A Detailed Examination of the Circumstances Surrounding Ren Bishi Leading His Troops Back to Support the Central Red Army's Long March

From 1941 to 1942, the Marxist historian Ye Huasheng, due to his work in Yan'an, visited Ren Bishi once a week. At Ren Bishi's place, there were often gatherings of comrades originally from the Second Front Army of the Red Army. On one occasion, they spoke to Ye Huasheng about a past event involving "a successful, risky repeated breakthrough of enemy blockades." Ye Huasheng believed that Ren Bishi, who led the Western Expedition of the Sixth Army Corps of the Red Army, demonstrated "strict organizational concepts and a strong Party spirit" in the decision to turn back and support the Central Red Army's Long March. Therefore, he remembered this conversation vividly and later recorded it in his memoir "What I Heard of the Bequeathed Teachings." However, Ye Huasheng did not detail this historical fact in his article, and other historical materials and works rarely record it separately. Therefore, it is necessary to sort out and analyze the already published archives, telegrams, reports, battle bulletins, and memoirs from both the Communist and Nationalist sides to verify the true circumstances of this military history, thereby further excavating the precious red genes accumulated by the Sixth Army Corps on its Western Expedition.

1941年至1942年，马克思主义史学家叶蠖生在延安因为工作关系，每星期去看任弼时一次。在任弼时那里，常会有来自原红二方面军的同志聚会。有一次，他们对叶蠖生谈到“一次冒险反复突破敌人封锁线的成功”往事。叶蠖生认为，率领红六军团西征的任弼时在决策回援中央红军长征的过程中，体现出了“严格的组织观念，坚强的党性”，因此对这段谈话记忆深刻，后记入回忆文章《我所听到的遗教》。但叶蠖生没有在文章中详述这段史实，其他史料、著作等也少有单独记载。因此，有必要梳理、分析已公开的国共双方档案、电报、报道、战报、回忆等历史文献，考证这段军史的真实情况，从而进一步挖掘红六军团在西征路上积淀的宝贵红色基因。

1. The Central Revolutionary Military Commission Issued Three Orders to Turn Back on October 3–4, 1934

一、中革军委于1934年10月3—4日发出3份回援指令

Ye Huasheng's article described the general process of the Sixth Army Corps receiving the Central Committee's order to turn back: The Sixth Army Corps, led by Ren Bishi, had set out more than a month before the main Central Red Army. "When the main Central Red Army also broke out for the Long March, although the two were separated by a great distance, the Sixth Army Corps still had the task of coordinating with the main Central Red Army through radio command." "When the Sixth Army Corps had just broken through a blockade line and escaped a dangerous area, they received a telegram from the Central Committee ordering them to break through again and go back to coordinate with the Central Red Army's actions. This made the problem serious." If such an order to turn back from the Central Committee of the CPC and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission existed, its content must have included instructions to change the Sixth Army Corps' originally planned route, as well as the idea of needing the Sixth Army Corps to coordinate with the Central Red Army's Long March. The key to determining whether such an order existed is to sort out and analyze the Sixth Army Corps' route during the Western Expedition and the telegrams exchanged between it and the Central Committee.

叶蠖生在文章中叙述了红六军团收到中央回援指令的大概经过：任弼时领导的红六军团比中央主力红军早一个多月出发。“等到中央主力红军也突围长征时，两个虽隔着很远的距离，但从无线电指挥中六军团还要担负配合中央主力红军的任务。”“当六军团有一次刚刚突破封锁线，越出危险地区的时候，接到中央的电报要他们重新突围，返回去配合中央红军行动。这一下问题就严重了”。倘若存在中共中央、中革军委回援指令的话，那其内容必然包含改变红六军团原定行军路线的指示，也该有需要红六军团配合中央红军长征的想法。判断是否存在回援指令的关键是梳理、分析红六军团西征期间的行军路线，以及其与中央之间的来往电报。

On July 23, 1934, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued an instruction to the Sixth Army Corps and the Hunan-Jiangxi Military District: transfer to the weak enemy area in central Hunan, achieving the goals of "assisting the operations of the Central Soviet Area" and "establishing reliable contact with the Second Army Corps, thereby creating the precondition for linking the Jiangxi and Sichuan Soviet Areas." The first step of the action route was specified as: first transfer to Guidong, Hunan, then advance west to the Xintian, Qiyang, Lingling area, and finally move north "to develop in the mountainous area between Xinhua and Xianshui counties, and from there move north to establish contact with the Second Army Corps." On August 7, Ren Bishi, Xiao Ke, and Wang Zhen led the troops to begin the Western Expedition, continuously reporting enemy situations, marching routes, and combat situations to the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, and destroying enemy blockhouses and other obstacles. On September 8, at Chetian west of Dabu, Guangxi, Ren Bishi, Xiao Ke, and Wang Zhen received an urgent supplementary instruction from the Military Commission. The Central Revolutionary Military Commission believed that "the first step of the Sixth Army Corps' actions as stipulated in the July 23 instruction is basically concluded." Considering the enemy situation and geographical conditions, it instructed the Sixth Army Corps to abandon the original order to advance north to Xinhua and Xianshui, and "at least before September 20" to remain active in the mountainous areas of Chengbu, Suining, and Wugang in northern Hunan, attacking the enemy and developing the Soviet and游击运动[n]. After the 20th, the Sixth Army Corps was to continue west, moving "from Suining and Tongdao to Jinping, Tianzhu, Yuping, and Tongren in Guizhou," then turn to the northwestern Hunan area to establish contact with the Second Army Corps. Subsequently, "coordinate with the Second Army Corps to develop Soviet and游击运动 in western and northwestern Hunan, and establish a solid base area in the Fenghuang, Songtao, Qiancheng, and Yongsu region." Finally, "backed by Guizhou, to attract more Hunan enemies to the northwestern Hunan front." The supplementary instruction directed the Sixth Army Corps to slow its advance, attack the enemy, and join the Second Army Corps to establish a base, further attracting and diverting Hunan enemies.

中共中央书记处、中革军委于1934年7月23日向红六军团及湘赣军区发出训令：转移到敌人力量薄弱的湖南中部地区，达到“辅助中央苏区之作战”“确立与二军团的可靠的联系，以造成江西、四川两苏区联结的前提”等目的。规定第一步的行动路线为：先转移至湖南桂东，再西进至新田、祁阳、零陵地域，最后北上“向新化、溆浦两县间的山地发展，并由该地域向北与红二军团取联络”。8月7日，任弼时、萧克、王震率部开始西征，沿途不断向中革军委上报敌情、行军路线、作战情况，并损毁敌方碉堡等障碍。9月8日，在广西大埠头以西的车田，任弼时、萧克、王震接到军委补充的火急训令。中革军委认为“七月二十三日训令中规定的六军团第一步的动作，基本上是结束了”，考虑到敌情及地理条件，指令红六军团放弃北上新化、溆浦的原定指示，“最少要于九月二十号前”保持在北部的湖南城步、绥宁、武冈山地行动，打击敌人，发展苏维埃和游击运动。20日后，红六军团继续西进，从“绥宁、通道到贵州之锦屏、天柱、玉屏、铜仁”，再转向湘西北地域，与红二军团取得联络。继而，“协同二军团于湘西及湘西北地域发展苏维埃及游击运动，并于凤凰、松桃、乾城、永绥地域建立巩固的根据地”。最后，“背靠贵州，以吸引更多湘敌于湘西北方面”。补充训令指示红六军团减缓进军速度打击敌人，并会合红二军团建立根据地，进一步吸引、调动湘敌。

The Sixth Army Corps, advancing rapidly from Chetian, failed in its plans to attack the enemy in the Chengbu and Suining areas on the 11th and 14th after receiving the instruction. On the 15th, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, not fully aware of the situation, criticized the Sixth Army Corps for "recent actions not in accordance with the Military Commission's instruction of the 8th," stating they should not have prematurely forced a march into Guizhou territory, nor should they have maintained the tactical principle of avoiding battle. It ordered them to eliminate the enemy in the triangular area of Suining, Jing County, and Tongdao, and to widely develop游击战争[n] in the Chengbu, Tongdao, Suining, and Jing County area. On the same day, Ren Bishi, Xiao Ke, and Wang Zhen jointly telegraphed the Central Revolutionary Military Commission to explain the reasons. On the 17th, the Sixth Army Corps took advantage of the enemy's weakness to capture Tongdao County. On the 18th, to avoid the danger of being attacked from both sides, they reported to the Central Revolutionary Military Commission their intention to advance into Guizhou. On the 19th, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission telegraphed its approval, emphasizing that in future actions, "the enemy should not be allowed to push us west of the designated advance route," and "if the situation permits, you may pause briefly on the way; arriving at the newly designated area by mid-October is sufficient." The newly designated area referred to here is northwestern Hunan. At 1:30 PM on October 1, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission telegraphed the Sixth Army Corps, which had advanced to the Huangping area, ordering them to move north to Jiangkou: "Advance from Huangping via Qingsha, Jinpengchang, Ma'anshan, and Gouya north of Shibei towards Jiangkou County." On the morning of October 2, the Sixth Army Corps occupied Old Huangping.

