Zhou Enlai’s Strategic Thinking and Practical Wisdom on News and Propaganda Work

Attaching great importance to news and propaganda work is a fine tradition of our Party. In the long practice of revolution and construction, Zhou Enlai always cared for the Party’s journalistic endeavors. He not only focused on specific newspaper operations but also viewed propaganda from a strategic height, recognizing its special and important role in revolution and construction. He engaged in profound reflection on how to conduct news and propaganda work well, leaving behind many important ideas and viewpoints. Current academic research in this area is mainly concentrated on the following dimensions: first, investigations of specific historical periods, such as studies of Zhou Enlai’s journalistic activities in his early years and during his time in Europe; second, analyses of specific journalistic fronts, such as thematic studies centered on the *Xinhua Daily*; third, studies of specific historical events, particularly historical narratives based on the recollections of eyewitnesses. These achievements have laid a good foundation for further deepening research. This article intends to start from several core theses of Zhou Enlai on news and propaganda work, combine them with the historical background in which they emerged, and concretely and tangibly demonstrate Zhou Enlai’s strategic wisdom in steering and responding to complex public opinion situations.

高度重视新闻宣传工作，是我们党的优良传统。在长期的革命和建设实践中，周恩来始终关怀党的新闻事业，不仅关注具体的办报业务，更从战略高度看待宣传在革命和建设中的特殊重要作用，对做好新闻宣传工作进行了深刻的思考，留下了许多重要思想和观点。目前学界相关研究主要集中在以下维度：一是特定历史时期的考察，如对周恩来早期及留欧时期新闻活动的研究；二是特定新闻阵地的剖析，如围绕《新华日报》的专题研究；三是特定历史事件的研究，特别是基于亲历者回忆视角的历史叙述。这些成果对于进一步深化研究奠定了良好的基础。本文拟从周恩来关于新闻宣传工作的几个核心论断切入，结合其产生的时代背景，具体可感地展现周恩来从战略高度驾驭、应对复杂舆论局势的斗争智慧。

I. “Pen warfare is the vanguard of gun warfare, and also the rearguard of gun warfare”: The Dialectics of News Propaganda and Armed Struggle

一、“笔战是枪战的前驱，也是枪战的后盾”：新闻宣传与武装斗争的辩证法

Correctly grasping the relationship between the “pen” and the “gun,” that is, between news propaganda and armed struggle, is a valuable experience in the victory of the Chinese revolution. Our Party was born and grew up in revolutionary struggle. Grasping the “gun” firmly, using armed revolution to oppose armed counter-revolution, is the fundamental prerequisite for achieving national independence and the people’s liberation. At the same time, grasping the “pen” firmly, propagating the Party’s policies and propositions, and conducting effective public opinion struggle, is an inevitable necessity for deeply mobilizing the masses, organizing the masses, and arming the masses, creating a vast ocean of people’s war. In September 1940, Zhou Enlai inscribed for Mr. Wang Xijun of the Chinese Vocational Education Society: “Pen warfare is the vanguard of gun warfare, and also the rearguard of gun warfare.” [1]1 Zhou Enlai, inscription for Wang Xijun of the Chinese Vocational Education Society, September 1940. This was not only a strategic response to the Kuomintang’s reactionary policy of “both civil and military hands” — slandering the CPC politically and engaging in military anti-communist friction after the Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifth Kuomintang Central Executive Committee [2]2 The Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifth Kuomintang Central Executive Committee (January 1939) adopted a policy of “limited resistance” against Japan and intensified its anti-communist activities, leading to increased military and political friction with the CPC. — but also profoundly revealed the inherent, organic dialectical relationship between news propaganda and armed struggle.

正确把握“笔杆子”与“枪杆子”的关系，即新闻宣传与武装斗争的关系，是中国革命取得胜利的宝贵经验。我们党是从革命斗争中诞生、成长起来的，抓好“枪杆子”，以武装的革命反对武装的反革命，是实现民族独立、人民解放的根本前提；同时，抓好“笔杆子”，宣传党的政策主张，开展有效的舆论斗争，是深入发动群众、组织群众、武装群众，造就人民战争的汪洋大海的必然之举。1940年9月，周恩来为中华职业教育社王席君先生题词：“笔战是枪战的前驱，也是枪战的后盾。”[1]这不仅是针对五届五中全会后国民党对中共政治舆论污蔑和军事反共磨擦“文武两手”反动政策的战略回应，也深刻揭示了新闻宣传与武装斗争之间内在的、有机的辩证关系。

(I) “Vanguard”: The Forerunner of Ideological Enlightenment and Mass Mobilization

（一）“前驱”：思想启蒙与群众动员的先行

“Vanguard” implies ideological guidance and the foundation for action. Zhou Enlai deeply understood that before any large-scale social change or military struggle, ideological mobilization and public opinion preparation are often necessary, and he put this into practice himself.

“前驱”意味着思想上的先导和行动上的基础。周恩来深知，在任何大规模的社会变革和军事斗争之前，往往需要进行思想的发动和舆论的准备，并在实践中身体力行。

During his early years studying in Europe, as a traveling correspondent in Europe for the Tianjin *Yishi Daily*, Zhou Enlai wrote a total of 57 dispatches from Europe, conveying the changing international situation back to China. At the same time, as a main leader and contributor to the organ of the European Communist Youth League, *The Youth* (later renamed *Red Light*), he wrote numerous articles propagating Marxism, introducing the experience of the Russian October Revolution, analyzing the international and domestic situation, and pointing out the direction of revolution for Chinese youth in Europe. This can be seen as his early practice of using “pen warfare” for ideological enlightenment. During the Great Revolution period, Zhou Enlai served as Director of the General Political Department of the National Revolutionary Army’s Eastern Expedition. While leading the establishment of new political power organs and mass organizations in the Dongjiang region of Guangdong, he led the founding of the *Lingdong Republican Daily*, personally writing the masthead “Revolution” for its supplement and making it the newspaper’s guiding principle. This newspaper quickly became the main Kuomintang party newspaper in the Chaozhou, Meizhou, and Hailufeng areas, playing an important “vanguard” role in arousing the revolutionary spirit of the masses. After the outbreak of the National War of Resistance Against Japan, the guiding role of “pen warfare” became even more important. On the third day after the July 7th Incident [3]3 The July 7th Incident (1937) at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing marked the beginning of the full-scale outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War., Zhou Enlai proposed: “In the areas ruled by the Kuomintang, there is much to be done. We must run a Party newspaper.” [1]1 Zhou Enlai, inscription for Wang Xijun of the Chinese Vocational Education Society, September 1940. After multiple rounds of negotiations, under Zhou Enlai’s direct leadership and care, the *Xinhua Daily* and the *Mass* weekly were founded, becoming our Party’s open organs in the Kuomintang-controlled areas, sounding the “clarion call to encourage progress.” [2]2 The Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifth Kuomintang Central Executive Committee (January 1939) adopted a policy of “limited resistance” against Japan and intensified its anti-communist activities, leading to increased military and political friction with the CPC. Furthermore, under Zhou Enlai’s guidance, in August 1937, the *National Salvation Daily*, a “newspaper of the cultural united front for national resistance,” was established. [3]3 The July 7th Incident (1937) at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing marked the beginning of the full-scale outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. In 1941, the *China Daily News*, a “propaganda outpost for overseas Chinese and progressive people in Southeast Asia and Western countries,” was founded in Hong Kong. [4]4 The Southern Anhui Incident (January 1941) was a major military clash in which Kuomintang forces attacked the Communist-led New Fourth Army, killing or capturing thousands of its soldiers and triggering a severe political crisis. These fronts fully played the role of “pathbreakers,” accumulating deep explosive force for the “gun warfare” against the Northern Warlords and Japanese imperialism.

早年赴欧洲求学期间，作为天津《益世报》旅欧通讯员的周恩来，共计撰写旅欧通讯57篇，向国内传递国际风云变幻。同时，作为旅欧共产主义青年团机关刊物《少年》（后改名为《赤光》）的主要领导人和撰稿人，他撰写大量文章宣传马克思主义，介绍俄国十月革命的经验，分析国际国内形势，为在欧洲的中国青年指明革命方向。这可以看作他运用“笔战”进行思想启蒙的早期实践。大革命时期，周恩来任国民革命军东征军总政治部主任，在领导广东东江地区建立新的政权机构和群众组织期间，领导创办了《岭东民国日报》，亲自为副刊题写刊头“革命”，并将其作为办报的宗旨。该报迅速成为国民党在潮、梅、海陆丰地区的主要党报，在唤起群众革命精神方面发挥了重要的“前驱”作用。全国抗战爆发后，发挥“笔战”的先导作用更为重要。七七事变后第三天，周恩来即提出：“在国民党统治区域，要做的事很多。我们要办一张党报”[1]。经多番交涉，在周恩来的直接领导和关怀下，《新华日报》和《群众》周刊创刊，成为我们党在国统区公开的机关报，吹响了“鼓励前进的号角”[2]。此外，在周恩来指导下，1937年8月，筹办了“文化界抗日民族统一战线性质的报纸”——《救亡日报》[3],1941年在香港建立了“对‘南洋’和西方各国华侨、进步人士的宣传据点”——《华商报》[4]。这些阵地充分发挥了“开路先锋”的作用，为反对北洋军阀和日本帝国主义的“枪战”积蓄了深厚的爆发力。

(II) “Rearguard”: Public Opinion Cover and Support for the Revolutionary Camp

（二）“后盾”：舆论掩护与革命阵营的支撑

Compared to the “vanguard’s” ideological mobilization and opinion-building, what Zhou Enlai referred to as “rearguard” focused more on holding positions and stabilizing morale, aiming to “escort” the revolutionary struggle. He deeply recognized that in brutal military struggle, news and propaganda work must play the role of “rearguard,” both building a public opinion defense line to resist the enemy’s political slanders and expanding the united front to break political isolation, thereby providing reliable political cover and broad social support for armed struggle.

