The "Quasi-Feudal" Phenomenon in Digital Space Production in Western Countries and China's Response

Marx once pointed out: "Space is an element of all production and all human activity." Human beings live in specific spaces and continuously produce spaces. With the development of digital technology, digital space production, as an activity and process that supplies digital space products and reshapes digital space structures and organizations, has become a revolution on an unprecedented scale, continuously innovating production methods, transforming social relations, and shaping power structures, profoundly affecting economic development, political stability, social progress, and individual life. In feudal society, the landlord class owned land as the basic means of production, while peasants, owning little or no land, were forced to depend on the landlord class, which exploited them through rent in kind, labor rent, and money rent. Today, some Western capitalist countries exhibit a "quasi-feudal" phenomenon in digital space production, confining the fruits of digital technological progress and digital economic development within specific digital fiefdoms, where they are seized by digital lords, exacerbating inequality in wealth distribution and power allocation, and posing a severe challenge to global digital space production. In the process of Chinese-path modernization, we should fully leverage the institutional advantages of socialism, take forceful measures to prevent the "quasi-feudal" phenomenon in digital space production, promote the continuous advancement of digital technology, foster the healthy development of the digital economy, and uphold fairness and justice in digital society.

马克思曾指出：“空间是一切生产和一切人类活动的要素。”人类生活于特定空间，又在不断生产空间。随着数字技术发展，数字空间生产作为供给数字空间产品以及重塑数字空间结构与组织的活动和过程，已成为一场规模空前的革命，不断创新生产方式、变革社会关系、塑造权力结构，深刻影响经济发展、政治稳定、社会进步和个体生活。在封建社会，地主阶级占有作为基本生产资料的土地，农民因不占有土地或很少占有土地而不得不依附于地主阶级，地主阶级通过实物地租、劳役地租、货币地租等方式剥削农民。当今，一些西方资本主义国家数字空间生产呈现“类封建”现象，将数字技术进步和数字经济发展的成果禁锢于特定数字领地，使其被数字领主攫取，加剧财富占有和权力分配的不公，对全球数字空间生产构成严峻挑战。在中国式现代化进程中，我们应充分发挥社会主义制度优势，采取有力举措防范数字空间生产“类封建”现象，推动数字技术持续进步，促进数字经济健康发展，维护数字社会公平正义。

I. Main Manifestations of the "Quasi-Feudal" Phenomenon in Digital Space Production

一、数字空间生产“类封建”现象的主要表征

Some scholars have pointed out that "space, besides being a means of production, is also a means of control, and therefore a means of domination, a mode of power." In the digital age, although the structure of productive factors, production methods, and social relations have undergone tremendous changes compared to feudal society, digital technology oligopolies, by monopolizing data factors and enclosing digital space territories, have become "landlords" cloaked in the aura of technology, and through digital space rent, they squeeze all who enter this space, causing digital space production to exhibit a "feudalization" trend.

有学者指出，“空间除了是一种生产手段，也是一种控制手段，因此还是一种支配手段、一种权力方式”。在数字时代，尽管生产要素结构、生产方式、社会关系等相对于封建社会已发生巨变，但是，数字科技寡头独占数据要素、圈占数字空间领地，成为笼罩着科技光芒的“地主”，并通过数字空间地租压榨进入该空间的所有人，使得数字空间生产呈现“封建化”趋势。

1. The Digital Enclosure Movement: The Enfeoffment of Digital Space Spheres of Influence

1.数字圈地运动：数字空间势力范围的分封

Some scholars argue: "A genuine, original basic order is essentially built upon some clear spatial boundary, upon some standard and some distribution of land." A prominent manifestation of the "quasi-feudal" phenomenon in digital space production is that digital technology oligopolies, in pursuit of capital accumulation, erect a new hierarchical order based on technological and economic power, aggressively enclosing digital territories.

有学者认为：“真正的、源初意义上的基本秩序本质上建立在某种明确的空间界限的基础之上，建立在某种标准和土地分配的基础之上。”数字空间生产“类封建”现象的突出表现，就是数字科技寡头为实现资本增殖，在技术和经济强权的基础上架构起新的等级秩序，大肆圈占数字领地。

First, digital technology oligopolies become digital lords.

第一，数字科技寡头成为数字领主。

In feudal society, wealth accumulation was based on land ownership. In digital space production, digital technology oligopolies become digital lords through the digital enclosure movement. Of course, what they enclose is not physical land but virtual digital land. They compete for digital land not through violence but by establishing monopolistic positions in certain fields through digital technological advantages, dividing digital space into several heterogeneous "independent kingdoms." For example, Meta not only possesses powerful data processing capabilities but also holds a leading position in advanced technology fields such as artificial intelligence, virtual reality, augmented reality, and mixed reality. The company connects billions of people, building the world's largest and most complex social network, becoming a super digital technology empire with users worldwide and business operations spanning the globe. Its financial report for the third quarter of 2025 shows that the average daily active users in September 2025 was 3.54 billion. This massive user base brings enormous wealth, with quarterly revenue reaching $51.242 billion.

在封建社会，财富的积累以占有土地为基础。在数字空间生产中，数字科技寡头通过数字圈地运动成为数字领主。当然，他们圈占的不是有形土地，而是虚拟数字土地。他们争夺数字土地并不是靠暴力，而是通过数字技术优势确立在某一领域的垄断地位，将数字空间划分为若干异质性的“独立王国”。例如，Meta不仅拥有强大的数据处理能力，而且在人工智能、虚拟现实、增强现实、混合现实等先进技术领域也处于领先地位。该公司将数十亿人连接在一起，建立起全世界最庞大、最复杂的社交网络，成为一个用户遍布世界、业务覆盖全球的超级数字科技帝国。其2025年第三季度财务报告显示，2025年9月平均日活跃用户数为35.4亿。巨大的用户规模，为其带来巨额财富，该季度收入高达512.42亿美元。

Second, digital lords dominate digital space comprehensively.

第二，数字领主全方位主导数字空间。

As digital lords, digital technology oligopolies are supreme rulers on their territories, acting simultaneously as legislators, enforcers, and judges. Unlike their feudal counterparts, who needed to maintain large retinues of servants, digital technology oligopolies need only control the "on-off mechanism" for users to enter digital space, such as "user agreements and privacy policies," to establish a series of self-serving rules. These rules are unilaterally set by digital technology oligopolies, are non-transparent, and subject to change at any time. Various types of users on digital fiefdoms must submit to the technological control of digital technology oligopolies, endure economic, emotional, physical, and intellectual exploitation, and alter their original life paths and ways of thinking. Any user who disobeys a digital technology oligopoly risks having their account banned or their code reset. For some users, this could mean losing their means of livelihood. The potential cost of leaving a digital territory is as high as it was for serfs expelled from barren land in feudal society.

作为数字领主的数字科技寡头在其领地上是至高无上的统治者，既是立法者，又是执法者，还是审判者。不必像封建社会的“同行”那样，需要建立庞大的仆从队伍，数字科技寡头只需掌控用户进入数字空间的“开关机制”，如“用户协议与隐私政策”，就可以制定一系列利己规则。这些规则由数字科技寡头单方面制定，不透明且随时变动。数字领地上的各类用户不得不屈从于数字科技寡头的技术控制，不得不接受经济、情感、体力、智力等方面的压榨，不得不改变原有的生活路径和思维方式。因为任何不服从数字科技寡头的用户，都可能被封禁账号或重置代码。对一些用户而言，这可能导致其丧失维持生计的手段。脱离数字领地可能付出的代价之高昂，就像封建社会的农奴被驱逐到不毛之地。

Third, digital lords focus on data possession.

第三，数字领主聚焦于数据占有。

Digital technology restructures social production methods, making data a core productive factor for economic development. Compared to traditional productive factors like land and capital, data factors have characteristics such as non-consumability and reusability, allowing for near-zero-cost infinite copying and use. Data is not consumed by use; instead, its use generates new data, and the collection and utilization of new data further enhance the value of the original data. Aggregating data on a large scale and mining high-dimensional data value can continuously optimize algorithms, accurately grasp user psychology, and provide more "considerate" products and services, thereby achieving higher user stickiness and market position, realizing exponential growth in economies of scale. Driven by strategic considerations for data mining, digital technology oligopolies show keen interest in data-rich areas, engaging in exclusive competition for data resources. Cédric Durand points out: "The current strategies for conquering cyberspace all share the same goal—controlling the space for observing and capturing human activity data." All kinds of data within digital territories, including user search, shopping, payment, and social information, as well as personal location, health status, and other private information, are collected, integrated, and claimed as private property by digital technology oligopolies.

数字技术重构社会生产方式，数据成为经济发展的核心生产要素。相较于土地、资本等传统生产要素，数据要素具有非消耗性、复用性等特质，可以近乎零成本地无限复制使用。数据不会因被使用而消耗，反而会因被使用而产生新的数据，新数据的收集和利用又进一步提升原生数据的价值。大规模汇聚数据，挖掘高维数据价值，可以不断优化算法，精准把握用户心理，提供更“善解人意”的产品和服务，由此获得更高的用户黏性和市场地位，实现规模经济效应的指数级增长。出于数据挖掘的战略考量，数字科技寡头对数据富矿区展现出浓厚兴趣，纷纷投身排他性数据资源竞争。塞德里克·迪朗指出：“现在征服网络空间的策略都有相同的目标——控制观察与捕获人类活动数据的空间。”数字领地中的各类数据，包括用户的搜索、购物、支付、社交等信息，乃至个人位置、健康状况等隐私信息均被收集整合，并被数字科技寡头据为私有财产。

2. Digital Personal Dependency: Changes in Class Structure in Digital Space

2.数字人身依附：数字空间阶级结构的变化

Marx noted that in feudal society "people were all dependent: serfs and lords, vassals and suzerains, laymen and clergy. The social relations of material production and the spheres of life built upon this production were characterized by personal dependency." The new classes emerging in digital space production can be divided into digital lords, digital vassal capitalists, the digital proletariat, and digital serfs. Apart from the digital lords, the other three groups cannot control their own destinies, thus generating multiple layers of dependency relationships.