由车田急进的红六军团在接到训令后，于11日、14日在城步、绥宁一带打击敌人的计划相继落空。15日，没有了解实情的中革军委批评六军团“近日行动与中革军委八日训令不合”，不应过早强行军进入贵州地境，更不应保持不打仗的战术原则，要求其消灭绥宁、靖县及通道三角地带的敌人，并于城步、通道、绥宁、靖县地域广泛发展游击战争；同日，任弼时、萧克、王震联名致电中革军委说明原委。17日，红六军团乘虚袭占通道县城；18日，为避免遭敌夹击的危险，报告中革军委拟向贵州前进；19日，中革军委电复同意，强调：在今后的行动中，“不应让敌人将我们压迫到所规定前进路线以西的地域”，“如情况许可时，在途中可稍停留，十月中以前到达新指定的地域就够了”。此处所说新指定的地域即湘西北。10月1日13时半，中革军委电令进至黄平地域的红六军团北上江口：“由黄平经施秉以北之清沙、金蓬场、马鞍山、狗牙向江口县前进。”10月2日晨，红六军团进占老黄平。

From August 7 to October 2, the Sixth Army Corps' marching route was basically consistent with the instructions of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission. Therefore, the instructions during this period did not contain any content that would change the Sixth Army Corps' originally planned route.

从8月7日至10月2日，红六军团的行军路线基本与中革军委指令保持一致，所以这一时间段的指令不存在改变红六军团原定行军路线的内容。

Under the "encirclement and suppression" by Hunan, Guangxi, and Guizhou enemies on all sides, the Sixth Army Corps did not follow the instruction to advance north from Huangping to Jiangkou. Instead, it planned to advance west to the Monkey Ford (Houwei) in Weng'an County to force a crossing of the Wujiang River, breaking through the weak Guizhou enemy positions to make a detour to Jiangkou. On October 3, Ren Bishi and others led the troops to withdraw from Old Huangping, and on the 4th, they advanced west to Monkey Ford in Weng'an County. It was during this march from Huangping to Monkey Ford in Weng'an County that Ren Bishi and his troops received three consecutive urgent instructions from the Central Revolutionary Military Commission. At 2:00 PM on the 3rd, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, having detected the Sixth Army Corps' intentions, telegraphed that the Guangxi enemy was now moving south, and intelligence reported that "the Second Army Corps has already occupied Yinjiang." It ordered the Sixth Army Corps to quickly advance northeast to the Jiangkou area, and under no circumstances "move further west." At 3:00 AM on the 4th, it further telegraphed, "The Military Commission has absolutely not ordered you to cross the Wujiang River and move west," ordering the Sixth Army Corps to follow the 1st's telegram and quickly advance to Jiangkou to "respond to He Long, who has already reached Yinjiang County," and "absolutely must not move further northwest." At 12:30 PM, it again telegraphed the Sixth Army Corps to take advantage of the enemy's dispersal and quickly advance to Jiangkou, attacking the Guizhou enemies near Songtao and Tongren. These three telegrams from the Central Revolutionary Military Commission not only contained clear content to change the Sixth Army Corps' originally planned route but also showed the Military Commission's urgent demand for the Sixth Army Corps to accelerate its rendezvous with the Second Army Corps.

在湘桂黔敌的四面“围剿”下，红六军团没有按照从黄平北上江口的指令行军，而是计划西进瓮安县猴场抢渡乌江，突破战力薄弱的黔敌阵地迂回至江口。10月3日，任弼时等率部撤离老黄平，4日西进至瓮安县猴场。也就是在任弼时等率部由黄平进至瓮安县猴场的行军中，连续接到3份中革军委紧急指令。3日14时，察觉红六军团意图的中革军委电告，桂敌现向南开动，谍报称“二军团已占印江”，令红六军团速向东北区域的江口前进，无论如何“不得再向西移”。4日3时，继续电告“军委绝未令你们渡乌江向西行动”，令红六军团依照1日电令速向江口前进与“贺龙已至印江县的红军相呼应”，“绝对不可再向西北转移”；12时半，再次电令红六军团趁敌军分散的时机，迅速向江口前进，打击松桃、铜仁附近的黔敌。中革军委的3份电令不但包含有改变红六军团原定行军路线的明确内容，而且显示出中革军委迫切要求红六军团加速会合红二军团。

The "Chronicle of Zhou Enlai" records: In September 1934, the Central Committee of the CPC and the Central Red Army were preparing to set out for a strategic转移[n], heading to the Hunan-Hubei-Sichuan border area to join the Second and Sixth Army Corps. Nie Rongzhen also recalled that Zhou Enlai told him and Lin Biao, who had returned to Ruijin in mid-September, that "the Central Committee has decided the Red Army will make a strategic转移," and ordered them to prepare in secret. According to the recollections of Otto Braun[n], the main drafter of the Central Red Army's Long March plan, the Central Committee of the CPC and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission made the "final decision" to break out in "late September or early October." That is to say, when the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued the three urgent instructions to the Sixth Army Corps on October 3–4, the Central Committee of the CPC and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission had already made the firm decision for a strategic转移. On October 10, the Central Committee of the CPC and the Central Red Army officially began the Long March. The reason for repeatedly urging the Sixth Army Corps to turn back and accelerate its rendezvous with the Second Army Corps was that it was necessary both for the Sixth Army Corps to join the Second Army Corps in opening up a base area in northwestern Hunan, providing a foothold for the Central Red Army's strategic转移, and for the Sixth Army Corps to scout the route for the Central Red Army's Long March.

《周恩来年谱》记载：1934年9月，中共中央和中央红军准备出发进行战略转移，前往湘鄂西与红二、红六军团会合。聂荣臻也曾回忆，周恩来9月中旬曾告诉回到瑞金的他和林彪“中央决定红军要作战略转移”，要求做好秘密准备。据中央红军长征计划的主要拟定人李德回忆，中共中央、中革军委在“九月底十月初”作出了突围的“最后决定”。也就是说，中革军委10月3—4日向红六军团发出3份紧急指令的时候，中共中央、中革军委已下定决心作战略转移。10月10日，中共中央、中央红军正式开始长征。之所以反复催促红六军团掉头加速会合红二军团，是因为既需要红六军团会师红二军团在湘西北开辟根据地，为中央红军的战略转移提供立足点，又需要红六军团为中央红军长征探路。

According to Otto Braun’s memoirs, the Military Commission’s August plan called for a breakout in late October or early November. The reason for dispatching the Sixth Red Army Corps to link up with the Second Red Army Corps, which had no direct communication with the Central Committee, was that the border region of Hunan, Hubei, Sichuan and Guizhou was a consolidated base area, “strategically very important,” and “could provide a good foothold for broad political activities and military operations.” Thus the Western Expedition of the Sixth Red Army Corps was intended not only to resolve the perilous situation of the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Base Area but also to provide a foothold to coordinate with the Central Red Army’s Long March. Xiao Ke believed that the Sixth Red Army Corps bore not only the task of providing a foothold for the Central Red Army but also the task of reconnoitering the route for the Central Red Army’s Long March: “The Central Military Commission’s intention was for the Sixth Red Army Corps to act as the advance party for the Central Red Army”; “The Central Military Commission repeatedly telegraphed instructions for the Sixth Corps to establish a base area in the Fenghuang region, mainly so that the Central Red Army would have a foothold after breaking out of encirclement”; “The Central Military Commission repeatedly telegraphed instructions forbidding the Sixth Corps from crossing the Wujiang River, mainly for the convenience of the Central Red Army’s subsequent Long March.” Zhang Ziyi also agreed with Xiao Ke’s account: “At that time, the Central Red Army’s operation was a moving-house operation. The overall goal was to move house. They wanted the Sixth Red Army Corps to set up a stall first so they could move over. All actions revolved around this goal. And they demanded mechanical execution of its tasks; direct coordination was required, indirect coordination would not do. In short, you had to obey absolutely. The goal of going to central Hunan was to set up a stall first, to make it convenient for them to move over.” “When they reached Guizhou, they were not allowed to cross the Wujiang River; the goal was for us to open up a situation in the Fenghuang area so they could move over. If they crossed the Wujiang, it would be inconvenient for them to move.” The Central Red Army at that time indeed had the idea of “moving house.” Chen Yun recalled that carrying such cumbersome baggage, “they thought that creating a new Soviet base area was merely a matter of moving from one place to another, without needing to undergo a new period of arduous struggle and great effort.” Yang Shangkun also recalled: “When the Central Committee broke out and moved, it did not think it would be a Long March; it only considered it a ‘big house move,’ moving the base area from Jiangxi to western Hunan to join forces with Comrades Ren Bishi and He Long’s Second and Sixth Army Corps.”

据李德回忆，军委8月计划在10月底11月初突围，之所以派遣红六军团会合与中央没有直接联系的红二军团，是因为湘鄂川交接地区是块巩固的根据地，“战略上很重要”，“可以为广泛的政治活动和军事行动提供很好的立脚点”。那么红六军团的西征不仅为了解决湘赣革命根据地处境危殆的局势，也能通过提供立足点以策应中央红军的长征。萧克认为红六军团不但承担着为中央红军提供立足点的重任，而且承担着为中央红军长征探路的重任：“中央军委的意图是让红六军团给中央红军打前站”；“中央军委屡次电报指示六军团在凤凰地区建立根据地，主要是便于中央红军突围后有一个立脚点”，“中央军委屡次电报不让六军团过乌江，主要是从中央红军尔后长征方便为前提的”。张子意也赞同萧克的说法：“那时，中央红军的行动，是搬家式的行动。总目的就是搬家。要红六军团先摆开一个摊子他们好搬过去。一切行动，就是围绕着这个目的。而且要求机械的执行他的任务，要直接配合，间接配合都不行。总之是要你绝对服从。到湘中的目的是要先摆一个摊子，便于他搬过去。”“到贵州时，不让过乌江，目的是要我们在凤凰地域摆开一个局面，他好搬得去。如过乌江，他就不好搬了”。当时的中央红军也确实是有“搬家”的想法。陈云回忆说：带这样笨重的行装，“以为创造新的苏维埃根据地，只是从这一个地方迁徙到别个地方，而不需要经过一番新的艰苦的斗争和大的努力”。杨尚昆也回忆道：“中央在突围转移时并没有想到要长征，只认为是一次‘大搬家’，把根据地从江西搬到湘西，同任弼时、贺龙同志领导的二、六军团会合。”

Thus it can be seen that the Central Revolutionary Military Commission indeed entrusted the Sixth Red Army Corps with the glorious mission of coordinating with the Central Red Army’s Long March. Because telegraphic communication between the Second Red Army Corps and the CPC Central Committee and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission had been cut off, the Sixth Red Army Corps, before its rendezvous with the Second Red Army Corps, actually had to bear the heavy responsibility of coordinating with the Central Red Army’s Long March on its own. Therefore, the three urgent directives issued by the Central Revolutionary Military Commission to the Sixth Red Army Corps on October 3–4 implicitly contained the idea that the Sixth Red Army Corps needed to coordinate with the Central Red Army’s Long March.

