Mao Zedong and the Narrative Construction of the Long March Revolutionary Epic — From the Perspective of Conceptual History

Viewed from the historical process of the CPC’s century-long struggle, Mao Zedong, as the core of the Party’s first generation of central collective leadership, continuously reflected on and summarized the history of the strategic transfer of the nation’s main Red Army forces, putting forward a series of original ideas that became an organic component of Mao Zedong Thought. This year marks the 90th anniversary of the victory of the Long March. Deeply excavating and studying the application and interpretation of the concept of the “Long March” in Mao Zedong Thought holds significant practical importance for promoting the great spirit of the Long March and inspiring the entire Party, the entire military, and the people of all ethnic groups across the country to steadfastly advance on the Long March of realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

从中国共产党百年奋斗的历史进程看，作为党的第一代中央领导集体的核心，毛泽东不断反思和总结全国主力红军战略转移的历史，提出了一系列原创性思想，成为毛泽东思想的有机组成部分。今年是长征胜利90周年，深入发掘、研究毛泽东思想中有关“长征”概念的运用与阐释，对于弘扬伟大长征精神，激励全党全军全国各族人民走好实现中华民族伟大复兴的长征路具有重要的现实意义。

From the perspective of academic history, with the deepening of research on the Long March issue in the New Era, scholars have published many outstanding research results based on classical texts, focusing on the Red Army’s Long March and its contemporary value. However, the increase in the number of homogenized results from traditional text research methods has objectively reduced the research space in this field. Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, Xi Jinping has provided scientific interpretations of the new Long March in the New Era on multiple occasions. How to conduct in-depth research on the historical origins of the new Long March inevitably traces back to the revelation of the meaning of the “Long March” concept by Chinese Communists represented by Comrade Mao Zedong. Based on this, academic research on the Red Army’s Long March urgently needs to transcend the traditional paradigm of “discussing texts based on texts” and conduct historical investigation from the perspective of conceptual history. The perspective of conceptual history regards the discursive expression of specific concepts in specific historical time-spaces and specific historical contexts as the outlet of thought, drawing on the discourse analysis methods of linguistics to explore propositions in the history of thought. It focuses both on the historical trajectory of the concept’s own evolution and on in-depth research into the changes in political and social structures during specific historical stages.

从学术史看，伴随着新时代对长征问题研究的深入，学者们从经典文本出发，针对红军长征及其当代价值发表了许多优秀研究成果。然而，传统文本研究方法同质化成果数量的增加，客观上缩减了该领域的研究空间。党的十八大以来，习近平在多个场合为新时代新长征作出科学诠释，如何对新长征的历史溯源进行深入研究，必然追溯至以毛泽东同志为代表的中国共产党人对于“长征”概念的意涵揭示。基于此，学界关于红军长征的研究亟须超越“就文本论文本”的传统范式，从概念史视角予以历史考察。概念史视角把特定概念在特定历史时空和特定历史语境下的话语表述视为思想的出口，借鉴语言学的话语分析方法探讨思想史命题，既聚焦概念自身演变的历史轨迹，也深入研究特定历史阶段中政治与社会结构的变迁。

The few existing research results that explore the basic connotations of the Red Army’s Long March from the perspective of conceptual history all discuss Mao Zedong’s significant contributions and possess the characteristics of academic innovation. However, the academic community rarely has monographs discussing Mao Zedong’s application and interpretation of the “Long March” concept, and existing research also has obvious limitations in the discussion of the “Long March” concept: first, it is confined to the concrete expression of the “Long March” concept; the academic community often equates early terminological textual research with the entire connotation of the study of the “Long March” concept, lacking abstract thinking about it as a historical category; second, theoretical construction is weak, failing to deeply reveal the internal logic by which this revolutionary discourse was elevated from specific historical facts to a political symbol. This research status has led the academic community’s understanding of the Long March concept to remain at the level of describing phenomena, failing to grasp the generative logic and dissemination laws of its formation as an important political and cultural symbol of modern China. Looking back through history, based on different historical positions of national rejuvenation, Mao Zedong, in different revolutionary contexts, combined China’s specific realities and the requirements of social development, elevating “Long March,” a purely descriptive verb, into the ideological discourse of the CPC, representing the Party’s grasp of and stance on the future and destiny of the Chinese nation during specific historical periods.

现有从概念史视角探讨红军长征基本内涵的少量研究成果，均论及毛泽东所作的重大贡献，具有学术创新特质。但学界鲜有探讨毛泽东运用与阐释“长征”概念的专论，现有研究在“长征”概念的探讨上也存在明显的局限性：其一，局限于“长征”概念的具象表述，学界往往将早期术语考证等同于“长征”概念研究的全部内涵，缺乏对其作为历史范畴的抽象思考；其二，理论建构薄弱，未能深入揭示这一革命话语从具体史实升华为政治符号的内在逻辑。这种研究现状导致学界对长征概念的理解停留在现象描述层面，未能把握其作为现代中国重要政治文化符号的生成逻辑与传播规律。纵观历史，毛泽东基于民族复兴的不同历史方位，在不同的革命语境中结合中国具体实际和社会发展要求，将“长征”这一单纯的描述性动词升华为中国共产党意识形态话语，代表了特定历史时期中国共产党对中华民族前途命运的把握和立场。

I. Tracing the Origins: The Concept of “Long March” in a General Sense

一、追本溯源：一般意义上的“长征”概念

Definition is the logical method for clarifying the connotation of a concept. In the Chinese language system, “Long March” (长征) possesses both the attributes of a verb and a proper noun. Consulting the *Cihai* dictionary, the main definitions of the term “Long March” are: “① a long expedition… ③ the strategic transfer of the main Red Army forces from the north and south of the Yangtze River to the Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Area during the Agrarian Revolutionary War.” The first meaning is the original meaning; the third meaning is a noun abstracted from the first meaning, with the CPC as the narrative subject, belonging to the historical concept of the Long March. The international understanding of the “Long March” mainly refers to the definition in the *Concise Encyclopaedia Britannica*: “Long March (1934–1936), a major strategic transfer of the main forces of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army led by the Chinese Communist Party.” It can be seen that these domestic and international definitions of the Red Army’s Long March all identify “strategic transfer” as the basic connotation of the Long March concept, and these interpretations indeed conform to the original meaning of “long expedition.”

定义是明确概念内涵的逻辑方法。在汉语言体系中，“长征”兼具动词和专有名词的属性。查阅《辞海》，“长征”一词主要释义是：“①长途出征……③土地革命战争时期红军主力从长江南北各向陕甘苏区进行的战略转移”。第一个义项是本义，第三个义项是由第一个义项抽象出来的、以中国共产党为叙事主体的名词，属于长征历史性概念。国际上对“长征”的理解，主要参考《不列颠简明百科全书》的定义：“长征（1934年至1936年期间），中国共产党领导的工农红军主力重大的战略转移。”可见，国内国际这些关于红军长征的定义，都将“战略转移”确定为长征概念的基本内涵，这些解释确实符合“长途出征”的本义。

The term “Long March” underwent a historical process from its appearance within the Party to becoming widely known. In October 1934, the Central Red Army was forced to begin a strategic transfer due to the failure of the Fifth Counter-Encirclement and Suppression Campaign.[n] Influenced by the revolutionary situation at the time, this strategic transfer initially had no fixed name and was referred to as “breakout” (突围), “westward advance” (西进), etc. In early October 1934, the Central Committee of the CPC pointed out in an instruction to the Central Sub-Bureau that the “breakout of the main Red Army forces” was an important way to overcome the enemy’s fortification strategy and achieve revolutionary victory. According to the recollections of telegraph operator Huang Liangcheng, the Eighth Army Corps of the First Front Army, to which he belonged, “everyone was determined to ‘live and die with the Soviet Area, fight to defend the Soviet Area, fight to defend our homeland!’ ready to counterattack at any time,” until “the deputy director of the Political Department conveyed the Military Commission’s order to shift positions, emphasizing that the westward shift was to move the main forces to a direction more favorable for striking the enemy, for mobile warfare, and ultimately to defend the Soviet Area and smash the enemy’s ‘encirclement and suppression’.” Thus, the initial goal of the Central Red Army’s strategic transfer was to smash the Kuomintang army’s Fifth Counter-Encirclement and Suppression Campaign, preserve existing revolutionary forces, advance westward deep into enemy territory, and lead the establishment of new Soviet base areas. Early Central Red Army Long March documents more frequently used “westward advance” to refer to our route of advance, such as Zhu De’s order on October 23, 1934, for the field army to continue advancing westward after crossing the Xinfeng River.