马克思指出，在封建社会“人都是互相依赖的：农奴和领主，陪臣和诸侯，俗人和牧师。物质生产的社会关系以及建立在这种生产的基础上的生活领域，都是以人身依附为特征的”。数字空间生产中出现的新型阶级可划分为数字领主、数字附庸资本家、数字无产阶级以及数字农奴。除数字领主外，其他三个群体均无法主宰自己的命运，于是生成多重依附关系。

First, the bourgeoisie splits into digital lords and digital vassal capitalists.

第一，资产阶级分裂为数字领主和数字附庸资本家。

Digital technology oligopolies transform into digital lords, monopolizing core technologies and key resources, holding a stranglehold on the development of digital productive forces, and owning digital space. Other capitalists, who must rely on the digital technologies and digital infrastructure of digital lords to ensure the orderly conduct of production and operational activities, become dependent on digital lords, degenerating into digital vassal capitalists. Thus, a unique feature of the "quasi-feudal" phenomenon in digital space production is the change in the internal class structure of the bourgeoisie. Although digital vassal capitalists belong to the bourgeoisie, they too suffer exploitation by digital lords. This feudal predatory model profoundly highlights multi-layered hierarchies and coercive personal dependency relationships. At the same time, hierarchical relationships among different types of capital are being restructured. Digital technology oligopolies, through monopolistic digital capital, control digital space, thereby subordinating industrial capital and commercial capital. In other words, digital technology oligopolies intensify the differentiation of capital and the differentiation of the bourgeoisie, restructure relationships among capitals and within the bourgeoisie, make social hierarchies more rigid, and ensure their own position at the pyramid's apex, creating a "suction effect." Consequently, a host of digital technology oligopolies have risen rapidly in a relatively short period, amassing wealth at a speed and scale far exceeding traditional capitalists.

数字科技寡头摇身一变，成为数字领主，独揽核心技术和关键资源，紧扼数字生产力发展的咽喉，掌握数字空间所有权。其他资本家因为必须依赖数字领主的数字技术和数字基础设施，才能保证生产经营等活动的有序开展，因而只能依附于数字领主，沦为数字附庸资本家。可见，数字空间生产“类封建”现象的独特之处在于资产阶级内部阶层结构发生变化。虽然数字附庸资本家属于资产阶级，但也要遭受数字领主的剥夺。这种封建掠夺模式深刻凸显多层次的等级制和强制性人身依附关系。同时，不同类型资本间的等级关系也在重构。数字科技寡头通过垄断性数字资本控制数字空间，从而使产业资本和商业资本成为附庸。换言之，数字科技寡头加剧资本的分化和资产阶级的分化，重构资本间的关系和资产阶级内部的关系，使社会等级更加森严，并确保自身处于金字塔顶端，形成“虹吸效应”。因此，一众数字科技寡头在较短时期内迅速崛起，其攫取财富的速度和规模远超传统资本家。

Second, digital laborers evolve into the digital proletariat.

第二，数字劳动者演变为数字无产阶级。

Digital labor is the activity of using digital production tools to create digital wealth. Digital laborers use digital technology, digital platforms, and the like as their means of labor, and data, information, symbolically encoded social relations, and the like as their objects of labor. In digital space production, digital laborers are abstracted into machines that produce data, continuously suffering both material and spiritual deprivation, and become the digital proletariat. On the surface, digital laborers possess some means of production, such as production tools, unlike the propertyless proletariat under the traditional capitalist system. Moreover, because digital labor requires grasping complex relations and deep logic from vast amounts of data, it is an intellectually intensive form of labor that highly emphasizes cognitive ability, creative ability, and human-machine collaboration. Therefore, digital laborers have a certain degree of autonomy, even considerable autonomy, in the labor process. However, this does not change their essence as the digital proletariat. This is because core digital factors of production such as technology and data are firmly held in the hands of digital lords, and the means of production that digital laborers possess, as well as their relatively autonomous labor process, are all under the control of the digital lords. The more labor成果 [n] digital laborers create, the more heavily they are exploited by the digital lords.

数字劳动是利用数字生产工具，创造数字化财富的活动。数字劳动者以数字技术、数字平台等为劳动资料，以数据、信息、符号化的社会关系等为劳动对象。在数字空间生产中，数字劳动者被抽象化为生产数据的机器，持续遭受物质和精神的双重剥夺，成为数字无产阶级。从表面上看，数字劳动者拥有生产工具等部分生产资料，不同于传统资本主义制度下一无所有的无产阶级。并且，由于数字劳动需要从海量数据中把握复杂关系和深层逻辑，是高度强调认知能力、创造能力、人机协作能力的智力密集型劳动，因此，数字劳动者在劳动过程中具有一定自主性乃至较大自主性。但是，这并不能改变其作为数字无产阶级的实质。因为技术、数据等核心数字生产要素牢牢掌握在数字领主手中，数字劳动者拥有的生产资料及其相对自主的劳动过程均在数字领主掌控之中。数字劳动者创造的劳动成果越多，被数字领主剥削得越重。

Third, digital consumers are reduced to digital serfs.

第三，数字消费者沦为数字农奴。

Every action digital consumers take in digital space leaves a digital footprint, which in turn generates new data. However, they receive no compensation for producing this data; instead, they must pay fees for consuming data. All these digital consumers, who provide unpaid labor to the digital lords, become digital serfs. Digital serfs generate data continuously in digital space, and this data becomes a tool for further exploiting them. To persistently and deeply squeeze the digital serfs, digital lords use digital technology to analyze their past behavioral trajectories, predicting, planning, and developing their behavior. For example, Amazon, Google, and others frequently conduct experiments to test the impact of interface changes, algorithm improvements, increased computing power, application modifications, and the like on users, and then adjust strategies to enhance user loyalty. It is evident that the exploitation of factors of production in digital space production has reached an unprecedented breadth and depth.

数字消费者在数字空间内的每一个动作都会留下数字足迹，并由此进一步生成新的数据。但是，他们不会因为自己生产了数据而获得报酬，反而会因为自己消费了数据而必须支付费用。所有这些为数字领主提供无偿劳动的数字消费者，就成为数字农奴。数字农奴在数字空间中时时刻刻都在生成数据，这些数据又成为进一步剥削数字农奴的工具。为了持久而深入地压榨数字农奴，数字领主运用数字技术分析其过往行为轨迹，对其行为进行预测、规划和开发。例如，亚马逊、谷歌等频繁开展实验，测试界面变化、算法改进、算力提升、应用程序变更等对用户产生的影响，进而调整策略提升用户忠诚度。可见，数字空间生产对生产要素的挖掘已达到前所未有的广度和深度。

3. Digital Space Rent: The Form of Digital Space Economic Plunder

3.数字空间地租：数字空间经济掠夺的样态

Digital lords, by controlling traffic and user entry points, levy "rent" on technology developers, service providers, commodity sellers, and others who "cultivate" within their territory.

数字领主通过控制流量和用户入口，向在其领地内“耕作”的技术开发者、服务提供者、商品销售者等征收“地租”。

First, digital space rent is a new form of capitalist rent.

第一，数字空间地租是资本主义地租的新形态。

Marxist rent theory divides capitalist rent into absolute rent, differential rent, and monopoly rent. Absolute rent is the rent that must be paid to the landowner simply for using the land. Differential rent arises from the difference formed when the individual production price of a product is lower than the social production price; it includes differential rent I and differential rent II. The former is the surplus profit above the average profit obtained due to fertile land or a favorable geographical location; the latter is the surplus profit formed by continuously investing additional capital on the same plot of land, thereby increasing labor productivity. Monopoly rent is a special form of rent, based on the monopoly price of rare and precious products produced on a small number of naturally unique plots of land. Digital space rent also includes digital space absolute rent, digital space differential rent I, digital space differential rent II, and digital space monopoly rent. Digital space absolute rent is the rent that must be paid for using digital space. Digital space differential rent is based on the attribute differences of different digital spaces, as well as differences in information flow, technical services, and the like. Digital space differential rent I is related to the volume of information flowing into the digital space from outside and the internal bidding for rankings. The volume of external traffic depends on factors such as the digital space's technological level, management quality, and reputation; the higher the external traffic, the greater the "fertility" of the digital space, and the larger the profit margins for various operators. In the internal bidding for rankings within digital space, the higher the ranking, the greater the "locational advantage," the more exposure, and the more traffic obtained. For example, the first search result clearly attracts more attention than the hundredth. The income generated by this high "fertility" is the basis of digital space differential rent I. Digital space differential rent II is related to continuous investment in capital, technology, management, and the like. Various operating entities within digital space, in order to gain more traffic, will improve the quality of their own products and services; digital technology oligarchs, in order to maintain their competitive market advantage, will also raise their technological level, optimize the spatial structure, and improve management mechanisms. The income formed by improving the competitiveness of the digital space itself and the products and services it contains is the basis of digital space differential rent II. It must be particularly pointed out that in feudal society, after the landowner leased out the land, the improvement of the land's "fertility" and productivity was often left to the operator. However, in digital space production, digital technology oligarchs always firmly control the entire digital space and are committed to improving its "fertility." Because in increasingly fierce competition, once technology, services, reputation, and the like fall behind, it means losing traffic, which may lead to the shrinkage or even disappearance of the digital territory. That is to say, the contribution of digital technology oligarchs to differential rent II is far greater than that of feudal landowners. As for digital space monopoly rent, it remains a special phenomenon, based on the monopoly price of scarce digital commodities. As Marx pointed out: "This monopoly price is determined neither by the production price of the commodity nor by the value of the commodity, but by the needs and ability to pay of the buyer."

