The Main Features and Research Value of *The Chronicle of Mao Zedong (1949–1976)*

*The Chronicle of Mao Zedong (1949–1976)*, compiled by the Party Literature Research Office of the CPC Central Committee, is a six-volume chronological work that comprehensively reflects the 27-year course in which Mao Zedong led the establishment of New China, the establishment of China’s socialist system, and the exploration of the path of socialist construction in China. This chronicle provides rich historical materials for studying Mao Zedong’s ideological theory and work practice after the founding of New China, for studying the historical achievements and experiences and lessons of the socialist revolution and socialist construction led by the CPC, and for studying the foundation on which socialism with Chinese characteristics was formed.

中共中央文献研究室编撰的《毛泽东年谱（1949—1976）》，是一部比较全面地反映毛泽东领导建立新中国，建立中国社会主义制度，探索中国社会主义建设道路27年历程的编年体著作，共6卷。这部年谱为研究新中国成立以后毛泽东的思想理论和工作实践，研究中国共产党领导社会主义革命和社会主义建设取得的历史成就和经验教训，研究中国特色社会主义的形成基础，提供了丰富史料。

The Main Features of *The Chronicle of Mao Zedong (1949–1976)*

《毛泽东年谱（1949—1976）》的主要特点

I. Rich Content and Solid Historical Materials. This chronicle records all aspects of Mao Zedong himself and the theoretical understanding and work practice of important aspects of the Party and the state from the founding of the People’s Republic of China to Mao Zedong’s death. This includes: the formulation of the Party’s line, principles, and policies at various historical stages; the development of political construction, economic construction, cultural construction, and national defense construction; the advancement of Party building; major events at home and abroad and the responses to them; as well as Mao Zedong’s summaries of the Party’s historical experience, his expositions on working methods and ideological methods, his reading and study, his comments on Chinese and foreign historical figures and events, and his interactions with relatives and friends, among other things.

一、内容丰富，史料翔实。这部年谱记述了从中华人民共和国成立到毛泽东逝世这段时期他本人的各个方面、党和国家一些重要方面的理论认识和工作实践。其中包括：各个历史阶段党的路线、方针、政策的制定，政治建设、经济建设、文化建设、国防建设的开展，党的建设的推进，国际国内发生的一些重大事件及应对情况，以及毛泽东对党的历史经验的总结、关于工作方法和思想方法的论述、读书学习情况、对中外历史人物和历史事件的评论、与亲朋好友的交往情况等等。

Many of Mao Zedong’s manuscripts and materials after the founding of the state have already been published publicly, and this chronicle also publishes a number of new documents. These mainly include reports, speeches, talks, instructions, annotations, editorial notes, letters, inscriptions, and so on. Compared with some chronicles already published, this chronicle has relatively many long entries, mainly recording Mao Zedong’s reports, speeches, talks, revisions to documents, and longer instructions and editorial notes, with the aim of reflecting Mao Zedong’s thought more fully and comprehensively. Whether previously published or unpublished, depending on the content of the manuscript, some are included in full, and some are included in excerpt. Correct ones, erroneous ones, and those where correct and erroneous are interwoven are all selected. Mao Zedong’s errors are not evaded. Basically, the original text and original words are quoted, and paraphrasing or summarizing is generally avoided, preserving Mao Zedong’s original meaning and language style. For some speeches, interjections from others are also used; for some important talks, the dialogue form is used for recording. In this way, one can understand the reason for Mao Zedong’s remarks, and also set off the atmosphere of the meetings and conversations at the time, deepening people’s feelings. Mao Zedong’s manuscripts are profound in thought, beautiful in writing, smooth in style, lively and vivid in speech, and widely cited. Although many entries are relatively long, they are fascinating to read and do not feel long.

毛泽东建国以后的文稿和资料公开发表的已经很多了，这部年谱又发表了不少新的文献。主要有报告、讲话、谈话、批示、批注、按语、书信、题字等。同已经出版的一些年谱相比较，这部年谱长条目比较多，主要是记述毛泽东的报告、讲话、谈话，对文件的修改和文字较长的批示、按语等，目的是为了比较充分地、全面地反映毛泽东的思想。不论是已经公开发表的，还是没有公开发表的，根据文稿的内容，有的全文收入，有的摘要收入。正确的、错误的、正确与错误交叉的都选。不回避毛泽东的错误。基本上引用原文、原话，一般不作转述或概括，保持毛泽东的原意和语言风格。有些讲话，还用了一些别人的插话，有的重要谈话，则用对话的形式记述。这样，既能了解毛泽东讲话的缘由，又能烘托出当时会议、谈话的氛围，加深人们的感受。毛泽东的文稿，思想深刻，文字优美，行文流畅，讲话生动活泼，旁征博引。许多条目虽然比较长，读起来却引人入胜，并不觉得长。

Based on relevant archives, the chronicle records Mao Zedong’s daily activities as fully as possible, including meetings, conversations with people, meeting foreign guests, drafting and reviewing telegrams, reading books and newspapers, going out for inspections, visits, and so on, all recorded in detail, with the vast majority having specific times and places. From this, one can see how Mao Zedong spent his day and how his work, which involved handling myriad affairs daily, was arranged.

年谱根据有关档案，尽可能记下毛泽东每天的活动情况，包括开会、与人谈话、会见外宾、起草和批阅文电、读书看报、外出视察、参观访问等，都作了详细记载，绝大部分有具体的时间和地点。从中可以看到毛泽东一天是怎样度过的，日理万机的工作是如何安排的。

The materials used in this chronicle are mainly archives preserved in the Central Archives. The compilers consistently adhered to the principle of objective recording without commentary.

这部年谱所使用的材料，主要是中央档案馆保存的档案。撰写者始终遵循客观记述、不作评论的方针。

II. Coherent Narration with Cross-Reference. The collected works, biographies, and chronicles of major Party and state leaders are referred to as the “three major items” in the compilation and research work of the Party Literature Research Office. Each has its own characteristics, value, and significance. The chronicle has strong historical material value, embodying the strengths of the chronological style, recording the subject’s thoughts and activities, and the process of formulating and implementing major events and major decisions in order of year, month, and day. This compilation fully displays the trajectory of Mao Zedong’s thought and work practice over 27 years, and in particular, one can concretely understand the historical process of how Mao Zedong led the handling of various major events, solved various major problems, and realized various major tasks of the Party and the state. This chronicle can be used both for consulting historical materials on a particular issue, event, or time, and for reading and studying as a biographical work.

二、叙事连贯，前后照应。党和国家主要领导人的著作集、传记、年谱，在中央文献研究室的编研工作中被称作“三大件”。各有各的特点、价值和意义。年谱，史料性强，体现了编年体的长处，按年、月、日顺序记述谱主的思想和活动，经历的重大事件和重大决策的制定与实施过程。这样编写，充分展示了毛泽东在27年间的思想和工作实践的轨迹，特别是可以从中具体地了解毛泽东如何领导处理各种重大事件、解决各种重大问题、实现党和国家各项重大任务的历史过程。这部年谱既可以供人们查阅某一问题、某一事件、某一时间的历史资料，又可以当作一部传记性的书阅读和研究。

Here is an example—the record of the formation process and the causes and effects of the important document *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People*. Mao Zedong gave this speech on February 27, 1957. The speech recorded in the chronicle is not the text later officially published, but the preliminary collated record of the speech at the time, titled *How to Handle Contradictions Among the People*. Mao Zedong revised this speech a total of 13 times. During the revision process, the domestic political situation underwent important changes, shifting from the Party’s rectification movement to the anti-rightist struggle, which inevitably influenced Mao Zedong’s revisions. The chronicle records day by day the situation of Mao Zedong revising the speech manuscript, the process of change in the domestic political situation at the time, and the speeches and instructions Mao Zedong issued during this period, until *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People* was officially published on June 19, 1957. Before February 27, 1957, the chronicle records the Polish and Hungarian events and the policies adopted by the CPC Central Committee, as well as the drafting process of the article *More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, and new situations such as worker strikes and student class boycotts that emerged domestically, along with some speeches Mao Zedong gave at the time and a letter he wrote to Huang Yanpei, all reflecting the historical background and origins of *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People*; after the February 27 speech, the chronicle records a series of Mao Zedong’s speeches and instructions, reflecting his vigorous implementation of the ideas of *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People* and his preparations for the Party’s rectification. This is a relatively complete factual record and can be read and studied as a narrative article. The chronicle is largely compiled in this way for many major events that occurred during these 27 years and the processes of major decisions Mao Zedong led.

这里举一个例子——《关于正确处理人民内部矛盾的问题》这一重要文献的形成过程及其前因后果的记述。毛泽东做这个报告的时间是1957年2月27日，年谱记述的这个报告，不是后来正式发表的文本，而是当时初步整理的讲话记录稿，题目是《如何处理人民内部的矛盾》。毛泽东对这个讲话，一共修改了13次。在修改过程中，国内政治形势发生了重要变化，由党内的整风运动转为反右派斗争，这对于毛泽东的修改不可避免地产生了影响。年谱将毛泽东修改讲话稿的情况、当时国内政治形势的变化过程以及毛泽东在这段时间发表的讲话和批示等，一天一天地记述，直到《正处》1957年6月19日正式发表。在1957年2月27日之前，年谱记述了波匈事件和中共中央采取的方针政策以及《再论无产阶级专政的历史经验》一文的起草过程，国内出现的工人罢工、学生罢课等新情况，以及毛泽东当时发表的一些讲话和写给黄炎培的一封信，这些都反映了《正处》产生的历史背景和渊源；2月27日讲话之后，年谱记述的毛泽东一系列讲话和批示，反映了他雷厉风行地贯彻《正处》思想，为党的整风作准备的情形。这是一段比较完整的实录，可以当作一篇记述文章来阅读和研究。年谱对这27年中发生的许多重大事件和毛泽东领导作出的许多重大决策过程，大都是这样编写的。

III. Selection of Background Materials Strives for Appropriateness. The chronicle not only records Mao Zedong’s words and deeds but also records many background materials indispensable for studying and understanding Mao Zedong’s words and deeds. A common way Mao Zedong guided the work of the entire Party was by forwarding work reports from various localities and central departments, as well as materials from internal publications and newspapers, and when forwarding them, writing comments or instructions in his own name or in the name of the Central Committee, providing guiding opinions. Through the recording of background materials, one can understand the basis for Mao Zedong’s written comments and instructions, as well as his judgments of the situation, and understand where his opinions and thoughts came from. The chronicle also explains the reactions and implementation of some of Mao Zedong’s important instructions after they were issued. Background materials strive to be concise and to the point, with the principle of being sufficient to explain the issue.

三、背景材料的取舍，力求得当。年谱不只是记载毛泽东的言行，还记述了许多对研究和理解毛泽东言行不可缺少的背景材料。毛泽东指导全党的工作，一种常见的方式，是通过转发各个地方和中央各个部门的工作报告以及内部刊物、报纸上的材料，转发时以他个人或者以中央的名义写批语或作指示，提出指导性的意见。通过背景材料的记述，可以从中了解毛泽东所写的批语、所作的指示，以及对形势的判断的依据，了解他的意见、他的思想是从哪里来的。年谱还对毛泽东的一些重要指示下发后的反映、贯彻落实的情况有所说明。背景材料力求写得简明扼要，以能说明问题为原则。

Mao Zedong often said that his mind was just a processing plant, and the materials all came from below. He said: “Writing a major article is not a matter of dashing off a torrent of words; it must be based on the opinions of subordinates and the masses, and must have materials and analysis, and be studied carefully.” He also said: “There is no major issue that we can think up subjectively; they all come from the opinions of those below. The cooperative transformation [1]1 The cooperative transformation refers to the movement to organize individual peasant households into agricultural producers’ cooperatives, a key part of the socialist transformation of agriculture in the 1950s. first saw from Anhui and Zhejiang that new areas could develop on a large scale, and then saw the comprehensive plan of Xiqin Village in Shuangcheng County, Heilongjiang, which made it possible for me to write the article *On the Question of Agricultural Cooperation*.” Mao Zedong launched the “Three-Anti” movement [2]2 The “Three-Anti” movement (1951–1952) was a campaign against corruption, waste, and bureaucracy within the Party and government. mainly after reading Gao Gang’s [3]3 Gao Gang (1905–1954) was a senior Party leader purged in 1954 for alleged factional activities. report of November 1, 1951; the shift from the “Three-Anti” to the “Five-Anti” [4]4 The “Five-Anti” movement (1952) was a campaign targeting bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and stealing state economic information, directed at the bourgeoisie. was due to reading the Beijing Municipal Party Committee’s report of January 23, 1952. Mao Zedong’s active promotion of the agricultural cooperation process in the autumn and winter of 1955, including the establishment of large cooperatives, was based on reports sent in from various localities at the time. His proposal that China could surpass Britain in two years came after reading Bo Yibo’s [5]5 Bo Yibo (1908–2007) was a senior economic official and later Vice Premier. report of June 17, 1958; his proposal for comprehensive balance during the Lushan Conference [6]6 The Lushan Conference (July–August 1959) was a key Party meeting where Mao Zedong criticized Peng Dehuai for opposing the Great Leap Forward., although this idea had long been brewing, was directly greatly influenced by Zhao Erlu’s [7]7 Zhao Erlu (1905–1967) was a senior military and economic official. report of May 26, 1959. The continued promotion of rural public canteens in 1960 was greatly influenced by the Guizhou Provincial Party Committee’s report of February 24, 1960. Examples like this are too numerous to list.

毛泽东经常说，他的头脑只是一个加工厂，材料都是下面来的。他说：“写大文章不是大笔一挥，滔滔不绝，要根据下级和群众的意见，要有材料有分析，过细研究才行。”他还说过：“没有哪一个大问题是我们主观可以想出来的，都是根据下面的意见来的。合作化就是先从安徽、浙江看到新区可以大发展，又看到黑龙江双城县希勤村的全面规划，才使我有可能写出《关于农业合作化问题》那篇文章。”毛泽东发动“三反”运动，主要是看了高岗1951年11月1日的报告后决定的；从搞“三反”到搞“五反”，则是由于看了北京市委1952年1月23日的报告。毛泽东1955年秋冬积极推动农业合作化的进程，包括办大社，都是根据当时各地送来的报告。他提出两年就可以超英，是看了薄一波1958年6月17日的报告；在庐山会议期间提出综合平衡，这个思想虽然早有酝酿，但直接受赵尔陆1959年5月26日报告的影响很大。1960年继续推广农村公共食堂，则是受贵州省委1960年2月24日报告的很大影响。这样的例子举不胜举。

The background materials in the chronicle include not only domestic and intra-Party events but also major international occurrences of the time, such as Stalin’s death, the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the Geneva Conference, the Bandung Conference, the Polish and Hungarian events, the Iraqi Revolution, the Cuban Revolution, the national independence movements in Asian, African, and Latin American countries, the US aggression against Vietnam, and the struggle of African Americans against racial discrimination. All of these exerted an important influence on Mao Zedong’s thinking and related decision-making.

年谱中的背景材料，除了党内和国内的，还有当时国际上发生的一些大事，如斯大林去世、苏共二十大、日内瓦会议、万隆会议、波匈事件、伊拉克革命、古巴革命、亚非拉国家的民族独立运动、美国对越南的侵略、美国黑人反种族歧视斗争等等，这些对毛泽东的思想和有关决策的作出都有着重要的影响。

IV. The chronicle strives to reflect the interactions and exchanges of the chronicle’s subject with others. As the principal leader of the Party and the state, Mao Zedong had extensive contacts and interactions with people from all walks of life—inside and outside the Party, domestic and foreign, at all levels, and even with relatives and friends. The main interactions were within the Party, conducted through meetings, conversations, correspondence, and the forwarding of reports. Many of the ideas and policies Mao Zedong put forward were formed and developed in the course of such exchanges and interactions. When he was about to make a major decision, he generally first talked with a small number of people, then held meetings of a smaller scope, and subsequently convened meetings of a larger scope. At the same time, he would go to the localities to talk and hold meetings with provincial, prefectural, and county-level officials to understand the situation and hear opinions. Some exchanges took the form of intra-Party correspondence. To give one example: in 1953, when China began large-scale economic construction, Mao Zedong made an inspection tour southward from February 15 to 26. During the journey, while talking with the deputy political commissar of the ship “Luoyang” on which he was traveling, he said: “This year is the first year of our country’s large-scale economic construction. I am going to several provinces to look around, precisely to hear the opinions of those below, so as to help the Central Committee make correct decisions.” In the process of exchange and interaction, Mao Zedong’s ideas and considerations influenced others, and others’ opinions in turn influenced Mao Zedong. Of course, the final decision-maker on policies and guidelines was Mao Zedong. When his guiding ideology was correct, this interaction was benign; when his guiding ideology erred, this interaction produced negative effects and reinforced erroneous tendencies. The rampant inflation of production targets during the “Great Leap Forward” is a typical example.

四、谱主同他人的交流互动，尽量反映。毛泽东作为党和国家主要领导人，同各方面人的交往与接触非常多，党内党外，国内国外，上上下下，以至亲朋好友。主要是党内的，通过开会、谈话、通信、批转报告等。毛泽东提出的很多思想和政策，大都是在交流和互动中形成和发展起来的。他要作出某一重大决策时，一般地是先找少数人谈话，然后再开较小范围的会，继而再开较大范围的会。同时，还要到地方上去，同省的和地县两级的负责人交谈、开会，了解情况，听取意见。有些则是以党内通信的形式，进行交流。举一个例子。1953年我国开始大规模经济建设，毛泽东从1953年2月15日到26日南下视察。途中在同所乘“洛阳”舰的副政委谈话时说:今年，是我国大规模经济建设第一年。这次我到几个省走一走，就是想听听下面的意见，有助于中央做出正确的决策。在交流、互动的过程中，毛泽东的想法和考虑影响了别人，别人的意见又反过来影响毛泽东。当然，提出方针政策的最后决定者是毛泽东。当他的指导思想是正确的时候，这种互动是良性的；当指导思想发生错误的时候，这种互动则会产生负面的影响，会助长错误的东西，“大跃进”中的高指标的泛滥就是一个典型的例子。

V. The annotations are relatively thorough. This chronicle contains approximately 3,900 annotations, the majority of which concern the official positions of individuals. At the same time, it provides some materials as supplements to and explanations of the main text. For example, under the entry for June 13, 1959, which records a meeting Mao Zedong convened, an annotation is added at the point where steel output targets are discussed, explaining the process by which the 1959 steel output target was reduced from 16.5 million tons to 13 million tons. Another example: during the first Lushan Conference, at the point where Mao Zedong’s shift from correcting “Leftist” errors to opposing “Rightist” errors is described—a shift that was to a certain extent influenced by some comrades with relatively “Leftist” thinking at the time—an annotation is inserted, citing Wang Renzhong’s diary as supporting evidence. At the point where Mao Zedong’s meeting with He Zizhen at Lushan is recorded, the annotation cites a participant’s recollections of specific details of that meeting. Another example: under the entry for July 29, 1959, which records Mao Zedong’s conversation with Huang Kecheng, Zhou Xiaozhou, and three others, the annotation cites the account of this conversation as recorded in *The Autobiography of Huang Kecheng*. Another example: concerning Mao Zedong’s letter to Jiang Qing on July 8, 1966, some people once believed that this letter must have been written after the Lin Biao incident and could not have been written in 1966. Among the extant archives, there is a copy of this letter transcribed by Mao Zedong’s confidential secretary Xu Yefu, with a few characters revised by Mao Zedong on the copy. After writing this letter, Mao Zedong showed it to Zhou Enlai and Wang Renzhong in Wuchang. An annotation is provided for this letter, citing Wang Renzhong’s diary entry for July 13, 1966, which records the circumstances under which he read the letter at that time. Another example: under the entry for September 8, 1971, which records Lin Biao writing a handwritten order instructing Lin Liguo to devise a plan to assassinate Mao Zedong, the annotation cites the handwritten confessions of Wang Fei and Lu Min. The annotations in the chronicle also introduce the content of articles Mao Zedong read or recommended to others, explain the implementation status of Mao Zedong’s instructions, clarify certain unsubstantiated rumors circulating in society, and correct factual or textual errors in the documents, among other things.