“长征”一词从在党内出现再到广为人知，经历了一个历史过程。1934年10月，中央红军因为第五次反“围剿”失败而被迫开始了战略转移。受当时革命形势的影响，此次战略转移起初并没有固定的名称，而是被称为“突围”“西进”等。1934年10月上旬，中国共产党中央委员会在给中央分局的训令中指出“主力红军突围”是克服敌人堡垒主义以取得革命胜利的重要方式。据电报员黄良诚回忆，其所在的第一方面军第八军团，“每一个人都抱着‘与苏区共存亡，为保卫苏区而战，为保卫家乡而战！’随时准备反攻的决心”，直到“政治部副主任传达了军委的转移阵地的命令，强调向西部转移是为了使主力转移到更有利于打击敌人的方面去，是为了机动作战，为了最后保卫苏区，粉碎敌人的‘围剿’”。由此可见，中央红军战略转移的最初目标是粉碎国民党军队的第五次“围剿”，保存现有革命力量，向西深入敌人内部并领导建立新的苏区根据地。早期中央红军长征的文件较多使用“西进”来指代我方前进路线，如1934年10月23日朱德要求野战军渡过信丰河后继续西进。

It was not until the troops successively broke through four blockade lines and gradually formed a strategic posture centered on northern Guizhou, radiating to the borders of Yunnan and Sichuan, that the term “Long March” began to appear within the Party. According to existing revolutionary documents, the earliest formal textual record of the term “Long March” can be traced back to revolutionary practice activities in Guizhou Province in the spring of 1935. In February 1935, the General Political Department of the Red Army issued the *Appeal to the Toiling Masses of Workers and Peasants* in Houtan Village, Liangcun Town, Xishui County, which opened with the statement, “Our Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, transferring from Jiangxi to the combat zone, has long-marched to the Sichuan-Guizhou border region.” In May of the same year, the Central Red Army successfully crossed the Jinsha River and entered the northern part of the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan. To propagate the Red Army’s ethnic policies and revolutionary principles to the Yi compatriots, the *Proclamation of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army* issued in the name of the Red Army Commander-in-Chief again mentioned the term “Long March,” the original text reading, “The Red Army’s ten-thousand-li Long March, its momentum sweeping all before it like a splitting bamboo.” At that time, the troops were busy with mobile warfare and marching, coupled with the urgency of the external revolutionary situation; this proclamation did not attract much attention within the Party. At this point, “Long March” could not yet be understood as a historical concept: in terms of connotation, it referred only to the long-distance expedition of the Central Red Army, not including the military transfer actions of the later Second and Fourth Front Red Armies; in terms of part of speech, it remained a descriptive verb, no different from the previous references by the CPC Central Committee and within the Red Army to this military action as “breakout” or “westward advance.” Even after the First and Fourth Front Red Armies joined forces, the *Red Star* newspaper published by the General Political Department of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army still referred to the long-distance march and combat of the First Front Red Army as “westward movement” (西移).

直到部队先后突破四道封锁线，逐步形成以黔北为核心、辐射川滇边境的战略态势后，“长征”一词才开始在党内出现。据现存革命文献考证，有关“长征”一词的正式文本记载最早可追溯至1935年春贵州境内的革命实践活动。1935年2月，红军总政治部在习水县良村镇吼滩村发布《告工农劳苦群众书》，开篇就提到“我工农红军从江西转移作战地区，长征到川贵边地域”。同年5月，中央红军胜利渡过金沙江，进入四川凉山彝族自治州北部。为了向彝族同胞宣传红军的民族政策和革命道理，以红军总司令名义发布的《中国工农红军布告》中再次提及“长征”一词，原文为“红军万里长征，所向势如破竹”。当时部队忙于转战行军，加之外在革命形势的紧迫，这则布告并没有在党内引起多少关注。此时的“长征”也不能作为历史概念来理解：它在内涵上仅指中央红军的长途远征，并没有包括后来红二、红四等方面军的军事转移行动；在词性上仍为描述性的动词，与之前中共中央和红军内部将此次军事行动称为“突围”“西进”等，并无二致。即便红一、红四方面军会师后，中国工农红军总政治部出版的《红星》报仍将红一方面军的长途行军与作战称为“西移”。

As a key element in the historical narrative of the Chinese revolution, the “Long March” is a historical concept that took shape only after several twists and turns. This concept was, in fact, a symbolic carrier gradually abstracted by the Party’s first generation of central collective leadership, with Comrade Mao Zedong at its core, based on repeated reflection on and refinement of the historical significance of the great military action of the strategic transfer of the nation’s main Red Army forces. From concrete practice to abstract elevation, the construction of the “Long March” concept was gradually established only as the Long March drew to a close. In a report drafted by Xu Xiangqian on the enemy situation in northwestern Sichuan and the situation of the Fourth Front Red Army, the basic connotation of the “Long March” concept was preliminarily mentioned, the original text reading, “The Western Expeditionary Army’s ten-thousand-li Long March, repeatedly capturing famous cities and repeatedly smashing powerful enemies.” Thereafter, the term “Long March” gradually appeared in central documents. Although the three main forces had not yet successfully joined forces at this time, the revolutionary base camp was basically established in the northwest. This meant that the military pressure of the main Red Army forces’ strategic transfer was temporarily alleviated, allowing people to look back and analyze those historical processes that were nearing completion, and to condense and elevate individual perceptual knowledge of past historical activities into rational cognition; only under such an opportunity could the term “Long March” possibly expand from a purely descriptive verb into a proper noun defining the strategic transfer of the nation’s main Red Army forces.

作为中国革命历史叙事的关键要素，“长征”是几经波折后才成型的历史概念。这一概念实则是以毛泽东同志为核心的党的第一代中央领导集体基于对全国主力红军战略转移这一伟大军事行动历史意义的反复思考与提炼，而逐渐抽象出的符号载体。从具象实践到抽象升华，“长征”概念的构建，直至长征接近尾声时，才逐步确立。徐向前起草的关于川西北敌情及红四方面军情况的报告中，初步提及“长征”概念的基本内涵，原文为“西征军万里长征，屡克名城，迭摧强敌”。此后，“长征”一词逐渐在中央文件中出现。尽管这时三大主力部队还没有胜利会师，但革命大本营基本奠基西北。这意味着主力红军战略转移的军事压力得到阶段性缓解，人们得以回溯并剖析那些趋于完结的历史过程，并将个体对过往历史活动的感性认识凝结升华为理性认知；也只有在这样的契机下，“长征”一词才有可能从单纯的描述性动词，逐渐扩充为诠定全国主力红军战略转移的专有名词。