马克思主义地租理论将资本主义地租分为绝对地租、级差地租和垄断地租。绝对地租是只要使用土地就必须向土地所有者缴纳的地租。级差地租由产品的个别生产价格低于社会生产价格而形成的差额转化而来，包括级差地租Ⅰ和级差地租Ⅱ。前者是因土地肥沃或地理位置佳而获得的高于平均利润的超额利润，后者是因在同一块土地上连续追加投资、提高劳动生产率而形成的超额利润。垄断地租是地租的特殊形式，以少量自然条件独特的土地上产出的名贵珍稀产品的垄断价格为基础。数字空间地租也包括数字空间绝对地租、数字空间级差地租Ⅰ、数字空间级差地租Ⅱ、数字空间垄断地租。数字空间绝对地租是使用数字空间就必须缴纳的租金。数字空间级差地租建基于不同数字空间的属性差异，以及信息流量、技术服务等方面的差异。数字空间级差地租Ⅰ与外部流入数字空间的信息量和内部竞价排名有关。外部流量大小取决于数字空间的技术水平、管理质量、口碑声誉等因素，外部流量越高意味着数字空间“肥力”越高，各类经营者获利空间越大。在数字空间内部竞价排名中，越靠前越有“区位优势”、越有曝光度、越能获得流量。例如，搜索结果的第1条显然比第100条更能获得关注。这种高“肥力”所带来的收益就是数字空间级差地租Ⅰ的基础。数字空间级差地租Ⅱ与资金、技术、管理等方面的持续投入有关。数字空间内各类经营主体为获得更多流量，会提高自身产品质量和服务水平；数字科技寡头为保持市场竞争优势，也会提高技术水平、优化空间结构、完善管理机制。这种通过提高数字空间本身及其内部所容纳的产品和服务的竞争力而形成的收益，就是数字空间级差地租Ⅱ的基础。需要特别指出的是，在封建社会，土地所有者出租土地后，该土地的“肥力”和产能的提高往往就交由经营者负责。但是，在数字空间生产中，数字科技寡头始终牢牢掌控整个数字空间并致力于提高其“肥力”。因为在日益激烈的竞争中，技术、服务、声誉等一旦落后，就意味着丧失流量，就可能导致数字领地萎缩甚至消失。这就是说，数字科技寡头对级差地租Ⅱ的贡献远大于封建社会的土地所有者。至于数字空间垄断地租，则仍是一种特殊现象，以稀缺性数字商品的垄断价格为基础。正如马克思所指出的：“这种垄断价格既不是由商品的生产价格决定，也不是由商品的价值决定，而是由购买者的需要和支付能力决定。”

Second, digital space rent is the economic realization of digital space ownership.

第二，数字空间地租是数字空间所有权在经济上的实现。

Marx pointed out that "rent is the economic realization of land ownership." Digital space is divided up and ownership is marked by digital technology oligarchs; entrants must pay rent to obtain the right to use digital space. For example, the transaction commissions, ranking recommendation fees, advertising fees, and the like that Amazon charges merchants are concrete manifestations of digital space rent. The amount of convenience enjoyed from digital space is related to the type and amount of digital space rent paid. Individual digital consumers not only have to pay data usage fees but must also cede personal privacy and data in exchange for permission to enter the digital territory. Perhaps, in the eyes of digital technology oligarchs, they are fundamentally different from the conservative and stubborn landlords of feudal society. Landlords merely used various means to possess land that already existed and then sat back and collected rent, whereas digital technology oligarchs are themselves the constructors of digital space, continuously innovating technology and improving operational efficiency. However, the technology that digital technology oligarchs possess is, in fact, the crystallization of humanity's collective wisdom, and the vast amounts of data they have appropriated are the products of various related parties. Marx pointed out: "All rent is surplus value, the product of surplus labor." Fundamentally, the various forms of digital space rent all originate from the surplus value created by human living labor, and are essentially the redistribution of surplus value by digital monopoly capital based on its monopoly over digital means of production.

马克思指出，“地租是土地所有权在经济上的实现”。数字空间被数字科技寡头瓜分并标注所有权，进入者必须缴纳租金才能换取数字空间使用权。例如，亚马逊向商家收取的交易佣金、排名推荐费、广告费等，就是数字空间地租的具体表现。享受数字空间带来的便利的多寡，与其交付的数字空间地租的类型和多寡有关。个体数字消费者不仅要支付数据使用费，还必须让渡个人隐私和数据以换取进入数字领地的许可。或许，在数字科技寡头看来，自己与封建社会那些保守顽固的地主根本不同。地主只是通过各种手段占有本就存在的土地，然后坐收地租，而数字科技寡头自身不仅是数字空间的建构者，还不断创新技术、提高营运效能。但是，数字科技寡头所掌握的技术，实际上是人类集体智慧的结晶，所据为己有的海量数据也是各相关方的产物。马克思指出：“一切地租都是剩余价值，是剩余劳动的产物。”从根本上来说，形形色色的数字空间地租都源于人的活劳动所创造的剩余价值，实质上是数字垄断资本基于垄断数字生产资料而对剩余价值的再分配。

Third, digital space rent reflects a new trend in the expansion of capital.

第三，数字空间地租反映资本增殖的新动向。

The rise of digital technology has shifted the economic logic of digital space production from “exploitation of surplus value” to “extraction of rent,” forming a capital accumulation model centered on data deprivation and knowledge monopoly. Feudal-style plunder will surpass capitalist production, and the disorderliness of rent will replace the orderliness of profit. Cédric Durand argues that the core of feudal-style plunder is “the unproductive nature of the rentier (that is, the value capture system),” and it follows an economic logic where rent takes precedence over production. In Marx’s M-C-M′ formula, surplus value arises from the valorization movement of industrial capital, with capital mostly injected into the productive activities of the C (commodity) link to obtain profit. But digital technology oligarchs skip the intermediate production link entirely and direct funds into areas that stably collect digital space rent. Adam Smith attributed the methods of generating profit from investment to two types: one is investment of circulating capital in production, sales, and other areas, undergoing the M-C-M′ valorization process; the other is investment of fixed capital, used to improve land, purchase useful machines and tools, or acquire items that provide profit without changing ownership or further circulation. Under the general trend of falling profit rates, the balance of capital investment tilts toward fixed capital investment in digital space, improving the “fertility” of digital space “land” to enhance the rent advantage of digital space. Digital technology oligarchs focus on seizing control of global digital space, abandoning productive activities in the real economy, leading to market concentration and homogenization, eroding space for innovation and overall social welfare.

数字技术的崛起使数字空间生产的经济逻辑从“剥削利润”转向“掠夺租金”，形成以数据剥夺和知识垄断为核心的资本积累模式。封建式掠夺将超越资本主义生产，租金的无序性将取代利润的有序性。塞德里克·迪朗认为，封建式掠夺的核心是“食利者（也就是价值捕获系统）的非生产性本质”，并遵循租金优先于生产的经济逻辑。在马克思的G-W-G′公式中，剩余价值产生于产业资本的增殖运动，资本大多注入W环节的生产性活动以获得利润，但数字科技寡头直接跳过中间生产环节而将资金投向稳定收取数字空间地租的领域。亚当·斯密把投资产生利润的方法归结为两种：一种是流动资本对生产、销售等领域的投资，进行G-W-G′的增殖过程；另一种是固定资本投资，用来改良土地，购买有用的机器和工具，或用来置备无须易主或无须进一步流通即可提供利润的东西。在利润率整体下降的趋势下，资本投资的天平偏向数字空间的固定资本投资，通过改良数字空间“土地”的“肥力”提高数字空间地租优势。数字科技寡头聚焦于争夺全球数字空间控制权，放弃实体经济的生产性活动，导致市场集中化与同质化，侵蚀创新发展空间与社会整体福祉。

II. Three Hidden Crises of the “Quasi-Feudal” Phenomenon in Digital Space Production

二、数字空间生产“类封建”现象隐匿的三重危机

The “quasi-feudal” phenomenon in digital space production does not mean that digital capitalism has or must regress to feudalism. On the contrary, it is itself a product of the logic of capital, a manifestation of the internal contradictions of capitalism, and capitalism’s self-shaping and self-adjustment in the digital age. Driven by capital’s profit-seeking nature, digital technology oligarchs firmly control digital space production by enclosing digital territories, manipulating attention, and closing off digital space ecosystems, turning people and technology into tools for capital valorization. This leads to the spread of digital technology hegemonism, the strengthening of relations of personal dependence, and the exacerbation of social injustice, triggering crises of technological monopoly, human alienation, and governance imbalance.

数字空间生产的“类封建”现象，并不意味着数字资本主义已经或者必然回退至封建主义。相反，它本身就是资本逻辑的产物，是资本主义内在矛盾的表现，是资本主义在数字时代的自我塑造、自我调整。在资本逐利本性的驱动下，数字科技寡头通过圈占数字领地、操控注意力、封闭数字空间生态系统等方式牢牢控制数字空间生产，将人、技术等转化为资本增殖的工具，导致数字技术霸权主义蔓延、人身依附关系加强、社会不公加剧，引发技术垄断危机、人的异化危机、治理失衡危机。

1. The Crisis of Technological Monopoly: Western Countries’ Digital “Enclosure” Movement Fuels Digital Technology Hegemonism

1.技术垄断危机：西方国家数字“圈地”运动助长数字技术霸权主义

Digital space production requires the development of digital technology, but the Western countries’ digital “enclosure” movement demarcates digital technology territories, restricting interaction and mutual promotion between different digital technologies. At the same time, to protect the interests of digital technology oligarchs, the scope of digital technology application is strictly limited, and emerging digital technology countries face repeated suppression. That is to say, the “quasi-feudal” phenomenon in digital space production hinders the further development of digital technology and prevents digital technology from enhancing human welfare.

