The Historical Contributions and Contemporary Implications of the CPC’s Promotion of Adapting Marxism to the Chinese Context and the Needs of the Times During the Long March
李朝阳、郭莎莎:长征时期中国共产党推进马克思主义中国化时代化的历史贡献与当代启示
The times are the mother of thought; practice is the source of theory. The Long March was an important test that the Communist Party of China underwent in the Chinese revolution. The victory of the Long March required theoretical guidance, and the Long March itself was also an important practice that generated theory. Although during the Long March period the Communist Party of China had not yet explicitly put forward the proposition of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context, the great Long March powerfully propelled the development of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times. As Xi Jinping pointed out: “The victory of the Long March enabled our Party to further recognize that only by integrating the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete realities of the Chinese revolution and independently resolving the major issues of the Chinese revolution could the revolutionary cause be led to victory.” In a certain sense, the victory of the Long March was the victory of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times, and it was an important component of the great practice of its first historic leap. On the 90th anniversary of the victory of the Red Army’s Long March, looking back once again at the history of the Long March and deeply exploring the historical contributions and contemporary implications of the Party’s promotion of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times during the Long March period is not only an academic need for deepening the study of Party history and theory, but also a practical requirement for taking the new Long March of the New Era well and leading practical innovation with theoretical innovation.
时代是思想之母,实践是理论之源。长征是中国共产党在中国革命中经受的一次重要考验,长征的胜利需要理论的指导,长征本身也是产生理论的重要实践。尽管在长征时期,中国共产党还没有明确提出马克思主义中国化命题,但伟大的长征有力推动了马克思主义中国化时代化的发展。正如习近平所指出的:“长征的胜利,使我们党进一步认识到,只有把马克思列宁主义基本原理同中国革命具体实际结合起来,独立自主解决中国革命的重大问题,才能把革命事业引向胜利。”从一定意义上说,长征的胜利,就是马克思主义中国化时代化的胜利,是其第一次历史性飞跃伟大实践的重要组成部分。在红军长征胜利90周年之际,再次回首长征历史,深入探讨长征时期党推进马克思主义中国化时代化的历史贡献与当代启示,既是深化党的历史和理论研究的学术需要,更是走好新时代长征路、以理论创新引领实践创新的现实要求。
I. Breaking Through the Shackles of Dogmatism and Consolidating the Ideological Foundation for Adapting Marxism to the Chinese Context and the Needs of the Times
一 冲破教条主义束缚,夯实马克思主义中国化时代化的思想基础
The ideological line, i.e., the cognitive line, refers to the guiding principles and philosophical basis that people follow in understanding, analyzing, and solving problems; it is the organic unity of worldview and methodology. Starting from the concrete realities of the Chinese revolution, the Communist Party of China applied the dialectical materialist epistemology to understanding and solving the problems of the Chinese revolution, thereby establishing the ideological line of seeking truth from facts. The ideological line of seeking truth from facts is the essence of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times. The formation of this ideological line went through stages from the emphasis on investigation and research in *Oppose Book Worship* to the philosophical argumentation in *On Practice*, then to the systematic elaboration of the specific connotation of seeking truth from facts in *Reform Our Study*, and finally to its formal establishment at the Seventh National Congress of the Party. The formation of the ideological line of seeking truth from facts reflects the Party’s deepening process of understanding the Chinese revolution. During the Long March period, the Chinese Communists broke free from the shackles of “Left” dogmatism, based themselves on the realities of the Chinese revolution, and independently explored the path of the Chinese revolution. This was a crucial period for the formation and development of the ideological line of seeking truth from facts, and it consolidated the ideological foundation for adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times.
思想路线即认识路线,是指人们认识问题、分析问题、解决问题所遵循的指导原则和哲学基础,是世界观和方法论的有机统一。中国共产党从中国革命的具体实际出发,把辩证唯物主义认识论应用于认识和解决中国革命问题中,确立了实事求是的思想路线。实事求是的思想路线是马克思主义中国化时代化的精髓,这一思想路线的形成经历了从《反对本本主义》中对调查研究的重视到《实践论》中的哲学论证,再到《改造我们的学习》中对实事求是具体内涵的系统阐释,再到党的七大上思想路线的正式确立。实事求是思想路线的形成反映了党对中国革命认识不断深化的历程。而在长征时期,中国共产党人冲破“左”倾教条主义束缚,立足中国革命的实际,独立自主地探索中国革命道路,这是实事求是思想路线形成发展的关键时期,夯实了马克思主义中国化时代化的思想基础。
(I) The Development of Adapting Marxism to the Chinese Context and the Needs of the Times Before the Long March and the Obstacles of “Left” Dogmatism
(一)长征前马克思主义中国化时代化的发展与“左”倾教条主义障碍
The Communist Party of China was the product of the integration of Marxism-Leninism with the Chinese workers’ movement. As early as the May Fourth Movement period, one of the Party’s founders, Li Dazhao, already possessed the ideological self-awareness of focusing on proceeding from China’s actual conditions when studying and propagating Marxism. In his *My Marxist Views*, he pointed out that “Marx’s doctrine is indeed a product of its era,” but we cannot “take it over wholesale as it is and apply it to the society in which we live.” In a certain sense, this was the germination of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times in the ideological consciousness of Chinese Communists.
中国共产党是马列主义与中国工人运动相结合的产物。早在五四时期,党的创始人之一李大钊在学习和宣传马克思主义时就有注重从中国实际出发的思想自觉。他在《我的马克思主义观》中指出,“马氏的学说,实在是一个时代的产物”,但我们不能“就那样整个拿来,应用于我们生存的社会”。从一定意义上说,这是马克思主义中国化时代化在中国共产党人思想意识中的萌芽。
In the process of advancing the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times, Mao Zedong made significant contributions. He delved deeply into the realities of the Chinese revolution and authored theoretical works of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times, such as *Why Is It That Red Political Power Can Exist in China?* and *The Struggle in the Jinggang Mountains*. In a letter in 1929 analyzing the causes of various erroneous ideas within the Fourth Red Army, he first proposed the concept of the “ideological line.” In the letter, he pointed out that the erroneous ideas within the Fourth Red Army were “merely the culmination of history, the final struggle of a historically erroneous ideological line.”
在马克思主义中国化时代化的推进过程中,毛泽东作出了重大贡献。他深入中国革命实际,创作了《中国的红色政权为什么能够存在?》《井冈山的斗争》等马克思主义中国化时代化的理论著述,并在1929年的一封分析红四军党内存在的种种错误思想原因的信中首次提出了“思想路线”这一概念。他在信中指出,红四军党内存在的错误思想“只是历史的结穴,历史上一种错误的思想路线上的最后挣扎”。
Before the Long March, within the Party there successively appeared “Left” putschism represented by the “theory of continuous revolution” and the “theory of a rising revolutionary tide,” “Left” adventurism represented by “organizing armed uprisings in the central cities nationwide and concentrating the entire Red Army to attack the central cities,” and “Left” dogmatism represented by Wang Ming. Faced with these “Left” errors, Mao Zedong emphasized that the Chinese revolution required Chinese comrades to understand China’s situation, and that one should not be rigidly confined to Marxist texts; book worship divorced from actual investigation could only result in opportunism and putschism. In May 1930, in *Oppose Book Worship*, Mao Zedong pointed out: “Marxist ‘books’ must be studied, but they must be integrated with China’s actual conditions. We need ‘books,’ but we must correct book worship that is divorced from actual conditions.” This exposition emphasized the importance of proceeding from reality in everything and integrating theory with practice; it can be said to be the initial form of the Party’s ideological line. After the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, Wang Ming’s “Left” dogmatist line gained a dominant position within the Party Central Committee, and the correct line represented by Mao Zedong was suppressed, even being labeled as “narrow empiricism” and “extremely serious consistent Right opportunism,” which brought enormous losses to the revolutionary cause. As the *Resolution on Certain Historical Issues* pointed out: “The greatest evil consequence of the third ‘Left’ line in the revolutionary base areas was the defeat of the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign in the area where the Central Committee was located and the withdrawal of the main forces of the Red Army from that area.”
在长征前,党内先后出现了以“继续革命论”和“革命形势高涨论”为代表的“左”倾盲动主义、以“组织全国中心城市武装起义和集中全国红军进攻中心城市”为代表的“左”倾冒险主义,以及以王明为代表的“左”倾教条主义。面对这些“左”倾错误,毛泽东强调,中国革命要由中国的同志了解中国的情况,不可一味囿于马克思主义文本,脱离实际调查的本本主义的结果只能是机会主义、盲动主义。1930年5月,毛泽东在《反对本本主义》中指出:“马克思主义的‘本本’是要学习的,但是必须同我国的实际情况相结合。我们需要‘本本’,但是一定要纠正脱离实际情况的本本主义。”这一论述强调了一切从实际出发、理论联系实际的重要性,可以说是党的思想路线的最初形态。在党的六届四中全会后,王明“左”倾教条主义路线在党中央占据支配地位,以毛泽东为代表的正确路线被压制,甚至被认定为“狭隘经验主义”“极严重的一贯右倾机会主义”,这给革命事业带来了巨大损失。正如《关于若干历史问题的决议》所指出的:“第三次‘左’倾路线在革命根据地的最大恶果,就是中央所在地区第五次反‘围剿’战争的失败和红军主力的退出中央所在地区。”
(II) Doubts and Dissatisfaction with “Left” Dogmatism in the Early Period of the Long March
(二)长征初期对“左”倾教条主义的怀疑和不满
The failure of the fifth counter-encirclement campaign did not shake the dominance of the “Left” error within the Party, and the harm of dogmatism persisted in the early stages of the Long March. From October to November 1934, the Red Army successively broke through three blockade lines of the Kuomintang army and arrived at the ferry crossing of the Xiang River. Chiang Kai-shek mobilized nearly 300,000 troops to construct a fourth blockade line east of the Xiang River, attempting to rely on the natural barrier of the Xiang River to “annihilate” the Red Army. At this time, the dogmatist provisional central authorities, represented by Bo Gu and Li De, disregarded the changing circumstances of the revolutionary situation, insisted on proceeding according to the original plan to join forces with the Second and Sixth Army Groups in western Hunan, and carried a large amount of baggage along the way, which restricted the army’s mobility. This “basically not resolute and combative, but a panicked flight and a moving-house-style action” caused the Red Army to suffer heavy losses again in the Xiang River Campaign, with the army reduced by more than half. Chen Yun, in reviewing the Xiang River Campaign, pointed out the military errors committed by the Red Army: “It was as if we were always following a route drawn with a pencil on paper, advancing straight in one direction. This mistake was very great. As a result, wherever we went, we encountered the enemy’s attack everywhere, because they had already foreseen from the map where we would appear and where we would advance. Thus we became utterly passive, unable to attack the enemy, but instead became the object of enemy attacks.” The harsh reality brought by the dogmatist military line led to growing suspicion and discontent within the Party and the Red Army toward Bo Gu and Li De. Some comrades who had previously committed “Left” errors also began to awaken, gradually siding against the “Left” error and turning to support the correct line represented by Mao Zedong. The “Channel Turn” [n] was a result of Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang, Zhou Enlai, and others heeding Mao Zedong’s correct opinion, abandoning the original plan to advance north to western Hunan, and instead marching toward Guizhou, where enemy forces were weak. Subsequently, the Liping Conference [n] adopted the “Decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on the Strategic Policy,” which, in the form of a central document, clarified Mao Zedong’s correct military propositions. As Chen Yun recalled: “At Liping, there was a dispute within the leadership, and in the end we corrected the errors we had made. We expressed distrust of the leaders who had previously ‘commanded with a pencil.’” Mao Zedong’s military strategic opinions began to receive high attention. Especially at the subsequent Houchang Conference [n], a regulation was made that “regarding operational policy, as well as the choice of operational timing and location, the Military Commission must report to the Political Bureau meeting,” which in essence revoked Bo Gu and Li De’s arbitrary power over military affairs and normalized the Party’s command of the army. From the Xiang River Campaign to the “Channel Turn,” from the Liping Conference to the Houchang Conference, the dominance of “Left” dogmatism within the Party gradually wavered, and Mao Zedong’s correct strategic opinions increasingly gained support from the majority of central leaders. This cleared the obstacles for the Zunyi Conference to resolve military and organizational issues and to effectively establish Mao Zedong’s leadership position in the Party and the Red Army.