相对于“前驱”的思想动员与舆论造势，周恩来所指的“后盾”，更侧重于守住阵地与稳固人心，旨在为革命斗争“护航”。他深刻认识到，在残酷的军事斗争中，新闻宣传工作必须发挥好“后盾”作用，既要构筑舆论防线以抵御敌人的政治污蔑，又要拓展统战阵地以打破政治孤立，从而为武装斗争提供可靠的政治掩护和广泛的社会支撑。

First, news propaganda, by striking out in a timely manner, provides effective cover for armed struggle. During the strategic stalemate phase, when friction between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party was constant, the Kuomintang often used its propaganda advantage to “demonize” the Communist army, attempting to isolate our Party and army politically. Zhou Enlai emphasized: “We must not relent in refuting the enemy’s deceptive propaganda,” and “this work is very important, and we must never hesitate.” [5]5 The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea (1950–1953) was China’s military intervention in the Korean War, officially framed as a defensive war against U.S. imperialism. This means that “pen warfare” must build a defense line on the flank of “gun warfare.” A typical historical footnote is the public opinion struggle after the Southern Anhui Incident [4]4 The Southern Anhui Incident (January 1941) was a major military clash in which Kuomintang forces attacked the Communist-led New Fourth Army, killing or capturing thousands of its soldiers and triggering a severe political crisis.. When the Kuomintang militarily besieged the New Fourth Army and attempted to label it a “rebel army” in public opinion, Zhou Enlai, in grief and indignation, wrote the inscription: “A thousand years of injustice, a leaf south of the river; fratricidal strife, why the burning haste?” [6]6 The four big families: Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung, and Chen Lifu and Chen Guofu, the leading bureaucratic-capitalist cliques that dominated the Kuomintang regime. This was published by the *Xinhua Daily* after breaking through Kuomintang press censorship. This was not merely an emotional catharsis; it was a classic battle example of the Party, in extreme difficulty, using news propaganda to seize the right to interpret the facts. It allowed the people in the rear areas to see the truth of the situation, rapidly turning the tide of public opinion, and successfully thwarting the Kuomintang’s attempt to completely annihilate the New Fourth Army politically. Besides valuing “pen warfare” in the complex domestic struggle environment, Zhou Enlai also highly valued the role of propaganda in the face of armed provocations by international imperialism. After the start of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea [5]5 The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea (1950–1953) was China’s military intervention in the Korean War, officially framed as a defensive war against U.S. imperialism., Zhou Enlai reviewed and issued the *Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Directive on Conducting Nationwide Current Affairs Propaganda*, making meticulous and thoughtful arrangements for propaganda work on how to enable the masses to correctly understand the current situation and eliminate the psychology of fearing America. [7]7 Hundred Days’ Reform: A 1898 reform movement led by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, supported by Emperor Guangxu, which was crushed by the Empress Dowager Cixi. Through effective propaganda and education, “Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, Protect Our Homes and Defend Our Country” became a consensus across the nation. This vividly illustrates the important significance of using news propaganda to proclaim the justice of war and strengthen confidence in victory, thereby providing effective cover for military struggle.

首先，新闻宣传通过及时出击，为武装斗争提供有力的掩护。在国共磨擦不断的战略相持阶段，国民党常利用其宣传优势“妖魔化”共产党军队，企图在政治上孤立我党我军。周恩来强调：“对敌人的欺骗宣传应该不放松地驳斥”，“这项工作是非常重要的，决不要迟疑”。[5]这意味着，“笔战”必须在“枪战”的侧翼构筑起一道防线。一个典型的历史注脚是关于皖南事变后的舆论斗争。当国民党在军事上围攻新四军，并企图在舆论上将其定性为“叛军”时，周恩来悲愤写下“千古奇冤，江南一叶；同室操戈，相煎何急”[6]的题词，由《新华日报》冲破国民党新闻检查刊出。这不仅仅是情感的宣泄，更是党在极端困境下，利用新闻宣传抢夺事实解释权的经典战例。它让大后方民众看清了事实真相，使舆论风向迅速扭转，成功阻止了国民党在政治上彻底消灭新四军的企图。除了在国内复杂的斗争环境中重视“笔战”，面对国际帝国主义的武装挑衅，周恩来同样高度重视宣传的作用。抗美援朝战争开始后，周恩来审定并签发《中共中央关于在全国进行时事宣传的指示》，对如何使人民群众正确认识当前形势、消灭恐美心理等进行细致周到的宣传布置安排。[7]经过切实有效的宣传教育，“抗美援朝，保家卫国”成为全国上下的共识。这生动诠释了通过新闻宣传宣示战争正义性和坚定胜利信心，为军事斗争提供有力掩护的重要意义。

Second, news and propaganda expanded the revolutionary camp’s “circle of friends” by winning over intermediate forces and breaking political isolation. In 1941, facing the Kuomintang reactionaries’ tight political blockade, the Party’s situation in the Kuomintang-controlled areas was once very difficult. Zhou Enlai soberly analyzed the united front situation at the time: although we had made many friends in the cultural and educational circles, the Party’s influence was still very weak among the industrial and commercial circles, which had relatively strong economic power, and many public opinion positions were occupied by the Kuomintang government. To break this situation, he led the Southern Bureau to take the *Commercial Daily* as a breakthrough, establishing a strategy of “seizing positions from within the organization” and adopting a “squeeze strategy, squeezing our people in and squeezing secret agents out of important departments” [1]1 Zhou Enlai, inscription for Wang Xijun of the Chinese Vocational Education Society, September 1940.. Within less than half a year, except for the publisher, all the newspaper’s personnel had been replaced with Party comrades. The reorganized *Commercial Daily* shifted its commentary and reporting to speaking for national industry and commerce, concretely exposing the policies and measures of the four big bureaucratic-capitalist families [6]6 The four big families: Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung, and Chen Lifu and Chen Guofu, the leading bureaucratic-capitalist cliques that dominated the Kuomintang regime. that restricted and strangled national industry and commerce, turning an anti-Communist tool back into a newspaper that spoke for the business community. Zhou Enlai highly appraised this achievement: “The work of the Chongqing *Commercial Daily* during this period was done well. In 1941, our Party was still relatively isolated in Chongqing; only people from the cultural and educational circles dared to approach us. The *Commercial Daily* mobilized the industrial and commercial circles to oppose the four big families, and the industrial and commercial circles began to draw close to us, expanding our Party’s united front” [2]2 The Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifth Kuomintang Central Executive Committee (January 1939) adopted a policy of “limited resistance” against Japan and intensified its anti-communist activities, leading to increased military and political friction with the CPC.. Under Zhou Enlai’s guidance, the *Commercial Daily* not only spoke about big political principles but also concretely “spoke up” for the oppressed national industrialists and merchants, successfully winning over the originally hesitant intermediate forces. The broad social support thus obtained built a reliable social shield for the revolutionary forces under the White Terror.

其次，新闻宣传通过争取中间势力，打破政治孤立，为革命阵营扩充“朋友圈”。1941年，面对国民党反动派严密的政治封锁，党在国统区的处境一度十分艰难。周恩来清醒地分析了当时的统战局势：虽然我们在文化教育界交了不少朋友，但对具有较强经济力量的工商界，党的影响力还很薄弱，不少舆论阵地为国民党政府所占据。为打破这种局面，他领导南方局以《商务日报》为突破口，确立了“从组织内部掌握阵地”的策略，采取“挤的策略，把我们的人挤进去，把特务分子从重要部门挤出来”[1]。不到半年，除了社长之外，该报人员就都换成了共产党的同志。改组后的《商务日报》把言论和报道转到为民族工商业代言，具体揭露官僚资本四大家族限制、扼杀民族工商业的政策和措施，把反共的工具变回为商界立言的报纸。周恩来高度评价这一成绩：“重庆商务日报这段工作做的不错，1941年我党在重庆还比较孤立，只有文化教育界人士敢于接近我们，商务日报动员工商界反对四大家族，工商界开始靠近我们，扩大了我党的统一战线。”[2]在周恩来指导下，《商务日报》不光讲政治大道理，更实实在在地替受压迫的民族工商业者“说话”，成功将原本犹豫不决的中间势力争取了过来。由此得到的广泛社会支持，为处于白色恐怖中的革命力量建立了一道可靠的社会屏障。

(3) Strategic Extension: From “Advancing on Both the Cultural and Military Fronts” to “Two Wheels”

（三）战略延伸：从“文武并进”到“两个轮子”

From a broader perspective, Zhou Enlai always regarded news and propaganda as an important component of the Party’s cultural work, emphasizing its special strategic position. In August 1940, when discussing the role of the cultural movement, he recalled the past and contrasted it with the present, pointing out: “In the three stages of the entire history of the Chinese revolution, from the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom onward, the reforms of the Hundred Days’ Reform [7]7 Hundred Days’ Reform: A 1898 reform movement led by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, supported by Emperor Guangxu, which was crushed by the Empress Dowager Cixi. and the cultural revolutionary movement and New Army movement led by Sun Yat-sen brought about the Xinhai Revolution; the May Fourth Movement, the February 7th General Strike [8]8 February 7th General Strike: A 1923 strike of Beijing-Hankou railway workers, violently suppressed by the warlord Wu Peifu, marking a key event in the early Chinese labor movement., and the founding of the Whampoa Military Academy brought about the Great Revolution; after the failure of the Great Revolution, the cultural movements in Shanghai and Beijing, and the December 9th Movement and the National Salvation Movement that arose from them, also played a role in coordinating with the armed struggle.” From this, he concluded: “The cultural movement has special significance for the Chinese revolution,” and stressed that it was necessary to “advance on both the military and cultural fronts simultaneously” [3]3 The July 7th Incident (1937) at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing marked the beginning of the full-scale outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War..

从更广阔的视野看，周恩来始终将新闻宣传看作党的文化工作的重要内容，强调其特殊的战略地位。1940年8月，他在论及文化运动的作用时抚今追昔指出：“在整个中国革命历史的三个阶段中，从太平天国以后，戊戌政变的改良与孙中山先生领导的文化界革命运动、新军运动，造成了辛亥革命；五四运动、‘二七’大罢工运动与黄埔军校的开办，造成了大革命；大革命失败后，上海、北平的文化运动及由此而起的一二九运动、救国会运动等，也起了与武装斗争配合的作用”，由此得出结论：“文化运动对中国革命是有特别意义的”，强调必须“军事与文化两条战线并进”。[3]

With the victory of the New Democratic Revolution, Zhou Enlai extended this dialectic with great foresight. After the founding of New China, facing the new central task of economic construction, he vividly pointed out: “Economic construction and cultural construction are like the two wheels of a cart, moving forward in coordination.” “In cultural and educational work, besides education, it also includes culture and arts, science, health, news, publishing, and so on. These are all closely related to economic construction. Therefore, to carry out economic construction, cultural and educational work must be strengthened and must not be weakened” [4]4 The Southern Anhui Incident (January 1941) was a major military clash in which Kuomintang forces attacked the Communist-led New Fourth Army, killing or capturing thousands of its soldiers and triggering a severe political crisis.. This in effect regarded news and propaganda work as an important support for the smooth progress of national construction, reflecting Zhou Enlai’s high political acumen and strategic vision.

