explicitly: “Relying mainly on one’s own growing strength, combined with the intensification of the enemy’s difficulties and the increase in international assistance to us, can change the overall situation between the enemy and ourselves, from the current situation of enemy superiority and our inferiority to a balance between the enemy and ourselves, and then to our superiority and the enemy’s inferiority. This is the fundamental problem that must and can be solved during the long stalemate stage.”

1937年10月，毛泽东在《目前抗战形势与党的任务报告提纲》中提出，中日战争的胜负取决于“中国的力量”“日本的力量”“国际的力量”，其中“决定的因素是中国自己的力量”。一年后，他在《论新阶段》中更是明确指出：“主要的依靠自己生长的力量，再配合之以敌人困难之加重，国际助我之增强，就能使整个敌我形势发生变化，由敌优我劣之现时形势，走到敌我平衡，再走到我优敌劣，这就是长期相持阶段中必须解决也可能解决的根本问题。”

The growth of China’s strength. Unlike some who placed the main hope for the War of Resistance on foreign aid, Mao Zedong believed that defeating the Japanese invaders should primarily rely on our own strength. During the strategic stalemate stage, the main task was to overcome our own weaknesses and increase our own strength, reflecting the principle of independence and self-reliance he had consistently advocated. In Mao’s view, China’s anti-Japanese strength included not only the number of troops, combat proficiency, and weaponry but also population size, production capacity, and the organization and mobilization of the people. Therefore, to increase China’s anti-Japanese strength, “it is necessary to make progress in all aspects, including military, political, cultural, Party affairs, and mass movements. Without greater progress in all aspects, it is impossible to mobilize all the vivid forces of the entire nation, nor to further unify and unite the entire nation.” This meant that to sustain a long-term War of Resistance and strive for final victory, it was necessary to stimulate the deep and enduring anti-Japanese strength of the entire nation through various means. Based on this judgment, during the strategic stalemate stage, our Party promoted progress in military, political, economic, cultural, and Party affairs by establishing anti-Japanese base areas deep behind enemy lines, developing anti-Japanese armed forces, carrying out struggles against “mopping-up” and “nibbling,” implementing the “Three-Thirds System” principle, [14]14 The “Three-Thirds System” (三三制) was a policy for the composition of anti-Japanese base area governments, where Communist Party members, non-Party progressives, and centrists each occupied one-third of the positions, aimed at broadening the united front against Japan. practicing streamlined administration, reducing rent and interest, launching the Great Production Movement, and strengthening self-construction, thereby continuously developing and expanding the anti-Japanese strength of the entire nation.

中国力量的增长。与一些人把抗战前途主要寄托在外国援助上不同，毛泽东认为战胜日寇主要应依靠自己的力量，在战略相持阶段主要的是克服自身弱点、增加自身力量，这反映出他一再倡导的独立自主原则。在毛泽东看来，中国抗战的力量不仅包括军队数量、战斗素养、武器装备等，还包括人口数量、生产能力、民众组织动员等。因此，要增长中国的抗战力量，“非从军事、政治、文化、党务、民运等各方面力求进步不可。没有各方面的更大的进步，就不能发动全民族一切生动力量，也就不能更进一步的统一团结全民族”。这意味着支持长期抗战与争取最后胜利，必须通过多种方式激发出全民族深沉持久的抗战力量。正是基于这一判断，在战略相持阶段，我们党通过深入敌后建立抗日根据地，发展抗日武装力量，开展反“扫荡”、反“蚕食”斗争，贯彻“三三制”原则，实行精兵简政，实行减租减息，开展大生产运动，加强自身建设等，推动军事、政治、经济、文化、党务等各方面进步，不断发展壮大全民族抗战力量。