II. Using Words to Refer to Deeds: Mao Zedong and the Formation of the “Long March” Concept During the Long March

二、以言指事：长征途中毛泽东与“长征”概念的形成

Mao Zedong first used the term “Long March” at the Hadapu meeting. In September 1935, the Party Central Committee led the main force of the First Front Army into Hadapu in southern Gansu. During the rest period, it convened a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and a meeting of cadres at and above the regimental level, making the major decision to set the final destination of this strategic shift in northern Shaanxi. According to the recollections of veteran Red Army soldier Xiao Feng, Mao Zedong at the Hadapu meeting, in a sonorous voice, called on the troops that had “marched over twenty thousand li in the Long March” to overcome all difficulties ahead and continue advancing toward the anti-Japanese base area in northern Shaanxi. On October 19, 1935, in a conversation with Xiao Feng, Mao Zedong introduced the basic situation of the Long March, saying “we marched for twelve months and five days,” and pointing to a map, explained that “the longest distance covered was over twenty-five thousand li.” At the end of the conversation, he affirmed the strategic significance of the Long March in the history of the Chinese revolution: “The Long March was bitter, but its effect was great. It proclaimed to the whole world that the Red Army were heroes and good men, and that the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries were useless.” This explanation by Mao Zedong was of great significance in the construction of the concept of “Long March.” He not only linked “Long March” with specific units of time and distance such as “twelve months and five days” and “twenty-five thousand li,” but also, taking the Communist Party of China as the narrative subject, used “Long March” as a conceptual noun, endowing “Long March” with an initial political connotation. In the period that followed, Mao Zedong mainly discussed the Long March through poetry and song; his representative works include “The Long March” (a seven-character regulated verse), “Kunlun” (to the tune of Niannujiao), “Mount Liupan” (to the tune of Qingpingyue), and “To Peng Dehuai.” These poems were not only an important part of the narrative discourse system of the Long March, but also, by displaying the revolutionary optimism of the Red Army soldiers along the march, gradually shifted the semantic connotation of the concept of “Long March” from a military operation to a cultural symbol. On November 5, 1935, Mao Zedong, leading the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment of the Central Red Army, arrived at Xiangzibiwan and delivered a speech to the accompanying troops, pointing out that up to that point, “this was a truly unprecedented Long March.” He encouraged the comrades who had been tempered and tested through the Long March to unite with the local people and together fulfill the great mission of the Chinese revolution, opening up a new phase in the Chinese revolution.

毛泽东最早是在哈达铺会议上使用了“长征”一词。1935年9月，中共中央率领红一方面军主力进入甘肃南部哈达铺，于休整期间召开了中央政治局会议和团以上干部会议，作出了把此次战略转移落脚点放在陕北的重大决策。据红军老战士萧锋回忆，毛泽东在哈达铺会议上用洪亮的声音号召“经过两万多里长征”的军队要战胜接下去面临的一切困难，朝着抗日阵地陕北继续前进。1935年10月19日，毛泽东在与萧锋的谈话中介绍了长征的基本情况，“我们长征十二个月零五天”，指着地图解释“最多的走了二万五千多里”，并在谈话的最后肯定了长征在中国革命史上的战略意义，即“长征苦是苦，可作用大，向全世界宣传红军是英雄好汉，蒋介石反动派是没有用的”。毛泽东的这一阐释在“长征”概念的建构中具有重要意义。他不仅将“长征”与“十二个月零五天”“两万五千里”这些具体的时间、距离单位相联系，而且以中国共产党为叙事主体，把“长征”作为概念性名词来使用，赋予了“长征”初步的政治意涵。此后一段时间里，毛泽东主要以诗词歌赋来论述长征，其代表作有《七律·长征》《念奴娇·昆仑》《清平乐·六盘山》《赠彭德怀》等。这些诗词不仅是长征叙事话语体系的重要组成部分，更通过展现长征途中红军战士的革命乐观主义精神面貌，推动“长征”概念的语义内涵从军事行动逐步转向文化符号。1935年11月5日，毛泽东领导中央红军陕甘支队到达象鼻子湾，向随行部队发表讲话，指出至今为止，“这是从来未有过的真正的长征”。他鼓励经过长征千锤百炼后留下来的同志要和当地人民团结一致，共同完成中国革命的伟大使命，开创中国革命新局面。

However, it must be noted that although the concept of “Long March” had taken initial shape in Mao Zedong’s manuscripts and internal speeches, at this time the use of this expression was still confined to internal exchanges among a very small number of people and high-level leaders, and had not yet produced a broad effect of social dissemination. The scope of dissemination of this expression was limited by specific historical conditions: on the one hand, the relevant discussions were mostly preserved in unpublished confidential Party documents or minutes of high-level cadre meetings; on the other hand, at the level of the various Red Army units and the masses in the base areas, more colloquial expressions such as “strategic shift” and “Western Expedition” were still in use. As a practical vehicle for the ideological discourse of the Communist Party of China, the fact that “Long March” could extend from the cognitive sphere within the Party to the social sphere outside the Party was rooted essentially in the profound transformation of the strategic configuration of the Chinese revolution. As Japanese imperialist powers intensified their aggression against China, the Communist Party of China, proceeding from the situation of national salvation and survival, grasped the change in the principal contradiction within the country, and readjusted its political line and revolutionary strategy. Thus, “Long March” was endowed with a new connotation pointing toward revolutionary practice.

然而，需注意的是，尽管“长征”概念在毛泽东的手稿记录及内部讲话中已具雏形，但此时该表述的使用场景仍局限于极少数人与高层领导之间的内部交流，尚未形成广泛的社会传播效应。这种表述的传播范围受限于特定历史条件：一方面，相关论述多存于未公开的党内密件或高级干部会议纪要中；另一方面，在红军各部队及根据地群众层面，仍沿用“战略转移”“西征”等更具通俗性的表述。作为中国共产党意识形态话语的实践载体，“长征”之所以能从党内认知范畴延伸至党外社会场域，本质上根植于中国革命战略格局的深刻嬗变。随着日本帝国主义列强加紧对中国的侵略，中国共产党从救亡图存的局势出发，把握国内主要矛盾的变化，重新调整政治路线与革命策略，“长征”由此被赋予了新的革命实践指向意涵。

In December 1935, at the meeting of Party activists in Wayaobao, Mao Zedong delivered the report “On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism,” in which he comprehensively reflected on and summed up the history of the strategic shift of the main Red Army forces. First, before all the comrades present, he described the Long March as “the great positional shift of China’s three main Red Army forces” over the previous year and a half, and pointed out that this shift had turned the old areas into guerrilla zones and expanded the influence of Soviet Bolshevism throughout China. Second, he correctly evaluated the Long March from the perspective of Marxist dialectical materialism, holding that “in one respect (the respect of maintaining the original positions) the Red Army was defeated, but in another respect (the respect of completing the Long March plan) it was victorious,” thereby refuting the erroneous views within and outside the Party that distorted this strategic action. Third, he affirmed the significance of the Long March through three vivid metaphors — “a declaration,” “a propaganda team,” and “a seeding machine” — stating that “the Long March is the first of its kind in the historical record, the Long March is a declaration, the Long March is a propaganda team, the Long March is a seeding machine.” He emphasized that the Long March not only proclaimed to the world the failure of the encirclement, pursuit, obstruction, and interception by the imperialists and the Kuomintang reactionaries, but also propagated to the people the revolutionary path of the Communist Party of China to win national independence and people’s liberation, and along the way sowed the revolutionary seeds of the Chinese nation uniting to resist foreign oppression. Fourth, he demonstrated the important role of the Long March in tempering and preserving a group of revolutionary cadres with firm convictions, concluding that the fundamental reason for victory was the leadership of the Communist Party of China, and also regarded the end of the Long March as the beginning of the establishment of the anti-Japanese national united front.