五、注释比较周详。这部年谱的注释，共有3900条左右，大量的是关于人物的任职。同时还提供一些材料，作为正文的补充和对正文的说明。例如，1959年6月13日条，记述毛泽东召开的一次会议，在讲到钢产指标的地方，加了一个注释，介绍1959年钢产量由1650万吨降到1300万吨的经过。又例如，第一次庐山会议期间，讲到毛泽东从纠“左”转到反右，在一定程度上也受到当时一些思想较“左”的同志的影响处，在这里写了一条注释，引用王任重的日记作为一个佐证。在记述毛泽东庐山会见贺子珍处，注释中引用了一位当事人对会见时一些具体情景的回忆材料。又例如，1959年7月29日，毛泽东同黄克诚、周小舟等四人谈话这一条。注释引用了《黄克成自述》中对这次谈话的情况的记述。又例如，关于1966年7月8日毛泽东给江青的信，曾有人认为这封信应当是在林彪事件以后写的，在1966年不可能写这样的信。在现存的档案中，有毛泽东的机要秘书徐业夫抄写的这封信，毛泽东在抄件上改了几个字。当年毛泽东写这封信后，曾在武昌给周恩来、王任重看过。对这封信作了一条注释，引用王任重1966年7月13日的日记，其中记载了他当时读到这封信的情况。又例如，1971年9月8日记述林彪亲笔写下手令，让林立果策划谋害毛泽东的方案这一条，在注释中引用了王飞的亲笔供词和鲁珉的亲笔供词。年谱的注释，还对毛泽东读过的或者推荐别人阅读的文章作内容介绍，对毛泽东批示的落实情况作说明，对社会上流传的一些不实之事进行澄清，对文献中史实、文字方面的错误进行订正，等等。

The Research Value of *The Chronicle of Mao Zedong (1949–1976)*

《毛泽东年谱（1949—1976）》的研究价值

Mao Zedong was the principal leader and decision-maker of the Party and the state. His thought played a guiding role in the socialist revolution and socialist construction carried out after the founding of New China. Studying Mao Zedong’s thought and work practice during these 27 years has not only historical significance but also contemporary and referential significance. The content of the chronicle is extremely rich and covers a very wide range of aspects. Below, we briefly introduce some of Mao Zedong’s main ideas and work practices recorded in the chronicle, as well as their development and changes, focusing on several issues.

毛泽东是党和国家的主要领导人和决策者。他的思想在新中国成立后进行的社会主义革命和社会主义建设中，起着主导作用。研究毛泽东在这27年间的思想和工作实践，不仅有历史意义，还有现实意义和借鉴意义。年谱的内容非常之多，涉及的方面非常之广。下面仅就几个方面的问题，简要地介绍年谱记述的毛泽东的一些主要思想和工作实践及其发展变化情况。

I. On the Question of Exploring a Path of Socialist Construction Suitable for China’s Conditions

一、 关于探索适合中国情况的社会主义建设道路问题

This is one of the most important contents of the entire work. From 1956, after the basic completion of the socialist transformation, Mao Zedong began to explore the theme of what socialism is and how to build it. *On the Ten Major Relationships* made a start. He said: “After liberation, during the three-year period of recovery, we were muddle-headed about construction. Then we carried out the First Five-Year Plan, and we were still muddle-headed about construction; we could only basically copy the Soviet methods, but we always felt dissatisfied and unhappy. In 1956, the socialist transformation of the means of production was basically completed. In the spring of 1956, I talked with more than thirty ministers, piecing together problems one by one, and put forward *On the Ten Major Relationships*. At that time, I also read Stalin’s 1946 election speech. The Soviet Union produced over 4 million tons of steel in 1921, and by 1940 it had increased to 18 million tons. In 20 years, it increased by 14 million tons. At that time, I thought, since both the Soviet Union and China are socialist countries, couldn’t we do it a bit faster and a bit more? Couldn’t we use a method of building socialism that is more, faster, better, and more economical?”

这是全书最重要的内容之一。自1956年社会主义改造基本完成以后，毛泽东就开始围绕什么是社会主义、怎样建设社会主义这个主题进行探索。《论十大关系》开了一个头。他说：“解放后，三年恢复时期，对搞建设，我们是懵懵懂懂的。接着搞第一个五年计划，对建设还是懵懵懂懂的，只能基本上照抄苏联的办法，但总觉得不满意，心情不舒畅。1956年，基本完成生产资料所有制的社会主义改造。1956年春，同三十几个部长谈话，一个问题一个问题地凑，提出了《论十大关系》。当时还看了斯大林1946年选举演说，苏联在1921年产钢400多万吨，1940年增加到1800万吨。20年中增加了1400万吨。当时就想，苏联和中国都是社会主义国家，我们是不是可以搞得快点多点，是不是可以用一种更多更快更好更省的办法建设社会主义。”

Here, Mao Zedong issued an important message: to find a path for building socialism different from that of the Soviet Union.

这里，毛泽东发出一个重要信息：要找到一条不同于苏联的建设社会主义的道路。

*On the Ten Major Relationships* precisely took the Soviet Union’s construction experience as a mirror, summed up the experience of China’s initial years of construction, and made a preliminary exploration of a path of socialist construction suitable for China’s conditions.

《论十大关系》正是以苏联的建设经验为鉴戒，并总结了新中国最初几年建设的经验，对适合中国情况的社会主义建设道路进行了初步探索。

Mao Zedong believed that *On the Ten Major Relationships* marked the beginning of finding a path of our own suited to China, and that Liu Shaoqi’s report at the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress of the CPC was relatively more complete. In fact, in the more than two years from *On the Ten Major Relationships* to the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress, great changes had taken place in the domestic situation, and Mao Zedong’s thinking had also undergone great changes. In the interim, there had been the Rectification Movement and the Anti-Rightist Struggle, the Third Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee’s change of the Eighth National Congress’s judgment on the principal contradiction in Chinese society, the Nanning Conference’s criticism of “opposing rash advance,” and the Chengdu Conference’s proposal of slogans such as “dare to think, dare to speak, dare to act.” It was against this background that the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress was convened. Liu Shaoqi’s report at that session mainly reflected Mao Zedong’s ideas and propositions, and in fact deviated from the correct line of the Eighth National Congress and the basic ideas of *On the Ten Major Relationships*. After the session, Mao Zedong launched the “Great Leap Forward” and the movement to establish people’s communes. After the First Zhengzhou Conference and the early stage of the Lushan Conference, there was an effort to correct “Leftist” errors, but the Lushan Conference then shifted from correcting “Leftist” errors to opposing “Rightist” errors, resulting in a major twist. In the spring of 1960, Mao Zedong discovered that the “communist wind” [8]8 “Communist wind” (共产风) refers to the tendency during the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961) to indiscriminately equalize and transfer property among collectives, often without compensation, in the name of advancing toward communism. was blowing again in some places, which drew his attention. He successively forwarded two reports from Guangdong and Shandong, severely criticizing the “communist wind.” However, under the strong anti-Rightist political atmosphere at the time, this had little effect. It was not until the autumn and winter of 1960, when the country faced extremely severe difficulties, including deaths from starvation, that Mao Zedong made up his mind to reverse the difficult economic situation. In March and May–June 1961, Central Work Conferences were held in Guangzhou and Beijing respectively, starting with adjustments to rural policies to begin reversing the severe economic difficulties. The chronicle provides a detailed record of this tortuous historical process, citing a large number of Mao Zedong’s speeches and comments at various meetings, as well as other materials.

毛泽东认为，《论十大关系》是开始找到自己的一条适合中国的路线，八大二次会议上刘少奇的报告就较为完整了。其实，从《论十大关系》到八大二次会议的两年多的时间里，国内形势发生了很大变化，毛泽东的思想也发生了很大变化。中间经过整风反右，八届三中全会改变八大关于中国社会的主要矛盾的论断，南宁会议批判反冒进，成都会议提出“敢想、敢说、敢做”等口号。八大二次会议就是在这样的背景下召开的。刘少奇在八大二次会议上的报告，主要是反映了毛泽东的思想和主张，实际上偏离了八大的正确路线和《论十大关系》的基本思想。会议后，毛泽东就发动了“大跃进”和人民公社化运动。经过第一次郑州会议到庐山会议前期的纠“左”，庐山会议又由纠“左”转到反右，出现一个大的曲折。1960年春，毛泽东发现有些地方又刮起了“共产风”，引起他的重视，连续转发广东、山东的两个报告，严厉批评“共产风”。但在当时浓厚的反右政治气氛下，没有产生什么效果。直到1960年秋冬，全国出现十分严重的困难，包括饿死人，毛泽东下决心扭转经济困难局面。1961年3月和5至6月先后在广州和北京召开中央工作会议，从调整农村政策着手，开始扭转严重的经济困难局面。对这段曲折的历史过程，年谱引用毛泽东在多次会议的大量讲话和批语，以及其他方面的材料，作了详细记载。

From the summer of 1960 onward, Mao Zedong continuously summarized and reflected on the lessons of the Great Leap Forward. In June 1960, he wrote the *Ten-Year Summary*, stating: “We still have a great blindness regarding revolution and construction in the socialist period. We must use the second ten-year period to investigate it, study it, and find its inherent laws.” By the time of the May 1961 Beijing Central Work Conference, he believed that “our understanding of socialism and how to build socialism has deepened considerably.” Regarding the understanding of socialism, he said that the First and Second Zhengzhou Conferences were still at the “primary school level,” and it was only at the March 1961 Guangzhou Central Work Conference and this Central Work Conference that they had reached the “junior high school level.” [9]9 The “Great Leap Forward” (1958–1961) was a nationwide campaign initiated by Mao Zedong to rapidly industrialize China and collectivize agriculture, which led to severe economic difficulties and famine. That is to say, they were still far from discovering the inherent laws of socialist construction and needed to continue exploring.

从1960年夏开始，毛泽东就对“大跃进”以来的经验教训不断进行总结和反思。1960年6月，写出《十年总结》，认为“我们对于社会主义时期的革命和建设，还有一个很大的盲目性，我们要用第二个十年的时间去调查它，研究它，找出它的固有规律”。到1961年的五月北京中央工作会议，他认为“对于社会主义的认识，怎样建设社会主义，大为深入了”。关于对社会主义的认识，他说第一次、第二次郑州会议还是“小学程度”，1961年的广州中央工作会议和这次中央工作会议才到了“初中程度”。这就是说，距离找出社会主义建设的固有规律，还相差甚远，需要继续探索。

At the Beijing Conference, Mao also made a relatively systematic review and reflection on some of the “Left” errors that had occurred after the Lushan Conference. [10]10 Montgomery: Bernard Law Montgomery, British field marshal who visited China in 1961 and met with Mao Zedong. He said: After the Lushan Conference, where were we wrong? The mistake was that we should not have transmitted the resolution concerning Peng, Huang, Zhang, and Zhou down to the county level and below. [11]11 The 7,000-Cadre Conference (January–February 1962) was an enlarged Central Work Conference of the CPC, attended by about 7,000 cadres from across the country, convened to review the experiences and lessons of the “Great Leap Forward.” It should have been transmitted only to the county level; below the county level, we should have continued to implement the *Zhengzhou Conference Record* and the “Eighteen Articles” from the Shanghai Conference, and continued to oppose the “Left.” Once we opposed the Right, it created a false impression—things were fine, production was booming—but that was not the case. The issue of Peng, Huang, Zhang, and Zhou should have been transmitted only within a small circle of tens of thousands of people. By pushing it further down, we turned many good people into “Right opportunists.” Now it is clear that we made a mistake, turning good people who spoke the truth into “Right opportunists,” and even into “counterrevolutionaries.” The Zhengzhou Conference was basically correct, and the “Eighteen Articles” proposed at the Shanghai Conference were also basically correct, but what was said about the communal dining halls and the supply system was incorrect. In the spring of 1960, we saw that the “communist wind” had blown again. First, in Guangzhou, we convened a three-hour meeting with comrades from the Central-South region—such a short time. Then, in Hangzhou, we convened a three- or four-day meeting with comrades from East China and Southwest China; the agenda was unfocused, and rectifying “equalization and indiscriminate transfer” did not become the central issue. Later, in Tianjin, we convened a meeting with comrades from the Northeast, Northwest, and North China, but it still did not solve the problem. At that time, we advocated several “great undertakings”: great efforts in water conservancy, great efforts in county and commune industries, great efforts in pig farming, great efforts in transportation, and great efforts in culture and education. Once these five great undertakings came, it was a disaster! Wasn’t that the “communist wind” blowing again? At the Beidaihe Conference in July and August of last year, we did not criticize the two types of equalitarianism. [12]12 “Communist wind” (共产风) refers to the practice during the People’s Commune movement of indiscriminately transferring resources, labor, and property from lower-level collectives to higher-level ones, violating the principle of exchange of equal values. The thorough resolution of the “equalization and indiscriminate transfer” problem only began in November with the issuance of the “Twelve Articles” directive. [13]13 The supply system (供给制) was a method of distributing basic necessities free of charge or at low cost, adopted in the revolutionary base areas and continued in some communes during the early period of collectivization. In implementing the “Twelve Articles” directive, we made one mistake: we only dealt with the third-category counties, communes, and production teams, and did not universally rectify the “communist wind,” the commandist wind, the exaggerating wind, the arbitrary direction wind, and the cadre special privilege wind. The March Guangzhou Conference this year enlightened our thinking and liberated our thinking, producing the “Sixty Articles,” but was the liberation thorough? [14]14 “Haste makes waste” (yusuzebuda) is a classical Chinese idiom, originally from Confucius’s *Analects* (Zilu chapter), meaning that excessive speed prevents reaching the goal. Not yet—issues like the 70–30 split, the communal dining halls, the grain problem, and some other problems were not resolved. We have been building socialism for 11 years, and now we must sum up experience. What I am talking about today is summing up experience; I will speak again next time.

在北京会议上，毛泽东还对庐山会议以后的一些“左”的错误作了比较系统的回顾和反思。他说：庐山会议后，我们错在什么地方呢？错就错在不该把关于彭、黄、张、周的决议，传达到县以下。应该传达到县为止，县以下继续贯彻《郑州会议记录》、上海会议的“十八条”，继续反“左”。一反右，就造成一个假象，可好了，生产大发展呀，其实不是那样。彭、黄、张、周的问题，在十几万人的小范围内传达就行了，搞下去就整出了许多“右倾机会主义分子”。现在看是犯了错误，把好人、讲老实话的人整成了“右倾机会主义分子”，甚至整成了“反革命分子”。郑州会议基本上是正确的，上海会议提出的“十八条”也还是基本上正确的，但对食堂、供给制问题是讲得不正确的。1960年春看出“共产风”又来了。先在广州召集中南各省的同志开了三个小时的会，时间这样短。接着在杭州又召集华东、西南各省的同志开了三四天会，议题不集中，整“一平二调”没有成为中心。后来又在天津召集东北、西北、华北各省同志开了会，也不解决问题。那时候提倡几个大办：大办水利，大办县社工业，大办养猪场，大办交通，大办文教。这五个大办一来，糟糕！那不又是“共产风”来了吗？去年七八月北戴河会议，也没有批评两个平均主义。“一平二调”问题的彻底解决，还是从11月发出“十二条”指示开始的。“十二条”指示，在执行中发生了一个错误，就是只搞了三类县、社、队，“共产风”、命令风、浮夸风、瞎指挥风、干部特殊风没有普遍去整。今年三月广州会议启发了思想，解放了思想，搞了个“六十条”，但是解放得彻底吗？还不彻底，什么三七开呀，食堂问题呀，粮食问题呀，还有些别的问题，没有解决。我们搞了11年社会主义，现在要总结经验。我今天讲的就是总结经验，我下回还要讲。

What Mao Zedong reviewed and summarized here was limited to the lessons of the renewed “communist wind” in the agricultural sector. In fact, after the Lushan Conference’s anti-Right campaign, the blind adventurism on the industrial production and capital construction fronts, and the losses it caused, were no lighter than those of the Great Leap Forward in 1958.

毛泽东在这里回顾和总结的，只是限于农业方面重刮“共产风”的教训。实际上，庐山会议反右之后，在工业生产战线和基本建设战线的盲目冒进以及所造成的损失，也不比1958年时的“大跃进”轻。

Mao Zedong, deeply reflecting on the mistakes of the Great Leap Forward, repeatedly engaged in self-criticism and assumed primary responsibility. For example, on June 8, 1961, at an enlarged meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee, he said: “Violating the laws of objective things and stubbornly trying to implement them will bring punishment. Having been punished, we must examine ourselves. Now we are being punished: the land, the people, and the livestock are emaciated. Isn’t this ‘three emaciations’ a punishment?” “The current ‘three emaciations’ are mainly the responsibility of the Central Committee and myself; I bear the main responsibility. These words should be spoken at the three-level cadre conference.” [15]15 This is a classical allusion to Mencius (*Mencius*, “Teng Wen Gong, Part I”), where the phrase “one does not first learn how to bear a child and then get married” is used to argue that one learns by doing, not by prior study alone. On February 21, 1965, when listening to Bo Yibo’s work report, Mao said: “I myself also made mistakes. At Beidaihe, I advocated the great smelting of steel, proposing to double steel output, and resorting to a human-sea tactic.” [16]16 The “Three-Anti” campaign (1951–1952) targeted corruption, waste, and bureaucracy within the Party and government; the “Five-Anti” campaign (1952) targeted bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and stealing state economic information among private industrialists and merchants. “Where was it that one horse took the lead and ten thousand horses gave way? In reality, ten thousand horses died, and the lead horse also died by half—didn’t steel output drop by half? These lessons must be firmly remembered, often told to people, and never forgotten.”