The intensification of Japan’s difficulties. Mao Zedong believed that the growth of the Japanese invaders’ difficulties was “the result of Japan’s barbaric aggression and China’s heroic resistance,” and that all means should be further adopted to weaken the enemy’s strength. First, targeting Japan’s weakness as a small country, especially its insufficient troops and financial resources, it was necessary to expand its disadvantage of insufficient and dispersed troops by establishing base areas deep behind enemy lines. At the same time, in response to the Japanese army’s plunder of occupied areas to support a long-term war, we should carry out tit-for-tat struggles to make it difficult for the puppet regime to be universally established and consolidated, thereby creating difficulties for its plunder. Second, targeting Japan’s internal contradictions—that is, the aggressive war launched by Japan, which was counterproductive and consumed resources, causing difficulties in the daily lives of the Japanese people and the rise of anti-war sentiment among soldiers—it was necessary to establish a common anti-aggression united front that included the Japanese military and civilian masses, distinguishing between Japanese imperialism and the Japanese people, between enemy officers and soldiers, and between senior and junior enemy officers. Through anti-war propaganda, we should continuously increase the Japanese soldiers’ homesickness, war-weariness, and even anti-war psychology, “forcing its people and soldiers to move toward a trend of resolutely opposing the war itself.” From the perspective of war practice, after entering the strategic stalemate stage, Japan’s difficulties greatly increased. From autumn to winter 1939, Japan was troubled by the sudden surfacing of national impoverishment. Facing difficulties such as electricity shortages, severe rice famines, and energy supply imbalances, its senior generals lamented, “Outwardly strong but inwardly weak is today’s portrayal of our country. If time drags on, it will be unsustainable.” It was precisely due to increased difficulties and national decline that “the confidence of the top brass of the Army General Staff in winning the war was shaken.”

日本困难的加重。毛泽东认为，日本侵略者困难的增长是“日本的野蛮侵略与中国的英勇抗战造成的结果”，应进一步采取一切手段削弱敌之力量。其一，针对日本是小国，特别是兵力财力不足的弱点，要通过深入敌后建立根据地等，扩大其兵力不足和分散的劣势。同时，针对日军在沦陷区进行掠夺以支持长期战争的图谋，针锋相对开展斗争，使敌伪政权不容易普遍建立与巩固，从而造成其掠夺的困难。其二，针对日本内部矛盾，即日本发动的侵略战争，倒行逆施、消耗资源，造成日本民众日常生活困难、士兵反战情绪燃起等情况，应建立包括日本军民大众在内的共同的反侵略统一战线，区别日本帝国主义与日本人民，区别敌军军官与士兵，区别敌军上级军官与下级军官，通过进行反战宣传，不断增加日军思乡厌战直至反战心理，“迫使他的人民与士兵大众走上用坚决的方法反对战争本身的趋势”。从战争实践看，进入战略相持阶段后，日本的困难极大增加，1939年从秋到冬，日本为突然表面化的国力穷困状态而苦恼着，面对电力不足、严重米荒、能源供应失衡等困难，其高级将领发出“外强中干是我国今日的写照。时间一长就维持不住了”的哀叹，正是由于困难增加、国力衰退，“陆军统帅部的首脑打赢战争的信念发生了动摇”。