随着新民主主义革命的胜利，周恩来将这一辩证法进行了极具远见的延伸。新中国成立后，面对经济建设这一新的中心任务，他形象地指出：“经济建设和文化建设，好像一辆车子的两个轮子，相辅而行”，“文教工作中，除了教育，还包括文化艺术、科学、卫生、新闻、出版等。这些，都与经济建设有密切关系。所以，要进行经济建设，文教工作就必须加强，决不能削弱”。[4]这实际上是将新闻宣传工作视为国家建设得以顺利推进的重要支持，体现了周恩来高度的政治敏锐性和战略眼光。

II. “Widely Disseminate Our Political Opinions”: The Political Communication Effectiveness of News and Propaganda

二、“把我们的政治意见广为传播”：新闻宣传的政治传播效能

As an important means of seizing positions in the ideological sphere, news and propaganda has a distinct class character and must firmly grasp the correct political direction. In January 1946, through the joint efforts of the Chinese Communist Party and various democratic parties, the Political Consultative Conference [9]9 Political Consultative Conference: The 1946 Chongqing Political Consultative Conference, a multiparty meeting that produced agreements on a coalition government and a draft constitution, which the Kuomintang soon violated. adopted five agreements, including the Organization of Government Plan, the Program for Peaceful National Reconstruction, and the Draft Constitution. However, the Kuomintang ruling clique was utterly unwilling to implement these agreements, and some diehards even openly slandered them, saying: “The Political Consultative Conference decisions are unfavorable to the Kuomintang” and “The constitutional principles are a betrayal of (Sun Yat-sen’s) testament” [5]5 The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea (1950–1953) was China’s military intervention in the Korean War, officially framed as a defensive war against U.S. imperialism.. Subsequently, the Kuomintang also acted against the trend of history and began deliberately to sabotage the Political Consultative Conference agreements. In this situation, in February 1946, Zhou Enlai clearly put forward at a Chongqing cultural circles symposium: “Widely disseminate our political opinions” [6]6 The four big families: Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung, and Chen Lifu and Chen Guofu, the leading bureaucratic-capitalist cliques that dominated the Kuomintang regime.. At the moment when the Political Consultative Conference had just concluded, this assertion was highly targeted and urgent. Zhou Enlai deeply understood that for agreements on paper to be transformed into actual peace, it was first necessary to defeat the reactionaries’ distortions and blockades in the public opinion arena. The core intention of “widely disseminating our political opinions” was to rapidly transform the Chinese Communist Party’s propositions on peace, democracy, and unity, as well as the real achievements of the Political Consultative Conference, into the political consensus of the broad masses of the people, thereby building a powerful public opinion dam in the whole society to restrict civil war and defend peace. Of course, using the Political Consultative Conference to propagate “stopping the civil war” was only one example of Zhou Enlai’s journalistic practice. In his view, it was not only urgent and major matters concerning “peace” that needed to be publicized on a grand scale; the Party’s political opinions in all areas and at all times could not be locked in drawers or kept only at the high levels. The Party’s political opinions must be widely disseminated, and the “closed-doorist” style of propaganda must be resolutely broken.

新闻宣传作为争夺意识形态领域阵地的重要方式，具有鲜明的阶级属性，必须把牢正确政治方向。1946年1月，经过中国共产党和各民主党派的共同努力，政协会议通过了政府组织案、和平建国纲领、宪法草案等五项协议。然而，国民党统治集团根本不愿意履行这些协议，一些顽固分子甚至公然地诋毁道：“政协决定不利于国民党”，“宪草原则是背叛（孙中山）遗教”。[5]之后，国民党还倒行逆施，开始蓄意破坏政协协议。在此局势下，1946年2月，周恩来在重庆文化界座谈会上鲜明提出：“把我们的政治意见广为传播”[6]。在政协会议刚刚闭幕之际，这一论断的提出具有极强的针对性和紧迫性。周恩来深刻认识到，纸面上的协议要转化为现实的和平，必须首先在舆论场上战胜反动派的歪曲与封锁。“把我们的政治意见广为传播”，其核心意图就是要将中国共产党关于和平、民主、团结的主张，以及政协会议的真实成果，迅速转化为广大人民群众的政治共识，从而在全社会构筑起制约内战、保卫和平的强大舆论堤坝。当然，利用政协会议宣传“制止内战”，只是周恩来新闻实践的一个缩影。在他看来，不仅仅是关于“和平”的急事、大事需要大张旗鼓地宣传，党在各个方面、各个时期的政治意见，都不能只锁在抽屉里或停留在高层，必须把党的政治意见广为传播，坚决打破“关门主义”的宣传方式。

(1) Clarifying “What to Disseminate”: Adherence to Political Direction and Manifestation of Class Stand

（一）明确“传播什么”：政治方向的坚守与阶级立场的彰显

First, it was necessary to unswervingly propagate Marxism-Leninism. As early as March 1922, at the age of 24, Zhou Enlai firmly stated: “The doctrine I recognize will certainly not change, and I am very determined to propagate and work for it” [1]1 Zhou Enlai, inscription for Wang Xijun of the Chinese Vocational Education Society, September 1940.. Actively propagating Marxism-Leninism was also Zhou Enlai’s consistent requirement for news and propaganda work. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, as the Party’s ideological beacon in the Kuomintang-controlled areas, the *Xinhua Daily* and the *Mass* weekly closely coordinated while each had its own emphasis. At the beginning of the founding of the *Mass* weekly, Zhou Enlai clearly pointed out: “The editorial policy of *Mass* is exactly the same as that of the *Xinhua Daily*. The difference is that *Mass* is a Party journal, a theoretical publication. It must proceed more from Marxism-Leninism, more from a theoretical perspective, to help the broad readership understand the justice of the War of Resistance Against Japan and the inevitability of victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan” [2]2 The Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifth Kuomintang Central Executive Committee (January 1939) adopted a policy of “limited resistance” against Japan and intensified its anti-communist activities, leading to increased military and political friction with the CPC.. In his view, arming the masses with scientific theory and helping readers understand the nature of the war and the future of the revolution from a theoretical height was an important mission of the Party’s news and propaganda. Under this policy, the *Mass* weekly strengthened its propagation and interpretation of Marxism-Leninism through various means, such as translating Marxist-Leninist classic works, setting up a column on “Research Materials on the History of the CPSU(B),” and publishing articles on the anniversaries of the births of Marxist-Leninist classic writers, playing an important role in the spread of Marxism in the Kuomintang-controlled areas during the War of Resistance. At the same time, the journal adhered to the fine style of study of integrating theory with practice, closely combining the study of Marxist theory with the analysis of the actual situation of the War of Resistance. For example, it published articles by Xu Dixin such as “How to Study Political Economy,” “On China’s Private Capital,” “The Characteristics of China’s Industrial Capital,” and “China’s Economic Path,” which used Marxist political economy principles to analyze China’s economic problems, especially providing a meticulous analysis of the moribund economic system in the Kuomintang-controlled areas, helping people to see clearly from a theoretical perspective “who is sucking blood.”

首先，要坚定不移地宣传马克思列宁主义。早在1922年3月，24岁的周恩来就坚定指出：“我认的主义一定是不变了，并且很坚决地要为他宣传奔走。”[1]积极宣传马克思列宁主义也是周恩来对新闻宣传工作的一贯要求。抗战时期，作为我们党在国统区的思想明灯，《新华日报》和《群众》周刊密切配合，同时又各有侧重。周恩来在《群众》周刊创刊之初就明确指出，“《群众》的编辑方针，同《新华日报》毫无二致，差别是在于《群众》是党刊，是理论性的刊物，它要更多地从马克思列宁主义出发，要更多地从理论的角度出发，帮助广大读者理解抗日战争的正义性，理解抗日战争胜利的必然性”[2]。在他看来，用科学的理论武装群众，帮助读者从理论的高度理解战争性质和革命前途，是党的新闻宣传的重要使命。在这一方针的指导下，《群众》周刊通过翻译马列主义经典著作、设置“联共（布）党史研究资料”专栏、抓好马列主义经典作家诞辰纪念节点刊文等多种方式，加强对马克思列宁主义的宣传阐释，对抗战时期国统区马克思主义的传播发挥了重要作用。同时，该刊坚持理论联系实际的优良学风，把研究马克思主义理论同分析抗战实际紧密结合起来。如刊载许涤新的《怎样研究政治经济学》《论中国的私人资本》《中国产业资本的特质》《中国经济的道路》等文章，运用马克思主义政治经济学原理剖析中国经济问题，特别是对国统区病入膏肓的经济体制进行了抽丝剥茧般的分析，帮助人们从理论上彻底看清“谁在吸血”。

Second, it is necessary to propagate the Party’s line, principles, and policies with a clear banner. In Zhou Enlai’s view, “political opinions” were the concentrated embodiment of the Party’s will. He explicitly stated that news must “fully play the role of the Party’s propaganda and agitation tool”[3]3 The July 7th Incident (1937) at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing marked the beginning of the full-scale outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. and must unconditionally promote the Party’s propositions. Zhou Enlai’s inscriptions for many newspapers and periodicals all reflected this. For example, his inscription for the inaugural issue of *Xinhua Daily* read: “Persist in protracted resistance and strive for final victory.” His inscription for the May Day special issue of *Xinhua Daily* read: “The entire Chinese working class, in commemorating May Day during the War of Resistance, actually has a twofold significance: on the one hand, the entire Chinese working class should strive for national liberation in order to seek its own liberation; on the other hand, it should unite with the working class of the whole world to resist the aggression of the brutal Japanese and safeguard world peace.” His inscription for *National Salvation Daily* read: “Consolidate and expand the national salvation front, mobilize tens of millions of the masses, and drive the Japanese bandits out of China!” His inscription for the *Eighth Route Army Military and Political Magazine* commemorating the second anniversary of July 7 read: “Persist in resistance to the end, oppose halfway compromise! Persist in the united front, oppose stirring up internal strife! Launch an all-out war, oppose monopolistic suppression!” And on the occasion of the founding of New China, his inscription commemorating the third anniversary of the founding of *Nanyang Daily* read: “Strive to propagate the Common Programme of the New Democracy, strive to protect the legitimate rights and interests of overseas Chinese.”[4]4 The Southern Anhui Incident (January 1941) was a major military clash in which Kuomintang forces attacked the Communist-led New Fourth Army, killing or capturing thousands of its soldiers and triggering a severe political crisis. These concise inscriptions pointed out the direction of advance for the newspapers and periodicals. Whether propagating the Party’s policy of united resistance or propagating the founding programme of New China, they were all proper meanings and inevitable requirements for spreading the Party’s voice. The Party press must bear the Party’s surname; this is the fundamental attribute on which its survival and development depend.