数字空间生产需要发展数字技术，但西方国家数字“圈地”运动划定数字技术领地，不同数字技术间的互动互促受到制约。同时，为维护数字科技寡头利益，数字技术的应用范围被严格限制，数字技术新兴国家遭受重重打压。也就是说，数字空间生产“类封建”现象阻碍数字技术进一步发展，妨碍数字技术增进人类福祉。

First, accelerating the digital technology race and advancing the privatization of the digital commons.

第一，加速数字技术竞赛，推进数字公地私有化。

The independent kingdoms of digital technology oligarchs are built on the monopolistic possession of digital technology, data, and other resources. The transition from Web 1.0 to Web 2.0 is a process of privatizing the digital commons. In the Web 1.0 era, the digital commons adhered to principles of openness and collaboration, with protocols like TCP/IP offered free of charge. In the Web 2.0 era, people’s identities are defined by data, and the data mapping these digital identities is highly concentrated in technology enterprises. People’s private information and behavioral data are collected, screened, and traded by invisible manipulators in the digital backstage. The free acquisition of vast amounts of raw data lays a solid foundation for the leap in digital technology and provides strong support for the “enclosure” by digital technology oligarchs. To further control the commanding heights of digital space production, digital technology enterprises compete to join the digital technology race, using the rapid iteration of digital technology to reshape the industry landscape, converting advantages in digital technology and digital infrastructure into advantages in digital space production, and consolidating and expanding their digital territories globally. The reason Facebook changed its name to Meta was to declare its intention to step out of the social media “comfort zone” and commit to building an interconnected metaverse. To this end, Meta has invested heavily in developing virtual reality, augmented reality, and mixed reality technologies.

数字科技寡头的独立王国建基于对数字技术、数据等资源的垄断性占有。从Web1.0到Web2.0的变迁，是数字公地私有化的历程。在Web1.0时代，数字公地奉行开放与协作原则，TCP/IP等协议免费服务。在Web2.0时代，人们的身份被数字所定义，映射这些数字身份的数据高度集中于科技企业。人们的私密信息和行为数据等被隐形操盘手在数字后台收集、筛选并交易，大量原始数据的免费获取为数字技术的飞跃奠定坚实基础，也为数字科技寡头的“圈地”提供有力支撑。为了进一步掌控数字空间生产的主导权，数字科技企业争相投身数字技术竞赛，以数字技术的快速迭代重塑行业格局，将数字技术和数字基础设施优势转化为数字空间生产优势，在全球范围内巩固和扩张自己的数字领地。Facebook之所以更名为Meta，就是宣示其要跳出社交媒体“舒适圈”，致力于构建万物互联的元宇宙。为此，Meta投入大量资源开发虚拟现实、增强现实、混合现实等技术。

Second, setting up digital technology barriers and shaping the power structure of digital territories.

第二，设置数字技术壁垒，形塑数字领地权力格局。

In the “quasi-feudal” phenomenon of digital space production, the developmental logic of digital technology itself is subordinated to the logic of hegemony. Digital technology hegemonist countries use means such as technological monopoly, technological blockade, and technological sanctions to hinder the progress of those catching up. First, they abuse the intellectual property protection system. Digital technology hegemonist countries file a large number of peripheral patents around core technologies, weaving an impenetrable patent net, so that every step taken by latecomers may trigger a landmine. The increased risk of infringement greatly raises the R&D costs for latecomers. The intellectual property protection system, which should incentivize innovation, is perverted into a tool that obstructs technological progress. Second, they form exclusive technology alliances. Digital technology hegemonist countries ally with their partners to jointly prevent the technological development of specific countries from achieving global scale effects. For example, the United States built the “Chip 4 Alliance” [n3], aiming to strengthen U.S. dominance in the semiconductor industry and curb the development of the semiconductor industry in mainland China. Third, they manipulate the formulation of international digital technology rules. Digital technology hegemonist countries dominate international technical standards organizations, pushing their own technical solutions to become international standards, forcing the entire industry to develop along a predetermined technical path. In this way, digital space production constructs a “center-periphery” structure, where technology, wealth, and power accelerate their concentration at the “center,” while the “periphery” sinks into a crisis of “digital poverty” and “technological dependency,” leading to a continuously widening digital technology divide.

在数字空间生产“类封建”现象中，数字技术自身的发展逻辑让位于霸权逻辑。数字技术霸权主义国家通过技术垄断、技术封锁、技术制裁等手段，阻碍追赶者的步伐。一是滥用知识产权保护制度。数字技术霸权主义国家围绕核心技术申请大量外围专利，编织水泄不通的专利网，使后来者每一步都可能踩雷。侵权风险的增加大大拉高后来者研发成本。本应激励创新的知识产权保护制度，被异化为阻碍科技进步的工具。二是组建排他性技术联盟。数字技术霸权主义国家联合盟友，共同阻止特定国家的技术发展产生全球性规模效应。例如，美国构建“芯片四方联盟”，旨在强化美国在半导体产业的主导权并遏制中国大陆半导体产业发展。三是操纵国际数字技术规则的制定。数字技术霸权主义国家主导国际技术标准组织，推动自身技术方案成为国际通用标准，使整个行业沿着既定技术路线发展。如此一来，数字空间生产就建构起“中心—边缘”结构，技术、财富和权力向“中心”加速聚集，“边缘”则深陷“数字贫困”和“技术附庸”危机，从而导致数字技术鸿沟持续扩大。

Third, widening the digital technology gap and locking down the boundaries of digital territories.

第三，扩大数字技术代差，锁定数字领地界域。

In the “quasi-feudal” phenomenon of digital space production, the “invisible hand” is replaced by the “digital technology Leviathan.” Digital technology hegemonist countries employ technological, economic, and political means to maintain their digital technology hegemony. First, they formulate national digital strategies to preemptively lay out future industries. By adjusting industrial structures and increasing economic investment, they focus on developing disruptive technologies, aiming to achieve a technological gap advantage like the one “smartphones had over feature phones.” For example, on July 23, 2025, the White House released *Winning the Competition: The U.S. Artificial Intelligence Action Plan* [n4], outlining a roadmap to achieve U.S. dominance in the field of artificial intelligence. Second, they replace “comprehensive suppression” with “precision containment.” Targeting cutting-edge digital technologies, they build a “small yard, high fence” through technology export controls, restrictions on foreign investment, and judicial interference, to control the flow of these technologies, and even do not hesitate to launch a “tech cold war” to suppress emerging digital technology countries. For example, the United States, citing “security” concerns, has banned the supply of high-end semiconductor components and chips to China, attempting to “choke” China’s high-tech R&D capabilities.

在数字空间生产“类封建”现象中，“看不见的手”被“数字技术利维坦”取代。数字技术霸权主义国家采取技术、经济、政治等多种手段，护持其数字技术霸权地位。一是制定国家数字战略，抢先布局未来产业。通过调整产业布局、增加经济投入等举措，着力研发颠覆性技术，以期取得像“智能手机碾压功能机”那样的技术代差优势。例如，2025年7月23日，美国白宫发布《赢得竞赛：美国人工智能行动计划》，为实现美国在人工智能领域的主导地位明确路线图。二是以“精准遏制”取代“全面打压”，针对前沿数字技术，通过技术出口管制、对外投资限制、司法干涉等方式筑起“小院高墙”，以控制其流动方向，甚至不惜发动“科技冷战”，对数字技术新兴国进行打压。例如，美国以“安全”为由禁止向中国提供高端半导体零部件和芯片，试图通过“卡脖子”的方式摧毁中国的高新技术研发能力。

2. The Crisis of Human Alienation: Attention Manipulation Strengthens Relations of Personal Dependence

2.人的异化危机：注意力操控强化人身依附关系

To attract more people into the digital space for its exploitation, digital technology oligarchs precisely manipulate emotional needs, fabricate false consumer demands, and vigorously develop the attention economy. This not only subjects people to heavy economic exploitation but also inflicts severe time deprivation and emotional exploitation, leading to a state of alienation as people lose their independence and autonomy.

为吸纳更多人到数字空间以供其役使，数字科技寡头精确操纵情感需要，制造虚假消费需求，大力开发注意力经济。这不仅使人遭受沉重的经济剥削，而且使人蒙受深重的时间剥夺、情感压榨，导致人因独立性、自主性丧失而呈异化态势。

First, the precise calculation of emotional needs.

第一，情感需要的精确计算。

The infinite supply of information and the finiteness of human time determine that attention is a scarce resource. As Jonathan Crary put it: "The endless accumulation of massive data, whether images or language, produces a numbing cacophony of noise and a variety of confusing illusions." In this situation, whoever can attract attention can potentially gain more benefits. This requires focusing on the human emotional world, because content that triggers emotions such as surprise and excitement is better able to attract attention. Digital technology oligarchs, through the chain mechanism of emotional data collection, emotional modeling, content推送[n], emotional response, and a new round of emotional data collection, effectively predict and manipulate human emotions. Technologies such as voice emotion recognition, visual emotion recognition, and text sentiment analysis can not only identify explicit emotional expressions but also infer latent emotional tendencies through subtle clues, thereby guiding emotional choices. For example, Meta, in order to attract more attention, researched emotional contagion in social networks; "this research established a link between emotional manipulation capability and social network engagement, and thereby established Facebook's profitability." Precision advertising based on accurate user profiling has brought Meta enormous revenue. In the third quarter of 2025, its advertising revenue reached $50.082 billion, accounting for 97.74% of total revenue.