毛泽东对“大跃进”的错误，痛定思痛，多次作自我批评，承担主要责任。例如，1961年6月8日他在中央政治局常委扩大会议上说：“违反客观事物的规律，硬去实行要受惩罚。受了惩罚，就要检讨。现在我们受惩罚，土地、人、牲畜瘦了。‘三瘦’不是受惩罚是什么？”“现在的‘三瘦’，主要是中央和我负责，我负主要责任。这些话应该在三级干部会上讲。”1965年2月21日，毛泽东听薄一波汇报工作时说：“我自己也犯了错误，北戴河主张大炼钢铁，提出钢铁翻一番的要求，闹人海战术。”“哪里是一马当先万马让路？实际是万马都死了，头一匹马也死了一半，钢不是降了一半吗？这些教训都要牢牢记住，要经常向人们讲，永远不要忘记。”

Some foreign leaders, mainly from developing countries, often raised the issue of learning from China’s construction experience when meeting with Mao Zedong. Fearing that they might learn from China’s

一些外国领导人，主要是一些发展中国家的领导人，在同毛泽东会见时，常常提出要学习中国的建设经验。毛泽东怕他们把中国在经济建设方面的错误做法学过去，总是说我们犯过错误，你们不要学。 1965年7月14日会见乌干达总理时说：“我们犯了错误，要搞多，要快，结果证明是不行的。经济要逐步上升，发展只能根据可能，不能只按照需要。”1970年7月20日，会见刚果人民共和国国务委员会代表团时说：“这20年中间，我们犯过许多错误”。“我们走的弯路，你们不要再走了。”在送客人到门口时，毛泽东再次叮嘱：“你们不要走我们的弯路。”

The setback of the “Great Leap Forward” sobered Mao Zedong considerably, causing him to deeply absorb the lesson and develop some new understandings of what socialism is and how to build it.

“大跃进”的挫败，使毛泽东头脑清醒了许多，深深地记取了教训，对于什么是社会主义，怎样建设社会主义也有了一些新的认识。

First, building socialism requires a very long historical period. Mao Zedong proposed that the stage of socialism might itself be divided into two phases: the first phase is underdeveloped socialism, and the second phase is relatively developed socialism. The latter phase may require an even longer period than the former. On 23 September 1961, he told Montgomery: to complete the stage of socialism requires a very long historical period, half a century to a century. On 30 January 1962, at the 7,000-Cadre Conference, he again said: “China has a large population, a weak foundation, and a backward economy. To greatly develop the productive forces, to catch up with and surpass the most advanced capitalist countries in the world, I think it cannot be done without a period of over a hundred years.” Clearly, this was already very different from the greed for more and haste for speed during the “Great Leap Forward,” and from the extremely unrealistic ideas then advanced of “surpassing Britain and catching up with America” and hastily “transitioning” to communism.

第一，建设社会主义需要一个很长的历史时期。毛泽东提出：社会主义这个阶段，又可能分为两个阶段，第一个阶段是不发达的社会主义，第二个阶段是比较发达的社会主义。后一阶段可能比前一阶段需要更长的时间。1961年9月23日，他对蒙哥马利说：要完成社会主义的阶段，需要很长的历史时期，半个世纪到一个世纪。1962年1月30日，他在七千人大会上又说：“中国的人口多，底子薄，经济落后，要使生产力很大地发展起来，要赶上和超过世界上最先进的资本主义国家，没有一百多年的时间，我看是不行的。”显然，这同“大跃进”中的贪多图快，以及当时提出的“超英赶美”、急于向共产主义“过渡”那些极不切实际的想法，已大不一样了。

Second, distribution according to work and exchange of equal values are two basic principles that must be upheld in socialist society. Mao Zedong said: “Many among our cadres at all levels do not understand what socialism is, what distribution according to work is, or what exchange of equal values is. Once the ‘communist wind’ blows, most cadres no longer understand. I hope that this year they can come to understand what socialism is.” He also said: “There are two basic principles: one is from each according to his ability, to each according to his work; the other is the law of value and exchange of equal values. ‘The communes’ implementation of the supply system and communal dining halls are both egalitarianism.” This understanding of his came mainly from the lesson of the “communist wind” during the collectivization movement. However, in the days that followed, as he once again emphasized class struggle and made the recognition of class struggle as the principal contradiction in socialist society the criterion for understanding socialism, he again deviated from the correct direction of exploring the path of Chinese socialist construction.

第二，按劳分配和等价交换是社会主义社会必须坚持的两条基本原则。毛泽东说：“我们各级干部中许多人不懂得什么是社会主义，什么叫按劳分配，什么叫等价交换，‘共产风’一刮，大多数干部就不懂得了。我希望今年能够懂得什么叫社会主义”。又说：“基本原则是两个，一个是各尽所能、按劳分配，一个是价值法则、等价交换。”“公社搞供给制和食堂都是平均主义。”他的这种认识，主要是从公社化刮“共产风”的教训中得来的。然而在往后的日子里，随着他重提阶级斗争，并把是否承认阶级斗争是社会主义社会的主要矛盾，作为懂不懂社会主义的标志，又偏离了探索中国社会主义建设道路的正确方向。

Third, in building socialism one must not be impatient; one must advance steadily. Mao Zedong said: “As I see it, in building socialism one should not be in too great a hurry; being in too great a hurry makes things impossible to accomplish, the more hurried one is the less one accomplishes, it is better to be a bit slower,” and “do not seek empty fame and thereby invite real disaster.” “Water conservancy and industry alike must not advance rashly; they must be done step by step, in a planned way, one step at a time.” When listening to Yu Qiuli’s report on long-term plan proposals, he also said: “You must be careful not to stir up the kind of blind ‘more, faster’ that happened in 1958, 1959, and 1960; in the end it was neither more nor faster.” “Given the experience of the past, ‘haste makes waste’ [14]14 “Haste makes waste” (yusuzebuda) is a classical Chinese idiom, originally from Confucius’s *Analects* (Zilu chapter), meaning that excessive speed prevents reaching the goal.; it is better to do a little less and a little slower and still reach the goal.” Having suffered from the Great Leap Forward, Mao Zedong was especially vigilant against high targets and was very cautious about economic construction work. Whenever he listened to reports on economic development plans, he always stressed the need to lower development targets. He said: “We must act according to objective possibilities and must never exceed objective possibilities. Within objective possibilities we must also leave some leeway, and the leeway must be ample, not small.” He warned the planning departments not to let their heads get hot, for he feared above all repeating the mistake of craving too much and too fast. He wanted everyone, including himself, to remember this painful lesson forever.

第三，进行社会主义建设不能急，要稳步前进。毛泽东说：“现在看来，搞社会主义建设不要那么十分急，十分急了办不成事，越急就越办不成，不如缓一点”，“不要图虚名而招实祸”。“水利、工业都不能冒进，要分步骤有计划地一步一步地搞。”他在听取余秋里汇报长期计划设想时还说：“你们注意，不要闹58年、59年、60年那样的盲目多快，结果也不多，也不快。”“鉴于过去的经验，欲速则不达，不如少一点慢一点能达到。”吃了“大跃进”的亏，毛泽东对高指标特别警惕，对经济建设工作非常谨慎。凡是在听取经济发展计划的汇报时，他总是强调要降低发展指标。他说：“要根据客观可能办事，绝不能超过客观可能。按客观可能还要留有余地，留有余地要大，不要小。”他告诫计划部门不要头脑发热，就怕再犯贪多、贪快的错误。他要大家包括他自己在内，永远记住这个沉痛的教训。

Fourth, one cannot use the old methods to engage in construction. The so-called old methods refer to the methods of the revolutionary war period, that is, the methods of political movements and of mass movements on a grand scale. Mao Zedong said: “After the war was over, when we encountered economic construction we were no longer capable. What is meant by ‘no longer capable’ is that we cannot use the old methods to engage in construction; it is a new matter, an entirely new problem.” Mao Zedong proposed that “we must learn to use economic methods to improve the industrial management system,” and believed that “the current method of managing the economy by administrative methods is no good and must be changed.” He once proposed that “trusts should be developed.” He said: “The bourgeoisie invented the trust; it is a progressive method. The trust system is actually a progressive system; the problem is ownership—in capitalist countries it is owned by the capitalists, in our country it is state-owned.” Mao Zedong regarded the trust as a kind of management method, usable by capitalist countries and also usable by socialist countries. But by the time of the Cultural Revolution, he again negated the trust, saying “we don’t need that thing.” However, his general emphasis on learning advanced technology and management methods from capitalist countries did not change.

第四，不能用过去的方法搞建设。所谓过去的方法，是指革命战争时期的方法，就是政治运动的方法、大搞群众运动的方法。毛泽东说：“打完仗之后，遇到经济建设我们就不行了。所谓不行了，就是不能用过去的方法来搞建设了，是新事情，完全是新的问题。”毛泽东提出，“要学会按经济办法改进工业管理体制”，认为“目前这种按行政方法管理经济的办法，不好，要改”。他曾经提出，“托拉斯要发展”。他说：“资产阶级发明这个托拉斯，是一个进步的方法。托拉斯制度实际上是个进步的制度，问题是个所有制，资本主义国家是资本家所有，我们是国有。”毛泽东把托拉斯看作是一种经营方法，资本主义国家可以用，社会主义国家也可以用。但到“文化大革命”时，他又否定了托拉斯，说“不要那个东西”。但是，一般地强调学习资本主义国家的先进技术和管理方法这一点，他没有改变。

Fifth, in building socialism one must pay attention to comprehensive balance. Mao Zedong said: “In building socialism, a very important issue is comprehensive balance.” “Agriculture also needs comprehensive balance; agriculture includes the five aspects of farming, forestry, animal husbandry, sideline occupations, and fisheries.” In 1961, when introducing to foreign friends the experiences and lessons of China’s eleven years of economic construction, he said: “How to increase grain output, develop animal husbandry and diversified cash crops, how to smelt iron and steel, increase coal production, manufacture machinery, how to find petroleum and refine it into various usable petroleum products—all of these require a comprehensive balance.” At the 1959 Lushan Conference, when summing up several years of experience, he believed the basic issues were four: “(1) comprehensive balance; (2) the mass line; (3) unified leadership; (4) attention to quality. Among the four issues, the most basic are comprehensive balance and the mass line.” He placed comprehensive balance at the head of the four basic issues. This was by no means accidental; it clearly contained the profound lesson of suffering from the destruction of comprehensive balance during the Great Leap Forward.

第五，搞社会主义建设，一定要注意综合平衡。毛泽东说：“搞社会主义建设，很重要的一个问题是综合平衡。”“农业也要综合平衡，农业包括农、林、牧、副、渔五个方面。”他在1961年向外国朋友介绍中国11年来经济建设的经验教训的时候说：“如何增产粮食、发展畜牧业和多种经济作物，如何炼钢、炼铁、增产煤碳、制造机器，如何找到石油并且炼制成各种可用的石油产品，所有这些都要有一个综合的平衡。”他在1959年庐山会议上总结几年来的经验时，认为基本问题是四个：“（一）综合平衡；（二）群众路线；（三）统一领导；（四）注意质量。四个问题中，最基本的是综合平衡和群众路线。”他将综合平衡列为四个基本问题之首。这绝不是偶然的，显然包含着“大跃进”中破坏综合平衡而吃了苦头的深刻教训在里面。

Sixth, a socialist society must vigorously develop commodity production and commodity exchange, and he proposed that the law of value is a “great school.” Mao Zedong’s concentrated discussion of this issue occurred mainly during the First and Second Zhengzhou Conferences and the period shortly thereafter. This was an important theoretical contribution of his on the issue of building socialism. Many materials on this aspect have already been published, so they will not be introduced here.

第六，社会主义社会要大力发展商品生产和商品交换，提出价值规律是一个“伟大的学校”。毛泽东对这个问题的集中论述主要是在第一次和第二次郑州会议及以后一段时间。这是他在建设社会主义问题上的一个重要理论贡献。这方面的材料已经发表很多，这里就不介绍了。

In the course of exploring the path of Chinese socialist construction, Mao Zedong also put forward many important ideas. These include: the question of the basic contradictions in socialist society; the question of correctly handling contradictions among the people; the question of handling various major relationships in socialist construction; the question of the strategic policy of overall consideration and comprehensive arrangement; the question of long-term coexistence and mutual supervision between the Communist Party and the democratic parties; the question of the policy of relying mainly on one’s own efforts while seeking external assistance as a supplement; the question of not engaging in construction behind closed doors but actively learning advanced foreign science and technology and expanding foreign economic exchanges; the question of the policy of taking agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading factor in developing the national economy; the question of the Chinese path of industrialization that simultaneously develops industry and agriculture; the question of the grand goal of realizing the Four Modernizations; the question of the policy of building the country and undertaking all undertakings through diligence and frugality; in distribution, opposing both equalitarianism and excessive disparity, and emphasizing common prosperity; the question of the policy of “letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend” in cultural construction; the question of combining education with productive labor and combining intellectuals with the masses of workers and peasants, and so on. These ideas are all recorded in the chronicle.

毛泽东在探索中国社会主义建设道路过程中，还提出许多重要思想。包括：关于社会主义社会的基本矛盾问题；关于正确处理人民内部矛盾问题；关于处理社会主义建设中各种重大关系问题；关于统筹兼顾、全面安排的战略方针问题；关于共产党同民主党派长期共存，互相监督问题；关于自力更生为主、争取外援为辅的方针问题；关于不能关起门来搞建设，要积极学习国外先进的科学技术和扩大对外经济交流问题；关于农业为基础、工业为主导的发展国民经济的方针问题；关于工农业同时并举的中国工业化道路问题；关于实现四个现代化的宏伟目标问题；关于勤俭建国、勤俭办一切事业的方针问题；在分配方面，既反对平均主义又反对过分悬殊，强调共同富裕问题；文化建设方面的“百花齐放，百家争鸣”方针问题；关于教育与生产劳动相结合、知识分子与工农群众相结合问题，等等。这些思想，在年谱中都有记述。

Some of the positive results formed by Mao Zedong in the course of exploring the path of building socialism in China still have practical significance for reference today.

毛泽东在探索中国建设社会主义道路中所形成的一些积极成果，至今仍有现实的借鉴意义。

Exploring a path of socialist construction suited to China’s conditions was a process of learning by doing, under circumstances where there was no experience and foreign experience could not be copied mechanically. As Mao Zedong himself said: “We are building socialism while learning to build it. Only by engaging in socialism can we have socialist experience. ‘One does not first learn how to bear a child and then get married.’” [15]15 This is a classical allusion to Mencius (*Mencius*, “Teng Wen Gong, Part I”), where the phrase “one does not first learn how to bear a child and then get married” is used to argue that one learns by doing, not by prior study alone. The important ideas Mao Zedong put forward concerning socialist construction were all proposed in the course of constantly summing up the experience of practice, especially the lessons of mistakes. His aim was to find the laws of building socialism in China and to realize the integration of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of Chinese socialist construction. Needless to say, in the process of exploring a path of socialist construction suited to China’s conditions, many detours were taken, serious twists and turns occurred, and the Party and the people paid a heavy price. Although there were objective reasons for this, it was inseparable from Mao Zedong’s subjective factors. The chronicle truthfully records this aspect of the situation as well.

探索一条适合中国情况的社会主义建设道路，是在没有经验而又不能照抄照搬外国经验的情况下，边干边学的。正如毛泽东所说的：“我们搞社会主义是边建设边学习的。搞社会主义，才有社会主义经验，‘未有先学养子，而后嫁者也’。”毛泽东提出的关于社会主义建设的一些重要思想，都是在不断总结实践的经验特别是失误的教训这一过程中提出来的。他的目的，是要找到在中国建设社会主义的规律，实现马克思列宁主义的基本原理同中国社会主义建设的具体实际的结合。无庸讳言，在探索适合中国情况的社会主义建设道路的过程中，所以走了不少弯路，发生过严重曲折，党和人民付出了很大代价，固然有客观原因，但同毛泽东的主观因素是分不开的。这一方面的情况，年谱也如实地作了记述。

II. On the Question of Handling the Relationship between Class Struggle and Economic Construction

二、 关于处理阶级斗争和经济建设的关系问题

This is a prominent thread running through this chronicle, reflecting the tortuous process that Mao Zedong experienced in his ideological understanding and practical work concerning the handling of these two issues. This is closely related to the domestic and international historical conditions of a given period, to the tasks the Party and the state had to accomplish and the problems they had to solve, to the inertia of thinking formed by the Chinese Communist Party in the long revolutionary struggle, and at the same time is closely related to Mao Zedong’s subjective factors. This issue is actually contained within the first issue. Because this issue is particularly important, and also for the convenience of exposition, it is introduced here as a separate issue.

这是贯穿这部年谱的一条突出线索，反映了毛泽东对处理这两个问题在思想认识方面和工作实践方面所经历的曲折过程。这同一定时期内所处的国内国际的历史条件、党和国家所要完成的任务和所要解决的问题密切相关，同中国共产党在长期的革命斗争中所形成的思维惯性密切相关，同时又与毛泽东的主观因素密切相关。这个问题，实际上是包含在第一个问题之中的。因为这个问题特别重要，同时又为了叙述的方便，所以把它单独作为一个问题来介绍。

In the seven years from the founding of the People’s Republic of China to the basic completion of the socialist transformation, the chronicle mainly records the large number of comments, directives, and speeches Mao Zedong issued in leading the work of class struggle. The content includes: the military struggle to eliminate the remaining forces of the Kuomintang army; the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, the campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries, the “Three-Anti” and “Five-Anti” campaigns, [16]16 The “Three-Anti” campaign (1951–1952) targeted corruption, waste, and bureaucracy within the Party and government; the “Five-Anti” campaign (1952) targeted bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and stealing state economic information among private industrialists and merchants. and the campaign to eliminate counterrevolutionaries, all carried out to consolidate the newly born people’s political power; the continued completion of tasks left over from the democratic revolution, such as land reform; several criticism campaigns carried out in the cultural sphere; and the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts, and capitalist industry and commerce. To guide each of the above movements, Mao Zedong read and forwarded a large number of reports every day, and drafted a large number of comments and directives, often drafting two or three, three or four, or even more in a single day. From these comments and directives, one can understand why Mao Zedong launched these tasks, how he guided them, and how, when deviations occurred in the work, he discovered and corrected them. From these comments and directives, one can also understand his policy and strategy thinking and his working methods.