第五次反“围剿”的失败,并没有动摇“左”倾错误在党内的统治地位,教条主义的危害在长征初期得以延续。1934年10月到11月间,红军接连突破国民党军队的三道封锁线,来到湘江渡口。蒋介石调集近30万大军在湘江以东构筑了第四道封锁线,企图依托湘江天险“全歼”红军。此时以博古、李德为代表的教条主义临时中央不顾革命形势的发展变化,执意按原计划前往湘西与红二、六军团会合,并且一路携带大量辎重,限制了军队的机动性。这种“基本上不是坚决的与战斗的,而是一种惊慌失措的逃跑的以及搬家式的行动”,致使红军在湘江战役中再次遭受重大损失,军队折损大半。陈云在回顾湘江战役时指出了红军所犯的军事错误:“我们仿佛总是沿着一条用铅笔在纸上画好的路线,朝着一个方向直线前进。这个错误很大。结果,我们无论走到哪里,到处都遇着敌人迎击,因为他们早已从地图上料到我们将出现在哪里,将往哪里前进。于是我们变成了毫无主动权、不能进攻敌人,反而被敌人袭击的对象。”教条主义军事路线带来的残酷现实,促使党和红军内部对博古、李德产生越来越多的怀疑和不满,一些曾经犯过“左”倾错误的同志也开始觉悟,逐渐站到反对“左”倾错误的立场上来,转而支持以毛泽东为代表的正确路线。“通道转兵”是张闻天、王稼祥、周恩来等人听取了毛泽东的正确意见,放弃北上湘西的原计划,转而向敌人力量薄弱的贵州进军。而后又在黎平会议上通过了《中央政治局关于战略方针之决定》,以中央文件形式明确了毛泽东的正确军事主张。正如陈云在回忆中所说:“在黎平,领导人内部发生了争论,结果我们终于纠正了所犯的错误。我们对此前‘靠铅笔指挥’的领导人表示不信任。”毛泽东的军事战略意见开始受到高度重视。尤其是后来的猴场会议,作出“关于作战方针,以及作战时间与地点的选择,军委必须在政治局会议上做报告”的规定,这在实质上取消了博古、李德对军事的独断权,使党对军队的指挥正常化。从湘江战役到“通道转兵”,从黎平会议到猴场会议,“左”倾教条主义在党内的统治逐渐动摇,毛泽东的正确战略意见日益得到中央大部分领导人的支持。这为遵义会议解决军事和组织问题,事实上确立毛泽东在党和红军中的领导地位扫清了障碍。
(3) The Zunyi Conference and the Struggle Against “Left” Dogmatism
(三)遵义会议与对“左”倾教条主义的斗争
The real settlement of accounts with “Left” dogmatism in military and organizational terms was the Zunyi Conference. Its landmark achievement was the explicit criticism, in the form of the “Zunyi Conference Resolution,” of the errors of the dogmatist line represented by Bo Gu and Li De since the fifth counter-encirclement campaign, the removal of Bo Gu and Li De’s command authority over the Red Army’s military affairs, the election of Mao Zedong as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and the realization of the Party’s correct line leading the Red Army. Chen Yun called the Zunyi Conference the “fourth victory” achieved by the Red Army since the Long March, because the Party thoroughly corrected the errors of the military leaders, “removed the ‘strategists who commanded with a pencil,’ and elected Comrade Mao Zedong to take up leadership,” strengthening the Party’s correct leadership over the army. The correct decisions of the Zunyi Conference were not accidental, but the inevitable result of Mao Zedong and others’ long-term adherence to proceeding from reality in everything and combining the basic principles of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. Starting from the Zunyi Conference, under the leadership of the first generation of the central collective leadership with Comrade Mao Zedong at its core, the ideological understanding of combining the basic principles of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution gained more recognition, laying an important ideological foundation for winning the Long March.
真正在军事上、组织上对“左”倾教条主义进行清算的是遵义会议,其标志性的成果就是以《遵义会议决议》的形式明确批判了第五次反“围剿”以来博古、李德等教条主义路线的错误,解除了博古、李德在红军军事上的指挥权,选举毛泽东为中央政治局常委,实现了党的正确路线对红军的领导。陈云称遵义会议是长征以来红军取得的“第四个胜利”,因为党彻底纠正了军事领导人的错误,“撤换了‘靠铅笔指挥的战略家’,推选毛泽东同志担任领导”,加强了党对军队的正确领导。遵义会议的正确决定不是偶然的,而是毛泽东等长期以来坚持一切从实际出发,将马克思主义基本原理与中国革命具体实践相结合的必然结果。自遵义会议开始,在以毛泽东同志为核心的第一代中央领导集体的领导下,把马克思主义基本原理同中国革命具体实践相结合的思想认识得到更多认同,为赢得长征胜利奠定了重要的思想基础。
Engels pointed out: “Our theory is a developing theory, not a dogma to be learned by rote and mechanically repeated.” The way of thinking about and solving problems must shift according to time, place, and conditions, and must bravely break through various dogmatic obstacles in theory and practice. The Red Army’s Long March promoted the organic combination of the basic principles of Marxism with the concrete reality of the Chinese revolution, and it was also a magnificent expedition that tested truth. Xi Jinping pointed out: “The path traversed by the Long March not only crossed thousands of mountains and rivers, but also crossed the erroneous ideological obstacle of treating Marxism as an immutable dogma.” In the Long March, filled with trials of life and death, Chinese Communists, mainly represented by Comrade Mao Zedong, applied the basic positions, basic viewpoints, and basic methods of Marxism to the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, opposed the erroneous tendency to dogmatize Marxism and to sanctify the resolutions of the Communist International and Soviet experience, and promoted the new development of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times. Only by combining the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete reality of the Chinese revolution and independently solving the major issues of the Chinese revolution could the Chinese revolution win victory. This was “the truth that the Chinese Communists derived from bloody lessons and the tests of struggle.”
恩格斯指出:“我们的理论是发展着的理论,而不是必须背得烂熟并机械地加以重复的教条。”思考问题和解决问题的方式必须以时间、地点、条件为转移,勇于突破理论和实践上的各种教条主义障碍。红军长征促进了马克思主义基本原理同中国革命具体实际的有机结合,同时也是一次检验真理的壮阔远征。习近平指出:“长征走过的道路,不仅翻越了千山万水,而且翻越了把马克思主义当做一成不变的教条的错误思想障碍。”在充满生死考验的长征中,以毛泽东同志为主要代表的中国共产党人,把马克思主义基本立场、基本观点、基本方法运用于中国革命具体实践,反对把马克思主义教条化、把共产国际决议和苏联经验神圣化的错误倾向,推动了马克思主义中国化时代化的新发展。只有把马克思列宁主义基本原理同中国革命具体实际相结合,独立自主解决中国革命的重大问题,中国革命才能赢得胜利,这是中国共产党人“在血的教训和斗争考验中得出的真理”。
II. Establishing a Strong Leadership Core, Consolidating the Organizational Foundation for Adapting Marxism to the Chinese Context and the Needs of the Times
二 确立坚强领导核心,夯实马克思主义中国化时代化的组织基础
Any political party should have a leadership core. A strong and powerful leadership core is the political guarantee and organizational support for the development of the party and the progress of its cause. As Engels said: “Without authority, there can be no unified action whatsoever.” The success of the proletarian cause must be led by a Marxist party, and a strong and powerful Marxist party must have “authority” and must have a “first violinist” as its leadership core. Only in this way can the Party’s organizational rigor and advanced nature be ensured, and can the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times be correctly advanced. The Long March period was an important stage in the formation of the first generation of the central collective leadership with Comrade Mao Zedong at its core, building a solid organizational foundation for promoting the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times.
任何政党都应该有领导核心,坚强有力的领导核心是政党发展、事业进步的政治保证与组织支撑。正如恩格斯所说:“没有权威,就不可能有任何的一致行动。”无产阶级事业的成功,必须由马克思主义政党来领导,而一个坚强有力的马克思主义政党必须有“权威”,必须有“第一提琴手”作为领导核心。唯有如此,才能保证组织的严密性和先进性,才能正确推进马克思主义中国化时代化。长征时期是以毛泽东同志为核心的第一代中央领导集体形成的重要阶段,构筑起了推进马克思主义中国化时代化的坚实组织基础。
(1) The Lack of a Mature and Stable Leadership Core Was an Important Reason for the Setbacks in the Revolutionary Cause
(一)缺乏成熟稳定的领导核心是革命事业受挫的重要原因
The adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times is a process of theoretical innovation and also a process of practical innovation. The key factor driving innovation in the practice and theory of the Chinese revolution is the subject of practice or cognition, and this subject is the Communist Party of China. In the revolutionary struggles before the Zunyi Conference, an important reason for the long-standing Right errors and “Left” errors within the Party was that the Party Central Committee was not yet mature. Xi Jinping pointed out: “Before the Zunyi Conference, our Party was not yet mature, especially in that it had not formed a mature Party Central Committee, nor had it formed unity and solidarity across the entire Party. This was an important reason why the cause of the Party and the people repeatedly suffered setbacks and even faced the danger of failure in the early stages of the revolution.”
