The Practical Exploration and Enlightenment of the Party and the Red Army in Promoting the Spirit of Close Unity during the Long March

Ninety years ago, during the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army’s Long March, the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves was extremely disparate, the natural environment was exceedingly treacherous, and inner-Party ideological struggle was unusually intense and complex. The Party made decisions and exercised leadership under conditions of complete independence and self-reliance, leading the Red Army repeatedly from near-annihilating blows to safety, turning danger into safety at critical junctures of life and death time and again, and successfully transforming the Long March from a strategic retreat into a victorious advance north to resist Japan. This great turning point in the Chinese revolution and an unprecedented miracle in the history of human warfare were achieved through the interplay of many factors, but the close unity of the Party and the Red Army was undoubtedly an important internal cause. “Unity is strength; only unity brings victory.” In his important speech at the rally commemorating the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Long March, General Secretary Xi Jinping summarized “taking the overall situation into account, strictly observing discipline, and maintaining close unity” as an important connotation of the great Long March spirit — this is a high affirmation of the spirit of close unity displayed by the Party and the Red Army during the Long March. This year marks the 90th anniversary of the victory of the Long March. Studying the concrete manifestations, important causes, and empirical lessons of the Party’s promotion of the spirit of close unity during the Long March undoubtedly has important theoretical value and practical significance for carrying forward the great Long March spirit and treading well the Long March of the New Era.

90年前的中国工农红军长征，敌我力量对比悬殊，自然环境极其险恶，党内思想斗争异常激烈复杂，党在完全独立自主的条件下决策和领导，带领红军多次从近乎毁灭的打击中化险为夷，一次次在生死关头转危为安，成功地使长征由战略退却转变为北上抗日的胜利进军。这一中国革命伟大转折和人类战争史上旷古奇迹的取得，固然有多方面因素起作用，但党和红军的紧密团结无疑是重要内因。“团结就是力量，团结才能胜利。”习近平总书记在纪念红军长征胜利80周年大会上的重要讲话中把“顾全大局、严守纪律、紧密团结”概括为伟大长征精神的重要内涵，就是对长征途中党和红军发扬紧密团结精神的高度肯定。今年正值红军长征胜利90周年，研究党在长征过程中发扬紧密团结精神的具体表现、重要原因及经验启示，对弘扬伟大长征精神，走好新时代长征路，无疑具有重要理论价值和现实意义。

I. Concrete Manifestations of the Party and the Red Army in Promoting the Spirit of Close Unity during the Long March

一、长征时期党和红军发扬紧密团结精神的具体表现

Along the entire Long March, the concrete manifestations of the Party and the Red Army in promoting the spirit of close unity were multifaceted, even comprehensive. The unity and solidarity of the Party Central Committee’s leadership, the close coordination among the various Red Army routes, the unity of purpose from top to bottom within the Red Army itself, and the flesh-and-blood bond between the Party and the Red Army and the masses of the people along the route were several important manifestations.

长征一路，党和红军发扬紧密团结精神的具体表现是多方面的，甚至是全方位的，而党中央领导层的团结统一、各路红军的密切配合、红军内部上下一心、党和红军与沿途人民群众的血肉相连是其中几个重要表现。

(1) The unity and solidarity of the Party Central Committee’s leadership was the prerequisite for the Party and the Red Army to promote the spirit of close unity during the Long March

（一）党中央领导层的团结统一，是长征时期党和红军发扬紧密团结精神的前提

Although during the early period of the Long March there were doubts, dissatisfaction, and even strong opposition among members of the Party Central Committee’s leadership toward the “Left” erroneous line, after the Zunyi Conference [n1] and a series of meetings before and after it criticized the “Left” erroneous military line and reorganized the “Left” erroneous leading organs, under the strong leadership of the Party Central Committee collective represented by Mao Zedong, a high degree of unity and solidarity was maintained. Along the Long March, although there were fierce debates and serious differences within the central leadership over major issues such as military strategy and tactics, and even the Zhang Guotao [n2] separatist incident occurred, unity always triumphed over division. Most importantly, the close unity of the central leadership during the Long March withstood the severe test of the Party Central Committee’s struggle against Zhang Guotao’s separatism. After the Central Red Army joined forces with the Fourth Front Army at Mao’gong in Sichuan, Zhang Guotao, relying on the numerical strength and superior weaponry of the Fourth Front Army he led, saw his warlordist ideology swell and conspired to usurp the supreme leadership of the Party and the Red Army. When his personal ambitions were not fully satisfied, he went so far as to set up a separate “Central Committee,” proclaiming himself “Chairman

长征时期党中央领导层成员尽管在长征初期有过对“左”倾错误路线的质疑、不满甚至强烈反对的情绪，但经过遵义会议及其前后一系列会议对“左”倾错误军事路线的批评和对“左”倾错误领导机构的改组后，在以毛泽东为代表的党中央集体的坚强领导下，保持了高度的团结统一。长征途中，中央领导层在讨论军事战略战术等重大问题上，尽管有着激烈的争论和严重的分歧，甚至发生了张国焘的分裂主义事件，但始终是团结战胜分裂。尤其重要的是，长征时期中央领导层的紧密团结经受了党中央同张国焘分裂主义斗争实践的严峻考验。在中央红军与红四方面军在四川懋功会师后，张国焘仗着他领导的红四方面军人多枪多，军阀主义思想澎胀，阴谋篡夺党和红军的最高领导权。当个人野心没有得到完全满足后，竟另立“中央”，自封“主席”，走上了与中央分道扬镳的邪路，使党和红军进入了危险境界。由于以毛泽东为代表的中央领导层成员的高度团结统一，经过党内的积极思想斗争，终于迫使他取消了自立的“中央”，率领第四方面军北上陕甘宁，与党中央和中央红军会合，使长征取得了完全胜利。如果没有以毛泽东为代表的中央领导层成员的高度团结统一，中央要在长征特别艰难的条件下战胜张国焘的分裂主义，实现三大主力红军的胜利会师，是很难的。正如亲身经历了张国焘闹分裂始末的李先念所回忆的那样：“懋功会师形成的团结局面，后来虽然经历了曲折复杂的发展过程，但是最终实现了一、二、四方面军和全国红军的大团结。历史证明，我们党的团结，军队的团结，是符合革命历史发展潮流的，任何人，任何力量都破坏不了。”李先念这里所讲的长征时期全党全军最终保持大团结，其前提保障就是党中央领导层的团结统一。正是由于党中央高层团结统一，全体官兵在长征路上不管遇到什么困难，经历什么挫折，最终都紧密团结在党中央周围，夺取了长征的胜利。

(2) The various Red Army units closely coordinated with each other in strategic cooperation, material support, intelligence exchange, and troop replenishment, forming a united fighting force for the victory of the Long March.

（二）各路红军从战略配合、物质支持、情报交流和兵源补充等方面密切配合，为夺取长征胜利形成了团结奋战的合力

The Long March was not an isolated struggle waged solely by the Central Red Army under the direct leadership of the Party Central Committee; rather, it was a victory song composed through the close coordination and concerted efforts of all Red Army units, including the First, Second, and Fourth Front Armies, the 25th Army, the Northern Shaanxi Red Army, and the Red Army units that remained in the Central Soviet Area. Among the several Red Army units participating in the Long March, the First Front Army under the Party Central Committee, i.e., the Central Red Army, bore the greatest pressure and faced the most difficulties. Blockaded from the front, intercepted in the middle, and pursued from the rear by hundreds of thousands of enemy troops, it suffered exceptionally heavy losses, with its strength plummeting from 86,000 men when it set out from the Central Base Area to just over 8,000 men upon reaching Northern Shaanxi. Although the Central Red Army paid an enormous price, it fought against and pinned down enemy forces more than ten times its own size along the way, spread revolutionary truths, sowed the seeds of revolution, and successfully protected the Party Central Committee in its safe arrival in Northern Shaanxi—this was the outstanding contribution of the Central Red Army. After the main force of the Central Red Army reached Northern Shaanxi, it immediately united fraternally with the Northern Shaanxi Red Army, won the Battle of Zhiluo Town, successfully carried out the Eastern and Western Expeditions, expanded the Northern Shaanxi Base Area, and formed the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Base Area, thereby creating the conditions for the victorious rendezvous of the three main forces of the Red Army—the First, Second, and Fourth Front Armies—in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Base Area.