1935年12月，毛泽东在瓦窑堡党的活动分子会议上作了《论反对日本帝国主义的策略》报告，对主力红军战略转移的历史进行了全面反思和总结。其一，他在全体与会同志面前，将长征表述为这一年半以来“中国的三支主力红军都在作阵地的大转移”，并指出这次转移使得旧区域变为游击区，扩大了苏维埃布尔什维主义在全中国的影响。其二，他从马克思主义唯物辩证法的角度正确评价了长征，认为“红军在一个方面（保持原有阵地的方面）说来是失败了，在另一个方面（完成长征计划的方面）说来是胜利了”，驳斥了党内外曲解这一战略行动的错误观点。其三，他以“宣言书”“宣传队”“播种机”这三个形象的比喻肯定了长征的意义，即“长征是历史纪录上的第一次，长征是宣言书，长征是宣传队，长征是播种机”，强调长征不仅向世界宣告了帝国主义和国民党反动派围追堵截的失败，而且向民众宣传了中国共产党争取民族独立、人民解放的革命道路，还在沿途播下了中华民族团结一致反抗外来压迫的革命火种。其四，他论证了长征在锻炼、保存一批信念坚定的革命骨干中的重要作用，总结胜利的根本原因是中国共产党的领导，还将长征的结束视为建立抗日民族统一战线的开始。

In June 1936, the American journalist Edgar Snow arrived in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region for interviews, initiating the process of international dissemination of the narrative discourse system of the Long March. During the four-month interview period, Mao Zedong not only explained to Snow the political propositions of the Chinese Soviet regime, but also discussed the reasons for this strategic shift of the Red Army, reconstructing it as a revolutionary military operation advancing toward the anti-Japanese front line. In August of the same year, Mao Zedong and Yang Shangkun sent a telegram to the various units for the publication of *The Long March Record*, calling on all leading cadres to mobilize and organize division and regiment cadres to write down in multiple fragments the battles, folk customs, and interesting anecdotes they had experienced during the Long March, and to submit them to the General Political Department by September 5. This dialectical unity of military practice and theoretical construction enabled the concept of “Long March” to bear both the historical core of the strategic shift and the symbolic implication of a “revolutionary epic.”

1936年6月，美国记者埃德加·斯诺来到陕甘宁边区采访，开启了长征叙事话语体系的国际传播进程。在为期四个月的访谈中，毛泽东不仅向斯诺阐释中华苏维埃政权的政治主张，更谈及此次红军战略转移的原因，将其重构为向抗日前线进军的革命军事行动。同年8月，毛泽东、杨尚昆为出版《长征记》向各部队发出电报，号召各位首长动员与组织师团干部，将他们在长征中经历的战斗、民风民俗以及奇闻趣事等内容写成多个片段，于9月5日前提交至总政治部。这种军事实践与理论建构的辩证统一，使“长征”概念既承载着战略转移的史实内核，又具有“革命史诗”的象征意蕴。

In February 1937, under the editorship of Ding Ling and others, the manuscript was compiled and completed, with the title *The Red Army’s Long March Record* (also known as *Twenty-Five Thousand Li*) written by Zhu De in his own calligraphy. As the earliest collective oral history of the Red Army soldiers of the Long March, *The Red Army’s Long March Record* broke through the shortcomings of previous grand narratives; its language was plain and unadorned, and between the lines it was filled with the most authentic and direct feelings of individuals, greatly enriching the content of “Long March” as a spiritual symbol. With the widespread dissemination of the story of the Long March, it became increasingly well known to ordinary people. When Mao Zedong’s strategic explanation achieved transnational dissemination through the American journalist Edgar Snow’s *Red Star Over China*, “Long March” finally completed its symbolic transformation from a strategic term of the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army into a spiritual totem of the Chinese revolution, becoming a signature discourse through which the world understood the Chinese revolution. Thus, “Long March” was recorded in history and became a familiar expression today.

1937年2月，在丁玲等人的编辑下，书稿整理完毕，由朱德提笔书写书名《红军长征记》（又称《二万五千里》）。作为最早的长征红军战士集体口述史，《红军长征记》突破了以往宏大叙事的不足，语言朴实无华，字里行间饱含个体最为真实、直接的感受，极大丰富了“长征”作为一种精神符号的内容书写。随着长征故事的广泛传播，长征被越来越多的普通民众熟知。当毛泽东的战略阐释通过美国记者埃德加·斯诺的《西行漫记》实现跨国传播时，“长征”最终完成了从中国工农红军战略术语向中国革命精神图腾的符号转型，成为世界认知中国革命的标志性话语。“长征”由此载入史册，成为当今耳熟能详的话语表达。

III. Using Words to Promote Action: Mao Zedong’s Initial Application of the Concept of “Long March” After Its Conclusion

三、以言促事：长征结束后毛泽东对“长征”概念的初步运用

In the practical process of leading the Party and the people in the New Democratic Revolution, Mao Zedong combined “Long March” with the issues of the anti-Japanese national united front and the Party’s self-revolution, developing important political thought guiding the Chinese revolution. Especially during the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, based on the dynamic background of the evolution of the war situation and the adjustment of relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, Mao Zedong not only continuously deepened the theoretical interpretation of the concept of “Long March,” but also, by linking the spirit of the Long March with the goal of building a new China, elevated it into an important concept expressing the vision of building a new China: “a new Long March.”

在领导党和人民进行新民主主义革命的实践进程中，毛泽东将“长征”同抗日民族统一战线、党的自我革命问题相结合，发展出指导中国革命的重要政治思想。尤其是在全面抗战时期，毛泽东基于抗战形势演变与国共关系调整的动态背景，不仅持续深化对“长征”概念的理论阐释，更通过将长征精神与建设新中国的目标相衔接，使其跃升为表达建设新中国愿景的重要概念“新的长征”。

Shortly after the Long March ended, the Communist Party of China developed revolutionary base areas in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, consolidating and expanding the anti-Japanese national united front by leading guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines, and seeking the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. After the full-scale War of Resistance against Japan shifted from the defensive phase to the stalemate phase, and faced with the anti-communist friction created by the Kuomintang and Japan’s policy of inducing surrender, Mao Zedong delivered a speech titled “Permanent Struggle” at the Yan’an Model Youth Conference in May 1939, transforming the hard-struggle work style tempered by the Long March into a political discourse encouraging youth to unite and struggle. During this period, undercurrents of tension ran beneath Kuomintang-Communist cooperation, with national crisis and class struggle interwoven, while the spiritual mettle displayed by the Red Army in breaking through encirclement and crossing snowy mountains during the Long March provided the spiritual prototype for the mobilizing discourse in “Permanent Struggle”: “We must carry the revolution through to the end, to the very end.” In this speech, Mao emphasized that youth must carry forward the spirit of permanent struggle, a spirit in the same line as the hard-struggle work style of the CPC during the Long March: “In the past, when the Red Army crossed the grasslands during the Long March, they went fifty days without food and ate tree bark. Only the Communist Party could do this; no one else could.” By reconstructing the narrative discourse system of the Long March, Mao not only internally linked the concept of the “Long March” with “the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” but also, through its specific historical context, transformed the Long March from a revolutionary historical event into a particular expectation for youth: that youth should continue to carry forward the hard-struggle work style of the Red Army during the Long March, wage permanent struggle against anti-communist elements such as local tyrants, evil gentry, corrupt officials, and defeat Japanese imperialism.