其次，要旗帜鲜明地宣传党的路线方针政策。在周恩来看来，“政治意见”就是党的意志的集中体现，他明确提出，新闻要“充分发挥党的宣传鼓动工具的作用”[3]，必须无条件地宣扬党的主张。周恩来为多家报刊的题词内容都体现了这一点。例如，他为《新华日报》创刊题词：“坚持长期抗战，争取最后胜利。”为《新华日报》“五一”纪念专刊题词：“全中国工人阶级，在抗战中来纪念五一，实具有两方面的意义：一方面，全中国工人阶级应努力于民族解放，以谋自身的解放；另一方面，应联合全世界工人阶级反抗暴日的侵略，以保障世界和平。”为《救亡日报》题词：“巩固和扩大救亡阵线，动员起千万万的群众，赶走日本强盗出中国！”为《八路军军政杂志》纪念“七七”两周年题词：“坚持抗战到底，反对中途妥协！坚持统一战线，反对挑动内讧！发动全面战争，反对包办压制！”以及在新中国成立之际为纪念《南侨日报》创刊3周年题词：“为宣扬新民主主义的共同纲领而奋斗，为保护国外华侨的正当权益而奋斗。”[4]这些言简意赅的题词，指明了报刊的前进方向。不论是宣扬党的团结抗战政策，还是宣扬新中国的建国纲领，都是传播党的声音的应有之义和必然要求。党报必须姓党，这是其赖以生存和发展的根本属性。

Zhou Enlai not only clarified the main content of propaganda but also emphasized that “the Party’s policies must be made public to the masses in a timely manner”; only then “can they gain the understanding and support of the masses and become a force.”[5]5 The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea (1950–1953) was China’s military intervention in the Korean War, officially framed as a defensive war against U.S. imperialism. To this end, he made it the basic duty of the Party’s news and propaganda work to make the Party’s principles and policies known to the public quickly and accurately at critical moments. Whenever there was a historical turning point or a major unexpected incident, he always guided the Party press to publish statements or editorials at the first opportunity, stating the Party’s attitude so that the masses would know what was what. For example, on the day before the fall of Wuhan in October 1938, Zhou Enlai dictated the last editorial for the Hankou edition of *Xinhua Daily*, solemnly declaring: We are only temporarily leaving Wuhan; we will definitely return, and Wuhan will eventually return to the hands of the Chinese people.[1]1 Zhou Enlai, inscription for Wang Xijun of the Chinese Vocational Education Society, September 1940. At this critical juncture, this kind of expression turned abstract strategic principles into visible and understandable promises, preventing the people from losing confidence in the country’s future because of a temporary retreat. When Wang Jingwei betrayed the country and defected to the enemy, Zhou Enlai led the Party press and periodicals to focus on combining the “condemnation of Wang” with strengthening the whole nation’s confidence in the War of Resistance. On January 2, 1939, he gave an interview to a Reuters correspondent, explaining that Wang’s actions could neither destroy China’s internal unity nor damage China’s resistance strength.[2]2 The Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifth Kuomintang Central Executive Committee (January 1939) adopted a policy of “limited resistance” against Japan and intensified its anti-communist activities, leading to increased military and political friction with the CPC. On the same day, *Xinhua Daily* published an editorial, “Wang Jingwei Betrays the Country,” criticizing the defeatist rhetoric of Wang Jingwei and his ilk who had lost confidence in the future of the War of Resistance, and through public opinion, showed the masses the Party’s firm determination to “resist to the end.” In 1946, when the Kuomintang forcibly convened a bogus National Assembly, Zhou Enlai immediately held a press conference in Nanjing, issued a “Solemn Statement on the Kuomintang’s Convening of the ‘National Assembly’,” which was published in *Xinhua Daily*, expressing the Chinese Communist Party’s attitude of “firmly refusing to recognize” it and drawing a clear political line. The purpose of this series of vocal actions was to clearly explain the Party’s position and clarify right from wrong amidst the cacophony of voices. After the founding of New China, Zhou Enlai still attached great importance to conveying the Party’s policies and propositions through news propaganda. In April 1954, Zhou Enlai led a delegation to participate in the Geneva Conference to discuss the peaceful resolution of the Korean issue and the restoration of peace in Indochina. At a time when the United States was openly advocating against a ceasefire, planning to expand the war, and mobilizing public opinion to clamour, Zhou Enlai instructed *People’s Daily* to add four sentences to an editorial: “We do not invade others, and we resolutely oppose any act of invasion by anyone; we do not threaten others, and we oppose any act of threat by anyone; we do not interfere in the internal affairs of others, and we oppose anyone interfering in the internal affairs of anyone; we advocate peace and oppose war, but if others launch any armed aggression against us, we will by no means turn a blind eye to it!”[3]3 The July 7th Incident (1937) at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing marked the beginning of the full-scale outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. These four sentences carried weight; they were both a declaration of position and a setting of policy tone, proclaiming to the world the independent and peaceful foreign policy line of New China.

周恩来不仅明确了宣传的主要内容，还强调，“党的政策必须适时地向群众公开”，如此，“才能得到群众的了解和拥护而成为力量”。[5]为此，他把在关键时刻使党的方针政策迅速、准确地公之于众，作为党的新闻宣传工作的基本职责，每逢历史转折或重大突发事件，总是第一时间指导党报发表声明或社论，表明党的态度，让群众心里有数。比如，1938年10月武汉沦陷的前一天，周恩来为《新华日报》汉口版口授最后一篇社论，郑重宣布：我们只是暂时离开武汉，我们一定要回来的，武汉终究要回到中国人民手中。[1]在紧急关头，这种表态把抽象的战略方针变成了看得见、听得懂的承诺，让人民不因为一时的撤退而对国家前途失去信心。汪精卫叛国投敌时，周恩来领导党报党刊注重把“讨汪”与坚定全民抗战信心结合起来。1939年1月2日，他对路透社记者发表谈话，说明汪之行动既不能破坏中国内部团结，也不能损害中国抗战力量。[2]同日，《新华日报》发表社论《汪精卫叛国》，批判了汪精卫之流对抗战前途丧失信心的亡国论调，通过舆论向民众表明党“抗战到底”的坚定决心。1946年国民党强行召开伪国大时，周恩来立即在南京举行记者招待会，发表《对国民党召开“国大”的严正声明》，并刊载于《新华日报》上，向各界表明了中国共产党“坚决不承认”的抵制态度，划清了政治界限。这一系列发声行动，目的就是在众声喧哗中，把党的立场讲清楚，把是非曲直讲明白。新中国成立后，周恩来依旧高度重视通过新闻宣传传达党的政策主张。1954年4月，周恩来率代表团参加日内瓦会议，讨论和平解决朝鲜问题和恢复印度支那和平问题。在美国公然宣传反对停战，策划扩大战争，动员舆论叫嚣的情况下，周恩来嘱咐《人民日报》在一篇社论中加进四句话：“我们不侵略别人，也坚决反对任何人的侵略行为；我们不威胁别人，也反对任何人的威胁行为；我们不干涉别人内政，也反对别人干涉任何人的内政；我们主张和平，反对战争，但别人对我们的任何武装侵略，我们决不会置之不理！”[3]这四句话掷地有声，既是立场的宣示，更是政策的定调，向世界宣示了新中国独立自主的和平外交路线。

(2) Solving “How to Propagate”: United Front Thinking, Expressive Art, and Strategic Proportion

（二）解决“如何传播”：统战思维、表达艺术与策略分寸

Propaganda must consider not only motives but also effects. To break through blockades and achieve the goal of “widely propagating” the Party’s political opinions, special attention must be paid to the methods and means of propaganda. To this end, Zhou Enlai constructed a set of three-dimensional communication strategies. First, one must find ways to expand propaganda channels and scope so that the Party’s voice can be heard by more people. During the War of Resistance, limited by the Kuomintang’s news blockade, Zhou Enlai particularly emphasized that Communists should “submit manuscripts to various centrist newspapers” and “get close to various newspapers; even the editors of stubborn newspapers are not all stubborn.”[4]4 The Southern Anhui Incident (January 1941) was a major military clash in which Kuomintang forces attacked the Communist-led New Fourth Army, killing or capturing thousands of its soldiers and triggering a severe political crisis. Zhou Enlai knew well that relying solely on one or two of our own newspapers would make it very difficult to break through the Kuomintang’s tight blockade. By submitting manuscripts to centrist newspapers, they were actually using legitimate public platforms to send the Party’s voice into the enemy’s public opinion positions, allowing the Party’s propositions to spread further and wider. During the War of Liberation, the exorbitant taxes and levies of the Kuomintang government led to soaring prices, and the wave of resistance among the people in the Kuomintang-controlled areas surged. To strengthen our Party’s propaganda work and add fuel to the fire of the Kuomintang’s deteriorating relations with the masses, in May 1947, Zhou Enlai, in the “Instructions on the Work Policy and Struggle Strategy in the Chiang-Controlled Areas” drafted for the Central Committee of the CPC, pointed out that “the Party’s propaganda work should focus on using people with positions and status among the masses to criticize current politics and increase discontent through public publications, newspapers, and gatherings,”[5]5 The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea (1950–1953) was China’s military intervention in the Korean War, officially framed as a defensive war against U.S. imperialism. thereby accelerating the “total collapse”[6]6 The four big families: Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung, and Chen Lifu and Chen Guofu, the leading bureaucratic-capitalist cliques that dominated the Kuomintang regime. of Kuomintang rule through legal struggle. Second, one must use clever techniques to enhance communication effectiveness. Zhou Enlai opposed dry preaching; he repeatedly emphasized that news publications “must, on the one hand, pay attention to standing firm, and on the other hand, be lively, clever, and not rigid,”[7]7 Hundred Days’ Reform: A 1898 reform movement led by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, supported by Emperor Guangxu, which was crushed by the Empress Dowager Cixi. “articles must be written concisely and vividly to attract readers,”[8]8 February 7th General Strike: A 1923 strike of Beijing-Hankou railway workers, violently suppressed by the warlord Wu Peifu, marking a key event in the early Chinese labor movement. and “in written propaganda, strive to be concrete, popular, and vivid.”[9]9 Political Consultative Conference: The 1946 Chongqing Political Consultative Conference, a multiparty meeting that produced agreements on a coalition government and a draft constitution, which the Kuomintang soon violated. Zhou Enlai also paid attention to the impact of specific wording on propaganda effectiveness. In May 1952, regarding propaganda and reporting work during the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, Zhou Enlai pointed out in a telegram to Li Kenong and Qiao Guanhua that “in our speeches and news articles, there are too many provocative words and phrases, such as ‘bandits,’ ‘imperialism,’ ‘devils,’ ‘fascists,’ etc., making it difficult for foreign newspapers and broadcasts to adopt them,” and that we should “focus on briefly and concisely exposing facts, stating reasons, exposing and attacking the enemy’s weaknesses, and avoiding or minimizing unnecessary provocative statements”; “the domestic side will also adopt the same approach.”[1]1 Zhou Enlai, inscription for Wang Xijun of the Chinese Vocational Education Society, September 1940. This communication strategy not only allowed the Party’s political opinions to “be spread out” but also enabled people of different strata to “listen in.” Third, one must adhere to the principle of “keeping internal and external affairs separate” and firmly grasp the political bottom line of public opinion communication. The “wide propagation” emphasized by Zhou Enlai had principles and bottom lines. He explicitly stated: “The publication of all work plans and work content must be detailed or brief depending on their scope and timeliness”[2]2 The Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifth Kuomintang Central Executive Committee (January 1939) adopted a policy of “limited resistance” against Japan and intensified its anti-communist activities, leading to increased military and political friction with the CPC. and emphasized that propaganda must adhere to the “principle of not leaking secrets.”[3]3 The July 7th Incident (1937) at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing marked the beginning of the full-scale outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. He strictly distinguished between secret channels and public channels, requiring that “the Party’s broadcast speeches and news of victories in the liberated areas be secretly and widely disseminated through extremely reliable connections.”[4]4 The Southern Anhui Incident (January 1941) was a major military clash in which Kuomintang forces attacked the Communist-led New Fourth Army, killing or capturing thousands of its soldiers and triggering a severe political crisis. This strict discipline ensured that the Party’s propaganda work during the White Terror could both extensively mobilize the masses and not threaten organizational security.

