A Discussion with the Author of “China Needs to Rewrite the History of the War of Resistance”

Still on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of China’s victory in the War of Resistance against Japan, an article titled “China Needs to Rewrite the History of the War of Resistance” drew people’s attention and has circulated to this day. I will offer my own views on why the history of the War of Resistance should be rewritten and how it should be rewritten.

还是在中国抗日战争胜利60周年之际，一篇《中国需要重写抗战史》的文章引起人们关注，流传至今。我针对为什么要重写抗战史和怎样重写，谈一下自己的见解。

First, the first question: why rewrite the history of the War of Resistance. I agree with the author that those who contributed to the War of Resistance should not be forgotten, even though the author only mentions the anti-Japanese generals of the Kuomintang. This is indeed one reason for rewriting the history of the War of Resistance. But the actual situation is that, from the 1980s onward up to the present, a large number of works have truthfully described the anti-Japanese deeds of Kuomintang officers and soldiers. It should especially be noted that on September 3, 2005, then-President Hu Jintao, in his speech at the rally commemorating the 60th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, clearly affirmed the positive contributions of the Kuomintang army to the War of Resistance. The rally awarded commemorative medals to veterans who had participated in the War of Resistance, and former Kuomintang anti-Japanese soldiers enjoyed the same honor. Subsequently, the Ministry of Civil Affairs clearly stipulated that former Kuomintang veterans who had participated in the War of Resistance were eligible for compensation. Some important battlefield sites where Kuomintang officers and soldiers fought heroically against Japan were restored and repaired.

先说第一个问题，为什么要重写抗战史。我赞成作者所说，不能遗忘为抗日战争作出贡献的人，尽管作者只提到国民党抗日将领。这确实是重写抗战史的一个理由。但实际情况却是，从20世纪80年代开始直到现在，已经有大量著作如实描述了国民党官兵的抗日事迹。尤其应该提到，2005年9月3日，时任国家主席胡锦涛在纪念中国人民抗日战争暨世界反法西斯战争胜利60周年的大会讲话中，明确地肯定了国民党军队对抗战的积极贡献。大会向参加过抗战的老战士颁发纪念奖章，当年的国民党抗日战士同样享有殊荣。此后，民政部明确规定参加过抗战的国民党老兵为抚恤对象。一些国民党官兵英勇抗日的重要战场遗址，重新得到修葺。

The matter the author worried about has already been resolved, so why is he still indignant? The article reveals the reason: he feels it is unjust that former Kuomintang generals who once fought against Japan were treated as war criminals. Here, the author confuses a fact, namely that the War of Resistance against Japan and the Civil War between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party were two completely different types of war. From a macro-historical perspective, the War of Resistance was a nationwide external anti-aggression war without regard to party affiliation, while the Civil War was a war between progressive forces and reactionary forces within China. In the former war, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party were comrades-in-arms; in the latter war, they were adversaries. Treating war adversaries as war criminals is in line with common sense. “The victor is king, the vanquished a bandit” [1]1 “The victor is king, the vanquished a bandit” (胜王败寇) is a Chinese idiom suggesting that historical judgment is often determined by who wins, rather than by objective moral or factual standards. is indeed not a scientific standard for judging history, but when the author emphasizes one aspect, he neglects another: that progress triumphs over reaction—this is the fundamental law of historical development. Of course, there are different interpretations of progress and reaction, and here there is indeed a question of standpoint. For example, during the ten-year civil war after the first Kuomintang-Communist cooperation broke down, the Communist Party called it the “Period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War,” while the Kuomintang called it the “Period of Bandit Suppression”; during the three-year civil war after the second Kuomintang-Communist cooperation broke down, the Communist Party called it the “Period of the War of Liberation,” while the Kuomintang called it the “Period of Rebellion Suppression.” [2]2 “Rebellion Suppression” (戡乱) was the term used by the Kuomintang government to describe its military campaign against the Chinese Communist Party during the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949). Looking at China today, right and wrong are clearly proven; Li Zongren, who made significant contributions to the War of Resistance but was declared by the Communist Party to be the second most important war criminal after Chiang Kai-shek, also corroborated with his words and deeds who represented progress. [3]3 Li Zongren (1891–1969) was a prominent Kuomintang general and politician who served as acting President of the Republic

