Characteristics of the Central Committee Meetings during the Long March Period

During the two years of the Long March, a period of ceaseless military activity, the Party Central Committee convened several dozen important meetings, conducting effective deliberations on the strategic direction of the Party and the Red Army, as well as on military, political, organizational, ideological, conduct-related, mass, ethnic, united front, and troop reorganization matters. These meetings produced scientific decisions and周密部署 [n] for securing victory in the Long March and opening a new phase in the Chinese revolution, and they also left behind valuable action tracks for our study of the rich historical legacy of the Long March today. Over the decades, scholarship on the Long March meetings has accumulated rich research findings on specific issues such as the number, type, time, place, problems resolved, and participants of the meetings. This article focuses on three main characteristics of the series of important meetings convened by the Party Central Committee during the Long March period, namely: seizing the main issue and debating it through to the end, correctly grasping the strategy of struggle in meetings, and adhering to democratic centralism. It analyzes each of these in turn, with the aim of providing a useful reference for deepening research on the history and culture of the Long March.

在长达两年的长征戎马倥偬中，党中央先后召开了几十次重要会议，围绕党和红军的战略方针以及军事、政治、组织、思想、作风、群众、民族、统战、部队整编等各方面工作进行了有效商议。这些会议为夺取长征胜利、开创中国革命新局面作出了科学决策和周密部署，也为我们今天研究长征丰厚的历史文化遗产留下了宝贵的行动轨迹。几十年来，学界关于长征会议的次数、类型、时间、地点、所解决的问题及参会人员等具体问题，积累了丰富的研究成果。本文聚焦于长征时期党中央召开的系列重要会议的三个主要特点，即抓准主要议题一议到底、正确把握会议斗争策略、坚持民主集中制，逐个加以分析，以期为深化长征历史文化研究提供有益参考。

I. Seizing the Most Important Issue and Debating It Through to the End

一、抓准最主要议题一议到底

The agenda of a meeting is the question or theme under discussion, the main content of the meeting. Whether the agenda is realistic and scientifically reasonable is the key to running a successful meeting. Throughout the Long March, the Party and the Red Army were caught in the tumultuous waves of campaigns east and west, battles south and north. A vast amount of routine daily management work could not be discussed and resolved through meetings at the central level; the issues taken up at central-level meetings had to be those that determined the success or failure of the Long March. From an analysis of more than twenty important meetings convened by the Party Central Committee during the Long March period, the core agenda was the establishment of the correct line, including strategic direction and tactical principles. Before the Party Central Committee reached northern Shaanxi, the main task was to resolve the military line; after it reached northern Shaanxi, it began to resolve the political line and the organizational line. Because the Long March was a strategic great transfer and a great military campaign, a life-and-death struggle between the Party and the Red Army on one side and the enemy on the other, the line question — especially the military line — directly determined the strategic direction and tactical principles. Whether it was correct or not concerned the success or failure of the Long March, the survival of the Party and the Red Army, and the future of the Chinese revolution. For this very reason, the line question naturally became the “first agenda item” of the series of important meetings convened by the Party Central Committee during the Long March period. Almost all important meetings had this issue on their agenda. Among them, fifteen important meetings — the Tongdao Meeting, the Liping Meeting, the Qinggangpo Meeting, the Dangui Meeting, the Luding Meeting, the Lianghekou Meeting, the Mao’ergai Meeting, the Baxi Meeting, the Hadapu Meeting, the Bangluo Zhen Meeting, the Wuqi Zhen Meeting, the Wayaobu Meeting, the Jinxi Meeting, the Taisi Meeting, and the First Bao’an Meeting — were dedicated to studying or mainly discussing the line question and strategic and tactical issues.

会议的议题就是会议讨论的问题和主题，是会议的主要内容。议题设置是否切合实际和合理科学，是能否开好会议的关键。长征一路，党和红军处于东征西讨、南征北战的惊涛骇浪之中，大量日常的具体管理工作，不可能通过召开中央层面的会议来讨论解决，中央层面开会所涉及的议题必须是事关长征成败的大事。从长征时期党中央所召开的20多次重要会议分析，核心议题是确立正确的路线，包括战略方针和战术原则。党中央到达陕北前，主要是解决军事路线问题，党中央到达陕北后，开始解决政治路线和组织路线问题。由于长征是一次战略大转移和军事大转战，是党和红军与敌人展开的殊死大搏斗，路线问题尤其是军事路线，直接决定着战略方向和战术方针，其正确与否，关乎长征的成败、党和红军的存亡以及中国革命的前途。正因如此，路线问题自然成为长征时期党中央召开系列重要会议的“第一议题”，几乎所有重要会议的议程都涉及这一议题。其中，通道会议、黎平会议、青杠坡会议、丹桂会议、泸定会议、两河口会议、毛儿盖会议、巴西会议、哈达铺会议、榜罗镇会议、吴起镇会议、瓦窑堡会议、晋西会议、太相寺会议、第一次保安会议等15次重要会议，就是专题研究或主要讨论路线及战略战术问题的关键会议。

Leadership is both the decision-maker that establishes the correct line and the organizer that implements it. Without correct leadership, there can be no formulation or execution of the correct line. Therefore, whether leadership is correct or not is equally an important precondition determining victory or defeat in the Long March. Discussing and studying the leadership question and establishing correct leadership naturally became another important agenda item for the series of important meetings convened by the Party Central Committee during the Long March period. The Luhua Meeting and the Second Bao’an Meeting, convened by the Party Central Committee during the Long March, had the leadership question as their main agenda item. It should be pointed out that the line question and the leadership question are closely related. The Party Central Committee used a series of important meetings along the Long March route to resolve these two important issues. Therefore, these two issues were not sharply separated but were interwoven and advanced in parallel. Along the Long March route, through a series of important meetings, the most representative of which was the Zunyi Meeting, the Party Central Committee not only put an end to the erroneous leadership of “Left” dogmatism [n] and established the correct leadership represented by Comrade Mao Zedong, but also ended the guidance of the “Left” erroneous military line and established the guidance of the correct military line represented by Comrade Mao Zedong. Through important meetings such as the Lianghekou Meeting and the Emeeting, the Party Central Committee, while smashing Zhang Guotao’s plot to usurp the supreme leadership of the Party and the Red Army and upholding the correct leadership of the Party Central Committee with Comrade Mao Zedong at its core, also rejected Zhang Guotao’s erroneous line of retreatism — whether southward or westward — and upheld the Party Central Committee’s correct line of resisting Japan by marching north. For this very reason, in addition to the meetings that mainly studied the line question or mainly studied the leadership question, the series of important meetings convened by the Party Central Committee during the Long March also included a number of meetings that listed the resolution of both the line question and the leadership question as their main agenda items. These eight meetings were: the Houwei Meeting, the Zunyi Meeting, the Zhaxi Meeting, the Gouba Meeting, the Huili Meeting, the Shawo Meeting, the Emeeting, and the Xiasiwan Meeting. As Nie Rongzhen, who experienced the entire Long March, pointed out: “The fundamental issue was still the leadership issue, the line issue.” Resolving these two fundamental issues became the most important agenda item for the series of important meetings convened by the Party Central Committee during the Long March period.

领导既是确立正确路线的决策者，又是贯彻正确路线的组织者。没有正确的领导，就没有正确路线的制定与执行。因此，领导的正确与否，同样是决定长征胜负的重要前提。讨论和研究领导问题，确立正确领导，自然成为长征时期党召开系列重要会议的另一项重要议题。党中央在长征时期召开的芦花会议、第二次保安会议，其主要议题便是讨论领导问题。需要指出的是，路线问题与领导问题密切相关，党中央在长征途中通过一系列重要会议来解决这两个重要问题。因此，这两个问题不是截然分开的，而是相互交织、齐头并进的。在长征途中，党中央通过以遵义会议为主要代表的一系列重要会议，不仅终结了“左”倾教条主义的错误领导，确立了以毛泽东同志为代表的正确领导，同时也结束了“左”倾错误军事路线的指导，确立了以毛泽东同志为代表的正确军事路线的指导。通过两河口会议、俄界会议等重要会议，党中央在粉碎张国焘企图篡夺党和红军最高领导权的阴谋、维护实际上以毛泽东同志为核心的党中央正确领导的同时，也否定了张国焘南下或西进的退却主义错误路线，坚持了党中央北上抗日的正确路线。正因如此，长征时期党中央召开的一系列重要会议，除了主要研究路线问题或主要研究领导问题以外，还有一系列重要会议将解决路线问题与解决领导问题并列为主要议题，如猴场会议、遵义会议、扎西会议、苟坝会议、会理会议、沙窝会议、俄界会议、下寺湾会议等八次会议。诚如亲历长征全过程的聂荣臻所指出：“根本问题还是个领导问题，路线问题。”解决好这两个根本问题，成为长征时期党中央召开系列重要会议的最主要议题。

Fortunately, the Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their main representative, at a time when they had completely lost contact with the Communist International, when the Party was deeply harmed by Wang Ming’s “Left” dogmatism, which had caused the failure of the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign [n] and the disastrous defeat of the Xiang River Campaign [n] in the early stages of the Long March — at this critical moment — and when, after the junction of the Central Red Army and the Fourth Front Army, they faced the harm of Zhang Guotao’s line of retreatism and分裂主义 [n], in the “darkest” and “most difficult” period, resolutely and independently shouldered the burden of saving the Party, the Red Army, and the Chinese revolution. Closely centering on the core agenda of resolving the line and leadership questions, they successfully convened a series of important meetings, the most representative of which was the Zunyi Meeting. Through these meetings, the Party put an end to the erroneous military line of “Left” dogmatism and its erroneous leadership, effectively established Mao Zedong’s leading position in the Party Central Committee and the Red Army, and established the guiding position of the correct line represented by Comrade Mao Zedong in the Party Central Committee and the Red Army. At the same time, through the successful convening of important meetings such as the Lianghekou Meeting and the Emeeting, it overcame the harm of Zhang Guotao’s line of retreatism and分裂主义, smashed his plot to seize the supreme leadership of the Party and the Red Army, upheld Mao Zedong’s leading position in the Party and the Red Army, and upheld the guiding position of the correct line represented by Comrade Mao Zedong in the Party and the Red Army, ultimately leading the Red Army to victory in reaching northern Shaanxi.