马克思主义中国化时代化是理论创新的过程,也是实践创新的过程。推动中国革命实践创新和理论创新的关键因素是实践或认识的主体,而这个主体就是中国共产党。在遵义会议前的革命斗争中,党内长期存在右倾错误、“左”倾错误的重要原因就是党中央还不成熟。习近平指出:“遵义会议前,我们党还不成熟,特别是没有形成一个成熟的党中央,没有形成全党的团结统一。这是党和人民事业在革命早期屡遭挫折甚至面临失败危险的重要原因。”
From the founding of the Party to the failure of the Great Revolution, Chen Duxiu was the principal responsible person of the Communist Party of China. Chen Duxiu made important contributions to the founding of the Party and the dissemination of Marxism, but his analysis of the reality of the Chinese revolution deviated; he was not adept at combining Marxism with China’s reality and committed Right opportunist errors. The Party’s third historical resolution [n] pointed out that “the Rightist thinking represented by Chen Duxiu within the Party developed into Right opportunist errors and occupied a dominant position in the Party’s leading organs,” which was an important reason for the failure of the Great Revolution.
从党的成立到大革命失败,陈独秀是中国共产党的主要负责人。陈独秀对建党以及马克思主义的传播等作出了重要贡献,但对中国革命实际的分析出现偏差,不善于把马克思主义与中国实际相结合,犯了右倾机会主义错误。党的第三个历史决议指出,“党内以陈独秀为代表的右倾思想发展为右倾机会主义错误并在党的领导机关中占了统治地位”,这是大革命失败的重要原因。
Faced with the defeat of the Great Revolution, the Party Central Committee convened the August 7th Meeting [1]1 The May Fourth Movement (1919) was an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal political and cultural movement initiated by Chinese students and intellectuals, which is regarded as the starting point of the New Democratic Revolution in China. and made timely adjustments, but “the August 7th Meeting, while opposing the right-opportunist error, opened the way for ‘Left’ errors.” Qu Qiubai and others confused the democratic revolution with the socialist revolution, erroneously assessed the situation of the Chinese revolution, and “ignoring the strength of the enemy and the conditions of the masses after the revolution’s defeat, ordered a small number of Party members and a small number of masses to organize local uprisings across the country that had no hope of victory.” [2]2 The Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC (January 1931) marked the rise of Wang Ming’s “Left” dogmatist line to dominance in the Party leadership. “Left” putschism brought grievous losses to the revolutionary cause. In April 1928, the Provisional Politburo of the CPC Central Committee issued a circular acknowledging the existence of “Left” putschist errors within the Party. The Sixth National Congress of the Party confirmed that the most dangerous tendencies at the time were putschism and commandism, promoting an important shift in the Party’s work policy, but “Left” thinking within the Party was not thoroughly eliminated, which laid the groundwork for the subsequent emergence of Li Lisan’s “Left” adventurism and Wang Ming’s “Left” dogmatism in succession. Li Lisan and others, who were actually in charge of the Central Committee’s work, did not acknowledge that the revolution required adequate subjective organizational preparation, did not acknowledge the unevenness of the Chinese revolution, did not acknowledge the unevenness of the world revolution, and did not acknowledge the protracted nature of the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution. They formulated several untimely “Left” policies, as well as the adventurist plan to organize armed uprisings in the country’s central cities and to concentrate the Red Army to attack the central cities, and they denounced the correct practices of Mao Zedong and others as “extremely erroneous” and as “peasant-minded localist and conservative concepts.” [3]3 The *Resolution on Certain Historical Issues* (1945) was an official Party document adopted at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, summing up the Party’s historical experiences and errors, including the “Left” lines. This “Left” adventurist error brought harm to the Party and the revolutionary cause in practice. The Party’s organizations in the white areas, especially in cities such as Wuhan and Nanjing, were almost entirely destroyed, and the rural base areas and the Red Army also suffered varying degrees of loss. In September 1930, the Enlarged Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party corrected the “Li Lisan line,” and Li Lisan himself also engaged in self-criticism. However, neither the Enlarged Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee nor the subsequent Central Committee clarified or settled accounts with the ideological essence of the “Li Lisan line”; a number of “Left” ideas and “Left” policies within the Party “still existed thickly.” [4]4 The “Channel Turn” (通道转兵) refers to the decision made at a temporary meeting in Tongdao, Hunan, in December 1934, to abandon the original plan of joining forces with the Second and Sixth Army Groups in western Hunan and instead march into Guizhou. At the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party, Wang Ming “raised the banners of ‘upholding the international line,’ ‘opposing the Li Lisan line,’ and ‘opposing conciliationism,’ linked up with and incited a part of the Party members to oppose the Third Plenary Session and the Central Committee that followed it, demanding a thorough remolding of the Party’s leading organs.” [5]5 The Liping Conference (黎平会议) was a meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held in Liping, Guizhou, in December 1934, which formally adopted Mao Zedong’s proposal to advance into Guizhou. In his pamphlet “The Struggle for the Further Bolshevization of the Communist Party of China,” Wang Ming concentratedly expounded his dogmatic line; the political strategies, military strategies, and cadre policies adopted in practical work during this period were erroneous in their main aspects. Viewed as a whole, this line “was more resolute, more ‘theoretical,’ more arrogant in tone, and more complete in form than the ‘Left’ of the Li Lisan line,” [6]6 The Houchang Conference (猴场会议) was a meeting of the Political Bureau held in Houchang, Guizhou, in early January 1935, which further restricted the military command authority of Bo Gu and Li De. and its harm to the Party and the revolutionary cause was undoubtedly the greatest.
面对大革命的失败,党中央召开八七会议作出及时调整,但“八七会议在反对右倾错误的时候,却为‘左’倾错误开辟了道路”。瞿秋白等人混淆民主革命和社会主义革命,错误地估计中国革命形势,“不顾敌人的强大和革命失败后的群众情况,命令少数党员和少数群众在全国组织毫无胜利希望的地方起义”。“左”倾盲动主义给革命事业带来了惨痛损失。1928年4月,中共中央临时政治局发出通告,承认党内存在着“左”倾盲动错误。党的六大确认当时最主要的危险倾向是盲动主义和命令主义,推动了党的工作方针发生重要转变,但“左”的思想在党内并没有被彻底清除,这为后来李立三的“左”倾冒险主义和王明的“左”倾教条主义的接连出现埋下了伏笔。实际主持中央工作的李立三等人,不承认革命需要主观组织力量的充分准备,不承认中国革命的不平衡性,不承认世界革命的不平衡性,也不承认中国资产阶级民主革命的长期性,制定了若干不合时宜的“左”倾政策,以及组织全国中心城市武装起义和集中全国红军进攻中心城市的冒险计划,并指责毛泽东等人的正确做法是所谓“极端错误的”和“农民意识的地方观念与保守观念”。这种“左”倾冒险主义错误,在实践中给党和革命事业带来了危害。党在白区,尤其是武汉、南京等城市的党组织几乎全部被破坏,农村根据地和红军也受到不同程度的损失。1930年9月,党的扩大的六届三中全会对“立三路线”进行了纠正,李立三本人也做了自我批评。但无论党的扩大的六届三中全会或其后的党中央,对于“立三路线”的思想实质,都没有加以清算和纠正,党内的若干“左”倾思想和“左”倾政策“还是浓厚地存在着”。在党的六届四中全会上,王明打起“‘拥护国际路线’、‘反对立三路线’、‘反对调和主义’的旗号,串联并鼓动一部分党员反对三中全会及其后的中央,要求彻底改造党的领导机关”。王明在《为中共更加布尔塞维克化而斗争》的小册子中集中阐明了其教条主义路线,这一时期在实际工作中所采取的政治策略、军事策略和干部政策在主要方面都是错误的。从整体上看,这种路线“比立三路线的‘左’倾更坚决,更‘有理论’,气焰更盛,形态也更完备了”,对党和革命事业的危害无疑也是最大的。
Whether it was the right-opportunist line or the “Left” putschist, adventurist, and dogmatic lines, the common cause of their emergence lay in the Party’s immaturity, especially the lack of a mature Party Central Committee. The Party’s theoretical preparation in Marxism was insufficient, it lacked practical experience, it did not have a thorough understanding of China’s history, its actual society, and the characteristics and laws of the Chinese revolution, and it was not adept at integrating the basic principles of Marxism with the concrete realities of the Chinese revolution, causing the Party and the revolutionary cause to suffer setbacks time and again.
无论是右倾机会主义路线,还是“左”倾盲动主义、冒险主义、教条主义路线,其产生的共同原因在于党还不成熟,特别是还没有一个成熟的党中央,党的马克思主义理论准备不足,缺乏实践经验,对中国的历史、现实社会以及中国革命的特点与规律不甚了解,还不善于把马克思主义基本原理同中国革命具体实际相结合,致使党和革命事业一次次遭受挫折。
The immaturity of the Party Central Committee was also manifested in the insufficient exercise of the Party’s independence under the command of the Communist International, especially in the blind obedience and mechanical execution of the Communist International’s directives by Wang Ming, Bo Gu, and others.
党中央的不成熟还表现为在共产国际指挥下党的独立自主性发挥不足,特别是王明、博古等人盲目地服从、机械地执行共产国际的指示。
As mentioned above, various erroneous lines emerged within the Party before the Zunyi Conference. The establishment and implementation of these erroneous lines were due not only to the Party’s own lack of revolutionary struggle experience but also to the erroneous guidance of the Communist International. The Communist Party of China was founded with the help of the Communist International, and the “Resolution on the Chinese Communist Party’s Accession to the Third International” clearly stipulated that the CPC was a branch of the Communist International. Under these circumstances, the CPC had to implement the resolutions of the Communist International’s congresses and its Executive Committee. Because the Communist International had major deviations in its understanding of the specific conditions of the Chinese revolution, it implemented a “Left” political line from the early period of the Agrarian Revolution, which grew step by step. For example, the “Left” views of Besso Lominadze, such as the “theory of uninterrupted revolution” and the “city-center theory,” were important theoretical supports for “Left” putschism. “The Communist International representative Lominadze bore major responsibility for the emergence of this ‘Left’ error; he was the main proposer and implementer of political putschism, organizational punitivism, and other ‘Left’ policies.” [7]7 The Party’s third historical resolution refers to the “Resolution on Certain Historical Issues of the Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China,” adopted at the 11th Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee in 1981. In January 1931, the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party was convened under the direct intervention of Pavel Mif. “The dominance of Wang Ming’s ‘Left’ dogmatic error in the Central Committee was caused by multiple factors, especially inseparable from the direct, imposed, and incorrect intervention of the Communist International.” [8]8 The “Li Lisan line” refers to the “Left” adventurist line represented by Li Lisan that dominated the CPC Central Committee from June to September 1930, advocating for immediate uprisings in major cities. It can be seen that, on the one hand, the Communist International did not fully understand the concrete realities of the Chinese revolution and, in the manner of “superiors giving orders to subordinates,” copied and transplanted the methods of the Soviet proletarian revolution wholesale into China; on the other hand,
如前所述,遵义会议前党内出现了各种错误路线。这些错误路线的确立和执行,除了党自身革命斗争的经验不足外,共产国际的错误指导也是重要原因。中国共产党是在共产国际的帮助下成立的,《中国共产党加入第三国际决议案》明确规定,中国共产党是共产国际的支部。在这种情况下,中国共产党必须执行共产国际代表大会及其执委会的决议。由于共产国际对中国革命的具体情况在认识上存在重大偏差,因而从土地革命初期就贯彻了偏“左”的政治路线,并一步步滋长起来。如罗米那兹“无间断革命论”“城市中心论”的“左”倾观点,就是“左”倾盲动主义的重要理论支撑。“共产国际代表罗米那兹对这次‘左’倾错误的出现负有重要责任,他是政治上的盲动主义、组织上的惩办主义以及其他‘左’倾政策的主要提出者和推行者”。1931年1月,党的六届四中全会是在米夫的直接干预下召开的,“王明‘左倾’教条主义错误在中央的统治,这是由多方面因素造成的,尤其是同共产国际直接的、强加于人的、不正确的干预分不开的”。可见,一方面是共产国际不完全了解中国革命的具体实际,以“上级命令下级”的方式,把苏联无产阶级革命的方法照搬照抄到中国来;另一方面是革命经验欠缺的中国共产党盲目执行共产国际决议,王明、博古等人把苏联经验、共产国际决议绝对化和神圣化,未能坚守马克思主义同中国具体实际相结合的正确方向,这是党犯路线错误的根本思想原因。
The basic principles of scientific socialism indicate that the cause of the proletarian revolution must be led by a proletarian party, and the historical practice of the Chinese revolution has proven that without a stable and mature leading collective and a strong leadership core, adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times cannot proceed smoothly, and the cause of the Chinese revolution can hardly achieve victory.