由此可见，中革军委确实赋予了红六军团策应中央红军长征的光荣使命。因为红二军团与中共中央、中革军委之间的电报联络中断，所以红六军团在与红二军团会师前实际上要独自承担策应中央红军长征的重任。因此，中革军委于10月3—4日向红六军团发出的3份紧急指令，隐含有需要红六军团策应中央红军长征的想法。

On October 5, Ren Bishi, Xiao Ke, and Wang Zhen led their troops from Houchang to turn northeast toward Jiangkou. On October 7, the Sixth Red Army Corps was ambushed at Ganxi and fell into the enemy’s four-sided “encirclement and suppression.” The main force of the Sixth Red Army Corps, led by Ren Bishi, Xiao Ke, and Wang Zhen, maneuvered back and forth in the areas of Shichang, Zhenyuan, Shibing, and Yujiang. During this time, they planned on the 12th to split their forces and move flexibly to the Soviet area, but the Central Revolutionary Military Commission replied on the 13th by telegram, explicitly ordering: “You should not cross north of the Wujiang River, nor proceed directly north from your present area; you should still advance toward Jiangkou, east of the Wujiang and west of Tongren, and continue to carry out the tasks originally assigned by the Military Commission.” They therefore abandoned the plan to split forces and continued maneuvering. On the 21st, Ren Bishi and others led the main force of the Sixth Red Army Corps into Chanxi, Yinjiang; at 3:00 on the 22nd, the Military Commission telegraphed the Sixth Red Army Corps: advance toward the Yinjiang-Songtao area, rendezvous with one unit of the Seventeenth Division, establish contact with the Second Red Army Corps, and establish a Soviet area in the Songtao, Qiancheng, and Fenghuang region to develop guerrilla warfare. After the two corps joined forces, they were to “immediately report to the Military Commission so as to receive instructions,” and the Second Red Army Corps was to report on its troop situation and movements. On the 24th, Ren Bishi and others led the main force of the Sixth Red Army Corps to rendezvous with a unit of the Second Red Army Corps, led by He Long, at Muhuang. From October 5 to 24, the route of march of the Sixth Red Army Corps was basically consistent with the instructions of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission.

10月5日，任弼时、萧克、王震率部从猴场转兵东北方向的江口。10月7日，红六军团在甘溪遇伏，陷入敌人的四面“围剿”。任弼时、萧克、王震率领的红六军团主力回旋于石阡、镇远、施秉、余庆一带。其间，计划12日分兵行动灵活转移到苏区，但中革军委13日回电明令“不应渡乌江北进，或由现地域一直北进，仍应向铜仁以西乌江以东之江口前进，继续执行军委原规定的任务”，遂放弃分兵继续回旋。21日，任弼时等率领红六军团主力进至印江缠溪；22日3时，军委电令红六军团：向印江、松桃间前进，会合十七师之一部，并与红二军团取得联络，在松桃、乾城、凤凰地域建立苏区，发展游击战争。两军会合后，“立告军委，以便受领指示”，并要红二军团报告其部队情况及行动。24日，任弼时等率领红六军团主力在木黄与贺龙率领的红二军团一部会师。10月5—24日，红六军团的行军路线也基本上与中革军委的指令保持一致。

Through the above analysis, it can be seen that only the three urgent Central directives of October 3–4 contained instructions to change the Sixth Red Army Corps’ originally planned route of march, while also implicitly containing the Central Committee’s need for the Sixth Red Army Corps to coordinate with the Central Red Army’s Long March—that is, they were turn-back-and-support directives. Ye Huosheng recalled that the Sixth Red Army Corps received the turn-back-and-support directives “just after breaking through the blockade line and leaving the danger zone,” which is also fairly consistent with the actual situation around the time the Sixth Red Army Corps occupied Old Huangping: from 10:00 on October 1, considering that the Guizhou enemy “was weaker in combat effectiveness compared to the Guangxi and Hunan enemy troops, and everyone was an opium addict,” [n] making them prone to losing combat effectiveness, the Sixth Red Army Corps, surrounded on four sides, chose the weaker Guizhou enemy to the west as its target for attack, forcing a crossing of the Dasha River in the Lanqiao-Dongpo sector. The Sixth Red Army Corps fought until the morning of the 2nd, broke through the Guizhou enemy’s blocking positions in one stroke, and then took advantage of the victory to capture Old Huangping, Huang County.

通过以上的梳理分析，可以看出，只有10月3—4日的3份中央紧急指令内容包含改变红六军团原定行军路线的指示，同时隐含中央需要红六军团配合中央红军长征的想法，即为回援指令。叶蠖生回忆红六军团是在“刚刚突破封锁线，越出危险地区的时候”收到回援指令的，这也比较符合红六军团进占老黄平前后的实际情形：从10月1日午前10时，考虑黔敌“比起广西、湖南的敌军，战斗力是较弱的，而且人人都是鸦片烟鬼”，容易丧失战斗力，四面临敌的红六军团选择了西面战斗力薄弱的黔敌为突击对象，在滥桥至东坡地段上抢渡大沙河。红六军团战至2日晨一举突破黔敌防堵阵地，并乘胜袭占黄平旧州。

II. Ren Bishi and Other Corps Leaders Made the Turn-Back-and-Support Decision at Houchang on October 4–5, 1934

二、任弼时等军团领导人于1934年10月4—5日在猴场作出回援决定

In his article, Ye Huosheng described the difficult choice Ren Bishi faced after receiving the turn-back-and-support directives: If they went back, passing once more through the breakthrough point where the pursuing troops were concentrated, they risked suffering heavy losses or even being annihilated. If they did not go back, they would be unable to coordinate with the Central Red Army’s operations. With the Central Committee unaware of the enemy situation, Ren Bishi did not send a telegram asking the Central Committee to change the order to break back through, but instead “resolutely led the troops to break back through again.” Did the highest leading organ of the Sixth Red Army Corps, the Military-Political Committee, with Ren Bishi as chairman and Xiao Ke and Wang Zhen as members, make a turn-back-and-support decision? Other already published materials do not directly record this period of history; therefore, it is necessary to judge by dredging up other indirect historical materials.

叶蠖生在文章中记述了任弼时在收到回援指令后作出的艰难抉择：倘若回去，再穿过追兵集中的突破口一次，就有遭受重大损失甚至被消灭的危险。不回去，便无法配合中央红军的行动。在中央不明敌情的情况下，任弼时没有发电请求中央改变重新突围回去的命令，而是“坚决率部重新突围回去”。那么红六军团的最高领导机关，以任弼时为主席、萧克和王震为委员的军政委员会是否作出过回援决定呢？其他已公开出版的资料并没有直接记载这段历史，因此，必须通过钩沉其他间接史料来判断。

First, from the route of march of the Sixth Red Army Corps and the recollections of Xiao Ke and others, it is clear that the Sixth Red Army Corps did have an original plan to force a crossing of the Wujiang River and then rendezvous with the Second Red Army Corps.

首先，从红六军团的行军路线以及萧克等人的回忆来看，红六军团确实有抢渡乌江再会合红二军团的原定计划。

At 12:00 on September 20, 1934, the Sixth Red Army Corps entered the Qingshui River basin area of Liping, Guizhou. At 1:00 p.m., the Military Commission telegraphed the Sixth Red Army Corps, informing them that the Second Red Army Corps had possibly already occupied Sinan, Yinjiang, and Qingjiang and was advancing toward Shichang, and ordered them to move closer to the Second Red Army Corps’ area of activity—the Yinjiang-Songtao southern area—to establish contact: “Proceed from your present area through Qingjiang, Qingxi, and Sixian to the Shengxi, Tongren, and Jiangkou area. Then try to establish contact with the commander of the Second Army Corps.” It also instructed: “The Guizhou enemy is small in number, weak in combat effectiveness, and has no experience fighting us. When encountering the Guizhou enemy, you should quickly and resolutely annihilate them to open your own path forward.” But at this time the Second Red Army Corps was actually engaged in creating and developing the Eastern Guizhou Soviet Area in the border areas of Yanhe, Dejiang, Yinjiang, Songtao counties and the Youyang, Xiushan border area.