长征不只是党中央直接率领的中央红军孤立奋战，而是红一、红二、红四方面军和红二十五军等各路红军，以及陕北红军、留守中央苏区红军等各地红军紧密配合、同心协力谱写的胜利之歌。在参加长征的几路红军中，党中央所在的红一方面军，即中央红军，承受的压力最大，面临的困难也最多，遭到几十万敌兵的前堵中截后追，受到了特别惨重的损失，从中央根据地出发时的8.6万人剧减为到达陕北时的8000余人。中央红军尽管付出了极大代价，但一路抗击和牵制了10多倍于己的敌军，沿途宣传了革命道理，撒播了革命种子，成功地保护党中央胜利到达了陕北，这是中央红军的突出贡献。中央红军主力到达陕北后，立即与陕北红军兄弟般团结在一起，打赢了直罗镇战役，成功进行了东征和西征，拓展了陕北根据地，形成了陕甘宁根据地，为实现红一、红二、红四方面军三大主力红军胜利会师陕甘宁根据地创造了条件。

The Sixth Army Corps was ordered to march westward two months before the Central Red Army's Long March, advancing to eastern Guizhou to join forces with the Second Army Corps. The westward march of the Sixth Army Corps served as a reconnaissance and pathfinding vanguard for the Central Red Army's Long March. After the Second and Sixth Army Corps joined forces, they launched an offensive in western Hunan, established the Hunan-Hubei-Sichuan-Guizhou Revolutionary Base Area, pinned down over 140 regiments of enemy troops, and effectively reduced the pressure on various Red Army units, particularly providing effective coordination and support for the Central Red Army's operations in the three provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan. The Second and Sixth Army Corps began their Long March from Sangzhi, Hunan, in November 1935 and reached Garzê, Sichuan, in June 1936 to join forces with the Fourth Front Army. After the rendezvous, in accordance with the Central Committee's requirements, the Second Army Corps, the Sixth Army Corps, and the 32nd Army were combined to form the Second Front Army, which coordinated with the Fourth Front Army in marching north to the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia region to join the Central Red Army. Just after emerging from the vast grasslands, the Second Front Army, disregarding extreme fatigue, immediately launched new campaigns in the Longnan and Southern Shaanxi regions, swiftly capturing the three county towns of Chengxian, Liangdang, and Huixian in Gansu, and laying siege to the two county towns of Fengxian and Lueyang in Shaanxi. With a powerful offensive, it pinned down the main forces of the Nationalist Central Army to the south, creating favorable conditions for the victorious rendezvous of the three main Red Army forces in the Huining area of Gansu and for the final victory of the Long March.

红六军团于中央红军长征前两个月就奉命西征，挺进到贵州东部与红二军团会合。红六军团西征，为中央红军长征起到了侦察、探路的先遣队作用。红二、红六两个军团会师后，组织了湘西攻势，开创了湘鄂川黔革命根据地，牵制了140多个团敌军，有力减轻了各路红军的压力，特别是有效策应和支持了中央红军在云贵川三省的转战。红二、红六两个军团于1935年11月从湖南桑植开始长征，于1936年6月到达四川甘孜与红四方面军会师。会师后，根据中央要求，红二军团、红六军团与红三十二军共同组成红二方面军，协同红四方面军一道，北上陕甘宁与中央红军会合。在刚走出茫茫草地后，红二方面军不顾极度疲劳，立即在陇南和陕南地区发起新的战役，迅速攻占了甘肃的成县、两当、徽县三座县城，并围攻陕西的凤县和略阳两座县城，以强大的攻势牵制国民党中央军主力南下，为实现三大主力红军在甘肃会宁一带的胜利会师，以及长征的最后胜利，创造了有利条件。

During the difficult days when the Central Red Army was moving through Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan, the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army continuously provided intelligence support, offering important references for the Central Revolutionary Military Commission and Mao Zedong to accurately judge enemy situations and make scientific decisions. Later, in order to coordinate with the Central Red Army in crossing the Yangtze River and advancing northward, the Fourth Front Army voluntarily withdrew from the Sichuan-Shaanxi base area, launched the Jialing River Campaign, broke through the Sichuan army’s natural-defence line at the Jialing River, captured nine county towns in Sichuan, and established a base area in the Maogong region of northwestern Sichuan. To welcome the Central Red Army for a rendezvous, the Fourth Front Army not only actively cleared out local Nationalist defenders, but also gathered grain, tidied up houses, and even arranged cooks, preparing woks, seasonings and other cooking utensils — the preparatory work was quite thorough. After the two armies joined forces, the Fourth Front Army gave the Central Red Army large quantities of grain, clothing and bedding, and also proactively transferred three full-strength regiments totalling more than 3,800 officers and men to supplement the Central Red Army. These three regiments followed the Central Red Army in its initial northward advance, captured Lazikou, and victoriously reached northern Shaanxi in October 1935. After the Fourth Front Army arrived in northern Shaanxi, its three main corps crossed the Yellow River and advanced westward, carrying out a half-year-long arduous Western Expedition that effectively struck at and pinned down the Nationalist forces west of the Yellow River, coordinating with the struggle of the Red Army east of the river. The support and coordination that the Fourth Front Army provided to the Central Red Army during the Long March period, and its role and contribution to the victory of the Long March, should be affirmed in a manner that seeks truth from facts — this is the attitude of historical materialism.

红四方面军在中央红军转战云贵川的艰难日子里，不断提供情报支援，为中革军委和毛泽东精准判断敌情、科学决策提供了重要参考。后来为了策应中央红军渡过长江北进，红四方面军主动撤离了川陕根据地，发起了嘉陵江战役，突破川军嘉陵江天险防线，攻占了四川9座县城，在川西北懋功地区建立了根据地。为迎接中央红军前来会师，红四方面军不仅积极扫清当地国民党守军，还筹集粮食、收拾屋子，甚至安排了炊事员，准备了炒锅和调料等炊事用具，准备工作做得相当充分。两军会师后，红四方面军给中央红军赠送了大量粮食和衣被等，还主动调拨三个建制团共3800余名官兵补充给中央红军，这三个团跟随中央红军先期北上攻克腊子口，于1935年10月胜利到达陕北。红四方面军到达陕北后，主力三个军渡过黄河西进，进行长达半年的艰苦卓绝的西征，有力打击和牵制了河西的国民党军，配合了河东红军的斗争。长征时期红四方面军对中央红军的支持和配合，对长征胜利的作用和贡献，应该实事求是地予以肯定，这才是历史唯物主义的态度。

The Twenty-Fifth Red Army, led by Xu Haidong, began its Long March in November 1934 from Hejiachong in Luoshan County, southern Henan. After moving through battle to southern Shaanxi, it opened up the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi base area covering more than ten counties, twice smashed the “encirclement and suppression” campaigns of more than 30 Nationalist regiments, prevented tens of thousands of Nationalist troops from moving south or west, effectively reduced the pressure on other Red Army units, and coordinated with the Central Red Army’s Long March. To support the Long March of the Central Red Army and the Fourth Front Army, the Twenty-Fifth Red Army advanced northward from southern Shaanxi in July 1935, reached Yanchuan in northern Shaanxi in early September of the same year, joined forces with the northern Shaanxi Red Army, jointly formed the Fifteenth Red Army Corps, and immediately won the Battle of Laoshan, smashing the Nationalist “encirclement and suppression” of the northern Shaanxi base area, providing the final foothold for the Party Central Committee and the Red Army’s ten-thousand-li Long March. When the Party Central Committee and the Central Red Army, exhausted from long-distance marching and fierce fighting, arrived at the northern Shaanxi base area, they were worn out, their horses fatigued, and their material supplies were in extreme difficulty. Mao Zedong personally borrowed money from the Fifteenth Red Army Corps. Xu Haidong, commander of the Fifteenth Red Army Corps, immediately decided to take 5,000 silver dollars from the corps’ reserves of 7,000 silver dollars to support the Party Central Committee and the Central Red Army, and also provided the Central Red Army with large quantities of firearms, clothing, medical supplies and recruits. He further stressed a “three don’t-gives” to the Central Red Army: don’t give guns with missing parts, don’t give spoiled medicine, and don’t give torn or dirty clothes. This demonstrated a consciousness of the overall situation in supporting the Party Central Committee and a high degree of unity, reflecting the principle that the Red Armies under Heaven are one family.

徐海东领导的红二十五军于1934年11月从豫南罗山县何家冲开始长征，转战至陕南后开辟了范围覆盖十几个县的鄂豫陕根据地，先后两次粉碎了国民党军30多个团的“围剿”，使数万国民党军不能南下或西进，有力减缓了其他红军的压力，配合了中央红军的长征。为支援中央红军和红四方面军长征，红二十五军于1935年7月从陕南往北进军，于同年9月上旬进至陕北延川，与陕北红军会合，共同组建了红十五军团，随即打赢了劳山战役，粉碎了国民党军对陕北根据地的“围剿”，为党中央和红军的万里长征提供了最终落脚点。党中央和中央红军经过长途跋涉和鏖战，到达陕北根据地时，已是兵疲马乏，物资供给极度困难，毛泽东亲自向红十五军团借钱。红十五军团军团长徐海东当即决定从军团家底7000元银洋中拿出5000元，支助党中央和中央红军，并向中央红军提供大量枪支、衣物、医药用品和兵源，还强调给中央红军“三不送”，即不送零件缺损的枪支，不送变质药品，不送破衣服和脏衣服，体现出拥护党中央的大局意识和天下红军是一家的高度团结品质。

After the main force of the Central Red Army set out on the Long March, the Red Army units left behind in the Central Soviet Area, under the leadership of Xiang Ying, Chen Yi and others, relied closely on the local masses and waged three years of arduous struggle against the enemy. They not only completed the task of coordinating with and covering the strategic shift of the Party Central Committee and the main Red Army, but also effectively struck at and pinned down the enemy, coordinating with the main Red Army’s Long March.