信息的无限供给与人的时间的有限决定了注意力是一种稀缺资源。正如乔纳森·克拉里所言：“海量数据无休止地积聚，不管是图像还是语言，会产生让人麻木的刺耳杂音和各种令人困惑的假象。”在此境况下，谁能吸引注意力，谁就可能获得更多利益。这就需要聚焦人的情感世界，因为能引发惊奇、兴奋等情绪的内容，更能吸引注意力。数字科技寡头通过情感数据采集、情感建模、内容推送、情绪响应、新一轮情感数据采集的连环作用机制，有效预测并操纵人的情感。语音情感识别、视觉情感识别、文本情感分析等技术，不仅能识别显性情感表达，而且能通过幽微的线索推断潜在的情感倾向，进而引导情感选择。例如，Meta为了吸引更多注意力而研究社交网络中的情绪传播，“这项研究建立了情绪操纵能力和社交网络参与度之间的联系，进而建立了脸书的盈利能力”。基于用户精确画像的精准广告投放，为Meta带来了巨大收益。2025年第三季度，其广告收入高达500.82亿美元，在总收入中占比97.74%。

Second, the systematic production of虚假消费需求[n].

第二，虚假消费需求的系统生产。

The purpose of attracting attention is not only to increase traffic but also to induce users to make purchases. The first is to stimulate consumption desires. Digital technology oligarchs, by collecting and analyzing user behavioral data, extract information on consumption tendencies, preferences, habits, etc., and then carefully design诱导 strategies[n], shifting from catering to user needs to controlling user needs, and further to manufacturing user needs. The second is to eliminate spatial barriers. By unifying product templates, evaluation systems, logistics interfaces, etc., they incorporate globally dispersed commodities into a structured, searchable digital space, promoting the symbolic circulation of commodities, thereby transforming shopping from "the flow of people" into "the flow of goods," achieving "de-geographization," and shaping the consumption expectation of "instant availability." The third is to construct "thousands of faces for thousands of people" personalized scenarios. On digital platforms, users' browsing, searching, and purchasing behaviors are recorded in real time; personalized recommendations and search ranking algorithms reorganize the product interface in front of users in real time, creating exclusive consumption spaces. Moreover, digital platforms have expanded membership benefits from "free shipping" to content services such as video, music, and e-books, achieving full-scenario coverage of shopping, entertainment, and life services, making it difficult for people to break away. The fourth is to embed consumption culture with value-guiding characteristics, delivering cultural products containing cognitive biases, and strengthening people's dependence on digital platform consumption. As a result, much consumption is not so much to satisfy one's own needs as to fill desires manufactured by others.

吸引注意力的目的，不仅在于增加流量，而且在于诱导用户买单。一是刺激消费欲望。数字科技寡头通过收集分析用户行为数据，提炼消费倾向、喜好习惯等信息，进而精心设计诱导策略，从迎合用户需求转变为控制用户需求，进而跃升为制造用户需求。二是消弭空间障碍。通过统一商品模板、评价系统、物流接口等方式，将全球分散商品纳入结构化、可搜索的数字空间，促进商品符号化流通，从而将购物由“人的流动”转化为“物的流动”，实现“去地理化”，形塑“即时可得”的消费预期。三是构建“千人千面”的个性场景。在数字平台上，用户浏览、搜索、购买行为被实时记录，个性化推荐、搜索排名算法实时重组用户眼前的商品界面，打造专属消费空间。不仅如此，数字平台还将会员权益从“免运费”扩展至视频、音乐、电子书等内容服务，实现购物、娱乐、生活服务等全场景覆盖，使人难以脱离。四是嵌入具有价值引导性的消费文化，投送包含认知偏见的文化产品，强化人们对数字平台消费的依赖。这样一来，许多消费与其说是为了满足自己的需求，不如说是为了填补被他人制造出来的欲望。

Third, the continuous intensification of human alienation.

第三，人的异化的持续加剧。

Digital technology oligarchs, by means of emotional computing and desire manipulation, attract attention and induce people to linger in digital space, cutting off their connection with real space. In digital space, both the body and spirit of humans are labeled by digitalized symbols. Through data system analysis, human behavior and consciousness are clearly presented; humans become transparent beings that can be easily controlled. The "attention economy" enhanced by emotional computing not only competes for people's time but also manipulates their internal emotional states. Joy, anger, grief, and happiness are no longer personal feelings but data that are precisely quantified, accurately analyzed, and even purposefully shaped; vivid human emotions become products of program manipulation. The desire generation mechanism not only manufactures虚假消费需求[n] but also precisely guides behavioral choices, deconstructs people's systems of knowledge and experience, and devours human self-awareness. Long-term indulgence in unique虚假 digital landscapes[n] continuously narrows and homogenizes people's attention, obscures genuine emotions, diverts real needs, and severely impairs perceptual, cognitive, and action capabilities, making independent thinking, autonomous judgment, and conscious creation a luxury. Vibrant humans gradually become objectified into information nodes in digital space, alienated into subjects willingly enslaved by digital lords.

数字科技寡头借由情感计算、欲望操纵等方式吸引注意力，诱导人们流连于数字空间，切断其与现实空间的连接。在数字空间中，人的肉体和精神均被数字化的符号所标注。通过数据系统解析，人的行为和意识被清晰呈现，人变成可以轻易被把控的透明人。情感计算加持的“注意力经济”不仅争夺人的时间，而且操控人内在的情绪状态。喜怒哀乐已不再是个人的感受，而是被精确量化、精准分析甚至是被有目的地塑造的数据，生动的人类情感成为程序操纵的产物。欲望生成机制不仅制造虚假消费需求，而且精准引导行为选择，解构人的知识经验系统，吞噬人的自我意识。长期沉迷于独特的虚假数字景观，人的注意力被持续窄化和同化，真实情感被遮蔽，真正需求被转移，感知、认知和行动能力严重受损，独立思考、自主判断、自觉创造成为奢望。鲜活的人逐渐物化为数字空间的信息节点，异化为心甘情愿被数字领主奴役的对象。

3. Governance Imbalance Crisis: Closed Digital Space Ecosystems Exacerbate Social Injustice

3.治理失衡危机：封闭数字空间生态系统加剧社会不公

In order to maximize and sustainably extract digital space rent and consolidate their dominant position, digital technology oligarchs, leveraging their advantages in digital infrastructure and digital technology, establish closed digital space ecosystems, leading to information closure, resource monopolization, and power monopoly, thereby undermining social fairness and justice.

为最大化、可持续地攫取数字空间地租并巩固自身支配地位，数字科技寡头凭借在数字基础设施、数字技术等方面的优势，建立封闭数字空间生态系统，导致信息封闭、资源独占、权力垄断，从而破坏了社会公平正义。

First, spatial isolation forms information silos.

第一，空间隔离形成信息孤岛。

From the perspective of digital technology oligarchs, isolating digital territories from real-life spaces and other digital spaces is necessary to lock in users and exclude competitors, ensuring the maximization of capital accumulation. The first is technical control. They adopt incompatible technologies to isolate other digital spaces, even through hardware-software一体化闭环[n], strengthening the separation from the outside. For example, Apple's iOS system only runs on Apple's hardware devices. The second is ecological binding. They not only pre-install their own applications for bundled sales but also, through application programming interface (API) restrictions, prohibit or strictly control the interaction of applications and services within their ecosystem with competitors. At the same time, they require users to use a unified account to log into ecosystem services (including third-party services), using the monopoly of the account system to strengthen user binding. Apple and Google also require that applications be distributed only through their official app stores, achieving full control over the ecosystem. The third is economic blockade. They强制使用自有支付渠道[n], or restrict the use of third-party payments, thereby controlling the payment system, charging fees, and intercepting transaction data. Closed digital space ecosystems allow digital technology oligarchs to profit at every stage, while the spirit of internet connectivity, sharing, and open cooperation is completely lost. Yuval Noah Harari断言世界将分裂为若干数字帝国[n],人类社会将从“网”到“茧”[n]. "The world today is gradually being divided by a silicon curtain... The digital networks and codes on either side of the silicon curtain are also drifting further apart, each with its own norms and different purposes."

在数字科技寡头看来，将数字领地与现实生活空间、其他数字空间相隔离，才能锁定用户、排除竞争对手，确保资本增殖最大化。一是技术控制。采用不兼容技术来隔绝其他数字空间，甚至通过硬件软件一体化闭环，强化与外界的切割。例如，苹果的iOS系统只运行于苹果旗下的硬件设备。二是生态绑定。不仅通过预装自有应用实现捆绑销售，而且通过应用程序编程接口（API）限制，禁止或者严格控制本生态系统内的应用和服务同竞争对手的交互。同时，要求用户使用统一账号登录生态内服务（包括第三方服务），以账号体系的垄断强化用户绑定。苹果、谷歌还要求必须通过其官方应用商店分发应用，以实现对生态系统的全控制。三是经济封锁。强制使用自有支付渠道，或者限制使用第三方支付，从而控制支付系统，收取手续费并截留交易数据。封闭数字空间生态系统，使数字科技寡头在每一个环节都能获益，也使互联网联通共享、开放合作的精神荡然无存。尤瓦尔·赫拉利断言世界将分裂为若干数字帝国，人类社会将从“网”到“茧”。“现在的世界则逐渐是被硅幕分割的……硅幕两侧所用的数字网络与代码也渐行渐远，各自有不同的规范，也有着不同的目的。”

Second, resource monopolization fuels economic greed.