The strengthening of international assistance. In the gradually unfolding picture of world history, the aggression of one country against another is no longer confined to the two countries involved; other countries often make strategic judgments and operational deployments based on their own perceptions and interests. Mao Zedong pointed out sharply: “Neither China nor Japan is an isolated country; the question of peace and war in the East is a world question.” [15]15 Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War” (May 1938), Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 2. Although at the arrival of the strategic stalemate stage, the international community, especially the major powers, had not yet provided sufficient assistance to China’s War of Resistance, and were still hesitating and waiting, the barbaric acts of aggression by the Japanese army would inevitably arouse opposition from the majority of countries and peoples in the world. The root cause lay in the fact that Japan’s aggression was not only a trampling of China but also a threat to the world; Japanese imperialism was not only China’s enemy but also the enemy of all countries and peoples in the world who demanded peace. Therefore, China’s War of Resistance was not isolated; China’s War of Resistance Against Japan was closely linked to the world anti-fascist war. Hence, Mao Zedong proposed establishing an “international anti-fascist united front” and strengthening unity with all countries and peoples in the world who opposed the fascist rule of Germany, Italy, and Japan. It should be pointed out that, in response to the complex attitudes of various international forces toward Japan’s aggression against China at that time, in December 1940, Mao Zedong proposed: “We must distinguish between Japanese imperialism, which is invading China, and other imperialist powers that are not currently engaging in aggression; we must also distinguish between German and Italian imperialism, which have formed an alliance with Japan and recognized ‘Manchukuo,’ and British and American imperialism, which are in a position of opposition to Japan; and we must further distinguish between the British and Americans who previously adopted the Far Eastern Munich policy [16]16 The Far Eastern Munich policy refers to the appeasement policy of Britain and the United States toward Japan in the late 1930s, which sought to sacrifice China’s interests to reach a compromise with Japan, similar to the Munich Agreement of 1938 that ceded parts of Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany. to harm China’s War of Resistance and those who have now abandoned this policy and changed to supporting China’s War of Resistance.” He adopted the strategic principle of “utilizing contradictions, winning over the majority, opposing the minority, and defeating them one by one,” and by strengthening international propaganda and other means, seized the moral high ground to strive for the support and assistance of countries around the world.

国际援助的增强。在世界历史逐步展开的图景中，一国对另一国的侵略，其影响不再局限于两国之间，其他国家往往基于自身认知和利益来进行战略判断和行动部署。毛泽东鲜明指出：“无论是中国还是日本都不是孤立的国家，东方的和平与战争问题是一个世界性问题。”虽然在战略相持阶段到来时，国际社会特别是主要国家对中国抗战的援助还不充分，还在犹疑和观望，但日军的野蛮侵略行径必将引起世界多数国家和多数人民的反对，其根源在于日军的侵略，不仅是对中国的蹂躏，同时也是对世界的威胁；日本帝国主义不仅是中国的敌人，同时也是世界上要求和平的国家及其人民的敌人。因此，中国的抗战不是孤立的，中国抗日战争与世界反法西斯战争是紧密联系的。由此，毛泽东提出应建立“反法西斯的国际统一战线”，加强同世界上一切反对德意日法西斯统治的国家和人民进行联合。需要指出的是，针对当时各种国际力量对待日本侵略中国的复杂态度，1940年12月，毛泽东提出：“既须将侵略中国的日本帝国主义和现时没有举行侵略的其他帝国主义，加以区别；又须将同日本结成同盟承认‘满洲国’的德意帝国主义，和同日本处于对立地位的英美帝国主义，加以区别；又须将过去采取远东慕尼黑政策危害中国抗日时的英美，和目前放弃这个政策改为赞助中国抗日时的英美，加以区别”，采取“利用矛盾，争取多数，反对少数，各个击破”的策略原则，通过加强国际宣传等占领道义制高点，争取世界各国的支持和援助。

4. By striving for “a greater mobilization of the vital forces among all strata of the entire nation and greater progress in the Party, government, military, and civilian aspects,” clarify the general task of the strategic stalemate stage.

4、以争取“全民族各个阶层中生动力量之更大发动与党政军民各方面之更大进步”，明确战略相持阶段的总的任务

Mao Zedong clearly stated at the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party [17]17 The Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was held from September 29 to November 6, 1938, in Yan’an. It affirmed Mao Zedong’s leadership role and his line on the War of Resistance. that it was necessary to use extensive and sustained efforts to increase new forces. This increase meant “a greater mobilization of the vital forces among all strata of the entire nation and greater progress in the Party, government, military, and civilian aspects.” He emphasized that the general task was to “persist in the War of Resistance, persist in the protracted war, consolidate and expand the united front, so as to overcome difficulties, halt the enemy’s offensive, prepare our forces, and launch our counter-offensive, achieving the goal of finally expelling the enemy.”