中央红军主力长征后，留守在中央苏区的红军在项英、陈毅等领导下，紧紧依靠当地人民群众，对敌人展开了三年艰苦卓绝的斗争，不仅完成了策应、掩护党中央和主力红军的战略转移，还有力打击和牵制了敌人，配合了主力红军的长征。

(3) Unity from top to bottom within the Red Army, coalescing into powerful combat effectiveness for the victory of the Long March

（三）红军内部上下一心，为夺取长征胜利凝聚起强大战斗力

Chen Yun, who personally experienced the Long March, when summing up the reasons for the Party and the Red Army’s victory in the Long March, listed “the unity of the Red Army soldiers’ hearts” as the first item. He believed that the reason the Red Army soldiers’ hearts were united was, on the one hand, because the Party carried out much educational work among the Red Army soldiers, and the Red Army soldiers regarded resisting Japan to save the nation and liberating the workers and peasants as their own responsibility — this greatly boosted the Red Army’s morale. At the same time, Communist Party members and Communist Youth League members made up 40 to 50 percent of the Red Army soldiers, and these communists, having received specialized Party education, indeed played a great cellular role among the Red Army soldiers. Chen Yun’s analysis reflects the real situation of unity from top to bottom and solidarity within the Red Army during the Long March period. In the Red Army ranks on the Long March, from the highest leaders down to ordinary soldiers, clothing and food were all the same, and leading cadres at all levels proactively cared for, cherished and helped ordinary fighters. Mao Zedong suffered from a foot ailment throughout the Long March; the organization provided him with a stretcher, but he often gave it to the wounded and sick to lie on, and frequently gave his greatcoat to the soldiers for warmth. Zhu De often gave his mount to wounded and sick soldiers to ride, while he himself marched on foot. He Bingyan, commander of the Fifth Division of the Second Red Army Corps, had his right arm severely wounded and amputated; during the Long March, he not only gave his warhorse to the wounded and sick to ride, but also often led the horse for them. Officers and soldiers were united in heart; fighters looked out for each other and shared life and death. When climbing snow mountains, with high altitude, cold and oxygen deficiency, and physical exhaustion, many soldiers would rather collapse themselves than carry a comrade over the mountain. When crossing the vast grasslands, full of deadly traps, some soldiers gave their own lives rather than abandon a comrade trapped in the mire. When the Fourth Regiment of the First Front Red Army served as the advance regiment crossing the grasslands, all the officers’ mounts were pulled out for the collection teams to use to carry the wounded and sick across the grasslands. When the Central Red Army crossed the big snow mountains, the quartermaster chief distributed all the cold-weather clothing and bedding to others, while he himself marched in only a single layer of clothing, and as a result froze to death on the road. It can be seen that unity from top to bottom and solidarity between officers and men was an important manifestation of the spirit of close unity that the Red Army fostered during the Long March, and also an important factor in coalescing powerful combat effectiveness to win the Long March.

亲历长征的陈云在总结党和红军夺取长征胜利原因时，把“红军兵心团结”归结为第一条，他认为红军兵心之所以团结，一方面是因为党在红军兵士中进行许多教育工作，红军兵士自认抗日救国、解放工农是自己的责任，这就使红军士气大振。同时，共产党员及共产主义青年团团员在红军兵士中占百分之四五十，而这些共产主义者，曾受党的专门教育，在红军兵士中确有极大的细胞作用。陈云的分析，反映了长征时期红军内部上下一心、团结一致的真实情况。在长征的红军队伍里，上至最高领导，下至普通士兵，衣装饭食全部一样，而且各级领导干部还主动关心、爱护、帮助普通战士。毛泽东长征一路都患有足疾，组织上给他配备了担架，但他常常让给伤病员躺，还经常把大衣给战士们御寒。朱德时常把坐骑让给伤病战士乘，自己却徒步行军。身为红二军团第五师师长的贺炳炎，右臂重伤截肢，在长征中不但把军马让给伤病员骑，还不时为伤病员牵马引路。官兵团结一心，战士间守望相助、生死与共。爬雪山，高寒缺氧，身体乏力，许多战士宁可自己倒下，也要背战友翻越雪山。过茫茫草地，到处是死亡陷阱，有的战士为了不放弃搭救身陷泥沼的战友，自己却献出了生命。红一方面军红四团担任过草地先遣团时，干部的乘马都抽出来归收容队使用，驮运伤病员过草地。中央红军过大雪山时，军需处长把所有御寒的衣被都发给了别人，而自己只穿单衣行军，结果冻死在路上。可见，上下一致，将士同心，是红军长征时发扬紧密团结精神的重要表现，也是凝聚强大战斗力夺取长征胜利的重要因素。

(4) The Party and the Red Army were linked by blood with the masses along the Long March route, building a deep foundation of strength

（四）党和红军与长征沿途人民群众血肉相连，构筑了深厚的伟力根基

“The deepest roots of the great power of war lie in the masses.” In the course of the Long March’s long-distance, long-duration, large-scale mobile warfare without a fixed base area, the Red Army could not defeat the enemy for a moment without the support of the people along the route. Mao Zedong not only educated Red Army officers and soldiers to strictly enforce the “Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention” [1]1 This is a quotation from Xi Jinping’s speech at the commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Long March, delivered on October 21, 2016. and to care for and help the local people, but also taught by personal example, practicing what he preached. Wherever he went, he personally went deep among the local people, asking after their needs and offering comfort. In Jianhe County, Guizhou, Mao Zedong saw an old woman with a child; the child was wearing tattered thin clothing, frozen and hungry, collapsed on the ground. Mao Zedong immediately took off his own woolen sweater and put it on the child, and gave the old woman a bag of rice. When the Central Red Army passed through Shazhou Village in Rucheng County, southern Hunan, three female Red Army soldiers lodged with a local villager, Xu Jiexiu. They not only cured Xu Jiexiu’s child of a cold and fever, but when they left, they cut half of their only quilt in two and gave it to Xu Jiexiu. After the Red Army left, Xu Jiexiu told everyone she met: “What is the Communist Party? The Communist Party is when you have only one quilt, you cut half of it and give it to the common people.” The story of “half a quilt” confirms the real situation of the Party and the Red Army sharing hardships and destinies with the masses along the Long March route. When the Central Red Army passed through the Yi ethnic region of the Daliang Mountains, it formed a blood-brother alliance with Xiao Yedan, the chief of the Guji tribe of the Yi people, swearing an oath of brotherhood, which allowed the Central Red Army to pass smoothly through the Yi region, winning precious time for the forced crossing of the Dadu River. All the Red Army units also mobilized the masses along the way, attacking local tyrants and distributing land, abolishing exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies, establishing revolutionary political power, organizing people’s armed forces, sincerely protecting the interests of the masses, and doing practical things for the people. “When the army and the people are united as one, who in the world can defeat them?” [2]2 The Zunyi Meeting (January 1935) was a pivotal enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee held during the Long March. It ended the dominance of the “left” dogmatist military line and established Mao Zedong’s de facto leadership role in the Party and the Red Army. The Party and the Red Army’s love for and help to the masses enabled the Red Army on the Long March to win the masses’ strong support along the route — sending clothing and shoes, providing intelligence, delivering grain and fodder, acting as guides, treating and sheltering the wounded and sick, and even joining the Red Army — thereby obtaining a continuous supply of manpower and material resources for victory.