从中华人民共和国成立到社会主义改造基本完成这7年中，年谱主要记述了毛泽东在领导阶级斗争方面的工作而发表的大量批语、指示、讲话。内容包括消灭国民党军队残余力量的军事斗争；为巩固新生的人民政权而进行的抗美援朝战争、镇反、“三反”、“五反”、肃反；继续完成民主革命未完成的土地改革等项任务；在文化领域开展的几次批判运动；对农业、手工业和资本主义工商业进行社会主义改造等。为指导上述各项运动，毛泽东每天阅读和转发大量的报告，起草大量批语和指示，常常一天起草两三件，三四件，甚至更多。从这些批语、指示中，可以了解毛泽东为什么要开展这些工作，他是怎样指导这些工作的，当工作中出现偏差的时候，他又是怎样发现和加以纠正的。从这些批语、指示中，还可以了解他的政策策略思想和工作方法。

While fully reflecting Mao Zedong’s efforts in grasping class struggle, the chronicle also records the situation of Mao Zedong’s efforts in grasping economic construction during this period. On the eve of the founding of New China, at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, Mao Zedong already proposed that the Party’s work focus would shift from the countryside to the cities, and that urban work must take production and construction as its center. However, after nationwide victory, the unfinished tasks of the democratic revolution still had to be completed, and the victory of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea had to be guided and ensured; therefore, at that time Mao Zedong could not yet devote his main energy to economic construction. Even so, he was still very concerned with economic work and did not forget to shift the work center to economic construction. On December 18, 1949, when the People’s Liberation Army eliminated the Bai Chongxi Group of the Kuomintang army in Guangxi, he immediately telegraphed Lin Biao: “The work focus of the entire six provinces of Central-South China has already shifted from military affairs to the economy and land reform. We hope that you will establish a Central-South Military and Political Committee by January next year, concentrate your strength to lead the economic work of the entire region, and actively prepare the conditions for land reform.” After returning from signing the Sino-Soviet Treaty, Mao Zedong immediately focused on grasping the work of restoring the national economy. He successively convened meetings of the Political Bureau, heard reports from the major administrative regions and the two cities of Shanghai and Tianjin, and an important item of discussion was financial and economic work. On May 20, 1950, he telegraphed the secretaries of the various Central Bureau, demanding that “the principal responsible comrades of the various Central Bureau must personally grasp financial, monetary, and economic work; the meetings of the various Central Bureau must regularly discuss financial and economic work, and must not think that it is merely the work of financial and economic business organs and relax their efforts even slightly; the same applies to the various sub-bureaus, major municipal committees, provincial committees, and district committees.” And he said, “The Central Political Bureau now discusses financial and economic work at almost every meeting.” At the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, he called on the entire Party and the entire people to strive for the basic improvement of the financial and economic situation in his report. When the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea achieved victory in the third campaign and the Korean war situation was generally stabilized, he proposed to the entire Party on December 1, 1951: “From 1953 onward, we will enter large-scale economic construction, preparing to complete China’s industrialization in 20 years.” When the Korean Armistice Agreement was about to be signed and the three-year Korean War was about to end, Mao Zedong again emphasized on February 20, 1953, that the central work of economic work must be grasped well. He said: “From the very first day the Communist Party took over the state power from the Kuomintang, it fixed its eyes on production and construction, sparing no effort to grasp this central work.” On June 30 of the same year, he clearly pointed out: “Now that Korea is negotiating peace and land reform is concluded, the focus of domestic work is shifting to socialist transformation and socialist construction.”

年谱在充分反映毛泽东抓阶级斗争方面情况的同时，也记述了这一时期毛泽东抓经济建设方面的情况。在新中国成立前夕的七届二中全会上，毛泽东就提出党的工作重心将由乡村转移到城市，城市工作必须以生产建设为中心。但在全国胜利后，民主革命尚未完成的任务要继续完成，又要指导和保证抗美援朝战争的胜利，因此当时毛泽东还不可能把主要精力放在经济建设方面。即使是这样，他仍十分关心经济工作，没有忘记要把工作中心转到经济建设上来。1949年12月18日，当中国人民解放军在广西消灭了国民党军的白崇禧集团后，他立即致电林彪：“整个中南六省的工作重心，已由军事转到经济与土改，希望你们于明年一月间成立中南军政委员会，集中力量领导全区经济工作，并积极准备土改条件。”从签订中苏条约回国后，毛泽东即着力抓国民经济的恢复工作。连续召开政治局会议，听取各大行政区及上海、天津两市的汇报，一项重要内容就是讨论财政经济工作。1950年5月20日，他致电各中央局书记，要求“各中央局主要负责同志必须亲自抓紧财政金融经济工作，各中央局会议必须经常讨论财经工作，不得以为只是财经业务机关的工作而稍有放松，各分局、大市委、省委、区党委亦是如此。”并说“中央政治局现在几乎每次会议都要讨论财经工作”。在七届三中全会上，他在报告中号召全党和全国人民为争取财政经济状况的基本好转而斗争。当抗美援朝战争取得了第三次战役的胜利后，朝鲜战局大体稳定下来，他于1951年12月1日向全党提出：“从1953年起，我们就要进入大规模经济建设了，准备以20年时间完成中国的工业化。”在朝鲜停战协定即将签字，历时三年的朝鲜战争就要结束的时候，毛泽东于1953年2月20日再次强调必须把经济工作这个中心工作抓好。他说：“共产党从接管国民党政权的第一天起，就把眼睛盯住生产建设，不遗余力地抓好这一个中心工作。”同年6月30日又明确指出：“现在朝鲜议和，土地改革结束，国内工作的重点正在转到社会主义改造和社会主义建设。”

From 1953 onward, China began to implement the First Five-Year Plan and was about to launch large-scale economic construction nationwide. This was a matter of great excitement for the entire Party and the entire people. To discuss and revise the draft of the First Five-Year Plan, in November 1954 Mao Zedong, together with central leaders such as Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Li Fuchun, took the same special train to Guangzhou for a meeting. The chronicle records an episode. At one day’s meeting, when discussing the Three Gorges Project, Mao Zedong said: The Three Gorges Project should be included in the plan, but given our country’s current material and financial resources, it cannot be included in the Five-Year Plan, only in the long-term plan. I will not live to see it. At this point, he said to Deng Liqun, who was present: When it is completed in the future, write a funeral oration to tell me.

从1953年起，我国开始实施第一个五年计划，要在全国开展大规模的经济建设了，这对于全党和全国人民来说，是一件振奋人心的大事。为了讨论和修改第一个五年计划草案，1954年11月毛泽东与刘少奇、周恩来、李富春等中央领导人同乘一趟专列到广州开会。年谱记载了一个情节。在一天的会议上，谈到三峡工程时，毛泽东说：要把三峡工程列入计划，但按我们国家现在的物力、财力，又不能列入五年计划，只能列入长期计划。我是看不到了。这时他对在场的邓力群说：将来建成时，写一篇祭文告诉我。

From the chronicle covering 1949 to 1956, it can be seen that Mao Zedong grasped class struggle with one hand and economic construction with the other, with the former being primary. In his view, grasping the work of class struggle—such as completing the land reform of the democratic revolution, carrying out various tasks to consolidate the newborn people’s political power, and completing the three major socialist transformations—was all aimed at liberating and developing the productive forces, at clearing obstacles and opening up paths for economic construction. The Party’s general line for the transition period, formulated under Mao Zedong’s leadership, embodied this line of thinking. This general line, summarized, was “one body with two wings”: industrialization was the body, and the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts, and capitalist industry and commerce were the two wings. Such a strategic layout reflected a guiding thought of Mao Zedong: that the revolution in changing the socio-economic system from private ownership to public ownership was combined with the revolution in production technology. In his words: “In these few years, we are building while revolutionizing.”

从1949到1956年间的年谱，可以看出，毛泽东一手抓阶级斗争，一手抓经济建设，而以前者为主。在他看来，抓阶级斗争的工作，如完成民主革命任务的土地改革，为巩固新生的人民政权而进行的各项工作，完成社会主义的三大改造等，目的都是为了解放和发展生产力，都是为了经济建设扫除障碍和开辟道路。毛泽东主持制定的党在过渡时期的总路线，就体现了这个思路。这条总路线概括起来说，就是“一体两翼”，工业化是主体，对农业、手工业和对资本主义工商业的社会主义改造是两翼。这样一个战略布局反映毛泽东的一个指导思想，即：社会经济制度方面由私有制改变为公有制的革命同生产技术方面的革命是结合在一起的。用他的话说：这几年是一边建设一边革命。

After the basic completion of the socialist transformation, the Eighth National Congress of the CPC made a correct judgment on the principal contradiction in Chinese society and determined that the main task of the entire people from then on was to develop the social productive forces. In conversations during the congress with delegations from some fraternal parties attending the Eighth National Congress, Mao Zedong clearly reflected this guiding thought. On September 22, 1956, when meeting with the delegation of the Italian Communist Party, Mao Zedong, while analyzing Stalin’s mistakes, said: “When class struggle has already ended and the people are already using peaceful methods to protect the productive forces, rather than liberating the productive forces through class struggle, but ideologically one has not recognized this and continues to carry out class struggle—this is the root of the error.” On September 26, when meeting with the delegation of the Bulgarian Communist Party, he asked them what impressions they had of this congress. After the guests replied, Mao Zedong said: “The atmosphere of this congress reflects the people’s hope: to build industry.” On September 27, when meeting with the delegation of the Romanian Workers’ Party, Mao Zedong raised the issue of doing business with capitalist countries. He said: “Capitalism is better than us in many aspects of management; we should also learn their good things.” “Our door is open; in a few years, the United States, Britain, West Germany, Japan, and others will all do business with us. They have technology, we need technology; they have economic difficulties, so they will export technology to us.” On October 1, when meeting with the delegation of the French Communist Party, Mao Zedong’s thinking appeared even more open. He said: “It is not easy to build an industrialized country on a backward economic foundation.” Then he asked: “Can the French government, breaking free from US interference, establish diplomatic relations with China, and in trade, can it sell us complete sets of equipment, design factories for China, supply equipment, install equipment, and teach Chinese workers to operate the machinery?” From these conversations, it can be seen that Mao Zedong not only had clearly shifted the work focus of the Party and the state to economic construction but also hoped to open up relations with Western capitalist countries and develop economic and technological cooperation and trade with them.

在社会主义改造基本完成以后召开的中共八大，对中国社会的主要矛盾作出正确判断，确定全国人民今后的主要任务是发展社会生产力。毛泽东在会议期间同一些参加八大的兄弟党代表团谈话中，就清楚地反映了这个指导思想。1956年9月22日，在会见意大利共产党代表团时，毛泽东在分析斯大林的错误时说：“阶级斗争已经完结，人民已经用和平的方法来保护生产力，而不是通过阶级斗争来解放生产力的时候，但是在思想上却没有认识这一点，还要继续进行阶级斗争，这就是错误的根源”。9月26日，在会见保加利亚共产党代表团时，问他们对这次大会有什么感想。在客人回答之后，毛泽东说：“这次大会的空气，是反映人民的希望，建设工业。”9月27日，在会见罗马尼亚工人党代表团时，毛泽东提出要同资本主义国家做生意的问题。他说：“资本主义在经营上有许多地方比我们好，我们也要学习他们的好东西。”“我们的门是开着的，几年以后，美、英、西德、日本等都将与我们做生意的。他们有技术，我们需要技术，他们的经济有困难，就会向我们出口技术了。”10月1日，在会见法国共产党代表团时，毛泽东的思想表现得更加开放。他说：“在落后的经济基础上建设工业化国家并不容易。”接着他问：“法国政府能否摆脱美国干涉，同中国建立外交关系，在贸易上能否把成套设备卖给我们，替中国设计工厂、供应装备、安装装备并教会中国工人开动机器？”从这些谈话中可以看出，毛泽东不仅已经明确地要把党和国家的工作重点转到经济建设上来，而且希望打开同西方资本主义国家的关系，同它们发展经济技术合作和贸易往来。

From the Eighth National Congress of the CPC to before the launch of the Anti-Rightist Struggle, this was a period when Mao Zedong’s thinking that the country should take economic construction as its center was relatively concentrated in exposition. In his speech at the National Conference on Propaganda Work in March 1957, he proposed building a socialist country with modern industry, modern agriculture, and modern science and culture. After the conference, he went south on an inspection tour. Passing through Tianjin, then Jinan, then Nanjing, and finally Shanghai, all the way down, at meetings of Party cadres and members, he repeatedly spoke about the issue of taking economic construction as the center. He said: “We are now in an era where large-scale class struggle has basically ended.” “Class struggle has basically ended; where should our task shift? It should shift to engaging in construction, leading the entire society, leading the 600 million people, to struggle with nature, to make China prosperous and strong, and turn it into an industrial country.” He also said: “Taking the history of the Communist Party, it is more than 30 years; counting from the Opium War’s anti-imperialism, it is more than 100 years. We have done only one thing: engaged in class struggle. Class struggle changes the superstructure and the socio-economic system; this is merely to open up the path for construction, for developing production, for transforming from an agricultural country to an industrial country, and for raising the people’s living standards.” “In this century, the first half century was for revolution, the second half century is for construction. The central task now is construction.”

从党的八大到反右派斗争开展之前，是毛泽东对今后国家要以经济建设为中心的思想，阐述比较集中的一段时间。1957年3月在全国宣传工作会议上的讲话中，他提出要建设一个具有现代工业、现代农业和现代科学文化的社会主义国家。会后南下视察。到天津、到济南、到南京，最后到上海，一路走下来，在党员干部会议上，反复讲到经济建设为中心这个问题。他说：“我们现在处在这么一个时代，就是大规模的阶级斗争基本上结束”。“阶级斗争基本结束，我们的任务转到什么地方？就是要转入到搞建设，率领整个社会，率领六亿人口，同自然界作斗争，把中国兴盛起来，变成一个工业国。”又说：“拿共产党的历史来说有三十几年，从鸦片战争反帝国主义算起有一百多年，我们仅仅做了一件事，就是搞阶级斗争。阶级斗争改变上层建筑和社会经济制度，这仅仅是为建设、为发展生产、为由农业国到工业国开辟道路，为人民生活的提高开辟道路。”“这个世纪，上半个世纪搞革命，下半个世纪搞建设。现在的中心任务是建设。”

However, when Mao Zedong stressed shifting the Party’s and the state’s work focus to economic construction, he did not neglect class struggle. This can be seen from the following passage: “In the course of construction, we still cannot do without struggle between people. In the current transitional period, struggle between people still includes class struggle. We say that class struggle is basically concluded, meaning that some aspects remain unconcluded, especially in the ideological sphere; the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie will be prolonged for a fairly long time.”

但是，毛泽东在强调把党和国家的工作中心转到经济建设上来的时候，并没有忽略阶级斗争。从下面这段话里就可以看出来：“在建设过程中还是离不了人与人之间的斗争，在目前的过渡时期中，人与人之间的斗争还包括着阶级斗争。我们说阶级斗争基本完结，就是说还有些没有完结，特别是在思想方面，无产阶级与资产阶级之间的斗争，还要延长一个相当长久的时间。”

The chronicle records in detail the Party’s rectification movement and the process by which the rectification turned into the anti-rightist struggle. In the anti-rightist struggle, Mao Zedong intensified class struggle again, making an overestimation of the situation, which led to the serious error of the anti-rightist struggle’s extensive expansion. At the Third Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC, held in October 1957, he changed the Eighth National Congress’s thesis on the principal contradiction in Chinese society, re-emphasizing that the struggle between the two classes—the proletariat and the bourgeoisie—and between the two roads—socialism and capitalism—was the principal contradiction. This marked the beginning of the implementation of the “take class struggle as the key link” “Left” thinking in socialist construction.

年谱详细记述了党的整风运动和由整风转到反右派斗争的过程。在反右派斗争中，毛泽东又把阶级斗争强化了起来，对形势作出了过分估计，因而导致反右派斗争发生严重扩大化的错误。在1957年10月召开的中共八届三中全会，他改变了八大关于我国社会主要矛盾的论断，重新强调无产阶级与资产阶级两个阶级、社会主义与资本主义两条道路的斗争是主要矛盾。这标志着在指导思想上把以阶级斗争为纲的“左”的思想贯彻于社会主义建设中从此开始了。

Changing the formulation of the principal contradiction did not immediately affect the Party’s and the state’s practical work at that time, nor did it mean that Mao Zedong no longer attached importance to developing the productive forces. After the closure of the Third Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, in January 1958, Mao Zedong proposed shifting the Party’s and the state’s work focus to the technological revolution, which was in fact a continuation of the Eighth National Congress line centered on economic construction. Rapidly developing the productive forces, quickly changing China’s backward appearance, and building China into a modern socialist country as soon as possible—these were the motives and goals of Mao Zedong’s launching of the “Great Leap Forward.” However, due to impatience for success and violation of objective laws, the “Great Leap Forward” suffered serious setbacks. And in the process of correcting the “Left” errors, the intra-Party differences that emerged at the Lushan Conference were characterized by Mao Zedong as “a class struggle, a continuation of the life-and-death struggle between the two antagonistic classes of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in the socialist revolution of the past ten years.” [26]26 The Lushan Conference (July–August 1959) was a meeting of the CPC Central Committee at which Peng Dehuai, a senior military leader, criticized the excesses of the Great Leap Forward; Mao Zedong denounced this criticism as a manifestation of class struggle. In this way, the error of expanding class struggle in the anti-rightist movement was extended into the Party.

改变主要矛盾的提法，当时还没有立即影响到党和国家的实际工作，也不意味着毛泽东不再重视发展生产力。八届三中全会闭幕后，1958年1月，毛泽东就提出把党和国家的工作着重点放到技术革命上去，这实际上是以经济建设为中心的八大路线的延续。迅速发展生产力，尽快改变中国的落后面貌，早日把中国建设成现代化的社会主义国家，这是毛泽东发动“大跃进”的动机和目的。但是，由于急于求成，违反客观规律，“大跃进”遭受严重挫折。而在纠正“左”的错误过程中，庐山会议上出现的党内分歧，被毛泽东说成是“一场阶级斗争，是过去十年社会主义革命过程中资产阶级与无产阶级两大对抗阶级的生死斗争的继续”。这样，把反右派运动中阶级斗争扩大化的错误，延伸到了党内。

In 1962, due to differences in the assessment of the situation and on certain measures to be taken, disagreements arose again within the Party. The issue of fixing farm output quotas to the household served as the trigger, leading Mao Zedong to further re-emphasize class struggle at the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, and he said that class struggle must be discussed every year, every month. This marked a new development in Mao Zedong’s thinking that emphasized class struggle.