值得庆幸的是，以毛泽东同志为主要代表的中国共产党人，在与共产国际完全失去联系的情况下，在党内深受王明“左”倾教条主义危害、导致第五次反“围剿”失败以及长征初期湘江战役惨败的千钧一发之际，在中央红军与红四方面军会师后又面临张国焘退却主义和分裂主义路线危害的“最黑暗”“最困难”时期，毅然独立自主地肩负起挽救党、红军和中国革命的重担，紧紧围绕解决路线和领导问题的核心议题，成功召开了以遵义会议为主要代表的一系列重要会议。通过这些会议，党终结了“左”倾教条主义的错误军事路线及其错误领导，事实上确立了毛泽东在党中央和红军中的领导地位，确立了以毛泽东同志为代表的正确路线在党中央和红军中的指导地位；同时，通过成功召开两河口会议、俄界会议等重要会议，克服了张国焘退却主义和分裂主义路线的危害，粉碎了其企图攫取党和红军最高领导权的阴谋，维护了毛泽东在党和红军中的领导地位，维护了以毛泽东同志为代表的正确路线在党和红军中的指导地位，最终引领红军胜利到达陕北。

After arriving in northern Shaanxi, the Party Central Committee, with Comrade Mao Zedong at its core, convened in a timely manner a series of important meetings, including the Wayaobu Conference[n]. These meetings conducted a comprehensive analysis of the then highly complex situation, accurately assessed the major trend that the Chinese nation faced a more severe existential crisis, that the Sino-Japanese national contradiction had risen to become the principal contradiction while class contradiction had descended to a secondary one, scientifically grasped the internal logic of the Party's central work shifting from civil war to a war of national resistance against Japan, systematically corrected the "left" dogmatist political line and organizational line, terminated "left" sectarian exclusivism[n], established the strategy of a united national front against Japan, and pushed the work center of the base areas to gradually shift from opposing Chiang Kai-shek and resisting Japan to uniting with Chiang Kai-shek to resist Japan. At the same time, it made the Party the "two vanguards"[n], changed the "Chinese Soviet Worker-Peasant Republic" to the "Chinese Soviet People's Republic"[n], and transformed the Red Army into a nationwide anti-Japanese armed force, thereby maximizing the class and mass base of the Party, the Soviet regime, the Red Army, and base area construction. During this period, while opposing sectarian exclusivism and expanding the united front to include all anti-Japanese forces, the Party Central Committee always insisted on the Party's leadership within the united front. First, it strengthened united front work with the Northeastern Army and the 17th Route Army[n] and other local Kuomintang forces, pushed the base areas to shift from war to peace, and used the great unity of anti-Japanese forces in the Northwest to promote the great unity of anti-Japanese forces nationwide. It established the policy of "developing to consolidate"[n], and while smashing the enemy's military "encirclement and suppression" campaigns, it conducted the Eastern Expedition and the Western Expedition[n], consolidating and expanding the base areas, linking the Shaanxi-Gansu and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia base areas into one, ultimately forming the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Base Area. It corrected the "left" deviation in the suppression of counterrevolutionaries[n], eliminating internal hidden dangers within the base areas; established new Party, government, and military leadership organs, further consolidating Mao Zedong's core leadership position within the Party, and promoted brotherly unity among the various Red Army units—the Central Red Army, the 25th Red Army, and the Shaanxi Red Army—within the base area. It adjusted policies towards rich peasants and national capitalists, promoting economic development in the base areas. It founded schools such as the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Red Army University[n] to train military-political cadres and various specialized personnel, reserving骨干 for the national salvation war against Japan. In summary, after arriving in northern Shaanxi, through convening a series of important meetings including the Wayaobu Conference, the Party Central Committee further resolved the issues of line and leadership, consolidated the dominant position of the correct line and correct leadership represented by Comrade Mao Zedong within the Party and the Red Army, initiated a major transformation of the Party's work, consolidated and developed the northern Shaanxi base area, led the three main forces of the Red Army to a victorious rendezvous in Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia, achieved the complete victory of the Long March, and opened up a new phase in the Chinese revolution.

到达陕北后，以毛泽东同志为核心的党中央及时召开了瓦窑堡会议等一系列重要会议，对当时错综复杂的形势作出了全面分析，准确研判中华民族面临着更为严重的生存危机，中日民族矛盾上升为主要矛盾，阶级矛盾下降为次要矛盾的大趋势，科学把握了党的中心工作由国内战争向抗日民族战争转变的内在逻辑，系统纠正了“左”倾教条主义的政治路线和组织路线，终止了“左”倾关门主义，确立了抗日民族统一战线的策略，推动根据地工作中心从反蒋抗日逐步转向联蒋抗日。同时，使党成为“两个先锋队”，将“中华苏维埃工农共和国”改为“中华苏维埃人民共和国”，把红军转变为全民族的抗日武装队伍，从而最大限度地扩大了党、苏维埃政权、红军和根据地建设的阶级和群众基础。这一时期，党中央在反对关门主义、将统战对象扩大到所有抗日力量的同时，始终坚持党在统一战线中的领导权。首先加强东北军及第十七路军等当地国民党军的统战工作，推进根据地由战转和，以西北地区抗日力量的大联合促进全国抗日力量的大联合。确立“以发展求巩固”的方针，在粉碎敌人军事“围剿”的同时，进行东征和西征，巩固和拓展根据地，使陕北与陕甘两个根据地连成一体，最终形成陕甘宁根据地。纠正“左”倾肃反错误，消除根据地内部隐患；建立新的党政军领导机构，进一步巩固了毛泽东在全党的领导核心地位，促进了中央红军、红二十五军、陕北红军等各路红军在根据地内的兄弟般团结。调整对富农和民族工商业等的政策，推动根据地经济发展。创办中国人民抗日红军大学等学校，培养军政干部及各类专业人才，为抗日救国储备骨干。总之，党中央到达陕北后，通过召开瓦窑堡会议等一系列重要会议，进一步解决了路线和领导问题，巩固了以毛泽东同志为代表的正确领导和正确路线在党和红军中的主导地位，开启了全党工作的重大转变，巩固和发展了陕北根据地，引领三大红军主力胜利会师陕甘宁，夺取长征彻底胜利，开创了中国革命的新局面。

Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee, in convening the series of important meetings during the Long March period, not only grasped the most principal agenda items in terms of content but also managed time tightly, following through to the end. During the Long March journey from December 1934 to October 1935, the Party Central Committee convened over 20 important meetings, focusing on resolving issues of line and leadership, averaging more than two meetings per month, and at most four meetings per month. To ensure the successful convening of the Zunyi Conference[n] and resolve the "left" dogmatist military line and military leadership issues, the Party Central Committee, from December 12, 1934, to January 1, 1935, successively convened three important meetings—the Tongdao Conference, the Liping Conference, and the Hougou Conference[n]—which, while studying pressing military strategic and tactical issues, prepared ideologically and institutionally for the successful convening of the Zunyi Conference. To adjust military strategy and tactics and implement the spirit of the Zunyi Conference, the Party Central Committee, in the short span of 11 days from February 4 to 14, 1935, successively convened six meetings in the Zhaxi region of Yunnan. To implement the strategic policy of marching north to resist Japan and resolve Zhang Guotao's splittism[n], the Party Central Committee, in the 20 days from September 9 to 28, 1935, successively convened three enlarged meetings of the Politburo Standing Committee and one enlarged meeting of the Politburo. This demonstrates that during the Long March, to hold meetings, "holding meetings at every campsite was actually the normal working state of the central leaders," fully reflecting that the Chinese Communists, represented by Comrade Mao Zedong, were not only adept at grasping the most principal agenda items of meetings but also adept at holding on tight and following through to the end, fully manifesting the pragmatic and efficient style that "only by grasping tightly and never relaxing can one seize hold."

毛泽东和党中央在长征时期召开的系列重要会议，不仅在内容上抓准最主要议题，而且在时间上也抓得很紧，一抓到底。在1934年12月至1935年10月的长征途中，党中央就召开了20多次重要会议，集中解决路线和领导问题，平均每月召开2次以上，最多时每月达4次。为了开好遵义会议，解决“左”倾教条主义军事路线和军事领导问题，党中央从1934年12月12日至1935年1月1日，连续召开了通道会议、黎平会议和猴场会议等3次重要会议，在研究迫在眉睫的军事战略战术问题的同时，从思想上、制度上为遵义会议的成功召开做好了准备。为了调整军事战略战术并贯彻好遵义会议精神，党中央在1935年2月4日至14日的短短11天中，在云南扎西地区连续召开了6次会议。为了贯彻北上抗日战略方针和解决张国焘的分裂主义问题，党中央在1935年9月9日至28日的20天中，连续召开了3次政治局常委会和1次政治局扩大会议。由此可见，长征途中，为了开好会议，“每到宿营地就举行会议实际上是当时中央领导人的工作常态”，充分体现了以毛泽东同志为代表的中国共产党人不仅善于抓准会议的最主要议题，而且善于抓住不放、一抓到底，充分彰显了“只有抓得很紧，毫不放松，才能抓住”的务实和高效风格。

II. Correctly Grasping the Strategy of Struggle within Meetings

二、正确把握会议斗争策略

During the Long March period, the struggle between the correct line and the erroneous line, and between correct leadership and erroneous leadership within the Party, was extremely intense. For the series of important meetings convened by the Party Central Committee to successfully resolve the issues of line and leadership that affected the overall situation, it was necessary to correctly grasp the strategy of inner-Party struggle, both to overcome the interference of the erroneous line and erroneous leadership and to maintain the overall unity of the entire Party and entire army. The Chinese Communists, mainly represented by Comrade Mao Zedong, at the series of important meetings during the Long March journey, firmly grasped the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of the contradiction at that time, emphasized politics, considered the overall situation, and sought unity, formulating and implementing a struggle strategy combining principle and flexibility. With high artistic skill in struggle, they actively carried out effective inner-Party ideological struggle. Through the series of important meetings before and after the Zunyi Conference, they successfully terminated the "left" dogmatist erroneous military line and military leadership; through the series of important meetings including the Lianghekou Conference and the Emeeting Conference[n], they overcame the harm of Zhang Guotao's retreatism and splittism, adhered to the strategic policy of marching north to resist Japan, and maintained the unity and unification of the Party and the Red Army; through the series of important meetings including the Wayaobu Conference, they completely resolved the issue of the Party's political line and established the new strategy of building a broad united national front against Japan. These efforts provided firm guarantees in terms of line and leadership for achieving the complete victory of the Red Army's Long March and opening up a new phase in the Chinese revolution.