宣传既要讲动机，更要讲效果。要突破封锁，实现把党的政治意见“广为传播”的目的，需特别注意宣传的方式方法。为此，周恩来构建了一套立体化的传播策略。其一，要想方设法扩大宣传渠道和范围，使党的声音被更多人听到。抗战时期，受限于国民党的新闻封锁，周恩来特别强调，共产党人要“投寄稿件到各中间性报纸去”，要“接近各种报纸，即使是顽固派的报纸，他们的编辑也不都是顽固的”。[4]周恩来深知，如果光靠我们自己的一两张报纸，很难冲破国民党严密的封锁圈。通过给中间报刊投稿，实际上就是利用合法的公开平台，把党的声音送进敌人的舆论阵地里去，让党的主张传得更远、更广。解放战争时期，国民党政府的横征暴敛导致物价飞涨，国统区民众的反抗浪潮风起云涌。为了加强我们党的宣传工作，也给国民党党群关系再“添一把火”，1947年5月，周恩来在为中共中央起草的《关于在蒋管区工作方针和斗争策略的指示》中指出，要“将党的宣传工作，侧重于以群众中有职业有地位人物，利用公开刊物、报纸、集会，批评时政，增强不满”[5]，从而在合法斗争中加速国民党统治的“总崩溃”[6]。其二，要在提升传播效果上下巧功夫。周恩来反对枯燥的说教，他多次强调，新闻报刊“一方面要注意站稳立场，另方面也要活泼、巧妙，不能呆板”[7]，“稿子要写得精简生动，才有人看”[8]，“文字宣传上，要力求具体、通俗和生动”[9]。周恩来还注意具体用语对宣传效果的影响。1952年5月，就抗美援朝战争期间的宣传报道工作，周恩来在致李克农、乔冠华的电报中指出，“在我们的发言和新闻稿件中所用刺激性的词句，如‘匪类’、‘帝国主义’、‘恶魔’、‘法西斯’等甚多，以致国外报刊和广播不易采用”，应“注重简短扼要地揭发事实，申述理由，暴露和攻击敌人弱点，避免或少用不必要的刺激性语句”，“国内方面亦将采取同样的方针”。[1]这种传播策略，不仅让党的政治意见“传得出去”，更让不同阶层的人“听得进去”。其三，要坚守“内外有别”，把牢舆论传播的政治底线。周恩来所强调的“广为传播”是有原则、有底线的。他明确提出：“一切工作计划和工作内容的发表必须视其范围和时间性而定其详略”[2]，强调宣传要坚守“不泄密原则”[3]。他将秘密渠道与公开渠道严格区分，要求“将党的广播言论、解放区胜利消息，经过极可靠关系，辗转秘密散布”[4]。这种严密的纪律性，确保了白色恐怖下党的宣传工作既能广泛发动群众，又不会对组织安全造成威胁。

What Zhou Enlai understood by “wide dissemination” was by no means merely broad coverage in terms of reach, but rather the ability to truly touch people’s hearts, to be understood and accepted by them, and ultimately to be transformed into ideological identification and action-oriented followership. This placed higher demands on the Party’s news workers: they must not only possess a firm political stance and solid theoretical grounding, but also superb professional skills and propaganda artistry, adeptly embedding profound political and ideological content within the vividness and readability of reporting, truly achieving the effect of “spring breeze transforming rain, moistening things silently.” [16]16 “Spring breeze transforming rain, moistening things silently” (春风化雨，润物无声) is a Chinese idiom derived from Du Fu’s poem “Delighting in Rain on a Spring Night,” used here to describe the subtle, gradual, and profound influence of education and propaganda.

周恩来所理解的“广为传播”，绝非仅仅是传播范围上的广泛覆盖，更是指能够真正触及人们内心，被人们所理解接受，并最终转化为思想上的认同和行动上的追随。这就对党的新闻工作者提出了更高的要求：不仅要具备坚定的政治立场和扎实的理论功底，还要具备高超的业务能力和宣传艺术，善于将深刻的政治性、思想性巧妙地蕴含于报道的生动性、可读性之中，真正做到春风化雨、润物无声。

III. “A Throat for the People, a Guide for the People”: The Unity of Party Spirit and People-Centeredness in News and Propaganda

三、“为人民喉舌，为人民向导”：新闻宣传的党性与人民性的统一

For whom is a newspaper run? This is the fundamental question determining success or failure in running a newspaper. In early 1947, the gunfire of the full-scale civil war had already shattered the illusion of peace, and the *Xinhua Daily*, located in the Kuomintang-controlled areas, faced the perilous situation of imminent closure. Under this test of survival, Zhou Enlai inscribed a message for the ninth anniversary of the founding of the *Xinhua Daily*: “Be a throat for the people, a guide for the people; continue to strive, remain unyielding, to welcome the new high tide of national and democratic revolution.” [17]17 The *Xinhua Daily* was the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party in the Kuomintang-controlled areas during the War of Resistance Against Japan and the subsequent civil war, operating from 1938 to 1947. Zhou Enlai’s proposal of “a throat for the people, a guide for the people” was not only an encouragement to the comrades of the *Xinhua Daily* to persist in struggle under perilous conditions, but also a profound answer to the fundamental questions of news and propaganda work: “for whom, relying on whom, and who am I.” This was fundamentally different from the Kuomintang’s practice of “fearing the masses,” blocking information, fabricating lies, and keeping the people in the dark.

办报为了谁？这是决定办报成败的根本问题。1947年初，全面内战的炮火已彻底粉碎了和平的幻象，身处国统区的《新华日报》面临着即将被查封的险恶境地。在生死存亡的考验下，周恩来为《新华日报》创刊9周年题词：“为人民喉舌，为人民向导，继续努力，坚持不屈，来迎接民族民主的新高潮。”[5]周恩来提出的“为人民喉舌，为人民向导”，不仅是对《新华日报》同仁在险恶环境中坚持斗争的勉励，更深刻回答了新闻宣传工作“为了谁、依靠谁、我是谁”的根本问题。这与国民党因“怕群众”而封锁消息、编造谎言，把人民蒙在鼓里的做法有着根本不同。

(I) The Meaning of “Throat”: Going Deep into the Lives of the Masses and Sincerely Accepting Supervision

（一）“喉舌”之意：深入群众生活与诚恳接受监督

The so-called “throat for the people” emphasizes “coming from the masses,” highlighting reliance on the masses and reflecting popular sentiment, so that the Party’s propaganda work truly becomes a window for the people to express their will and pour out their hearts.

所谓“为人民喉舌”，侧重于“从群众中来”，强调依靠群众、反映民心，使党的宣传工作真正成为人民表达意愿、吐露心声的窗口。

First, one must go deep among the masses and observe the conditions of the people. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, Lu Yi, head of the interview department of the *Xinhua Daily*, once came to Zhou Enlai and said: “The current situation is dull, and there are few news leads. Some reports are dry and boring, and readers don’t want to read them either.” Zhou Enlai analyzed this, saying: “This is because you have not gone deep among the masses and do not understand the readers’ wishes and demands.” He also pointed out: “Apart from necessary interviews with some upper-level figures, you can focus on the masses.” “Go sit in a teahouse, listen to what the masses are talking about and thinking about.” [18]18 Lu Yi (1911–1997) was a prominent journalist and a member of the CPC. These guiding opinions promoted a transformation in the work style of the *Xinhua Daily*’s interview department, enabling the content subsequently published to truly reflect the actual conditions and wishes of the masses from all social strata.

首先，必须深入群众，体察民情。抗战时期，《新华日报》采访部主任陆诒有一次找周恩来说：“最近时局沉闷，新闻线索少。有的报道枯燥乏味，读者也不要看。”周恩来对此分析道：“这是因为你没有深入群众，不了解读者的愿望和要求。”同时指出：“除了必要地采访一些上层活动外，可以着眼于群众。”“到茶馆里去坐坐，听听群众在谈些什么，想些什么。”[6]这些指导意见推动了《新华日报》采访工作作风的转变，使后续刊发的内容真正反映了社会各阶层群众的真实状况和愿望要求。

Second, one must be open-minded and accept supervision. Zhou Enlai deeply recognized that supervision by the masses is an antiseptic to maintain the purity and combat effectiveness of the Party newspaper. During the Yan’an Rectification Movement in 1942, [19]19 The Yan’an Rectification Movement (1942–1945) was a Party-wide campaign to study Marxist-Leninist texts, criticize subjectivism, sectarianism, and stereotypical Party writing, and establish Mao Zedong Thought as the guiding ideology of the CPC. Mao Zedong telegraphed Zhou Enlai, demanding that the *Xinhua Daily* “strengthen Party spirit and reflect the masses.” [20]20 Mao Zedong (1893–1976) was the founding leader of the People’s Republic of China and chairman of the CPC. Under Zhou Enlai’s direct leadership, the newspaper published an editorial, “A Respectful Notice to Our Readers – Please Offer Us Comprehensive Criticism,” comparing the relationship between the newspaper and its readers to “fish and water, inseparable,” and emphasizing that without criticism, “it is like a pot of fragrant flowers, lacking the irrigation of clear water, and will eventually wither.” [21]21 The “fish and water” metaphor is a standard CPC trope for the relationship between the Party and the people. In the same year, the “Unity” supplement of the *Xinhua Daily* was launched. In its inaugural essay, “The Purpose of ‘Unity’,” Zhou Enlai pointed out: “We are confident” that the *Xinhua Daily*, after nearly five years of struggle, “has fulfilled its task as the bugle for united resistance and the throat of the people’s masses under the Party’s policy,” but “it goes without saying” that “there are also many shortcomings.” We are establishing the “Unity” supplement to “engage in our own self-reflection.” [22]22 The “Unity” supplement (《“团结”副刊》) was a regular feature of the *Xinhua Daily*. On January 11, 1947, on the ninth anniversary of the founding of the *Xinhua Daily*, the editorial department published an article, “Review and Encouragement – A Summary of Readers’ Opinions,” which meticulously compiled various suggestions from readers over a long period for improving the *Xinhua Daily*, covering editorial policy, commentary, news layout, correspondence, supplements, and other aspects. It extensively excerpted the original text of readers’ letters and sincerely stated at the end: “We must study these opinions more deeply, review our shortcomings, so that the newspaper can gradually improve in all aspects, to meet the earnest expectations of our readers.” [23]23 The editorial department of the *Xinhua Daily*. Zhou Enlai deeply understood that only by truly letting the masses speak and letting the masses supervise can a newspaper truly represent the people, and only then will everyone sincerely be convinced.