长征结束不久，中国共产党在陕甘宁边区发展革命根据地，通过领导敌后抗日游击战争来巩固和扩大抗日民族统一战线，谋求中华民族的复兴。在全面抗日战争由防御阶段进入相持阶段后，面对国民党制造的反共摩擦和日本的诱降政策，毛泽东于1939年5月在延安庆贺模范青年大会上发表题为《永久奋斗》的讲话，将长征淬炼的艰苦奋斗作风转化为鼓舞青年团结奋斗的政治话语。这一时期，国共合作暗流涌动，民族危机与阶级矛盾交织，而长征途中红军突破围剿、跨越雪山所展现出的精神气概，为《永久奋斗》中“一定要把革命干成功，干到底”的动员话语提供了精神原型。在这篇讲话中，毛泽东强调青年要发扬永久奋斗的精神，这一精神与长征时期中国共产党艰苦奋斗的作风一脉相承，“从前红军长征过草地的时候，有五十天没有饭吃，吃树皮，这只有共产党能做到，别人是做不到的”。毛泽东通过重构长征叙事话语体系，不仅将“长征”概念与“中华民族之复兴”内在联系起来，而且以其特定的历史语境，将长征从革命历史事件转化为对青年的特定期盼，即青年应继续发扬红军长征的艰苦奋斗作风，跟土豪劣绅、贪官污吏这些反共分子作永久斗争，打倒日本帝国主义。

On December 9, 1939, at a Yan’an conference commemorating the fourth anniversary of the December 9th Movement, Mao Zedong juxtaposed the Long March with the youth national salvation movement as historical fulcrums that, under the Party’s leadership, drove the War of Resistance against Japan toward phased victory, stating: “The Red Army comrades completed this great Long March, and the student comrades in Beiping launched this great national salvation movement. Both are struggles for the liberation of the nation and the liberation of the people, and their direct significance is to advance the War of Resistance against Japan.” In other words, Mao believed that the Long March achieved the strategic shift of “marching north to resist Japan” through the Red Army’s military victory in breaking through encirclement, while the December 9th Movement completed the political breakthrough of “stopping the civil war” through the wave of student awakening; the two complemented each other and together constituted the practice of the anti-Japanese national united front under CPC leadership. From this, it is not difficult to see that, after nearly half a year of observation and practice, Mao’s discursive expression and conceptual use of the “Long March” had already moved beyond the earlier stage of “using words to refer to things.” Combining changes in the objective situation, he expanded the scope of meaning of the “Long March” concept in his discursive statements, and, using youth as a link, constructed the “Long March” discourse into an “action” concept calling on youth to engage in permanent struggle in the new era — that is, both the Red Army’s Long March and the student movement enhanced the overall interests of the Chinese nation, thereby developing into a stage of “using words to promote action” in the discursive expression concerning the “Long March.” This discursive construction internally connected the strategic shift from the Agrarian Revolutionary War to the nationwide War of Resistance, marking the gradual maturation of the CPC’s ideological discourse system with the “Long March” concept as its carrier.

1939年12月9日，毛泽东在延安各界纪念一二·九运动四周年的大会上，将长征与青年救亡运动并置为在党的领导下，推动抗日战争取得阶段性胜利的历史支点，指出：“红军同志完成了这么伟大的长征，学生同志在北平发动了这样伟大的救亡运动，两者都是为解放民族和解放人民而斗争，其直接意义都是推动抗日战争。”换言之，毛泽东认为长征以红军突破围剿的军事胜利实现了“北上抗日”的战略转向，一二·九运动以学生的觉醒浪潮完成“停止内战”的政治突破，两者相互配合共同构成中共领导下的抗日民族统一战线实践。由此不难看出，在经过近半年的观察和实践后，毛泽东对“长征”的话语表达与概念运用，已经超出了此前的“以言指事”阶段。他结合客观形势的变化，在话语陈述中拓展了“长征”概念的意义范畴，并以青年为纽带，将“长征”话语构建成新时期号召青年永久奋斗的一个“行动”概念，即红军长征和学生运动都增进了中华民族的整体利益，进而在有关“长征”的话语表达中发展到“以言促事”的阶段。这种话语建构内在连接了土地革命与全民族抗战的战略转向，标志着以“长征”概念为载体的中国共产党意识形态话语体系正逐步走向成熟。

Entering the 1940s, in order to correctly resolve the problem of integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, the Party’s first generation of central collective leadership, with Comrade Mao Zedong at its core, centered on Yan’an, focused on the issue of work style, and launched a rectification education movement within the Party. This movement, with opposition to subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party stereotypes as its core content, entered the stage of summing up the Party’s historical experience from October 1943 onward. In the process of systematically studying the history of the CPC, Mao’s understanding of the “Long March” also deepened continuously. On the one hand, taking the major losses caused by bloated institutions and rigid command during the Long March as a warning, he demanded that the military implement policies such as streamlining administration and simplifying troops. In August 1942, in a telegram to Chen Yi regarding opinions on streamlining administration and simplifying troops in the Central China region, Mao pointed out: “During the civil war, there could still be a Long March, but now there absolutely cannot be a Long March.” Here, the “Long March” carried a clear political warning: in the strategic stalemate phase, although the Central China anti-Japanese base areas faced frequent “mopping-up” operations by Japanese and puppet forces and pressure from Kuomintang troops, they no longer possessed the conditions for large-scale strategic relocation like that during the Long March period; only by implementing the political strategy of streamlining administration and simplifying troops could the stable development of the Central China anti-Japanese base areas be ensured. In this telegram, Mao drew on the historical lessons of the Long March, explicitly linking the Long March with the policy of streamlining administration and simplifying troops. Through the contrast between history and reality, he emphasized that only by basing oneself on reality could the stable development of the anti-Japanese base areas be ensured, pointing out the direction for simplifying military and political institutions and transforming organizational structures.

进入20世纪40年代，为了正确解决马克思列宁主义普遍真理与中国革命具体实践相结合的问题，以毛泽东同志为核心的党的第一代中央领导集体以延安为中心，聚焦作风建设问题，在党内开展整风教育运动。这场运动以反对主观主义、宗派主义和党八股为核心内容，从1943年10月起进入到总结党的历史经验阶段。在系统研讨中国共产党历史的过程中，毛泽东对“长征”的认识也在不断深化。一方面，他以长征途中机构臃肿、指挥僵化导致的重大损失为鉴，要求部队实施精兵简政等相关政策。1942年8月，毛泽东在给陈毅关于华中地区实行精兵简政意见的电报中指出：“内战时还可以有长征，现在则绝不能有长征。”此处的“长征”带有明显的政治警示意味：在战略相持阶段，华中抗日根据地虽面临日伪军的频繁“扫荡”与国民党军队的挤压，但已不具备如长征时期那样大规模战略转移的条件，唯有推行精兵简政的政治策略，才能保证华中抗日根据地的发展稳定。在这份电报中，毛泽东借鉴长征途中的历史教训，明确将长征与精兵简政的政策相联系，通过历史与现实的对照，强调只有立足实际才能确保抗日根据地稳定发展，指明了军队政权简化、组织机构改造的方向。

On the other hand, Mao repeatedly affirmed the positive significance of the Long March in military training and cadre development. For example, on October 14, 1943, at a high-level cadre conference of the CPC Central Committee’s Northwest Bureau, Mao emphasized the key role of the Long March in tempering the strong will of the people’s army, pointing out that the army and its cadres “have been through the 25,000-li Long March, are well-traveled and experienced,” and demanded that the army continue to implement the ten major policies, including streamlining administration and simplifying troops. In 1944, as the dawn of victory in the War of Resistance appeared, Mao again mentioned that the forces left behind after the Long March “have great prospects for development.” Furthermore, based on the historical trajectory of the Chinese revolution, he emphasized the important role of the Long March’s foothold, the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, in promoting the development of the Chinese revolution. On February 15, 1945, in “The Current Situation and Other Issues,” Mao pointed out: “After the 10,000-li Long March, our feet were sore, and we ran to this place to rest for a while; it is called a foothold. We are not going to live here forever; this place is a foothold, and at the same time, it is a starting point.” This meant that the Chinese Communists, represented by Mao Zedong, had established the “Long March” concept as a turning point in the Chinese revolution: in the history of the Chinese revolution, the Long March both ended the passive situation caused by the erroneous “Left” line and, at the same time, opened a new situation in which the Party independently resolved the practical problems of the Chinese revolution. At this point, the semantic reference of the “Long March” had already extended into the field of work style construction, becoming a unique concept within the CPC’s ideological discourse system.

