New Changes in the Accumulation Mode of Financial Imperialism under Digital Production and Their Implications

I. Statement of the Problem

一、问题的提出

In investigating the characteristics of the modern economy, financial monopoly has long been regarded as the core economic feature of imperialism. With the rapid development of digital technology, especially big data and artificial intelligence, the mode of capital operation is undergoing tremendous transformation. Digital capital is a comprehensive form of capital generated from the monopolistic fusion of functional capitals such as financial capital, commercial capital, and industrial capital. Financial capital constitutes the core of digital capital; the former, through digital technology, achieves an upgrade in its valorization mode and transforms into the latter, that is, a capital form with financial capital as its core, digital technology as its means, and monopoly control as its goal, presenting a unity in which “the shell of digital capital conceals the soul of financial capital.” The American political economist of communication Dan Schiller has proposed that financialization, after digitization has been incorporated into the financial system, has already become “the fulcrum of capitalist expansion and imperial control.” The logic of contemporary digital capital harbors an inherent tension between “change” and “unchangedness.” Thus, the question that needs to be answered is: Has financial imperialism under digital production altered Lenin’s fundamental definition and thesis on imperialism? Has it brought about a fundamental change in the accumulation base of international financial monopoly capital? The answer is no. However, it is necessary to re-examine the connotations, new manifestations, and new characteristics of financial imperialism in light of actual developments. In *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Lenin argued that as capitalism progressed from free competition to monopoly capitalism and then to the imperialist stage based on international monopoly capital, financial capital gradually replaced industrial monopoly capital and, fused into financial oligarchies, became the decisive force in the world capitalist system. John Bellamy Foster believes that Lenin regarded imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism, not the latest stage, because of the “moribundity” of capitalism at the beginning of the twentieth century. In the twenty-first century, this “moribundity” manifests as intensified monopolization leading to economic stagnation, economic stagnation leading to capitalist financialization, and financialization giving rise to international financial monopoly capital, thereby entering the stage of late imperialism. At present, the combination of financial imperialism and emerging digital capital is increasingly becoming a notable feature of late imperialism.

在探究现代经济特点时，金融垄断一直被视为帝国主义的核心经济特征。随着数字科技，尤其是大数据和人工智能的快速发展，资本运作方式正在经历巨大变革。数字资本是金融资本、商业资本和产业资本等职能资本垄断融合后生成的总体性资本形式。金融资本构成数字资本的内核，前者通过数字技术实现增殖模式的升级，转化为后者，即以金融资本为内核，以数字技术为手段，以垄断控制为目标的资本形态，呈现“数字资本的外壳下隐藏着金融资本的灵魂”的一体性。美国传播政治经济学家丹·席勒（Dan Schiller）提出，数字化并入金融系统后的金融化已经成为“资本主义扩张与帝国控制的支点”。当代数字资本逻辑蕴含着“变”与“不变”的内在张力。由此，需要解答的问题在于：数字化生产下的金融帝国主义是否改变了列宁关于帝国主义的基础定义和论断？是否使国际金融垄断资本的积累基础发生了根本变化？答案是否定的。但需要根据现实的发展，重新审视金融帝国主义的内涵、新表现形式及其新特点。列宁在《帝国主义是资本主义的最高阶段》中提出，随着资本主义从自由竞争到垄断资本主义，再到以国际垄断资本为基础的帝国主义阶段，金融资本逐渐取代产业垄断资本，并融合成金融寡头，成为世界资本主义体系的决定性力量。约翰·贝拉米·福斯特（John Bellamy Foster）认为，列宁将帝国主义视为资本主义的最高阶段而非最新阶段，是因为20世纪初资本主义的“垂死性”。在21世纪，这种“垂死性”表现为垄断化加剧导致经济停滞，经济停滞又导致资本主义金融化，金融化又催生国际金融垄断资本，从而进入晚期帝国主义阶段。当前，金融帝国主义与新兴数字资本的结合，日益成为晚期帝国主义的显著特征。

The core economic characteristic of imperialism can be seen as “the molecular process of capital accumulation across time and space,” that is, as a political-economic process, imperialism achieves a dominant position through the control and utilization of capital in its spatial-temporal expansion. Traditionally, financial imperialism relied mainly on international financial monopoly capital (referring to large banks and multinational corporations operating globally and exerting significant influence over the world economy) to realize this accumulation process. According to data from the *Global Digital Economy White Paper (2024)*, the total scale of the digital economy in five countries, including the United States, exceeded 33 trillion US dollars in 2023, a year-on-year increase of over 8%. The rise of the digital economy seems to provide a new pathway for capital accumulation to salvage sluggish growth for financial imperialism: capital, riding the wave of digitization, rapidly advances its global布局 and seizes profits. But in essence, the foundation for the emergence and development of digital capital is a digitized production mode characterized by universality. It not only provides the soil for the growth of digital capital but also enables digital capital to achieve comprehensive penetration into economic and social life. Although the form has changed, the nature and operational logic of digital capital still follow the laws of traditional international financial monopoly capital, achieving accumulation through controlling productive forces and monopolizing markets. The basic contradictions of financial imperialism have not been eliminated, and it cannot avoid a “total outbreak of accumulated capital weaknesses.” Based on this, this paper will, by reviewing Marx’s exposition on the “social productive forces of capital,” analyze the attributes of the productive forces of capital under digital production, re-examine why digital capital has become a key proposition for understanding financial imperialism, explain the interactive logic between digital capital and financial imperialism through the “center-periphery” logic of digital hegemonic expansion strengthening financial capital accumulation and the “digital-financial” logic of digital capital output deepening financial capital accumulation, and then concretize the above logic into the renewal and shaping of the accumulation mode of financial imperialism. Combining cases and data, it will elucidate the changes in the accumulation mode of financial imperialism under digital production and their consequences, and on this basis, explore the practical implications for transcending financial imperialism, proposing how China should adapt to changes in the new situation and accelerate the construction of a Digital Community with a Shared Future.

帝国主义在经济上的核心特点可以被看作“资本积累在时空中的分子化过程”，即作为政治经济过程，帝国主义在时空扩散中通过控制和利用资本获得优势地位。传统上，金融帝国主义主要依靠国际金融垄断资本（指在全球范围内运作、对全球经济具有重要影响力的大银行和跨国公司）来实现这一积累过程。根据《全球数字经济白皮书（2024年）》数据，2023年美国等5个国家数字经济总体规模突破33万亿美元，同比增长超8%。数字经济的崛起似乎为金融帝国主义提供了挽救增长乏力的资本积累新途径：资本借助数字化浪潮快速推进全球布局和攫取利润。但究其实质，数字资本得以产生和发展的根基，是具有通用性特点的数字化生产方式。它不仅为数字资本提供了生长土壤，更使得数字资本实现了对经济与社会生活的全面渗透。尽管形式变化了，数字资本的本质和运作逻辑仍遵循传统国际金融垄断资本的规律，通过控制生产力和垄断市场实现积累，金融帝国主义的基本矛盾并未消除，无法避免“资本累积弱点总爆发”。基于此，本文将通过回顾马克思关于“资本的社会生产力”的论述，分析数字化生产下的资本生产力属性，重新审视数字资本为何成为理解金融帝国主义的关键命题，以数字霸权扩张强化金融资本积累的“中心—外围”逻辑以及数字资本输出深化金融资本积累的“数字—金融”逻辑，解释数字资本与金融帝国主义的互动逻辑，进而将上述逻辑具体化为金融帝国主义积累模式的更新塑造，结合案例、数据阐明数字化生产下金融帝国主义积累模式的变化及其后果，并在此基础上探讨超越金融帝国主义的现实启示，提出中国应如何适应新形势的变化，加快推进数字命运共同体的构建。

II. Digital Capital Becomes the Key Proposition for Understanding Financial Imperialism

二、数字资本成为理解金融帝国主义的关键命题

The valorization logic of digital capital remains the continuation and deepening of the “social productive forces of capital.” By mastering the core of digital technology—computing power resources—international financial monopoly capital integrates data, as a new productive factor, into the production system, achieving deep control over digital industries and global economic activities, and extracting enormous profits from it. The driving force of this capital expansion is not free competition but the advantages of international financial monopoly capital in technological research and development, intellectual property protection, and dominance in the digital market. Therefore, digital capital, as a new form of the fusion of the digital industry and financial capital, further expands the influence and control of financial imperialism, becoming its key proposition.