长征时期，党内正确路线与错误路线、正确领导与错误领导之间的斗争十分激烈。党中央召开的系列重要会议要成功解决事关全局的路线和领导问题，必须正确把握党内斗争策略，既要克服错误路线和错误领导的干扰，又要维护全党全军的团结大局。以毛泽东同志为主要代表的中国共产党人，在长征途中的系列重要会议上，紧紧抓住当时的主要矛盾和矛盾的主要方面，讲政治、顾大局、求团结，制定和实行了原则性与灵活性相结合的斗争策略，以高超的斗争艺术，积极开展有效的党内思想斗争，通过遵义会议前后的系列重要会议，成功终结了“左”倾教条主义的错误军事路线和军事领导；通过两河口会议、俄界会议等系列重要会议，克服了张国焘退却主义和分裂主义的危害，坚持了北上抗日的战略方针，维护了党和红军的团结和统一；通过瓦窑堡会议等系列重要会议，彻底解决了党的政治路线问题，确立了建立广泛的抗日民族统一战线的新策略。这些努力，为夺取红军长征的完全胜利、开创中国革命的新局面，提供了坚强的路线和领导保障。

First, Mao Zedong, with the artistic struggle of considering the overall situation and uniting the majority, facilitated the successful convening of the Zunyi Conference.

首先，毛泽东以顾全大局和团结大多数的斗争艺术，促成了遵义会议的成功召开。

After the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Party Congress, a group of "Left" dogmatists represented by Wang Ming, having received strong support from the Comintern, entered the Central Committee leadership, including the interim central leader Bo Gu and the Comintern military advisor Otto Braun, whose power was extremely high. They used factionalist methods to place "Left" elements in many important Party and military posts, so that "Left" dogmatists virtually dominated all fields of Party politics, military affairs, and so on. They did not understand China's national conditions, lacked practical experience in the Chinese revolution, were divorced from reality, turned Marxism into dogma and Comintern directives into sacred writ, mechanically copied the experience of the Russian October Revolution, and severely shackled the ideological vitality of many comrades within the Party to explore and innovate from reality. In the field of military struggle, the "Left" leaders negated the flexible and mobile guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare operational guidelines, represented by Comrade Mao Zedong, which had been tested through long-term struggle against the enemy in the Central Soviet Area. In the early stage of the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign[n], they committed errors of adventurism in the offensive, and subsequently committed errors of conservatism in the defensive and flightism in the retreat, ultimately leading to the defeat of the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign in the Central Soviet Area, as well as the heavy losses suffered by the Central Red Army in the Battle of the Xiangjiang River[n] when breaking through the enemy's fourth blockade line, plunging the Party, the Red Army, and the Chinese revolution into an unprecedented crisis. The lesson of blood aroused strong dissatisfaction and opposition within the Party and the army toward the "Left" military line and leadership. In view of the long-term and stubborn nature of the "Left" errors, Mao Zedong deeply realized that to change this erroneous line and leadership, relying solely on individual strength would be difficult to achieve; it was necessary to win as much support as possible within the Party, especially the understanding and support of the majority of the top central leadership, in order to reverse the crisis. Therefore, after the disastrous defeat in the Battle of the Xiangjiang River, Mao Zedong paid particular attention to winning over two important members of Wang Ming's "Left" line camp — Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang. At that time, within the "Three-Person Group"[n], which held the highest central military decision-making and command authority, Zhou Enlai understood and supported Mao Zedong's correct military strategic guidelines but was in the minority. Zhang Wentian, as a member of the Central Committee Politburo Standing Committee and the Secretariat, and Wang Jiaxiang, as an alternate member of the Central Committee Politburo, Vice Chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, and concurrently Director of the Red Army's General Political Department, had both, like Bo Gu, been Bolsheviks who had studied in the Soviet Union and were core figures in the central "Left" leadership at the time. Their key positions determined that they had significant influence within the Party and the army. Mao Zedong knew well that if he could win the support of Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang, it might be possible to change the erroneous line and leadership of the central "Three-Person Group," thereby enabling the Red Army to escape its passive and beaten situation, avoid a repeat of the Xiangjiang tragedy, and save the Party, the Red Army, and the Chinese revolution. As early as the start of the Long March, Mao Zedong, on the grounds that he and Zhang Wentian were ill and Wang Jiaxiang was wounded, applied for and obtained approval for the three of them to be assigned together to the central column stretcher-bearer team, thus enabling them to travel together and creating favorable conditions for the three to exchange views and discuss the military situation at any time. During the march, Mao Zedong had in-depth heart-to-heart exchanges with Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang on the erroneous military line and leadership of Bo Gu and Otto Braun. Through repeated communication among the three, especially Mao Zedong's patient and meticulous ideological and political work, Wang Jiaxiang, who had already had some understanding of and agreement with Mao Zedong's correct military strategic guidelines, became more clear-headed and strengthened his determination to support Mao Zedong's correct military line and leadership and to oppose the "Left" erroneous military line and military leadership of Bo Gu and Otto Braun, saying: "When the time comes, we'll hold a meeting and 'blast' them down!" Zhang Wentian gradually awakened and sincerely declared, "Whoever holds the truth, I will follow." At this point, Mao Zedong had successfully completed the ideological work on Wang Jiaxiang and Zhang Wentian, bringing the two to an ideological consensus with Mao Zedong on the main issues of the military line and military leadership, forming a "three-person core" within the top central leadership opposing the erroneous military line and leadership of Otto Braun and Bo Gu, laying a solid organizational and ideological foundation for the smooth convening of the Zunyi Conference[n].

党的六届四中全会以后，以王明为代表的一批“左”倾教条主义者，由于得到共产国际的大力支持，纷纷进入中共中央领导层，其中就包括临时中央负责人博古和共产国际军事顾问李德，他们的权势极高，运用宗派主义手段将“左”倾分子安插到党和军队的许多重要岗位，使得“左”倾教条主义者几乎统治了党内政治、军事等各个领域。他们不了解中国国情，缺乏中国革命实践经验，脱离实际，把马克思主义教条化、共产国际指示神圣化，机械照搬俄国十月革命经验，严重束缚了党内许多同志从实际出发进行探索与创新的思想活力。在军事斗争领域，“左”倾领导者否定了经过中央苏区长期对敌斗争实践检验、以毛泽东同志为代表的机动灵活的游击战和运动战作战方针，在第五次反“围剿”初期犯了进攻中的冒险主义错误，其后又相继犯了防守中的保守主义和撤退中的逃跑主义等错误，最终导致中央苏区第五次反“围剿”失利，以及中央红军在突破敌人第四道封锁线时的湘江战役中遭受重大损失，使党、红军和中国革命陷入空前危机。血的教训引发了党内军内对“左”倾军事路线和领导的强烈不满和反对。鉴于“左”倾错误的长期性与顽固性，毛泽东深刻认识到，要改变这一错误路线与领导，单凭个人力量难以奏效，必须争取党内尽可能多的支持，尤其是中央高层多数领导的理解与支持，方能扭转危局。因此，在湘江战役惨败后，毛泽东尤为重视王明“左”倾路线阵营中的两位重要成员——张闻天和王稼祥，对他们开展争取工作。当时，拥有中央最高军事决策和指挥权的“三人团”中，周恩来虽然理解并支持毛泽东的正确军事战略方针，但处于少数地位。而张闻天作为中央政治局常委和书记处成员，王稼祥作为中央政治局候补委员、中革军委副主席兼任红军总政治部主任，两人都曾与博古一样，是留苏回国的布尔什维主义者，是当时中央“左”倾领导层的核心人物。他们的关键地位决定了他们在党内和军内具有重要影响力。毛泽东深知，若能争取到张闻天、王稼祥的支持，就有可能改变中央“三人团”的错误路线和领导，从而使红军摆脱被动挨打的局面，避免重演湘江惨败的悲剧，挽救党、红军和中国革命。早在长征出发时，毛泽东便以自己和张闻天有病、王稼祥有伤为由，申请并获批准三人一同编入中央纵队担架队，从而得以一路同行，为三人相互交流、随时讨论军情创造了有利条件。行军途中，毛泽东与张闻天、王稼祥就博古、李德的错误军事路线和领导问题进行了深入的谈心交流。通过三人的反复沟通，特别是毛泽东耐心而细致的思想政治工作，原本就对毛泽东正确军事战略方针有所认识与认同的王稼祥更加清醒，坚定了拥护毛泽东正确军事路线与领导、反对博古和李德“左”倾错误军事路线和军事领导的决心，并表示：“到时候要开会，把他们‘轰’下来！”张闻天也逐渐觉醒，由衷表示“真理在谁手里，我就跟谁走”。至此，毛泽东成功做通了王稼祥、张闻天的思想工作，使二人在军事路线及军事领导等主要问题上与毛泽东达成了思想共识，在中央高层形成了反对李德和博古错误军事路线和领导的“三人核心”，为遵义会议的顺利召开奠定了坚实的组织与思想基础。