1934年9月20日12时，红六军团进入贵州清水江流域的黎平地区。下午1时，军委电告红六军团，红二军团可能已经占领思南、印江、清江并向石阡前进，令其向红二军团活动地区印江、松桃南面地带靠拢以取得联系：“由现地域经清江、青溪、思县到达省溪、铜仁、江口地域。然后设法与二军团首长取得联络”，并指示：“贵敌数量少，战斗力弱，没有与我作战的经验。当与贵州敌人遭遇时，应迅速坚决消灭之，以开辟自己前进的道路”。但此时的红二军团实际正在沿河、德江、印江、松桃等县和酉阳、秀山边界一带进行黔东苏区的创建和发展工作。

On the 25th, following the original plan to advance north to the Kaizhai-Mengyou area, the Sixth Red Army Corps encountered a Hunan enemy “blocking attack” that had been prepared in advance. At this time, the Guangxi enemy was rapidly reinforcing from the Panggang direction of Tianzhu County, while the Guizhou enemy was to the west; along the Yanyang River, the enemy was waiting at ease, and east of Zhenyuan the river was not fordable. Therefore, the Sixth Red Army Corps decided to break off the engagement, return to Daguang, and prepare to either advance west from Daguang or cross south over the Qingshui River and then go upstream, seeking an opportunity to cross north over the Yanyang River. That evening, the Sixth Red Army Corps set out from the Kaizhai-Mengyou area and marched back overnight. But when they arrived at Daguang on the morning of the 26th, they encountered the Guangxi enemy, who had arrived first and occupied advantageous terrain. The corps leadership, considering the danger of being caught between two enemies, immediately decided to quickly withdraw from the battle, shake off the enemy, and move west. After shaking off the enemy at Daguang, the Sixth Red Army Corps passed through Gaoqiu, Liangshang, Baojing, Shidongkou, and entered Wenggulong, Huangping County, on the 30th. At Wenggulong, they reported to the Military Commission on the battle situation at Daguang and their action plan—“plan to advance toward Huangping and Shibing, preparing to cross the river between Shi and Huang on the 1st”—because the area they had passed through had few roads and no detailed military maps of Guizhou Province, and there were few residents who knew the roads twenty or thirty li away, making marching difficult; they hoped the Military Commission would “in future deployments, indicate the small place names by specifying the larger place names they are near.” At this time, the Hunan, Guangxi, and Guizhou provincial enemy troops were pursuing in two columns, attempting to force the Red Army into a decisive battle on the banks of the Wujiang River and “annihilate” the Sixth Red Army Corps south of Zhenyuan, between the Yanyang River and the Qingshui River.

25日，按照原定计划北进至凯寨、孟优地区的红六军团，遭到早有准备的湘敌“堵击”。这时，桂敌又从天柱县的盘杠方向急速增援，西面又有黔敌，沿沅阳河一带，敌人蓄势待劳，而镇远以东又不能徒涉。因此，红六军团决定退出战斗，返回大广，准备改由大广西进或南渡清水江再沿江而上，相机北渡沅阳河。傍晚，红六军团由凯寨、孟优地区出发，连夜回师。但26日晨抵达大广时，与先期到达、占据有利地形的桂敌遭遇。军团领导考虑到有腹背受敌的危险，当即决定迅速撤出战斗，摆脱敌人，向西转移。红六军团在大广摆脱敌人后，经高丘、良上、报京、施洞口于30日进至黄平县瓮谷陇。在瓮谷陇，向军委报告大广战斗情况，以及行动计划——“拟向黄平、施秉前进，准备一日在施、黄间渡河”，因为所过地区道路很少，且没有贵州省军用和较详细的地图，少有知二三十里外道路的居民，行军困难，希望军委“以后布置之小地名望指明所靠近之大地名”。这时，湘、桂、黔三省敌军分两路追来，企图压迫红军于乌江畔强行决战，将红六军团“歼灭”于镇远以南，沅阳河与清水江两河之间。

On October 1–2, the Sixth Red Army Corps forced a crossing of the Dasha River, broke through the blocking positions of the Guizhou enemy, and captured the old town of Huangping by assault. The Nationalist side’s materials also contain relevant records: on September 30, “they scattered in small groups across Pingzhai, Xincheng, Wenggulong, and Huang’ao”; on October 1, “they suddenly concentrated all their strength, several thousand men with rifles, and fiercely attacked the Shi-Huang line; the Guizhou army fought a full day”; on October 2, “they broke into and occupied Old Huangping”; “from 10 a.m. on the 1st until dawn on the 2nd, there was a full day and night of intense battle.” On October 3, Ren Bishi and others led their troops out of Huangping; on the 4th, they advanced to Houchang in Wengxian County. When Ren Bishi, Xiao Ke, and Wang Zhen led the main force of the Sixth Red Army Corps into Houchang in Wengxian County on the 4th, the advance guard had already reached Sunjiadu. The plan was to find a suitable crossing point to ford the Wujiang River in the Sunjiadu area and the region to its north, completely shake off the pursuing and blocking enemy, and then move north to make contact with the Second Red Army Corps. Xiao Ke once explained the purpose of not following the route specified by the Military Commission but instead planning to force a crossing of the Wujiang: “When we reached the Wujiang, we were prepared to cross it. After crossing, our area of operations would be much larger. The intention of finding the Second Corps was never abandoned. If we had crossed the Wujiang, we would be facing the Second Corps across the river; the intention was to get close to and find them, which did not contradict the goal of joining up with the Second Corps. At that time, we still did not know a definite location for their base area, nor did we have a clear topographical target, such as ‘Mount Fanjing’.” The enemy’s materials record that “the defeated remnants fled to Yuqing and Houchang, plotting to secretly cross the Wujiang at Sunjiadu and Qingkou, exit through Tuanxi, and head north to Zunyi,” which also corroborates that the Sixth Red Army Corps indeed had a plan to force a crossing of the Wujiang. On the 3rd, “they fled to Laofenkou and Houchang in Wengxian County; another group fled to Yuqing”; on the 4th, “the vanguard reached Sunjiadu, but their attempt to cross failed, so they turned back to Houchang, planning to secretly cross the Wujiang again at Yuanjiadu and Qingkou.”

10月1—2日，红六军团抢渡大沙河，突破黔敌防堵阵地，并袭占黄平旧州。国民党方面的资料也有相关记载：9月30日，“窜平寨新城瓮谷陇黄坳一带，化整为零”；10月1日，“突集全力，人枪数千，猛扑施黄之线，黔军激战终日”；10月2日，“窜陷老黄平”；“自一日午前十时战起，至二日拂晓为止，经一昼夜激烈大战”。10月3日，任弼时等率部撤离黄平；4日，进抵瓮安县猴场。任弼时、萧克、王震率红六军团主力4日进抵瓮安县猴场时，前卫部队已抵孙家渡。计划准备在孙家渡及其以北地区寻找有利渡场渡过乌江，彻底甩掉追堵之敌，然后再向北联络红二军团。萧克曾解释了没有按照军委指定路线行军而是计划抢渡乌江的目的：“我们到乌江时是准备过江，过江后活动区域就大了。寻找二军团的意图始终没有放弃。如果过了乌江，与二军团隔江相望，意图是靠近和寻找他们，不违背与二军团会合的目的。当时，他们的根据地我们还不知道一个确定的位置，也没有一个明显的地形目标，譬如‘梵净山’，这样的目标。”敌方资料里记载，“溃退余庆及猴场，图由孙家渡、箐口一带偷渡乌江，出团溪，北窜遵义”，这也可印证红六军团确实有抢渡乌江的计划。3日，“窜瓮安县属之老坟嘴，猴场一带，另一股窜余庆”；4日，“先头窜至孙家渡，谋渡不成，折窜猴场，拟再由袁家渡箐口，偷渡乌江”。

The leaders of the Sixth Red Army Corps believed that crossing the Wujiang to the west “was easy, and the enemy west of the Wujiang was weak, which would facilitate our army’s movements.” They originally planned to implement the Military Commission’s instructions flexibly, force a crossing of the Wujiang, and then join up with the Second Red Army Corps. This plan was indeed very wise. Xiao Ke once said: “If we had crossed the Wujiang, we could have avoided the battle at Ganxi. If we had crossed the river, we could have saved at least two thousand more men.” The Guizhou and Guangxi enemies had no intention of fighting a life-or-death battle with the Red Army at that time; they thought, “As long as they don’t go down to Hunan or enter Guiyang, that’s fine. Why bother fighting a hard battle? Losing all one’s troops is not worth it.” They “deployed their main forces in northeastern Guizhou and around Guiyang,” with “the Guizhou army pursuing from afar, leaving a path for them to take. Whether they went to Sichuan or Yunnan, we would let them be.” The Hunan enemy’s thinking was “to prevent this Red Army unit from reaching western Hunan to join the Second Red Army Corps (at the time we did not know this designation) and to ‘send this Red Army unit far away from the Hunan and Guangxi provinces.’” Therefore, avoiding the enemy’s main blocking efforts in northeastern Guizhou and choosing to force a crossing of the relatively weakly defended Wujiang was indeed a wise choice.

红六军团领导人认为西渡“乌江是容易过的，乌江以西敌人薄弱，便于我军行动”，原本计划灵活地执行军委训令，抢渡乌江后与红二军团会合。这一计划确实是非常明智的。萧克曾说：“过了乌江可以避免甘溪一仗，要是过了江，至少可以多保存两千人。”黔、桂两敌当时根本没有与红军拼死决战的想法，他们以为“不下湖南，不进贵阳就得啦，何必去硬拼呢，部队打光了是不合算的”，“把重兵摆在黔东北及贵阳的四周”，由“黔军远远的追，放出一条路给他们走，他们过四川，上云南我们都听便”。湘敌的想法是“则要阻止这部红军到湘西去与红二军团（当时我们并不知道这个番号）会师”，“把这部分红军送得离湘桂两省远一点”。因此，避过敌人重点防堵的黔东北，选择抢渡防守相对薄弱的乌江确实是明智的选择。

Secondly, judging from the changes in the Sixth Red Army Corps’ route of march and the recollections of Xiao Ke and others, the Military-Political Committee composed of Ren Bishi, Xiao Ke, and Wang Zhen did, after receiving the order to turn back and provide support, make the decision to abandon the plan to force a crossing of the Wujiang and instead turn back to support the Central Red Army’s Long March.