数字资本的增殖逻辑仍是“资本的社会生产力”的延续与深化。国际金融垄断资本通过掌握数字技术的核心——算力资源，将数据作为新型生产要素融入生产体系，实现对数字化产业和全球经济活动的深度控制，并从中获得巨额利润。这种资本扩张的驱动力不是自由竞争，而是国际金融垄断资本在技术研发、知识产权保护和数字市场主导地位上的优势。因此，数字资本作为数字产业与金融资本交融的新形态，进一步扩大了金融帝国主义的影响和控制力，成为其关键命题。

(I) Review of the Proposition: Marx’s Basic Exposition on the “Social Productive Forces of Capital”

（一）命题的回顾：马克思关于“资本的社会生产力”的基本论述

Capital is not only an accumulation of wealth but also a concrete manifestation of social productive forces, particularly prominently reflected in its specific relations of production and level of development. First, under the conditions of private ownership, social productive forces are manifested as the productive forces of capital, whose development centers on technological progress and improvement in production efficiency, and these advances and improvements are all premised on the needs of capital accumulation and expansion. “The technical basis of modern industry is revolutionary, while the technical basis of all previous modes of production was essentially conservative.” [n1] With the mechanization and automation of the means of labor, the accumulation of technology and knowledge is gradually absorbed by capital, and the progress and increase of productive forces thus increasingly manifest as attributes of fixed capital. Second, the social productive forces of capital are also reflected in the organization and management of the labor process. Through cooperation, division of labor, and optimization of management methods, capital brings into being “a new force arising from the fusion of many forces into a single general force.” [n2] Science and technology deeply permeate the instruments of production, the objects of labor, the laborers, and the organization and management of production, thereby greatly promoting the enhancement of production efficiency. Third, the capacity of productive factors and their development play a key role in improving social productive forces, which is particularly evident in technological innovation and changes in production methods. Under the capitalist mode of production, this process is accompanied by the transformation of the method of producing surplus value, that is, the conversion from the production of absolute surplus value to the production of relative surplus value; the interdependence between the two has not changed. Thus, the logic of capital’s self-valorization indicates that “the bourgeoisie cannot transform these limited means of production from personal means of production into social means of production—that is, means of production that can only be used jointly by a group of people—without turning them into powerful productive forces.” [n3]

资本不仅是财富的积累体，更是社会生产力的具体表现，尤为突出地体现在其特有的生产关系和发展水平 中。一 是在私有制条件下，社会生产力体现为资本的生产力，其发展以技术进步和生产效率的提升为核心，而这些进步与提升均以资本积累和扩张的需求为前提。“现代工业的技术基础是革命的，而所有以往的生产方式的技术基础本质上 是保守的”。随着 劳动资料的机械化与自动化，技术与知识的积累逐步被资本吸收，生产力的进步与提高因而更多地体现为固定资本的属性。二是资本的社会生产力还体现在劳动过程的组织和管理之中。通过协作、分工以及管理方式的优化，资本将“许多力量融合为一个总的力量而产生的新 力量”。 科学技术深度渗透到生产工具、劳动对象、劳动者以及生产组织管理中，从而极大地推动生产效率的提升。三是生产要素能力及其发展对社会生产力的提高起到关键作用，这在技术创新与生产方式变革中表现得尤为突出。资本主义生产方式下，这一过程伴随着剩余价值生产方法的转变，即从绝对剩余价值生产向相对剩余价值生产的转化，两者的相互依存关系并未改变。由此，资本实现自身增殖的逻辑表明，“资产阶级要是不把这些有限的生产资料从个人的生产资料变为社会化的即只能由一批人共同使用的生产资料，就不能把它们变成强大的 生产力”。

(II) Expansion of the Proposition: The Valorization Logic of Capital Elements under Digital Production

（二）命题的拓展：数字化生产下资本要素的增殖逻辑

The valorization of capital is the internal driving force of capitalist development, and the capitalization of the machine system is of great significance to the valorization of capital. Unlike the substitution of natural forces and human physical labor by machines in the early capitalist period, the capitalization of digital technology has become an important tool for the valorization of capital today. This process is essentially a substitution for and transformation of intellectual labor, that is, what Marx called "general intellect." [4]4 "General intellect" is a concept Marx develops in his *Grundrisse* (1857–1858) to describe the power of scientific knowledge and collective social intelligence as direct productive forces under capitalism. As the creative development of abstract labor, "general intellect" marks science and technology as the dominant productive factor. The widespread application of digital technology has enabled the production process to become intelligent, automated, and data-driven, fully controlled by capital, breaking through geographical and temporal constraints and extending capital expansion into digital space. On the one hand, computing power, as the core of digital technology, is controlled by international financial monopoly capital; on the other hand, data, as a new factor of production, is integrated into the production process, promoting broader collaboration and producing more efficient modes of production. This transformation shifts international competition from the previous struggle over material resources to competition over non-material factors such as information, data, and knowledge, followed by the financialization of data, giving rise to data financial assets.

资本增殖是资本主义发展的内在动力，机器体系的资本化对资本增殖具有重要意义。不同于早期资本主义时期机器对自然力和人的体力劳动的替代，数字技术的资本化成为当今资本增殖的重要工具，这一过程实质上是对智力劳动的替代和转化，即马克思所说的“一般智 力”。“一般智力”作为抽象劳动的创造性发展，标志着科技成为主导性生产因素。 数字技术的广泛应用使得生产过程的智能化、自动化和数据化被资本全面掌控，打破了地域和时空的限制，将资本扩张延伸至数字空间。一方面，算力成为数字技术的核心，被国际金融垄断资本所掌控；另一方面，数据作为新的生产要素，被整合进生产过程，促进更广泛的协作，产生更高效的生产方式。这种转变使得国际竞争从以往对物质资源的争夺转向在信息、数据和知识等非物质要素方面的竞争，随之而来的是数据的金融化，数据金融资产应运而生。

Under digital production, the logic of capital valorization further manifests as capital, in the post-industrial era, shifting labor to the "service" sector and utilizing finance and information technology to achieve "unlimited growth." Forms of income in the capitalist economy, such as interest, financial service fees, speculative trading profits, and intellectual property royalties, still originate from the exploitation of productive labor, creating no new value but only redistributing surplus value. Therefore, although the virtual economy and similar business models have developed rapidly, they primarily reflect the evolution of the distribution method of surplus value rather than the emergence of a new mode of value production. Overall, the valorization logic of digital capital remains a continuation and deepening of the "social productive forces of capital."

在数字化生产下，资本增殖逻辑进一步显现为后工业化时代资本通过劳动力转移至“服务”部门，并利用金融与信息技术实现“无限增长”。资本主义经济的收入形式，如利息、金融服务费、投机交易利润、知识产权版税等，实际上仍来源于对生产性劳动的剥削，并未创造新的价值，而是对剩余价值的再分配。因此，尽管虚拟经济和类似的商业模式迅速发展，但它们主要反映了剩余价值的分配方式演化，而非新的价值生产方式的出现。从整体上看，数字资本的增殖逻辑仍是“资本的社会生产力”的延续与深化。

(3) Why Digital Capital Becomes a Key Proposition for Understanding Financial Imperialism

（三）数字资本何以成为理解金融帝国主义的关键命题

In the *Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy (1857–1858 Manuscripts)*, Marx pointed out that "capital posits the production of wealth itself, and hence the full development of the productive forces, and the constant revolution of its existing premises, as the presupposition of its own reproduction." Thus, the capitalist mode of production constantly revolutionizes existing economic conditions and social relations. Continuing this line of argument, Lenin, in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, elaborated on the fusion of bank capital and industrial capital, stating: "The concentration of production; the monopolies arising from concentration; the merging or coalescence of banks with industry—this is the history of the rise of finance capital and the content of this concept." In the digital age, this "fusion" primarily manifests as the combination of the digital industry and finance capital. The rise of digital capital is a natural extension of capitalism's constant self-renovation and expansion of productive forces, conforming to the internal logic of capitalist development.