“战争的伟力之最深厚的根源，存在于民众之中。”在长征这种长距离、长时间、大规模而无固定根据地的流动作战过程中，红军要克敌制胜，须臾不能没有沿途百姓的支持。毛泽东不仅教育红军将士要严格执行“三大纪律八项注意”，关心和帮助当地百姓，还言传身教，身体力行，每到一地，总要亲自深入当地百姓，嘘寒问暖。在贵州剑河县城，毛泽东看见一位老妇带着一个孩童，孩童身穿破烂单衣，冻饿得昏倒在地，毛泽东当即脱下自己的毛线衣给小孩披上，并赠送给老妇一袋白米。中央红军长征途经湘南汝城县沙洲村，三名女红军借宿于当地村民徐解秀家，不仅治好了徐解秀小孩的感冒发烧，临走时，还把她们自己仅有的一床被子剪下半条送给徐解秀。红军离开后，徐解秀逢人就说：“什么是共产党？共产党就是自己有一条被子，也要剪下半条给老百姓的人。”“半条被子”的故事，印证了长征路上党和红军与人民群众同患难、共命运的真实情况。中央红军长征经过大凉山彝族地区时，与彝族果基部落首领小叶丹歃血盟誓，义结金兰，使中央红军顺利通过彝族地区，为抢渡大渡河赢得宝贵时间。各路红军还沿途发动群众，打土豪、分田地，除苛捐、削杂税，建立革命政权，组织人民武装，真心实意地保护人民群众利益，为人民群众办实事。“军民团结如一人，试看天下谁能敌。”党和红军对人民群众的热爱和帮助，使红军长征赢得了沿途人民群众送衣送鞋、送情报、送粮草、当向导、救治安置伤病员，甚至参加红军等各方面的大力支持，为赢得胜利获得了源源不断的人力、物力保障。

2. Main Reasons Why the Party and the Red Army Fostered a Spirit of Close Unity During the Long March Period

二、长征时期党和红军发扬紧密团结精神的主要原因

The reason the Party and the Red Army were able to foster a spirit of close unity during the Long March, in addition to the Party’s nature and advanced character and other such reasons, also had specific deep-seated causes. Among these, the common ideal and faith of the broad ranks of officers and soldiers was the endogenous driving force, the correct leadership of the Party was the prerequisite condition, and strict discipline was an important guarantee.

党和红军在长征中之所以能发扬紧密团结精神，除了党的本质和先进性等原因外，还有具体的深厚缘由，其中，广大官兵共同的理想信念是内生动力，党的正确领导是前提条件，严明的纪律是重要保障。

(1) Common ideal and faith was the endogenous driving force for the Party and the Red Army to foster a spirit of close unity on the Long March

（一）共同的理想信念是党和红军在长征途中发扬紧密团结精神的内生动力

Comrade Deng Xiaoping, who personally experienced the Long March, pointed out in 1985: “Why were we able to struggle through under extremely difficult circumstances in the past, overcoming countless hardships and dangers to achieve revolutionary victory? It was because we had ideals, we had Marxist convictions, we had communist convictions.” The “extremely difficult circumstances” referred to here also include the Long March, which indicates that the fundamental internal reason why the Party and the Red Army could unite and fight to final victory amid the unprecedented predicaments of the Long March was their shared ideals and convictions. This shared ideal and conviction was the Marxist faith, the communist ideal, and the belief that the revolution would surely triumph. “The Long March was a great expedition of ideals and convictions.” [1]1 This is a quotation from Xi Jinping’s speech at the commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Long March, delivered on October 21, 2016. Shared ideals and convictions became the adhesive for unity within the Party and the Red Army during the Long March, and the source of motivation and the spiritual foundation for the vast number of Red Army commanders and fighters to face death unflinchingly and advance courageously. During the Long March, Red Army soldiers, facing enemies dozens of times their own number and a harsh, perilous natural environment, always maintained a tenacious collectivist fighting spirit and revolutionary heroism. They were firmly gathered under the Party flag, united under the Party organization, taking the Party’s banner as their banner, going and fighting wherever the Party directed, and were never intimidated, scattered, or defeated. Throughout the long journey, the vast majority of grassroots soldiers did not know where they would ultimately end up, nor did anyone know where the end would be, but everyone firmly believed that as long as they followed the Party, aligned themselves with the Party, and united as one, they would surely win victory. In 1937, when talking about the heroic deeds of the eighteen warriors of the First Red Regiment who braved a hail of bullets to forcibly cross the Dadu River during the Long March, Zhu De said: “The Red Army embodied a new concept of heroism. We cultivated revolutionary mass heroes, who were not selfish or self-interested, were not swayed by any temptation, were determined to sacrifice for the revolution, and fought until our people and country were liberated.” Why did Red Army soldiers become mass heroes? In Zhu De’s view, it was because they had the ideal and conviction to fight to the end for the “liberation of the people and the country.” Precisely because they cherished shared ideals and convictions, Red Army commanders and fighters remained closely united throughout the Long March, forging ahead through thorns and brambles toward a common goal, and were forged into an invincible steel torrent.

亲历长征的邓小平同志在1985年指出：“为什么我们过去能在非常困难的情况下奋斗出来，战胜千难万险使革命胜利呢？就是因为我们有理想，有马克思主义信念，有共产主义信念。”这里所指的过去非常困难的情况也包括长征，这就说明党和红军在长征前所未有的困境中能够团结奋战至最后胜利的根本内因是有着共同的理想信念。这个共同理想信念就是马克思主义信仰、共产主义理想、革命一定会胜利的信念。“长征是一次理想信念的伟大远征”。共同的理想信念，成为长征中党和红军内部团结一致的黏合剂，成为红军广大指战员视死如归、勇往直前的动力之源、精神之本。长征中，红军将士面对数十倍于己的敌人和恶劣凶险的自然环境，始终保持顽强的集体主义斗志和革命英雄主义精神，坚定地凝聚在党旗下，团结在党组织下，以党的旗帜为旗帜，党指向哪里就走到哪里、打到哪里，始终吓不倒、走不散、打不垮。在漫漫长征途中，广大基层官兵没有人知道最终将去何方，也没有人清楚哪里才是尽头，但大家都坚信只要跟着党，向党看齐，团结一致，就一定会赢得胜利。朱德在1937年谈起长征途中红一团十八勇士冒着枪林弹雨抢渡大渡河的英雄事迹时说：“红军体现了英雄主义的新观念。我们培养出革命的群众英雄，他们不自私自利，不为任何诱惑所动，决心为革命牺牲，一直战斗到我们的人民和国家获得解放为止。”红军战士为什么会成为群众英雄？在朱德看来，这是因为他们有为“人民和国家获得解放”而战斗到底的理想信念。正是由于胸怀共同的理想信念，红军将士在长征中始终紧密团结，朝着共同的目标披荆斩棘，铸就成一支无坚不摧的钢铁洪流。

(II) The Correct Leadership of the Party Was the Prerequisite Guarantee for the CPC and the Red Army to Promote the Spirit of Close Unity During the Long March Period

（二）党的正确领导是长征时期党和红军发扬紧密团结精神的前提保障

Shortly after the Central Red Army concluded the Long March, Mao Zedong pointed out: “Who made the Long March victorious? It was the Communist Party. Without the Communist Party, such a Long March would be inconceivable.” In June 1936, Mao Zedong, while being interviewed by American journalist Edgar Snow in northern Shaanxi, again emphasized that the victory of the Long March was “first of all due to the correct leadership of the Communist Party.” Thus, in Mao Zedong’s view, the fundamental reason for the victory of the Long March was the correct leadership of the Party. Similarly, it can be fully concluded that the prerequisite for the close unity of the Party and the Red Army during the Long March was the correct leadership of the Party, especially the strong leadership of the Party Central Committee represented by Mao Zedong. Had the Zunyi Meeting [2]2 The Zunyi Meeting (January 1935) was a pivotal enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee held during the Long March. It ended the dominance of the “left” dogmatist military line and established Mao Zedong’s de facto leadership role in the Party and the Red Army. not ended the “left” erroneous military line and “begun to establish the leading position of the correct Marxist line represented mainly by Comrade Mao Zedong within the Party Central Committee,” the result might have been, as Zhang Wentian put it, “the Red Army under the leadership of Li De and Bo Gu would have been scattered,” or, as Zhu De put it, “if such leadership continued, we could no longer follow along!” The Party Central Committee, represented by Mao Zedong, in order to ensure the close unity of the entire Party and the entire army during the Long March, creatively integrated the basic principles of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. It not only formulated correct strategies and tactics, commanding the Red Army to continuously win battles, thereby enhancing confidence for promoting unity within the Party and the Red Army, but also implemented scientific and effective inner-Party struggle strategies, adhering to the combination of principle and flexibility. Through the Zunyi Meeting and a series of meetings before and after it, it ended the “left” dogmatist military line. After the Lianghekou Meeting, [3]3 The Lianghekou Meeting (June 1935) was a meeting of the CPC Central Committee held after the rendezvous of the First and Fourth Front Armies. It resolved to continue northward, opposing Zhang Guotao’s proposal to move south. it successfully overcame Zhang Guotao’s southward retreatist and splittist errors. [4]4 Zhang Guotao was a senior CPC leader who, during the Long March, advocated a southward retreat and attempted to split the Party and the Red Army by establishing a separate central committee. He later defected to the Kuomintang. It not only eliminated the harm of the erroneous military line but also united comrades who had previously committed “left” errors and the vast number of cadres and soldiers of the Fourth Front Army who had followed Zhang Guotao southward, thereby safeguarding the unity of the entire Party and the entire army during the Long March period.