作者忧心的事情已经解决，何以还要忿忿？文章道出原因，他是对把曾经抗日的国民党将领当成战犯处理感到不公。这里，作者混淆了一个事实，即抗日战争与国共内战完全是两种不同性质的战争。从历史宏观来看，抗日战争是不分党派的全民族对外反侵略战争，国共内战是中国内部进步力量与反动力量之间的战争。在前一个战争中，国共两党是战友，在后一个战争中，国共两党是对手。把战争对手作为战犯处理，符合常情。“胜王败寇”确实不是评判历史的科学标准，但是，作者在强调一个方面的时候却忽略了另一个方面，那就是进步战胜反动，这才是历史发展的根本规律。当然，对于进步和反动有不同的解释，这里确实有个立场问题。比如，国共第一次合作破裂后的十年内战，共产党称之为“土地革命战争时期”，而国民党称之为“剿匪时期”；国共两党第二次合作破裂后的三年内战，共产党称之为“解放战争时期”，而国民党称之为“戡乱时期”。看看今天的中国，孰是孰非，已有明证；对抗日战争有过重要功绩却被共产党宣布为仅次于蒋介石的第二号战犯李宗仁，也以他的言行佐证了谁代表了进步。

The author has another point of contention: that the Chinese government was too lenient with Japanese war criminals, while Kuomintang war criminals were not so fortunate. In fact, the Chinese government’s reform-through-labor of Japanese war criminals was very successful; many Japanese war criminals released back to Japan established the famous “Chūkiren” [4] and played an important role in the struggle against the Japanese right wing. As for whether Kuomintang war criminals were fortunate, reading their memoirs makes it easy to find the answer. The author also uses the post-American Civil War treatment of the Confederate army as a standard of humanitarian value judgment; in fact, a slight understanding of the situation at Guantánamo would lead to the opposite conclusion. The author’s indignation and entanglement are clearly not reasons for rewriting the history of the War of Resistance.

作者还有一个纠结，那就是中国政府对日本战犯过于宽大，而国民党战犯却没有那么幸运。其实，中国政府改造日本战犯是非常成功的，很多被释放回国的日本战犯成立了著名的“中归连”，在与日本右翼的斗争中发挥了重要作用。而国民党战犯是否幸运，看看他们的回忆文章也不难找出答案。作者还以美国内战后处理南军的做法为人道的价值判断标准，其实，只要稍微了解关塔那摩的情况，结论将会相反。作者的忿忿与纠结，显然不是重写抗战史的理由。

Now, the second question: how to rewrite the history of the War of Resistance. From the laws of historical research, only by constantly examining and revising past research results with new perspectives, new historical materials, and new methods can historical scholarship be advanced. The study of the history of the War of Resistance is no exception; rewriting is intended to make it more objective and truthful, thereby promoting a rational and fair judgment of history and drawing useful lessons from it. Therefore, I not only agree with rewriting the history of the War of Resistance but also practice it myself. In fact, the crux of the issue is not whether to rewrite, but how to rewrite.

再说第二个问题，怎样重写抗战史。从历史研究的规律来看，只有不断地以新的视角、新的史料、新的方法来检讨与修正既往研究成果，才能推动史学进步。抗战史研究也不例外，重写是为了使之更加客观、真实，从而推动人们理性、公正地评判历史并从中总结出有益的经验教训。因此，我不仅赞成重写抗战史，并且身体力行。其实，问题的症结不在是否重写，而在如何重写。

As for how to rewrite the history of the War of Resistance, the author offers no specific suggestions, but from his reflections, two debatable questions can be summarized. These two questions have long received widespread attention.

对于如何重写抗战史，作者没有具体的建议，但从他的感慨中，可以归纳出两个可以讨论的问题。这两个问题一直受到人们的广泛关注。

The first is the question of anti-Japanese policy. The author proposes that the National Government’s policy choices after 1931 should be viewed positively. In short, after the September 18th Incident, [5] under the circumstances of the enemy being strong and we being weak, the National Government’s adoption of a policy of non-resistance was a rational choice, and this does not mean it abandoned preparations for resistance against Japan. It should be acknowledged that after the September 18th Incident, especially after the January 28th Incident, [6] the National Government did indeed begin preparations for resistance against Japan. However, the author overlooks an important fact: in the face of Japanese aggression, the dominant policy of the Kuomintang central authorities led by Chiang Kai-shek was “first internal pacification, then external resistance.” [7] What is “internal pacification”? Simply put, it meant “suppressing the Communists” and eliminating other dissidents. Such a policy not only did not benefit the formation of an anti-Japanese situation but also greatly undermined the national cohesion needed for the War of Resistance. Although the Kuomintang army also carried out anti-Japanese military actions before the July 7th Incident, [8] its main forces were used for “internal pacification.” This practice violated the overall interests of the nation and therefore met with opposition from the majority of the people across the country. The occurrence of the Liangguang Incident and the Xi’an Incident [9] showed that the policy of “first internal pacification, then external resistance” was unworkable. Ultimately, under pressure from the people nationwide, Chiang Kai-shek had to change course, cooperate with the Chinese Communist Party, and prepare for resistance against Japan by rallying all anti-Japanese forces. In fact, even at the time of the July 7th Incident, the situation of the enemy being strong and we being weak had not changed; what had changed was the anti-Japanese situation within China.