科学社会主义基本原理指明了无产阶级革命事业必须由无产阶级政党领导,而中国革命的历史实践证明,没有一个稳定成熟的领导集体和坚强的领导核心,马克思主义中国化时代化就不能顺利推进,中国革命事业就难以取得胜利。
(II) The Zunyi Conference Established a Strong Leadership Core
(二)遵义会议确定坚强领导核心
In the process of upholding truth and correcting errors, the Chinese Communists gradually established the correct leadership of the first generation of the central leading collective with Comrade Mao Zedong at its core. Guided by Marxism and proceeding from the actual conditions of the Chinese revolution, Mao Zedong and others waged a struggle against various erroneous lines existing within the Party. Mao Zedong not only never endorsed the “Li Lisan line”[8]8 The “Li Lisan line” refers to the “Left” adventurist line represented by Li Lisan that dominated the CPC Central Committee from June to September 1930, advocating for immediate uprisings in major cities. but also, with great patience, corrected the “Left” errors in the First Front Army of the Red Army. Consequently, the Red Army in the Jiangxi revolutionary base area not only suffered no losses during this period but, on the contrary, took advantage of the favorable situation created by the outbreak of the Central Plains War[9]9 The Central Plains War (1930) was a large-scale military conflict between the Nationalist (KMT) factions of Chiang Kai-shek and a coalition of regional warlords, which diverted KMT attention from the Communist base areas. to develop and achieve victory in the first counter-“encirclement and suppression” campaign.[10]10 The first counter-“encirclement and suppression” campaign (December 1930–January 1931) was the successful Communist military response to the first of five major KMT campaigns to destroy the Jiangxi Soviet base area. Before the Party Central Committee after the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee[11]11 The Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC (January 1931) brought the “28 Bolsheviks” faction, backed by the Comintern and led by Wang Ming, to power, marking the ascendancy of dogmatic “Left” line in the Party. had time to implement its erroneous line, Mao Zedong correctly led the second and third counter-“encirclement and suppression” campaigns to victory. However, the correct line represented by Mao Zedong resolutely fought against “Left” dogmatism, which led to Mao Zedong gradually being pushed out of the central leadership and losing his command over the military. The dogmatist provisional central leadership even extended its marginalization to all Party cadres who supported Mao Zedong’s correct views; the struggle against the so-called “Jiangxi Luo Ming line”[12]12 The “Jiangxi Luo Ming line” was a fabricated label used in 1933 to attack cadres in the Jiangxi Soviet who supported Mao Zedong’s more pragmatic military and land policies, named after Luo Ming, a Fujian provincial leader. was an important manifestation of this.
中国共产党人在坚持真理、修正错误的过程中,逐渐确立起以毛泽东同志为核心的第一代中央领导集体的正确领导。毛泽东等人以马克思主义为指导,从中国革命的实际出发,同党内存在的各种错误路线展开斗争。毛泽东不但始终没有赞成“立三路线”,而且以极大的耐心纠正红一方面军中的“左”倾错误,江西革命根据地的红军因而在这个时期内不但没有受到损失,反而利用了当时发生中原大战的有利形势得到了发展,并取得了第一次反“围剿”斗争的胜利。在党的六届四中全会后的党中央还没有来得及贯彻其错误路线的情况之下,毛泽东又正确领导了第二次和第三次反“围剿”斗争并取得胜利。但是,以毛泽东为代表的正确路线坚决同“左”倾教条主义作斗争,却使毛泽东逐渐被排挤出中央,并失去了对军队的指挥权。教条主义临时中央的排挤甚至扩大到一切支持毛泽东正确主张的党员干部,反对所谓“江西罗明路线”的斗争就是一个重要表现。
The Zunyi Conference “victoriously ended the domination of the ‘Left’ line in the Party Central Committee.” The Resolution on Certain Historical Issues[13]13 The Resolution on Certain Historical Issues (1945), adopted at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, was the Party’s official appraisal of its history from 1921 to 1945, condemning the “Left” and Right deviations. points out that the Zunyi Conference “began the new leadership of the Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Zedong, which was the most historically significant turning point within the Chinese Party.” This shift was not only a change in leadership organization but also a change in the ideological line, opening a new chapter in which the Chinese Communist Party, proceeding from reality, independently resolved the problems of the Chinese revolution. Thereafter, the Party and the Red Army gradually extricated themselves from the passive and beleaguered situation brought about by the dogmatist line, laying a solid organizational foundation for the victory of the Long March. As the Party’s third historical resolution[14]14 The Party’s third historical resolution refers to the Resolution on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century, adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee in November 2021. summarized, the Zunyi Conference “opened a new stage in which the Party independently resolved the practical problems of the Chinese revolution.” After the Zunyi Conference, under the correct leadership of the Party Central Committee, the Red Army crossed the Chishui River four times, skillfully crossed the Jinsha River, captured the Luding Bridge by force, forced the Dadu River, traversed snowy mountains and grasslands, and ultimately successfully achieved the great strategic shift. The victory of the Red Army’s Long March was the key to turning the Chinese revolution from peril to safety.
遵义会议“胜利地结束了‘左’倾路线在党中央的统治”。《关于若干历史问题的决议》指出,遵义会议“开始了以毛泽东同志为首的中央的新的领导,是中国党内最有历史意义的转变”。这一转变不仅是领导组织上的转变,更是思想路线的转变,开启了中国共产党一切从实际出发,独立自主地解决中国革命问题的新篇章。党和红军此后逐渐摆脱了教条主义路线带来的被动挨打的局面,为长征胜利奠定了坚实的组织基础。正如党的第三个历史决议所总结的,遵义会议“开启了党独立自主解决中国革命实际问题新阶段”。遵义会议后,在党中央的正确领导下,红军四渡赤水、巧渡金沙江、飞夺泸定桥、强渡大渡河、跨越雪山草地,最终胜利实现了战略大转移。红军长征的胜利,是中国革命转危为安的关键。
The first generation of the central collective leadership, with Comrade Mao Zedong at its core, was proven by practice to be a mature and stable leadership collective. After being tempered by the Long March, the War of Resistance Against Japan [n15], and other ordeals, this leadership collective was finally established at the Seventh National Congress of the Party [n16] and became the strong leading force for China’s revolution and construction. As Deng Xiaoping pointed out, “From Chen Duxiu onward, right up to the Zunyi Conference [n17], there was not a single session that was truly mature,” and “in the history of our Party, the truly mature leadership began with the generation of Mao, Liu, Zhou, and Zhu [n18].” It was precisely because of such a strong leadership collective and its core that the great practical undertaking of China’s revolution and construction, and the theoretical innovation of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times, had an increasingly mature mainstay, enabling them to continuously advance from victory to new victory.
以毛泽东同志为核心的第一代中央领导集体是被实践证明了的成熟、稳定的领导集体,经过长征、全民族抗战等洗礼,这一领导集体最终在党的七大上被确立下来,并成为中国革命和建设事业的坚强领导力量。正如邓小平所指出的,“从陈独秀起,一直到遵义会议,没有一届是真正成熟的”,“我们党的历史上,真正形成成熟的领导,是从毛刘周朱这一代开始”。正是有了这样一个坚强的领导集体及其领导核心,中国革命和建设的实践伟业、马克思主义中国化时代化的理论创新才有了越来越成熟的主心骨,才能不断从胜利走向新的胜利。
The history of Party organizational building during the Long March proves: a strong and independent leadership collective is the fundamental guarantee for the development of the revolutionary cause and also the fundamental political prerequisite for adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times. At all times, we must maintain the Party’s advanced nature in both theory and practice, and maintain the maturity and stability of the Party Central Committee.
长征中党的组织建设的历史证明:一个坚强有力、独立自主的领导集体,是革命事业发展的根本保证,也是马克思主义中国化时代化的根本政治前提。任何时候,我们都必须在理论和实践上保持党的先进性,保持党中央的成熟与稳定。
III. Implementing the Mass Line, Consolidating the Mass Foundation for Adapting Marxism to the Chinese Context and the Needs of the Times
三 贯彻群众路线,筑牢马克思主义中国化时代化的群众基础
The mass line is “the Party’s lifeline and fundamental working method,” providing value guidance, a source of strength, and a scientific method for adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times. The starting point and ultimate goal of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times is to guide the Party and the people’s revolutionary and construction undertakings to success. The process of theoretical innovation in adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times is also inseparable from the practice of the broad masses of the people. As Mao Zedong said, correct understanding is “to concentrate the views of the masses and then persist in them among the masses. In such an endless cycle, it becomes more correct, more vivid, and richer each time.” The Long March period was an important period for the Party to implement the mass line, and the practice of the Long March consolidated the mass foundation for adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times.