其次，必须虚怀若谷，接受监督。周恩来深刻认识到，群众监督是保持党报纯洁性和战斗力的防腐剂。1942年延安整风期间，毛泽东致电周恩来要求《新华日报》“增强党性与反映群众”[7]。在周恩来的直接领导下，该报发表社论《敬告本报读者——请予本报以全面的批评》，把报纸与读者的关系比作“鱼水之不可或离”，强调若无批评，“就像一盆芬芳的鲜花，缺少了清水的灌溉，终于会枯竭的”。[1]同年，《新华日报》“团结”副刊创刊，周恩来在发刊词《“团结”的旨趣》中指出：“我们自信”，经过近5年奋斗的《新华日报》“在党的方针下，尽了他为团结抗战的号角为人民大众的喉舌的任务的”，“但毋庸讳言的”，也“存在许多缺点”，我们筹设“团结”副刊，是为“做我们自己的反省功夫”。[2]1947年1月11日，《新华日报》创刊9周年之际，以编辑部名义发表文章《检讨和勉励——读者意见总结》，从编辑方针、言论、新闻版面、通讯、副刊等多个方面，细致整理了长期以来读者对改进《新华日报》提出的各类建议，大量摘录了读者来信原文，并在文末诚恳地表示，“要更深入地来研究这些意见，检讨我们的缺点，使本报能逐渐在各方面都有改进，以符读者诸君的殷切期望”。[3]周恩来深刻认识到，只有真正让群众说话，让群众监督，报纸才能真正代表人民，大家才会真心信服。

(II) The Responsibility of “Guide”: The Organic Unity of Theoretical Guidance and Differentiated Dissemination

（二）“向导”之责：理论指引与分类传播的有机统一

The so-called “guide for the people” emphasizes “going to the masses,” highlighting the education of the masses and guidance of public opinion, pointing out the direction of struggle for the people.

所谓“为人民向导”，侧重于“到群众中去”，强调教育群众、引导舆论，为人民指明奋斗方向。

First, importance is attached to using scientific theory to dispel fog and guide the course. News and public opinion must not only reflect the wishes and demands of the people’s masses, but also use the Marxist stance, viewpoint, and method, and the Party’s scientific theories and correct policies, to educate and guide the masses. Zhou Enlai’s vigorous promotion and dissemination of *On Protracted War* is a classic practice embodying this “guide” function. In May 1938, Mao Zedong published *On Protracted War*, systematically elucidating the Party’s general strategy of protracted war against Japan. Zhou Enlai deeply understood the great significance of publicizing *On Protracted War*. Shortly after *On Protracted War* was published, Zhou Enlai introduced its basic spirit to Bai Chongxi, a senior Kuomintang general. Bai Chongxi greatly admired it, considering it “the highest strategic policy for defeating the enemy,” and summarized the spirit of *On Protracted War* as “accumulating small victories into big victories, trading space for time.” After obtaining Zhou Enlai’s consent, this was issued by the Military Affairs Commission as the guiding strategy for the entire country during the War of Resistance Against Japan. [24]24 Bai Chongxi (1893–1966) was a senior Kuomintang military commander and a leading figure in the Guangxi clique. In February 1939, while in Guilin discussing work with Li Kenong, head of the Eighth Route Army Office, Zhou Enlai specifically emphasized the need to pay attention to publicizing the ideas of *On Protracted War*. [25]25 Li Kenong (1899–1962) was a senior CPC intelligence official and later a general in the People’s Liberation Army. He also sent *On Protracted War* to Hong Kong, entrusting Soong Ching-ling to find someone to translate it into English for overseas distribution. In particular, from October 7 to 9, 1938, Zhou Enlai published a long article in the *Xinhua Daily* in the form of consecutive editorials, titled “On the Current Situation of the War of Resistance.” The article began by pointing out that China “can only achieve final victory in the War of National Liberation for the Chinese nation by persisting in a protracted war.” On the basis of publicizing the scientific thesis of *On Protracted War* and the correct strategy for the War of Resistance, Zhou Enlai, combining the situation at the time when Wuhan was in imminent danger, some pessimists were again doubting the prospects of the War of Resistance, and a portion of opportunists were trying to salvage the crisis through a desperate gamble, calmly analyzed and pointed out: “The battle to defend Wuhan, viewed from the overall situation of the War of Resistance, is only the key to whether the first phase can transition to the second phase, and by no means the key to whether a protracted war can continue.” [26]26 The Battle of Wuhan (June–October 1938) was a major military engagement during the War of Resistance Against Japan. After this article was published, it was also printed as a pamphlet and widely distributed, enabling many people to see the future clearly from their confusion and strengthen their belief in the inevitable victory of the War of Resistance. The publication and dissemination of *On Protracted War*, along with Zhou Enlai’s elaboration in light of the War of Resistance situation, powerfully refuted the erroneous views of “quick victory” and “national subjugation” that were widespread at the time, answering questions that people were most concerned about but could not see clearly for a while. This practice vividly illustrates the great use of news and propaganda: it is not only for transmitting messages, but more importantly, at critical moments, to light a lamp so that the people can see clearly where to go.

首先，重视以科学理论驱散迷雾、指引航向。新闻舆论不仅要反映人民群众的愿望和要求，更要运用马克思主义的立场、观点和方法，运用党的科学理论和正确政策，去教育群众、引导群众。周恩来对《论持久战》的大力推介与宣传，就是体现这一“向导”作用的经典实践。1938年5月，毛泽东发表《论持久战》，系统阐明了党的抗日持久战战略总方针。周恩来深知，宣传《论持久战》意义重大。《论持久战》刚发表，周恩来就把它的基本精神向国民党高级将领白崇禧作了介绍，白崇禧深为赞赏，认为“这是克敌制胜的最高战略方针”，并把《论持久战》的精神归纳成“积小胜为大胜，以空间换时间”，在取得周恩来同意后，由军事委员会通令全国，作为抗日战争中的战略指导思想。[4]1939年2月，周恩来在桂林同八路军办事处负责人李克农等谈工作时，专门强调要注意宣传《论持久战》的思想。[5]他还将《论持久战》寄到香港，委托宋庆龄找人将其翻译成英文，以便在海外发行。特别是1938年10月7日至9日，周恩来在《新华日报》以连日社论形式发表长篇文章《论目前抗战形势》，文章开篇即指出：中国“只有坚持长期抗战，才能争取中华民族解放战争的最后胜利”。在宣传《论持久战》的科学论断和正确抗战战略的基础上，周恩来结合当时武汉告急，一些悲观论者又怀疑抗战前途，而一部分侥幸论者想从孤注一掷中挽救这个危机的情势，冷静分析指出：“保卫武汉的战斗，从整个抗战的形势看来，它只是第一阶段能否即过渡到第二阶段的关键，而决不是能否继续长期抗战的关键。”[6]这篇文章发表后，还印成小册子大量发行，使许多人从惶惑中看清前途，坚定了抗战必胜的信念。《论持久战》的发表与传播，以及周恩来结合抗战形势的阐发，有力驳斥了当时广为流传的“速胜论”“亡国论”错误观点，回答了人们最关心而一时又看不清楚的问题。这一实践生动说明了新闻宣传的大用途：它不光是用来传递消息的，更要在紧要关头点亮一盏明灯，让人民看清该往哪儿走。

Second, he emphasized running newspapers and journals according to the characteristics of different readerships to enhance the effectiveness of guidance. Zhou Enlai opposed “stereotyped writing” and advocated differentiated guidance based on the characteristics of different reader groups. After the founding of the *National Salvation Daily*, Zhou Enlai consistently followed the development of this newspaper, which bore the character of a united front. In April 1943, Xia Yan, the editor-in-chief of the *National Salvation Daily*, reported to Zhou Enlai on his work. After Zhou Enlai inquired in detail about the newspaper’s situation, its circulation, and feedback from various quarters, he said: if your newspaper is “run exactly like the *Xinhua Daily*, some people will not dare to read it. The general policy is to propagate resistance against Japan, unity, and progress, but you must develop a unique style and produce a newspaper that people from the left, the center, and the right all want to read and enjoy reading.”[27]27 Zhou Enlai’s conversation with Xia Yan, April 1943. The *National Salvation Daily* was a united-front newspaper founded in Shanghai in August 1937. The *National Salvation Daily* earnestly implemented Zhou Enlai’s instructions, enabling the newspaper to exert a significant influence across broad social strata. In November 1958, when discussing newspaper work with Qi Feng, Secretary of the CPC Hong Kong-Macao Work Committee, he again pointed out that if the *Ta Kung Pao* and the *Wen Wei Po* both used Xinhua News Agency dispatches, it would be difficult for them to compete with other Hong Kong newspapers. The supplements of newspapers should have ideological content. The Hong Kong news section should not only report content related to the struggle against the enemy but also appropriately increase some content about the lives of the masses, without becoming detached from the intermediate masses. Writing commentaries should also suit the level of the local masses; the *People’s Daily* editorials need not all be published in Hong Kong.[28]28 Zhou Enlai’s conversation with Qi Feng, November 1958. The differentiation of published content was also reflected in the overall consideration given when writing news. In April 1949, Zhou Enlai stated in a conversation with Xinhua News Agency that writing news and commentaries should take all aspects into account, and at that time, special attention should be paid to the democratic parties and personages whom you were not familiar with but whose status in domestic political life was becoming increasingly important. Your reporting should fully embody the Party’s united front policy and fully respect all democratic parties and personages.[29]29 Zhou Enlai’s conversation with Xinhua News Agency, April 1949. Of course, in Zhou Enlai’s view, “differentiation” was the means, while “integration” was the goal. Categorized guidance is like a “bridge to cross the river”; one cannot just build the bridge and forget to cross the river. Only by using language that different groups can understand to explain the same truth can the Party’s propositions enter every household, truly play a guiding role, and make everyone think in the same direction and exert their strength in unison.

其次，强调根据不同读者特点办报办刊，提升引导实效。周恩来反对“千篇一律”，主张根据不同读者群体的特点进行差异化引导。《救亡日报》创刊后，周恩来一直关注着这份带有统一战线性质的报纸的发展。1943年4月，《救亡日报》总编辑夏衍向周恩来汇报工作，周恩来详细询问了报社情况、报纸销路以及各方面对报纸的反映后说道，你们的报纸如果“办成像《新华日报》一样，有些人就不敢看了。总的方针是宣传抗日、团结、进步，但要办出独特的风格来，办出一份左、中、右三方面的人都要看、都喜欢看的报纸”[1]。《救亡日报》认真贯彻周恩来的指示，使该报在广泛的社会阶层中产生了很大影响。1958年11月，在同中共港澳工委秘书长祁峰谈办报问题时，他再一次指出，《大公报》《文汇报》如果都用新华社电稿，是很难与别的港报竞争的。报纸的副刊要有思想性。港闻版不仅要报道对敌斗争的内容，还应当适当增加一些群众生活内容，不要脱离中间群众。写评论也要适合当地群众的水平，《人民日报》社论在香港不一定都登载。[2]刊载内容的差异化，还表现在新闻撰写时的统筹兼顾。1949年4月，周恩来在对新华社的谈话中指出，写新闻、评论要照顾各个方面，当前特别要照顾好你们不熟悉的，但在国内政治生活中地位越来越重要的各民主党派、民主人士。你们的报道要充分体现党的统一战线政策，要充分尊重各民主党派、民主人士。[3]当然，在周恩来看来，“分”是手段，“合”才是目的。分类指导就像是“过河的桥”，不能光修桥却忘了过河。只有用不同群体听得懂的语言去讲同一个道理，才能让党的主张走进千家万户，真正发挥引导作用，让大家心往一处想，劲往一处使。

The two role orientations of “the people’s mouthpiece” and “the people’s guide” are dialectically unified and mutually reinforcing. If separated from the people’s character, the so-called “mouthpiece” could become alienated into a tool for a minority or a few interest groups to voice their opinions, or even a tool to suppress public opinion; the so-called “guide” could also lose its direction because it is divorced from the actual needs and fundamental interests of the masses, or even lead the people astray. Only by unswervingly adhering to the unity of Party spirit and the people’s character can news and propaganda work truly play the proper role of “mouthpiece” and “guide” for the Party, forever maintaining its vitality and vigor.