毛泽东在党的扩大的六届六中全会上明确提出，必须用广大持久的努力去增加新的力量，这种增加，即“全民族各个阶层中生动力量之更大发动与党政军民各方面之更大进步”，强调总的任务是“坚持抗战，坚持持久战，巩固与扩大统一战线，以便克服困难，停止敌之进攻，准备力量，实行我之反攻，达到最后驱逐敌人之目的”。

Repel the enemy’s political offensive, persist in the War of Resistance, persist in unity, and persist in progress. In the strategic stalemate stage, the enemy, in order to undermine our will and capacity for struggle, adopted methods such as splitting, disintegrating, deceiving, and inducing surrender, which posed a major threat to us. If not effectively countered, this would fundamentally shake the foundation of the War of Resistance. In October 1939, Mao Zedong pointed out in “The Current Situation and the Party’s Tasks” that in the stalemate stage, “If China cannot disrupt the enemy’s occupied areas, allowing them to achieve the goal of securing and managing these areas; and if China cannot repel the enemy’s political offensive, cannot persist in the War of Resistance, persist in unity, and persist in progress to prepare the forces for counter-offensive, or if the Kuomintang government should voluntarily surrender; then, in the future, the enemy would still have the possibility of launching a large-scale offensive. That is to say, the already arrived stalemate situation could still be destroyed by the enemy and the capitulationists.” After entering the strategic stalemate stage, the Japanese aggressors abandoned the strategy of a quick victory and induced the Nationalist government to compromise with Japan. At the same time, the anti-communist tendency of the Chiang Kai-shek clique also grew markedly. Whether it was the treason of the Wang Jingwei clique, the secret talks between Japanese military representatives and representatives of the Chongqing government in Hong Kong and Macau in 1940, or the repeated friction incidents created by the Kuomintang army, all indicated that the dangers of capitulation, division, and retrogression were real. Mao Zedong keenly recognized the seriousness of this issue. In January 1940, in an instruction drafted by the Central Committee of the Party for internal Party guidance, he clearly pointed out that there existed a confrontation and struggle between the direction of capitulation and the direction of resistance in the current situation. On July 7, the Central Committee of the Party issued a declaration emphasizing: “Now is a period of unprecedented danger of capitulation and unprecedented difficulty in the War of Resistance for China… The whole country should strengthen its unity to overcome this danger and difficulty.” Facing the critical situation, Mao Zedong stressed the need to “persist in the stand of the War of Resistance and oppose any compromise movement,” “persist in the stand of unity and oppose any divisive movement,” and “persist in the stand of progress and oppose any retrogressive movement.” He proposed that the task of the Chinese Communist Party and the people of the whole country was “to unite all anti-Japanese and progressive forces, resist all capitulationist and retrogressive forces, strive for an improvement in the situation, and reverse the deterioration of the situation.” To this end, our Party launched a nationwide struggle against capitulation, resolutely denouncing the Wang Jingwei clique’s act of betraying the country and collaborating with the enemy. The Eighth Route Army launched the Hundred Regiments Offensive [18]18 The Hundred Regiments Offensive (August–December 1940) was a large-scale campaign by the Eighth Route Army against the Japanese army in North China, involving over 100 regiments. It aimed to boost Chinese morale and disrupt Japanese lines of communication. in North China, the largest-scale and longest-duration strategically offensive operation since the start of the all-out War of Resistance, which strengthened the confidence of the entire nation in fighting the war to the end. In particular, in response to the dual attitude of the Chiang Kai-shek clique—wavering and compromising yet not daring to openly abandon resistance, and actively opposing the Communist Party yet not daring to completely break up the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation—Mao Zedong creatively proposed developing progressive forces, winning over intermediate forces, and isolating die-hard forces. He emphasized carrying out struggles that were justified, advantageous, and restrained, seeking unity through struggle, and thereby striving for an improvement in the situation.