马克思在《政治经济学批判（1857—1858年手稿）》中指出，“资本把财富本身的生产，从而也把生产力的全面的发展，把自己的现有前提的不断变革，设定为它自己再生产的前提”，所以资本主义生产方式总是在不断变革现有的经济条件和社会关系。延续这一论述，列宁在《帝国主义是资本主义的最高阶段》中阐述了银行资本与工业资本的融合，并指出：“生产的集中；从集中生长起来的垄断；银行和工业日益融合或者说长合在一起，——这就是金融资本产生的历史和这一概念的内容”。在数字时代，这种“融合”首要表现为数字产业与金融资本的结合，数字资本的崛起是资本主义不断自我革新和扩张生产力的自然延伸，符合资本主义发展的内在逻辑。

From a practical perspective, the widespread application of digital technology in production, circulation, and finance has significantly boosted economic growth rates. Taking the United States as an example, since the 1990s, digital technology has propelled the US economy into a "New Economy" period, characterized by "high growth, low inflation, and low unemployment," with an average annual economic growth rate of 4.03% from 1995 to 2000. This growth benefited from the fact that "data is a material that is extracted, refined, and used in various ways, a raw material that must be abstracted in the era of digital capitalism." [5]5 Paraphrasing Lisa Parks and Nicole Starosielski, eds., *Signal Traffic: Critical Studies of Media Infrastructures* (University of Illinois Press, 2015). Digital capital exploits ambiguity in data ownership to strip the future income rights (the core of its financial attribute) that data assets can generate through securitization, packaging them into standardized derivatives, thereby creating purely digital financial products. At the same time, data valuation detaches from consumer supply and demand and instead relies on capital volume and expected cash flow. Digital capital uses this to construct investment strategies such as futures and arbitrage, promoting the valorization of data and serving capital valorization. Clearly, the financialization of digital capitalism is a renewal of the digital capital accumulation form, targeting the creation of new channels for extracting super-profits in the digital realm. The factors of production related to algorithms and digital processing technology become more concentrated in modern production, and thus are more easily monopolized and become hegemonic, accelerating the global accumulation of international financial monopoly capital.

从现实情况来看，数字技术在生产、流通及金融领域的广泛应用极大地提升了经济增长率。以美国为例，20世纪90年代以来，数字技术推动美国经济进入“新经济”时期，其特征是“高增长、低通胀、低失业”，1995年至2000年间的经济平均增长率达4.03%。这一增长得益于“数据是一种被提取、被精炼并以各种方式被使用的物质，是在数字资本主义时代必须被抽象的原材料”。数字资本利用数据权属不清的漏洞，将数据资产所能产生的未来收益权（其金融属性的核心）通过证券化手段剥离出来，并包装成标准化的衍生品，从而创造出纯粹的数字金融品。同时，数据估值脱离消费供求而依赖资金量与预期现金流，数字资本借此构建期货、套利等投资策略，推动数据价值化并服务于资本增殖。显然，数字资本主义的金融化属于数字资本积累形态的更新，其目标是为获取超额数字利润创造新渠道。与算法和数字处理技术相关的生产要素在现代生产中更加集中，因而也更易被垄断并成为霸权，从而加快国际金融垄断资本在全球范围内的积累。

In summary, digital capital, dominated by international financial monopoly capital, becomes a core proposition of financial imperialism, mainly because its productive-force attributes demonstrate new capabilities in capital accumulation, expansion, and monopoly. This reflects international financial monopoly capital's adaptation to and utilization of these changes in the context of economic globalization and technological innovation, thereby expanding the influence and control of financial imperialism.

综上所述，由国际金融垄断资本主导的数字资本成为金融帝国主义的核心命题，主要是由于其生产力属性在资本积累、扩张和垄断方面展现出新能力，这体现了国际金融垄断资本在经济全球化和技术革新背景下对这些变革的适应和利用，从而扩大了金融帝国主义的影响力和控制力。

3. The Interaction Logic between Digital Capital and Financial Imperialism: Hegemonic Expansion and Capital Export

三、数字资本与金融帝国主义的互动逻辑：霸权扩张与资本输出

"A key to creating and maintaining market control is to demonstrate hegemony in every link of the production chain." [6]6 This phrasing is widely attributed to Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century* (Verso, 1994), in the context of tracing historical shifts in capitalist hegemony. In the interaction logic between digital capital and financial imperialism, digital hegemony provides a new foundation for capital export, while capital export becomes an important means of consolidating and expanding digital hegemony. On the one hand, the urgent need for the valorization of digital capital drives hegemonic digital countries to seek dominance over the global industrial and value chains, strengthening the "center-periphery" logic of international financial monopoly capital accumulation. On the other hand, capital export presupposes more efficient technological advantages. The export of digital capital from technologically advanced countries becomes a lever for digital hegemonic expansion, expressed through forms such as financial capital, technical services, data resources, and intellectual property, deepening the "digital-finance" logic of international financial monopoly capital accumulation.

“创造和维持市场控制的关键之一，就是在生产链的每一环节都展示霸权”。在数字资本与金融帝国主义的互动逻辑中，数字霸权为资本输出提供了新的基础，而资本输出则成为巩固和拓展数字霸权的重要途径。一方面，数字资本增殖的迫切需要，驱使数字霸权国家谋求巩固其在全球产业链和价值链的主导权，强化了国际金融垄断资本积累的“中心—外围”逻辑。另一方面，资本输出以更有效率的技术优势为前提，数字技术优势国家的数字资本输出成为数字霸权扩张的抓手，并通过金融资本、技术服务、数据资源和知识产权等形式呈现，深化了国际金融垄断资本积累的“数字—金融”逻辑。

(1) Digital Hegemonic Expansion Strengthens the "Center-Periphery" Logic of International Financial Monopoly Capital Accumulation

（一）数字霸权扩张强化了国际金融垄断资本积累的“中心—外围”逻辑

Worldwide capital accumulation is one of the important tools for financial imperialism to alleviate its own economic crises. The nature of capital drives it to "annihilate space with time." [7]7 This phrase paraphrases Marx's *Grundrisse*, where capital's tendency is described as "to annihilate space with time" in the circulation process. Digital capital, by means of technological conditions, expands the scope of capital circulation, sustaining the universal intercourse of the world market based on capital expansion. At the same time, due to the technical characteristics of digital commodity capital and digital currency capital, it demands an increase in the efficiency of value realization, forming a "center-periphery" world market with digital technology at its core in international value exchange, significantly reinforcing the hierarchy of world intercourse. In this process, hegemonic digital countries dominate international industrial and value chains, controlling core links such as technology development, product design, and marketing, and also controlling labor. The World Economic Forum's *Chief Economists Outlook* released in 2025 points out that the geo-economy dominated by hegemonic economic powers will accelerate fragmentation in the next three years, and increased restrictions on technology transfer and data transmission will place greater pressure on global integration. [8]8 World Economic Forum, *Chief Economists Outlook*, January 2025. This also aligns with Lenin's thesis on imperialism that "finance capital and trusts have not weakened but have increased the differences in the rate of development of the various parts of the world economy." [9]9 V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, ch. 9 ("Critique of Imperialism").

世界范围内的资本积累，是金融帝国主义缓解自身经济危机的重要工具之一。资本的本性驱动其“用时间去消灭空间”，数字资本既借助技术条件扩大资本流通范围，维系以资本扩张为基础的世界市场的普遍交往，又因数字商品资本与数字货币资本的技术特性，要求提升价值实现效率，在国际价值交换中形成以数字技术为核心的“中心—外围”世界市场，显著强化了世界交往的层级性。在这一进程中，数字霸权国家主导国际产业链和价值链，掌控核心环节如技术开发、产品设计与营销，并控制劳动力。2025年世界经济论坛发布的《首席经济学家展望报告》指出，未来3年经济霸权国家主导的地缘经济将加速分裂，技术转让和数据传输限制增多会使全球一体化面临更大压力。这也契合列宁帝国主义论中“金融资本和托拉斯不是削弱而是加强了世界经济各个部分在发展速度上的差异”的观点。

On the one hand, because the "center countries" have accumulated a large amount of "surplus digital capital," including digital currencies, digital assets, data resources, and so forth, their domestic markets can no longer satisfy the demand of this capital for higher returns. Therefore, promoting the expansion of financial monopoly capital outward by means of digital hegemony becomes an inevitable trend. The "center countries" use their ability to control the flow of financial information and the dissemination of digital platforms to influence market expectations and global capital flows, extracting value from the "periphery" through a non-productive rentier model. Taking the United States as an example, it relies on its international currency status to conduct international transactions and investments at low cost during boom cycles, leverages its advantages in digital technology to improve the efficiency of financial transactions and accelerate capital flows, and manipulates global financial markets through the "digital dollar" system, thereby maintaining the "center's" domination over the "periphery." On the other hand, because "peripheral countries" lag behind in digital technology, these countries are more likely to become "digital colonies" of the digital hegemonic states. "The relations among different nations depend on the extent to which each has developed its productive forces, the division of labor, and internal intercourse." [n10] The "center countries" use digital technology to exercise "digital-nomad" control over the key links of global digital production, lead the operation of digital industrial capital through new types of financial business, and build a rentier system based on monopoly powers such as digital market monopolies and data pricing rights. This severely constrains the independent development and innovation capacity of developing countries in digital technology and other fields, locks the "peripheral countries" into the bottom layer of value distribution, and reinforces a hierarchical "center-periphery" accumulation system with digital technology as its core and financial monopoly as its linchpin.