另一方面，毛泽东多次肯定了长征在军队锻炼、干部建设中的积极意义。如1943年10月14日，毛泽东在中共中央西北局高级干部会议上强调长征在磨炼人民军队坚强意志方面所发挥的关键作用，指出军队和军队中的干部“是经过二万五千里长征的，是见闻广博而有经验的”，要求军队继续执行包括精兵简政在内的十大政策。1944年抗战胜利曙光初现之际，毛泽东再次提及经过长征留下的力量“发展前途是很大的”。此外，他还立足中国革命历史脉络，强调长征的落脚点即陕甘宁边区在推动中国革命发展中的重要作用。1945年2月15日，毛泽东在《时局问题及其他》中指出：“万里长征，脚走痛了，跑到这个地方休息一下，叫做落脚点。我们不是要永远住在这里，这个地方是落脚点，同时又是出发点。”这意味着以毛泽东为代表的中国共产党人已将“长征”概念确立为中国革命的转折点：在中国革命史上，长征既结束了由“左”倾错误路线导致的被动局面，同时又开创了党独立自主解决中国革命实际问题的新局面。此时“长征”的语义指涉已经延展到作风建设领域，成为中国共产党意识形态话语体系中的一个独特概念。

After the victory of the War of Resistance in 1945, facing the grave situation in which the Kuomintang unilaterally tore up the “Double Tenth Agreement” and launched an all-out civil war, Mao further expanded the semantic connotation of the “Long March” concept, transforming the experiences and lessons of the Long March into a reference source for strategic decision-making. He proposed using revolutionary war to eliminate all reactionary forces, leading the Party and the people to win victory in the New Democratic Revolution and clearing obstacles for modernization. On August 12, 1947, as the Liu-Deng Army advanced a thousand li into the Dabie Mountains, Mao, drawing on the experiences and lessons of the 25,000-li Long March, emphasized that “much of that impatience was unnecessary,” demanding that the army avoid unnecessary losses caused by rash and reckless advance. This flexibility in interconnecting Long March experience with real struggle was embodied in Mao’s “The Present Situation and Our Tasks,” published in December of the same year, as “taking the annihilation of the enemy’s effective strength as the main objective, not the defense or capture of cities and places,” thereby accumulating key strength for the subsequent strategic offensive.

1945年抗战胜利后，面对国民党单方面撕毁“双十协定”、发动全面内战的严峻局势，毛泽东进一步拓展了“长征”概念的语义内涵，将长征途中的经验教训转化为战略决策的参考源泉，提出要以革命战争消灭一切反动势力，领导党和人民夺取新民主主义革命胜利，为现代化建设扫除障碍。1947年8月12日，刘邓大军千里跃进大别山之际，毛泽东鉴于二万五千里长征时期的经验教训，强调“那种性急有许多是不必要的”，要求军队避免因急躁冒进造成不必要的损失。这种长征经验与现实斗争相互贯通的灵活性，在同年12月毛泽东发表的《目前形势和我们的任务》中体现为“以歼灭敌人有生力量为主要目标，不以保守或夺取城市和地方为主要目标”，为后续的战略进攻积蓄了关键力量。

On the eve of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong pointed out at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Party that “to win nationwide victory is only the first step in a long march of ten thousand li,” emphasizing that although the Chinese revolution led by the Party over the past twenty-odd years had been great, the road after the revolution would be longer and more arduous, and vigilance could not be relaxed, because the erroneous moods of arrogance that might arise from victory, of regarding oneself as a meritorious official, of stopping and refusing to advance, and of seeking pleasure and unwillingness to continue living a hard life might grow. In light of the new situation the Party faced at the time, Mao Zedong deeply understood that China’s future development path was like the long and winding Long March of ten thousand li, with every step full of hardship and challenge. Here, Mao Zedong endowed “Long March” with a new political connotation: on the one hand, he clearly proposed completing “the first step,” that is, the Chinese revolution must quickly achieve nationwide victory; on the other hand, he warned the entire Party that winning nationwide victory was by no means the end point of the revolution, but merely the starting point of the “long march of ten thousand li,” that is, socialist revolution and construction, guiding the whole Party to recognize that this revolutionary victory was only a very small step. After nationwide victory, the Party and the people would continue to face the long march of ten thousand li of building a new China. How to continue walking the new long march well? These would become major issues urgently needing resolution for the Party’s first generation of central collective leadership with Comrade Mao Zedong at its core. Therefore, the whole Party should continue to maintain a modest, prudent, and free from arrogance and rashness work style, and continue to maintain a hard-working and plain-living work style. With the establishment of the new China, the discourse of “new long march” gradually developed into “New Long March” in the course of socialist modernization, symbolizing the arduous and hard-working process experienced in a new historical period to achieve new goals.

中华人民共和国成立前夕，毛泽东在党的七届二中全会上指出，“夺取全国胜利，这只是万里长征走完了第一步”，强调尽管这20多年来党领导的中国革命是伟大的，但革命以后的路程更长、更艰苦，并不能放松警惕，因为胜利而产生的骄傲情绪、以功臣自居的情绪、停顿起来不进步的情绪、贪图享乐不愿再过艰苦生活的错误情绪，可能生长。结合党在当时面临的新形势，毛泽东深知未来中国的发展道路犹如漫长曲折的万里长征，每一步都充满了艰辛与挑战。在这里，毛泽东赋予了“长征”新的政治内涵：一方面明确提出要走完“第一步”，即中国革命要迅速取得全国胜利；另一方面也告诫全党，夺取全国胜利绝非革命的终点，而仅仅是“万里长征”即社会主义革命和建设的起点，引导全党认识到这个革命的胜利还只是很小的一步。在全国胜利之后，党和人民将继续面临建设新中国的万里长征，如何继续走好新的长征路？这些都将成为以毛泽东同志为核心的党的第一代中央领导集体亟待解决的重大问题。因此，全党应继续保持谦虚谨慎、不骄不躁的工作作风，继续保持艰苦奋斗的工作作风。随着新中国的建立，“新的长征”这一话语在社会主义现代化建设中逐渐发展为“新长征”，象征着在新的历史时期为实现新的目标所经历的艰苦奋斗过程。

IV. Words into Deeds: Mao Zedong’s In-Depth Elaboration of the Concept of “Long March” after the Founding of New China

四、以言成事：新中国成立后毛泽东对“长征”概念的深入阐发

After the founding of New China, how to consolidate the newborn democratic regime and restore the national economy became a major issue that the ruling Chinese Communist Party had to resolve. In order for the Chinese nation to stand proudly among the nations of the world, Mao Zedong, on the basis of analyzing changes in the principal social contradiction, integrated theories such as ideological education on hard work and plain living and seeking truth from facts through investigation and research into the concept of “Long March,” thereby extending the semantic reference of the “Long March” concept further into the fields of economic construction and ideological culture, aiming to construct a discourse of socialist revolution and construction that “keeps cadres and the masses constantly filled with full revolutionary enthusiasm.”