群众路线是“党的生命线和根本工作路线”,为马克思主义中国化时代化提供价值指引、力量源泉和科学方法。马克思主义中国化时代化的出发点和落脚点是指导党和人民的革命、建设事业取得成功,马克思主义中国化时代化的理论创新过程也离不开广大人民群众的实践。正如毛泽东所说,正确的认识就是“从群众中集中起来,再到群众中坚持下去。如此无限循环,一次比一次地更正确、更生动、更丰富”。长征时期是党贯彻群众路线的重要时期,长征的实践筑牢了马克思主义中国化时代化的群众基础。
(1) All for the Masses, Rely on the Masses in Everything: The Value Foundation and Source of Strength for Adapting Marxism to the Chinese Context and the Needs of the Times
(一)一切为了群众,一切依靠群众:马克思主义中国化时代化的价值根基和力量源泉
During the Long March, the Party’s adherence to the mass line was first embodied in the value commitment and strength support of “all for the masses, rely on the masses in everything.” “All for the masses” answers the question of the original aspiration of “for whom is the revolution, for whom is the struggle,” constituting the value foundation for adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times. “Rely on the masses in everything” is the practical extension of this value stance, answering the question of the driving force of “on what does victory depend,” constituting the source of strength for adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times. The great Long March is precisely a vivid textbook for understanding this dialectical relationship.
在长征途中,党坚持群众路线首先体现为“一切为了群众,一切依靠群众”的价值坚守与力量支撑。“一切为了群众”回答了“革命为了谁、奋斗为了谁”的初心之问,构成了马克思主义中国化时代化的价值根基;“一切依靠群众”则是这一价值立场的实践延伸,回答了“胜利靠什么”的动力之问,构成了马克思主义中国化时代化的力量源泉。伟大的长征,正是理解这一辩证关系的生动教科书。
Wherever the Red Army went during the Long March, it strictly enforced the “Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention” [n19], abolished exorbitant taxes and levies, struck at local tyrants and evil gentry, and distributed daily necessities such as grain, salt, cloth, and land to the poor and common people, safeguarding the people’s vital interests through concrete actions. As Chen Yun recalled in his “A Journey to the West with the Army”: “The reason the Red Army won the hearts of the people was not only because the rural peasants supported the Red Army’s propaganda and actions of ‘striking local tyrants, distributing land’ and ‘confiscating the grain of local tyrants and evil gentry and distributing it to the peasants,’ but also because the army had discipline. The Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention of Zhu Mao’s Red Army (I have forgotten the exact content) indeed made the Red Army soldiers abide by them.” It was precisely this value orientation of safeguarding the fundamental interests of the broad masses that made the people truly feel that the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army was their own army, thus establishing a flesh-and-blood bond of life-and-death interdependence and shared hardships between the Party and the people.
红军在长征中所到之处,严格执行“三大纪律八项注意”,废除苛捐杂税,打击土豪劣绅,把粮食、盐、布、土地等生活物资分给贫苦百姓,以实际行动维护群众的切身利益。正如陈云在《随军西行见闻录》中所回忆的:“赤军之所以能得民心者,不仅在于乡村农民拥护赤军‘打土豪,分土地’、‘没收土豪劣绅的谷米分给农民’之宣传和行动,而且在于军队有纪律。朱毛赤军中之三大纪律、八项注意,(内容我已记不清),确使赤军兵士遵守。”正是这种维护广大人民群众根本利益的价值取向,让群众真切感受到工农红军是自己的队伍,从而奠定了党同人民群众生死相依、患难与共的血肉联系。
Correctly handling ethnic relations was a typical example of “all for the masses” during the Long March. The Central Red Army’s Long March covered 25,000 li [n20], passing through eleven provinces and successively traversing the compact communities of multiple ethnic minorities, including Miao, Yao, Zhuang, Dong, Shui, Bouyei, Gelao, Tujia, Bai, Naxi, Yi, Tibetan, Qiang, Yugur, Hui, and Mongol. Handling relations with ethnic minorities well became an important manifestation of the Party’s implementation of the mass line. In handling ethnic affairs, the Party attached great importance to cultivating deep friendships with the masses of ethnic minorities, actively practicing major ethnic theories and policies such as Marxist ethnic equality, ethnic unity, and freedom of religious belief, fully respecting the unique customs and habits of each ethnic minority, and earnestly safeguarding the vital interests of the ethnic minority people. At the same time, the Red Army also relied on various methods such as assembly lectures, village visits, posting slogans, propaganda catchphrases, cultural and artistic education, and household visits to widely disseminate Marxism and the Party’s revolutionary propositions. It was precisely for this reason that the Red Army won the heartfelt support of the people of all ethnicities along the Long March route. In “A Journey to the West with the Army,” Chen Yun detailed the Red Army’s policy towards the Miao people after entering Guizhou, such as treating the Miao people with an attitude of equality in propaganda, opposing warlord oppression, demanding the arming and liberation of the Miao people, fully respecting the interests of the Miao people, and always avoiding conflicts with them. When the Central Red Army crossed the Jinsha River and reached the Yi ethnic compact community in the Liangshan area, the “Proclamation of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army” issued by Commander-in-Chief Zhu De in the Yi area stated, “The Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army liberates the weak and small ethnic groups; all Yi and Han commoners are brothers and flesh and bone,” and “truly equal and free, no longer bullied by others.” Furthermore, the historical story of Liu Bocheng and Xiao Yedan’s “Alliance at the Yi Sea” [n21] has been passed down to this day and is the best historical testimony of the Red Army uniting with ethnic minorities. It can be seen that during the Long March, the Party and the Red Army, proceeding from reality, formulated and implemented ethnic policies that conformed to local conditions, effectively implementing and consolidating the mass line, laying the mass foundation for uniting the forces of ethnic minorities, passing through ethnic areas, and achieving the strategic shift.
正确处理民族关系,是“一切为了群众”在长征中的一个典型例证。中央红军长征行程两万五千里,途经十一个省份,沿途先后经过苗、瑶、壮、侗、水、布依、仡佬、土家、白、纳西、彝、藏、羌、裕固、回、蒙古等多个少数民族的聚居地区,处理好与少数民族的关系问题成为党贯彻群众路线的重要表现。党在处理民族事务的过程中,高度重视培养与少数民族群众的深厚情谊,积极践行马克思主义的民族平等、民族团结以及宗教信仰自由等重大民族理论与政策,充分尊重各少数民族独有的风俗习惯,切实保障少数民族人民的切身利益。与此同时,红军还依托集会宣讲、村落走访、张贴标语、口号宣传、文艺教化、入户宣讲等多种方式,广泛传播马克思主义与党的革命主张。也正因如此,红军获得了长征沿途各族人民的衷心拥护。陈云在《随军西行见闻录》中详细记述了红军进入贵州后对苗族的政策,如在宣传上以平等的态度对待苗家,反对军阀压迫,要求武装苗家,解放苗家,并充分尊重苗家的利益,时刻避免和苗家起冲突。中央红军在渡过金沙江到达凉山彝族聚居区时,朱德总司令在彝区签发的《中国工农红军布告》中指出,“中国工农红军,解放弱小民族;一切彝汉平民,都是兄弟骨肉”,“真正平等自由,再不受人欺辱”。此外,刘伯承与小叶丹“彝海结盟”的历史佳话流传至今,更是红军团结少数民族最好的历史见证。可见,党和红军在长征中从实际出发,制定和执行符合当地民情的民族政策,有力地贯彻和筑牢了群众路线,为团结少数民族力量,通过民族地区,实现战略转移奠定了群众基础。
Precisely because the Party consistently adhered to the value stance of “all for the masses” during the Long March, the masses voluntarily became the Party’s most solid reliance. The American journalist Edgar Snow pointed out in *Red Star Over China* that the Chinese Communist Party “armed thousands upon thousands of peasants, left cadres to train guerrilla units, and made the Nanjing troops run ragged ever after.” During the Long March, the masses not only enthusiastically joined the army but also actively raised supplies, provided medical aid, and unhesitatingly sheltered the wounded. It was precisely by relying on the selfless dedication and full support of the broad masses that the Red Army was able to break through numerous obstacles, survive countless desperate situations, and victoriously complete the great Long March.
正因为党在长征中始终坚持“一切为了群众”的价值立场,群众才自愿成为党最坚实的依靠。美国记者埃德加·斯诺在《西行漫记》里指出,中国共产党“武装了千千万万的农民,留下干部来训练游击队,使南京军队从此疲于奔命”。在长征途中,群众不仅踊跃参军,还主动筹措物资、提供医疗救助,义无反顾地掩护伤员。正是依靠广大人民群众的无私奉献、全力支持,红军才能冲破重重险阻,渡过无数艰难绝境,胜利完成伟大的长征。
The dialectical unity of “all for the masses” and “rely on the masses in everything” profoundly reveals the value foundation and source of strength for adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times. As Mao Zedong said: “What is a true bastion of iron? It is the masses, the millions upon millions of people who sincerely support the revolution. That is a true bastion of iron, which no force can break, absolutely cannot be broken.” This assertion contains profound historical logic: the “bastion of iron” did not exist naturally; rather, because the Party chose the value stance of “all for the masses,” the masses consciously and voluntarily became the strength guarantee for “rely on the masses in everything.” The two are unified in the theoretical foundation combining the Marxist view of the masses with the people-oriented thought in fine traditional Chinese culture. The practice of the Long March shows that an important reason why Marxism was able to take root, blossom, and bear fruit on Chinese soil is that the Chinese Communist Party has always insisted on placing the people at the center of all work, closely integrating the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism with the actual interests of the Chinese people and the survival and development of all ethnic groups in China.
“一切为了群众”与“一切依靠群众”的辩证统一,深刻揭示了马克思主义中国化时代化的价值根基与力量源泉。正如毛泽东所说:“真正的铜墙铁壁是什么?是群众,是千百万真心实意地拥护革命的群众。这是真正的铜墙铁壁,什么力量也打不破的,完全打不破的。”这一论断蕴含着深刻的历史逻辑:“铜墙铁壁”不是天然存在的,而是因为党选择了“一切为了群众”的价值立场,群众才自觉自愿地成为“一切依靠群众”的力量保障,二者统一于马克思主义群众史观与中华优秀传统文化中的民本思想相结合的理论根基之中。长征的实践表明,马克思主义之所以能够在中国大地扎根、开花、结果,重要原因就在于中国共产党始终坚持把人民置于一切工作的中心,把马列主义普遍真理同中国人民的实际利益、同中国各民族的生存发展紧密结合起来。
(2) From the Masses, to the Masses: The Scientific Method for Adapting Marxism to the Chinese Context and the Needs of the Times
(二)从群众中来,到群众中去:马克思主义中国化时代化的科学方法
The Party’s implementation of the mass line during the Long March was also embodied in its adherence to the scientific method of “from the masses, to the masses.” The Party and the Red Army always placed the improvement of the masses’ livelihood, leadership of the masses’ struggles, and winning the broad support of the masses at the top of all work priorities. As Mao Zedong emphasized: “Organizing revolutionary war and improving the livelihood of the masses are our two major tasks.” [22]22 Mao Zedong, “Our Economic Policy” (August 1933), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 1. Therefore, wherever the Red Army troops went, the policy of “overthrowing the local tyrants and distributing the land” was implemented. Going deep among the masses, understanding their urgent concerns and difficulties, and solving their practical problems were important methods for the Party to maintain close ties with the masses. At the same time, the Party also humbly learned from the masses. In the construction of the Party’s military democratic system, convening “Zhuge Liang meetings” [23]23 “Zhuge Liang meeting” (诸葛亮会) refers to a brainstorming session or meeting to pool collective wisdom, named after Zhuge Liang, the legendary strategist of the Three Kingdoms period. was an important manifestation of the Party drawing wisdom from ordinary soldiers and the masses, a method fully utilized during the Long March. The breakthrough of the natural barrier of the Wujiang River was a major victory during the Long March. Geng Biao, then commander of the 4th Regiment of the 2nd Division of the 1st Red Army Corps, personally participated in the Red Army’s forced crossing of the Wujiang River and later wrote an inscription commemorating the Red Army’s breakthrough: “A flying crossing of the natural barrier, shaking the past and astounding the present.” [24]24 Geng Biao (1909–2000) was a senior Chinese Communist military commander and later a diplomat. Geng Biao recounted in his memoirs that it was precisely by mobilizing the masses, drawing wisdom from soldiers who had been carpenters, bamboo weavers, and blacksmiths before joining the army, as well as from local villagers, and creatively devising a method of building bamboo rafts for a pontoon bridge, that the Red Army successfully broke through the natural barrier of the Wujiang River. Mao Zedong pointed out: “It must be understood that the masses are the real heroes, while we ourselves are often childish and ignorant; without understanding this, it is impossible to acquire even the most rudimentary knowledge.” [25]25 Mao Zedong, “Preface and Postscript to ‘Rural Surveys’” (March/April 1941), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 3.