一方面，由于“中心国家”积累了大量的“过剩数字资本”，包括数字货币、数字资产、数据资源等，使其国内市场已经无法满足这些资本追求更高回报的需求，因此，推动金融垄断资本借助数字霸权对外扩张成为一种必然趋势。“中心国家”凭借其掌控金融信息流动和数字平台传播的能力影响市场预期与全球资本流向，通过非生产性食利模式从“外围”攫取价值。以美国为例，凭借其国际货币地位在繁荣周期以低成本开展国际交易投资，依托数字技术优势提升金融交易效率、加速资本流动，通过“数据美元”体系操纵全球金融市 场， 维系“中心”对“外围”的支配。另一方面，由于“外围国家”在数字技术方面的落后状态，这些国家更容易成为数字霸权国家的“数字殖民地”。“各民族之间的相互关系取决于每一个民族的生产力、分工和内部交往的发展程 度”，“中心国家”借助数字技术“数字游牧”式掌控全球数字生产的关键环节， 以新型金融业务主导数字产业资本运行，依托数字市场垄断、数据定价权等垄断权力构建食利体系，使发展中国家数字技术等领域的自主发展和创新能力受到严重制约，将“外围国家”锁定在价值分配底层，强化了以数字技术为核心、以金融垄断为纽带的层级化“中心—外围”积累体系。

(2) Digital capital export reinforces the "digital-financial" logic of the accumulation of international financial monopoly capital

（二）数字资本输出强化了国际金融垄断资本积累的“数字—金融”逻辑

Marx argued that capitalists increase the rate of profit by expanding the scope of exploitation and raising the degree of exploitation: "The fall in the rate of profit and accelerated accumulation are only different expressions of the same process, insofar as both express the development of productive forces." [n11] This statement implies the premise that capitalist capital export presupposes the advantage of more efficient technology. Similarly, in contemporary society, digital capital export must also be premised on advantages in digital technology. The British economist Mohamed El-Erian has pointed out that an increasing number of countries are trying to break free from Western dominance, leading to intensified global trade tensions. This forces the West to update its means of external expansion and global economic dominance, of which digital capital export has become the main mode. At the same time, because digital technology undergoes extremely rapid renewal and iteration, financial imperialist states can plan ahead for the digital spaces that will generate future data wealth, thereby harvesting future monopoly gains, bringing these into the digital market for capitalization, which also becomes a driving force for digital capital export. In the above process, the "digital-financial" complex, which encompasses digital finance, technology, and industrial capital, carries out capital operations through digital services and intelligent tools. This greatly enhances the scale and circulation efficiency of capital concentration, highlights the new form of contemporary financial imperialism's capital export, and enables international financial monopoly capital to realize global deployment and value extraction more efficiently.

马克思认为，资本家会通过扩大剥削范围和提高剥削程度来增加利润率，“利润率的下降和积累的加速，就二者都表现生产力的发展来说，只是同一个过程的不同表现”。这句话暗含着这样一个前提，即资本主义资本输出以更有效率的技术优势为前提。同样，当代社会中数字资本输出也要以数字技术优势为条件。英国经济学家穆罕默德·埃里安（Mohamed El-Erian）指出，越来越多的国家试图摆脱西方主导，导致世界贸易紧张加剧。这迫使西方更新对外扩张和支配全球经济的手段，其中数字资本输出成为主要方式。同时，由于数字技术更新迭代极快，金融帝国主义国家可以对未来产生数据财富的数字空间提前谋划，借此收获未来的垄断收益，并将其带入数字市场实现资本化，这也成为数字资本输出的动因。上述进程中，囊括了数字金融、技术和产业资本的“数字—金融”复合体，通过数字化服务与智能化工具开展资本运作，使得资本集中的规模量级与流转效能大幅提升，凸显出当代金融帝国主义资本输出的新形态，推动国际金融垄断资本以更高效的方式实现全球布局与价值攫取。

On the one hand, the digitalization of financial capital allows financial imperialism to control the global deployment of capital efficiently and flexibly. Under the global capitalist system, financial capital firmly controls the global currency circulation link by virtue of the international monetary system and transnational financial networks, collecting "currency circulation rents" in the form of interest, service fees, and so on (for example, cross-border financing business conducted by international investment banks extracts value through fund lending and capital operations). In contrast, after digital transformation, financial capital is deeply bound up with transnational digital platforms. By relying on the "GAMMA" (an acronym for Google, Apple, Meta, Microsoft, Amazon, and similar companies) global digital platforms that monopolize the consumer resource pool, it obtains "consumer circulation rents" through traffic fees, advertising fees, membership fees, data premiums, and the like. Thus, financial capital uses the user networks of digital platforms to expand its fund deployment and value-added space, while digital platforms absorb capital to accelerate user expansion and market penetration. On the other hand, the financialization of digital industries forms a transnational rentier accumulation system that consolidates and expands the global influence of financial imperialism. The integration of financial capital and digital technology drives the financialization of digital industries, deepening international monopolies through two channels. First, financial capital penetrates overseas digital industries throughout their entire cycle, exploiting the high growth of digital markets in developing countries to harvest value through an "incubation-to-monetization" model. For instance, after expanding through financing in the Latin American market, Uber (a global ride-hailing service platform) went public, and institutions such as Morgan Stanley reaped huge profits through stock underwriting and initial share subscriptions. Second, overseas data assets are virtualized into financial derivatives, and value is plundered through cross-border capital flows. The "digital-financial" complex binds peripheral countries through a dual export of capital and technological standards. Even when enterprises operate at a loss, profits can be obtained through asset valuation speculation and data asset stripping, forming a transnational rentier closed loop from investment to valuation and then to exit. Digital capital achieves expansion by investing in overseas digital enterprises, extending the "digital-financial" logic globally, and upgrading the accumulation of international financial monopoly capital into systematic control over global digital industry chains and financial rules.

一方面，金融资本数字化使金融帝国主义能高效、灵活地控制全球资本布局。在全球资本主义体系下，金融资本凭借国际货币体系与跨国金融网络，牢牢掌控全球货币流通环节，以利息、手续费等形式收取“货币流通租金”（如国际投行开展的跨境融资业务，通过资金借贷与资本运作实现价值攫取）。与之相对，数字化转型后的金融资本与跨国数字平台深度绑定，借助“GAMMA”（即谷歌、苹果、Meta、微软、亚马逊等公司的首字母缩写）全球数字平台垄断消费者资源池，通过流量费、广告费、会员费、数据溢价等途径获取“消费者流通租金”。由此，金融资本借助数字平台用户网络扩大资金投放和增值空间，数字平台则吸收资本加速用户扩张与市场渗透。另一方面，数字产业金融化形成跨国食利性积累体系，巩固和扩大金融帝国主义全球影响力。金融资本与数字技术融合推动数字产业金融化，通过两条路径深化国际垄断：一是金融资本全周期渗透海外数字产业，利用发展中国家数字市场的高成长性，以“孵化—变现”模式收割价值。例如，“优步”（Uber， 全球打车服务平台）在拉美市场通过融资扩张后上市，摩根士丹利等机构通过股票承销和原始股认购获取暴利。二是将海外数据资产虚拟化为金融衍生品，通过跨境资本流动实现价值掠夺。“数字—金融”复合体以资金和技术标准的双重输出绑定外围国家，即便企业经营亏损，也能通过资产估值炒作和数据资产剥离获取收益，形成从投资到估值、再到退场的跨国食利闭环。数字资本通过投资海外数字企业实现扩张，将“数字—金融”逻辑延伸至全球，使国际金融垄断资本积累升级为对全球数字产业链、金融规则的系统性控制。

IV. Changes and Consequences of the Accumulation Model of Financial Imperialism under Digital Production

四、数字化生产下金融帝国主义积累模式的变化与后果

Thomas Piketty believes that the "principle of infinite accumulation" of capital remains highly significant in the 21st century. The combination of finance and digital technology, along with the trend of financial capital becoming embedded in digital capital and diffusing globally, accelerates the harvesting of global surplus value by international financial monopoly capital. This is essentially the concretization and manifestation of the interactive logic between digital capital and financial imperialism. That is, horizontally, the strengthening of the "center-periphery" exploitation system of digital geopolitics, and vertically, the deepening of the "digital-financial" composite operation as the dominant form of capital. This has profoundly changed the accumulation model of financial imperialism under digital production. "One side of growth is the economic force; the other side is the hidden risk." [n12] The shift in the center of gravity of the financial imperialist accumulation model toward production in digital space cannot solve the economic problems of physical space; on the contrary, it exacerbates the separation of the real economy from the virtual economy, reinforcing speculative, predatory, and parasitic characteristics. This will ultimately undermine the growth prospects of financial imperialism. In other words, financial imperialism under digital production gives rise to more complex exploitation mechanisms and greater instability, forming risks and hidden dangers that hinder global economic development and breed global digital crises.