打退敌人政治进攻，坚持抗战、坚持团结、坚持进步。在战略相持阶段，敌为瓦解我之斗争意志和能力，其采取的分化瓦解、欺骗诱降等手段对我造成重大威胁，如果不能有效应对，将从根本上动摇抗战根基。1939年10月，毛泽东在《目前形势和党的任务》中指出，相持阶段“如果中国不能破坏敌人占领地，让其达到确保占领地、经营占领地的目的；又如果中国不能打退敌人的政治进攻，不能坚持抗战，坚持团结，坚持进步，以准备反攻力量，或者国民党政府竟自动投降；那末，在将来，敌人就仍有大举进攻的可能。就是说，已经到来的相持局面仍有被敌人和投降派破坏的可能”。进入战略相持阶段后，日本侵略者放弃速战速决方针，诱使国民政府对日妥协。同时，蒋介石集团反共倾向也明显增长。无论是汪精卫集团的叛国，还是1940年日本军方代表同重庆政府代表在香港和澳门进行的秘密会谈，抑或国民党军队屡屡制造磨擦事件，都表明投降危险、分裂危险、倒退危险现实存在着。毛泽东敏锐意识到这一问题的严重性，在1940年1月为中共中央起草的对党内的指示中明确指出，时局中存在投降方向和抗战方向的对立、斗争。7月7日，中共中央发表宣言强调：“现在是中国空前投降危险与空前抗战困难的时期……全国应该加紧团结起来，克服这种危险与困难。”面对危局，毛泽东强调要“坚持抗战的立场，反对任何的妥协运动”，“坚持团结的立场，反对任何的分裂运动”，“坚持进步的立场，反对任何的倒退运动”，提出中国共产党和全国人民的任务“就是团结一切抗日的进步的势力，抵抗一切投降的倒退的势力，力争时局的好转，挽救时局的逆转”。为此，我们党在全国范围掀起反投降斗争，坚决声讨汪精卫集团的卖国投敌行为。八路军在华北发动全民族抗战以后规模最大、持续时间最长的带战略性进攻的百团大战，坚定了全国人民抗战到底的信心。特别是针对蒋介石集团既动摇妥协又不敢公开放弃抗日、既积极反共又不敢彻底破裂国共合作的两面态度，毛泽东创造性提出发展进步势力、争取中间势力、孤立顽固势力，强调进行有理有利有节的斗争，以斗争求团结，争取了时局的好转。

Resolutely rely on the masses and wage a people’s war. Mao Zedong believed that the decisive factor in war “is people, not things,” and that “the soldiers and the people are the foundation of victory.” To sustain a long-term war and win final victory, it was necessary to firmly rely on the masses and wage a people’s war. First, it was necessary to mobilize the masses extensively and deeply. The role of material factors in war cannot be separated from the spiritual awakening of people. China’s objective conditions—vast territory, abundant resources, and large population—ultimately depended on awakened people to utilize them. Therefore, Mao Zedong regarded the political mobilization for the War of Resistance as “an extremely important matter,” comparing the mobilized common people to a “vast ocean” that would engulf the Japanese invaders. He demanded that through oral propaganda, newspapers, and other popularized and mass-oriented means, linked to the progress of the war and the lives of the people, extensive, deep, and regular mobilization be carried out, so that the broad masses would truly recognize the extreme importance of resisting Japanese aggression for the country and the people, and consciously throw themselves into the torrent of resistance. Second, it was necessary to effectively organize and arm the masses. Mao Zedong believed that the prerequisite for gaining superiority and initiative was “superior mass organization.” Therefore, it was necessary to adapt to the needs of war development, innovate organizational methods, and organize workers, peasants, youth, women, children, merchants, and others into anti-Japanese organizations through various forms. Their familiarity with local conditions should be utilized to assist the anti-Japanese armed forces in blocking news, covering operations, providing support, etc., thereby creating misperceptions and misjudgments for the enemy and enhancing our own combat effectiveness. In particular, it was necessary to arm the masses in accordance with the requirements of war, implementing a three-in-one armed forces structure of main forces, local forces, and militias and self-defense corps (armies). In mass guerrilla movements, main force units should be cultivated, and with the help of main force units, local armed forces should be built. Third, it was necessary to establish an attitude of “respecting soldiers and respecting the people” and properly handle “the relationship between officers and soldiers, and between the military and the people.” In the extensive and protracted War of Resistance, only when the entire nation’s people and the anti-Japanese armed forces were truly united could the mighty force to win the war be formed. For the leaders of the war, to achieve a situation of unity, it was necessary not only to use external means such as mobilization and organization but also to establish an attitude of respecting soldiers and respecting the people. Only policies formulated and methods adopted from this attitude could win the understanding and support of soldiers and the people in practical work. Otherwise, it would be impossible to properly handle the relationship between officers and soldiers and between the military and the people, and unity in the War of Resistance would become empty talk.