党在长征中贯彻群众路线,还体现为坚持“从群众中来,到群众中去”的科学方法。党和红军始终把改善群众生活、领导群众斗争、赢得广大群众拥护放在全部工作的重中之重。正如毛泽东所强调的:“组织革命战争,改良群众生活,这是我们的两大任务。”因此,红军部队走到哪里,“打土豪、分田地”的政策就执行到哪里。深入群众,了解他们的急难愁盼,解决他们的实际问题,是党密切联系群众的重要方法。与此同时,党还虚心向人民群众学习。在党的军事民主制度建设中,开“诸葛亮会”是党在普通战士和人民群众中间汲取智慧的重要体现,这一方法在长征中被充分运用。突破乌江天险是长征途中的一次重大胜利。时任红一军团第二师第四团团长的耿飚亲自参加了红军抢渡乌江的战役,并在后来为纪念红军突破乌江题词“天险飞渡,震古烁今”。耿飚曾在回忆录中讲道,正是依靠发动群众,从入伍前当过木工、篾匠、铁匠的战士和当地老乡那里汲取智慧,创造性地想出搭建竹排浮桥的方法,红军才成功突破了乌江天险。毛泽东指出,“必须明白:群众是真正的英雄,而我们自己则往往是幼稚可笑的,不了解这一点,就不能得到起码的知识”。
During the Long March, the Party also paid special attention to adhering to the principle of “to the masses,” that is, taking the scattered and perceptual opinions and demands of the masses, refining them through research into the Party’s systematic policies and propositions, and then returning them to the masses for implementation, transforming them into the masses’ conscious action. Along the route of the Long March, the Red Army used methods such as convening mass meetings and posting bulletins and slogans to explain the policy of “overthrowing the local tyrants and distributing the land” and the rationale for resisting Japan and marching north to the masses, thereby guiding and elevating them. At the same time, based on the results of the masses’ practice, the Party tested the policies and revised and improved decisions. Mao Zedong later profoundly summarized: “Concentrating ideas from the masses and then persisting in them among the masses, so as to form correct leadership opinions, this is the basic method of leadership.” [26]26 Mao Zedong, “Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership” (June 1943), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 3.
在长征中,党还特别注重坚持“到群众中去”,即将群众分散的、感性的意见与要求,经过研究提炼,上升为党的系统的政策主张,再回到群众中加以贯彻执行,使之转化为群众的自觉行动。长征途中,红军以召开群众大会、张贴布告标语等方式,把“打土豪、分田地”的政策、北上抗日的道理讲给群众,用以引导群众、提升群众。同时,又根据群众在实践中的结果检验政策、修正完善决策。毛泽东后来深刻总结道:“从群众中集中起来又到群众中坚持下去,以形成正确的领导意见,这是基本的领导方法。”
The practice of the Long March fully proved that correct decisions are never made behind closed doors but are gradually formed through the recurring cycle of “from the masses” and “to the masses.” It is necessary both to go deep among the masses, understand their opinions and needs, and respect the people’s initiative, and to transform the concentrated wisdom of the masses into policies and return them to the masses for implementation and testing; neither is dispensable. This is the methodological source for the Party to maintain close ties with the masses, enhance political wisdom, and improve its ability to struggle, and it is also a vivid manifestation of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times at the practical level.
长征的实践充分证明,正确的决策绝非闭门造车而来,而是在“从群众中来”与“到群众中去”的往复循环中逐步形成的。既要深入群众,了解群众的意见和需求,尊重人民的首创精神,又要将集中起来的群众智慧转化为政策并回到群众中贯彻检验,二者缺一不可。这是党密切联系群众、增长政治智慧、提升斗争本领的方法源泉,也是马克思主义中国化时代化在实践层面的生动体现。
The great Long March expanded the revolutionary forces, greatly enhanced the revolutionary influence, and made the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism and the propositions of the Chinese Communists deeply rooted in the hearts of the people. As Mao Zedong pointed out: “The Long March is the first of its kind in the annals of history, the Long March is a manifesto, the Long March is a propaganda team, the Long March is a seeder.” [27]27 Mao Zedong, “On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism” (December 1935), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 1. The victory of the Long March fully demonstrated that the masses are the foundation of the revolution. Only by winning the support and endorsement of the people, being adept at drawing wisdom and gaining strength from the masses, and continuously strengthening the close bond of shared weal and woe between the Party and the people, can the theory of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times be deeply rooted among the people. The Long March, through its severe tests and great practice, profoundly answered the fundamental question of “for whom and relying on whom is the revolution,” deepened the Party’s understanding of how to realize “from the masses, to the masses,” and laid the deepest mass foundation for the Party’s later leadership of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the War of Liberation, and ultimately the nationwide victory. Mao Zedong later summarized in *On Coalition Government*: “The people, and the people alone, are the motive force in the making of world history.” [28]28 Mao Zedong, *On Coalition Government* (April 1945), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 3. Today, as socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a New Era, Xi Jinping points out: “The people are the creators of history and the fundamental force determining the future and destiny of the Party and the country.” [29]29 Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Ceremony Marking the 95th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China” (July 1, 2016). No matter how times change, the mass line remains an important magic weapon for our Party to cope with various risks and challenges and continuously march from victory to victory, and it is the value guide, source of strength, and scientific method for promoting the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times.
伟大长征壮大了革命力量,极大提升了革命影响,使马列主义普遍真理和中国共产党人的主张深入人心。正如毛泽东指出的那样:“长征是历史纪录上的第一次,长征是宣言书,长征是宣传队,长征是播种机。”长征的胜利充分表明,群众是革命的根基,只有赢得人民群众的拥护与支持,善于从人民群众中汲取智慧、获得力量,不断系牢党同人民群众休戚与共的紧密纽带,才能使马克思主义中国化时代化的理论深深植根于人民群众之中。长征以严酷的考验、伟大的实践深刻回答了“革命为了谁、依靠谁”的根本问题,深化了党对如何实现“从群众中来,到群众中去”的认识,为党后来领导抗日战争、解放战争直至全国胜利奠定了最深厚的群众基础。毛泽东后来在《论联合政府》中总结道:“人民,只有人民,才是创造世界历史的动力。”时至今日,中国特色社会主义进入新时代,习近平指出:“人民是历史的创造者,是决定党和国家前途命运的根本力量。”无论时代如何变迁,群众路线都是我们党应对各种风险挑战、不断从胜利走向胜利的重要法宝,是推动马克思主义中国化时代化的价值指引、力量源泉和科学方法。
IV. Forging the Great Long March Spirit, Inspiring the Driving Force for Advancing the Adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese Context and the Needs of the Times
四 铸就伟大长征精神,激发推进马克思主义中国化时代化的奋进动力
Spiritual strength is the inner driving force condensed from ideas, values, and will and character, and it is the soul pillar supporting the survival and development of an individual, a nation, and a country. Xi Jinping clearly pointed out: “A person cannot stand without spirit, and a country cannot be strong without spirit.” [30]30 Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Conference Commemorating the 80th Anniversary of the Victory of the Red Army’s Long March” (October 21, 2016). The Long March forged the great Long March spirit. In the ninety years since the victory of the Long March, the Long March spirit has always kept pace with the times, continuously evolving and sublimating, becoming the driving force for Chinese Communists to inherit the red gene, continue the red bloodline, and continuously advance the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times. Today, on the new journey of the New Era, to promote the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times, we must draw wisdom and strength from the great Long March spirit and continuously open up new realms of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times in theoretical innovation and practical exploration.
精神力量是思想观念、价值追求、意志品格所凝聚的内在动力,是支撑一个人、一个民族、一个国家生存发展的灵魂支柱。习近平明确指出:“人无精神则不立,国无精神则不强。”长征铸就了伟大的长征精神。长征胜利九十年来,长征精神始终在时代发展中与时俱进、不断升华,成为中国共产党人传承红色基因、赓续红色血脉,不断推进马克思主义中国化时代化的奋进动力。如今,在新时代新征程中,推进马克思主义中国化时代化,必须从伟大长征精神中汲取智慧和力量,在理论创新与实践探索中不断开辟马克思主义中国化时代化新境界。
(1) The Process of Condensing the Long March Spirit: From Practical Tempering to Conceptual Sublimation
(一)长征精神的凝练历程:从实践淬炼到概念升华
The great Long March spirit was tempered in the Long March and propagated through the development of the times. At the Wayaobu Conference in December 1935, Mao Zedong compared the Long March to a manifesto, a propaganda team, and a seeder, providing a concise summary of the great significance and spiritual value of the Long March’s victory. [31]31 The Wayaobu Conference was a meeting of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee held in Wayaobu, northern Shaanxi, in December 1935, which formulated the strategy of the anti-Japanese national united front. On the eve of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong likened the victory of the Chinese revolution to “only the first step in a long march of ten thousand li,” [32]32 Mao Zedong, “Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China” (March 1949). a metaphor that elevated the Long March from a specific historical memory into a spiritual continuity passed down in an unbroken line. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the scientific connotation of the Long March spirit was further and deeply summarized. Yang Shangkun pointed out at the conference commemorating the 50th anniversary of the victory of the Red Army’s Long March: “What is the Red Army’s ‘Long March spirit’? In summary, it is the unwavering loyalty and firm conviction in revolutionary ideals and the revolutionary cause; it is the heroic spirit of fearing no sacrifice, daring to win, being full of optimism, and pressing forward indomitably; it is the noble character of taking the overall situation into account, strictly observing discipline, and maintaining close unity; it is the lofty thought of maintaining ties with the masses, working hard, and serving the people wholeheartedly.” [33]33 Yang Shangkun (1907–1998) was a senior Chinese Communist leader who served as President of the People’s Republic of China (1988–1993). This was a systematic expression of the Red Army’s Long March spirit. Subsequently, in major events such as the commemorations of the 60th and 70th anniversaries of the Long March, important speeches by Party and state leaders provided in-depth interpretations of the Long March spirit, continuously enriching and developing it.