毛泽东在中央红军长征结束不久后指出：“谁使长征胜利的呢？是共产党。没有共产党，这样的长征是不可能设想的。”1936年6月，毛泽东在陕北接受美国记者埃德加·斯诺采访时再次强调长征胜利“首先是由于共产党的正确领导”。可见，在毛泽东看来，长征胜利的根本原因是党的正确领导。同样，据此完全可以认为党和红军在长征中之所以能紧密团结，其前提就是党的正确领导，特别是以毛泽东为代表的党中央的坚强领导。如果没有遵义会议结束“左”倾错误军事路线，“开始确立以毛泽东同志为主要代表的马克思主义正确路线在党中央的领导地位”，其结果可能是如张闻天所讲的“红军在李德、博古领导下会被打散”，或者是如朱德所讲的“如果继续这样的领导，我们就不能再跟着走下去！”以毛泽东为代表的党中央，在长征中为了确保全党全军的紧密团结，创造性地将马克思主义基本原理与中国革命具体实践结合起来，不仅制定了正确的战略战术，指挥红军不断打胜仗，为促进党和红军内部的团结统一增强了信心，还实行了科学有效的党内斗争策略，坚持原则性和灵活性相结合，通过遵义会议及其前后系列会议终结了“左”倾教条主义军事路线，在两河口会议后又成功克服了张国焘的南下退却主义和分裂主义错误，不仅排除了错误军事路线的危害，还团结了原先犯过“左”倾错误的同志和跟随张国焘南下的红四方面军广大干部和战士，维护了长征时期全党全军的团结统一。

(III) Strict Discipline Was an Important Guarantee for the CPC and the Red Army to Promote the Spirit of Close Unity During the Long March Period

（三）严明的纪律是长征时期党和红军发扬紧密团结精神的重要保障

Compared with the battles before the Long March, which relied on fixed Soviet base areas, the Party and the Red Army, during the Long March, faced more severe crises and graver challenges due to prolonged, large-span, large-scale mobile operations. Therefore, strict discipline was even more necessary to enhance organization, demonstrate vanguard nature, and ensure internal unity and external coordination, just as Zhu De pointed out: “During the Long March, we relied on discipline to get by.” First, during the Long March period, the entire Party strictly enforced political discipline, ensuring the authority of the Party Central Committee and safeguarding the unity of the entire Party. Along the Long March, the Party and the Red Army always prioritized the education and enforcement of political discipline, emphasizing that the Party commands the gun, firmly establishing the political discipline consciousness of obeying all commands from the Party Central Committee and absolutely submitting to the Party’s leadership. This made the Long March a crucible for forging political loyalty among Red Army officers and soldiers, ultimately smashing Zhang Guotao’s plot to split the Party and the Red Army and safeguarding the unity of the entire Party and the entire army. Second, during the Long March period, the entire Party strictly enforced military discipline, ensuring that all actions obeyed commands, thereby guaranteeing the Red Army’s combat effectiveness. Along the Long March, the Party attached great importance to the education and enforcement of marching and combat discipline among Red Army soldiers, making the Red Army an iron army that could not be scattered, broken, or worn down. Chen Yun, who served as the political commissar of the ferry command during the forced crossing of the Jinsha River, reported to the Communist International on the Red Army’s Long March, saying that the forced crossing of the Jinsha River “once again proved that our Red Army soldiers obey discipline, are tightly organized, and have a high level of consciousness.” Third, during the Long March period, the Party and the Red Army strictly enforced mass discipline, ensuring the flesh-and-blood connection between the Party and the masses and the fish-and-water relationship between the army and the people. Along the Long March, the Party and the Red Army strictly implemented the “Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention,” [5]5 The “Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention” were a set of behavioral regulations for the Red Army, originally formulated by Mao Zedong in the late 1920s. They emphasized obedience, respect for property, and fair treatment of civilians. always maintaining “very strict military discipline, not touching a single thread or grain, buying grain at fair prices, and paying the full amount.” This greatly improved the relationship between the Party and the Red Army with the outside world, established stable relations of unity and mutual assistance with the people along the route, and won substantial support and help from the people along the way.

与长征前有固定的苏区为依托的作战相比，长征期间党和红军由于长时间、大跨度、大规模地流动作战，面临更加严重的危机和更严峻的挑战，因而更需要以严明的纪律来增强组织性、彰显先进性，确保内部的团结和对外的协调，正如朱德所指出的那样，“长征时我们就是靠纪律吃饭的”。首先，长征时期全党严明政治纪律，确保了党中央的权威，维护了全党的统一。长征途中，党和红军始终把政治纪律的教育和执行摆在首位，强调党指挥枪，牢固树立一切听从党中央指挥、绝对服从党的领导的政治纪律意识，使长征成为红军官兵锻造政治忠诚的大熔炉，最终粉碎了张国焘分裂党和红军的阴谋，维护了全党全军的统一。其次，长征时期全党严明军事纪律，做到一切行动听指挥，确保了红军的战斗力。长征途中，党高度重视红军将士的行军和战斗纪律的教育和执行，使红军成为一支走不散、打不烂、拖不垮的铁军。在抢渡金沙江时担任渡河司令部政委的陈云，在向共产国际报告红军长征情况时说，抢渡金沙江，“再次证明我们红军战士服从纪律，组织严密，觉悟很高”。第三，长征时期，党和红军严明群众纪律，确保了党群之间的血肉联系和军民之间的鱼水关系。长征途中，党和红军严格执行“三大纪律八项注意”，始终保持“军纪十分严明，不动一丝一粟，粮食公平购买，价钱交付十足”，极大地改善了党和红军与外部的关系，与沿途人民群众建立了稳固的团结互助关系，赢得了沿途人民群众的大力支持和帮助。

III. The Experience and Enlightenment of the CPC and the Red Army in Promoting the Spirit of Close Unity During the Long March Period

三、长征时期党和红军发扬紧密团结精神的经验启示

During the Long March, the Party and the Red Army were closely united and fought with one heart, ultimately achieving the victorious rendezvous of the three main Red Army forces and opening up a new phase in the Chinese revolution. This great victory was inseparable from the Party’s nature, purpose, guiding ideology, etc. The many valuable experiences of the close unity of the Party and the Red Army during the Long March provide useful enlightenment for carrying forward and promoting the spirit of close unity on the new journey of the New Era.

长征途中，党和红军紧密团结，同心奋战，最终实现三大主力红军胜利会师，开创了中国革命新局面。这一伟大胜利与党的性质宗旨、指导思想等分不开，党和红军在长征中紧密团结的许多宝贵经验为新时代新征程传承弘扬紧密团结精神提供了有益启示。

(I) Formulating Correct Strategic Guidelines Is an Important Prerequisite for Forming the Spirit of Close Unity

（一）制定正确的战略方针，是形成紧密团结精神的重要前提

During the Long March period, one important prerequisite for the Party and the Red Army to ultimately achieve close unity was that, after the Zunyi Meeting, the collective leadership of the Party Central Committee, with Mao Zedong as its de facto core, formulated correct strategic guidelines that were appropriate to the actual conditions at the time, which won high recognition and resolute support from the entire Party and the entire army. Strategic guidelines concern direction and goals. “Unity formed around a clear goal of struggle is the most solid unity, and struggle relying on close unity is the most powerful struggle.” After the Zunyi Meeting, guided by Mao Zedong’s correct military strategic guidelines, the Red Army completely changed the previous situation of being passive and beaten everywhere under the guidance of the “left” dogmatist military line, which had nearly led to the complete annihilation of the army. It executed a combination of flexible mobile warfare tactics, such as the Four Crossings of the Chishui River, the Surprise Attack on Loushan Pass, the Clever Crossing of the Jinsha River, the Forced Crossing of the Dadu River, and the Daring Capture of the Luding Bridge, successfully breaking free from the encirclement, pursuit, and interception of several hundred thousand Kuomintang troops. Mao Zedong’s correct military strategic guidelines gave the Party and the Red Army a new lease on life, brought confidence in victory to the entire Party and the entire army, and strengthened the ideological foundation for the entire Party and the entire army to unite around the Party Central Committee with Mao Zedong as its de facto core. Without the guidance of Mao Zedong’s correct military strategic guidelines, under the command of the erroneous “left” military line, it would naturally have been impossible to achieve the unity of the entire Party and the entire army.