After unifying the thinking of Wang Jiaxiang and Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong paid even more attention to exchanges and communication with Zhou Enlai. Zhou Enlai, who had long recognized Mao Zedong's military leadership abilities, was struggling to hold the situation together after the Xiangjiang disaster and was very eager to obtain Mao Zedong's support and help in order to salvage the situation in the midst of a defeated army. When the Central Committee held an emergency military meeting in Tongdao[n] to discuss the Red Army's next direction of advance, Mao Zedong's proposal to advance westward into Guizhou won the approval of Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang, and Zhou Enlai and was adopted by the Central Committee; while Otto Braun's proposal for the Central Red Army to continue northward into western Hunan to join forces with the Second and Sixth Red Army Corps was rejected. This was the first time since Mao Zedong was pushed out of his Red Army command post by the "Left" leaders at the Ningdu Conference[n] in October 1932 that he participated in a top-level central military decision-making meeting, and his correct views were partially adopted by the top central leadership, thereby changing the direction of the Red Army's Long March advance, turning the troops westward into Guizhou, and preventing the Red Army from falling into the "trap" that Chiang Kai-shek had already set in the north and being annihilated. This marked Mao Zedong's first victory in the struggle against the "Left" rulers, successfully uniting Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, and Wang Jiaxiang at an important Party meeting. At the subsequent Central Committee Politburo meetings in Liping[n] and at the Monkey Stockade[n], Mao Zedong's strategic route of advancing into northern Guizhou and Zunyi was further confirmed; while Bo Gu and Otto Braun's route of advancing into western Hunan to join forces with the Second and Sixth Red Army Corps was not only further rejected, but their military command authority was also restricted. The Monkey Stockade meeting stipulated that regarding the Red Army's operational guidelines and the choice of operational timing and location, "the Military Commission must report to the Politburo meeting." This institutionally restricted the arbitrary and dictatorial style of the "Left" leaders, creating conditions and laying a solid foundation for the Central Committee to later lead the Red Army into Zunyi and successfully convene the enlarged Politburo meeting there to resolve the issues of the "Left" erroneous military line and erroneous military leadership.

在统一了王稼祥、张闻天的思想之后，毛泽东更加重视与周恩来的交流和沟通。早已领略到毛泽东军事领导才能的周恩来，在湘江惨败后苦苦支撑着危局，十分渴望得到毛泽东的支持和帮助，以期在败军之际挽救时局。当中央在通道召开紧急军事会议、讨论红军下一步进军方向时，毛泽东提出的西进贵州建议得到了张闻天、王稼祥和周恩来的赞同，被中央采纳；而李德主张中央红军继续北上湘西与红二、红六军团会合的进军路线被否决。这是毛泽东自1932年10月在宁都会议上被“左”倾领导者排挤出红军指挥岗位以来，首次参加中央高层军事决策会议，其正确意见被中央高层部分采用，从而改变了红军长征的进军方向，转兵西进贵州，使红军避免了北上陷入蒋介石早已布置好的“口袋”而遭受覆灭的危险。这标志着毛泽东在党内重要会议上成功团结周恩来、张闻天、王稼祥，取得与“左”倾统治者斗争的第一回合胜利。在随后召开的中央政治局黎平会议、猴场会议上，毛泽东进军黔北遵义的战略路线得到进一步确认；而博古、李德，不仅进军湘西与红二、红六军团会合的进军路线被进一步否决，其军事指挥权也受到限制。猴场会议规定，关于红军作战方针以及作战时间和地点的选择等，“军委必须在政治局会议上做报告”。这就从制度上限制了“左”倾领导者的个人专断作风，为后来中央指挥红军打下遵义并在遵义成功召开政治局扩大会议，解决“左”倾错误军事路线和错误军事领导问题，创造了条件，奠定了坚实基础。

At the Zunyi Conference, Mao Zedong delivered an excellent speech. Among the 20 representatives present, all except Bo Gu, Li De, and Kai Feng expressed approval of Mao’s views. This outcome arose both from Mao’s speech profoundly embodying the principle and content of integrating the basic tenets of Marxism with China’s specific realities, and even more from Mao’s skill in uniting the majority within the Party, rallying the Party, the military, and the people through the power of truth and personal charisma. At the Zunyi Conference, besides Mao Zedong’s important speech, three other central leaders’ addresses and speeches played a key role. The first was Zhang Wentian. He immediately followed the central general responsible person Bo Gu’s formal report and the Red Army General Political Commissar Zhou Enlai’s supplementary report, delivering a “counter-report” based on an outline “collectively created but with Comrade Mao Zedong’s thought as the guiding principle” by Mao, Wang Jiaxiang, and himself, systematically criticizing Bo Gu’s and Li De’s errors in military command, setting the tone for the Zunyi Conference’s complete negation of the “Left” deviationist military line. The second was Wang Jiaxiang. After Mao Zedong finished his important speech, Wang spoke first, fully endorsing Zhang Wentian’s report and Mao’s views, demanding the removal of Li De’s and Bo Gu’s military command authority, the dissolution of the “Three-Person Group,” [n27] and proposing that the Red Army be commanded by someone with Mao’s rich practical combat experience. Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang both held important positions in the Party and the Red Army; their reports and speeches at the conference opposing the “Left” deviationist erroneous military line and military leadership, and supporting Mao Zedong’s correct military line and correct leadership, became key factors determining the Zunyi Conference’s success. The third was Zhou Enlai. In his supplementary report, he sought truth from facts, acknowledging the serious strategic and tactical errors committed by the central leadership since the Fifth Counter-“Encirclement and Suppression” Campaign, [n28] and voluntarily took responsibility, engaging in profound self-criticism. Zhou Enlai also proposed that the Red Army’s future actions should be led by Mao Zedong. This important proposal immediately gained the approval of the majority present. Zhou Enlai’s attitude and proposal cast a crucial vote enabling the Zunyi Conference to adopt Mao Zedong’s correct proposals and elect Mao Zedong as a member of the Central Committee’s Politburo Standing Committee. Mao Zedong himself fully affirmed this point. He once said that at the Zunyi Conference, “Comrade Enlai played an important role.”

在遵义会议上，毛泽东作了精彩发言，在与会的20位代表中，除了博古、李德、凯丰3人外，其余均对毛泽东的观点表示赞许。这一局面的形成，既源于毛泽东的发言深刻体现了马克思主义基本原理同中国具体实际相结合的原则和内涵，更归因于毛泽东善于团结党内多数，以真理的力量与人格感召力凝聚了党心军心民心。在遵义会议上，除了毛泽东的重要发言外，还有3名中央领导的讲话和发言起了关键作用。第一个是张闻天。他是紧接在中央总负责人博古作完正报告和红军总政委周恩来作完副报告之后，根据毛泽东、王稼祥和他自己三人“集体创作而以毛泽东同志的思想为主导的”提纲作“反报告”，系统地批评了博古和李德在军事指挥上的错误，为遵义会议对“左”倾军事路线作出彻底否定立了基调。第二个是王稼祥。他在毛泽东作完重要发言之后率先发言，完全赞同张闻天所作报告和毛泽东阐述的观点，要求取消李德、博古的军事指挥权，解散“三人团”，并提出红军应由毛泽东这样富有实战经验的人来指挥。张闻天和王稼祥均在党和红军中担任要职，他们在会上所作的反对“左”倾错误军事路线和军事领导、支持毛泽东正确军事路线和正确领导的报告与发言，成为决定遵义会议成功的关键因素。第三位是周恩来。他在作副报告时，实事求是地承认了中央领导在第五次反“围剿”以来所犯的严重战略战术错误，并主动承担责任，作出了深刻的自我批评。周恩来还建议，今后红军的行动应由毛泽东来领导。这一重要建议当即获得与会大多数人的赞同。周恩来的态度和建议，为遵义会议得以通过毛泽东的正确主张并选举毛泽东为中央政治局常委，投了十分关键的一票。关于这一点，毛泽东本人也充分肯定过。他曾经说过，在遵义会议上，“恩来同志起了重要作用”。

Second, Mao Zedong took the most pressing military issues of the time as the breakthrough point, avoided a comprehensive assault, ensured the resolution of the principal contradiction, and safeguarded the unity and solidarity of the entire Party and the entire military.