首先是抗日政策问题。作者提出，应该积极地看待国民政府1931年后的政策选择。简而言之，九一八事变发生之后，在敌强我弱的情势之下，国民政府采取不抵抗政策是理性的选择，这并不表明它放弃了抗日准备。应当承认，九一八事变之后，尤其是一•二八事变之后，国民政府确实着手了抗日准备。但是，作者忽略了一个重要的事实，即面对日本侵略，以蒋介石为首的国民党中央的主导政策是“攘外必先安内”。什么是“安内”？简单地说，就是“剿共”和剪除其他异己。这样的政策不仅无利于抗日局面的形成，而且极大地破坏了抗日所需的民族凝聚力。尽管到七七事变之前，国民党军队也有过抗日军事行动，但它的主力却用于了“安内”。这种做法违背了民族整体利益，因此遭到了全国多数人的反对。两广事变的发生，西安事变的发生，表明了“攘外必先安内”政策行不通。最终，在全国人民的压力之下，蒋介石只能改弦更张，与中国共产党合作，从集合一切抗日力量方面来做抗日准备。事实上，即使到了七七事变的时候，中日之间敌强我弱的情况也没有发生变化，而变化了的是中国内部的抗日形势。

The second is the question of anti-Japanese military affairs. China’s War of Resistance had the frontal battlefield led by the Kuomintang and the enemy rear battlefield led by the Communist Party. Which battlefield played a greater role has always been a hot topic, and the article specifically discusses it. I agree with the author that the victory in the Battle of Changsha and the great victory at Pingxingguan [10] are equally worthy of commemoration. Broadening this, I believe the achievements of both battlefields should be affirmed. Even regarding how to evaluate the retreats on the frontal battlefield, if specific campaigns (such as the Henan-Hunan-Guangxi Campaign) [11] are set aside, I also agree with the author that, under conditions of the enemy being strong and we being weak, advances and retreats were unavoidable. However, the author then pointedly says, “Only an army that avoids decisive battles will not retreat, but will instead continuously grow stronger.” This is not only unfair but also contrary to the facts. First, the Communist Party’s army never avoided decisive battles; for example, in the early stages of the war, it actively participated in the Battle of Taiyuan and was commended by the National Government for its achievements. [12] Second, during the most difficult period of China’s War of Resistance, the Eighth Route Army made great sacrifices by launching the Hundred Regiments Offensive, actively cooperating with the frontal battlefield. [13] Third, the Communist Party’s army did grow stronger, but it did not “grow strong by sitting idle”; rather, it was the result of extensively mobilizing the masses to participate in the national liberation war. Moreover, through guerrilla warfare, it created a vast ocean of people’s war in the enemy rear battlefield, whose strategic role was by no means inferior to the large-scale decisive battles on the frontal battlefield. My view is that although the two battlefields differed in scale and form of operations, they had an important interdependent relationship. At different times, they played different roles in terms of importance, but both made significant contributions to the final victory of the Chinese nation. If the history of the War of Resistance is to be rewritten, one cannot emphasize only one aspect while neglecting the other.

其次是抗日军事问题。中国抗战有国民党领导的正面战场和共产党领导的敌后战场，两个战场谁的作用更大，一直是热门话题，文章也专门论及。我赞成作者所说，即长沙会战的胜利与平型关大捷同样值得纪念。扩大开来，我以为两个战场的功绩都要肯定。甚至，对正面战场的溃退如何评价，如果抛开了具体的战役（如豫湘桂战役），我也赞成作者所说，在敌强我弱条件下，有进有退是不能避免的。但是，紧接着作者指向明确地说，“只有一支躲避会战的军队才不会溃退，反而会不断壮大”，就不仅有失公允，也违背了事实。第一，共产党的军队从来没有躲避过会战，如战争初期积极参加了太原会战，并以自己的战绩受到国民政府的表彰。第二，在中国抗战最困难的时期，八路军付出重大牺牲发动百团大战积极配合了正面战场。第三，共产党军队是壮大了，但并非“坐大”，而是广泛地动员人民群众参加民族解放战争的结果。另外，通过游击战在敌后战场造成人民战争的汪洋大海，其战略作用绝不逊于正面战场的大规模会战。我的观点是，两个战场虽然作战规模与形式有所不同，但它们之间有着重要的依存关系。在不同的时期，它们显示的作用大小不同，但都为中华民族的最后胜利作出了重要贡献。如果重写抗战史，不能只强调一个方面而忽略另一个方面。

The author uses exaggerated methods to describe isolated fragments while stripping away the logical connections between those fragments, deviating from the standpoint of historical materialism. When rewriting the history of the War of Resistance, such phenomena must be prevented.

作者以夸大的手法描述孤立的片段，而抽去了那些片段之间的逻辑关联，偏离了历史唯物主义立场。重写抗战史，要防止这种现象的出现。

Online editor: Jia Fei

网络编辑：嘉扉