其次，从红六军团行军路线的变化以及萧克等人的回忆来看，任弼时、萧克、王震组成的军政委员会在收到回援指令后的确作出了放弃抢渡乌江、回援中央红军长征的决策。

Under repeated telegraphic orders from the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, Ren Bishi and the other corps leaders abandoned the plan to force a crossing of the Wujiang. On October 5, they turned around from Houchang and headed northeast towards Jiangkou. Chen Jing, a Miao native of Weng’an, Guizhou, who joined the Red Army in 1934 at the age of 16 and served as a propagandist in the Sixth Red Army Corps, recalled the action at the time: “The Sixth Corps could have rested and reorganized in southern Guizhou, expanded its ranks, and replenished itself with fresh blood. However, the central leadership, in a state of panic as it set out from southern Jiangxi towards western Hunan, suddenly ordered the Sixth Corps to turn east from southern Guizhou and, at all costs, advance into the Fenghuang area of western Hunan to open up a situation and prepare a landing place for the Central Red Army. So the Sixth Corps, without stopping, left Weng’an, hurried east from Houchang, passed through Songping, Muyejing, and Longxi, entered Yuqing and Shiqian, and fell into an enemy encirclement ten times its own strength.”

在中革军委的再三电令下，任弼时等军团领导人放弃抢渡乌江计划，10月5日，从猴场掉头向东北方向的江口前进。贵州瓮安苗族人陈靖，1934年16岁时参加红军，曾任红六军团宣传队宣传员。他曾回忆当时的行动：“六军团本来是可以在黔南歇脚休整，扩大队伍，补充新鲜血液的。然而当时的中央领导，惊惊慌慌地从赣南向湘西出发时，突然要六军团从黔南掉头向东，不惜一切进军湘西凤凰地区，打开局面为中央红军准备落脚地。于是六军团马不停蹄地离开瓮安，从猴场急速东进，经松坪、木叶井、龙溪进入余庆、石阡，陷入十倍于己的敌人重围之中。”

Although no published historical materials directly record that Ren Bishi, Xiao Ke, and Wang Zhen discussed whether to abandon the plan to force a crossing of the Wujiang and turn back to support the Central Red Army, compared to the relatively certain plan of forcing the Wujiang crossing, turning the army towards Jiangkou while risking encountering the pursuing enemy at any moment was a crucial decision concerning the fate of the Sixth Red Army Corps. At that time, Ren Bishi and the others had not received definite news of the Central Red Army’s Long March; it was not until October 29 that the Central Revolutionary Military Commission telegraphed the Sixth Red Army Corps, stating that “the Central Red Army has already advanced into southern Jiangxi and southern Hunan.” As a matter of common sense, to change the original marching plan, the Military-Political Committee, headed by Ren Bishi, could not have avoided a careful discussion and decision-making process regarding such an important subsequent military action.

虽然没有公开的史料直接记载任弼时、萧克、王震三人曾讨论过是否放弃抢渡乌江、回援中央红军，但是相对于比较有把握的抢渡乌江计划，冒着随时遭遇追敌的危险转兵江口方向是一项关乎红六军团命运的重要抉择。当时的任弼时等并没有得到中央红军长征的确切消息，因为直到10月29日，中革军委才电告红六军团“中央红军已向赣南、湘南进军”。从常理上来说，要改变原定的行军计划，以任弼时为首的军政委员会不可能不对接下来的重要军事行动，进行一次慎重的讨论和决策。

Even without explicit instructions from the central authorities or clear news of the Central Red Army’s Long March, when Ren Bishi received the order to turn back and provide support, it was entirely possible for him to realize that the Central Red Army was about to transfer from Jiangxi and that the Sixth Red Army Corps’ task was to coordinate with and support the Central Red Army’s transfer. As early as before the Sixth Red Army Corps’ western expedition, while everyone was still pondering the direction of action after the Red Army’s failure in the counter-“encirclement and suppression” campaigns, Ren Bishi, with his sharp strategic vision, judged that the Hunan-Jiangxi Red Army and the Central Red Army might transfer to Hunan. One day, he told Xiao Ke: “The Central Red Army might go west, to the Hunan area, and our Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Red Army might also transfer.” Soon after, the central authorities ordered the Hunan-Jiangxi Red Army to transfer to central Hunan to develop guerrilla warfare and establish new Soviet areas. Ren Bishi’s “estimate that the Central Red Army would go west became relatively certain.” On September 8, the central authorities urgently ordered the Sixth Red Army Corps to reach the newly designated area—northwestern Hunan—by “before mid-October.” On October 3–4, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued successive orders changing the Sixth Red Army Corps’ originally planned route of march. Ren Bishi should have been able to judge that the Central Red Army was about to make a major strategic transfer and that the Sixth Red Army Corps needed to act in coordination. Wang Yongjun, who was responsible for code-breaking work in the Sixth Red Army Corps, recalled: “When advancing from Huangping towards Shiqian, the Military-Political Committee communicated to the army that the central authorities’ and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission’s order for the Sixth Red Army Corps’ western expedition had the strategic intention of joining up with He Long’s Third Red Army and covering the Central Red Army’s westward transfer.” Wang Zhen once told Li Zhen that after the Sixth Red Army Corps’ defeat at Ganxi, “we were moving around in that area, partly because of the enemy and partly to attract the enemy’s attention and facilitate the Central Red Army’s actions.” These recollections indicate that the leaders of the Sixth Red Army Corps were at that time clearly aware that the Central Red Army was about to transfer from Jiangxi and that the Sixth Red Army Corps’ task was to coordinate with and support the Central Red Army’s transfer.

即使没有中央指令的明示，没有得到中央红军长征的明确消息，任弼时在收到回援指令时也完全有可能意识到中央红军即将从江西转移，红六军团的任务是策应中央红军的转移。早在红六军团西征前，大家还在思索着红军反“围剿”失利后的行动方向的时候，任弼时就以敏锐的战略眼光判断出湘赣红军和中央红军可能要向湖南转移。有一天，他告诉萧克：“中央红军可能要向西，到湖南方面去，我们湘赣苏区红军也可能转移”。不久，中央指令湘赣红军转移到湖南中部，发展游击战争及创立新的苏区，任弼时“对中央红军向西的估计就比较肯定了”。9月8日，中央紧急指令红六军团在“十月中以前”到达新指定的地域——湘西北。10月3—4日，中革军委又接连发出改变红六军团原定行军路线的指令。任弼时应该能够判断出中央红军即将要作大的战略转移，红六军团需要作出配合行动。红六军团负责密码破译工作的王永浚回忆：“在从黄平向石阡方向前进时，军政委员会向军内传达了中央及中革军委命令红六军团西征的战略意图，是为了与贺龙的红三军会师，并掩护中央红军向西转移。”王震曾告诉李贞，红六军团甘溪失利后“在那个地方打转，一方面因为敌人的关系，另一方面是为了吸引敌人，便利中央红军行动”。这些回忆说明，红六军团领导人在当时已清晰地意识到中央红军即将从江西转移，红六军团的任务是策应中央红军的转移。

Xiao Ke recalled that although there was indeed the idea of crossing the Wujiang to join the Second Red Army Corps, the problem was: “At that time, we still did not know a definite location for their base area, nor did we have a clear topographical target, such as ‘Mount Fanjing’.” The Sixth Red Army Corps did not obtain a nearly one-square-meter French-language map of Guizhou Province until they occupied Old Huangping. After translating it into Chinese, “they could finally see the mountains, rivers, towns, and countryside of Guizhou in somewhat more detail, and their movements began to become more convenient.” Therefore, crossing the Wujiang would mean spending more time before being able to join the Second Red Army Corps. Ren Bishi and the others should also have realized that forcing a crossing of the Wujiang to await an opportunity to join the Second Red Army Corps might not necessarily allow them to reach western Hunan and northwestern Hunan “before mid-October,” thereby coordinating with the Central Red Army’s Long March.

萧克回忆，虽然当时确实有过乌江会合红二军团的想法，但麻烦的是：“当时，他们的根据地我们还不知道一个确定的位置，也没有一个明显的地形目标，譬如‘梵净山’，这样的目标。”红六军团直到占领老黄平时才得到一张近一平方米大小的法文贵州省地图，译成中文后“才稍微详细的看清楚贵州的山川城乡的大小，行动才开始方便了些”。所以，过乌江意味着要耗费更多的时间才能会合到红二军团。任弼时等也应该意识到抢渡乌江伺机会合红二军团，不一定能够在“十月中以前”到达湘西及湘西北地域，从而配合中央红军长征。

Considering all these influencing factors, it was only then that the Military-Political Committee composed of Ren Bishi, Xiao Ke, and Wang Zhen could finally make the decision to abandon the relatively weak Wujiang defense line, risk encountering a strong enemy, turn the army from Houchang, and march directly northeast towards Jiangkou, accelerating the joining of the Second Red Army Corps in order to coordinate with and support the Central Red Army’s Long March.

考虑到以上这些影响因素，任弼时、萧克、王震组成的军政委员会才有可能最终下定决心放弃相对薄弱的乌江防线，冒着遭遇强敌的风险从猴场转兵，径直向东北方向的江口行军，加速会合红二军团以策应中央红军长征。

III. The March and Combat of the Sixth Red Army Corps from October 5–24, 1934, Possessed the Significance of Providing Support

三、红六军团于1934年10月5—24日的行军和作战具有回援意义

Ye Huosheng wrote in his article that Ren Bishi “resolutely led the troops to break out and turn back again, avoiding the enemy’s encirclement and attack, and completed the task assigned by the central authorities.” So, did the march and combat of the Sixth Red Army Corps after turning at Houchang actually serve the function of supporting the Central Red Army’s Long March?