其次，毛泽东以解决当时最为紧迫的军事问题为突破口，避免全面出击，确保主要矛盾的解决，维护全党全军的团结统一。

At the Zunyi Conference, an urgent and critical meeting, Mao Zedong consistently insisted on concentrating on resolving military issues, without including other agenda items such as correcting the political and organizational line. Therefore, the conference focused on analyzing the serious errors in the military line and military command committed by the central “Left” deviationist leaders since the Fifth Counter-“Encirclement and Suppression” Campaign, clearly pointing out that “all facts prove that our purely defensive military line was the main reason we could not smash the enemy’s fifth ‘encirclement and suppression’.” The Zunyi Conference also profoundly pointed out that the “Left” deviationist leaders committed similarly principled errors at key junctures such as strategic shifts and breakout deployments. This was that when achieving decisive victory through interior-line operations had become extremely unlikely and ultimately completely impossible, they failed to promptly shift strategic policy, “implement a strategic retreat to preserve the vital strength of our main Red Army forces, seeking a favorable opportunity in the vast fortress-free areas to transition to a counteroffensive, smash the ‘encirclement and suppression,’ create new Soviet areas, and defend the old Soviet areas.” Instead, they adopted the opposite strategic orientation, insisting on positional warfare and attrition, causing the Red Army to suffer heavy losses. Moreover, during the breakout, their actions were “basically not resolute and combative, but rather a panicked flight and a house-moving-style action.” While severely criticizing the “Left” deviationist military line and leadership errors, the Zunyi Conference fully affirmed Mao Zedong’s correct military thought, formed from long experience in domestic revolutionary war and tested in actual combat, encompassing the basic concept of people’s war, the policy of mobile warfare drawing the enemy in deep, and flexible and mobile guerrilla tactics. It clearly emphasized that for the errors “in military leadership since the Fifth Counter-‘Encirclement and Suppression’ Campaign, Bo Gu and Li De ‘bore the main responsibility’.” Given the serious errors in military line and command committed by Bo Gu, Li De, and others, leading to serious setbacks, the Zunyi Conference dissolved the “Three-Person Group,” elected Mao Zedong as a member of the Central Committee’s Politburo Standing Committee, and involved him in central military decision-making and Red Army command. It specified that “the highest military commanders Zhu De and Zhou Enlai are the military commanders, while Zhou Enlai is the comrade entrusted by the Party to bear the final responsibility for military command decisions.” Shortly after the Zunyi Conference, the Central Committee met in the small village of “Cockcrow at Three Provinces,” [n29] clarifying the division of labor among Politburo Standing Committee members, deciding that “Zhang Wentian replaces Bo Gu as the central general responsible person” and “Mao Zedong is Zhou Enlai’s assistant in military command.” After the Red Army reoccupied Zunyi, the Central Committee’s Politburo decided to establish a Front Army Headquarters, with Mao Zedong serving as Political Commissar. Not long after, to meet the needs of the rapidly changing battlefield situation, the Central Committee formed a new “Three-Person Group” composed of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Wang Jiaxiang, with full authority over military operations command. Through the Zunyi Conference and a series of subsequent organizational adjustments implementing the conference’s spirit, the Party Central Committee effectively revoked the military decision-making and command authority of the “Left” deviationist leaders, gradually established Mao Zedong’s leadership position in the military sphere, and initially formed the Party’s first generation of collective leadership with Comrade Mao Zedong at its core, thereby laying a solid organizational foundation for implementing Mao Zedong’s correct military line and strategic policy.

在遵义会议这一紧迫而关键的会议上，毛泽东始终坚持集中解决军事问题，而不将纠正政治和组织路线等其他议题纳入会议议程。因此，会议聚焦于剖析中央“左”倾领导者在第五次反“围剿”以来所犯的军事路线与军事指挥的严重错误，明确指出“一切事实证明我们在军事上的单纯防御路线，是我们不能粉碎敌人五次‘围剿’的主要原因”。遵义会议还深刻指出，“左”倾领导者在战略转变与突围部署等关键环节上同样犯了原则性错误，这就是在内线作战取得决定性胜利已经极少可能以至于最后完全没有可能时，没有及时转变战略方针，“实行战略上的退却，以保持我们主力红军的有生力量，在广大无堡垒地区寻求有利时期转入反攻，粉碎‘围剿’，创造新苏区与保卫老苏区”，反而采取了相反的战略取向，坚持阵地战、拼消耗，致使红军蒙受重大损失。而在突围过程中，其行动“基本上不是坚决的与战斗的，而是一种惊慌失措的逃跑的以及搬家式的行动”。在严厉批评“左”倾军事路线与领导失误的同时，遵义会议充分肯定了毛泽东基于长期国内革命战争经验所形成、经过实战检验的正确军事思想，涵盖人民战争的基本理念、诱敌深入的运动战方针和灵活机动的游击战术，明确强调，对于第五次反“围剿”以来“在军事领导上的错误，博古、李德‘要负主要责任的’”。鉴于博古、李德等人在军事路线和指挥上所犯的严重错误并导致严重失利，遵义会议取消了“三人团”，选举毛泽东任中央政治局常委，参与中央军事决策和红军指挥。明确“由最高军事首长朱德、周恩来为军事指挥者，而周恩来是党内委托的对于指挥军事下最后决心的负责者”。遵义会议之后不久，中央在“鸡鸣三省”小村庄开会，明确了政治局常委的分工，决定“由张闻天代替博古负中央总的责任”“毛泽东为周恩来在军事指挥上的帮助者”。红军二占遵义后，中央政治局决定设立前敌司令部，由毛泽东担任政治委员。此后不久，为适应战场形势瞬息万变的需要，中央组建了由毛泽东、周恩来、王稼祥三人组成的新“三人团”，全权负责军事行动的指挥。通过遵义会议及随后一系列贯彻会议精神的组织调整，党中央事实上取消了“左”倾领导者的军事决策与指挥权，逐步确立了毛泽东在军事领域的领导地位，初步形成了以毛泽东同志为核心的党的第一代领导集体，从而为贯彻毛泽东正确的军事路线与战略方针奠定了坚实的组织基础。

The Zunyi Conference was convened under extremely严峻 war conditions and was an emergency expanded meeting of the Central Committee’s Politburo. Attempting through such a temporary meeting to overturn the political line established by the previous Central Plenum and sustained for four years was not only insufficient in time but also premature in terms of the ideological maturity of most comrades within the Party. Therefore, under Mao Zedong’s guidance, the conference focused its重心 on resolving the military issues directly concerning the survival of the Party and the Red Army, striving to rectify the military line and adjust military command authority. This arrangement had both overall strategic significance and met the urgent demands of the situation and the wishes of the majority of comrades. It ensured that the most critical military issues were properly handled while maintaining unity within the Party. As a Marxist philosopher deeply versed in dialectics, Mao Zedong clearly grasped the internal connection between military and political matters under the prevailing conditions. In that context, military struggle had become the Party’s overwhelming central task, that is, the greatest politics. As long as the military issues, especially the military line and command authority, could be effectively resolved, it would suffice to turn the tide, thereby saving the Party, the Red Army, and the Chinese revolution. Therefore, whoever held military decision-making and command authority at that time, provided they could lead military struggle to victory, would effectively become the leader of the political line and would inevitably become the navigator of future political struggles. It can be said that the struggle strategy Mao Zedong adopted at the Zunyi Conference was extremely astute, demonstrating both his far-sighted vision and overall perspective as an outstanding politician and his superb art of struggle. Zhang Wentian, the main initiator and main speaker at this conference, later recalled that the Zunyi Conference did not criticize the past central political line but instead affirmed its correctness. Under the historical conditions of the time, this was the only feasible choice for Mao Zedong, “otherwise our unity would have become impossible, and thus the Zunyi Conference could not have achieved victory. For the interests of the Party and the revolution, which are above all else, Comrade Mao Zedong made a principled concession at the time, acknowledging an incorrect line as correct. This was completely necessary and completely correct under those circumstances. This example can serve as a model for inner-Party struggle.”

遵义会议召开于战争形势异常严峻的背景下，是一次具有紧急性质的中央政治局扩大会议。试图通过这样一次临时性会议，来推翻此前由中央全会确立并持续四年之久的政治路线，不仅时间不充足，党内大多数同志在思想认识上也尚未成熟。因此，在毛泽东的主导下，会议将重心集中于解决当时直接关系党和红军生死存亡的军事问题，致力于端正军事路线和调整军事领导权。这一安排既具有全局性的战略意义，也符合当时形势的迫切要求与多数同志的意愿，既确保了最为关键的军事议题得到妥善处理，又维护了党内的团结统一。作为一位深谙辩证法的马克思主义哲学家，毛泽东清晰地把握当时军事与政治之间的内在联系。在当时的背景下，军事斗争已成为全党压倒一切的中心任务，亦即最大的政治。只要军事问题，特别是军事路线与指挥权问题能够得到有效解决，便足以扭转时局，进而挽救党、红军与中国革命的命运。因此，在当时掌握军事决策与指挥权的人，只要能够引领军事斗争取得胜利，实际上就成为政治路线的引领者，也必将成为日后政治斗争的领航者。可以说，毛泽东在遵义会议上所采取的这一斗争策略极为高明，既展现出他作为杰出政治家的长远眼光与全局视野，也体现了其高超的斗争艺术。作为此次会议的主要发起者和主要发言人，张闻天后来回忆指出，遵义会议并未批评过去中央的政治路线，反而肯定了其正确性，这在当时的历史条件下，对毛泽东而言已是唯一可行的选择，“不然我们的联合会成为不可能，因而遵义会议不能取得胜利。为了党与革命的利益，而这个利益是高于一切的，毛泽东同志当时做了原则上的让步，承认一个不正确的路线为正确，这在当时是完全必要，完全正确的。这个例子，可以作为党内斗争一个示范来看”。

Finally, Mao Zedong correctly grasped the unity of principle and flexibility, and of unity and struggle, defeated Zhang Guotao’s splittism, and achieved the victorious junction of the three main Red Army forces and the final victory of the Long March.

最后，毛泽东正确把握原则性与灵活性、团结与斗争的统一性，战胜了张国焘的分裂主义，实现了三大主力红军的胜利会师和长征的最终胜利。

After the Central Red Army and the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army joined forces at Mao Gong in western Sichuan, the situation at the time was highly favorable for the Red Army to advance northward and open up a new base area. If at this point they had followed Mao Zedong’s and the Party Central Committee’s correct decision, seized the favorable opportunity to move quickly north into the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu region, exploited the advantages of that area’s resources and population, and relied on the political advantage of being close to the anti-Japanese front in northern China to establish a new base, they would surely have opened a new chapter for the Chinese revolution. However, at this critical juncture, the principal leader of the Fourth Front Army, Zhang Guotao, held a different position on the Red Army’s strategic direction of advance and opposed the northward advance strategy established by the Party Central Committee. Zhang Guotao “exaggerated the enemy’s strength excessively and underestimated the revolutionary forces, thus losing confidence in the future of the Chinese revolution.” He believed that the Central Red Army’s Long March marked a low ebb in the Chinese revolution and that the Chinese revolution as a whole was in a “general retreat” phase. He therefore advocated that the Red Army’s main forces withdraw to the remote areas of Xikang, Qinghai, and Xinjiang, or temporarily move southward — in essence, a line of flightism.