新中国成立后，如何巩固新生的民主政权、恢复国民经济，成为执政的中国共产党必须解决的重大问题。为使中华民族屹立于世界民族之林，毛泽东在分析社会主要矛盾变化的基础上，将艰苦奋斗思想教育、实事求是调查研究等理论融入“长征”概念，使“长征”概念的语义指涉进一步延展到经济建设、思想文化领域，旨在建构起“使干部和群众经常保持饱满的革命热情”的社会主义革命和建设话语。

After three years of recovery and adjustment, by the end of 1952, the task of restoring the national economy was successfully completed. At the same time, Mao Zedong perceived that the principal social contradiction in our country had transformed into the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie, and hoped to promote the rapid development of productive forces by changing the relations of production. In order to keep the entire people maintaining the enthusiasm and drive of the revolutionary period, Mao Zedong again called on all revolutionary workers throughout the country to continue to carry forward the spirit of hard work and plain living forged during the Long March, and “forever maintain the hard-working and plain-living style that the workers in Yan’an and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region had over the past ten-plus years.” This call not only enriched the connotation of the “Long March” concept, but also evoked the historical memory of the vast number of workers regarding the fearlessness of challenges and tenacity during the Long March period, thereby inspiring the entire Party and people of all ethnic groups across the country to continue to maintain this style in the new long march of socialist construction.

经过三年的恢复与调整，到1952年年底，国民经济恢复的任务胜利完成。与此同时，毛泽东觉察到我国社会主要矛盾已经转变为工人阶级与民族资产阶级的矛盾，希望通过变革生产关系来促进生产力快速发展。为了使全国人民继续保持革命时期的热情与干劲，毛泽东再次号召全国一切革命工作人员继续发扬长征途中铸就的艰苦奋斗精神，“永远保持过去十余年间在延安和陕甘宁边区的工作人员中所具有的艰苦奋斗的作风”。这一号召不仅丰富了“长征”概念的内涵，也唤起了广大工作人员对长征时期不畏挑战、坚韧不拔的历史记忆，进而激励全党全国各族人民在社会主义建设的新长征中继续保持这种风貌。

After the basic completion of the Three Great Socialist Transformations [9]9 The Three Great Socialist Transformations (1953–1956) were the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicraft industry, and capitalist industry and commerce in China., with the proposal of the strategic vision of “overtaking Britain and catching up with the United States,” our country began to show a tendency toward quick success and instant benefit in the process of exploring the path of socialist modernization, leading to radical “Left” errors. After the “Left” errors occurred, Mao Zedong combined the “Long March” with the Marxist theory of practice, emphasizing the importance of the hard-working and plain-living style and the ideological line of seeking truth from facts formed during the Long March. On March 23, 1961, at the Central Work Conference convened in Guangzhou, Mao Zedong stressed the importance of practical experience, pointing out: “Without the failure of the Fifth Counter-Encirclement and Suppression Campaign [10]10 The Fifth Counter-Encirclement and Suppression Campaign (1933–1934) was the Chinese Communist Party’s military campaign against the Nationalist forces’ fifth encirclement campaign in the Jiangxi Soviet area; its failure directly triggered the Long March., without the Long March of ten thousand li, my little book *Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War* could not have been written.” The application of the “Long March” concept in the field of economic construction opened a completely new page in the evolution of the “Long March” concept.

社会主义三大改造基本完成后，随着“超英赶美”战略设想的提出，我国在探索社会主义现代化建设道路过程中开始有了急功近利的倾向，出现了激进的“左”倾错误。在“左”倾错误发生后，毛泽东将“长征”与马克思主义实践论相结合，强调了在长征途中形成的艰苦奋斗作风、实事求是思想路线的重要性。1961年3月23日，毛泽东在广州召开的中央工作会议上强调实践经验的重要性，指出：“不经过第五次反‘围剿’的失败，不经过万里长征，我那个《中国革命战争的战略问题》小册子也不可能写出来。”在经济建设领域运用“长征”概念，开启了“长征”概念流变的全新一页。

In summary, after the founding of New China, the Party’s first generation of central collective leadership with Comrade Mao Zedong at its core always took national rejuvenation as its goal, used the concept of “Long March” as a guide for economic construction and an important vehicle for ideological and political education of youth, promoted its integration into the spiritual genealogy of Chinese Communists, and made it a signature concept for understanding Mao Zedong’s ideological style in today’s academic circles.

概言之，新中国成立后，以毛泽东同志为核心的党的第一代中央领导集体始终以民族复兴为目标，将“长征”概念作为经济建设指南和对青年进行思想政治教育的重要载体，推动其融入中国共产党人精神谱系，成为当今学界理解毛泽东思想风范的标识性概念。

Conclusion

结语

Looking at Mao Zedong’s interpretation and application of the concept of “Long March” in different periods, the trajectory of changes in its semantic reference and theoretical connotation profoundly demonstrates the practical wisdom of Chinese Communists in integrating the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism with China’s concrete reality. The Party’s first generation of central collective leadership with Comrade Mao Zedong at its core, always based on the practical needs of China’s revolution and construction, while adhering to the basic principles of Marxism, took realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation as the fundamental proposition for theoretical innovation, and continuously deepened the interpretation of the major revolutionary event of the Long March. It was precisely Mao Zedong’s creative interpretation that truly brought the Long March story “to life”—from a mere description of military operations during the Agrarian Revolutionary War, to a symbol of political mobilization during the War of Resistance Against Japan, and then to a composite theoretical marker covering the fields of economic construction and ideological culture after the founding of New China. The “Long March” ultimately sublimated into a symbolic symbol of the Chinese revolution and a widely celebrated revolutionary epic, becoming a vivid example of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times. The regular methods and experience contained in the historical evolution of this concept provide profound inspiration for upholding and developing Marxism in the New Era.

纵观不同时期毛泽东对“长征”概念的阐释与运用，其语义指涉与理论内涵的嬗变轨迹，深刻彰显了中国共产党人将马克思列宁主义基本原理同中国具体实际相结合的实践智慧。以毛泽东同志为核心的党的第一代中央领导集体，始终立足中国革命与建设的现实需求，在坚守马克思主义基本原理的基础上，将实现中华民族伟大复兴作为理论创新的根本命题，对长征这一重大革命事件进行持续深化解读。正是毛泽东的创造性阐释，使长征故事真正“活”了起来——从土地革命时期单纯的军事行动描述，到抗战时期的政治动员符号，再到新中国成立后涵盖经济建设、思想文化领域的复合型理论标识，“长征”最终升华为中国革命的标志性符号与广为传颂的革命史诗，成为马克思主义中国化时代化的生动例证。这一概念的历史演进所蕴含的规律性方法与经验，为新时代坚持和发展马克思主义提供了深刻启示。

First, semantic extension rooted in revolutionary practice. Basing oneself on practice is the fundamental reliance of Marxist theoretical innovation. In the historical practice of leading the strategic shift of the main Red Army forces, Mao Zedong reconstructed the semantic meaning of the ancient Chinese phrase “long journey of ten thousand li” into a political term for military revolutionary action; after the full outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan, by integrating the theory of the united front with the requirements of work style construction, he promoted the leap of the “Long March” discourse from the military field to the political dimension; after the founding of New China, he further injected the epochal propositions of socialist revolution and construction into it, causing this concept to break through the political category and form a composite theoretical symbol covering fields such as economy and culture. From the goal of the “Four Modernizations” [11]11 The Four Modernizations, formally proposed by Zhou Enlai in 1964 and reiterated by Deng Xiaoping after 1978, were the modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. to the grand blueprint of a “great modern socialist country,” the “New Long March” discourse not only inherits the revolutionary enthusiasm and fighting spirit of the traditional Long March discourse, but also fuses the theoretical innovation achievements of Chinese Communists in the New Era.