长征时期，党和红军最终实现紧密团结，其中一个重要前提是，遵义会议后以毛泽东为实际核心的党中央领导集体制定了切合当时实际的正确战略方针，获得了全党全军的高度认可和坚决拥护。战略方针事关方向和目标，“围绕明确奋斗目标形成的团结才是最牢固的团结，依靠紧密团结进行的奋斗才是最有力的奋斗。”遵义会议后，在毛泽东的正确军事战略方针引领下，红军一改原先在“左”倾教条主义军事路线指导下处处被动挨打以致陷入全军覆灭的危险局面，打出了四渡赤水、奇袭娄山关、巧渡金沙江、强渡大渡河、飞夺泸定桥等机动灵活的运动战组合拳，成功摆脱了几十万国民党军的围追堵截。毛泽东的正确军事战略方针使党和红军获得重生，给全党全军带来了胜利的信心，给全党全军团结在以毛泽东为实际核心的党中央周围增强了思想基础。如果没有毛泽东的正确军事战略方针的指引，在错误的“左”倾军事路线统领下，要实现全党全军的团结自然也就不可能。

After the Central Red Army joined forces with the Fourth Front Army, Zhang Guotao, the principal leader of the Fourth Front Army, relying on his larger numbers and more weapons, opposed the Central Committee’s strategic policy of marching north to resist Japan, took the Fourth Front Army south on his own authority, and split the Party and the Red Army. In the end, the Party Central Committee, with Mao Zedong as its de facto core, crushed Zhang Guotao’s conspiracy and led the Party and the Red Army toward the light. Zhang Guotao’s strategic policy of dividing the army and moving south ran counter to the situation at the time and ran counter to the will of the vast majority of the officers and men of the Fourth Front Army, thus causing Zhang Guotao’s separatist actions to end in failure. It is evident that whether one strives for unity and wins unity, and whether one has the guidance of a correct strategic policy, is extremely important.

当中央红军与红四方面军会师后，红四方面军的主要领导张国焘自恃人多枪多，反对中央北上抗日战略方针，私自带领红四方面军南下，分裂党和红军。最终，以毛泽东为实际核心的党中央粉碎了张国焘的阴谋，引领党和红军走向光明。张国焘分兵南下的战略方针违背了当时的形势，违背了当时包括广大红四方面将士的意愿，从而使张国焘的分裂行径以失败而告终。可见，争取团结、赢得团结，有没有正确的战略方针指引，是极其重要的。

(2) Carrying out correct inner-Party struggle is a necessary condition for maintaining the unity of the entire Party and the entire army.

（二）开展正确的党内斗争，是维护全党全军团结的必要条件

Mao Zedong pointed out: “Struggle is the means of achieving unity, and unity is the goal of struggle. If unity is sought through struggle, unity will be preserved,” [6]6 Mao Zedong, “Policies, Measures and Perspectives for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation,” *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, p. 745. [n] which explains that struggle is a necessary condition for maintaining unity, but how to carry out effective struggle requires both adhering to principles without fearing struggle and not engaging in struggle without limits or strategy. During the Long March, the spirit of close unity of the Party and the Red Army was not formed under smooth conditions but was forged through active inner-Party struggle. During the Long March, the Party overcame the “Left” errors, especially Zhang Guotao’s separatist errors, which became a necessary condition for maintaining the unity of the entire Party and the entire army. In the early stage of the Long March, due to the erroneous guidance of the “Left” line, military defeats followed one after another, and different voices began to emerge within the Party and the Red Army. Especially after the disastrous defeat at the Xiang River, the Party, the Red Army, and the Chinese revolution were on the brink of extinction. Within the Party and the army, there were differing opinions on the “Left” erroneous leadership of the Central Committee; indeed, opinions of doubt, suspicion, and opposition grew stronger and more numerous, and the morale of the entire army was low. At this critical moment, Mao Zedong, disregarding his personal safety, endured humiliation and shouldered the heavy burden of turning the tide when all seemed lost. He actively carried out ideological and political work, striving for the understanding and support of the majority of Central Committee members, especially winning the support of key figures such as Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang. At the Zunyi Conference, he made a speech that hit the nail on the head, focusing on analyzing and criticizing the “Left” erroneous military line and leadership of Bo Gu and Li De, and elucidating the correct strategy and tactics for the Chinese revolution, winning the approval of the vast majority of comrades attending the Zunyi Conference. Thus, the Zunyi Conference successfully ended the dominance of the “Left” erroneous military line. Through the Zunyi Conference and a series of meetings before and after it, the Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their main representative, adhering to the principle of seeking truth from facts, independently solved the problem of the “Left” erroneous military line. They completely repudiated the “Left” military line and removed the military leadership of those who followed the “Left” line, but they did not launch a comprehensive attack. They did not completely settle accounts with the “Left” line ideologically, organizationally, or politically; they only repudiated and criticized the erroneous “Left” military line, relieved Bo Gu, Li De, and other principal leaders of the “Left” line of their military command authority, but did not remove them from their other leadership posts, nor did they reduce their treatment in any respect. “This was completely necessary and entirely correct under the conditions at the time.” [7]7 *Selected Important Documents Since the Zunyi Conference*, Vol. 1, p. 428. [n] Practice proved that Mao Zedong’s method of struggle was entirely suited to the special conditions of the time. Considering the specific conditions of the time, to completely repudiate the “Left” dogmatist line that had dominated the Central Committee for four years: first, the time was not yet ripe; many comrades in the Party only saw the harm caused by the “Left” military line and had not yet recognized the harm of the “Left” political line, ideological line, and organizational line. Second, conditions did not permit it. The “Left” line had dominated the Central Committee for four years; to completely settle accounts with the “Left” errors would have required a comprehensive review and summary, and even full communication and debate, but the urgent military situation and intense military struggle at the time made such time unavailable. Third, it would not have been conducive to uniting the majority. Key figures such as Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang, who took the lead in opposing the military leadership of Bo Gu and Li De at the Zunyi Conference, had once been supporters of Wang Ming’s “Left” dogmatist line, and even important members of the “Left” camp. It was only after experiencing the failure of the Central Committee’s Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign and the major military setbacks of the Central Red Army in the early stage of the Long March that they came to recognize the errors and harm of the “Left” military line and leadership. If the “Left” line had been completely repudiated, especially the “Left” political line, they might not have agreed. Zhang Wentian said: “Comrade Mao Zedong could only act in this way at that time; otherwise, our united front would have been impossible, and consequently the Zunyi Conference could not have achieved victory.” [8]8 Zhang Wentian, “Self-Criticism at the Zunyi Conference,” *Selected Works of Zhang Wentian*, p. 80. [n] It is evident that Mao Zedong’s method of struggle was not only adapted to local and temporal conditions, seizing the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of the contradiction facing the Party and the Red Army at the time, but was even more aimed at maintaining the unity of the Party and the Red Army, at uniting those comrades who had once committed “Left” errors, so that everyone could unite as one and work together to accomplish the most urgent and important task of the time: military breakout and transfer.

毛泽东指出：“斗争是团结的手段，团结是斗争的目的。以斗争求团结则团结存”，说明了斗争是维护团结的必要条件，但如何开展有效斗争，既要坚持原则而不怕斗争，又不能不讲策略无限制地斗争。长征途中，党和红军的紧密团结精神不是在一帆风顺中形成的，而是经过党内积极斗争铸就的。长征途中，党克服“左”倾错误特别是张国焘分裂主义错误，成为维护全党全军团结一致的必要条件。长征前期，由于“左”倾路线的错误指导，导致军事连连失利，党和红军内部开始出现不同声音，特别是在湘江惨败后，党、红军和中国革命濒临绝境，党内军内对中央“左”倾错误领导持有不同意见，甚至怀疑、抵触和反对的意见越来越多越来越强烈，整个部队士气低迷。在这千钧一发之际，毛泽东不顾个人安危，忍辱负重，主动挑起挽狂澜于既倒的重担，积极开展思想政治工作，争取中央多数同志的理解和支持，特别是争取到了张闻天、王稼祥等关键人物的支持，并在遵义会议上作了切中要害的发言，集中分析和批评了博古、李德的“左”倾错误军事路线和领导，阐明了中国革命的正确战略战术，赢得了参加遵义会议的绝大多数同志的赞同，使遵义会议成功结束了“左”倾错误军事路线的统治。通过遵义会议及其前后系列会议，以毛泽东同志为主要代表的中国共产党人，本着实事求是的原则，独立自主地解决了“左”倾错误军事问题，既彻底否定了“左”倾军事路线，撤换了“左”倾路线者的军事领导，又不全面出击，没有从思想上、组织上、政治上全面清算“左”倾路线，只是否定和批判了“左”倾错误的军事路线，解除了博古、李德等“左”倾路线主要领导者的军事领导权，没有撤换他们的其他领导职务，也没有降低他们的各方面待遇。“这在当时是完全必要，完全正确的。”实践证明，毛泽东的这种斗争方法，完全切合当时特殊条件。从当时具体条件看，要全面否定在中央占统治地位达四年之久的“左”倾教条主义路线，一是时机还未成熟，党内许多同志只看到“左”倾军事路线带来的危害，还没有认识到“左”倾政治路线、思想路线、组织路线等方面的危害。二是条件不允许。“左”倾路线在中央占统治地位达四年之久，要全面清算“左”倾错误，就要进行全面回顾总结，甚至要进行充分的沟通、争论，而当时紧迫的军事形势和激烈的军事斗争，不可能有这么多的时间。三是不利于团结大多数。在遵义会议上带头反对博古、李德军事领导的张闻天、王稼祥等关键人物，曾经都是王明“左”倾教条主义路线的拥护者，甚至是“左”倾阵营的重要成员，他们在经历了中央第五次反“围剿”失败和长征前期中央红军的重大军事挫折后，才认识到了“左”倾军事路线和领导的错误和危害。如果全面否定“左”倾路线，特别是否定“左”倾政治路线，他们不一定会同意。张闻天说：“这在毛泽东同志当时只能如此做，不然我们的联合会成为不可能，因而遵义会议不能取得胜利。”可见，毛泽东这种斗争方法，既是因地因时制宜，抓住了当时党和红军面临的主要矛盾和矛盾的主要方面，更是为了维护党和红军的团结，为了团结曾经犯过“左”倾错误的同志，使大家团结一致、齐心协力完成军事突围和转移这个当时最紧迫最重要的任务。