“人民喉舌”与“人民向导”这两个角色定位，是辩证统一、相辅相成的。如果离开了人民性，所谓“喉舌”就可能异化成为少数人、少数利益集团发声的工具，甚至成为压制民意的工具；所谓“向导”也可能因为脱离人民群众的实际需求和根本利益而迷失方向，甚至将人民引向歧途。只有始终不渝地坚持把党性与人民性统一起来，新闻宣传工作才能真正为党发挥好“喉舌”与“向导”的应有作用，永葆其生机与活力。

IV. “Sharp Weapon”: The Art of Public Opinion Struggle Based on Authenticity

四、“锐利的武器”：以真实性为基石的舆论斗争艺术

At the end of October 1950, the newly born republic was facing severe tests from both internal and external troubles. Internationally, the flames of the Korean War had reached the Yalu River; the Chinese People’s Volunteers had just entered the war, and the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea had officially begun. Domestically, the task of restoring and developing the national economy was urgent, while remnant Kuomintang forces and secret agents were still carrying out sabotage in secret, and the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries was about to unfold. Amidst the smoke of gunpowder and an extremely complex public opinion environment, Zhou Enlai signed the “Directive of the Government Administration Council on Improving and Developing the National Publishing Industry” on the 28th, putting forward highly combative requirements for news and publishing work, emphasizing the need to “regard the publication of periodicals as a regular and sharp weapon for guiding work.”[30]30 Government Administration Council Directive, 28 October 1950. The Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries was a nationwide campaign launched in 1950–1951 to eliminate suspected counterrevolutionaries. Comparing the publication of newspapers and periodicals to a “sharp weapon” was Zhou Enlai’s profound summary of the Party’s practice in public opinion struggle. In his view, newspapers and periodicals were not only an important driving force for economic and social construction but also a sharp sword in the struggle against the enemy. No matter how the environment changed, news work could not lose this “edge of combat.” To make this “weapon” truly razor-sharp, two core elements were necessary: first, possessing an indestructible foundation of credibility, that is, emphasizing the authenticity of news reporting; second, adopting highly flexible tactical methods, that is, emphasizing the combative nature of news and public opinion.

1950 年10月底，新生的共和国正面临着内忧外患的严峻考验。国际上，朝鲜战争战火已烧至鸭绿江边，中国人民志愿军刚刚入朝作战，抗美援朝战争正式拉开序幕；国内，恢复和发展国民经济的任务迫在眉睫，国民党残余势力与特务却仍在暗中破坏，镇压反革命运动即将展开。在硝烟弥漫、舆论环境极其复杂的时刻，周恩来于28日签署《政务院关于改进和发展全国出版事业的指示》，对新闻出版工作提出了极具战斗性的要求，强调要“把出版期刊当作指导工作的经常性的和锐利的武器”[4]。将出版报刊比作“锐利的武器”，是周恩来对党的舆论斗争实践的深刻总结。在他看来，报刊不仅是经济社会建设的重要推动力，更是对敌斗争的利剑，无论环境如何变化，新闻工作都不能失去这种“战斗的锋芒”，而要使这把“武器”真正锋利无比，必须具备两个核心要素：一是拥有坚不可摧的信誉基石，即强调新闻报道的真实性，二是采取高超灵活的战术方法，即强调新闻舆论的斗争性。

(1) Authenticity is the Blade of the “Weapon”: Only by Being Authentic Can It Be Powerful

（一）真实是“武器”的锋刃：唯有真实，方能有力

Zhou Enlai regarded “seeking truth” as the bottom line of news work throughout his life. In January 1950, he wrote an inscription for the New Year supplement of the *News Daily*: “Strive to report truthful news!”[31]31 Zhou Enlai’s inscription for the *News Daily*, January 1950. He also often admonished journalists, “Reporting must conform to reality.”[32]32 Zhou Enlai’s admonition to journalists, undated. This was not only an admonition of professional ethics but also a profound judgment based on strategic considerations—in the international public opinion struggle, any deviation from the facts, any exaggerated propaganda, could become a handle for hostile forces to attack, thereby causing the “weapon” to lose its edge and its combat effectiveness.

周恩来一生视“求真”为新闻工作的底线。1950年1月，他为《新闻日报》元旦增刊题词：“为报道真实新闻而奋斗！”[5]他还常告诫记者，“报道要符合实际”[6]。这不仅是职业操守的训诫，更是基于战略考量的深刻判断——在国际舆论斗争中，任何事实的偏差、任何夸大的宣传，都可能成为敌对势力攻击的把柄，从而导致“武器”卷刃，丧失战斗力。

During the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, in the face of the U.S. military’s bombing of the neutral zone in Kaesong, followed by its denial of the act, Zhou Enlai carefully reviewed the news telegrams released to the public. In August 1951, he drafted a telegram for Mao Zedong to Li Kenong, which specifically mentioned: “The invading enemy aircraft should be confirmed as one, and do not say the number is unknown again, causing contradictions in the reports before and after,” “Of the nine bombs dropped by the enemy aircraft, how many exploded, whether the unexploded bombs and the fragments of the exploded ones are still preserved in their original places, whether the craters formed and the scorched crops are still preserved in their original state, and whether there are scars on the ground objects from the strafing? What is the testimony of the residents on this?” On the basis of fully grasping the facts, Zhou Enlai decisively instructed that the detailed investigation results be broadcast in both Chinese and English via radio and published in full in the *People’s Daily*, sternly refuting the other side’s lies: “Facts speak louder than words... The fragments of the bombs dropped by your aircraft, the craters they formed, the cracks in the blasted rocks, and the scorched areas are all still preserved in their original state near the residence of our delegation at the Kaesong conference site. The residents of the Kaesong area can also testify to the true situation of the bombing and strafing by your aircraft that night,” “As long as one comes into contact with the actual scene of the bombed area in Kaesong, one can see: who is the creator of this provocative incident, and who, disregarding the facts, has arbitrarily issued absurd lies.”[33]33 Zhou Enlai’s telegram to Li Kenong, August 1951. Li Kenong was a senior CPC intelligence official and diplomat. By making the verifiable details public in their original form for all peace-loving people in the world to discern right from wrong, it was precisely this adherence to reverence for the facts in news work that enabled us to be invincible in the game of public opinion.

抗美援朝战争期间，面对美军轰炸开城中立区，事后却矢口否认的行径，周恩来审慎把关对外发布的新闻电讯稿。1951年8月，他为毛泽东起草给李克农的电报，其中专门提到：“入侵的敌机应确定为一架，不要再说数目不详，弄得报道上前后矛盾”，“敌机所投九个炸弹，爆炸了几个，未炸的及炸了的碎片是否仍保存在原处，炸成的坑及烧焦的作物是否仍保存原状，扫射在地物上有无伤痕？居民对此见证如何？”在充分掌握事实的基础上，周恩来果断指示将详尽的调查结果通过广播以中英文双语播发，并全文刊载于《人民日报》上，义正词严地戳破对方的谎言：“事实胜于雄辩，……你方飞机投下的炸弹碎片及其炸成的土坑，炸破的岩石裂痕，烧焦的地方都还在开城会址区我方代表团住所附近原状未动地保存着，开城地区的居民也能证明当夜你方飞机轰炸和扫射的真实情况”，“只要接触到开城被炸地区的现场实际，就可看出：谁是这次挑衅事件的制造者，谁不根据事实而武断地发出荒谬绝伦的谎言”。[1]把经得起推敲的细节原原本本地公之于众，供全世界爱好和平的人们明辨孰是孰非，正是这种在新闻工作中始终坚守对事实的敬畏，我们才能在舆论博弈中无坚不摧。

(2) Struggle is the Application of the “Weapon”: Take the Initiative, Attack the Mind as the Priority

（二）斗争是“武器”的运用：主动出击，攻心为上

Zhou Enlai was adept at wielding this “sharp weapon” at critical moments as needed to win political battles, demonstrating a superb art of public opinion struggle.

周恩来善于根据需要，在关键时刻拿起这把“锐利的武器”，打赢政治仗，展现了高超的舆论斗争艺术。

First, he was adept at seizing positions and breaking blockades. After the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japan, Chiang Kai-shek, in order to monopolize the fruits of victory, “outwardly expressed a willingness to compromise to deceive the people, while secretly deploying military forces, with great conspiracies.”[34]34 Zhou Enlai’s assessment of Chiang Kai-shek’s strategy, circa 1945–1946. Especially after the Kuomintang government returned its capital to Nanjing, rumors were rife. To expose Chiang Kai-shek’s conspiracy of false peace talks and to refute the Kuomintang authorities’ fabricated rumors that the CPC did not want peace or unity, it was crucial to occupy the public opinion battlefield. During the Chongqing Negotiations, in order to “use legal means to unite the masses during the chaotic period before the Kuomintang’s rule was established and stabilized,”[35]35 Zhou Enlai’s analysis of the post-war situation, circa 1945–1946. Zhou Enlai strongly advocated that “our Party must prepare to establish a major Party newspaper and news agency in Shanghai.”[36]36 Zhou Enlai’s proposal to the CPC Central Committee, circa 1945–1946. In May 1946, in a telegram to the Central Committee of the CPC, Zhou Enlai clearly stated: “Nanjing and Shanghai have become centers of reactionary public opinion, where rumors are more rampant than in Chongqing. Therefore, our Party must have newspapers in both Beijing and Shanghai to facilitate operations and mobilize the masses; otherwise, being besieged, we will have no chance to fight back.”[37]37 Zhou Enlai’s telegram to the CPC Central Committee, May 1946. This pointed the way for our Party to strive for the dominant power of public opinion under the obscure situation after the victory of the War of Resistance, and thereby to seize the initiative in the revolution. Under Zhou Enlai’s leadership, the Southern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee adopted a series of measures, such as moving the *Mass* weekly from Chongqing to Shanghai for publication and founding the English-language *Xinhua Weekly*, opening up propaganda channels in the heart of the enemy’s territory and seizing the initiative in discourse.