叶蠖生在文章中记述，任弼时“坚决率部重新突围回去，避开敌人的围攻，完成了中央所给的任务”。那么，红六军团猴场转兵后的行军和作战究竟是否起到了回援中央红军长征的作用呢？

After the Sixth Red Army Corps turned its troops at Houchang, what was the enemy’s deployment? The pursuing enemy not only had no troops moving southward but was also planning a new and larger-scale “encirclement and annihilation.” Liao Lei, Li Jue, and other enemy commanders held an emergency meeting at Zhenyuan, judging that the Sixth Red Army Corps would find it difficult to cross the natural barrier of the Wujiang River to the west and north, and that as long as the Shiqian–Zhenyuan highway was sealed off to prevent a junction with the Second Red Army Corps, it would be possible to “encircle and annihilate” the Sixth Red Army Corps. The enemy decided that the Guizhou Army’s Hou Zhidan Brigade would deploy five regiments to strictly guard the Wujiang River, while the main forces of the Hunan and Guangxi armies that had entered Guizhou would seal off the Shiqian–Zhenyuan highway, blocking the Red Army’s route. The Guangxi Army’s 24th Division, the Hunan Army’s First Supplementary General Unit, and four regiments of the Guizhou Army would deploy along the Shibing–Yiqing line, pressing the Red Army from south to north. In total, the enemy mobilized 20 regiments, attempting to “encircle and annihilate” the Sixth Red Army Corps in the area west of Shiqian. According to this operational plan, the enemy urgently moved troops day and night: the Hunan Army’s 55th Brigade, the Independent 32nd Brigade, and Xie Mingqiang’s Regiment advanced to Shiqian and its vicinity; Liao Lei led the 19th Division to deploy in the Dadi Fang, Tiechang, and Pingguan area; the Guangxi Army’s 24th Division, the Hunan Army’s First Supplementary General Unit, and the Guizhou Army’s 5th, 6th, and 13th Regiments and Special First Regiment advanced from the Shibing area to the Yiqing line. The three provinces’ enemy forces, after careful planning, spread a large net, waiting for the Sixth Red Army Corps to arrive.

红六军团从猴场转兵后，敌人的部署是怎样的呢？追敌不但没有任何部队向南开动，而且正在策划新的更大规模的“围歼”。廖磊、李觉等敌军指挥官在镇远紧急会商，判断红六军团难以渡过西、北两面之乌江天险，只要封锁石阡、镇远大道阻止与红二军团会合，就有可能“围歼”红六军团。敌军决定由黔军侯之担部五个团严密防守乌江，以入黔的湘、桂两军主力封锁石、镇大道，堵住红军去路，以桂军第二十四师、湘军补充第一总队及黔军四个团沿施秉、余庆一线展开，由南向北压迫红军。敌人总共动用20个团的兵力，企图将红六军团“围歼”于石阡以西地区。按照这个作战计划，敌军星夜紧急调动部队：湘军第五十五旅、独三十二旅及谢明强团推进到石阡及其附近地区；廖磊率第十九师部署在大地方、铁厂、平贯一线；桂军第二十四师、湘军补充第一总队及黔军第五、第六、第十三团和特一团由施秉地区推进到余庆一线展开。三省敌军经过精心策划，张开大网等待红六军团到来。

Shortly after the turn at Houchang, on October 7, the Sixth Red Army Corps encountered Guangxi enemy forces at Ganxi in Shiqian County, and the corps was cut into several sections by the enemy. After temporarily shaking off the pursuing enemy, Ren Bishi and others leading the main force of the Sixth Red Army Corps planned on the 12th to split their forces and flexibly move to the Soviet area. However, knowing that the Sixth Red Army Corps had suffered heavy losses, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission [n] replied on the 13th with an explicit order: “You should not cross the Wujiang River northward, nor advance directly north from your current area; you should still advance toward Jiangkou, west of the Wujiang River and east of Tongren, and continue to carry out the tasks originally assigned by the Military Commission.” Ren Bishi and others leading the main force therefore abandoned the plan to split forces and continued to maneuver. On the morning of October 17, Ren Bishi and others led the main force of the Sixth Red Army Corps back to Ganxi, and in the afternoon they reached Masang (Factory) Flat [n] from Dunaoshan, Shanlitou, Ganheba, and Hekou (before 2 p.m.). The Hunan enemy’s 62nd Division and 52nd Brigade launched a “pincer attack” from two directions; at 10 p.m., the corps’ main force, guided by a local old hunter, crossed a steep ridge via Wankuang, passed through Tongxi, and reached Yaozhai for lodging. On the 18th, the main force of the Sixth Red Army Corps moved from Yaozhai to Xiaojigong, advancing to Lengjiabang, “70 li from Shiqian and 80 li from Minjiachang,” finally breaking through the encirclement of the Hunan, Guangxi, and Guizhou enemy forces.

猴场转兵后不久，10月7日，红六军团便在石阡县的甘溪迎面遭遇桂敌，红六军团被敌人截成数段。任弼时等率领的红六军团主力暂时摆脱追敌后曾计划12日分兵行动，灵活转移到苏区。但在明知红六军团遭受重大损失的情况下，中革军委13日仍回电明令“不应渡乌江北进，或由现地域一直北进，仍应向铜仁以西乌江以东之江口前进，继续执行军委原规定的任务”。任弼时等率领主力遂放弃分兵继续回旋。10月17日晨，任弼时等率红六军团主力复抵甘溪，下午从杜脑山、山里头、干河坝、河口等地到达马桑（厂）坪（午后2时前）。湘敌六十二师与五十二旅分两路“夹击”，夜10时，军团主力在当地一老猎户带领下从绝岭走湾圹、经桶溪，直到尧寨宿营。18日，红六军团主力从尧寨到小鸡公进至“离石阡七十里，闵家场八十里”的冷家榜，终于冲出湘桂黔敌包围。

The Hunan enemy’s Independent 32nd Brigade, under Hu Da, recorded in its combat report on pursuing and blocking the Sixth Red Army Corps the detailed process of the corps breaking through the blockade on the 17th. On the afternoon of the 17th, Xie Mingqiang “led the Second Battalion to immediately open fire at Tiechang; when the battalion assembled at 5:20 p.m. at Fengxiangpu, preparing to advance toward Pingguan,” news came that the Sixth Red Army Corps had reached Ganheba. “He immediately ordered the battalion to run toward Machangping at full speed; en route, when they reached the high mountain north of Machangping, it was nearly dark.” By then, the Sixth Red Army Corps had already occupied Machangping. “The battalion’s companies immediately deployed and attacked, advancing,” and “by 6:40 p.m., they had completely occupied Machangping.” “Night had fallen, and the terrain was difficult to observe,” so “a stalemate ensued.” “Around 9 p.m., the first battalion of the 694th Regiment arrived in full at Machangping; the brigade sent the first and third companies of that battalion, along with two machine guns, to coordinate with Xie’s regiment stationed at Pingguan, advancing toward Machangping in a two-sided pincer attack,” cutting the Sixth Red Army Corps into two sections. “One part fled east via Panlongao, while a large part retreated to the high mountains near Ganheba.” At dawn on the 18th, the commander of the first battalion of the 695th Regiment, Jiang Xin, led a pursuit, later reporting that the Red Army had “fled” toward Yinjiang and joined up with He Long.

湘敌独立三十二旅胡达部关于追堵红六军团战斗详报，记载了红六军团17日突破封锁的详细经过。17日午后，谢明强“率第二营即时开赴铁厂，该营于午后五时二十分在风香铺集合，准备向平贯前进时”，得到红六军团已至甘河坝的消息，“即令该营用跑步向马厂坪急进中，行至马厂坪北端高山，天色将黑”。此时，红六军团已先占领马厂坪，“该营各连即行展开攻击前进”，“至六时四十分，遂将马厂坪完全占领”，“天已入暮，地形视察难明”，“遂成相持之势”。“午后九时许，六九四团第一营全部到达马厂坪，旅派该营第一、三两连及机枪两挺，协同谢团驻平贯之一营，向马厂坪前进，两方夹击”，将红六军团截为两段。“一部经盘龙坳向东逃窜，一大部窜回甘河坝附近之高山”。18日拂晓，六九五团第一营营长蒋鑫率部追击，后称，向印江方面“窜走”，与贺龙会合。