托马斯·皮凯蒂（Thomas Piketty）认为资本的“无限积累原则”在21世纪依然具有重大意义。金融与数字技术的结合，以及金融资本内嵌于数字资本向全球扩散的趋势，加速了国际金融垄断资本对全球剩余价值的收割，这本质上是数字资本与金融帝国主义互动逻辑的具体化、显性化，即横向上数字地缘政治“中心—外围”剥削体系的强化，纵向上资本主导形态“数字—金融”复合运转的深化，深刻地改变了数字化生产下金融帝国主义的积累模式。“增长的一面是经济力量，另一面则是隐藏的风险”，金融帝国主义积累模式的重心转向数字空间生产，不仅不能解决实体空间的经济难题，还会加剧实体经济与虚拟经济的分离，强化投机性、掠夺性和寄生性，这终将瓦解金融帝国主义的增长前景。也就是说，数字化生产下金融帝国主义催生了更为复杂的剥削机制和更大的不稳定性，正在形成阻碍全球经济发展、催生全球数字危机的风险隐患。

(A) New Fields of Capital Accumulation for Financial Imperialism

（一）金融帝国主义资本积累的新领域

Financial imperialism, with its tighter integration of digitalization and financialization, has enabled finance capital to thoroughly penetrate into the daily lives of ordinary people. On the one hand, digitalization drives the borderless expansion of finance capital. The 2024 Global Financial Centres Index report indicates that information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure is a key pillar of the competitiveness of modern financial centers, directly affecting the operational efficiency and innovation capacity of the financial sector. For example, BlackRock’s practice of replacing traders’ manual intuition with computer information models and dominating global financial markets through electronic modes has pioneered what is called “version 2.0 of financial capitalism,” making it the successor to the era of Morgan finance capitalism. At the same time, virtual financial markets, relying on algorithms and data, achieve high-frequency trading, while digital currencies, using distributed technology, accelerate cross-border circulation; together, these constitute an “digital expansion channel” for international finance-monopoly capital. On the other hand, financialization, through digitalization, penetrates and disciplines individual spheres of life. With the support of digital technology, individuals’ occupational, consumption, credit, and other information is placed under surveillance and recording. International finance-monopoly capital uses debt, risk, and neoliberal ideology as tools to impose financialized discipline on individuals and households. In recent years, global private-sector debt has reached approximately 13 percent of global GDP, growing faster than during the global financial crisis. This is, to a large extent, “thanks to” financial institutions using digital platforms to precisely push financial products, constructing a financial service system built around individual consumption needs, converting leisure time into labor time and investment time, further promoting the capitalist system’s strengthening of finance capital accumulation through “digital abstract domination.”

数字化和金融化更紧密融合的金融帝国主义，使金融资本彻底渗透至普通人的日常生活。一方面，数字化推动金融资本无边界扩张。2024年全球金融中心指数报告表明，信息与通信技术（ICT）基础设施是现代金融中心竞争力的关键支撑，直接影响金融部门的运行效率与创新能力，例如，贝莱德集团以计算机信息模型替代交易员人工直觉、通过电子化模式统摄全球金融市场的实践，开创了所谓“金融资本主义的2.0版本”，成为摩根金融资本主义时代的继任者。同时，虚拟金融市场依托算法与数据实现高频化交易，数字货币借助分布式技术加速跨境流通，二者共同构成国际金融垄断资本的“数字化扩张通道”。另一方面，金融化借助数字化渗透与规训个体生活领域。在数字技术支撑下，个体职业、消费、信贷等信息处于被监控记录状态，国际金融垄断资本借此以债务、风险及新自由主义意识形态为工具，对个体和家庭实施金融化规训。近年来，全球私人部门债务已达到全球国内生产总值的13%左右，增长速度比全球金融危机期间还要快。这在很大程度上“得益于”金融机构利用数字平台精准推送金融产品，构建起一个围绕个体消费需求的金融服务体系，将休闲时间转化为劳动时间和投资时间，进一步促进了资本主义体系通过“数字抽象统治”强化了金融资本积累。

(2) The New Mechanism of Capital Accumulation for Financial Imperialism

（二）金融帝国主义资本积累的新机制

The high-technology and intellectual labor of digital production enables international finance-monopoly capital to obtain higher profits through it, exacerbating inequality on a global scale. On the one hand, the complexity and high value-creating capacity of digital labor provide international finance-monopoly capital with ample profits. Digital labor creates high-value-added digital products, yet the “digital working class” still cannot own the surplus value it creates. Susan Strange defined the production structure as the sum of all arrangements involved in production. Under conditions of digital production, the production structure of the platform economy allows capital to utilize the labor power of the “collective worker,” extracting surplus value from directly employed laborers, and to expand the source of surplus value by converting external labor within the entire platform ecosystem into a source of value. This mechanism of capital accumulation pushes up production costs in the real economy and the living costs of digital laborers, leading to the accumulation of poverty. On the other hand, the struggle among international finance-monopoly capital for the redistribution of surplus value from digital production has become more intense. As the West’s financialization of “shifting from real to virtual” [13]13 “Shifting from real to virtual” (脱实向虚) refers to the tendency of capital to flow away from the real economy (manufacturing, agriculture, services) and into speculative financial and real-estate activities. intensifies, the struggle among finance capitals for shares of surplus value distribution becomes fiercer, and the share of fixed capital investment serving production continues to decline, exacerbating the false prosperity of the global digital economy and industrial hollowing-out. For example, from 1947 to 2024, the share of U.S. manufacturing value-added in GDP fell from 25 percent to about 10 percent, and the traditional industrial foundation for capital proliferation continues to erode. Looking at reality, the limited results of the U.S.’s recent “reindustrialization” are also closely related to the difficulty of curbing financialization. As of August 2025, total U.S. national debt exceeded $37 trillion for the first time, meaning all newly issued public debt is used exclusively to pay interest, deeply trapped in a predicament of robbing Peter to pay Paul.

数字化生产的高技术和智力劳动，使国际金融垄断资本得以借此获取更高利润，加剧全球范围内的不平等现象。一方面，数字劳动的复杂性、高价值创造能力为国际金融垄断资本提供了丰厚的利润。数字劳动创造出高附加值的数字产品，而“数字工人阶级”却依然无法拥有自己创造的剩余价值。苏珊·斯特兰奇（Susan Strange）将生产结构定义为涉及所有生产安排的总和。在数字化生产条件下，平台经济的生产结构使资本能利用“总体工人”的劳动力，从直接雇佣的劳动者中榨取剩余价值，并通过将整个平台生态系统中的外部劳动转化为价值源泉，扩大剩余价值来源。这种资本积累的机制，推高了实体产业生产成本与数字劳动者生活成本，导致贫困的积累。另一方面，国际金融垄断资本对数字化生产剩余价值再分配的争夺更加激烈。随着西方“脱实向虚”的金融化愈演愈烈，金融资本间争夺剩余价值分配份额的斗争变得更加激烈，服务于生产的固定资本投资份额持续降低，加剧了全球数字经济虚假繁荣与产业空心化。例如，1947年至2024年，美国制造业增加值占GDP比重从25%降至10%左右，资本增殖依赖的传统产业根基持续瓦解。现实地看，近年美国“再工业化”成效甚微，也与金融化膨胀难抑密切相关。截至2025年8月，美国的国债总额首次超过37万亿美元，即每年新发公共债务全用于还息，深陷拆东墙补西墙的困局。

(3) The New Method of Capital Accumulation for Financial Imperialism

（三）金融帝国主义资本积累的新方式

Digital capital not only functions in the production process but also upgrades the method of accumulation by dispossession outside the production process. On the one hand, the digital colonial system has become “center-scatter” in form, intensifying the parasitic nature of finance capital. Traditional capitalist industrial production formed a division of labor between “center (industrial countries)” and “periphery (raw material supplying countries).” Digital production further fragments developing countries from “periphery” into “scatter points.” “Center countries,” by controlling data platforms, algorithms, and technical standards, dominate commodity sales, data circulation, and consumption networks, turning globally dispersed production entities into “scatter points” executing commands, trapped in a predicament of “having production but no market.” On this basis, the digital colonial system possesses digital monopoly, and its exploitative essence evolves into a new type of digital rentier character, strengthening finance capital accumulation through monopoly forms such as digital technology, prices, markets, and currencies. For example, the price of data commodities is determined by the monopolistic will of capital, forming a disguised “digital tax.” At the same time, both digital productive accumulation and non-productive accumulation are separated from the direct digital production process, causing finance capital to further “degenerate” into rentier capital parasitic on digital production. On the other hand, digital capital uses predatory accumulation to reinforce the logic of dispossession in financial imperialism. The model of consolidating digital hegemony through exclusive possession of data, monopolizing algorithms, and pushing for “decommodification” of labor is, in essence, an upgrade of accumulation by dispossession. Its key lies in leveraging platform power to amass and monopolize, capturing surplus value from production sectors. Any production entity using such monopoly platforms and data must pay high “digital rents,” akin to landowners operating outside the production process, obtaining “non-productive proliferation” financialized rents from users and industrial capitalists through “relations of capture.”