首先，善于抢占阵地，打破封锁。抗战胜利后，蒋介石为了独占胜利果实，“表面愿求妥协，以欺骗国人，暗中布置军事，阴谋甚大”[2]。尤其是在国民党政府还都南京后，谣言甚嚣尘上。为了揭穿蒋介石假和谈的阴谋，以及批驳国民党当局编造的所谓中共不要和平、不要团结的谣言，占领舆论阵地至关重要。在重庆谈判期间，为了在“国民党统治尚未建立和稳定的混乱期间”，“利用合法团结群众”[3]，周恩来力主“我党在沪必须筹备一大的党报和通讯社”[4]。1946年5月，周恩来在给中共中央的电文中明确提出，“南京、上海已成为反动舆论中心，谣言之盛超过重庆。故我党在京、沪均应有报纸才便作战与动员群众，否则处在围攻中，我无还手机会”[5]。这就为我们党在抗战胜利后晦暗不明的局势下争取舆论主导权，进而争取革命主动权指明了路径。在周恩来的领导下，中共中央南方局采取一系列举措，如将《群众》周刊由重庆迁到上海出版，创办英文刊物《新华周刊》等，在敌人的心脏地带打开了宣传通道，掌握了话语主动权。

Second, he was adept at “using borrowed force to strike a blow” and winning people over. The effect of public opinion struggle depends crucially on the choice of news reporting angle. During the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, US planes bombed power plants on the Yalu River, the Changjin River, the Pujon River and the Huchon River on two consecutive days in June 1952. Zhou Enlai specifically offered a suggestion to the Korean side regarding the news release on this matter: “Whether the content of the news can focus on pointing out that the power plants serve the Korean people and cannot constitute military targets, and that the US side’s wanton bombing of them is clearly an intentional act of destroying the daily lives of Korean residents, violating the principles of humanity.” [6]6 The four big families: Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung, and Chen Lifu and Chen Guofu, the leading bureaucratic-capitalist cliques that dominated the Kuomintang regime. After the Korean side released this news, Zhou Enlai instructed *People’s Daily* to reprint it and publish an editorial titled “The United States Must Be Held Responsible for the Crime of Bombing the Yalu River Power Plants.” Protesting the fact of the US bombing from the angle of “violating the principles of humanity” exposed the evil intention of the United States to destroy peaceful life. This unique entry point for public opinion made it easier to arouse condemnation of the aggressor and sympathy for the Korean people from world opinion, thereby multiplying the striking power of the “weapon.”

其次，善于“借力打力”，争取人心。舆论斗争的效果如何，新闻报道角度的选取至关重要。抗美援朝战争期间，美机在1952年6月连续两日日间轰炸了鸭绿江、长津江、赴战江、虚川江等地发电厂。周恩来专门就此事的新闻发布，向朝方提出建议：“新闻内容是否可以着重指出发电厂系为朝鲜人民服务的，不能构成军事目标，美方对之肆意轰炸，显然是有意破坏朝鲜居民的日常生活，违反人道原则。”[6]在朝方发布这条新闻后，周恩来指示《人民日报》予以转载，并发表社论《美国必须对轰炸鸭绿江发电厂的罪行负责》。从“违反人道原则”的角度来抗议美机轰炸的事实，揭开了美国破坏和平生活的罪恶用心。这一独特的舆论切口，更容易引发世界舆论对侵略者的谴责和对朝鲜人民的同情，从而使“武器”的打击效力倍增。

Third, he was adept at “knowing the enemy and knowing yourself” and mining intelligence. In Zhou Enlai’s hands, news publications were not only propaganda tools but also sources of intelligence. During the Korean Armistice negotiations, Zhou Enlai was adept at obtaining valuable clues from the enemy’s news. In December 1951, in two telegrams on negotiation strategy he drafted for Mao Zedong, he mentioned: “Whether the enemy intends to use the cessation of construction of new airfields as a bargaining chip, please assess this, because there is such a hint in the enemy’s news”; “Apart from the current haggling methods, the enemy has even conceived of using the issue of prisoner repatriation as a trade for abandoning free inspection, which has already been revealed in the enemy’s news reports of the 7th.” [1]1 Zhou Enlai, inscription for Wang Xijun of the Chinese Vocational Education Society, September 1940. By analyzing the clues in the enemy’s public reports to ascertain their true intentions behind them, this allowed the “sharp weapon” not only to strike the enemy’s vital points but also to see through the enemy’s schemes, thereby helping us grasp the initiative in complex struggles. In addition to aiding the information game at the negotiating table, foreign news reports could also serve as references for our comparative study. *Reference News* [Cankao Xiaoxi] selects valuable materials broadcast or published by foreign news agencies, newspapers, etc., for domestic reference. Zhou Enlai always attached great importance to and cared about the publication of *Reference News*, emphasizing that “it cannot only publish reports favorable to China; it must also appropriately publish some negative things.” [2]2 The Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifth Kuomintang Central Executive Committee (January 1939) adopted a policy of “limited resistance” against Japan and intensified its anti-communist activities, leading to increased military and political friction with the CPC. In October 1971, Zhou Enlai pointed out when meeting with American friends: “We publish *Reference Materials* [Cankao Ziliao] and *Reference News*, which carry articles from the Associated Press, Reuters, Agence France-Presse, etc. … Publishing these newspapers can educate our people and enable them to distinguish right from wrong. … If people are not allowed to compare various ideas, how can they recognize correct propositions and correct opinions?” [3]3 The July 7th Incident (1937) at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing marked the beginning of the full-scale outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Comparing and distinguishing right from wrong was intended to enhance the immunity and combat effectiveness of thought.

再次，善于“知己知彼”，挖掘情报。在周恩来手中，新闻报刊不仅是宣传工具，也是情报来源。朝鲜停战谈判期间，周恩来就善于从敌方新闻中获取有价值的线索。1951年12月，在他为毛泽东起草的两封谈判策略电报中提到，“敌人是否想以停止建设新的飞机场作为交换，请你们予以估计，因敌人新闻中有此暗示”；“敌人除掉现在所进行的讨价还价的办法外，甚至已在设想拿遣俘问题做他们放弃自由视察的交换，这在七日的敌人新闻报道中已有此透露”。[1]通过分析敌人公开报道里的蛛丝马迹，来摸清他们背后的真实意图，这让“锐利的武器”不仅能用来打击敌人的要害，还能用来识破敌人的阴谋，从而帮我们在复杂的斗争中掌握主动权。除了助力谈判桌上的信息博弈，国外的新闻报道也可以作为我们比较学习的参考。《参考消息》通过选载外国通讯社、报刊等播发或发表的有价值的材料供国内参考。周恩来一直非常重视和关心《参考消息》的出版工作，强调“不能光登对中国好的反映，也要适当登一些反面的东西”[2]。1971年10月，周恩来在会见美国友人时指出：“我们出了《参考资料》和《参考消息》，登的文章有美联社的、路透社的、法新社的等。……发行这些报刊可教育我们人民，使他们辨别是非。……不使人们进行各种思想的比较，怎么能够认识正确的主张、正确的意见？”[3]通过比较鉴别是非，为的是增强思想的免疫力和战斗力。

The “sharp weapon” advocated by Zhou Enlai refers to a comprehensive combat effectiveness formed on the basis of ironclad facts, matched with precise timing and superb art of expression. “Sharpness” is mainly reflected in the profundity of its critique, the timeliness of its combat, and the firmness of its stance. It requires that news and propaganda, when facing great storms, must not only have the momentum to overwhelm the enemy and dare to confront head-on, but also be adept at sizing up the situation, knowing how to use borrowed force to strike a blow, and always keep the initiative in public opinion struggle in one’s own hands amid complex situations.

周恩来所倡导的“锐利的武器”，是指基于铁一般的事实、配合精准的时机和高超的表达艺术所形成的综合战斗力。“锐利”主要体现在其批判的深刻性、战斗的及时性和立场的坚定性。它要求新闻宣传在面对大风大浪时，既要有压倒敌人的气势，敢于硬碰硬；又要善于审时度势，懂得借力打力，在复杂的局势中始终把舆论斗争的主动权掌握在自己手里。

V. Conclusion

五、结语

From his student days, Zhou Enlai was “enthusiastic about running school journals, exerting double effort” [4]4 The Southern Anhui Incident (January 1941) was a major military clash in which Kuomintang forces attacked the Communist-led New Fourth Army, killing or capturing thousands of its soldiers and triggering a severe political crisis., accumulating preliminary experience in news work from the practice of running publications such as *Jingye* [Dedication], *Xiaofeng* [School Ethos], and *Tianjin Student Union Journal*. In September 1915, he wrote: “Upholding integrity without bending, strict in praise and blame, wielding Dong Hu’s brush [38]38 Dong Hu was a historian of the Spring and Autumn period renowned for his integrity and refusal to distort the historical record, even at the risk of death., upholding the spirit of the Spring and Autumn Annals [39]39 The Spring and Autumn Annals, a chronicle attributed to Confucius, was traditionally believed to use subtle and precise language to convey moral judgment on historical events., that is the highest journalism; only promoting good, only concealing evil, holding to one opinion, not regretting even in defeat, unafraid even if the blade is applied to the body, that is middle-level journalism; as for spreading rumors that lose touch with facts, echoing others, that is beneath contempt.” [5]5 The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea (1950–1953) was China’s military intervention in the Korean War, officially framed as a defensive war against U.S. imperialism. In his long practice of revolution and construction, Zhou Enlai, with his unremitting pursuit of “the highest journalism,” elevated news and propaganda work, including running newspapers and journals, from a purely professional category to the strategic level of the Party and the state, promoting the Party’s news and propaganda cause to always serve the overall work of the Party and the state and achieve remarkable results. These important theses put forward by Zhou Enlai, from multiple dimensions such as strategy and tactics, political propaganda, fundamental stance, and the art of struggle, highly summarize his core concepts and specific requirements for news and propaganda work, clearly demonstrating his systematic thinking and strategic foresight, and exerting a profound influence on the theoretical construction and practical exploration of the Chinese Communist Party’s journalism cause. The wisdom contained therein still holds important enlightening significance for us today in doing a good job of the Party’s propaganda, ideology, and cultural work in the complex domestic and international public opinion environment, and in assisting the comprehensive advancement of building a strong country and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation through Chinese-path modernization.

周恩来从学生时代就“热心从事学报，尤倍竭其力”[4]，从《敬业》《校风》《天津学生联合会报》等办报实践中积累了初步的新闻工作经验。1915年9月，他写道：“守正不阿，严于褒贬，秉董狐之笔，执春秋之义，上报也；惟善是彰，惟恶是隐，持一见，虽败勿悔，刃锯加身而不惧，中报也；至传闻失实，随声附和，则自哙以下矣。”[5]周恩来在长期革命和建设实践中，以对“上报”的不懈追求，将包括办报办刊在内的新闻宣传工作从单纯的业务范畴提升至党和国家战略层面，推动党的新闻宣传事业始终服务党和国家工作大局并取得显著成效。周恩来提出的这些重要论断，从战略与策略、政治宣传、根本立场、斗争艺术等多个维度，高度概括了他对新闻宣传工作的核心理念与具体要求，清晰展现了他的系统性思考和战略性远见，对中国共产党新闻事业的理论构建与实践探索产生了深远的影响。其中蕴含的智慧，对于我们今天在复杂的国内外舆论环境中做好党的宣传思想文化工作，助力以中国式现代化全面推进强国建设、民族复兴伟业，仍有重要启示意义。

Author’s bio: Cheng Yingying, editor at the Institute of Party History and Literature of the CPC Central Committee.

作者简介：程莹莹，中共中央党史和文献研究院编辑。