1962年，由于对形势的估计和采取某些措施的问题上，党内又发生了意见分歧。以包产到户问题为导火线，引发毛泽东在八届十中全会进一步重提阶级斗争，并且说阶级斗争要年年讲、月月讲。这标志着毛泽东强调阶级斗争的思想有了新的发展。

Drawing lessons from the Lushan Conference, Mao Zedong accepted Liu Shaoqi’s opinion and proposed that dealing with the problem of class struggle should not hinder work. “Work must be put in first place, with class struggle parallel to it, not placed in a very serious position. We must not be disturbed; we must not let class struggle interfere with our work. The bulk of the time should be spent on work, but there must be specialized personnel to deal with this class struggle.” At the central work conference held before the Tenth Plenary Session, he once pointed out: “The starting point and focus of our policies in all areas are to develop production, promote production, and be beneficial to production.” Raising the significance of developing production to such a height shows the importance Mao Zedong attached to developing the national economy.

鉴于庐山会议的教训，毛泽东接受了刘少奇的意见，提出不要因为对付阶级斗争问题而妨碍了工作。“要把工作放到第一位，阶级斗争和它平行，不要放在很严重的地位。我们不要受干扰，不要让阶级斗争干扰了我们的工作。大量的时间要做工作，但是要有专人对付这个阶级斗争。”在十中全会前召开的中央工作会上，他曾指出：“我们各方面政策的出发点和着眼点，是发展生产，促进生产，对生产有利。”把发展生产的意义提到这样的高度，说明毛泽东对发展国民经济的重视程度。

After re-emphasizing class struggle at the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, Mao Zedong, proceeding from opposing and preventing revisionism, decided to launch a socialist education movement nationwide and personally presided over the drafting of the *Decision of the Central Committee of the CPC on Some Problems in Current Rural Work (Draft)*. This document stressed that “serious and acute class struggle has emerged in current Chinese society.” The document also quoted a sentence from Mao Zedong: “Class struggle, once grasped, works wonders.”

在八届十中全会重提阶级斗争以后，毛泽东从反修防修出发，决定在全国发动一场社会主义教育运动，并亲自主持起草《中共中央关于目前农村工作中若干问题的决定（草案）》。这个文件强调“当前中国社会出现了严重的尖锐的阶级斗争情况”。文件中还引用了毛泽东的一句话：“阶级斗争，一抓就灵”。

While devoting his main energy to leading the socialist education movement, Mao Zedong did not relax his attention to and emphasis on production, especially agricultural production. He proposed combining class struggle with production struggle. He said: “Class struggle, production struggle, and scientific experimentation must be combined. If we only engage in production struggle and scientific experimentation but do not grasp class struggle, people’s mental outlook cannot be invigorated, and production struggle and scientific experimentation still cannot be done well. If we only engage in production struggle but not scientific experimentation, can that work? If we only engage in class struggle but not production struggle and scientific experimentation, and say we support the general line, the result will be false.” He demanded that “every step” of the socialist education movement “must be closely integrated with production.” “Production must develop; if production is done poorly and declines, the rural socialist education movement will have failed.”

毛泽东在以主要精力领导社会主义教育运动的时候，也没有放松对生产特别是农业生产的关注和重视，他提出要把阶级斗争和生产斗争结合起来。他说：“阶级斗争、生产斗争、科学实验三者必须结合。只搞生产斗争、科学实验，而不抓阶级斗争，人的精神面貌不能振奋，还是搞不好生产斗争、科学实验的。只搞生产斗争，不搞科学实验，行吗？只搞阶级斗争，而不搞生产斗争、科学实验，说拥护总路线，结果是假的。”他要求，社教运动的“每一步骤都要紧密结合生产”。“生产要发展，如果生产搞坏了，下降了，农村社会主义教育运动就是失败了。”

In the summer of 1963, Mao Zedong proposed a strategic goal for developing the national economy in two steps. He said in a warning tone: “If we do not strive, within the next few decades, to thoroughly change our country’s state of economic and technological backwardness far behind the imperialist countries, being beaten will be unavoidable.” We should “strive to change our country’s backward state in social economy and technology within a not-too-long period of time; otherwise, we will make mistakes.”

1963年夏，毛泽东提出发展国民经济分两步走的战略目标。他用带有警示的口气说：“如果不在今后几十年内，争取彻底改变我国经济和技术远远落后于帝国主义国家的状态，挨打是不可避免的。”我们应当“力求在一个不太长久的时间内，改变我国社会经济、技术方面的落后状态，否则我们就要犯错误”。

However, after re-emphasizing class struggle at the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee in 1962, Mao Zedong’s thinking, energy, focus, and practical work were mainly placed on class struggle. First, launching the socialist education movement; second, carrying out large-scale criticism in the cultural and ideological fields; third, leading the Sino-Soviet debate. These three aspects influenced and propelled each other, expanding and absolutizing class struggle, which existed within a certain scope in socialist society, linking international anti-revisionism with domestic opposition to and prevention of revisionism, forming the “Left” guiding ideology of taking class struggle as the key link. The chronicle records all this in detail.

但是，从1962年八届十中全会重提阶级斗争以后，毛泽东的思想、精力、关注点和实际工作主要放在阶级斗争方面。一是发动社会主义教育运动；二是开展文化思想领域的大批判；三是领导中苏论战。这三个方面互相影响，互相推动，把社会主义社会中一定范围内存在的阶级斗争扩大化、绝对化，从国际上的反修联系到国内的反修防修，形成以阶级斗争为纲的“左”的指导思想。这些，年谱都作了详细记述。

When the Eighth National Congress of the Party was held in 1956, Mao Zedong once said that the root of Stalin’s errors was that, when class struggle had already concluded, he continued to carry out class struggle. Yet in 1975 he said, “Class struggle is the key link; everything else is secondary. Stalin made a big mistake on this issue.” When correcting the errors of the “Great Leap Forward,” Mao Zedong said that not understanding commodity exchange and the law of value meant not understanding what socialism is. When emphasizing class struggle, he said that not understanding class struggle meant not understanding what socialism is. This situation shows that Mao Zedong’s theoretical understanding of the principal contradiction and principal task of socialist society, and of what methods to adopt to build socialism in China, was still in a state of uncertainty. Thus, whenever there were disturbances or political storms at home or abroad, his understanding would waver and turn to class struggle. He even said: “Marx’s doctrine is the doctrine of class struggle.”

1956年召开党的八大的时候，毛泽东曾说，斯大林错误的根源，是在阶级斗争已经完结，还要继续进行阶级斗争。而到了1975年他却说，“阶级斗争是纲，其余都是目，斯大林在这个问题上犯了大错误。”在纠正“大跃进”错误的时候，毛泽东说，不懂得商品交换、价值规律，就是不懂得什么叫社会主义。在强调阶级斗争的时候，他又说不懂得阶级斗争，就是不懂得什么叫社会主义。这种情况说明，毛泽东对社会主义社会的主要矛盾和主要任务，以及采取什么方式方法在中国建设社会主义，在理论认识上还处于不确定状态。因而一遇到国内国际出现的风吹草动、政治风波，认识上就发生反复，就往阶级斗争上想。甚至说：“马克思的学说，就是阶级斗争的学说。”

Reading through this chronicle, one can see the process of change in Mao Zedong’s understanding and handling of the relationship between class struggle and economic construction over the 20 years after 1956. From establishing developing the productive forces as the fundamental task of the Party and the state, to giving equal weight to class struggle and economic construction, and then to taking class struggle as the key link with everything else secondary. These two issues—class struggle and economic construction—were never forgotten in his mind. But the overall trend was that the thinking of taking class struggle as the key link grew increasingly strong, until the launch of the “Cultural Revolution.”

通读了这部年谱，可以看出，从1956年后的20年间，毛泽东在对待阶级斗争和经济建设两者的关系的认识和处理上的变化过程。从确定以发展生产力为党和国家的根本任务，到阶级斗争和经济建设并重，再到阶级斗争为纲，其余都是目。阶级斗争和经济建设这两个问题，在他的头脑里始终没有忘记。而总的趋势，则是阶级斗争为纲的思想越来越强烈，直到发动“文化大革命”。

Launching the “Cultural Revolution” was a serious, overall error of Mao Zedong’s later years. This issue occupies a considerable portion of the chronicle. The chronicle records in relative detail the process by which Mao Zedong launched and led the “Cultural Revolution.” The ten-year “Cultural Revolution” carried the expansion and absolutization of class struggle to an extreme, turning it into a civil strife that caused great damage to economic construction. However, when he believed that the climax of the “Cultural Revolution” had ended and the overall situation was relatively stable, his attention would again turn to economic construction.

发动“文化大革命”，是毛泽东晚年所犯的全局性的严重错误。关于这个问题，在年谱中占有相当的篇幅。年谱比较详细地记述了毛泽东发动和领导“文化大革命”的过程。10年“文化大革命”，将阶级斗争扩大化、绝对化达到了极端，成为一场内乱，使经济建设遭到很大破坏。但是当他认为“文化大革命”高潮结束、整个形势处于相对稳定的时候，他的注意力又会转到经济建设方面。

Through the chronicle one can understand: why Mao Zedong launched the “Cultural Revolution” and the process by which he led the “Cultural Revolution”; why the “Cultural Revolution” had to take the form of a mass struggle from below, and what measures Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee took to criticize and halt the extreme behaviors that emerged during the movement; why the “Cultural Revolution” lasted for ten years, and what breathtaking struggles occurred during those ten years; how Mao Zedong’s policies toward cadres, intellectuals, and his attitude toward some veteran revolutionaries changed; how Mao Zedong went from supporting the rebels to criticizing them and then to feeling disappointed in them; how Mao Zedong went from fully supporting the Central Cultural Revolution Group to no longer relying on them and then to criticizing the “Gang of Four,” preventing their plot to usurp the highest Party and state power from succeeding; [27]27 The “restoration of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations” refers to the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan on September 29, 1972. how Lin Biao went from being Mao Zedong’s successor to the chief culprit in a plot to murder Mao Zedong and then fled abroad, dying in a plane crash; [28]28 “Chiang Kai-shek” (1887–1975) was the leader of the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) and the head of the Republic of China government on Taiwan after 1949. how, after Deng Xiaoping was overthrown in the “Cultural Revolution,” Mao Zedong protected

通过年谱可以了解：毛泽东为什么发动“文化大革命”以及领导“文化大革命”的过程；“文化大革命”为什么要采取自下而上的群众斗争的形式，当运动中出现一些极端行为的时候，毛泽东和党中央采取怎样的措施，进行批评和制止；“文化大革命”为什么会延续10年之久，在这10年中间，发生了哪些惊心动魄的斗争；毛泽东的干部政策、知识分子政策以及对待一些老一代革命家的态度，是怎样变化的；毛泽东是怎样从支持造反派，到批评造反派，进而对他们感到失望的；毛泽东是怎样从全力支持中央文革小组，到不再重用他们，进而批评“四人帮”，不让他们窃取党和国家最高权力的阴谋得逞；林彪是怎样从毛泽东的接班人变成谋害毛泽东的祸首而叛逃国外，机毁人亡；邓小平在“文化大革命”中被打倒以后，毛泽东是怎样保护邓小平，起用邓小平，而最后又发动“批邓、反击右倾翻案风”；毛泽东是怎样从搞个人崇拜，到抑制和批评对他的过分颂扬，等等。

III. On International Strategy and the Question of War and Peace

三、关于国际战略和战争与和平问题

As the principal leader of the Party and state and a great strategist, Mao Zedong consistently followed international developments and dynamics, and devoted close attention to the formulation of international strategy and war strategy. He always had a clear picture in his mind of whom to unite with, whom to win over, whom to isolate, and whom to strike at on the world stage. Regarding the configuration of the world, his proposals, from the “intermediate zone” to the “two intermediate zones” and then to the division into “three worlds,” together with his strategy of “one line,” reflected his broad global vision and strategic thinking on international affairs.

作为党和国家的主要领导人、伟大的战略家，毛泽东一直关注国际形势和国际动态，注重国际战略和战争战略的谋划。对于在世界上团结谁、争取谁、孤立谁、打击谁，始终做到心中有数。关于世界格局，他从提出“中间地带”到“两个中间地带”再到“三个世界”的划分，以及他提出的“一条线”的战略，反映了他广阔的世界眼光和国际战略思维。

As early as the mid-1940s, Mao Zedong put forward the concept of the “intermediate zone,” which at that time referred to the vast zone between the United States and the Soviet Union. From the mid-1950s onward, Mao spoke on this question many times again, mainly referring to the vast zone between the countries of the socialist camp and the United States. Later, he made a concrete analysis of the “intermediate zone”: “In the world today, the socialist camp counts as one side, the United States counts as the other side, and everything else counts as the intermediate zone. But the nature of the countries in the intermediate zone varies: some have colonies, such as Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and others; some have achieved genuine independence, such as Guinea, the United Arab Republic, Mali, and Ghana; and some have achieved nominal independence but are in fact still dependencies. Britain and France are imperialist, but they also have contradictions with the United States and can serve as indirect allies of the people.” By 1964, Mao clearly distinguished the intermediate zone into two parts, which he called the two intermediate zones (sometimes also referred to as the “two Third Worlds”). He said: “The intermediate zone has two parts. One part consists of the vast economically backward countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The other part consists of the imperialist countries and developed capitalist countries represented by Europe. Both parts oppose U.S. control. In the countries of Eastern Europe, there is the problem of opposing Soviet control.” Not long after, he said: “Asia, Africa, and Latin America are the first intermediate zone; Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan are the second intermediate zone.” By 1974, Mao had clearly put forward the division of the three worlds: the United States and the Soviet Union were the First World. Japan, Europe, Australia, and Canada were the Second World. Asia, except for Japan, was all the Third World. The whole of Africa was the Third World, and Latin America was also the Third World. He referred to the Third World as “a great expanse.” [27]27 The “restoration of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations” refers to the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan on September 29, 1972. The formulation of the international strategy of the three worlds enabled China to win over a broad range of friends on the international stage. Deng Xiaoping once said: “Comrade Mao Zedong’s strategic thinking on the division of the three worlds opened a path for us.” [28]28 “Chiang Kai-shek” (1887–1975) was the leader of the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) and the head of the Republic of China government on Taiwan after 1949.

早在上世纪40年代中期，毛泽东就提出“中间地带”这个概念，当时指美、苏两国之间的广大地带。从上世纪50年代中期，毛泽东又多次讲到这个问题，主要是指社会主义阵营国家同美国之间的广大地带。后来，他对“中间地带”作了具体分析：“现在的世界，社会主义阵营算一个方面，美国算另一个方面，除此以外，都算中间地带。但是中间地带国家的性质也各不相同：有些国家有殖民地，如英、法、比、荷等国；有些国家取得了真正的独立，如几内亚、阿联、马里、加纳；还有一些国家取得了名义上的独立，实际上仍然是附属国。英国和法国是帝国主义，但同美国也有矛盾，可以作为人民的间接同盟者。”到1964年，毛泽东把中间地带明确区分为两个部分，叫做两个中间地带（有时又称作“两个第三世界”）。他说：“中间地带有两部分，一部分是指亚洲、非洲、拉丁美洲的广大经济落后的国家，一部分是指以欧洲为代表的帝国主义国家和发达的资本主义国家。这两部分都反对美国的控制。在东欧各国则发生反对苏联控制的问题。”不久，他又说：“亚洲、非洲、拉丁美洲是第一个中间地带，欧洲、加拿大、澳洲、日本是第二个中间地带。”到1974年，毛泽东明确提出了三个世界的划分：美国、苏联是第一世界。日本、欧洲、澳大利亚、加拿大是第二世界。亚洲除了日本，都是第三世界。整个非洲都是第三世界，拉丁美洲也是第三世界。他把第三世界称作“一大片”。三个世界划分的国际战略的提出，使中国在国际舞台上争取了广大的朋友。邓小平曾说过：“毛泽东同志关于三个世界划分的战略思想，给我们开辟了道路。”

Opposing hegemonism, China never seeking hegemony, and China belonging to the Third World—these were a basic state policy determined and proclaimed externally by Mao Zedong. He stated this many times to foreign dignitaries. For example, on June 19, 1970, he said to the Somali government delegation: “We count ourselves as part of the Third World. The newspapers now often talk about the United States, the Soviet Union, and China as a ‘big triangle.’ I do not acknowledge that.”

反对霸权主义、中国永远不称霸、中国是属于第三世界，这是毛泽东确定并对外宣示的一项基本国策。他向外国政要多次申明，比如1970年6月19日对索马里政府代表团说：“我们把自己算作第三世界的。现在报纸上经常吹美国、苏联、中国叫做大三角。我就不承认。”

For a long time, Mao Zedong had consistently opposed U.S. hegemonism. Later, the Soviet Union also engaged in hegemonism, turning the world into a contest between the two hegemons, the United States and the Soviet Union. Mao then proposed: oppose both U.S. and Soviet hegemonism. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Sino-Soviet relations became increasingly tense, and the Soviet Union posed the main threat to China. At the same time, the Soviet Union’s expansionist ambitions threatened the global interests of the United States, especially its interests in Europe and the Middle East. Based on changes in the strategic relations among China, the United States, and the Soviet Union, Mao proposed: “Making use of the contradictions between the two superpowers is our policy. Between the two hegemons, we must try to win over one hegemon and avoid fighting on two fronts.” [29]29 “Nixon Subsequently, he put forward the strategy of “one line,” that is, “the United States, Japan, China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, the Arab world, and Europe must all unite” to jointly oppose Soviet hegemonism. As for what “one line” meant, Mao said he was drawing a horizontal line according to the earth’s latitude. [30]30 The “two musts” refers to Mao Zedong’s admonition at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the CPC in March 1949: “The comrades must be taught to remain modest, prudent, and free from arrogance and rashness, and the comrades must be taught to preserve the style of hard struggle.”