数字资本不仅在生产过程中发挥作用，还升级了生产过程之外的剥夺性积累方式。一方面，数字殖民体系“中心—散点”化，加剧了金融资本的寄生性。传统资本主义工业生产形成“中心（工业国）—外围（原材料供应国）”分工，而数字化生产使发展中国家从“外围”进一步碎片化为“散点”。“中心国家”经由控制数据平台、算法、技术标准，主宰商品销售、数据流通与消费网络，将全球分散的生产主体变为执行指令的“散点”，陷入“有生产无市场”的困境。在此基础上，数字殖民体系具有数字垄断性，其剥削实质则演变为一种新型的数字食利性，通过数字技术、价格、市场、货币等垄断形式强化金融资本积累，如数据商品价格由资本垄断意志决定，形成变相的“数字税”。同时，数字生产性积累与非生产性积累均与直接数字生产过程分离，使金融资本更加“堕落”为寄生在数字化生产之上的食利资本。另一方面，数字资本以掠夺式积累强化金融帝国主义的剥夺逻辑。通过独占数据、垄断算法、推动劳动力“去商品化”来巩固数字霸权的模式，本质上是剥夺式积累的升级。其关键在于借助平台权力积聚与垄断，攫取生产部门剩余价值。任何生产主体使用此类垄断平台及数据均需支付高额“数字租金”，如同土地所有者般游离于生产过程之外，通过“捕获关系”从用户与产业资本家处获得“非生产性增殖”的金融化租金。

(4) The New Channel of Capital Accumulation for Financial Imperialism

（四）金融帝国主义资本积累的新渠道

International finance-monopoly capital, “borrowing the shell” of state power to export digital capital, uses exclusionary means to compete for a central position in the global digital market and pushes transnational alliances to greater depth. On the one hand, “digital rentier states” accelerate the transnational carve-up of global digital markets. The operation of “digital-finance” capital, by manipulating digital power, markets, and social relations, gives rise to “digital rentier states.” Digital oligarchs, relying on monopoly positions, form collusion with “digital rentier states” to consolidate their position in the global digital market. For example, tech companies such as Palantir and OpenAI take on multi-billion-dollar defense contracts, and Elon Musk’s X platform even attempts to create an “everything app,” integrating functions like financial transactions, communication, and identity verification into privately controlled digital infrastructure, thereby partially replacing government functions. The political and legal systems of “digital rentier states” are transformed into the institutional guarantee for the accumulation of international finance-monopoly capital, intensifying a “comprehensive reaction caused by the oppression of oligarchs and the elimination of free competition.” [14]14 This is a quotation from Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1917), describing the political consequences of monopoly capitalism. On the other hand, international finance-monopoly capital alliances expand in depth. The rise of emerging economies and digital industries changes the global economic landscape. When Western countries face competitive pressure, they summon economic alliances to coordinate financial actions, “indicating that the blatant political-economic operations of dispossession still exist vigorously in the center of the capitalist world.” [15]15 This phrase paraphrases an argument from David Harvey’s *The New Imperialism* (2003), where he argues that accumulation by dispossession remains a central feature of contemporary capitalism. For instance, by using flexible exchange rate regimes to replace the Bretton Woods system, international finance-monopoly capital acquires, at extremely low prices, large quantities of real assets, including digital industries, in (semi-)peripheral countries and regions, which also involves exploitation in the development of mineral resources in the ICT industrial chain. Furthermore, “government-enterprise frictions” similar to Western countries sanctioning TikTok (the short-video social platform under China’s ByteDance) are both responses to alliance pressure under traditional geopolitical logic and reflections of the struggle between different camps for platform control and digital information resources in the game of digital geopolitics.

国际金融垄断资本“借壳”国家权力进行数字资本输出，以排他性手段争夺在全球数字市场的中心地位，并将跨国同盟推向纵深化。一方面，“数字食利国”加快对全球数字市场的跨国瓜分。“数字—金融”的资本运转通过操控数字权力、市场与社会关系，催生了“数字食利国”。数字寡头凭借垄断地位，与“数字食利国”形成合谋，巩固自身在全球数字市场的地位。例如，“帕兰提尔”（Palantir， 美国大数据研究公司）、“开放人工智能”（OpenAI，美国人工智能研究公司）等科技公司承接数十亿美元的国防合同，埃隆·马斯克（Elon Musk）的X平台甚至试图打造“一切应用”，将金融交易、通信、身份验证等功能集成于私人控制的数字基础设施中，进而取代部分政府职能。“数字食利国”的政治法律体系被转化为国际金融垄断资本积累的秩序保障，加剧了“寡头的压迫和自由竞争的消除引起的全面的反动”。另一方面，国际金融垄断资本同盟向纵深拓展。新兴经济体和数字产业的崛起改变全球经济格局，当西方国家受到竞争压力，就会召集经济同盟，协调金融行动，“这表明公然剥夺的政治经济运作仍生猛地存在于资本主义世界的中心”。例如，借助弹性汇率制度替代布雷顿森林体系，国际金融垄断资本以极低价格收购（半）外围国家地区包括数字产业在内的大量实体资产，其中也涉及对于信息与通信技术产业链矿产资源的开发等环节的剥削。此外，类似西方国家制裁“抖音国际版”（TikTok， 中国企业字节跳动旗下的短视频社交平台）的“政企摩擦”，既是传统地缘政治逻辑下的同盟压力响应，也反映了数字地缘政治博弈中不同阵营对平台控制权及信息数字资源的争夺。

(5) The New Frontier of Capital Accumulation for Financial Imperialism

（五）金融帝国主义资本积累的新边疆

With the expansion of digital hegemony, international finance-monopoly capital has shifted its focus of control from real physical territory to the vast digital space. This stems from the inherent demand of financial imperialist countries to seek new spaces for accumulation and pathways for expansion. On the one hand, there is a transition from the saturation of physical space to the release of the potential of digital space. Since the Industrial Revolution, spatial expansion has been an important means for imperialism to maintain and enhance its own development. However, with the spread of digitalized production, just as Marx revealed the essence of capital — constantly seeking to eliminate spatial boundaries in order to expand the market — the limitations of physical resources and physical space have become increasingly apparent. International finance-monopoly capital has thus turned to virtual digital space, constructing a framework for global digital labor and digital markets. Currently, the expansion of digital space is extending from land to the oceans and beyond Earth. The “Ocean of Things” project promoted by the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the “Artemis Accords” launched by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration both indicate that the future competition for dominance over digital space will become increasingly intense. On the other hand, virtual economy and financial activities form a value-production mechanism for digital space. Financial activities have become inseparable from the virtual economy (including part of the digital economy). In the field of internet finance, financial capital merges with capital invested in the digital economy, forming a “dual virtualization of the economy.” This is essentially what Michael Hudson refers to as the “purely mathematical” growth characteristic of the M-M′ financial scenario, achieving the accumulation and extraction of compound interest. Along with the expansion of international finance-monopoly capital into digital space, there arise risks of uncertainty in the pricing of the virtual economy and virtual capital, as well as information security and information processing risks stemming from technological defects in cross-border digital finance. All these risks will not only disrupt the stable operation of digital space but also make global digitalized production more unstable, and the consequences will mainly be borne by the working class and developing countries.