坚决依靠民众，进行人民战争。毛泽东认为，战争的决定因素“是人不是物”，“兵民是胜利之本”，要支持长期战争并赢得最后胜利，必须坚持紧紧依靠民众，进行人民战争。其一，要广泛深入地动员民众。战争中物质因素作用的发挥离不开人的精神觉醒，中国地大、物博、人多这些客观条件最终要靠觉醒了的人去使用，因此毛泽东把抗战政治动员看成“一件绝大的事”，把动员起来的老百姓比作是造成日寇灭顶之灾的“汪洋大海”，要求通过口头、报刊等通俗化、大众化手段，联系战争进展、联系民众生活，进行广泛深入、经常性的动员，使广大民众真正认识到抗击日寇侵略于国于民的极端重要性，自觉投身抗日洪流。其二，要有力组织和武装民众。毛泽东认为，赢得优势和主动的先决条件是“优越的民众组织”。因此，要因应战争发展需要，创新组织方式，通过各种形式把工人、农民、青年、妇女、儿童、商人等组织在抗日团体之内，发挥他们熟悉当地情况的优势，协助抗日武装封锁消息、掩护行动、提供支援等，从而造成敌军错觉误判，增强我军之战力。特别是要适应战争要求武装群众，实行主力军、地方军和民兵、自卫队（军）三结合的武装力量体制，在群众性的游击运动中培养主力兵团，在主力兵团的帮助下造就地方武装。其三，要树立“尊重士兵和尊重人民”的态度，处理好“官兵关系、军民关系”。在广泛持久的抗日战争中，只有全国民众、抗战武装真正团结起来，才能形成赢得战争的磅礴力量。对于战争领导者来说，要获得团结一致的局面，不仅需要外在的动员、组织等手段，还要树立尊重士兵和尊重人民的态度。只有从这一态度出发制定的政策及采取的方式方法，才能在实际工作中赢得士兵和民众的理解和支持，否则就不可能搞好官兵关系、军民关系，团结抗战就会沦为空谈。

Master the art of swimming in the ocean of war, and effectively steer the course of war. War is not only a contest of force, but also a contest of wisdom. Mao Zedong believed that “all problems in the confrontation between two opposing armies are resolved through war,” and that although victory or defeat in war is closely related to objective factors such as economic conditions, weaponry, and terrain, these material factors must be closely integrated with human subjective initiative to form the power of war. “War is a contest of subjective ability between the commanders of the two opposing armies, who use military strength, financial resources, and other material foundations as their arena to compete for superiority and initiative.” Mao Zedong vividly likened the commander to someone swimming in the ocean of war; to reach the shore of victory, one must master the art of swimming. “Strategy and tactics, as the laws guiding war, are the art of swimming in the ocean of war.” Facing the new characteristics of the enemy situation and the demands of war in the strategic stalemate stage, Mao Zedong issued the call to study military issues, including military theory, strategy and tactics, and political work. He clarified that the purpose of war is “to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy,” expounded on the strategic position of the anti-Japanese guerrilla war, pointed out the significance and principles and methods of establishing anti-Japanese base areas, emphasized the initiative, flexibility, and planning in operational guidance, and profoundly elucidated a series of major relationships, including offense and defense, exterior and interior lines, protracted and quick decisions, attrition warfare and annihilation warfare, as well as mobile warfare, guerrilla warfare, and positional warfare. These innovative understandings, reflecting the multi-faceted and multi-layered nature of the anti-Japanese military struggle, are rich in content and form an integrated whole, elevating our Party’s understanding of the laws guiding war to a new height and pointing the way for the anti-Japanese military and civilians to defeat a stronger enemy with weaker forces and achieve victory.