长期以来，毛泽东一直反对美国的霸权主义。后来，苏联也搞霸权主义，变成美、苏两霸争夺世界。毛泽东就提出：美、苏两霸一起反。上世纪60年代末、70年代初，中苏关系日趋紧张，苏联对中国构成主要威胁。而苏联的扩张野心又威胁着美国的全球利益，特别是美国在欧洲、中东的利益。毛泽东根据中、美、苏三国战略关系的变化，提出“在两个超级大国之间可以利用矛盾，就是我们的政策。两霸我们总要争取一霸，不两面作战。”随后又提出“一条线”的战略，即“美国、日本、中国、巴基斯坦、伊朗、土耳其，阿拉伯世界，欧洲，都要团结起来”，共同对付苏联霸权主义。所谓“一条线”，毛泽东说，他是按地球纬度划的一条横线。

Handling relations with the United States always occupied an important position in China’s international strategy. After the founding of New China, under circumstances where the United States was hostile to New China and imposed a policy of encirclement and blockade, U.S. imperialism naturally became the number one enemy of the Chinese people. Mao Zedong and our Party kept abreast of U.S. developments in a timely manner, made a series of unique analyses and judgments about the United States, and insisted on both daring to struggle and being skilled in struggle in dealing with the United States, taking the safeguarding of the supreme interests of our country and nation as the fundamental starting point.

处理同美国的关系，在中国的国际战略中，始终占着重要的位置。新中国成立后，在美国敌视新中国、对新中国采取包围封锁的情况下，美帝国主义自然成为中国人民的头号敌人。毛泽东和我们党及时了解美国动向，对美国作出一系列独到的分析和判断，并对美国坚持既敢于斗争又善于斗争，一切以维护我们国家和民族的最高利益为根本出发点。

In October 1950, shortly after the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea [31]31 Yan’an was the revolutionary base area of the CPC from 1936 to 1948, and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region was its administrative center; the “Yan’an spirit” of hard struggle is a key part of CPC tradition. began, Mao Zedong, when explaining why China had to fight this war, said: “If we ignore the Korean issue, U.S. imperialism will inevitably advance step by step, following the old path of Japan’s aggression against China, and will act even more ferociously than Japan did. It wants

1950年10月，抗美援朝战争打响不久，毛泽东在讲到中国为什么要进行抗美援朝战争时，曾这样说过：“我们对朝鲜问题，如果置之不理，美帝必然得寸进尺，走日本侵略中国的老路，甚至比日本搞得更凶。它要把三把尖刀插在我们的身上，从朝鲜一把刀插在我们的头上，以台湾一把刀插在我们的腰上，把越南一把刀插在我们的脚上。天下有变，它就从三方面向我们进攻，那我们就被动了。我们抗美援朝就是不许它的如意算盘得逞。‘打得一拳开，免得百拳来’。”

In the 1950s and 1960s, Mao Zedong consistently emphasized that the threat of war against China came primarily from the east, from the United States. He stated: "The danger of world war and the threat to China come mainly from the warmongers of the United States.

上世纪五六十年代，毛泽东一直强调，对中国的战争威胁主要来自东面，来自美国。他说：“世界战争的危险和对中国的威胁主要来自美国的好战分子。他们侵占中国的台湾和台湾海峡，还想发动原子战争。”1959年3月，西藏发生武装叛乱。4月26日，印度外交秘书杜德发表谈话，说达赖喇嘛已进入印度。尼赫鲁会见了他，并在议会中宣布，达赖在印度会受到尊重的待遇。杜德的谈话，还把中印关系中出现的不正常现象的责任推到中国方面。在印度严重伤害中印关系的情况下，毛泽东重申中国的主要斗争方向仍然在东方，而不在其他方面。他在审阅中国外交部对杜德谈话的答复稿时，加写了一段话，其中说：“中国人民的敌人是在东方，美帝国主义在台湾、在南朝鲜、在日本、在菲律宾，都有很多的军事基地，都是针对中国的。中国的主要注意力和斗争方针是在东方，在西太平洋地区，在凶恶的侵略的美帝国主义，而不在印度，不在东南亚及南亚的一些国家。”“中国不会这样蠢，东方树敌于美国，西方又树敌于印度。”

Because the United States itself had certain difficulties, as well as its support for Japanese militarism, Mao Zedong believed that if the United States were to launch a war in the East, it would rely mainly on Japan. He said: “In the future, if the United States wants to wage war in the East, it cannot do so without relying on Japan; therefore we must study the situation in Japan well.” He also said: “If the United States wants to fight China, it cannot do so alone; it must drag in Japan, the South Korean reactionaries, and also Chiang Kai-shek. Whether European countries participate or not is uncertain. The main thing is that without Japan it would not dare to fight, because the United States has too many things to manage—Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America.” Speaking of Japan, after the restoration of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations in the 1970s, Mao had a sober assessment of Japan’s future development and changes. In 1974, when former British Prime Minister Edward Heath asked whether China believed in Japan’s peaceful intentions, Mao said: “Within a foreseeable period of time, it is hard to say in the future.”

由于美国自身存在一些困难，以及它对日本军国主义的扶持，毛泽东认为，美国要在东方发动战争，主要依靠日本。他说：“将来美国在东方战争中不依靠日本是搞不起来的，因此我们要很好地研究日本的情况。”又说：“美国如果要打中国，它一国不行，得拉日本、南朝鲜反动派，还有蒋介石。欧洲国家参加不参加就不一定了。主要是没有日本它就不敢打，因为美国管的事太多了，又是亚洲、非洲，又是欧洲，还有拉丁美洲。”说到日本，毛泽东在上世纪70年代中日邦交恢复以后，对日本将来的发展变化有一个清醒的估计。1974年，当英国前首相希思问中国是否相信日本的和平意图时，毛泽东说：“在可以估计到的一段时间内，将来很难说。”

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Mao Zedong, based on changes in the strategic relations among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, timely adjusted his struggle strategy and improved relations with the United States. At that time, the United States, based on its own strategic interests, was also eager to improve relations with China. Mao once analyzed the U.S. change in policy toward China as follows: “Some of our friends do not understand why we invited Nixon to Beijing. The United States has great difficulties; other places have become tense, so it must create a détente in the East in order to focus its main attention on its domestic affairs, on Europe, and on the Mediterranean. The purpose of his trip to Beijing is precisely this.”

上世纪60年代末70年代初，毛泽东根据美、苏、中三国战略关系的变化，适时调整斗争策略，同美国改善关系。当时美国基于它的战略利益考虑，也急于同中国改善关系。毛泽东对美国改变对华政策，曾作过这样的分析：“我们有些朋友们不理解为什么我们要请尼克松到北京来。美国困难大得很，别的地方紧张起来了，他一定要使东方有个缓和的局面才能够把主要的注意力放在它的国内，放在欧洲和地中海。他跑到北京的目的就是这个。”

In talks with U.S. leaders, Mao Zedong always maintained a clear head and safeguarded the nation’s dignity. When he met Kissinger, Kissinger always emphasized that the Soviet Union wanted to attack China and said that the United States had decided not to allow China’s security to be undermined; Mao rebuffed him. Afterwards, Mao said to Zhou Enlai, Qiao Guanhua, and others: “I talked with Kissinger for almost three hours, but there was actually only one sentence: ‘Beware, the polar bear wants to attack you Americans,’ in response to his ‘Beware, the polar bear wants to attack China.’ With the United States, we must be careful; when struggling, it is easy to be ‘left,’ and when uniting, it is easy to be right. I think we should not enter into a military alliance with it. World affairs must be observed; a hundred years. Today, among those present, there are elderly comrades, middle-aged comrades, and young comrades are the majority. We must keep a clear head; this requires some thought and analysis. But to fight blindly and chaotically will not do either.”

毛泽东同美国领导人会谈中始终保持清醒的头脑，维护国家的尊严。他会见基辛格时，基辛格总是强调苏联要整中国，并说美国已经决定不允许中国的安全遭到破坏，被毛泽东顶了回去。事后，毛泽东对周恩来、乔冠华等说：我向基辛格差不多讲了三个小时，其实只有一句话，“当心，北极熊要整你们美国”，对付他的“当心，北极熊要整中国”。对美国要注意，斗争的时候容易“左”，搞联合的时候容易右。我看不跟它搞军事同盟一套。世界上的事要看嘛，一百年。今天在座的，有年老的同志、中年的同志，青年同志占多数。要保持清醒头脑，这个要动点脑筋，有所分析。但是乱战一气，也不行。

From the day the People’s Republic of China was founded, Mao Zedong hoped for a peaceful international environment so that he could concentrate on domestic construction. The question of war and peace, and whether a world war could break out, was a major issue that Mao constantly pondered, because it was an important prerequisite for formulating domestic and international policies. In December 1949, during his first visit to the Soviet Union, the first question he raised in talks with Stalin was: “How and to what extent can peace be guaranteed?”

从新中国成立之日起，毛泽东就希望有一个和平的国际环境，以便集中力量进行国内建设。关于战争与和平问题，关于世界大战能不能打起来的问题，是毛泽东一直在思考的一个重大问题，因为这是制定国际国内方针政策的重要前提。1949年12月他第一次访苏，同斯大林会谈时提出的第一个问题就是：如何和在多大程度上能够保障和平？

On August 24, 1954, in a conversation with a delegation from the British Labour Party, Mao Zedong expressed China’s desire for world peace. He said: “China is an agricultural country; to become an industrial country will take several decades and requires help from many sides, first of all a peaceful environment. Constant fighting makes it hard to get things done, and maintaining many troops will hinder economic construction. If you agree, we will continue to create a peaceful international environment.” “We believe that different systems can coexist peacefully.” On October 23 of the same year, during a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Nehru, he again expressed this wish: “We now need several decades of peace, at least several decades of peace, in order to develop domestic productive forces and improve the people’s livelihood. We do not want war. If such an environment can be created, that would be very good. We can cooperate with anyone who approves of this goal.” On May 26, 1955, during a meeting with Indonesian Prime Minister Sastroamidjojo, he said: “Even with Western countries, as long as they are willing, we are also willing to cooperate with them. We are willing to use peaceful methods to resolve existing problems.” “If the United States is willing to sign a peace treaty, it can be for any length of time; 50 years is not enough, then 100 years—I wonder if the United States would agree.” Whenever foreign friends asked Mao what conditions China needed for construction, Mao always replied: “First, we need time; second, we need a peaceful international environment.”

1954年8月24日，毛泽东在同英国工党代表团谈话时，表达了中国对世界和平的渴望。他说：“中国是农业国，要变为工业国需要几十年，需要各方面帮助，首先需要和平环境。经常打仗不好办事，养许多兵会妨碍经济建设的。如果诸位同意的话，我们要继续创造一个和平的国际环境。”“我们认为，不同的制度是可以和平共处的。”同年10月23日，在会见印度总理尼赫鲁时，再次表达了这个愿望：“我们现在需要几十年的和平，至少几十年的和平，以便开发国内的生产，改善人民的生活。我们不愿打仗。假如能创造这样一个环境，那就很好。凡是赞成这个目标的，我们都能同他合作。”1955年5月26日，在会见印尼总理沙斯特罗阿米佐约时说：“就是西方国家，只要它们愿意，我们也愿同它们合作。我们愿意用和平的方法来解决存在的问题。”“如果美国愿意签订一个和平条约，多长的时间都可以，50年不够就100年，不知美国干不干。”每当外国友人问到毛泽东中国进行建设的条件是什么？毛泽东总是回答：第一要有时间，第二要有和平的国际环境。

Mao Zedong’s wishes were one thing; the actual situation was another. From the founding of the People’s Republic, some Western countries, mainly the United States, used various means such as blockade and containment against China, and threatened it with force. Especially by the 1960s, China’s surrounding environment was extremely perilous. To the east was Taiwan, supported by the United States, clamoring every day to counterattack the mainland; to the south, first there was a border armed conflict with India, then the U.S. invasion of Vietnam; to the north, the Soviet Union had a million troops deployed. Mao Zedong maintained a high degree of vigilance against the threat of war.

毛泽东的愿望是一回事，现实的情况是另一回事。从新中国成立起，一些西方国家，主要是美国，对中国实行封锁、遏制等种种手段，并以武力相威胁。特别是到了上世纪60年代，我国周边环境十分险恶。东边是美国支持的台湾，天天喊反攻大陆，南面先是中印边境发生武装冲突，后又有美国侵略越南，北边则有苏联陈兵百万。毛泽东对战争威胁保持了高度警惕。

Mao Zedong’s basic attitude toward war was: first, oppose it; second, not fear it. On January 29, 1956, when reviewing the government work report, he revised one sentence to read: “We demand peace, but if international aggressor groups impose war on us, we are not afraid of war either.” On March 13, 1959, Mao met with the famous American black scholar W.E.B. Du Bois. When asked why the Chinese people were not afraid of war, Mao replied: “If imperialism is determined to start a war, what use is it to be afraid? Whether you are afraid or not, war will come anyway; the more you fear it, the sooner war may come. Therefore, we have two principles: first, resolutely oppose war; second, if imperialism insists on fighting, we will fight it. Once you think the problem through like this, you are not afraid.” On August 28, 1960, during a meeting with the Albanian Minister of Defense, he also said: “Who says there must be war? If there is no war for a hundred years, I would approve. But if imperialism attacks, what will you do? Will you kneel down, or will you fight? To fight means there will be deaths. If you are afraid of fighting and say every day that imperialism has changed, that it will not fight, that there is no possibility of world war, then things become easy—just sleep. This is very dangerous; it makes people lose their vigilance.” On June 28 and 29, 1965, while listening to work reports from He Long and others, he said: “Things in the world are always like that: if you are not prepared, the enemy will come; if you are prepared, the enemy will not dare to come.”

毛泽东对战争的基本态度是：第一条，反对；第二条，不怕。1956年1月29日，他在审阅政府工作报告时，将其中的一句话修改为：“我们要求和平，但是如果国际侵略集团把战争强加在我们头上的话，我们也并不惧怕战争。” 1959年3月13日，毛泽东会见美国著名黑人学者杜波伊斯，当被问到为什么中国人不害怕战争时，毛泽东是这样回答的：“如果帝国主义一定要发动战争，你害怕有什么用呢？你怕也好，不怕也好，战争反正到来，你越是害怕，战争也许还会来得早一些。因此，我们有两条：第一条，坚决反对战争；第二条，如果帝国主义一定要打仗，我们就同它打。把问题这样想透了，就不害怕了。”1960年8月28日，在会见阿尔巴尼亚国防部长时又说：“谁说一定要打仗？一百年不打仗，我都赞成。帝国主义打来了，你怎么办呀？你是要跪在地下，还是要打？要打就要死人。你如果怕打，天天说帝国主义已经变了，他不会打了，没有世界大战的可能性了，那事情好办了，睡觉就是了。这样是很危险的，使人们丧失警惕。”1965年6月28、29日在听贺龙等汇报工作时说：“世界上的事情总是那样，你准备不好，敌人就来了；准备好了，敌人反而不敢来。”

When handling major issues and making major decisions, Mao Zedong always prepared for the worst possible outcome while striving for the best prospects and results; his approach to the question of war was the same.

毛泽东在处理重大问题，作出重大决策时，总是向最坏的可能性作准备，争取最好的前途和结果，对待战争问题也是如此。

Mao Zedong was unswerving in safeguarding national independence and sovereignty, never allowing any infringement or harm. He pointed out: “The people of our country do not need and should not encroach upon any foreign territorial sovereignty, but our people must defend their own territorial sovereignty from infringement.” He also said: “We love peace. If anyone endangers our independence, our nature is to rise up and defend it without regard for our own lives.”

毛泽东在维护国家独立和主权问题上，坚定不移，绝不容许受到任何侵犯和危害。他指出：“我国人民不需要也不应当侵占外国任何领土主权，但是我国人民必须保卫自己的领土主权不受侵犯。”又说：“我们热爱和平。如果有人危害我们的独立，我们的天性就是奋不顾身地起来捍卫。”

Defending national sovereignty requires strength. Without strength, one has no say in international affairs, and lacking basic conditions and guarantees, it is impossible to safeguard national independence and sovereignty. Mao Zedong said: “Since history began in the world, there has never been a case where power politics was not practiced. Any class, any country, practices power politics.” This was Mao’s conclusion drawn from historical experience, both Chinese and foreign, ancient and modern. Relating this to China’s economic situation at the time, he sharply pointed out: “If we do not strive to thoroughly change the state of our country’s economy and technology lagging far behind the imperialist countries within the next few decades, it is inevitable that we will be beaten.”

捍卫国家主权是要靠实力的。没有实力在国际上就没有发言权，要维护国家的独立和主权，就缺乏基础性的条件和保障。毛泽东说：“世界上从有历史以来，没有不搞实力地位的事情。任何阶级、任何国家，都是要搞实力地位的。”这是毛泽东从古今中外的历史经验中得出的结论。联系到当时中国的经济状况，他尖锐指出：“如果不在今后几十年内，争取彻底改变我国经济和技术远远落后于帝国主义国家的状态，挨打是不可避免的。”

Speaking of national strength, the first requirement is a strong military capable of winning battles and defeating any aggressor. This is because aggressors, when they intend to violate a country’s territory and endanger its independence and sovereignty, ultimately tend to resort to force and launch wars of aggression. As soon as New China was founded, Mao Zedong proposed: “We must not only have a powerful army, but also build a powerful air force and a powerful navy.” Mao Zedong placed great emphasis on the construction of the air force, and especially the navy. He said: “In the past, imperialist aggression against China mostly came from the sea. Now the Pacific is still not peaceful. We should have a powerful navy.” “Our country is poor, we have little steel, our coastline is very long, and the imperialists bully us precisely because we have no navy. For over a hundred years, imperialist aggression against us has all come from the sea; we must not forget this historical lesson.” On June 29, 1958, Mao Zedong stated: “The development of the navy deserves study. It has been proposed to build 500,000 tons over ten years; that is too little, we should build at least one million tons. Our country needs to do business with foreign countries, so we need oceangoing vessels. We can also build warships and aircraft. We must build a ‘water railway’ [build warships]. At present, the Pacific is in fact not peaceful.” Mao Zedong, from the perspective of drawing historical lessons to strengthen national defense and from the perspective of future maritime development, raised the urgency and necessity of developing the navy—this was a highly forward-looking strategic consideration.

说到实力，首先是要有一支能打胜仗、能战胜任何侵略者的坚强军队。因为侵略者要侵犯一个国家的领土、危害其独立和主权，最终往往是要诉诸武力，发动侵略战争。新中国刚一成立，毛泽东就提出：“我们不仅应该有强大的陆军，还应建立强大的空军，强大的海军。”毛泽东非常重视空军特别是海军的建设。他说：“过去帝国主义侵略中国大都是从海上来的。现在太平洋还不太平。我们应该有一支强大的海军。”“我们国家穷，钢铁少，海防线很长，帝国主义就是欺负我们没有海军。一百多年来，帝国主义侵略我们都是从海上来的，不要忘记这一历史教训。”1958年6月29日，毛泽东提出：“海军发展值得研究，提出十年搞五十万吨位，这太少，最少搞一百万吨位。我国要和外国做生意，需要远洋船只，还可以造军舰、飞机。要修水上铁路（造军舰）。目前，太平洋实际上是不太平的。”毛泽东从记取历史教训加强国防的角度，并从未来海洋事业发展的角度，提出发展海军的紧迫性和必要性，这是一个极具前瞻性的战略考虑。

The level of cutting-edge defense science and technology is an important indicator of a country’s strength. Mao Zedong paid particular attention to this matter. He said: “Cutting-edge defense technology—this thing must be grasped firmly. In today’s world, if you don’t have it, it’s as if you are not a country, and others will ignore you.” The brilliant achievements China has made today in the fields of the two bombs, one satellite, and the space industry were strategically planned and had their foundation laid during the Mao Zedong era.