随着数字霸权的扩张，国际金融垄断资本将控制的重点由现实的物理领土转向广阔的数字空间，这根源于金融帝国主义国家寻求新积累空间与扩张路径的内在要求。一方面，从物理空间的饱和到数字空间的潜力释放。自工业革命以来，空间扩张是帝国主义维持和增强自身发展的重要途径。但随着数字化生产的推广，如同马克思所揭示的资本本质——不断寻求消除空间界限以扩大市场，实体资源和物理空间的局限性日益明显，国际金融垄断资本开始转向虚拟数字空间，搭建全球数字劳动与数字市场框架。当前数字空间的拓展正从陆地向海洋、地外延伸。美国国防部高级研究计划局推进的“海洋物联网”项目与美国国家航空航天局推出的“阿尔忒弥斯协定”都表明，未来围绕数字空间主导权的博弈将更趋白热化。另一方面，虚拟经济与金融活动形成数字空间的价值生产机制。金融活动已与虚拟经济（包括部分数字经济）密不可分。互联网金融领域中，金融资本与投资于数字经济的资本融合，形成“经济的双重虚拟化”。这本质上是迈克尔·赫德森（Michael Hudson）所言的M-M′金融场景中“纯粹数学”的增长特征，实现复利的累积与榨取。伴随国际金融垄断资本向数字空间的扩张，产生虚拟经济和虚拟资本定价的不确定性风险，以及跨境数字金融领域的技术缺陷带来的信息安全和信息处理风险。上述种种风险不仅会破坏数字空间的稳定运行，还将导致全球数字化生产更不稳定，而后果主要由工人阶级和发展中国家承担。

V. Measures to Transcend Financial Imperialism under Digitalized Production

五、数字化生产下超越金融帝国主义的举措

Changes in the mode of production driven by major technological innovation often trigger transformations, whether gradual or rapid, in the global economic structure, political structure, and even the entire superstructure. From the analysis of the changing trends in the accumulation mode of financial imperialism, it is not difficult to see that digitalized production is reshaping the global political and economic structure at an unprecedented speed and depth, and rapidly transmitting risks to various economies through financial market fluctuations and financial crises. For China, it is necessary to both break free from the control exerted by the digital hegemony of financial imperialist countries over China’s industrial and value chains, achieve breakthroughs in key core technological barriers with high-level science and technology, accelerate the development of new quality productive forces, and clarify the operational direction of “digital-finance” serving the integration of the real economy and the digital economy. At the same time, it is also necessary to resist the erosion of China’s digital industrialization and industrial digitalization by the digital capital exports of financial imperialist countries, use the principle of classified guidance to regulate and guide the healthy development of the digital industry, and form a development pattern where “digital-finance” supports the co-progress of the state-owned and private sectors. To go a step further and transcend financial imperialism under digitalized production, it is necessary to build a “digital community with a shared future,” regulate the relationships of competition and cooperation among digital powers, consolidate the foundation of global digital cooperation, transform digitalized production “into a harmonious great whole composed of cooperative free labor,” and, in the process of coordinating particular interests with universal interests, promote the development of a new international political and economic order in the digital age toward a more just and reasonable direction.

重大技术革新驱动的生产方式变革，往往会促使世界范围内的经济结构、政治结构乃至整个上层建筑产生或缓或急的转型。从对金融帝国主义积累模式变化趋势的分析中，不难发现，数字化生产正以前所未有的速度和深度重塑全球政治经济结构，并通过金融市场波动和金融危机将风险迅速传递至各经济体。对于中国来说，既要摆脱金融帝国主义国家数字霸权扩张对我国产业链和价值链的控制，以高水平科技突破关键核心技术壁垒，加快发展新质生产力，明确“数字—金融”服务实数融合的运行方向，又要抵御金融帝国主义国家数字资本输出对我国数字产业化和产业数字化的侵蚀，以分类指导原则规范和引导数字产业健康发展，形成“数字—金融”支持国民共进的发展格局。更进一步在数字化生产下超越金融帝国主义，需要构建“数字命运共同体”，调节数字大国竞合关系，巩固全球数字合作的基础，把数字化生产“变为一个由合作的自由劳动构成的和谐的大整体”，并在协调特殊利益与普遍利益的过程中，推动数字时代的国际政治经济新秩序朝着更加公正合理的方向发展。

(1) Breaking Free from the Digital Hegemony Expansion of Western Countries: Clarifying the Operational Direction of “Digital-Finance” Serving the Integration of the Real Economy and the Digital Economy

（一）摆脱西方国家的数字霸权扩张：明确“数字—金融”服务实数融合的运行方向

The fundamental reason why financial imperialist countries, represented by the United States, can make resources such as data, computing power, and algorithms the core variables for maintaining digital hegemony, and consolidate their advantage by strictly restricting the international trade and circulation of related software and hardware, lies in their global leading position in cutting-edge digital technology. This reality determines that to break the digital hegemony of Western countries, it must proceed in tandem with breaking technological monopolies in the digital sphere. On the one hand, anchor the development direction of new quality productive forces to consolidate the foundation of technological self-reliance and self-controllability. Only by “winning the battle against key core technologies and cultivating new drivers for the development of new quality productive forces” can the autonomy of the economic system be enhanced and the impact of financial imperialist crises on China’s economy be reduced. Among various industries, the mobile communications industry is highly innovative and has strong driving effects. China has achieved a phased leap in leading 5G and is advancing research on key 6G technologies. Frontier innovations such as “ubiquitous intelligence” are worth anticipating. The 6G research and development opportunity should be seized to achieve a “bend overtaking” [16]16 “Bend overtaking” (弯道超车) is a Chinese idiom used in policy discourse to mean seizing an opportunity to surpass competitors during a phase of technological transition or catch-up., driving digital technology to leap from “coexistence of running, following, and leading” [17]17 “Running, following, and leading” (三跑) refers to the three typical stages of technological development: running behind (跟踪), running alongside (并跑), and leading (领跑). It is commonly used in Chinese policy documents to describe the country’s position in international technology competition. to “leading across the board,” thereby shaping a more resilient national economic structure. On the other hand, promote the deep coupling of technological innovation with financial resources to optimize the allocation of strategic resources. In response to the potential threats posed by the technological and market advantages of financial imperialism, it is necessary to precisely identify the strategic integration points of technological innovation and financial resources, providing financial support for the “deep integration of the real economy and the digital economy.” As of February 2025, taking Hangzhou as an example, the total approved scale of the city’s two major funds for science, innovation, and entrepreneurship exceeded 1.85 trillion yuan, mobilizing approximately 1.35 trillion yuan in social capital, effectively serving the growth of local digital enterprises. However, overall, the national capital market still exhibits a significant characteristic of being “large but not strong.” Therefore, it is necessary to enhance the responsiveness of the capital market to technological innovation, build a multi-level financial ecosystem that serves the real economy — such as simplifying the listing process for technology-based enterprises, broadening bond issuance channels, optimizing the environment for mergers and acquisitions and restructuring, and promoting the deep participation of venture capital funds in the technological innovation industrial chain. At the same time, efforts should be made to strengthen the construction of risk management and compensation mechanisms for fintech products, promote the synergistic effect of financial capital chains, technological innovation chains, achievement transformation chains, and market chains, and assist China’s real economy in forming comparative advantages in global competition.

以美国为代表的金融帝国主义国家之所以能够将数据、算力、算法资源等作为维系数字霸权的核心变量，并通过严格限制相关软硬件的国际贸易流通巩固优势，根本在于其前沿数字技术的全球领先地位。这一现实决定了要破解西方国家数字霸权，必须与打破数字技术垄断同步推进。一方面，锚定新质生产力发展方向，夯实技术自主可控根基。唯有“打好关键核心技术攻坚战，培育发展新质生产力的新动能”，才能增强经济体系自主性，降低金融帝国主义危机对我国经济的冲击。在各类产业中，移动通信产业创新活跃、带动性强，我国已实现5G引领的阶段性跨越，正在推进6G关键技术研究，“泛在智能”等前沿创新值得期待。应以6G研发为契机实现“弯道超车”，推动数字技术从“三跑共存”向“全面领跑”跃升，塑造更具韧性的国民经济结构。另一方面，推动科技创新与金融资源深度耦合，优化战略资源配置。针对金融帝国主义的技术与市场优势带来的潜在威胁，需精准定位科技创新与金融资源的战略结合点，为“实体经济和数字经济深度融合”提供金融支持。截至2025年2月，以杭州为例，该市科创与创新两大基金批复总规模超1850亿元，撬动社会资本约1350亿元，有效服务当地数字企业成长。但整体上，全国资本市场“大而不强”特征仍显著。因此，需要提升资本市场对科技创新的响应效能，构建多层次、服务实体经济的金融生态系统，如简化科技型企业上市流程、拓宽债券发行渠道、优化并购重组环境，推动创业投资基金深度参与科技创新产业链。同时，着力加强金融科技产品的风险管理与补偿机制建设，推动金融资本链、科技创新链、成果转化链与市场链形成协同效应，助力我国实体经济在全球竞争中形成比较优势。

(2) Resisting the Digital Capital Exports of Western Countries: Forming a Development Pattern Where “Digital-Finance” Supports the Co-Progress of the State-Owned and Private Sectors