当中央红军与红四方面军在川西懋功会师后，当时的形势十分有利于红军北上开辟新根据地。若此时依照毛泽东及党中央的正确决策，抓住有利时机迅速北上川陕甘地区，利用当地区域与人口等资源优势，并依托靠近华北抗日前沿的政治优势，创建新根据地，必能为中国革命打开新局面。然而，在这一关键节点上，红四方面军主要领导人张国焘对红军进军战略方向持不同立场，反对党中央确立的北上战略方针。张国焘“过分夸大了敌人的力量，过低估计了革命的力量，因而对中国革命的前途丧失了信心”，认为中央红军的长征标志着中国革命陷入低潮，中国革命整体处于“总退却”阶段，遂主张红军主力退向偏远的西康、青海、新疆等地，或暂时向南发展，实质上是逃跑主义路线。

Was it to be northward, or westward and southward? The answer to this question concerned the future and fate of the Chinese revolution. At the Lianghekou Meeting, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee refuted Zhang Guotao’s erroneous position with sound reasoning and evidence, hoping through patient ideological and political work to win his acceptance of the Central Committee’s northward advance strategy. At the same time, on Mao Zedong’s suggestion, and in order to unite the Fourth Front Army, the Central Committee decided to add Zhang Guotao as a vice-chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission. But Zhang Guotao refused to carry out the established plan of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, arbitrarily led his troops southward, retreating into the Sichuan-Xikang region, and put forward unreasonable demands to the Central Committee for reorganizing the Central Revolutionary Military Commission and the General Headquarters, advocating that he himself become chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission. In response, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee firmly refused, but in order to win Zhang Guotao’s support for the Central Committee’s decision and to maintain the unity of the Party and the Red Army, after repeated consultations they made a principled concession, appointing Zhang Guotao as General Political Commissar of the Red Army. However, Zhang Guotao persisted in his willful course and continued his activities of splitting the Party and the Red Army. Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee worked on Zhang Guotao with great patience, reaffirming the northward advance anti-Japanese strategic line through the Luhu Meeting, the Shawo Meeting, the Ma’ergai Meeting, and the E’xi Meeting, criticizing Zhang Guotao’s errors, and at the same time ordering him via telegram exchanges to lead his troops northward, patiently conducting ideological education in the hope that he would quickly lead his forces to join the Central Committee. After Zhang Guotao gained some initial advantage by moving south into western Sichuan, he even set up a so-called Party “Central Committee,” “Central Government,” and “Central Military Commission” of his own, carrying out acts of splitting the Party and the Red Army. Even so, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee still treated his splitting behavior as an intra-Party contradiction, not as an enemy-ours contradiction, and sought through every possible channel to win him back, making every effort to maintain Party unity and Red Army cohesion and prevent the split from widening. When Zhang Guotao led his troops southward alone and openly broke with the Party Central Committee, some within the Party proposed expelling him from the Party, but Mao Zedong firmly opposed this. He took the overall situation to heart and had a long-term perspective, believing that this was not merely Zhang Guotao’s personal problem but also involved the broad masses of officers and soldiers of the Fourth Front Army; mishandling it would affect the unity of the Party and the Red Army. “If you expel him from the Party, he still commands tens of thousands of troops, and he still hoodwinks tens of thousands of troops; afterwards it will be hard to meet face to face.” [n30] From this it can be seen that at a critical juncture, Mao Zedong remained calm and composed, displaying the broad-mindedness and high-level struggle wisdom of a great statesman, organically unifying the principled and tactical aspects of intra-Party struggle. He made a certain degree of concession to Zhang Guotao’s personal demands for power and interests, while also carrying out a principled, forceful, and measured resistance, criticism, and struggle against Zhang Guotao’s splittist errors. After the Central Red Army successfully arrived in the northern Shaanxi region, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee again dispatched the main force of the First Front Army on a western expedition to open a corridor and welcome Zhang Guotao’s Fourth Front Army and the Second Front Army northward. Through the multifaceted efforts of Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee, and with the active struggle for unity by the broad masses of officers and soldiers of the Fourth and Second Front Armies, Zhang Guotao finally abandoned his splittist actions and led his troops northward to the Shaanxi-Gansu region, realizing the victorious joining of the Fourth and Second Front Armies with the First Front Army. The Long March thus achieved complete victory. In the struggle to overcome Zhang Guotao’s splittism, Mao Zedong employed this method of intra-Party struggle combining principle with flexibility precisely “in order to unite the comrades who had made mistakes, especially in difficult times.” Practice has already proven that it was precisely Mao Zedong’s “correct policy for handling intra-Party problems that enabled everyone to unite, get through the most difficult times, and complete the Long March.”

是北上，还是西进或南下？这一问题的回答关系到中国革命的前途和命运。在两河口会议上，毛泽东与党中央有理有据地否定了张国焘的错误主张，通过耐心的思想政治工作，期望其认同中央北上的战略方针。同时，在毛泽东建议下，为团结红四方面军，中央决定增补张国焘为中革军委副主席。但张国焘拒不执行中革军委的既定计划，擅自率军南下，向川康地区退却，向中央提出改组中革军委和总司令部等无理要求，主张由他担任中革军委主席。对此，毛泽东与党中央坚决拒绝，但为了争取张国焘拥护中央决策，为了维护党和红军的团结统一，经反复商议后作出有原则的让步，任命张国焘为红军总政委。然而，张国焘一意孤行，持续进行分裂党和红军的活动。毛泽东与党中央以极大的耐心对张国焘开展工作，先后通过芦花会议、沙窝会议、毛儿盖会议、俄界会议等重申北上抗日战略方针，批评张国焘的错误，同时通过电报往来命令其率军北上，并耐心进行思想教育，希望他尽快率部与中央会师。张国焘在南下川西初步得势后，竟然另立所谓党的“中央”“中央政府”和“中央军委”，实施分裂党和红军的行径。即便如此，毛泽东与党中央仍将其分裂行为作为党内矛盾处理，未视作敌我矛盾，通过一切可能途径争取其回心转意，全力维护党的团结与红军统一，防止分裂局面的扩大。当张国焘单独率军南下并公然与党中央闹分裂时，党内有人主张开除其党籍，毛泽东却坚决反对。他胸怀全局，目光长远，认为这不仅仅是张国焘个人问题，更牵涉红四方面军广大指战员，处理不当将影响党和红军内部的团结统一，“你开除他的党籍，他还是统率几万军队，还蒙蔽着几万军队，以后就不好见面了”。由此可见，在危急关头，毛泽东沉着冷静，展现了一个伟大政治家的博大胸襟与高超斗争智慧，将党内斗争的原则性与策略性有机统一，既对张国焘的个人权益要求作出了一定程度的让步，又对他的分裂主义错误进行了有理有力有节的抵制、批评与斗争。中央红军胜利到达陕北后，毛泽东和党中央又派红一方面军主力西征，打开通道，迎接张国焘率领的红四方面军和红二方面军北上。在毛泽东和党中央的多方面努力下，加之红四、红二方面军广大指战员争取团结的积极斗争，张国焘最终放弃分裂行径，率军北上陕甘，实现了红四、红二方面军与红一方面军的胜利会师，长征由此取得完全胜利。在战胜张国焘分裂主义的斗争中，毛泽东之所以运用这种原则性同灵活性相结合的党内斗争方式，“就是要把犯错误的同志团结起来，特别是在困难的时候”。实践已经证明，正是毛泽东这种“正确处理党内问题的政策，使大家团结起来，渡过了最困难的时刻，完成了长征”。

III. Adherence to Democratic Centralism

三、坚持民主集中制

Democratic centralism is the Party’s fundamental organizational and leadership system, and also the most important organizational discipline within the Party. It organically unifies the full development of intra-Party democracy with the resolute implementation of centralism on the basis of democracy, and is the fundamental guarantee for resolving intra-Party differences over line and leadership, consolidating the Party’s strength, and enhancing the Party’s combat effectiveness. One important reason why Wang Ming’s [n31] “Left” dogmatist line dominated the Central Committee for as long as four years was that the Party was still in its infancy at the time, and its system of democratic centralism was not yet well established. Wang Ming, relying on the authority of the Comintern, [n32] which was divorced from Chinese realities, suppressed intra-Party democracy and used abnormal organizational methods to place himself and his close associates in leading positions in the Central Committee. When the Provisional Central Committee moved into the Central Soviet Area, [n33] the “Left” leaders such as Bo Gu [n34] again engaged in factionalism. Under the banner of carrying out Comintern directives, they violated democratic centralism to attack and suppress the supporters of the correct line represented by Comrade Mao Zedong, concentrating military decision-making and command authority in the hands of Otto Braun. [n35] Braun not only did not understand China’s national conditions, the actual situation of the Chinese Communist Party and the Red Army, but his leadership style was also “extremely bad.” “He not only completely ignored all differing opinions on military matters, but also adopted various methods of suppression; the independent decision-making and creativity of lower-level commanders were obliterated.” This leadership and organizational style, which violated democratic centralism, not only allowed the “Left” dogmatists to occupy leading positions in the Central Committee, but also stifled the initiative, activity, and creativity within the Party and the army, leading to the failure of the Fifth Counter-Encirclement and Suppression Campaign [n36] in the Central Soviet Area and the major disastrous defeats of the Red Army in the early stages of the Long March.