Xiao Ke [n] once recalled the battle on the 17th: “We advanced to the enemy’s blockade line from Shiqian to Zhenyuan, routed the enemy’s patrol and警戒 [n] units, then occupied the road junction leading east to Jiangkou, and deployed strong警戒 to the south toward Zhenyuan and to the north toward Shiqian. My greatest concern at the time was that the enemy would control this road junction and block our eastward route. That would have forced us back to the original unfavorable strategic area. Fortunately, we controlled this road junction in time. And, guided by a local old hunter, we advanced late at night into a rarely traveled mountain ravine watercourse (called a ‘jia gou’ in Guizhou) and moved eastward in single file along the ravine bottom.” “I personally stood at the road junction directing the troops’ movement. By midnight, the vast majority had passed through. I then ordered the covering units on both flanks to withdraw to the road junction and become the rear guard, following the main force. At dawn, I emerged from the ravine with the rear guard and saw the rising sun; I breathed a sigh of relief.” “From then on, the Sixth Corps escaped the encirclement and pursuit of the Guizhou, Guangxi, and Hunan armies.” On the 17th, before passing through the ravine, Ren Bishi gave a mobilization speech to the corps’ direct units. After explaining the current enemy situation, he said: “We all came out of the land revolution; we must share life and death, share hardships, and resolutely and bravely fight our way through.” He encouraged the commanders and fighters: “Ahead is He Long’s troops; break through and victory is ours. Use the dauntless spirit of Communist Party members to overcome all difficulties and advance courageously; charge through the ravine and there is light!” After the Sixth Red Army Corps emerged from the ravine, the pursuing enemy could only “watch the dust and fail to catch up.” Zeng participating in the “pursuit and suppression,” the Hunan enemy’s 19th Division commander Li Jue recalled: “We held the line at Shiqian and Zhenyuan for about seven or eight days. Several times at night the Red Army tried to cross the blockade line, but we stopped them and they turned back. Later, on a night at the end of September, the Red Army, taking advantage of the rainy, dark night and with a local old hunter as guide, slipped safely out of the blockade line along a rarely traveled ravine watercourse on the front of the Independent Brigade, about 40 li south of Shiqian (I can’t remember the place name). The next morning at dawn, when we found straggling Red Army soldiers, we realized the main Red force had already passed, at least 20 to 30 li away from the blockade line. Apart from sending out tracking and搜索 [n] parties, our main force could only begin to assemble in disappointment.” Regarding this fierce battle, recorded in both Nationalist and Communist materials, Ren Bishi once mentioned it to Ye Huosheng, saying lightly and with a smile: “We were one hour away from the danger of being surrounded and annihilated.” After breaking out of the encirclement, Ren Bishi, Xiao Ke, and Wang Zhen led the main force of the Sixth Red Army Corps to join a part of the Second Red Army Corps, led by He Long, at Muhuang on the 24th, achieving the strategic goal of linking up with the Second Red Army Corps. After the two corps joined forces, they quickly advanced into northwestern Hunan, struck the enemy, established the Hunan–Sichuan–Guizhou–Hubei Revolutionary Base Area, and further supported the Central Red Army’s Long March. Long Shulin, a former head of the Sixth Red Army Corps’ cryptographic section, recalled in his later years that one of the strategic purposes of joining the Second Red Army Corps was “to establish a base area, attract the main enemy forces of Hunan and Hubei provinces, and reduce the resistance to the Central Red Army’s westward advance.”

萧克曾回忆17日的战斗过程：“我们进至石阡至镇远敌之封锁线上，击溃了敌之巡逻警戒部队后，占领了东去江口的路口，并向南面之镇远及北面之石阡派出了强有力的警戒。我当时最大的顾虑是敌人控制这个路口，堵我东去之路。这样就得回到原来不利的战略地区。幸好，这个路口我们及时控制了。并在当地老猎户引导下，深夜进到一条人迹罕见的谷涧水沟（贵州称为夹沟）从沟底鱼贯而东。”“我亲自站在路口指挥部队行动，午夜，绝大部分过去了，我又令两侧掩护部队，撤到路口改为后卫，随大部队跟进。天亮，我与后卫一起出了夹沟，看到了正在东升的太阳，才松了一口气。”“从此，六军团脱离了贵州和广西、湖南军队的围追堵截”。17日，在通过夹沟之前，任弼时向军直部队作了动员，在说明当前敌情之后说：“我们都是土地革命中出来的，要同生死共患难，要坚决勇敢地打过去。”他鼓励指战员：“前面就是贺龙的部队，打过去就是胜利。用共产党员大无畏精神，克服一切困难奋勇前进，冲过了峡谷就是光明！”红六军团冲出夹沟之后，追敌只能“望尘莫及”了。曾参与“追剿”的湘敌十九师师长李觉回忆说：“我们在石阡、镇远之线，相持了约七、八天。红军有几次在夜间试图过封锁线，都被我们阻止折回。后来在九月底的一个晚上，红军乘雨夜阴暗并得到当地一个老猎人作向导，由石阡以南约四十里处（地名记不起了）的独立旅正面，沿着一条不通人迹的溪沟安全溜出了封锁线。我们在第二天拂晓发现有掉队的红军战士时，才知道红军主力已经过去，离封锁线起码已有二三十里之远。当时除派队跟踪搜索外，我们的主力部队也只好在失望之下开始集结。”国共双方资料所记载的这次激战，任弼时也曾对叶蠖生提及，他当时云淡风轻地笑着对叶蠖生说：“差一小时，我们就有被包围消灭的危险。”冲出包围后，任弼时、萧克、王震于24日率领红六军团主力在木黄与贺龙率领的红二军团一部会师，完成了会合红二军团的战略目的。两军团会师后，迅速深入湘西北，打击敌人，建立湘鄂川黔革命根据地，进一步策应了中央红军长征。曾任红六军团机要科长的龙舒林晚年回忆，与红二军团会合的战略目的之一就是“建立根据地，吸引湘鄂两省敌军主力，减轻中央红军西进阻力”。

From the above梳理 [n], it is clear that Ren Bishi and others leading the Sixth Red Army Corps successfully joined the Second Red Army Corps, fulfilling the tasks assigned by the Central Revolutionary Military Commission’s directive to provide support. It should be noted that the Sixth Red Army Corps’ march and combat from October 5 to 24 supported the Central Red Army’s Long March not only by joining the Second Red Army Corps and opening up a base area, thereby providing a foothold for the Central Red Army, but also by clearing the path for the Central Red Army’s advance, attracting and diverting enemy forces, and reducing the resistance faced by the Central Red Army on its Long March. Yang Shangkun recalled that Zhou Enlai once mentioned that the purpose of dispatching the Sixth Red Army Corps on its western expedition was to “reconnoiter the route” for the Central Red Army. As mentioned earlier, Xiao Ke and others also noted that the Sixth Red Army Corps’ western expedition was intended to facilitate the Central Red Army’s Long March. Upon learning of the Central Red Army’s转移 [n], the Hunan enemy Li Jue, who had been “suppressing” the Sixth Red Army Corps, suddenly realized: “Only then did we think that the previous sudden westward movement of the Sixth Red Army Corps was actually to act as a vanguard for the Central Red Army, to reconnoiter the situation in Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Guizhou provinces.” Therefore, the Sixth Red Army Corps’ march and combat from October 5 to 24 essentially also supported the Central Red Army’s Long March by “reconnoitering the route.”

由以上的梳理来看，任弼时等率领红六军团成功地会合红二军团，完成了中革军委回援指令所规定的任务。需要指出的是，红六军团10月5—24日的行军和作战对中央红军长征的策应，不仅体现在会合红二军团、开辟根据地，从而为中央红军提供了立足点，也为中央红军开辟前进道路，吸引、调动敌人减轻了中央红军长征抗敌阻力。杨尚昆回忆，周恩来曾提到派遣红六军团西征的目的是为中央红军“探路”。如前所述，萧克等人也曾提到红六军团的西征是为了便利中央红军的长征。得知中央红军转移的消息时，“围剿”红六军团的湘敌李觉顿时恍然大悟：“我们才想到前次红六军团之突然向西行动，原来是替中央红军当先遣队，来侦察湘粤桂黔各省情况的。”因此，红六军团10月5—24日的行军和作战实质上也是通过“探路”来回援中央红军长征。

Another important contribution of the Sixth Red Army Corps’ march and combat from October 5 to 24 to the Central Red Army’s Long March was that it attracted and pinned down a large number of enemy forces, reducing the resistance the Central Red Army faced on its Long March.

红六军团10月5—24日的行军和作战，对中央红军长征的另一个重要贡献就是吸引、牵制了大量敌人，减轻了中央红军长征路上抗敌的阻力。

To support the Central Red Army’s Long March, the Sixth Red Army Corps paid a bitter price at the Battle of Ganxi, and many commanders and fighters recalled this episode with deep regret. The old Red Army soldier Qi Yuande wrote in a posthumous manuscript: “After the breakout of the nearly 10,000-strong main force of the Sixth Red Army Corps, casualties were severe, with only about 3,300 survivors.” General Tan Tianzhe recalled: “In this battle in the Ganxi area, our Sixth Red Army Corps lost a total of more than 1,400 men. The Battle of Ganxi was the most unforgettable and heart-wrenching pain I have ever experienced in my life; so many good comrades-in-arms were sacrificed.” After the Battle of Ganxi, the Sixth Red Army Corps faced the extremely dangerous prospect of being “encircled and annihilated,” yet it still did not forget to use its own maneuvering during the breakout to attract the enemy and support the Central Red Army’s Long March. As Wang Zhen said, one of the purposes of the Sixth Red Army Corps’ maneuvering after the Ganxi defeat was “to attract the enemy and facilitate the Central Red Army’s actions.” Although it paid a huge price, the Sixth Red Army Corps’ return-and-support operation did indeed attract the enemy’s attention and pinned down a large number of enemy troops in Hunan Province, thereby reducing the pressure on the Central Red Army’s Long March.