其一，以革命实践为根基的语义延展。立足实践是马克思主义理论创新的根本依托。在领导主力红军战略转移的历史实践中，毛泽东将古汉语“长途远征”的语义重构为军事革命行动的政治术语；全面抗战爆发后，通过整合统一战线理论与作风建设要求，推动“长征”话语从军事领域向政治维度跃升；新中国成立后，更将社会主义革命与建设的时代命题注入其中，使这一概念突破政治范畴，形成涵盖经济、文化等领域的复合型理论符号。从“四个现代化”的奋斗目标到“社会主义现代化强国”的宏伟蓝图，“新长征”话语既承续了传统长征话语中的革命热情与拼搏精神，更熔铸了新时代中国共产党人的理论创新成果。

Second, practical exploration with national rejuvenation as the main axis. Marxist theory always resonates at the same frequency as the nation’s destiny. At the Wayaobu Conference [12]12 The Wayaobu Conference (December 1935) was a meeting of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party in northern Shaanxi that formulated the strategy of the anti-Japanese national united front., Mao Zedong positioned the Long March as a “declaration,” a “propaganda team,” and a “seeding machine,” taking national salvation as the core to awaken the will to resist Japan, making it a spiritual bond that condensed the strength of the War of Resistance; at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Party, he proposed that “to win nationwide victory is only the first step in a long march of ten thousand li,” linking revolutionary victory with the goal of building a new China, anchoring the direction for advancing national development; during the period of socialist construction, he called for inheriting the Long March’s hard-working and plain-living style, guiding the people to gather joint forces to overcome difficulties in restoring the economy and promoting industrialization. From national independence to national prosperity, the concept of “Long March” has always been connected with the interests of the people, not only inheriting the spiritual gene of the Chinese nation’s unremitting self-improvement, but also becoming the ideological banner under which the Party unites and leads the people toward rejuvenation.

其二，以民族复兴为主轴的实践探索。马克思主义理论始终与民族命运同频共振。在瓦窑堡会议上，毛泽东将长征定位为“宣言书”“宣传队”“播种机”，以民族救亡为核心唤醒抗日斗志，使其成为凝聚抗战力量的精神纽带；党的七届二中全会上，提出“夺取全国胜利只是万里长征走完了第一步”，将革命胜利与建设新中国的目标衔接，为推进国家发展锚定方向；社会主义建设时期，号召传承长征艰苦奋斗作风，引导人民在恢复经济、推进工业化中凝聚攻坚克难的合力。从民族独立到国家富强，“长征”概念始终与人民利益相连，既承续了中华民族自强不息的精神基因，更成为党团结带领人民迈向复兴的思想旗帜。

Third, theoretical innovation characterized by keeping pace with the times. The eternal charm of Marxism lies in its open and inclusive theoretical character. During the Agrarian Revolutionary War, the concept of the “Long March” focused on the needs of military struggle and was a proper noun defining the strategic shift of the main Red Army forces; during the War of Resistance against Japan, it was integrated with the requirements of the united front and Party building, rising to become a discursive symbol of political mobilization; after the founding of New China, it was infused with the propositions of socialist revolution and construction, breaking through the political category to form a composite theoretical marker. From “Long March” to “new Long March” and then to “New Long March,” its connotation both adheres to the fundamental stance of Marxism and, according to changes in the times, endows it with new practical orientations. This process profoundly confirms the essential characteristic of Marxism — developing in practice and guiding practice through development — and also provides an important guideline for contemporary theoretical innovation: it is necessary both to adhere to fundamental positions and basic principles and to respond to the issues of the times with an open attitude, opening up new frontiers in adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times through the positive interaction of practice and theory.

其三，以与时俱进为特质的理论创新。马克思主义的永恒魅力在于其开放包容的理论品格。土地革命时期，“长征”概念聚焦军事斗争需求，是界定主力红军战略转移的专有名词；抗战时期融入统一战线与作风建设要求，跃升为政治动员的话语符号；新中国成立后注入社会主义革命与建设命题，突破政治范畴形成复合型理论标识。从“长征”到“新的长征”再到“新长征”，其内涵既坚守马克思主义根本立场，又根据时代变化赋予新的实践指向。这一过程深刻印证了马克思主义在实践中发展、在发展中指导实践的本质特征，也为当下理论创新提供了重要遵循：既要坚守根本立场与基本原则，又要以开放态度回应时代课题，在实践与理论的良性互动中开辟马克思主义中国化时代化新境界。

“Every generation has its own Long March, and every generation must walk its own Long March well.” Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, the victorious song of poverty alleviation, the breakthrough progress in scientific and technological innovation, and the systemic achievements in ecological civilization construction have together endowed the concept of the “Long March” with a brand-new contemporary connotation. “The strong pass of the enemy is like a wall of iron, yet with firm strides we are crossing its summit.” [13]13 A line from Mao Zedong’s poem “Loushan Pass” (1935), written during the Long March. The full couplet is: “Fierce the west wind, / Wild geese cry under the frosty morning moon. / Under the frosty morning moon, / Horses’ hooves clatter, / And bugles sob. / Do not say that the strong pass is like a wall of iron. / With firm strides we are crossing its summit today.” The great Long March spirit epitomizes the revolutionary character of the Communist Party of China and the people’s army, the spiritual trait of the Chinese nation’s unremitting self-improvement, and the patriotism in revolutionary practice. In the new context of the New Era and the new journey, efforts should be focused on continuing to write the great Long March spirit, following the great cause pioneered by the revolutionary forebears, and writing a new chapter and creating new miracles on the new Long March of comprehensively building a modern socialist country and realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. From the bloody battles of the Xiangjiang Campaign to the ice-breaking advance of reform and opening up, from the life-and-death choices of the Zunyi Conference to the overcoming of difficulties in the New Era, Chinese Communists have always continued to write the Long March belonging to our generation with the sober-mindedness of “being tested,” [14]14 A metaphor derived from the historical practice of imperial examinations in China, used by Mao Zedong on the eve of the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949 to describe the Party’s entry into the cities and assumption of state power as a new “test” that must be passed with vigilance and humility. It has since become a standard Party term for maintaining revolutionary discipline and self-awareness. forging new historical monuments in the continuous struggle. In short, in every historical period of revolution, construction, and reform, the Communist Party of China has always taken the story of the Red Army’s Long March as its spiritual foundation, and through explorations and practices based on China’s actual conditions, has continuously enriched the narrative dimensions of this revolutionary heroic epic, steadily advancing the theoretical innovation of adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of the times.

“每一代人有每一代人的长征路，每一代人都要走好自己的长征路。”党的十八大以来，脱贫攻坚的胜利凯歌、科技创新的突破性进展、生态文明建设的系统性成就，共同赋予“长征”概念崭新的时代内涵。雄关漫道真如铁，而今迈步从头越。伟大长征精神集中体现了中国共产党与人民军队的革命品格，中华民族自强不息的精神特质以及革命实践中的爱国主义精神。在新时代新征程的新语境下，应着力续写伟大长征精神，沿着革命前辈所开创的伟大事业，在全面建设社会主义现代化国家、实现中华民族伟大复兴的新长征路上书写新篇章、创造新奇迹。从湘江战役的浴血奋战到改革开放的破冰前行，从遵义会议的生死抉择到新时代的攻坚克难，中国共产党人始终以“赶考”的清醒续写着属于我们这一代人的长征路，在接续奋斗中铸就新的历史丰碑。总之，在革命、建设、改革的各个历史时期，中国共产党始终以红军长征故事为精神底色，通过立足中国实际的探索实践，不断丰富这部革命英雄史诗的叙事维度，持续推进马克思主义中国化时代化的理论创新。

(He Yuxi, School of Marxism, Ningbo University; Li Baogeng, School of Marxism, University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

（何羽茜，宁波大学马克思主义学院，李包庚，中国社会科学院大学马克思主义学院）