国防尖端科学技术水平，是衡量一个国家实力的重要标志。毛泽东特别重视这件事。他说：“国防尖端，这个东西要切实抓一下，现在世界上没有这个东西，好像就不是一个国家，人家就不理你。”今天我国在两弹一星和航天事业所取得的辉煌成就，就是在毛泽东时代作出了战略谋划并打下了重要基础的。

Mao Zedong’s reflections on China’s international strategy and the question of war and peace, as well as the decisions he made, evolved with changes in the international situation and international relations, especially changes in relations between China and major powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union. That is to say, they truly advanced with the times and sought truth from facts. Mao Zedong’s far-sighted considerations regarding China’s diplomacy and international strategy, along with his tremendous efforts and contributions, are indelible.

毛泽东对中国国际战略和战争与和平问题的思考和提出的决策，是随着国际局势、国际关系特别是中国与美、苏等大国关系的变化而变化的，就是说是真正与时俱进、实事求是的。毛泽东对中国外交和国际战略的深谋远虑及其作出的巨大努力和贡献，是功不可没的。

IV. On Party Building and the Party’s Mass Line

四、关于党的建设与党的群众路线

After the founding of New China, the Communist Party of China became the ruling party. The environment in which the Party found itself changed, its status changed, and its power also grew. In light of these new circumstances, Mao Zedong’s attention in Party building was concentrated on the following aspects.

新中国成立以后，中国共产党成为执政的党。党所处的环境变了，地位变了，权力也大了。根据这一新的情况，在党的建设方面毛泽东的注意力比较集中到以下几个方面。

First, he proposed combating corruption and promoting integrity, and called on all Party comrades to forever maintain the style of hard struggle. On the eve of the nationwide victory of the revolution, Mao Zedong promptly sounded the alarm for the entire Party, proposing that the “two musts” [30]30 The “two musts” refers to Mao Zedong’s admonition at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the CPC in March 1949: “The comrades must be taught to remain modest, prudent, and free from arrogance and rashness, and the comrades must be taught to preserve the style of hard struggle.” be upheld and that the attack of “sugar-coated bullets” be guarded against. Facts proved that Mao Zedong’s prediction was correct. On December 1, 1951, when reviewing and revising the “Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Streamlining Administration, Increasing Production and Practicing Economy, and Opposing Corruption, Waste, and Bureaucracy,” he added and rewrote some passages, stating: “Since we occupied the cities two to three years ago, serious cases of corruption have occurred continuously, proving that the warning at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Party in the spring of 1949 about the inevitability of the bourgeoisie’s erosion of the Party and the necessity of preventing and overcoming this great danger was entirely correct. Now is the urgent moment for the entire Party to mobilize and earnestly implement this resolution.” “It is now necessary to issue a warning to the entire Party: all Party members engaged in state work, Party work, and work in people’s organizations who use their positions to commit corruption or waste are committing serious crimes.” “All acts of corruption must be exposed and dealt with according to the severity of the case, with punishments ranging from warnings, transfer, dismissal, expulsion from the Party, various terms of imprisonment, up to execution.” At the same time, he pointed out: “Although waste and corruption differ somewhat in nature, the losses from waste are greater than those from corruption, and their consequences are often close to acts of embezzlement, theft, fraud of state property, or acceptance of bribes. Therefore, severe punishment of waste must proceed simultaneously with severe punishment of corruption.”

第一、提出反腐倡廉，倡导全党同志必须永远保持艰苦奋斗的作风。在全国革命胜利前夕，毛泽东就及时地向全党敲警钟，提出要坚持两个“务必”，警惕“糖衣炮弹”的攻击。事实证明，毛泽东的预见是正确的。1951年12月1日，他在审阅修改《中共中央关于实行精兵简政、增产节约、反对贪污、反对浪费和反对官僚主义的决定》时，在加写和改写的一些话中指出：“自从我们占领城市两年至三年以来，严重的贪污案件不断发生，证明一九四九年春季党的二中全会严重地指出资产阶级对党的侵蚀的必然性和为防止克服此种巨大危险的必要性，是完全正确的，现在是全党动员切实执行这项决议的紧急时机了。”“现在必须向全党提出警告：一切从事国家工作、党务工作和人民团体工作的党员，利用职权实行贪污和实行浪费，都是严重的犯罪行为。”“一切贪污行为必须揭发，按其情节轻重，给以程度不等的处理，从警告、调职、撤职、开除党籍、判处各种徒刑、直至枪决。”同时指出：“浪费和贪污在性质上虽有若干不同，但浪费的损失大于贪污，其结果又常与侵吞、盗窃和骗取国家财物或收受他人贿赂的行为相接近。故严惩浪费，必须与严惩贪污同时进行。”

Mao Zedong promptly launched a movement with the main content of opposing corruption, waste, and bureaucracy—the “Three-Anti” Movement. This movement was carried out shortly after the liberation of the whole country, under conditions where the legal system was still very imperfect. There were excesses in its methods, and some wrong cases occurred, but most were quickly corrected. It should be said that this movement was launched very timely and played a positive and long-lasting role in purifying the Party’s organism and preventing the spread of corruption. The chronicle cites a large number of Mao Zedong’s directives and instructions on launching and guiding the “Three-Anti” Movement.

毛泽东及时地发动了一场以反贪污、反浪费、反官僚主义为主要内容的“三反”运动。这次运动是在全国解放不久，法制还很不健全的条件下进行的，做法上又有过头的地方，曾发生了一些错案，但大都很快得到纠正。应当说，这次运动开展得很及时，对于健全党的肌体，防止腐败现象的蔓延，起了积极的和相当长时间的作用。年谱引述了毛泽东关于发动和指导“三反”运动的大量的指示、批示。

From the founding of New China until his later years, Mao Zedong never relaxed his struggle against corrupt phenomena within the Party.

毛泽东从新中国成立一直到他的晚年，从来没有放松过同党内的腐败现象进行斗争。

Mao Zedong always earnestly educated Party cadres at all levels and the broad masses of Party members to maintain the style of hard struggle. At the very beginning of the establishment of New China, he expressed the hope that “all revolutionary personnel throughout the country will forever maintain the style of hard struggle that the personnel in Yan’an and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region possessed during the past ten-plus years.” [31]31 Yan’an was the revolutionary base area of the CPC from 1936 to 1948, and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region was its administrative center; the “Yan’an spirit” of hard struggle is a key part of CPC tradition. Later, he constantly reminded everyone. In 1956, at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, he proposed “building the country through diligence and frugality, opposing extravagance and waste, promoting the style of hard work and plain living, and sharing weal and woe with the masses,” and elevated hard struggle to the height of being the “political essence” of our Party. In 1957, during the rectification movement, he hoped that through rectification, the tradition of hard struggle would be well promoted throughout the Party. He said: “Because the revolution has been victorious, some comrades have somewhat weakened their revolutionary will, their revolutionary enthusiasm has diminished, their spirit of serving the people wholeheartedly has lessened, the spirit of desperate struggle they had when fighting the enemy in the past has lessened, while things like jockeying for position, seeking fame, being particular about food and clothing, comparing salaries, and scrambling for fame and gain have increased.” In 1965, when Mao Zedong revisited Jinggangshan, he said with deep feeling to his accompanying personnel: “Without the difficult struggle on Jinggangshan in the past, there would be no today. I advise everyone: now that life is better, do not lose the spirit of hard struggle; do not lose the revolutionary spirit of Jinggangshan.”

毛泽东总是谆谆教育党的各级干部和广大共产党员一定要保持艰苦奋斗的作风。新中国建立伊始，他就提出，希望“全国一切革命工作人员永远保持过去十余年间在延安和陕甘宁边区的工作人员中所具有的艰苦奋斗的作风”。以后他又不断地提醒大家。1956年在八届二中全会上，他提出“要勤俭建国，反对铺张浪费，提倡艰苦朴素作风，与群众同甘共苦”，并把艰苦奋斗提到是我们党的“政治本色”这样的高度来认识。1957年开展整风运动，他希望经过整风，把艰苦奋斗的传统在全党好好发扬起来。他说：“因为革命胜利了，有一部分同志，革命意志有些衰退，革命热情有些不足，全心全意为人民服务的精神少了，过去跟敌人打仗时的那种拼命精神少了，而闹地位，闹名誉，讲究吃，讲究穿，比薪水高低，争名夺利，这些东西多起来了。”1965年，毛泽东重上井冈山，颇有感触地对陪同人员说：“没有过去井冈山艰难的奋斗，就不可能有今天。我劝大家，日子好过了，艰苦奋斗的精神不要丢了，井冈山的革命精神不要丢了。”

Mao Zedong also particularly emphasized strengthening education on hard struggle among the youth, so that this fine style would be passed down from generation to generation. He said: “Now our upper and middle-level cadres have not yet forgotten the hard struggle, but today’s twenty-year-old youth were only ten years old when the revolution was victorious; they do not understand hardship. They must be educated so that they have revolutionary drive. Do not let them become scientists or cadres and then forget hardship, only pursuing individualism.” He was even more worried about the children of cadres, saying: “I am very worried about our cadres’ children. They have no life experience or social experience, yet they put on great airs and have a strong sense of superiority. They must be educated not to rely on their parents, not to rely on the martyrs, but to rely entirely on themselves.”

毛泽东还特别强调要在青年中加强艰苦奋斗的教育，让这个优良作风一代一代地传下去。他说：“现在我们的上层、中层干部还没有忘记艰苦的斗争，但现在二十岁的青年，革命胜利时只有十岁，不懂艰苦，要加以教育，使他们有革命干劲。不要当了科学家、干部就忘记艰苦，只搞个人主义。”他更担心的是干部子弟，说：“我很担心我们的干部子弟，他们没有生活经验和社会经验，可是架子很大，有很大的优越感。要教育他们不要靠父母，不要靠先烈，要完全靠自己。”

Second, he proposed opposing bureaucracy and advocated that cadres at all levels of the Party and state should appear in the posture of ordinary laborers. It can be said that Mao Zedong struggled against the phenomenon of bureaucracy within the Party all his life. In December 1952, upon seeing the “Report on Opposing Bureaucracy, Opposing Commandism, and Opposing Violations of the Law and Discipline” from the Discipline Inspection Commission of the Shandong Sub-Bureau, he drafted for the CPC Central Committee the “Directive on Opposing Bureaucracy, Opposing Commandism, and Opposing Violations of the Law and Discipline.” It pointed out: “The kind of bureaucracy that does not understand the suffering of the masses, does not understand the situation at the grassroots level slightly farther from one’s own work unit, does not understand that among cadres at the county, district, and township levels there are many commandist and law-and-discipline-violating bad people and bad deeds, or, although having some understanding of these bad people and bad deeds, turns a blind eye, feels no indignation, does not realize the seriousness of the problem, and therefore does not adopt active measures to support good people, punish bad people, promote good deeds, and eliminate bad deeds—this kind of bureaucracy has, in many areas, many aspects, and many departments, basically not been resolved.” Mao Zedong showed no mercy towards bureaucracy. Later, in another instruction, he wrote: “We must completely and thoroughly eliminate the lordly style, bureaucratic style, and commandist style in our leadership.”

第二，提出反对官僚主义，倡导党和国家的各级干部要以普通劳动者的姿态出现。可以说，毛泽东同党内的官僚主义现象斗争了一辈子。1952年12月，他看到山东分局纪律检查委员会《关于反对官僚主义、反对命令主义、反对违法乱纪的意见的报告》，即为中共中央起草《关于反对官僚主义、反对命令主义、反对违反乱纪的指示》。指出：“对于不了解人民群众的痛苦，不了解离开自己工作机关稍为远一点的下情，不了解县、区、乡三级干部中存在着许多命令主义和违法乱纪的坏人坏事，或者虽然对于这些坏人坏事有一些了解，但是熟视无睹，不引起义愤，不觉得问题严重，因而不采取积极办法去支持好人，惩治坏人，发扬好事，消灭坏事，这样一方面的官僚主义，则在许多地区、许多方面和许多部门，还是基本上没有解决。”毛泽东对官僚主义是毫不留情的。后来，他又在一个批示中写道：“我们一定要把领导上的老爷式作风、官僚主义作风、命令作风，完全消灭得干干净净。”

What is particularly noteworthy is that Mao Zedong seriously raised the issue of being vigilant against bureaucracy forming an aristocratic stratum. He said: “We must be vigilant, and must not allow the bureaucratic style of work to grow, nor allow the formation of an aristocratic stratum divorced from the people. Whoever commits bureaucracy, fails to solve the masses’ problems, abuses the masses, oppresses the masses, and never reforms, the masses have reason to oust him. I say it is good to oust him, and it should be done.” When reading the Soviet *Textbook of Political Economy*, he also raised the issue of being vigilant against the emergence of “vested interest groups.” He said: “In the process of the development of socialist society, there is another issue worth noting, and that is the issue of vested interest groups. In every period, there will always be a portion of people for whom preserving the old system is beneficial, while replacing the old system with a new one is disadvantageous to them. They are content with the existing system and unwilling to change it.” These words were spoken more than fifty years ago, yet reading them today carries a strong sense of contemporary relevance.

特别值得注意的是，毛泽东严肃地提出要警惕官僚主义形成一个贵族阶层的问题。他说：“我们一定要警惕，不要滋长官僚主义作风，不要形成一个脱离人民的贵族阶层。谁犯了官僚主义，不去解决群众的问题，骂群众，压群众，总是不改，群众就有理由把他革掉。我说革得很好，应当革掉。”他在读苏联《政治经济学教科书》时，还提出要警惕出现“既得利益集团”的问题。他说：“社会主义社会的发展过程中，还有一个问题值得注意，这就是既得利益集团的问题。每一个时期，总会有这样一部分人，保持旧制度对他们有利，用新制度代替旧制度对他们不利。他们安于已有的制度，不愿意改变这种制度。”这些话是早在五十多年以前说的，今天读起来却有很强的现实感。

Mao Zedong believed that the struggle against bureaucracy is a long-term task. “Bureaucracy and commandism are not only a major problem in our Party and government at present, but will remain a major problem for a very long period to come.” “The bad style of bureaucracy, inherited from the old society, will grow again in the spring breeze if it is not swept away with a broom once a year.”

毛泽东认为，同官僚主义作斗争是一个长期的任务。 “官僚主义和命令主义在我们的党和政府，不但在目前是一个大问题，就是在一个很长的时期内还将是一个大问题。”“官僚主义这种旧社会遗留下来的坏作风，一年不用扫帚扫一次，就会春风吹又生了。”

Mao Zedong said that what he detested most were those who sit high above, putting on bureaucratic airs before the common people and before their subordinates. He repeatedly stated that leading cadres must shed official airs, treat others as equals, and appear in the posture of ordinary laborers. This vividly reflects Mao Zedong’s concept of equality and his values. In his *Sixty Articles on Work Methods (Draft)*, he wrote a specific article on this issue, stating: “Treat cadres and the masses with a truly equal attitude. People must feel that the relations among people are indeed equal, and that your heart is given to them.” “People’s work differs, and their positions differ, but no matter how high an official’s rank, among the people they must appear in the posture of an ordinary laborer. Putting on airs is absolutely impermissible; the official style must be shed.” The reason Mao Zedong particularly emphasized this issue was that some of our cadres, as he put it, considered themselves number one under heaven, looked down on others, relied on their seniority to get by, and, once they became officials, especially high-ranking ones, were unwilling to appear in the posture of ordinary laborers. He called this “a vile phenomenon.”

毛泽东说，他最厌恶的就是那些高高在上、在老百姓面前、在下级面前摆官僚架子的人。他反复地讲，领导干部要打掉官气，要平等待人，要以普通劳动者的姿态出现。这鲜明地反映了毛泽东的平等观和价值观。他在《工作方法六十条（草案）》中，专门就这个问题写了一条，其中说：“以真正平等的态度对待干部和群众。必须使人感到人们互相间的关系确实是平等的，使人感到你的心是交给他的。”“人们的工作有所不同，职务有所不同，但是任何人不论官有多大，在人民中间都要以一个普通劳动者的姿态出现。决不许可摆架子，一定要打掉官风。”毛泽东之所以特别强调地提出这个问题，就是因为我们有些干部，如他所说的，老子天下第一，看不起人，靠资格吃饭，做了官，特别是做了大官，就不愿以普通劳动者的姿态出现。他说“这是一种恶劣现象”。

To ensure that cadres at all levels of the Party and state appear in the posture of ordinary laborers, integrate with the common people, and treat others as equals, Mao Zedong once proposed many measures, including: stipulating that cadres at all levels spend four months each year conducting grassroots investigations and participating in productive labor, and that generals in the People’s Liberation Army serve as soldiers in company-level units, among others.

为保证党和国家的各级干部以普通劳动者的姿态出现，与老百姓打成一片，平等待人，毛泽东曾经提出过许多措施，包括：规定各级干部每一年要有四个月到基层调查并参加生产劳动，解放军的将军下连队当兵，等等。

Third, he proposed that the Communist Party must accept supervision. Mao Zedong said that supervision should first come from the class, the masses, and people’s organizations, and he also proposed supervision by democratic parties. This was an important idea of Mao Zedong’s on strengthening the building of the ruling Party. He believed that the Communist Party, ruling alone, wielded great power and enjoyed very high prestige among the masses, and without supervision it would make mistakes. He said: “Now that we have won victory and hold state power ourselves, it is easy to emphasize dictatorship and neglect the aspect of democracy.” “Our Party is very large, holds power, and has done many good deeds, so people applaud, but then problems arise and bureaucracy emerges.” He also said: “The Chinese Communist Party is a party of great strength; if it does not do well, the people will fear us. A party that makes the people fear it is a bad party, a dangerous one.” On the need to accept supervision by the democratic parties, Mao Zedong once said: “The reason is that our Party’s contributions are too great, and its prestige in Chinese society is too high, which creates a danger: it is easy to take over and act arbitrarily, to act by simple administrative orders. Therefore, we specially invite several democratic parties to supervise us and coexist with us for a long time.” In 1957, when the Chinese Communist Party launched a rectification campaign against bureaucracy, sectarianism, and subjectivism, it invited the democratic parties to help rectify the Party’s style of work, sincerely hoping they would offer opinions to the Party. This was a concrete practice of supervision. Later, when the rectification campaign turned into the Anti-Rightist Struggle, in countering the rightists’ attack on the Party and socialism, the error of serious expansion occurred, which also harmed members of the democratic parties. This was a serious lesson. The Party has summarized and drawn lessons from this aspect in the *Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China* [32]32 The *Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China* is a key Party document adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC in June 1981, which officially assessed Mao Zedong’s role and the Cultural Revolution.. The principle that the Chinese Communist Party, as the ruling party, must accept supervision by the democratic parties and non-Party democratic personages is a policy that should be upheld and well implemented over the long term.