为策应中央红军长征，红六军团在甘溪一役付出了惨痛代价，许多指战员回忆起这段往事时无不痛惜。老红军戚元德在遗稿中写道：“红六军团近万人的大部队突围后伤亡惨重，仅幸存3300余人。”谭天哲将军回忆道：“甘溪地区的这一战斗，我红六军团共计损失1400余人。甘溪之战是我一生经历过的最难以忘怀的揪心之痛，多少好战友都牺牲了。”甘溪一役后，红六军团面临被“围歼”的极度危险的境地，仍不忘通过自身的回旋在转战突围中吸引敌人以策应中央红军长征。正如王震所说，红六军团甘溪失利后转战回旋的目的之一就是“为了吸引敌人，便利中央红军行动”。虽然付出了巨大牺牲，但红六军团的回援行动确实吸引了敌人的注意力，牵制了湘省大量敌军，从而减轻了中央红军长征的压力。

Long Shulin recalled that the successful junction of the Sixth Red Army Corps with the Second Red Army Corps basically fulfilled the strategic task of “using the operation to draw the main enemy forces encircling and suppressing the Hunan-Jiangxi border region into pursuing the Sixth Corps, thereby facilitating the Central Red Army’s breakthrough of the Gan River defense line and its strategic transfer (the Sixth Corps moved in August, the Central Red Army crossed the Gan River westward in October).” This account is fully consistent with historical facts. On October 18, Chiang Kai-shek only then learned that the main force of the Central Red Army had broken out and was moving westward, so he hastily ordered Chen Jitang, He Jian, and Bai Chongxi to set up blocking defenses in Guangdong-Jiangxi, southern Hunan, and Guangxi-northern borders respectively, and ordered Xue Yue’s Sixth Route Army, with Wu Qiwei and Zhou Hunyuan’s columns, to pursue. On the night of October 21, the Central Red Army broke through the first blockade line set by the Kuomintang army between Wangmudu in Gancheng and Xintian County, and advanced westward through Dayu and Chongyi. The CPC Central Committee and the Central Red Army successfully left the Central Soviet Area. He Jian, learning that the Central Red Army was poised to enter Hunan, felt deeply that “southern Hunan’s troops were thin,” and on the 22nd urgently ordered Li Jue’s troops, then in Shiqian, Guizhou, to “return to Hunan to reinforce defenses.” Li Jue recalled: “From Shiqian to Qiyang, normally it would take at least half a month, but under orders, we had to advance as fast as possible. By the time we reached Zhijiang, we learned that the main force of the Central Red Army on the Jiangxi-Fujian border had already concentrated and was preparing to break out northward to resist Japan.” Yang Shangkun recalled: On November 8, the Red Army smoothly passed through the second blockade line and entered the Hunan-south and Guangdong-north region. “The enemy’s third blockade line was set up from Chenxian, Liangtian, and Yizhang in southern Hunan to Lechang in northern Guangdong. At that time, the Guangdong army’s main force had withdrawn southward to Dayu and Nanxiong to prevent our army from entering Guangdong’s interior, leaving only two regiments at Lechang. He Jian’s Hunan army could not cover both ends; most of its 15th Division had already been transferred to Guizhou for a ‘joint suppression’ of the Second and Sixth Red Army Corps; most of the 62nd Division was still returning from Jiangxi and could not reach southern Hunan and northern Guangdong in time. Chiang Kai-shek’s Zhou and Wu ‘pursuit’ columns were still far away on the Hunan-Jiangxi border, so the blockade line was thinly held, with the main defenders at Yizhang and Rucheng being ‘volunteer troops’ and local militia.” The Sixth Red Army Corps’ return-and-support march and combat from the 5th to the 24th attracted and pinned down a large number of enemy troops, providing favorable conditions for the Central Red Army to smoothly pass through the first three blockade lines.

龙舒林回忆，红六军团胜利会师红二军团的行动，基本实现了“借以调动‘围剿’湘赣边区的敌军主力部队尾追六军团，便于中央红军突破赣江防线实行战略转移（红六军团8月转移，中央红军10月渡过赣江西进）”的战略任务。这一说法是完全符合史实的。10月18日，蒋介石才得知中央红军主力突围西进，遂仓促命令陈济棠、何键、白崇禧分别在粤赣、湘南、桂北布防阻击，并令第六路军薛岳率领吴奇伟、周浑元两纵队追击。10月21日夜，中央红军在赣城王母渡、信丰县新田之间突破国民党军设置的第一道封锁线，从大庾、崇义间西进。中共中央及中央红军顺利离开中央苏区。得知中央红军有入湘之势的何键深感“湘南兵单”，22日急令在贵州石阡的李觉部“回湘增防”。李觉曾回忆：“由石阡到祁阳，通常最快也得半月时间，但格于命令，我们只好尽速前进。待赶到芷江，知道闽赣边区中央红军主力已经集中，准备突围北上抗日。”杨尚昆曾回忆：11月8日，红军顺利地通过第二道封锁线，进入湘南粤北地域。“敌人的第三道封锁线设置在湘南的郴县、良田、宜章到粤北的乐昌。这时，粤军主力已南撤至大庾、南雄一带，防备我军进入广东腹地，在乐昌的只有两个团。湘军何键部首尾难以兼顾，它的主力十五师大部分已调往贵州‘会剿’红二、六军团；第六十二师大部分正从江西返回途中，来不及向湘南粤北靠拢。蒋介石的周、吴两个‘追剿’纵队，还远在湘赣边界，所以，封锁线上兵力空虚，在宜章和汝城担任守备的主要是‘义勇军’和民团。”红六军团5—24日的回援行军和作战吸引和牵制了大量敌人，为中央红军顺利通过前三道封锁线提供了便利条件。

On October 26, 1944, at the Hunan-Jiangxi Work Symposium, Ren Bishi affirmed that the Sixth Red Army Corps had basically fulfilled the strategic task of assisting the Central Red Army’s Long March: “In terms of the breakout military operation’s role in helping the main Red Army, acting as a vanguard for the main Red Army, it can be said that this task was generally accomplished.” This summary is consistent with historical facts.

1944年10月26日，在湘赣工作座谈会上，任弼时肯定红六军团基本完成了援助中央红军长征的战略任务：“突围的军事行动，在帮助主力红军方面，成为主力红军的先遣队的作用来说，大体上是完成了这个任务的。”这个总结是符合历史事实的。

On October 29, 1934, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission telegraphed He Long, Xia Xi, Guan Xiangying, Ren Bishi, Xiao Ke, and Wang Zhen: “The Sixth Corps may temporarily rest in the Soviet area, and after a few days of reorganization should move directly toward Songtao, Fenghuang, and Qiangcheng to establish a new base area,” and “the Second Corps should back onto the Wujiang River to pin down Bai Chongxi’s enemy and take active action against the Guizhou enemy.” It also informed them: The Hunan enemy would move most of its forces to resist the Central Red Army advancing into southern Hunan. The Second and Sixth Red Army Corps “should use this opportunity to seek major development into Hunan.” Thereafter, the responsibility of supporting the Central Red Army’s Long March was jointly borne by the Sixth and Second Red Army Corps.

1934年10月29日，中革军委电告贺龙、夏曦、关向应、任弼时、萧克、王震，“六军团可暂在苏区休息，改编数天后应直向松桃、凤凰、乾城地区发展，创立新的根据地”，“二军团则应背靠乌江钳制白秀之敌，向黔敌积极行动”，并告：湘敌将调动大部分兵力抗击向湘南进军的中央红军。红二、红六军团“应利用此时机求得向湖南大发展”。此后，策应中央红军长征的重任便由红六军团、红二军团共同承担了。

Conclusion

结语

The episode of Ren Bishi leading troops to return and support the Central Red Army’s Long March, as recalled by Ye Huosheng, is a real piece of military history. The main process was as follows: On October 2, 1934, the Sixth Red Army Corps broke through the Guizhou enemy’s blockade, captured Huangping Jiuzhou (Old Huangping), and then planned to cross the Wujiang River and seek an opportunity to join the Second Red Army Corps. On October 3–4, while marching from Huangping to Houchang in Weng County, it received three return-and-support orders from the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, which had decided on a strategic transfer. Ren Bishi, Xiao Ke, and Wang Zhen led the troops into Houchang on the 4th, decided to abandon the plan to cross the Wujiang River westward or northward, and on the 5th turned northeast toward Jiangkou to support the Central Red Army’s Long March. On October 7, at Ganxi, they were ambushed by Guangxi enemy forces, suffering heavy casualties; on the 17th, they broke out near Masangping in Shiqian County; on the 18th, they advanced to Lengjialang, breaking through the encirclement of Hunan, Guangxi, and Guizhou enemy forces; on the 24th, Ren Bishi, Xiao Ke, and Wang Zhen led the main force to a victorious junction with a part of He Long’s Second Red Army Corps at Muhuang.

叶蠖生所回忆的任弼时率部回援中央红军长征一事，是真实存在的一段军史。主要过程为：红六军团1934年10月2日，突破黔敌封锁，攻陷黄平旧州（老黄平），后计划抢渡乌江，寻找机会会合红二军团。10月3—4日，由黄平向瓮安县猴场的行进中，连续接到决定作战略转移的中革军委的3份回援指令。任弼时、萧克、王震率部4日进抵猴场后，决定放弃西渡或北渡乌江计划，5日转兵东北方向的江口以回援中央红军长征。10月7日，在甘溪遭桂敌伏击，伤亡惨重；17日，在石阡县马桑（厂）坪附近突围；18日，进至冷家榜冲破湘桂黔敌包围；24日，任弼时、萧克、王震率主力与贺龙率领的红二军团一部在木黄胜利会师。

The return to support the Central Red Army’s Long March is an important historical episode in the Sixth Red Army Corps’ Western Expedition history, an unforgettable memory for its commanders and fighters. In the process of supporting the Central Red Army’s Long March, the Sixth Red Army Corps suffered heavy casualties but accomplished the tasks assigned by the CPC Central Committee, achieved the strategic goal of joining the Second Red Army Corps, and by “reconnoitering the route,” attracting and pinning down the enemy, effectively supported the Central Red Army’s Long March. This event fully demonstrates the political character of Ren Bishi, Xiao Ke, Wang Zhen, and the many commanders and fighters—their loyalty to the Party, firm conviction, willingness to take responsibility, fearlessness of sacrifice, hard struggle, and optimistic and open-minded revolutionary spirit!

回援中央红军长征一事是红六军团西征史上的一段重要史实，是红六军团指战员难以忘怀的记忆。红六军团在回援中央红军长征的过程中遭受了重大伤亡，但完成了中共中央指定的任务，达到了会合红二军团等战略目的，通过“探路”、吸引和牵制敌人，有力地策应了中央红军长征。这一事件充分展现出任弼时、萧克、王震等广大指战员对党忠诚、信念坚定的政治品格，敢于担当、不怕牺牲、艰苦奋斗、乐观豁达的革命精神！