伟大长征精神在长征中淬炼,在时代发展中传扬。在1935年12月的瓦窑堡会议上,毛泽东将长征比作宣言书、宣传队和播种机,对长征胜利的重大意义、精神价值作了精辟概括。在中华人民共和国成立前夕,毛泽东又把中国革命的胜利比作“万里长征走完了第一步”,这一比喻将长征从一段具体的历史记忆升华为一脉相承的精神延续。在中华人民共和国成立后,长征精神的科学内涵得到了进一步深入概括。杨尚昆在纪念红军长征胜利50周年大会上指出:“什么是红军的‘长征精神’呢?概括地说,就是对革命理想和革命事业无比忠诚、坚定不移的信念;就是不怕牺牲,敢于胜利,充满乐观,一往无前的英雄气概;就是顾全大局,严守纪律,亲密团结的高尚品德;就是联系群众,艰苦奋斗,全心全意为人民服务的崇高思想。”这是对红军长征精神作出的系统性表述。之后,在纪念长征60周年、70周年等重大活动中,党和国家领导人的重要讲话都对长征精神进行深入阐释,使之不断得到丰富和发展。
In 2016, Xi Jinping delivered an important speech at the conference commemorating the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Red Army’s Long March, providing a more systematic and comprehensive explanation of the scientific connotation of the Long March spirit. He pointed out: “The great Long March spirit is the spirit of placing the fundamental interests of the entire nation and the Chinese people above all else, firmly believing in revolutionary ideals and convictions, and firmly believing in the inevitable victory of a just cause; it is the spirit of fearing no difficulties or obstacles, and sparing no sacrifice to save the country and the people; it is the spirit of adhering to independence and self-reliance, seeking truth from facts, and proceeding from reality in everything; it is the spirit of taking the overall situation into account, strictly observing discipline, and maintaining close unity; it is the spirit of closely relying on the masses, sharing life and death, sharing weal and woe, and working hard with the masses.” [34]34 Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Conference Commemorating the 80th Anniversary of the Victory of the Red Army’s Long March” (October 21, 2016). This judgment, closely integrating the practical requirements of the New Era, elevated the core elements of the Long March spirit to a new height with greater theoretical systematicity and practical guidance, reflecting both the continuity of the spiritual lineage and the progressiveness of theoretical generalization keeping pace with the times.
2016年,习近平在纪念红军长征胜利80周年大会上发表重要讲话,对长征精神的科学内涵作出了更为系统全面的阐释。他指出:“伟大长征精神,就是把全国人民和中华民族的根本利益看得高于一切,坚定革命的理想和信念,坚信正义事业必然胜利的精神;就是为了救国救民,不怕任何艰难险阻,不惜付出一切牺牲的精神;就是坚持独立自主、实事求是,一切从实际出发的精神;就是顾全大局、严守纪律、紧密团结的精神;就是紧紧依靠人民群众,同人民群众生死相依、患难与共、艰苦奋斗的精神。”这一论断紧密结合新时代实践要求,将长征精神的核心要素提升到一个更具理论体系性和实践指导力的崭新高度,既体现了精神命脉的一脉相承,又展现了理论概括的与时俱进。
(2) The Contemporary Resonance of the Long March Spirit: Continuously Opening Up New Realms of Adapting Marxism to the Chinese Context and the Needs of the Times
(二)长征精神的当代回响:不断开辟马克思主义中国化时代化新境界
At the conference commemorating the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Red Army’s Long March, Xi Jinping profoundly pointed out: “No matter to what stage our cause develops, no matter what great achievements we have made, we must vigorously promote the great spirit of the Long March and continue to forge ahead courageously on the new Long March.” This assertion is not only a respect for and inheritance of history, but also the requirement of the times and the fundamental guideline for advancing the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times and for treading the new Long March well in the New Era. To advance the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times against the backdrop of the “two overall situations” [35]35 The “two overall situations” (两个大局) refers to the overall situation of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and the overall situation of changes unseen in a century in the world., we must draw wisdom and strength from the great spirit of the Long March, uphold the Party’s leadership, hold fast to the foundation of faith, abide by seeking truth from facts, stand firm on the people’s position, and carry forward the spirit of struggle, thereby continuously opening up new realms for adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times in the dialectical unity of theoretical innovation and practical exploration.
在纪念红军长征胜利80周年大会上,习近平深刻指出:“不论我们的事业发展到哪一步,不论我们取得了多大成就,我们都要大力弘扬伟大长征精神,在新的长征路上继续奋勇前进。”这一论断既是对历史的尊重与继承,更是新时代推进马克思主义中国化时代化、走好新的长征路的时代要求和根本遵循。在“两个大局”背景下推进马克思主义中国化时代化,必须从伟大长征精神中汲取智慧和力量,坚持党的领导、坚守信仰之基、恪守实事求是、站稳人民立场、发扬斗争精神,在理论创新与实践探索的辩证统一中不断开辟马克思主义中国化时代化新境界。
First, use the Party’s leadership to guide the direction of innovation in adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times. The leadership of the Communist Party of China is the fundamental guarantee for the victory of China’s revolution, construction, and reform, and it is also the core force for the Party to advance the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times during the Long March. Xi Jinping pointed out: “The Party exercises overall leadership over all areas of endeavor in every part of the country.” [36]36 This is a standard formulation from the 19th National Congress of the CPC report, emphasizing the Party’s leadership over all sectors of society. It was precisely because of the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee, forming a strong leading core, that the series of hardships and dangers faced during the Long March completely reversed the revolutionary crisis and preserved the revolutionary flame. The question of direction is the primary issue for the Party’s survival and development, and it is also the primary issue to be upheld in theoretical innovation. Xi Jinping once told a story: “When the Red Army was crossing the grasslands, the cook comrades, as soon as they got up, did not ask whether there was rice to cook today, but first asked whether they were heading south or north. This shows that in the Red Army ranks, even a cook understood that the question of direction was more important than what to eat.” This profoundly philosophical interpretation powerfully elucidates the extreme importance of the question of direction for a Marxist political party. This enlightens us that, on the new journey of the New Era, to advance the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times, we must “continuously promote the in-depth and practical study and implementation of Xi Jinping’s thought on Party building,” take the “Fourteen Perseverances” [37]37 The “Fourteen Perseverances” (十四个坚持) are the basic strategies outlined in Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, covering areas such as upholding Party leadership, people-centered development, and comprehensive deepening of reform. as the fundamental guideline and action guide for building a long-term governing Marxist party in the New Era, and constantly consolidate and strengthen the Party’s leadership, thereby ensuring that the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times always advances victoriously along the correct direction guided by the Party.
第一,以党的领导引领马克思主义中国化时代化的创新方向。中国共产党的领导是中国革命、建设和改革事业取得胜利的根本保证,也是党在长征中推进马克思主义中国化时代化的最核心力量。习近平指出:“党政军民学,东西南北中,党是领导一切的。”长征途中面临的一系列艰难险阻,正是因为有党中央的集中统一领导,形成了坚强的领导核心,才彻底扭转了革命危局,保住了革命火种。方向问题是党生存发展的第一位的问题,也是理论创新要坚持的首要问题。习近平曾讲过这样一个故事:“红军过草地的时候,伙夫同志一起床,不问今天有没有米煮饭,却先问向南走还是向北走。这说明在红军队伍里,即便是一名炊事员,也懂得方向问题比吃什么更重要。”这一深含哲理的解读有力阐明了方向问题对于马克思主义政党的极端重要性。这启示我们,在新时代新征程上推进马克思主义中国化时代化,必须“要持续推动学习贯彻习近平党建思想走深走实”,以“十四个坚持”为新时代建设长期执政的马克思主义政党的根本遵循和行动指南,不断巩固和加强党的领导,从而确保马克思主义中国化时代化始终沿着党指引的正确方向胜利前进。
Second, use ideals and convictions to provide inexhaustible impetus for adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times. The victory of the Long March was a victory of ideals and convictions. During the Long March, the Red Army faced powerful enemies several times its own size, harsh and adverse natural environments, material shortages, and severe tests from erroneous lines within the Party. Yet it was able to overcome countless hardships and dangers, traverse myriad mountains and rivers, and ultimately victoriously reach northern Shaanxi, relying on its firm belief in Marxism and its persistent pursuit of the cause of communism. This firm ideal and conviction was not superstition or blind obedience, but was established on a profound grasp of the scientific truth of Marxism, and was embodied in the unswerving arduous exploration of the Chinese revolutionary path. This historical experience profoundly enlightens us that, in the New Era of socialism with Chinese characteristics, to advance the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times, we must always remain firm in our ideals and convictions, fear no hardships or dangers amidst complex international and domestic situations, dare to break through and innovate, forge ahead courageously and keep pace with the times in the practice of the Two Integrations [38]38 The Two Integrations (两个结合) refers to integrating the basic tenets of Marxism with China’s specific realities and with the best of traditional Chinese culture., continuously open up new realms for adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times, and ensure that the Party’s innovative theories forever radiate powerful truth and inexhaustible practical strength.
第二,以理想信念为马克思主义中国化时代化提供不竭动力。长征的胜利,是理想信念的胜利。长征途中,红军面对数倍于自己的强敌、严酷恶劣的自然环境、物资匮乏和党内错误路线的严峻考验,依然能够战胜千难万险,跨越千山万水,最终胜利到达陕北,靠的就是对马克思主义的坚定信仰、对共产主义事业的执着追求。这一坚定理想信念不是迷信、盲从,而是建立在对马克思主义科学真理的深刻把握之上,体现在坚定不移地对中国革命道路的艰辛探索之中。这一历史经验深刻启示我们,在中国特色社会主义新时代,推进马克思主义中国化时代化,必须始终坚定理想信念,在复杂的国际国内形势中不畏艰难险阻,勇于突破、敢于创新,在“两个结合”的实践中勇往直前、与时俱进,不断开辟马克思主义中国化时代化新境界,使党的创新理论永远焕发强大的真理力量和不竭的实践伟力。
Third, use seeking truth from facts to activate the source of theoretical innovation in adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times. Seeking truth from facts is the living soul of Mao Zedong Thought and the essence of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times. During the Long March, the Communist Party of China broke free from the shackles of dogmatism, formulated revolutionary strategies independently based on the actual conditions of the Chinese revolution, and achieved a great turning point from setbacks to victory. One of the precious revelations the Long March gave to the Chinese revolution is that “only by creatively applying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, seeking truth from facts, and independently solving the major problems of the Chinese revolution can the revolutionary cause be led to victory.” Therefore, to advance the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times in the New Era, we must continue to carry forward the spiritual character of seeking truth from facts and integrate it throughout the entire process of Chinese-path modernization. We must adhere to a problem-oriented approach, conduct in-depth investigation and research, continuously propose new concepts, new ideas, and new methods that truly solve problems, and constantly respond to and answer the new issues raised by the times under the guidance of theories that keep pace with the times, thereby truly realizing the mission and value of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times.