（二）抵御西方国家的数字资本输出：形成“数字—金融”支持国民共进的发展格局

Financial imperialist countries, with the help of transnational digital monopoly enterprises, plunder the surplus value of global digital labor and small and medium-sized enterprises. State power becomes the political backing for digital capital exports, turning digital economy competition into a power game between nations. To resist digital capital exports, it is necessary to adhere to the basic socialist economic system and the “Two Unwaverings” [18]18 The “Two Unwaverings” (两个毫不动摇) refers to the Chinese Communist Party policy of unwaveringly consolidating and developing the public sector of the economy, and unwaveringly encouraging, supporting, and guiding the development of the non-public sector., “promoting the healthy development and common development of all types of capital, and leveraging their role in developing productive forces, creating social wealth, and enhancing the well-being of the people.” On the one hand, prudently handle the relaxation of foreign shareholding limits in the financial sector, and resolutely prevent international finance-monopoly capital from taking the opportunity to erode China’s digital industry. Encourage the development of policy-based financial institutions led by state-owned capital, using their policy orientation and market influence to channel social capital towards high-tech, high-efficiency, high-quality new quality productive forces. To this end, it is also necessary to deepen the reform of performance evaluation and fault-tolerant mechanisms for state-owned assets, break away from performance evaluations based on a short-term financial perspective, incorporate long-term demonstration effects such as technological innovation and industrial upgrading, implement differentiated evaluations for exploratory investments in new fields, and ensure that fault-tolerant mechanisms strictly adhere to decision-making procedural norms and clearly define applicable scenarios. This will provide a safety net for state-owned capital acting as “patient capital” and foster an investment ecology that encourages innovation. On the other hand, follow the principle of classified guidance to promote the standardized, healthy, and sustained development of China’s digital industry. First, from the dimension of ownership, eradicate the private ownership foundation of digital industry monopolies, ensuring that the control over data resources is firmly in the hands of the state and the people. Based on the public ownership of digitalized production means and by virtue of a higher level of productive forces, promote the direct integration of laborers with digital production means, return to the essence of digital technology as a liberator of labor, and enable the masses to genuinely share in the fruits of building a digital China. Second, at the level of function orientation, attempt to construct a national big data integrated management platform led by “digital central state-owned enterprises.” Create a “trinity” data collaborative management system for the government, enterprises, and users, dedicated to the overall coordination, allocation management, and classified supervision of big data. This will both ensure the sustainable development of public-interest digital industries and ensure that for-profit digital industries align with the national development strategy.

金融帝国主义国家借助跨国数字垄断企业，掠夺全球数字劳动及中小企业的剩余价值，国家权力成为数字资本输出的政治后盾，使数字经济竞争演变为国家间的力量博弈。抵御数字资本输出，需要坚持社会主义基本经济制度和“两个毫不动摇”，“促进各类资本良性发展、共同发展，发挥其发展生产力、创造社会财富、增进人民福祉的作用”。一方面，审慎对待放宽金融业外资持股限制，坚决防止国际金融垄断资本借机侵蚀我国数字产业。鼓励发展国有资本主导的政策性金融机构，以其政策导向性和市场影响力，促进社会资本向高技术、高效能、高质量的新质生产力领域集中。为此，也要深化国有资产绩效评价与容错机制改革，突破短期财务视角的绩效评价，纳入科技创新、产业升级等长期示范效应，对新领域探索性投资实施差异化评价，容错机制要严守决策程序规范，明确适用场景，为国有资本充当“耐心资本”兜底，营造鼓励创新的投资生态。另一方面，遵循分类指导原则推动我国数字产业规范健康持续发展。一是从所有制维度，破除数字产业垄断的私有制根基，确保数据资源控制权由国家与人民牢牢掌握。基于数字化生产资料公有制，凭借更高生产力水平，推动劳动者与数字生产资料直接结合，回归数字技术解放劳动的本质，让人民群众切实共享数字中国建设成果。二是从功能定位层面，尝试以“数字央企”为主导构建国家大数据综合管理平台。打造政府、企业、用户“三位一体”的数据协同管理体系，专司大数据的统筹协调、配置管理与分类监管等职能，既保障公益性数字产业可持续发展，又促使营利性数字产业与国家发展战略相契合。

(3) The Chinese Solution to Cracking Financial Imperialism: Accelerating the Construction of a Digital Community with a Shared Future and Promoting a New Type of Economic Globalization

（三）破解金融帝国主义的中国方案：加快构建数字命运共同体，推进新型经济全球化

As financial imperialism under digital production increasingly approaches the tipping point of "implosion," history is accelerating its "transition to a higher system." Amid this major transformation period, China, as a responsible digital power, can contribute Chinese wisdom and strength to building a digital community with a shared future and promoting a new type of economic globalization through practical measures such as providing global digital public goods and improving international financial governance structures. On the one hand, by promoting the synergy of "hard connectivity" and "soft connectivity," we can bridge the global digital divide. Through multidimensional cooperation to effectively enhance the technological capabilities of developing countries, China can deepen joint research on cutting-edge digital technologies and innovate models for transferring digital technologies. At the same time, by implementing the Global Development Initiative [19]19 The Global Development Initiative is a major concept proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2021, advocating a focus on development as a priority and promoting international cooperation to achieve the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. in the context of South-South Cooperation, systematically promoting digital public goods, and developing multilateral e-commerce cooperation mechanisms, China can join the Global South in breaking through the original imbalances in digital trade. Furthermore, from the perspective of the geographical distribution of digital resources, the East Asian region, with its dense population and electronic device users, is an important base for hardware design, production, and original equipment manufacturing. Faced with U.S. "long-arm jurisdiction" [20]20 Long-arm jurisdiction refers to the extraterritorial application of U.S. domestic laws, particularly sanctions and export controls, to assert legal authority over entities and individuals in foreign countries. and technological blockade, China needs to overcome non-structural issues in East Asian cooperation with strategic resolve, promote the building of a community with a shared future in the neighborhood, maintain regional prosperity and stability, and advance digital industrial upgrading through regional cooperation. On the other hand, we should strengthen international macroeconomic policy coordination and promote the improvement of international financial governance structures. We should actively participate in formulating a new quota formula for the International Monetary Fund, emphasizing indicators such as trade contribution and the level of digital economy development, so that quota distribution can better reflect and balance the digital interest demands of all parties. At the same time, we should promote international financial institutions to increase attention and investment in the digital finance field, and by jointly building the "Digital Silk Road" [21]21 The Digital Silk Road is a component of China's Belt and Road Initiative that focuses on digital connectivity, including cross-border e-commerce, digital infrastructure, and technology cooperation., help digitally marginalized countries improve their digital financial regulatory capabilities. This will achieve effective "grid connection and linkage" between global and bilateral, original and newly created financial networks, jointly safeguard the stability and security of the international financial system under digital production, and allow the digital dividends of the new type of economic globalization to be shared by the people of the world.

随着数字化生产下金融帝国主义日益接近“内爆”的临界点，历史正加速推动其向“更高级的制度的过渡”。处于当前的重大转型期，中国作为负责任数字大国，能够通过提供全球数字公共产品、完善国际金融治理结构等务实举措，为构建数字命运共同体，推进新型经济全球化贡献中国智慧和中国力量。一方面，以“硬联通”与“软联通”协同推进，弥合全球数字鸿沟。通过多维度合作切实推动发展中国家科技能力提升，中国可以深化前沿数字技术联合研究，以及创新数字技术转让模式，同时，在“南南合作”中践行全球发展倡议，系统性地推广数字公共产品，并通过发展多边电子商务合作机制，联同全球南方突破原有的数字贸易不平衡状态。此外，从数字资源地缘分布来看，东亚地区人口与电子设备用户密集，是重要的硬件设计、生产和代工基地。面对美国“长臂管辖”与技术封锁，中国需以战略定力克服东亚合作中的非结构性问题，推动周边命运共同体建设，维护区域繁荣稳定，在区域合作中推进数字产业升级。另一方面，加强国际宏观经济政策协调，推动国际金融治理结构完善。主动参与制定国际货币基金组织新的份额公式，强调按贸易贡献度以及数字经济发展水平等指标，使份额分配更能反映和平衡各方的数字利益诉求。同时，推动国际金融机构加强对数字金融领域的关注与投入，借助共建“数字丝绸之路”，帮助数字边缘国家提升数字金融监管能力，以实现全球与双边、原有与新创金融网络的有效“并网联动”，共同维护数字化生产下国际金融体系的稳定与安全，让新型经济全球化的数字红利为世界人民共享。