民主集中制是党的根本组织和领导制度，也是党内最重要的组织纪律。它把充分发扬党内民主与坚决实行民主前提下的集中有机统一起来，是解决党内路线和领导分歧、凝聚党内力量、增强党内战斗力的根本保障。王明“左”倾教条主义路线之所以在中央统治达四年之久，一个重要原因就是当时党处于幼年时期，党内民主集中制还不健全，王明借助少数脱离中国实际的共产国际领导权威压制党内民主，利用不正常的组织手段，使自己及其亲信占据了中央的领导地位。当临时中央迁进中央苏区后，博古等“左”倾领导者又搞宗派主义，打着执行共产国际指令的旗帜，违反民主集中制打击和压制以毛泽东同志为代表的正确路线拥护者，将军事决策权和指挥权集中到李德手中。而李德不仅不了解中国国情、中国共产党和红军的实际情况，领导方式也“极端的恶劣”，“对于军事上一切不同意见，不但完全忽视，而且采取各种压制的方法，下层指挥员的独断专行与创造性是被抹杀了”。这种违背民主集中制的领导方式和组织方式，不仅使“左”倾教条主义者占据了中央领导地位，还扼制了党内军内的积极性、主动性和创造性，导致中央苏区第五次反“围剿”失败和长征初期红军的重大惨败。

Therefore, the Chinese Communists represented by Comrade Mao Zedong, in order to overcome the erroneous "Left" and Right lines within the Party and reverse the defeats of the Long March, had to uphold democratic centralism when convening meetings to make decisions, allowing correct opinions to be voiced, making scientific decisions on a democratic basis, and executing them in a concentrated manner under those scientific decisions. The Party Central Committee convened more than 20 important meetings during the Long March period, conducting discussions and struggles over strategic direction and leadership issues, and ultimately relied on the magic weapon of democratic centralism to let truth defeat error, the correct line replace the erroneous line, and correct leadership replace erroneous leadership. It can be said that although the Party Central Committee's meetings during the Long March period were hasty due to the tense military situation, in order to clarify the rights and wrongs of the line, formulate correct strategic direction, and establish correct leadership, the democratic nature of the meetings was ensured. According to incomplete statistics, of the more than 20 enlarged meetings of the Politburo or the Politburo itself convened by the Party Central Committee during the Long March, 14 took the form of enlarged meetings, the purpose being to strengthen democratic forces and enhance the credibility of the meetings' decisions. In order to convene the Zunyi Meeting[n] successfully and put an end to the "Left" dogmatist erroneous military line and military leadership, the enlarged meeting of the Politburo was expanded to include "the leaders of the Red Army headquarters and the various army groups," the purpose being to allow the commanders fighting on the front lines to speak better and offer better suggestions based on the actual situation. At the Zunyi Meeting, in addition to the attending members and alternate members of the Politburo who made serious speeches, Liu Bocheng, Peng Dehuai, Nie Rongzhen, and other leaders of the Red Army headquarters and army groups also actively spoke. Combining the actual situation, they bitterly denounced the serious harm caused by the "Left" dogmatist erroneous military line and erroneous military leadership, clearly supporting Mao Zedong's correct military line and military leadership, adding democratic strength and the weight of truth to the success of the meeting. At the Zunyi Meeting, regarding the reports of Bogu, Zhou Enlai, and Zhang Wentao, as well as Mao Zedong's important speech, the 20 comrades participating in the discussion all spoke frankly and engaged in heated debate. Except for Bogu, Li De, and Kai Feng, all the other comrades supported the correct opinions put forward by Mao Zedong, opposing and criticizing the "Left" dogmatist erroneous military line and military leadership, while also praising and supporting the correct military line and military leadership mainly represented by Comrade Mao Zedong. Faced with the opinions of the overwhelming majority of comrades within the Party, Bogu and the few other "Left" dogmatists found it difficult to persist in their erroneous views and had to admit that they had committed errors in line and leadership. Therefore, the Zunyi Meeting's ending of the rule of the "Left" erroneous military line was not so much the result of the correct line within the Party, mainly represented by Comrade Mao Zedong, defeating the "Left" dogmatist erroneous line, as it was the result of the overwhelming majority within the Party, mainly represented by Comrade Mao Zedong, defeating the tiny minority within the Party represented by Bogu; it was a victory for the implementation of democratic centralism within the Party.

因此，以毛泽东同志为代表的中国共产党人为了克服党内“左”右倾错误路线，扭转长征败局，必须在开会决策时坚持民主集中制，让正确意见说出来，在民主基础上作出科学决策，在科学决策下集中执行。党中央在长征时期先后召开了20多次重要会议，就战略方针和领导问题开展讨论和斗争，最终靠民主集中制这个法宝使真理战胜谬误、正确路线代替错误路线、正确领导取代错误领导。可以说，党中央在长征时期尽管由于紧张的战事而使开会时间匆促，但为了明确路线是非，制定正确战略方针，确立正确领导，都确保了会议的民主性。据不完全统计，党中央在长征时期召开的20多次中央政治局常委会或政治局会议，就有14次采用了扩大会议形式，目的就是加强民主力量，增强会议对决策的公信力。为了开好遵义会议，终结“左”倾教条主义的错误军事路线和军事领导，中央政治局扩大会议扩大到“红军总部和各军团负责人”，目的就是让在军事一线指挥的将领们能结合实际情况作更好的发言、提更好的建议。在遵义会议上，除了与会的中央政治局委员和候补委员作了认真的发言外，刘伯承、彭德怀、聂荣臻等红军总部和军团负责人也积极发言。他们结合实际情况，痛陈“左”倾教条主义错误军事路线和错误军事领导带来的严重危害，明确支持毛泽东的正确军事路线和军事领导，为会议的成功增添了民主的力量和真理的分量。在遵义会议上，针对博古、周恩来、张闻天的报告以及毛泽东的重要发言，参与讨论的20位同志都直言不讳，展开了激烈争论。除博古、李德、凯丰三人外，其余同志都支持毛泽东提出的正确意见，反对和批判“左”倾教条主义的错误军事路线和军事领导，同时赞赏和拥护以毛泽东同志为主要代表的正确军事路线和军事领导。面对党内绝大多数同志的意见，博古等少数“左”倾教条主义者难以坚持其错误观点，不得不承认犯了路线错误和领导错误。所以，遵义会议结束“左”倾错误军事路线的统治，与其说是以毛泽东同志为主要代表的党内正确路线战胜“左”倾教条主义错误路线的结果，还不如说是以毛泽东同志为主要代表的党内绝大多数派战胜以博古为代表的党内极少数派的结果，是党内实行民主集中制的胜利。

During the Long March, the Party Central Committee's Gaobu Meeting[n] held from March 10 to 11, 1935, was likewise a typical example of upholding democratic centralism. The Gaobu Meeting lasted two days. At the meeting on March 10, a democratic vote rejected Mao Zedong's opposition to the Central Red Army attacking Dagu New Market[n], and it was decided to issue the order to attack Dagu New Market on the morning of March 11. Although Mao Zedong was in the minority at the meeting, and after intense argument and debate his correct opinion was still rejected in the democratic vote, a strong sense of mission and responsibility drove Mao Zedong to firmly believe that sometimes truth lies in the hands of the minority. For the fate of the Party and the Red Army, and for the future of the Chinese revolution, he disregarded the personal blow of having his position as Political Commissar of the Front Army Headquarters also removed in the democratic vote, and, carrying a kerosene lamp, walked alone for over an hour along a narrow path to find Zhou Enlai. Using detailed intelligence and sufficient reasons, he successfully persuaded Zhou Enlai to abandon the attack on Dagu New Market, and then together with Zhou Enlai persuaded Zhu De. At the meeting the next day, Mao Zedong, together with Zhou Enlai and Zhu De, finally persuaded the attending representatives, leading the meeting to decide to abandon the plan to attack Dagu New Market, thereby sparing the Central Red Army a major setback. At the Gaobu Meeting, although Mao Zedong grasped the truth, he did not press his advantage unreasonably. Instead, he abided by democratic centralism, insisted on the minority submitting to the majority, and complied with the meeting's decision. However, in the process of reserving his opinion, by working overnight to persuade Zhou Enlai and Zhu De, these two key leaders, he gradually made the correct opinion understood by the majority, and it was ultimately accepted through democratic discussion and voting at the meeting. Although this back-and-forth democratic voting, in a time of tense military operations, could delay opportunities and was not necessarily advisable, it reflects the style of upholding democratic centralism manifested in the Party Central Committee's meetings during the Long March period.