After the Central Red Army joined forces with the Fourth Front Army in northwestern Sichuan, the primary task they faced was to determine the next strategic direction, unify the direction of advance, break the encirclement and pursuit of the Nationalist army, open up new base areas, and create a new situation for the Chinese revolution. At this critical juncture concerning the success or failure of the Long March and the future of the revolution, “the unity of the Party and the unity of the Red Army were the main conditions for accomplishing this task.” However, Zhang Guotao’s personal ambition, his southward retreat line, warlord thinking, and separatist activities seriously affected and threatened the unity of the Party and the Red Army, causing great harm to the realization of the Central Committee’s strategy of advancing north to resist Japan. The Party Central Committee, represented by Mao Zedong, proceeded from the overall situation of maintaining the unity of the entire Party and the entire army, combining firmness of principle with flexibility of tactics. While taking a serious attitude and resolutely criticizing Zhang Guotao’s individualism and the idea of the gun commanding the Party, strictly ordering him to submit to the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee and to implement the principle of the Party commanding the gun, it also proceeded from the desire for unity and made some principled concessions to Zhang Guotao personally, appointing him Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and General Political Commissar of the Red Army. When Zhang Guotao led his troops south, set up a separate Central Committee, proclaimed himself Chairman, and openly

中央红军与红四方面军在川西北会师后，面临的首要任务是确定下一步战略方针，统一进军方向，打破国民党军的围追堵截，开辟新的根据地和开创中国革命新局面。在这个事关长征成败和革命未来的紧要关头，“党的团结，红军的团结，是实现这一任务的主要条件。”然而，张国焘的个人野心、南下退却路线和军阀主义思想、分裂主义活动，严重影响和威胁着党和红军的团结，对实现中央北上抗日战略造成巨大危害。以毛泽东为代表的党中央，从维护全党全军团结大局出发，坚持原则的坚定性与策略的灵活性相结合，既严肃态度，坚决批评了张国焘的个人主义和枪指挥党的思想，严令他服从党中央集中统一领导，执行党指挥枪的原则，又从团结愿望出发，对张国焘个人作出了部分有原则的让步，任命他为中央军委副主席、红军总政委。当张国焘率军南下另立中央、自封主席，公然分裂党和红军时，党内不少同志主张开除他的党籍。关键时刻，毛泽东坚决不同意，认为这不是张国焘个人问题，而是牵涉红四方面军广大指战员的大问题，这个问题解决得不好，会影响党和红军内部的团结和统一，甚至影响中国革命大局，“你开除他的党籍，他还是统率几万军队，还蒙蔽着几万军队，以后就不好见面了”。危急关头，毛泽东沉着镇定和举重若轻，显现出一个伟大政治家的博大胸怀和高超智慧，有机地把握了党内斗争原则性与灵活性相统一的关系，始终没有把张国焘的分裂行径当作敌我矛盾处理，而是当作党内矛盾处理，先后通过系列会议、电报往来及共产国际代表张浩出面协调等渠道，做张国焘的思想政治工作，劝说张国焘率军北上与中央会师，尽最大努力和耐心对张国焘的错误行径进行批评教育和挽救，全力维护党的团结和红军的统一。在以毛泽东为代表的党中央正确领导和有理有利有节的斗争下，在红四、红二方面军广大干部战士积极响应党中央北上和要求团结的大氛围中，张国焘最终率军北上陕甘，实现了红一方面军与红四、红二方面军的胜利会师，使长征取得完全胜利。如果没有正确的党内斗争策略和党中央取得同张国焘分裂主义斗争的胜利，党和红军在长征路上的紧密团结就会遭受重大挫折。在战胜张国焘分裂主义活动中，“毛泽东同志正确处理党内问题的政策，使大家团结起来了，渡过了最困难的时刻，完成了长征”。事实充分证明，如果当时开除了张国焘的党籍，很可能使张国焘走得更远，党也可能会丢失红四方面军这支坚强的红军队伍。因为红四方面军和其他红军一样，是党创建和领导的人民军队，不是张国焘的私人武装。在当时特殊条件下，在红四方面军内部，还有不少官兵被张国焘蒙蔽，没有看清他分裂党和红军的真面目。正如亲身经历了党与张国焘分裂主义斗争始末的彭德怀后来回忆说：“如果当时开除了张国焘的党籍，以后争取四方面军过草地，就会困难得多。就不会有以后的二、四方面军在甘孜的会合，更不会有一、二、四方面军在陕北的大会合了。”由此可以看出，正确的党内斗争策略，对维护全党全军的团结，是多么重要！

(3) The high level of Party spirit consciousness among leading cadres and their words and deeds in consciously maintaining the overall situation of unity were the key to promoting unity within the entire Party and the entire army.

（三）领导干部的高度党性觉悟和自觉维护团结大局的言行，是促进全党全军团结的关键

During the difficult years of the Long March, promoting unity and taking the overall situation into consideration could not rely solely on verbal emphasis and policy guidance; it also depended on the firm Party-spirit consciousness, behavioral demonstrations, and personal charisma of the leaders. During the Long March period, leading members of the Party and the Red Army, represented by Mao Zedong, set a good example and served as role models for adhering to the principles of Party spirit and maintaining the unity of the entire Party and the entire army through their concrete actions. Although Mao Zedong was the universally recognized leader after the Zunyi Conference [n9], he did not take it for granted that he should assume the highest leadership position in the Central Committee. Instead, he recommended Zhang Wentian, who had previously been a member of Wang Ming's "Left" deviationist line camp [n10], had shifted his stance before the Zunyi Conference to support Mao Zedong's correct opinions, and had taken the lead at the Zunyi Conference in criticizing the "Left" deviationist erroneous military line, to be the General Secretary of the Central Committee. Doing so powerfully influenced comrades within the Party who held differing opinions, and in particular united comrades who had previously committed "Left" deviationist errors to work together. To unite Zhang Guotao, Zhou Enlai voluntarily resigned from his post as General Political Commissar of the Red Army to allow him to assume it, demonstrating a broad-mindedness that placed the interests of the Party above all else. Faced with Zhang Guotao's separatist act of moving south, establishing a separate "Central Committee," and proclaiming himself "Chairman," and faced with Zhang Guotao's coercion and inducements, Zhu De, who was in the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army, firmly stated: "With a powerful enemy before us, we must promote unity! The Red Army under Heaven is one family. The Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, under the unified leadership of the Party Central Committee, is an integral whole." "You want me, this 'Zhu,' to oppose 'Mao'? I can't do that! No matter how big the incident, it is an internal problem of the Red Army. Everyone must be calm and find a solution. We cannot let Chiang Kai-shek watch our show." This demonstrated a Communist Party member's firm principle of Party spirit in promoting unity. When the Second Front Army of the Red Army joined forces with the Fourth Front Army, facing Zhang Guotao's separatist schemes, Ren Bishi, He Long, and others also displayed a high degree of Party-spirit consciousness, resolutely opposing Zhang Guotao's separatist activities and upholding the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee. When Zhang Guotao sent cadres to the Second Front Army to peddle his separatist ideas, Ren Bishi firmly instructed the cadres of the Second Front Army that "cadres coming from the Fourth Front Army are only allowed to talk about unity and share their experiences of crossing the grasslands; they are not permitted to engage in propaganda against the Central Committee, and any materials sent over must not be distributed," clearly revealing the political foundation of upholding the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee, making Zhang Guotao's separatist schemes difficult to succeed. When Zhang Guotao was about to speak at the rally celebrating the joining of the two armies, He Long, sitting next to him, said half-jokingly and half-seriously to him: "Guotao, only talk about unity, don't talk about splitting. Otherwise, watch out, or I might take a shot at you," displaying with righteous indignation the political stance of upholding unity and opposing division, greatly intimidating Zhang Guotao and preventing him from daring to voice his separatist schemes. It was precisely because leaders like Zhu De, Ren Bishi, and He Long had model words and deeds that firmly maintained the unity and unification of the entire Party and the entire army that they powerfully influenced and led the officers and soldiers of the Second and Fourth Front Armies of the Red Army to march north to join forces with the Party Central Committee.