第二，资源独占助长经济贪婪。

In closed digital space ecosystems, digital technology oligarchs monopolize resources such as data, further激发资本的逐利本性[n]. The first is to influence economic operations with self-serving rules. Google collects users' search content, browsing habits, geographic location, etc.; Amazon collects consumers' purchase preferences, consumption capacity, product evaluations, etc. These oligarchs, monopolizing massive amounts of data, construct real-world orders such as "consumption customization" and "data price discrimination," systematically shaping the order of production, circulation, and consumption in real space. The second is to replace competition with monopoly. Closed digital space ecosystems firmly lock in users and continuously strengthen user loyalty. At the same time, they block data outflow, forming a complete闭环[n] of data collection, processing, and application. The continuous privatization of data resources accelerates production concentration and capital concentration, suppresses market vitality, consolidates the dominant position of digital technology oligarchs, and generates enormous monopoly profits. The third is to challenge law and regulation. Large-scale collection and use of user data, even tracking user behavior and extracting data across applications and platforms through unified account systems, leads to the rampant spread of "surveillance capitalism," continuously eroding user privacy and autonomy. The fourth is to harm social public interests for their own benefit. Former Meta employee Frances Haugen publicly disclosed that this American social media giant, in order to maximize its own interests, tolerated the spread of harmful information; its algorithms fueled the spread of extremist and hateful content, exacerbating user division and confrontation.

在封闭数字空间生态系统中，数字科技寡头独占数据等资源，进一步激发资本的逐利本性。一是以利己规则影响经济运行。谷歌收集用户的搜索内容、浏览习惯、地理位置等数据，亚马逊收集消费者的购买偏好、消费能力、产品评价等数据。这些垄断海量数据的寡头，建构出“消费定制”“数据杀熟”等现实秩序，实现对现实空间生产、流通、消费等秩序的系统性建构。二是以垄断取代竞争。封闭数字空间生态系统牢牢锁定用户，不断强化用户忠诚度。同时阻断数据流出，形成数据采集、处理和应用的完整闭环。数据资源的持续私有化，加速生产集中和资本集中，抑制市场活力，巩固数字科技寡头支配地位，催生巨大垄断利润。三是挑战法律与监管。大规模收集和利用用户数据，甚至通过统一账号体系跨应用、跨平台追踪用户行为并提取数据，导致“监控资本主义”肆虐，不断侵蚀用户隐私权和自主权。四是为追求自身利益而不惜损害社会公共利益。Meta前员工弗朗西斯·豪根公开披露，这家美国社交媒体巨头，为了自身利益最大化纵容有害信息散布，其算法助长极端和仇恨内容传播，加剧用户分化和对立。

Third, power monopoly leads to power spillover.

第三，权力垄断导致权力外溢。

In closed digital space ecosystems, digital technology oligarchs hold supreme power. This power, lacking effective checks and balances, spills over into physical space. First, it influences political processes. Digital technology oligarchs who control global network communication and social media possess powerful discourse power, exerting significant influence over public opinion, public issues, and political elections. "Some tech giants use advanced technological capabilities to manipulate legislation and public opinion, and even interfere in national elections and major political arrangements." In the 2024 U.S. presidential election, Elon Musk used the social media platform "X" (formerly Twitter) under his control to campaign for Trump, helping him win. Second, it affects global governance. The tentacles of digital technology oligarchs have broken through traditional national geographic boundaries; their rules on "rent" collection, content moderation, etc., often conflict with the laws, regulations, and cultural traditions of the countries where they operate. Furthermore, digital technology oligarchs collude in power with capitalist states, using digital technology advantages to devour the digital space of other countries, plundering data resources on a large scale, damaging the digital sovereignty of relevant countries, and disrupting the global digital space production order.

在封闭数字空间生态系统中，数字科技寡头享有至上权力。这种权力缺乏有效制衡，会外溢到现实空间。一是影响政治进程。掌握全球网络传播和社交媒体的数字科技寡头拥有强大话语权，对社会舆论、公共议题、政治选举等具有重大影响。“一些科技巨头运用先进的技术能力，操控立法和舆论，甚至干预国家选举和重大政治安排”。在2024年美国总统大选中，埃隆·马斯克就是利用自己掌控的社交媒体“X”（前身为Twitter）为特朗普造势，助力其胜选。二是影响全球治理。数字科技寡头的触手已突破传统国家地理边界限制，其“地租”收取、内容审核等规则常常与业务开展国的法律法规和文化传统相冲突。此外，数字科技寡头还与资本主义国家进行权力勾连，利用数字技术优势吞噬其他国家的数字空间，大肆掠夺数据资源，损害相关国家数字主权，破坏全球数字空间生产秩序。

III. China's Plan to Transcend the "Quasi-Feudal" Phenomenon in Western Digital Space Production

三、超越西方国家数字空间生产“类封建”现象的中国方案

The "quasi-feudal" phenomenon in Western digital space production poses severe challenges to technological progress, human development, and global governance, serving as a wake-up call. China should further leverage the advantages of the new-type nationwide system [n15] to achieve a high level of technological self-reliance and self-strengthening, breaking through the encirclement of digital technology hegemonism; rationally allocate attention resources, escaping the manipulation of the desire-generation mechanism in digital space, and optimizing the dynamic mechanism of the digital economy; build an open digital space ecosystem, realize the universal sharing of data as a factor of production, and promote fairness and justice in digital society.

西方国家数字空间生产“类封建”现象，对科技进步、人的发展、全球治理提出严峻挑战，令人警醒。中国应该进一步发挥新型举国体制优势，实现高水平科技自立自强，突破数字技术霸权主义围堵；合理配置注意力资源，摆脱数字空间欲望生成机制操控，优化数字经济动力机制；构建开放数字空间生态系统，实现数据要素普惠共享，推动实现数字社会公平正义。

1. Achieve a High Level of Technological Self-Reliance and Self-Strengthening, Breaking Through the Encirclement of Digital Technology Hegemonism

1.实现高水平科技自立自强，突破数字技术霸权主义围堵

Currently, digital technology hegemonic states collude with international digital technology oligarchs to dominate digital space, launching a digital technology suppression offensive against China, pushing international digital technology competition toward a zero-sum game. Ensuring the independent controllability of key core technologies is the fundamental measure for China to address the "quasi-feudal" trend in digital space production. General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized: "Fully leverage the advantages of the new-type nationwide system to accelerate the achievement of a high level of technological self-reliance and self-strengthening." The "newness" of the "new-type nationwide system" lies in achieving an organic combination of a capable government and an effective market, fully mobilizing the initiative of all links and the entire chain of technological innovation to jointly advance key core technology breakthroughs.

当前，数字技术霸权主义国家勾结国际数字科技寡头统摄数字空间，向中国发起数字技术压制攻势，推动国际数字科技竞争走向零和博弈。确保关键核心技术自主可控，是中国应对数字空间生产“类封建”趋势的根本举措。习近平总书记强调：“充分发挥新型举国体制优势，加快推进高水平科技自立自强。”“新型举国体制”之“新”，关键在于实现有为政府与有效市场的有机结合，充分调动科技创新各环节、全链条积极性，共同推进关键核心技术攻关。

First, focusing on a capable government, build an open and inclusive innovation society.

第一，着眼有为政府，构建开放包容创新社会。

"Building a strong technological nation is the shared responsibility of the entire Party and the whole country." It is necessary to strengthen the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee over scientific and technological work, relying on the steady hand of a capable government to solve strategic, long-term, high-risk technical problems that the market is unwilling, unable, or incapable of handling, achieving original breakthroughs "from 0 to 1," and effectively transforming institutional advantages into advantages in science and technology governance and science and technology competition. First, strengthen strategic guidance. Target important areas concerning our country's industry, economy, and national security, scientifically formulate science and technology development strategic plans, clearly define priority development areas, key breakthrough directions, and major tasks, and clearly map out the roadmap and timeline for technological innovation. Second, innovate systems and mechanisms. Strengthen the construction of national strategic scientific and technological forces, optimize the systems and mechanisms for collaborative research among national research institutions, high-level research universities, and leading technology enterprises. Innovate talent cultivation models for science and technology, focusing on cultivating strategic scientists, first-class leading talents, and high-level innovation teams. Improve the evaluation mechanism for scientific and technological talent, encouraging innovation, highlighting contributions, emphasizing practical results, and valuing ability. Improve the fund management system, granting researchers greater autonomy in fund allocation and resource deployment. Improve the intellectual property protection system, fully safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of technological innovators. Third, integrate resource input. Focus on national strategic needs, improve the input mechanism combining competitive support and stable support, stably support key research institutions and key technological innovation entities, and stably support important basic research and major technological tasks. Mobilize social resources for long-term stable investment, "encourage and standardize the development of angel investment, venture capital, private equity investment, better utilize government investment funds, and develop patient capital." Fourth, regulate and guide digital capital. General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized: "Regulate and guide the healthy development of capital, leveraging its positive role as an important factor of production." Further deepen the understanding of digital capital, define the boundaries for digital capital operation, improve anti-monopoly legislation for digital capital, strengthen whole-process, whole-chain supervision, prevent digital capital from illegally "enclosing land to create wealth," and ensure it develops digital technology within the framework of serving the people and national interests. Fifth, cultivate an innovation environment. Strengthen the construction of the rule of law, protect fair competition, and reduce the institutional transaction costs of technological innovation. Cultivate an innovation culture, adhere to the principle of long-termism, maintain strategic resolve and strategic patience, encourage exploration, and uphold innovation.