长征途中，党中央于1935年3月10日至11日召开的苟坝会议，同样是坚持民主集中制的典型范例。苟坝会议一共开了2天，3月10日的会议以民主表决的形式否决了毛泽东反对中央红军攻打打鼓新场的意见，决定3月11日晨下达攻打打鼓新场的命令。毛泽东尽管在会上处于少数派，经过激烈争论和辩论，其正确意见还是在民主表决中被否决。但是，强烈的使命感和责任感促使毛泽东坚信有时真理掌握在少数人手中。为了党和红军的命运，为了中国革命的前途，他不顾前敌司令部政治委员职务在民主表决中也被撤销的个人打击，连夜提着马灯在羊肠小道上走了一个多小时找到周恩来，并以翔实的情报和充足的理由成功说服了周恩来放弃攻打打鼓新场，又与周恩来一起说服了朱德。在第二天的会议上，毛泽东与周恩来、朱德一道，终于说服了与会代表，使会议作出了放弃攻打打鼓新场的计划，从而使中央红军免遭一次重大挫折。在苟坝会议上，毛泽东尽管掌握了真理，但他并不得理不让人，而是遵守民主集中制，坚持少数服从多数，遵守会议决定。但在保留意见过程中，通过连夜做周恩来和朱德这两个关键领导的工作，使正确意见逐步被多数人所理解，最终又通过会议民主讨论和表决而被普遍接受。尽管这种来回民主表决，在战事紧张的时候，会贻误战机，不一定可取，但从中反映了长征时期党中央开会所体现的坚持民主集中制的风格。

The Party's overcoming of the harm of Zhang Guotao's splittist line during the Long March was also, from an institutional perspective, reliant on the Party's democratic centralism. The Central Committee's line of marching north to the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu region was adopted after discussion at an enlarged meeting of the Politburo. Zhang Guotao himself expressed agreement at the meeting, but afterwards opposed and refused to implement the Central Committee's northward line, seriously violating the Party's democratic centralism by not executing the Central Committee's line, which had been concentrated on a democratic basis. During his southward march, Zhang Guotao openly established a separate "Central Committee" and proclaimed himself "Chairman" for over two months. One important reason this was not made public was the deterrence of the democratic forces within the Party, especially the resolute opposition of many comrades within the Fourth Front Army. Even when Zhang Guotao used a surprise method to convene a meeting of senior cadres and announced the establishment of a separate "Central Committee," Zhu De and Liu Bocheng clearly stated at the meeting that they did not support it. Even Chen Changhao, Political Commissar of the Fourth Front Army, who had consistently supported Zhang Guotao since the southward march, did not immediately speak to express support due to being caught off guard. Xu Xiangqian, the commander of the Fourth Front Army, neither spoke nor raised his hand to vote, but "maintained a silent attitude." Later, as Zhu De and Liu Bocheng, who had remained with the Fourth Front Army, along with Fourth Front Army commander Xu Xiangqian and others, argued on the basis of principle, and especially when the Second and Sixth Army Groups came to join the Fourth Front Army, Ren Bishi, He Long, and others, having learned of Zhang Guotao's splittist plot through Zhu De and Liu Bocheng, also joined the ranks opposing the split. Thus, the number of comrades within the Party opposing Zhang Guotao's erroneous line grew increasingly large, to the point that at the Meizhou Thirty-Li Inn Meeting[n], the overwhelming majority of attendees supported Zhu De's opinion of marching north to join the Party Central Committee, opposing Zhang Guotao's westward advance and splittist proposal, leaving Zhang Guotao isolated and helpless. He had to say: "The minority submits to the majority. Since everyone is in favor of marching north, then I will give up my opinion." It can be seen that the essence of Zhang Guotao's error was that he "denied the basic organizational principle of the Party's democratic centralism, disregarded all Party discipline, and arbitrarily undermined the Central Committee's prestige before the masses." From an institutional perspective, what ultimately enabled our Party to overcome Zhang Guotao's erroneous line was still the Party's democratic centralism.

党在长征时期克服张国焘分裂主义路线的危害，从制度上看，也是靠党的民主集中制。中央北上川陕甘路线，是经中央政治局扩大会议讨论通过的，张国焘本人在会上也表示同意，但会后又反对和不执行中央北上路线，严重违反党的民主集中制，不执行在民主基础上集中起来的中央路线。张国焘在南下过程中公然另立“中央”、自封“主席”两个多月，之所以没有对外公开，一个重要原因就是慑于党内的民主力量，尤其是红四方面军内部不少同志的坚决反对。即使在张国焘运用突袭方式召开高级干部大会，宣布另立“中央”，朱德、刘伯承在会上都明确表态不支持，连南下以来一直支持张国焘的红四方面军政委陈昌浩，也因为毫无思想准备而没有立即发言表态支持他，作为红四方面军总指挥的徐向前，既没有发言，也没有举手表决，而“持沉默态度”。后来，随着留在红四方面军的朱德、刘伯承以及红四方面军将领徐向前等人据理力争，尤其是当红二、红六军团前来与红四方面军会师后，任弼时、贺龙等在朱德、刘伯承的介绍下，识破了张国焘的分裂阴谋，也加入了反对分裂的行列。由此，反对张国焘错误路线的党内同志越来越多，以至于在岷州三十里铺会议上，与会绝大多数人支持朱德北上与党中央会合的意见，反对张国焘西进搞分裂的主张，使张国焘陷入了孤立无援的境地，不得不说：“少数服从多数，既然大家都赞成北上，那我就放弃我的意见嘛。”可见，张国焘的错误本质是他“否认党的民主集中制的基本组织原则，漠视党的一切纪律，在群众面前任意破坏中央威信”。从制度上看，我们党最终战胜张国焘错误路线的还是党内民主集中制。

In view of the profound lessons of Zhang Guotao's推行 erroneous line and splitting the Party and the Red Army during the Long March, Mao Zedong, at the Party's Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee[n], reaffirmed the Party's democratic centralism, particularly emphasizing four principles: "(1) The individual is subordinate to the organization; (2) the minority is subordinate to the majority; (3) the lower level is subordinate to the higher level; and (4) the entire Party is subordinate to the Central Committee." These four principles were an important summation of the experience gained during the Long March period in convening good meetings, maintaining the overall situation of unity, upholding the correct line, opposing and preventing erroneous lines, maintaining correct leadership, and opposing erroneous leadership. They concentratedly reflect the main content of the Party's democratic centralism. These important principles of the Party's democratic centralism were later continuously upheld and improved through the Party Constitution adopted at successive Party Congresses and other important intra-Party regulations, playing an important institutional guarantee role in upholding and implementing the Party's correct line and maintaining the unity of the entire Party.

鉴于长征途中张国焘推行错误路线、分裂党和红军的深刻教训，毛泽东在党的六届六中全会上重申了党的民主集中制，特别强调了四条原则：“（一）个人服从组织；（二）少数服从多数；（三）下级服从上级；（四）全党服从中央。”这四条原则，是长征时期党中央开好会议、维护团结大局、坚持正确路线、反对和防止错误路线、维护正确领导、反对错误领导的重要经验总结，集中反映了党内民主集中制的主要内容。这些党内民主集中制的重要原则，后来经历次党代会通过的《中国共产党章程》及党内其他重要法规而不断得到坚持和完善，为坚持和贯彻党的正确路线、维护全党团结发挥了重要的制度保障作用。

Conclusion

结语

Meetings are purposeful, organized deliberative activities and an important vehicle for making scientific decisions and exercising correct leadership. Ninety years ago, our Party led the Red Army on the Long March, steering the course amid surging waves and steadying the helm through raging billows, ultimately turning danger into safety and defeat into victory. Many factors contributed to this great turning point, but the most critical was undoubtedly the Central Committee’s successful convening of a series of important meetings, which consistently adhered to the most principal issues and debated them through to the end, correctly conducted inner-Party ideological struggle, and upheld democratic centralism, thereby fundamentally resolving questions of line and leadership and establishing the correct line and correct leadership represented by Comrade Mao Zedong. Therefore, the characteristics displayed by the Central Committee in convening these series of important meetings during the Long March period not only played an irreplaceable role in leading the Party and the Red Army to successfully carry out a military breakout and strategic shift, open up new base areas, and create a new situation for the Chinese revolution, but also left us with valuable experience on how to improve decision-making and leadership through holding meetings, as we walk the Long March road of the New Era today. Compared with the Long March of that time, the environment we are in today has fundamentally changed, and internal and external conditions have been turned upside down, but the task of comprehensively building a modernized socialist strong country and realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation remains extremely arduous, the road remains full of perils, and it is in no way easier than the Long March of that time. “We still have many ‘snowy mountains’ and ‘marshlands’ to cross, and many ‘Loushan Passes’ and ‘Lazikou Passes’ to conquer”[n]; there are also many ideological understandings that need to be unified, and much wisdom and strength that need to be integrated. Under the strong leadership of the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, we must carry forward the fine tradition of holding good meetings from the Long March period, resolutely oppose formalism and bureaucratism, earnestly hold meetings at all levels, improve meeting quality, and put into practice the strengthening of the “Four Consciousnesses,” the firming of the “Four Confidences,” and the realization of the “Two Upholds,” so as to gather the mighty force for national rejuvenation and strength, walk today’s Long March road, and win new victories on the new journey.

会议是有目的、有组织的议事活动，是作出科学决策和实施正确领导的重要载体。90年前，我们党领导红军长征，在波涛汹涌中把准航向，在惊涛骇浪中把稳航舵，最终转危为安、反败为胜。促成这一伟大转折的因素固然众多，但党中央成功召开系列重要会议，始终紧扣最主要议题一议到底，正确开展党内思想斗争，坚持民主集中制，从根本上解决了路线和领导等重大问题，确立了以毛泽东同志为代表的正确路线和正确领导，无疑是最为关键的因素。因此，长征时期党中央召开系列重要会议所呈现的这些特点，不仅在当时引领党和红军成功实施军事突围与战略转移、开创新根据地和中国革命新局面中发挥了不可替代的作用，也为我们今天走好新时代新征程的长征路，留下了如何通过开好会议提高决策和领导水平的宝贵经验。与当年长征相比，今天我们所处的环境已发生了根本改变，内外条件更是翻天覆地，但全面建成社会主义现代化强国、实现中华民族伟大复兴的任务依然十分艰巨，路途依然充满艰险，丝毫不比当年长征轻松。“我们还有许多‘雪山’、‘草地’需要跨越，还有许多‘娄山关’、‘腊子口’需要征服”，也有不少思想认识需要统一，还有很多智慧和力量需要整合。我们要在以习近平同志为核心的党中央坚强领导下，传承长征时期开好会议的优良传统，坚决反对形式主义和官僚主义，切实开好各个层次的会议，提高会议质量，把不断增强“四个意识”、坚定“四个自信”、做到“两个维护”落到实处，凝聚起强国复兴的磅礴力量，走好今天的长征路，夺取新征程上的新胜利。