在长征的艰难岁月里，讲团结、顾大局，不能光靠口头强调和政策指引，还要靠领导者的坚定党性自觉、行为示范和人格魅力。长征时期，以毛泽东为代表的党和红军领导成员，以实际行动为坚持党性原则、维护全党全军的团结带好了头，作出了榜样。毛泽东在遵义会议后尽管是众望所归的领袖人物，但他并没有理所当然地担任中央最高领导，而是推荐曾经是王明“左”倾路线阵营成员、在遵义会议前转变立场支持毛泽东的正确意见并在遵义会议上带头批评“左”倾错误军事路线的张闻天为中央总负责。这样做，有力地影响了党内持不同意见的同志，特别是团结了曾经犯过“左”倾错误的同志一道工作。为了团结张国焘，周恩来主动辞去红军总政委职务让他担任，表现了党的利益至上的宽阔胸怀。面对张国焘南下另立“中央”、自封“主席”的分裂行径，面对张国焘的威逼利诱，身在红四方面军中的朱德坚定地说：“大敌当前，要讲团结嘛！天下红军是一家。中国工农红军在党中央统一领导下，是个整体”“要我这个‘朱’去反‘毛’，我可做不到呀！不论发生多大的事，都是红军内部的问题，大家要冷静，要找出解决办法来，可不能叫蒋介石看我们的热闹”。这彰显了一个共产党员讲团结的坚强党性原则。当红二方面军与红四方面军会师后，面对张国焘的分裂图谋，任弼时、贺龙等，也表现出高度的党性自觉，坚决反对张国焘的分裂活动，维护党中央集中统一领导。当张国焘派干部到红二方面军兜售他的分裂思想时，任弼时坚定地指示红二方面军干部，对“红四方面军来的干部，只准讲团结，介绍过草地的经验，不准进行反中央的宣传，送来的材料一律不准下发”，旗帜鲜明地亮出了坚持党中央集中统一领导的政治底色，使张国焘的分裂图谋难以得逞。当张国焘在两军会师庆祝大会上准备发言时，坐在他身旁的贺龙半开玩笑半认真地对他说：“国焘啊，只讲团结，莫讲分裂，不然，小心老子打你的黑枪”，大义凛然地亮出了坚持团结、反对分裂的政治立场，极大地震慑了张国焘，使他的分裂图谋不敢启口。正是有朱德、任弼时、贺龙等领导有着坚定维护全党全军团结统一的模范言行，才有力地影响和带动了红二、红四方面军将士北上与党中央会合。

(4) Adhering to democratic centralism was the institutional guarantee for maintaining the close unity of the entire Party and the entire army.

（四）坚持民主集中制，是维护全党全军紧密团结的制度保障

Democratic centralism is the fundamental organizational system and leadership system of our Party, and it is also the fundamental means of resolving different opinions and different line struggles within the Party. During the Long March, in order to overcome the harm of the "Left" errors and splittism within the Party, the Party Central Committee successively convened more than ten important meetings at different levels for discussion and struggle, and ultimately relied on democratic centralism to make truth triumph over error and unity replace division. At the Zunyi Conference, the attending comrades engaged in fierce debate. In the end, except for Bo Gu, Li De, and Kai Feng, all other comrades agreed with and supported Mao Zedong's correct views. Faced with the opinions of the overwhelming majority within the Party, Bo Gu and a few other "Left" leaders found it difficult to persist in their original erroneous positions and viewpoints. The Zunyi Conference ended the dominance of the "Left" erroneous military line. This was a victory for the overwhelming majority within the Party, represented by Mao Zedong, over the tiny minority represented by Bo Gu, and a victory for the implementation of democratic centralism within the Party. The Party's ultimate victory over Zhang Guotao's splittism during the Long March period was also, from an institutional perspective, achieved through inner-Party democratic centralism. The reason Zhang Guotao's act of setting up a separate "Central Committee" and splitting the Party and the Red Army succeeded temporarily was that the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army had long been under his personal autocratic leadership, leading to an imperfect democratic centralism. An important reason why Zhang Guotao did not publicly announce his separate "Central Committee" and self-appointed "Chairman" for two months was his fear of resolute opposition from many comrades within the Party, especially within the Fourth Front Army. Initially, Zhang Guotao influenced some officers and soldiers of the Fourth Front Army through deception and concealment. Later, as Zhu De, Liu Bocheng, and others who remained in the Fourth Front Army argued on the basis of principle, and especially after the Second Front Army and the Sixth Front Army of the Red Army joined forces with the Fourth Front Army, Ren Bishi, He Long, and others, having been informed by Zhu De and Liu Bocheng, saw through Zhang Guotao's separatist plot and joined the ranks opposing the split. This led to an increasing number of comrades within the Party opposing Zhang Guotao's divisive actions, forming a strong atmosphere supporting Zhu De's march north to join the Party Central Committee and opposing Zhang Guotao's westward advance to create a split. This forced Zhang Guotao to say, "The minority must submit to the majority. Since everyone agrees on marching north, then I will give up my opinion." It can be seen that democratic centralism played an institutional guarantee role in the ultimate victory over Zhang Guotao's splittism.

民主集中制是我们党的根本组织制度和领导制度，也是解决党内不同意见分歧和不同路线斗争的根本途径。长征途中，为了克服党内“左”倾错误和分裂主义危害，党中央先后召开了10多次不同层次的重要会议开展讨论和斗争，最终靠民主集中制使真理战胜谬误、团结代替分裂。在遵义会议上，与会同志开展了激烈的争论，最后除博古、李德、凯丰三人外，其余同志都赞同和支持毛泽东的正确意见。面对党内绝大多数人的意见，博古等少数“左”倾领导难以坚持原有的错误立场和观点。遵义会议结束“左”倾错误军事路线的统治，是以毛泽东为代表的党内绝大多数战胜了以博古为代表的极少数，是党内实行民主集中制的胜利。党在长征时期最终战胜张国焘的分裂主义，从制度上看，也是靠党内民主集中制。张国焘另立“中央”、分裂党和红军的行径之所以一时得逞，就是由于当时红四方面军长期受他的个人独裁领导而导致民主集中制不健全。张国焘另立“中央”、自封“主席”后两个月，没有对外公开，一个重要原因就是慑于党内特别是红四方面军内不少同志的坚决反对。一开始，张国焘靠欺骗和蒙蔽影响了红四方面军的一些将士。后来，随着留在红四方面军的朱德、刘伯承等据理力争，特别是当红二、红六军团与红四方面军会师后，任弼时、贺龙等在朱德、刘伯承的介绍下，识破了张国焘的分裂阴谋，也加入了反分裂的行列，使反对张国焘搞分裂行径的党内同志越来越多，形成了支持朱德北上与党中央会合、反对张国焘西进搞分裂的大氛围，迫使张国焘不得不说：“少数服从多数，既然大家都赞成北上，那我就放弃我的意见嘛。”可见，民主集中制在最终战胜张国焘分裂主义中起到了制度保障作用。

"Unity and struggle are the only way for the Party to lead the people in creating great historical achievements." On the new journey of the New Era, the great changes unseen in a century in the world are accelerating, and unpredictable and unforeseeable variables are increasing. We are still on the Long March road. There are still many "Loushan Passes" and "Lazikou"[n] to be conquered, many treacherous great rivers to be crossed, and many vast "snowy mountains" and "grasslands" to be traversed. We still need to carry forward the close unity spirit of the Party and the Red Army during the Long March period, further consolidate and develop the excellent situation of close unity of the entire Party, the entire military, and the entire people, seek the greatest common divisor for realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and draw the largest concentric circle for the common effort to achieve a strong country and the common prosperity of the people.

“团结奋斗是党领导人民创造历史伟业的必由之路。”新时代新征程，世界百年大局在加速演进，不可预料、不可预测的可变因素在增加，我们依然在长征路上，还有许多“娄山关”“腊子口”需要攻克，还有很多凶险的大江大河需要抢渡，还有不少茫茫“大雪山”“大草地”需要征服，我们仍然需要发扬长征时期党和红军的紧密团结精神，进一步巩固和发展全党全军全国人民紧密团结的大好局面，寻求实现强国复兴的最大公约数，画出为实现国强民富共同努力的最大同心圆。