掌握战争大海中的游泳术，有力驾驭战争。战争不仅是力的比拼，更是智的较量。毛泽东认为，“两军敌对的一切问题依靠战争去解决”，而战争胜负虽然与经济条件、武器装备、地形地貌等客观因素紧密相关，但这些物之因素要与人之主观能动性紧密结合，才能形成战之力量，“战争就是两军指挥员以军力财力等项物质基础作地盘，互争优势和主动的主观能力的竞赛”。毛泽东形象比喻说，指挥员犹如在战争的大海中游泳，要想到达胜利的彼岸，就必须掌握游泳术，“作为战争指导规律的战略战术，就是战争大海中的游泳术”。面对战略相持阶段新的敌情特点和战争要求，毛泽东发出研究军事理论、战略战术、政治工作等在内的军事问题的号召，明确战争的目的是“保存自己，消灭敌人”，阐发抗日游击战争的战略地位，指出建立抗日根据地的重要意义和原则方法，强调作战指导的主动性、灵活性、计划性，并对进攻与防御、外线与内线、持久与速决、消耗战与歼灭战，以及运动战、游击战、阵地战等一系列重大关系进行了深刻阐发。这些反映抗日军事斗争多方面、多层次的创新性认识，内涵丰富、浑然一体，把我们党对战争指导规律的认识提升到了新高度，为抗日军民以弱胜强、克敌制胜指明了方向。

Strengthen the Party’s own construction and play a vanguard and exemplary role. In “On the New Stage,” Mao Zedong specifically discussed “the position of the Chinese Communist Party in the national war,” emphasizing that Party members should demonstrate a high degree of initiative in the national war and play a vanguard and exemplary role in all aspects. He also clearly put forward specific requirements for the vanguard and exemplary role of Party members in the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, in their relations with friendly parties and armies, in government work, and in the mass movement. In response to the new demands placed on Party building by the war environment, Mao Zedong scientifically planned the strengthening of the Party’s own construction: he proposed that the Party must expand its organization, adopting the general policy of boldly developing members while not allowing a single bad element to infiltrate; he put forward the major proposition of “the Sinicization of Marxism,” emphasizing that studying theory is a condition for victory and that the Party’s level of Marxist theory must be continuously raised; he proposed that in the united front, the Party must maintain its independence, and that Party members must always maintain their independence in thought, politics, and organization, while also keeping the overall situation in mind and uniting all forces that can be united; he proposed training cadres who possess both political integrity and professional competence, and systematically training a large number of new cadres; he proposed that discipline is the guarantee for the implementation of the line, clarifying the basic principle of democratic centralism of “the Four Obediences” [19]19 The Four Obediences: An intra-Party principle requiring that individual Party members obey the organization, the minority obey the majority, the lower level obey the higher level, and the entire Party obey the Central Committee., and maintaining the Party’s unity and solidarity. In October 1939, in the “Foreword to ‘The Communist’,” Mao Zedong solemnly proposed that Party building is a “great project,” indicating that the Party’s understanding of the importance of strengthening its own construction had become more conscious and profound. In short, the strengthening of the Party’s leadership and Party building during the strategic stalemate stage provided a powerful political guarantee for the Party to play its role as the mainstay in the War of Resistance Against Japan.