“建设科技强国，是全党全国的共同责任。”必须加强党中央对科技工作的集中统一领导，依靠有为政府的定力，解决市场不愿干、不能干、干不好的战略性、长期性、高风险技术问题，实现“从0到1”的原始性突破，切实将制度优势转化为科技治理优势、科技竞争优势。一是加强战略引领。瞄准事关我国产业、经济和国家安全的重要领域，科学制定科技发展战略规划，明确优先发展领域、重点突破方向和重大任务，清晰绘制科技创新路线图和时间表。二是创新体制机制。加强国家战略科技力量建设，优化国家科研机构、高水平研究型大学、科技领军企业协同攻关的体制机制。创新科技人才培养模式，着力培养战略科学家、一流领军人才和高水平创新团队。完善科技人才评价机制，鼓励创新、突出贡献、注重实效、重视能力。完善经费管理制度，在经费支配、资源调度等方面，赋予科研人员更大自主权。完善知识产权保护制度，充分保障科技创新者合法权益。三是整合资源投入。聚焦国家战略需求，完善竞争性支持和稳定支持相结合的投入机制，稳定支持重点科研机构和重点科技创新主体，稳定支持重要基础研究和重大科技任务。调动社会资源长周期稳定投入，“鼓励和规范发展天使投资、风险投资、私募股权投资，更好发挥政府投资基金作用，发展耐心资本”。四是规范和引导数字资本。习近平总书记强调：“规范和引导资本健康发展，发挥其作为重要生产要素的积极作用。”进一步深化对数字资本的认识，厘定数字资本运行界限，完善数字资本反垄断立法，强化全过程全链条监管，防止数字资本违法违规“圈地造富”，使之在服务人民和国家利益的框架下发展数字技术。五是营造创新环境。加强法治建设，保护公平竞争，降低科技创新的制度性交易成本。培育创新文化，奉行长期主义原则，保持战略定力和战略耐心，鼓励探索，崇尚创新。

Second, based on an effective market, stimulate the vitality of technological innovation.

第二，立足有效市场，激发科技创新活力。

In the new-type nationwide system, the market is not a passive recipient but an important driving force for technological innovation, the main body that transforms technology into products, industries, and competitiveness, achieving the diffusion and application "from 1 to N." First, efficiently allocate innovation resources. Through supply-demand mechanisms, price mechanisms, and competition mechanisms, accurately reflect real demand, adjust the direction and flow of resources, and guide capital, technology, talent, data, and other factors toward the most critical, most promising, and most efficient technological innovation fields and enterprises, achieving optimal resource allocation. In particular, guide social capital to flow toward national major needs and key technological fields, forming synergy with state capital to amplify the effectiveness of funds. Second, fully leverage the role of enterprises as the main body of technological innovation. Fully leverage the leading goose effect of state-owned enterprises, making forward-looking arrangements in key and weak technological fields. Promote industry-university-research integrated innovation led by state-owned enterprises, facilitating the coordinated development of innovation chains, industry chains, capital chains, and talent chains. Support private enterprises in participating in global market competition with flexible methods, promoting the iterative upgrading, diffusion, and application of self-developed products. Encourage leading technology enterprises to take the lead in forming innovation consortia, undertaking major national technological research tasks, and playing the "role of 'question setter,' 'answer provider,' and 'evaluator' for leading technology enterprises." Guide specialized, small and medium-sized enterprises with unique technologies to broadly participate in technological innovation, focusing on breakthroughs in key components or key technologies. Third, accelerate the efficient transformation and application of scientific and technological achievements. Promote deep integration of technological innovation and industrial innovation, organically link the supply of scientific and technological achievements with the demand for industrial upgrading, improve the system for transferring and transforming scientific and technological achievements, enhance the efficiency of transforming achievements from samples to products to industries, and promote the rapid transformation of scientific and technological achievements into productive forces. Fourth, deepen international digital technology exchange and cooperation. Integrate into the global digital technology innovation network, make good use of international digital technology innovation resources, combine independent innovation and open innovation, and strengthen the external support forces for a high level of technological self-reliance and self-strengthening.

在新型举国体制中，市场并非被动接受者，而是科技创新的重要动力，是将技术转化为产品、产业和竞争力，实现“从1到N”扩散应用的主体力量。一是高效配置创新资源。通过供求机制、价格机制和竞争机制，精准反映真实需求，调节资源流向和流量，引导资本、技术、人才、数据等要素流向最紧要、最有前景、最高效率的科技创新领域和企业，实现资源优化配置。尤其要引导社会资本向国家重大需求、关键科技领域流动，与国有资本形成合力，放大资金效能。二是充分发挥企业科技创新主体作用。充分发挥国有企业头雁效应，前瞻性布局重点和薄弱科技领域。推动国有企业主导的产学研融通创新，促进创新链、产业链、资金链、人才链协同发展。支持民营企业以灵活的方式参与全球市场竞争，促进自主攻关产品迭代升级和推广应用。鼓励科技领军企业牵头组建创新联合体，承担国家重大科技攻关任务，发挥“科技领军企业‘出题人’、‘答题人’、‘阅卷人’作用”。引导专精特新中小企业广泛参与科技创新，聚焦关键部件或关键技术的突破。三是加快科技成果高效转化应用。推动科技创新和产业创新深度融合，有机衔接科技成果供给与产业升级需求，完善科技成果转移转化体系，提高科技成果从样品到产品再到产业的转化应用效率，促进科技成果快速转化为生产力。四是深化国际数字技术交流合作。融入全球数字科技创新网络，善用国际数字科技创新资源，融合自主创新和开放创新，壮大高水平科技自立自强的外部支持力量。

2. Rationally Allocate Attention Resources, Optimize the Dynamic Mechanism of the Digital Economy

2.合理配置注意力资源，优化数字经济动力机制

In the "quasi-feudal" digital space production, digital technology oligarchs, through algorithmic recommendations, personalized customization, and other means, deeply mine attention resources, continuously deconstructing human perceptual systems and behavioral patterns. In the process of Chinese-path modernization, although the development of the digital economy still relies on user attention, it is possible to transform "traffic thinking" into "value thinking," working from both breadth and depth dimensions to build a sustainable and healthy digital economy.

在“类封建”数字空间生产中，数字科技寡头凭借算法推荐、个性化定制等手段，深度挖掘注意力资源，不断解构人类感知系统和行为模式。在中国式现代化进程中，尽管数字经济发展仍离不开用户注意力，但可以将“流量思维”转变为“价值思维”，从广度和深度两个方面着力，构建可持续的健康数字经济。

First, deepen algorithm governance, expand "breadth attention."

第一，深化算法治理，拓展“广度注意力”。

Deepening algorithmic governance and ensuring that people have access to rich information are key to solving the problem of attention appropriation. First, increase the transparency of algorithmic recommendation systems. The focus is on helping all relevant stakeholders understand algorithms at different levels. For ordinary users, the reasons why they become the target of specific content推送 should be explained, and they should be allowed to turn off推送. For content creators, they should be informed of the specific circumstances under which content is recommended, restricted, or prohibited. For regulatory bodies, key parameters that explain the basic logic and operating mechanisms of algorithms should be provided to ensure their legality, compliance, fairness, and impartiality. Second, implement algorithmic ethics compliance responsibilities. Establish and improve algorithmic ethics governance institutions to assume functions such as formulating ethical guidelines, reviewing and approving high-risk projects, and adjudicating disputes. Embed people-centered ethical guidelines into algorithmic recommendation systems to standardize the value presuppositions hidden behind algorithms. Accelerate the construction of a legal system for algorithmic ethics governance to raise the level of rule-of-law in algorithmic ethics governance. Third, guarantee users' autonomous control over their personal attention resources. Improve risk warning mechanisms, research technical tools capable of identifying and resisting emotional manipulation and consumption inducement, and mark content that may trigger excessive emotional reactions. Construct an attention self-management mechanism based on informed consent, explore anti-addiction algorithmic architectures and flexible attention allocation pathways, return the choice to users, and grant users substantive veto power over algorithmic decisions.

深化算法治理，保障人们获取丰富信息，是解决注意力侵占问题的关键。一是提升算法推荐系统透明度。重点在于帮助利益各相关方从不同层面理解算法。对于普通用户，应解释其为什么会成为特定内容的推送对象，并允许其关闭推送。对于内容创作者，应告知内容被推荐、被限制、被禁止的具体情形。对于监管机构，应提供解释算法基本逻辑、运行机制的关键参数，确保其合法合规、公平公正。二是落实算法伦理合规责任。建立健全算法伦理治理机构以承担伦理准则制定、高风险项目审查审批、争议裁决等职能。在算法推荐系统中嵌入以人为本的伦理准则，规范潜藏于算法背后的价值预设。加快推进算法伦理治理法律制度建设，提高算法伦理治理法治化水平。三是保障用户对个人注意力资源的自主支配权。健全风险预警机制，研究能够识别和抵抗情感操纵、消费诱导的技术工具，标记可能引发情绪过度反应的内容。构建基于知情同意的注意力自主管理机制，探索反成瘾算法架构和弹性化注意力分配路径，把选择权交还给用户，并赋予用户对算法决策的实质性否决权。

Second, focus on value acquisition and cultivate "deep attention."

第二，聚焦价值获得，培育“深度注意力”。

Human beings are subjects who understand and transform themselves. Cultivating "deep attention" requires not only optimizing technical design but also individual self-empowerment. First, reshape the value pursuit of digital platforms. Uphold long-termism, change the practice of treating users as disposable fuel to be used up once, and exchange higher user trust and brand reputation for sustainable commercial value. Shift strategy from pursuing "user time spent" to pursuing "value obtained by the user," and from pursuing "broad sources of attention" to pursuing "attracting more attention through sustained attention." Introduce external evaluation mechanisms, adding indicators such as "information diversity" and "cognitive freshness" to help users efficiently obtain valuable content. Second, optimize the content production system. Strengthen the function of core socialist values in allocating attention resources, embedding core socialist values into the underlying logic of digital space content production. Encourage the creation of content with depth, warmth, and value, providing support such as traffic倾斜 and economic incentives for high-quality content producers. Compress the living space of irrational attention and promptly清除 low-quality content. Third, improve public digital literacy. Construct a rational cognitive framework for the public, enhancing their abilities to search, filter, verify, and integrate information, so that they maintain subjective autonomy in the dynamically evolving information ecology and consolidate control over their own consciousness. Cultivate critical thinking in the public, enabling them to objectively assess the truthfulness of information, selectively rather than passively accept algorithmic推送, and effectively resist being swept along by external information flows. Enhance the public's creative abilities, enabling them to skillfully use digital tools to deepen the known, explore the unknown, and create new knowledge, becoming active explorers rather than mere digital consumers. Strengthen offline community connections and健全 emotional support networks in real life to overcome public dependence on digital platforms.