第三，提出共产党要接受监督。毛泽东说首先是阶级的监督、群众的监督、人民团体的监督，他还提出要有民主党派的监督。这是毛泽东关于加强执政党建设的一个重要思想。他认为，共产党一党执政，权力很大，在群众中的威望又很高，没有监督就会犯错误。他说：“现在我们胜利了，自己掌握了政权，很容易强调专政，忽略民主的一面。”“我们的党很大，掌握权力，做了许多好事，人们就拍手，毛病就产生了，官僚主义就出来了。”又说：“中国共产党是一个力量很大的党，如搞不好，人民就要怕我们。一个党使人民怕，这个党就不好了，就危险了。”在讲到要接受民主党派的监督时，毛泽东曾说过这样一段话：“其原因就是因为我们这个党功劳太大，在中国社会的威望太大，这就发生一个危险，容易包办代替，用简单的行政命令行事。所以，我们特地请几个民主党派来监督我们，并且跟我们长期共存”。1957年中国共产党开展反对官僚主义、宗派主义和主观主义的整风运动，曾邀请民主党派帮助整风，真诚希望他们向党提意见，就是一次具体的监督实践。后来由整风转到反右派斗争时，在反击右派向党和社会主义的进攻中，发生了严重扩大化的错误，其中也伤害了民主党派人士，这是一个严重的教训。党在《关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议》中已总结和吸取了这方面的教训。中国共产党作为执政党，要接受民主党派和党外民主人士监督这个方针，是应当长期坚持并很好实行的。

Fourth, he proposed preventing peaceful evolution, emphasizing the need to attach great importance to and earnestly do a good job of cultivating successors for the socialist cause. From the late 1950s, Mao Zedong began to pay attention to the possibility of peaceful evolution in socialist countries. He first explicitly raised this issue on November 12, 1959, in a conversation with the first secretaries of provincial and municipal Party committees in the East China region. He shared with the comrades present three speeches by John Foster Dulles [33]33 John Foster Dulles was U.S. Secretary of State from 1953 to 1959, known for his staunch anti-communist stance and advocacy of “peaceful evolution” as a strategy to undermine socialist states.. In them, Dulles said that regarding socialist countries, “abandoning the use of force does not mean maintaining the status quo, but rather peaceful change.” Mao Zedong said: They want to “peacefully change whom? It is to change our countries, to carry out subversive activities, to make the interior conform to their ideology.” “Use peaceful change to corrode us.” Peaceful evolution was a new strategy proposed by Western imperialist countries after they realized they could not conquer socialist countries by force, and it was a long-term, unchanging strategy of theirs. Mao Zedong keenly seized on this issue and promptly raised the strategic task of preventing peaceful evolution, which was of great and far-reaching significance. However, in the process of implementing this policy, against the historical background of the expansion of class struggle, a “Left” deviation occurred.

第四，提出防止和平演变，强调要高度重视和切实抓好培养社会主义事业接班人的工作。从上世纪50年代末，毛泽东对社会主义国家可能发生和平演变问题，就开始注意起来。他第一次明确地提出这个问题，是在1959年11月12日同华东地区各省市委第一书记的谈话中。他向到会的同志讲了杜勒斯的三次讲话。其中杜勒斯说到，对社会主义国家“放弃使用武力并不意味着维持现状，而是意味着和平的转变”。毛泽东说：他们要“和平转变谁呢？就是转变我们这些国家，搞颠覆活动，内部转到合乎他的那个思想”。“用和平转变，腐蚀我们”。和平演变是西方帝国主义国家看到不能以武力征服社会主义国家的情况下提出的新战略，而且是他们的一项长期不变的战略。毛泽东敏锐地抓住这个问题，及时提出要防止和平演变的战略任务，这是具有重大而深远意义的。但是，这一方针在实施过程中，在阶级斗争扩大化的历史背景下，发生了“左”的偏向。

Mao Zedong raised the issue of cultivating successors for the socialist cause and proposed some basic criteria for successors, all aimed at ensuring that the Party does not change its nature and the state does not change its color. This was strategically farsighted. But in the end, he did not solve this problem well, and there were serious lessons to be learned.

毛泽东提出培养社会主义事业接班人问题，并提出接班人的一些基本标准，就是为了保证党不变质，国家不变色，是具有战略眼光的。但是他最终并没有解决好这个问题，而且有着严重的教训。

Combating corruption and promoting integrity, opposing bureaucracy, the Communist Party accepting supervision, and cultivating successors for the socialist cause—all these were aimed at preventing the Chinese Communist Party from becoming divorced from the masses, and at ensuring that the vast majority of Party members and cadres, especially leading cadres at all levels, maintain close ties with the masses, and realize, develop, and safeguard the people’s immediate and fundamental interests in all work. Therefore, these measures all embody the Party’s mass line.

反腐倡廉，反对官僚主义，共产党要接受监督，培养社会主义事业接班人，这些都是为了防止中国共产党脱离群众，为了使广大党员和干部特别是各级领导干部始终保持同人民群众的密切联系，在各项工作中实现、发展和维护好人民的切身利益和根本利益。因此这些举措都体现了党的群众路线。

Mao Zedong’s discourses on the mass line are numerous; they were delivered on different occasions, in response to different situations, to different audiences, or written down in certain directives. He spoke most frequently on this topic during the period from 1959 to 1965, especially when correcting the “Left” deviation and summing up the lessons of the “Great Leap Forward.”[34]34 The “Great Leap Forward” (1958–1961) was a mass campaign launched by the CPC to rapidly industrialize and collectivize agriculture, which led to severe economic difficulties and famine. On June 22, 1959, in a conversation with leading cadres of Henan Province, he pointed out: “The lesson of the people’s communes is precisely the question of the mass line—being divorced from the masses, whipping up the ‘communist wind.’[35]35 “Communist wind” (共产风) refers to the practice during the Great Leap Forward of indiscriminately expropriating property from individuals and lower-level collectives in the name of communism. What thing angered the masses? It was whipping up the ‘communist wind.’” After the Second Zhengzhou Conference,[36]36 The Second Zhengzhou Conference (February–March 1959) was a meeting of the CPC Central Committee that began to correct the excesses of the Great Leap Forward, particularly the “communist wind.” in a letter of March 17, 1959, to the first secretaries of provincial, municipal, and autonomous region Party committees on the question of convening county-level four-tier or five-tier cadre conferences, Mao pointed out: “Comrades who are secretaries of our people’s commune Party committees must concern themselves with the interests of the masses every day and every hour, and must always keep in mind that their policies and measures must suit the current level of consciousness of the masses and the pressing demands of the masses. Anything that violates these two points will certainly not work and will certainly fail.” On January 29, 1961, in a conversation with leading cadres of Jiangsu Province, he said: “The basic principle of Marxism is to serve the people; otherwise it is the style of the Kuomintang.[37]37 The Kuomintang (KMT) was the ruling party of the Republic of China before 1949, often criticized by the CPC for its bureaucratic and oppressive style. Those who have no feeling for the masses, no feeling for the poor and lower-middle peasants, who disregard whether the masses live or die, who do not understand the situation, who do not listen to the masses, and who do not listen to their superiors either—such people cannot do leadership work.” On May 14, 1961, in a directive forwarding Zhang Pinghua’s letter on the question of investigation, Mao pointed out: “We must resolutely follow the mass line; all problems must be discussed with the masses, and then jointly decided upon and implemented as policy. Party committees at all levels must not fail to conduct investigation and research work. It is absolutely forbidden for a few members of a Party committee, without conducting investigation, without consulting the masses, to shut themselves up in a room and concoct so-called policies that are subjectivist and deadly.” On May 21, 1961, in a speech at an enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Mao said with deep feeling: “In the past, when we held meetings, we always spoke other people’s words, listened to the prefectural and county Party committees; in short, we always heard things secondhand and spoke other people’s words, because you had not gone among the masses to listen to the masses. Take the question of the communal dining halls: this time, by staying at a grassroots point and understanding the real situation, we were able to speak our own words.” These words are very plain, yet they contain profound lessons—insights gained at a heavy cost—and they are of great educational significance for us today. At the Central Work Conference on June 8, 1961, when Mao made a self-criticism and assumed primary responsibility for launching the “Great Leap Forward,” he also said: “Never mind Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao Zedong, you, the cooks, the grooms—whatever they say, it must work among the masses. If you violate the laws of objective things and stubbornly try to implement something, you will be punished.”

毛泽东关于群众路线的论述很多，是他在不同场合，针对不同情况，与不同对象谈的，或者是在一些批示中写下来的。从1959年至1965年这段时间，特别是在纠“左”、总结“大跃进”的经验教训的时候，讲得最多。1959年6月22日，他同河南省委负责人谈话时就指出：“公社教训就是群众路线的问题，脱离群众，刮‘共产风’。哪一件事情触怒了群众呢？就是刮‘共产风’。”第二次郑州会议以后，毛泽东在1959年3月17日关于召开县的四级或五级干部大会问题，给各省、市、自治区党委第一书记的通信中指出：“我们的公社党委书记同志们，一定要每日每时关心群众利益，时刻想到自己的政策措施一定要适合当前群众的觉悟水平和当前群众的迫切要求。凡是违背这两条的，一定行不通，一定要失败。”1961年1月29日，他同江苏省委负责人谈话时说：“马克思主义基本原则是为人民服务，否则是国民党作风。对群众没有感情，对贫下中农没有感情，不顾群众死活，不了解情况，不听群众的话，也不听上边的话，这种人不能做领导工作。”1961年5月14日毛泽东在转发张平化关于调查问题的来信的批示中指出：“都要坚决走群众路线，一切问题都要和群众商量，然后共同决定，作为政策贯彻执行。各级党委，不许不作调查研究工作。绝对禁止党委少数人不作调查，不同群众商量，关在房子里，作出害死人的主观主义的所谓政策。”1961年5月21日，毛泽东在中央政治局常委扩大会议的讲话中很有感触地说：“过去我们开会，都是说的人家的话，听地委、县委的，总之都是听来的，说人家的话，因为你没有到群众中去，听群众的话。如食堂问题，这次蹲了点，了解了真实情况，才能说我们自己的话。”这段话说得很平实，却包含了深刻的教训，是付出了沉重的代价而得到的认识，对我们今天有很大的教育意义。在1961年6月8日的中央工作会议上，毛泽东作自我批评，承担对发动“大跃进”负主要责任时，还说过这样的话：“管他马克思、恩格斯、列宁、斯大林、毛泽东、你们、伙夫、马夫讲的，拿到群众中行得通才行。违反客观事物的规律，硬去实行，要受惩罚。”

Mao Zedong particularly emphasized relying on the laboring people—the peasants—who constitute the vast majority of the population. He said: “Without the support of the peasants, no matter how many railways you build or how much steel you produce, you will be overthrown.” On May 12, 1964, while listening to a report from the leading group of the State Planning Commission, he further said: “We must rely on the majority, rely on the poor and lower-middle peasants, and organize them. Our generation will never forget the poor and lower-middle peasants; sometimes it just takes a reminder. The children of cadres will probably forget. Many among us, including prefectural Party committee secretaries, have also forgotten; they now have ample food and clothing.” “You who do planning work must also pay attention to the vast majority, pay attention to the poor and lower-middle peasants.”

毛泽东特别强调要依靠占人口最大多数的劳动人民——农民。他说：“没有农民拥护，不管你修多少铁路，搞多少钢铁，也会搞翻的。”1964年5月12日在听取国家计委领导小组汇报时又说：“要依靠大多数，依靠贫下中农，把他们组织起来。我们这一辈子忘不了贫下中农，有时只要提醒一下就行了。干部子弟恐怕就会忘记了。我们许多人中间，地委书记也忘记了，他们现在丰衣足食了。”“你们做计划工作的也要注意绝大多数，注意贫下中农。”

When talking with foreign guests, Mao Zedong often expounded on the Marxist-Leninist mass line based on the experience of the Chinese revolution and his own personal understanding. He said to the editor-in-chief of the Japanese Communist Party newspaper *Akahata*: “Our experience is also Lenin’s experience, that is, the experience of Lenin during his lifetime around the time of the October Revolution—mainly trusting the masses, organizing the masses, and having Party policies reflect the opinions of the masses. In Lenin’s works, one can fully see his emphasis on the mass line.” Mao attributed the decisive factor in whether a revolution wins or loses to whether it is divorced from the masses. He said to an Algerian guest: “Revolution always goes through repeated struggles. If you do well, you can maintain political power and not be divorced from the masses. Anyone divorced from the masses is bound to fail. Whenever you win, it is because you have the support of the masses. Whenever you win and then lose, it must be because you have become divorced from the masses.” On April 21, 1957, when meeting with Inejiro Asanuma, a leader of the Japanese Socialist Party, Mao took the initiative to talk about the question of the people’s strength. He said: “The people’s strength must surely overcome the anti-people’s strength. Why was our Party able to seize political power? Why was it able to fight against armies that had foreign aid? It was because we had the people.” On April 24, 1963, when meeting with an Indonesian military friendship delegation, Mao further pointed out: “We fought against Chiang Kai-shek and Japan for a total of twenty-two years. The main lesson is that we must integrate with the masses. Whenever we cooperated well with the masses, we made progress; whenever we became divorced from the masses, we made mistakes and failed.” On September 9, 1963, in a conversation with V.G. Wilcox, chairman of the Communist Party of New Zealand, Mao talked about how his understanding of China’s situation came mainly from learning from the masses. He said: “It took me a very long time to understand China; I traveled a long road, with both victories and defeats. There was a time when it could be said that the Chinese did not understand China. I learned from Marx, I learned from Lenin and Stalin, I learned from the enemy, but most importantly, I learned from the masses.” Why is “learning from the masses” the most important? This statement is very profound. The ideas of the Marxist classical writers, as well as all human ideas that contain truth, are ultimately summarized from the social practical experience of the masses.

毛泽东在同外宾谈话时，常常根据中国革命的经验，结合他自己的切身体会，阐述马克思列宁主义的群众路线问题。他对日共《赤旗报》总编辑说：“我们的经验也是列宁的经验，即十月革命前后列宁在世时的经验，主要的是相信群众、组织群众，党的政策要反映群众的意见。在列宁的著作中，可以充分看到他对群众路线的重视。”毛泽东把革命胜利还是失败的决定因素归结于是不是脱离群众。他对阿尔及利亚客人说：“革命总是要经过反复斗争的，做得好可以把政权保持下去，不脱离群众。凡是脱离群众的，非失败不可，凡是胜利了，都是由于得到群众的支持，凡是胜利了又失败，一定是脱离了群众。”1957年4月21日，毛泽东会见日本社会党领导人浅沼稻次郎时，主动提出要谈谈人民力量的问题，他说：“人民力量一定要胜过反人民力量。我们党为什么能取得政权呢？为什么能和有外国援助的军队打仗呢？就是因为有人民。”1963年4月24日，在会见印尼军事友好代表团时，毛泽东又进一步指出：“我们跟蒋介石和日本一共打了二十二年，主要一条经验是，要同群众结合起来。什么时候跟群众合作得好，我们就得到发展；什么时候脱离群众，我们就犯错误，就失败。”1963年9月9日，毛泽东同新西兰共产党主席威廉斯谈话时，曾谈到他对中国情况的认识主要是向群众学习。他是这样说的：“我认识中国经过很长时间，走过很长的道路，有胜利，也有失败。有一个时候可以说是中国人不认识中国。我向马克思学习，向列宁、斯大林学习，向敌人学习，最重要的是向群众学习。”为什么“最重要的是向群众学习”呢？这个话是讲得很深刻的。马克思主义经典作家的思想，以及人类一切包含真理性认识的思想，归根到底，都是从群众的社会实践经验中总结出来的。

A foreign guest once asked Mao Zedong: “What is the secret of your greatness? What is the source of your strength?” Mao replied: “I am not great at all; I have merely learned a little knowledge from the common people. Of course, I have learned a bit of Marxism, but learning Marxism alone is not enough; one must study China’s problems from China’s characteristics and facts. The source of strength is the masses of the people. If you do not reflect the demands of the masses, no one can succeed. You must go to the masses to gain knowledge, formulate policies, and then go on to educate the masses.”

有一位外国客人问毛泽东：您这样伟大的秘密是什么？力量的源泉是什么？毛泽东回答说：“我没有什么伟大，就是从老百姓那里学了一点知识而已。当然我学了一点马克思主义，但是单学马克思主义还不行，要从中国的特点和事实来研究中国问题。力量的来源是人民群众。不反映人民群众的要求，哪一个也不行。要到人民群众那里学得知识，制定政策，然后再去教育人民群众。”

The twenty-seven years from the founding of the People’s Republic of China to Mao Zedong’s death constitute an important historical stage for New China. It is the stage of the founding of the People’s Republic, the stage in which our Party accumulated rich experience, both positive and negative, in exploring the path of socialist construction in China. Today, tremendous changes have taken place both internationally and domestically. When we look at that period of history and evaluate the Party leaders of that generation, we should adopt a historical materialist viewpoint and examine and study it within the historical conditions and historical processes of the time. We cannot simply measure that period of history by today’s policies and practices, nor can we demand that our predecessors meet the level of understanding of socialist construction that our Party has today. Their explorations, including both successful and unsuccessful ones, are all extremely valuable treasures left to our Party and our country.

从中华人民共和国成立到毛泽东逝世的27年间，是新中国的一个重要历史阶段。它是人民共和国奠基的阶段，是我们党探索中国社会主义建设道路积累了正反两方面丰富经验的阶段。今天，无论国际、国内都发生了巨大的变化。我们来看那段历史，对那一代党的领导人进行评价，应该采取历史唯物主义的观点，放在当时的历史条件下和历史过程中，去加以考察和研究。不能简单地用今天的政策和做法去衡量那段历史，也不能用今天我们党对建设社会主义的认识水平，去要求前人。他们的探索，包括成功的和不成功的，都是为我们党和国家留下的极其宝贵的财富。

Online editor: Jia Fei

网络编辑：嘉扉