加强党的自身建设，发挥先锋模范作用。毛泽东在《论新阶段》中对“中国共产党在民族战争中的地位”进行了专门论述，强调共产党员应在民族战争中表现其高度的积极性，应在各方面起先锋模范作用，并明确提出了共产党员在八路军与新四军中、在与友党友军发生关系中、在政府工作中、在民众运动中等的先锋模范作用的具体要求。针对战争环境对党的建设提出的新要求，毛泽东对加强党的自身建设进行科学擘画：提出党必须扩大自己的组织，采取大胆发展而又不让一个坏分子侵入的发展党员总方针；提出“马克思主义的中国化”重大命题，强调学习理论是胜利的条件，要不断提高全党马克思主义理论水平；提出在统一战线中要坚持党的独立性，共产党员必须时刻保持在思想上、政治上、组织上的独立性，同时要胸怀全局，团结一切可以团结的力量；提出培养德才兼备的干部，有计划地培养大批的新干部；提出纪律是执行路线的保证，明确“四个服从”的民主集中制的基本原则，维护党的团结统一。1939年10月，毛泽东在《〈共产党人〉发刊词》中郑重提出党的建设是一项“伟大的工程”，表明党对加强自身建设重要性的认识更加自觉和深刻。总之，战略相持阶段党的领导和党的建设的加强，为党在抗日战争中发挥中流砥柱作用提供了强有力的政治保证。

5. Conclusion

5、结语

Mao Zedong’s series of important theses on the strategic stalemate stage of the War of Resistance Against Japan, which took command of the overall war situation, judged the course of the war, and grasped the key junctures of the war, guided China’s War of Resistance to final victory with far-reaching strategic vision. The experience and wisdom contained therein remain of great significance today. At present, the changes unseen in a century in the world are accelerating, and China’s development has entered a period in which strategic opportunities and risks and challenges coexist, with increasing uncertainties and unpredictable factors. The report of the 20th National Congress of the CPC clearly identified the “five major principles” that must be firmly grasped on the path forward, one of which is “persisting in carrying forward the spirit of struggle.” To face risks and challenges head-on and wage a great struggle, it is necessary to comprehensively and dialectically analyze the characteristics of both sides in the struggle, scientifically judge the stage of the struggle, and accurately grasp the trends and direction of the struggle, so as to formulate a long-term and comprehensive strategy for the struggle; it is necessary to fully recognize the arduousness and complexity of the struggle, not to believe in evil, not to fear ghosts, not to be afraid of pressure, to strengthen the will to struggle, maintain strategic resolve, establish a firm belief in victory, and prepare for the struggle; it is necessary to aim at the shift of strength and weakness, the transformation of superiority and inferiority, persist in being proactive, select breakthrough points, seize the initiative, consolidate the situation of unity, strengthen one’s own forces, and rely on tenacious struggle to open up new horizons for the development of the cause.

毛泽东关于抗日战争战略相持阶段的一系列重要论断，统揽战争全局，研判战争进程，把握战争关节，以深远的战略眼光指引中国抗战赢得最后胜利，其中蕴含的经验智慧在今天仍然具有重要意义。当前，世界百年未有之大变局加速演进，我国发展进入战略机遇和风险挑战并存、不确定难预料因素增多的时期，党的二十大报告明确前进道路上必须牢牢把握的“五个重大原则”，其中之一就是“坚持发扬斗争精神”。直面风险挑战、进行伟大斗争，要全面辩证分析斗争双方特点，科学研判斗争所处阶段，准确把握斗争趋势走向，以此制定长期的全盘的斗争方略；要充分认清斗争的艰苦性复杂性，不信邪、不怕鬼、不怕压，强固斗争意志，保持战略定力，树立必胜信念，做好斗争准备；要瞄准强弱易位、优劣转化，坚持积极进取，选取突破点、争取主动权，巩固团结局面，厚植自身力量，依靠顽强斗争打开事业发展新天地。

Online editor: Jing Mu

网络编辑：静穆