人是认识自我、改造自我的主体。培育“深度注意力”，不仅需要优化技术设计，也需要人的自我赋能。一是重塑数字平台价值追求。秉持长期主义，改变将用户作为一次性燃料用完即弃的做法，以更高用户信任度和品牌美誉度换取可持续商业价值。转换策略，从追求“用户停留时长”转向追求“用户获得价值”，从追求“注意力来源广泛”转向追求“以持续关注吸引更多关注”。引入外部评价机制，增加“信息多样性”“认知新鲜度”等指标，帮助用户高效获得有价值的内容。二是优化内容生产体系。强化社会主义核心价值观的注意力资源配置功能，将社会主义核心价值观融入数字空间内容生产的底层逻辑。鼓励有深度、有温度、有价值的内容创作，为高质量内容生产者提供流量倾斜、经济激励等支持。压缩非理性注意力的生存空间，及时清除低质内容。三是提升公众数字素养。建构公众理性认知框架，提高公众信息搜索、筛选、验证和整合的能力，使其在动态演进的信息生态中保持主体性自觉，巩固对自身意识的控制权。培养公众批判性思维，使其能够客观评估信息的真实性，有选择地而非被动地接受算法推送，有效抵抗外界信息流的裹挟。提高公众创造能力，使其善用数字工具深化已知、探索未知、创造新知，成为主动探索者而不仅仅是数字消费者。强化线下社群连接，健全现实生活中的情感支持网络，克服公众对数字平台的依赖。

3. Build an Open Digital Space Ecosystem to Promote Social Justice and Fairness in the Digital Society

3.构建开放数字空间生态系统，推动实现数字社会公平正义

To prevent the "quasi-feudal" phenomenon in digital space production, it is necessary to prevent digital technology oligarchs from establishing closed digital space ecosystems to monopolize data resources. This requires完善 institutions and systems to promote the compliant and efficient circulation and use of data, and to advance the interconnection and interoperability of digital spaces.

防范数字空间生产“类封建”现象，必须防止数字科技寡头建立封闭数字空间生态系统以独占数据资源。这就需要完善制度和体制机制，促进数据合规高效流通使用，推进数字空间互联互通。

First, promote the compliant and efficient circulation and use of data.

第一，促进数据合规高效流通使用。

To avoid data monopolies, it is necessary to adhere to the principle of data sharing and common use, fully releasing and realizing the value of data as a factor of production. First,健全 mechanisms for the reasonable use of personal data. Reasonably classify categories of personal data and determine different levels of protection for different categories. Follow principles such as purpose limitation, informed consent, and data minimization to protect personal data. Collecting personal data requires not only obtaining the consent of the data subject but also ensuring that the collected data is limited to the minimum necessary to achieve the stated purpose. Legally define specific circumstances where social public interests take precedence over individual rights, promoting the reasonable use of personal data on the basis of balancing individual rights and social public interests. Second,完善 mechanisms for realizing enterprise data rights. Reasonably distinguish different types of data and formulate different management and usage strategies. Encourage enterprises to promote the standardized and systematic management of data, improving data security and usability, and leveraging the scale benefits of data to empower enterprise operations. Reasonably allocate data holding rights, data use rights, and data operation rights, focusing on the流通 of data use rights, and encourage enterprises to engage in data trading and data collaboration under conditions of compliance and security, promoting multi-scenario application of data and transforming data resources into actual benefits. Third, construct efficient流通 mechanisms for public data. Adhere to the "safety-controllable" principle, classify and grade public data, and reasonably delineate the boundaries of openness to ensure that national security, individual lawful rights and interests, and trade secrets are not harmed by data openness. For special data that needs to be opened, conduct lawful and compliant desensitization and anonymization processing to ensure it cannot be traced back to specific individuals or organizations. Based on the principle of "openness as the norm, non-openness as the exception," maximize the openness of public data outside the restricted list, allowing public data to enhance the public interest. Encourage the use of models such as overall authorization, sub-field authorization, and scenario-based authorization to grant operating entities the rights to develop, operate, and provide services, promoting data流通 and flourishing the digital economy. Fourth,健全 incentive mechanisms for the supply of data as a factor of production.健全 mechanisms where the market evaluates the contribution of data factors and determines remuneration based on contribution,完善 the income distribution system for data factors, protect the积极性 of enterprises as market entities, and appropriately倾斜 towards data workers, knowledge workers, and science and technology workers. Advance pilot reforms of "data finance," explore specific pathways for incorporating data assets into balance sheets, making data resources measurable and tradable formal assets for enterprises, effectively releasing the value of data.

避免数据垄断，需要坚持数据共享共用原则，充分释放和实现数据要素价值。一是健全个人数据合理利用机制。合理划分个人数据的类别，并确定不同类别数据的不同保护等级。遵循目的限定、知情同意、最小必要等原则保护个人数据。收集个人数据不仅需要获得当事人同意，而且应确保所收集数据仅限于实现已申明目的所必需的最小范围。依法界定社会公共利益优先于个人权利的具体情形，在平衡个人权利与社会公共利益的基础上促进个人数据合理利用。二是完善企业数据权益实现机制。合理区分不同类型数据，制定不同的管理和使用策略。鼓励企业推进数据的标准化系统化管理，提高数据的安全性和可用性，发挥数据的规模效益赋能企业业务。合理配置数据持有权、数据使用权、数据经营权，聚焦数据使用权流通，鼓励企业在合规和安全的前提下进行数据交易、数据协作，促进数据多场景应用，将数据资源转化为实际效益。三是建构公共数据高效流通机制。遵循“安全可控”原则，对公共数据进行分类分级，合理划定开放界限，保障国家安全、个人合法权益、商业秘密不因数据开放而受到损害。对于需要开放的特殊数据进行合法合规的脱敏和匿名化处理，确保其无法回溯到特定个人或组织机构。本着“开放为常态、不开放为例外”的原则，最大化开放限制清单以外的公共数据，让公共数据增进公共利益。鼓励采用整体授权、分领域授权、依场景授权等模式赋予运营机构开发、经营、服务的权利，促进数据流通，繁荣数字经济。四是健全数据要素供给激励机制。健全数据要素由市场评价贡献、按贡献决定报酬机制，完善数据要素收益分配制度，保护企业作为市场主体的积极性，并向数据劳动者、知识劳动者和科技劳动者等群体适度倾斜。推进“数据财政”改革试点，探索数据资产入表的具体路径，使数据资源成为企业可衡量、可交易的正式资产，有效释放数据价值。

Second, promote the interconnection and interoperability of digital spaces.

第二，推进数字空间互联互通。

To prevent the formation of closed digital space ecosystems, it is necessary to break down barriers between different digital technologies, platforms, applications, and services, and promote technical compatibility, rule interoperability, and identity mutual recognition across different digital spaces. First, carry out the construction of trusted data spaces. Scientifically formulate standards for the reference architecture, functional requirements, operational norms, and key technologies of trusted data spaces, guiding their standardized development. Innovate technologies such as data sandboxes, smart contracts, semantic discovery, and intelligent metadata recognition, accelerating the research, development, and application promotion of trusted流通 technologies. Optimize the construction of trusted data space infrastructure, removing obstacles to the transmission, management, and service of data resources across spaces. Second, construct a data lifecycle security assurance system.完善 the access authentication system, ensuring the authenticity of the identities of all participating parties in the digital space and the clarity of data management rights and responsibilities. In accordance with the requirement that "raw data does not leave the domain, data is usable but not visible," develop privacy computing technologies such as multi-party secure computation and confidential computing, fundamentally removing the concerns of data suppliers from a technical root. Develop blockchain-based evidence preservation technologies and services, using blockchain to record the entire process of data provision, trading, and use, achieving full-process traceability, full-node witnessing, and full-link auditability, ensuring immutability throughout the lifecycle, and creating a safe and reliable environment. Third, construct an open-source model for digital technology. Adhere to the concept of co-construction and sharing, encourage the construction of open-source communities for digital technology, and guide technology enterprises to deeply participate in community operations. Establish and健全 multi-stakeholder innovation incubation mechanisms, building collaborative networks for the流通, sharing, and co-creation of value in digital technology. Explore the establishment of mechanisms for the interconnection and interoperability of domestic and international digital spaces, expand international cooperation in digital spaces, and build a symbiotic and co-prosperous digital space ecosystem on the basis of openness, transparency, and mutual trust.

防止封闭数字空间生态系统的形成，需要打破不同数字技术、平台、应用、服务之间的壁垒，推动不同数字空间技术兼容、规则互通、身份互认。一是开展可信数据空间建设。科学制定可信数据空间参考架构、功能要求、运营规范、关键技术等标准，引导可信数据空间规范发展。创新数据沙箱、智能合约、语义发现、元数据智能识别等技术，加快可信流通技术研发和应用推广。优化可信数据空间基础设施建设，破除跨空间数据资源传输、管控、服务障碍。二是构建数据全生命周期安全保障体系。完善接入认证体系，确保数字空间参与各方身份真实、数据管理权责明确。按照“原始数据不出域、数据可用不可见”的要求，发展多方安全计算、密态计算等隐私计算技术，从技术根源上解除数据供给方的后顾之忧。发展区块链存证技术与服务，利用区块链记录数据提供、交易、使用全过程，实现全流程留痕、全节点见证、全链路可追溯，确保全生命周期不可篡改，营造安全可靠环境。三是构建数字技术开源模式。坚持共建共享理念，鼓励建设数字技术开源社区，引导科技企业深度参与社区运营。建立健全多方参与的创新孵化机制，建设数字技术流通共享、价值共创的协作网络。探索建立国内国外数字空间互联互通机制，拓展数字空间国际合作，在开放、透明、互信的基础上建立共生共荣的数字空间生态系统。