第三,以实事求是激活马克思主义中国化时代化的理论创新源泉。实事求是是毛泽东思想活的灵魂,也是马克思主义中国化时代化的精髓所在。在长征中,中国共产党冲破教条主义的束缚,从中国革命实际出发,独立自主地制定革命策略,实现了从挫折走向胜利的伟大转折。长征给予中国革命的宝贵启示之一就是,“只有创造性地运用马克思列宁主义基本原理,实事求是、独立自主地解决中国革命的重大问题,才能把革命事业引向胜利”。因此,新时代推进马克思主义中国化时代化,必须继续发扬实事求是的精神品格,并将其贯穿于中国式现代化建设的全过程。要坚持问题导向,深入调查研究,不断提出真正解决问题的新理念新思路新办法,在与时俱进的理论指导中不断回应和解答时代提出的崭新课题,真正实现马克思主义中国化时代化的使命价值。
Fourth, use putting the people first to anchor the value stance of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times. The victory of the Long March was, in the final analysis, a victory of the people, a victory of popular sentiment. During the Long March, the masses of the people actively raised funds and provisions for the Red Army, guided the way and delivered messages, rescued the wounded, and joined the army and fought, becoming the strong backing and source of strength for the Red Army to break through encirclements and overcome difficulties. The Long March, with its greatest practice, powerfully answered the fundamental political question concerning the Party’s survival or extinction: “For whom is the revolution fought, and on whom does it rely?” In this regard, Xi Jinping profoundly pointed out: “The victory of the Long March enlightens us: the masses of the people possess boundless wisdom and strength. Only by always trusting the people, closely relying on the people, and fully mobilizing the initiative, enthusiasm, and creativity of the broad masses can we unite the mighty force of unity of purpose.” Therefore, to advance the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times in the New Era, only by deeply rooting ourselves in the people, wholeheartedly relying on the people, and unswervingly working for the people can we obtain the deepest source of motivation and always maintain strong vitality.
第四,以人民至上锚定马克思主义中国化时代化的价值立场。长征的胜利,归根结底是人民的胜利,是民心的胜利。在长征中,人民群众主动为红军筹粮筹款、带路送信、救护伤员、参军参战,成为红军突破重围、战胜困难的坚强后盾与力量源泉。长征用最伟大的实践有力地回答了“革命为了谁、依靠谁”这一关乎党的生死存亡的根本政治问题。对此,习近平深刻指出:“长征胜利启示我们:人民群众有着无尽的智慧和力量,只有始终相信人民,紧紧依靠人民,充分调动广大人民的积极性、主动性、创造性,才能凝聚起众志成城的磅礴之力。”因此,新时代推进马克思主义中国化时代化,只有深深扎根于人民、全心全意依靠人民、始终不渝为了人民,才能获得最深厚的动力源泉,才能始终保持强大的生命力。
Fifth, use the spirit of struggle to hone the courage and boldness in adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times. The victory of the Long March was a great victory of daring to struggle and being adept at struggle; the spirit of struggle ran through the entire process of the Long March. Xi Jinping emphasized: “On the new journey to realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, there will inevitably be arduous and heavy tasks, and there will inevitably be hardships and dangers, even stormy waves, which especially require us to carry forward the spirit of hard struggle.” On the new great journey to continue advancing the adaptation of Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times, there are still many “snowy mountains” and “grasslands” to cross, and many “Loushan Passes” and “Lazikou Passes” [39]39 Loushan Pass and Lazikou Pass are famous strategic locations where the Red Army fought fierce battles during the Long March, often used metaphorically to represent formidable obstacles. to conquer. This requires us to always remain clear-headed, carry forward the spirit of struggle, dare to unsheathe our swords against fallacies and risks, and be adept at increasing our capabilities through struggle. With the posture of upholding fundamental principles and breaking new ground, we must continuously open up new realms for adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times amidst stormy waves, enabling Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era to demonstrate more powerful and more convincing truth, providing scientific theoretical guidance and strong driving force support for us to tread the new Long March of the New Era well and to comprehensively advance the building of a strong country and the great cause of national rejuvenation through Chinese-path modernization.
第五,以斗争精神砥砺马克思主义中国化时代化的胆识与魄力。长征的胜利,是敢于斗争、善于斗争的伟大胜利,斗争精神贯穿长征的全过程。习近平强调:“在实现中华民族伟大复兴的新征程上,必然会有艰巨繁重的任务,必然会有艰难险阻甚至惊涛骇浪,特别需要我们发扬艰苦奋斗精神。”在新的伟大征程上继续推进马克思主义中国化时代化,还有许多“雪山”“草地”需要跨越,还有许多“娄山关”“腊子口”需要征服。这就要求我们必须时刻保持清醒,发扬斗争精神,既敢于向谬误和风险亮剑,又善于在斗争中增长本领,以守正创新的姿态,在惊涛骇浪中不断开辟马克思主义中国化时代化的新境界,推动习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想展现出更强大、更有说服力的真理力量,为我们走好新时代长征路,以中国式现代化全面推进强国建设、民族复兴伟业提供科学理论指导与强大动力支撑。
Notes
- The May Fourth Movement (1919) was an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal political and cultural movement initiated by Chinese students and intellectuals, which is regarded as the starting point of the New Democratic Revolution in China. ↩
- The Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC (January 1931) marked the rise of Wang Ming’s “Left” dogmatist line to dominance in the Party leadership. ↩
- The *Resolution on Certain Historical Issues* (1945) was an official Party document adopted at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, summing up the Party’s historical experiences and errors, including the “Left” lines. ↩
- The “Channel Turn” (通道转兵) refers to the decision made at a temporary meeting in Tongdao, Hunan, in December 1934, to abandon the original plan of joining forces with the Second and Sixth Army Groups in western Hunan and instead march into Guizhou. ↩
- The Liping Conference (黎平会议) was a meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held in Liping, Guizhou, in December 1934, which formally adopted Mao Zedong’s proposal to advance into Guizhou. ↩
- The Houchang Conference (猴场会议) was a meeting of the Political Bureau held in Houchang, Guizhou, in early January 1935, which further restricted the military command authority of Bo Gu and Li De. ↩
- The Party’s third historical resolution refers to the “Resolution on Certain Historical Issues of the Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China,” adopted at the 11th Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee in 1981. ↩
- The “Li Lisan line” refers to the “Left” adventurist line represented by Li Lisan that dominated the CPC Central Committee from June to September 1930, advocating for immediate uprisings in major cities. ↩
- The Central Plains War (1930) was a large-scale military conflict between the Nationalist (KMT) factions of Chiang Kai-shek and a coalition of regional warlords, which diverted KMT attention from the Communist base areas. ↩
- The first counter-“encirclement and suppression” campaign (December 1930–January 1931) was the successful Communist military response to the first of five major KMT campaigns to destroy the Jiangxi Soviet base area. ↩
- The Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC (January 1931) brought the “28 Bolsheviks” faction, backed by the Comintern and led by Wang Ming, to power, marking the ascendancy of dogmatic “Left” line in the Party. ↩
- The “Jiangxi Luo Ming line” was a fabricated label used in 1933 to attack cadres in the Jiangxi Soviet who supported Mao Zedong’s more pragmatic military and land policies, named after Luo Ming, a Fujian provincial leader. ↩
- The Resolution on Certain Historical Issues (1945), adopted at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, was the Party’s official appraisal of its history from 1921 to 1945, condemning the “Left” and Right deviations. ↩
- The Party’s third historical resolution refers to the Resolution on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century, adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee in November 2021. ↩
- The War of Resistance Against Japan (1937–1945) was China’s war against Japanese invasion, often referred to in the West as the Second Sino-Japanese War.
- The Seventh National Congress of the CPC was held in Yan’an in April–June 1945, where Mao Zedong Thought was established as the Party’s guiding ideology.
- The Zunyi Conference (January 1935) was a pivotal meeting during the Long March where Mao Zedong gained effective leadership of the Party and the Red Army.
- Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Zhu De.
- The “Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention” were basic codes of conduct for the Red Army, later formalized as the “Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention” of the People’s Liberation Army.
- 25,000 li is approximately 12,500 kilometers or about 8,000 miles.
- The “Alliance at the Yi Sea” refers to the 1935 pact between Red Army commander Liu Bocheng and Yi chieftain Xiao Yedan, symbolizing ethnic unity.
- Mao Zedong, “Our Economic Policy” (August 1933), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 1. ↩
- “Zhuge Liang meeting” (诸葛亮会) refers to a brainstorming session or meeting to pool collective wisdom, named after Zhuge Liang, the legendary strategist of the Three Kingdoms period. ↩
- Geng Biao (1909–2000) was a senior Chinese Communist military commander and later a diplomat. ↩
- Mao Zedong, “Preface and Postscript to ‘Rural Surveys’” (March/April 1941), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 3. ↩
- Mao Zedong, “Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership” (June 1943), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 3. ↩
- Mao Zedong, “On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism” (December 1935), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 1. ↩
- Mao Zedong, *On Coalition Government* (April 1945), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 3. ↩
- Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Ceremony Marking the 95th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China” (July 1, 2016). ↩
- Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Conference Commemorating the 80th Anniversary of the Victory of the Red Army’s Long March” (October 21, 2016). ↩
- The Wayaobu Conference was a meeting of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee held in Wayaobu, northern Shaanxi, in December 1935, which formulated the strategy of the anti-Japanese national united front. ↩
- Mao Zedong, “Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China” (March 1949). ↩
- Yang Shangkun (1907–1998) was a senior Chinese Communist leader who served as President of the People’s Republic of China (1988–1993). ↩
- Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Conference Commemorating the 80th Anniversary of the Victory of the Red Army’s Long March” (October 21, 2016). ↩
- The “two overall situations” (两个大局) refers to the overall situation of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and the overall situation of changes unseen in a century in the world. ↩
- This is a standard formulation from the 19th National Congress of the CPC report, emphasizing the Party’s leadership over all sectors of society. ↩
- The “Fourteen Perseverances” (十四个坚持) are the basic strategies outlined in Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, covering areas such as upholding Party leadership, people-centered development, and comprehensive deepening of reform. ↩
- The Two Integrations (两个结合) refers to integrating the basic tenets of Marxism with China’s specific realities and with the best of traditional Chinese culture. ↩
- Loushan Pass and Lazikou Pass are famous strategic locations where the Red Army fought fierce battles during the Long March, often used metaphorically to represent formidable obstacles. ↩