On Mao Zedong’s Far-Sighted Insight into Breaking the Cycle of Rise and Fall

In his famous book *Leaders*, U.S. President Richard Nixon evaluated Mao Zedong as being “like the most revolutionary leaders, capable of destruction but not construction.” In fact, Mao was not only adept at destroying an old world but also at building a new one; not only adept at building a new world but also at consolidating and defending it. Nixon failed to see Mao’s deep anxiety over the security of a socialist China built on a relatively backward economic and cultural foundation and situated in an unstable and complex domestic and international environment; he failed to see Mao’s arduous efforts to maintain the long-term stability of socialist China; and he failed to see Mao’s historic contribution to enabling the Communist Party of China to break the cycle of rise and fall [1]1 The “cycle of rise and fall” (治乱兴衰周期率) refers to the historical pattern in Chinese dynastic history where a ruling house rises, flourishes, declines, and falls, a problem Mao discussed with Huang Yanpei in 1945.. To break this cycle, Mao devoted all his energies, vigilantly guarding the rise and fall of the nation, and adopted a series of strategic or constructive measures in multiple areas: constructing state institutions, preventing corruption and resisting degeneration, coordinating development and security, finding a new path of democracy, and building a vigorous proletarian party. These measures withstood tests of risk and challenge from domestic and international political, economic, and military fronts, providing the institutional foundation and valuable experience for contemporary Chinese Communists to continue exploring how to break the cycle of rise and fall.

美国总统尼克松在那本著名的《领袖们》一书里，评价毛泽东“像那些最革命的领袖们一样，会破坏而不会建设。”其实，毛泽东不但善于破坏一个旧世界，而且善于建设一个新世界；不但善于建设一个新世界，而且善于巩固和捍卫一个新世界 。尼克松没有看到毛泽东对建立在经济文化相对落后基础上、处于不稳定和复杂的国内外环境中的社会主义中国安危的忧心忡忡，没有看到毛泽东维护社会主义中国长治久安的艰辛努力，没有看到毛泽东对中国共产党跳出治乱兴衰周期率的历史性贡献 。为跳出治乱兴衰周期率，毛泽东殚精竭虑，警觉我国的兴衰安危，从建构国家制度、防腐拒变、统筹发展与安全、找到民主新路、建设朝气蓬勃的无产阶级政党等多个方面，采取了一系列的战略性或建设性举措，经受住来自国内外政治、经济、军事诸多方面的风险挑战考验，为当代中国共产党人继续探索如何跳出治乱兴衰周期率提供了制度基础和宝贵经验。

I. The Political Institutional Presupposition for Breaking the Cycle of Rise and Fall

一、跳出治乱兴衰周期率的政治制度预设

The great historical figure Mao Zedong, at every major turning point in history, always looked far ahead, discerned the trends of the times, and made long-term decisions that met the demands of historical development, thereby influencing the course of history. The founding of New China was, without doubt, a major event forever recorded in Chinese history and even world history. What form of state system [2]2 “State system” (国体) refers to the class nature of the state, i.e., which class holds political power. and government system [3]3 “Government system” (政体) refers to the form of political organization through which state power is exercised. to construct, and what form of state structure to adopt, to ensure the long-term stability of New China, were high-difficulty historic tasks facing Chinese Communists around the time of the founding of New China. History has witnessed Mao’s great talent and bold vision, his far-sighted insight, at the critical moment of historical choice. His choices provided a solid political institutional foundation for safeguarding national peace and social stability and for breaking the cycle of rise and fall.

历史伟人毛泽东总是在历史的重大关头，高瞻远瞩，洞察时代趋势，做出符合历史发展要求的长远决策，影响历史进程。新中国成立，毫无疑问，是永远彪炳在中国历史乃至世界历史上的一件大事。建构什么样的国体和政体以及采取哪种国家结构形式，以保证新中国的长治久安，是新中国成立前后的中国共产党人面临的高难度历史性课题。历史见证了毛泽东在历史抉择的关键时刻表现出来的雄才大略，远见卓识，他的抉择为维护国家安宁和社会稳定，跳出治乱兴衰周期率，提供了稳固的政治制度基础。

Whether in the period around the founding of New China or in the considerable time after reform and opening up, many in academic circles were superstitious about Western political systems, but Western political systems were not conducive to the long-term stability of New China. Lenin pointed out sharply the falsity of bourgeois democratic systems for the masses: “In essence, power is always in the hands of capital, regardless of whether there are restrictions on rights or other restrictions, regardless of whether it is a democratic republic or not, it is all the same, and the more democratic the republic, the more severe and shameless this rule of capital becomes. … Therefore, no democratic republic, no electoral system, can change the essence of the matter.” This falsity brings about political corruption and social chaos in the electoral process. Engels exposed the corrupt phenomenon of the capitalist-controlled bourgeois parties that alternate in power in the United States: “These people turn politics into a business, speculating for profit on seats in the federal Congress and state legislatures, or making a living by canvassing for their party, and when their party wins, they take positions as their reward.” Large-scale electoral fraud causes social instability. To this day, not only have the politicians who alternate in power in the United States failed to change the situation where “the two major groups of politicians use the dirtiest means to achieve the dirtiest ends, while the people are powerless to deal with these two groups, who ostensibly serve the people but in reality rule and plunder them,” but the experiments of Western democracy in other developing countries and regions have also produced a deeply disappointing caricature that stands in stark opposition to the loudest and most beautiful promises of democracy and freedom made by Western politicians! Politicians cheat and intrigue against each other, throwing the entire national order into chaos at the hands of a few campaigning political charlatans. Parliaments become free-for-all brawls, ballots become bribes, political contributions become quid-pro-quo exchanges of power and money—this kind of political system brings about severe political and social crises.

无论是新中国成立前后，还是改革开放后的相当长的一段时间里，学界有不少人迷信西方的政治制度，但西方的政治制度不利于新中国的长治久安。列宁一针见血地指出资产阶级国家的民主制度对人民群众的虚假性：“实质上政权总是操在资本手里，不管权利有没有资格限制或其他限制，不管是不是民主共和国，反正都是一样，而且共和国愈民主，资本主义的这种统治就愈厉害，愈无耻。……所以任何民主共和制、任何选举制度都不会改变事情的实质。”这种虚假性，带来选举过程中的政治腐败性和社会混乱性。恩格斯曾揭露美国轮流执政的资产阶级政党被资本控制的腐败现象：“这些人把政治变成一种生意，拿联邦国会和各州议会的议席来投机牟利，或是以替本党鼓动为生，在本党胜利后取得职位作为报酬。”大规模的选举舞弊，造成社会不稳定。至今，不但美国轮流执掌政权的政客们没有改变“以最肮脏的手段来达到最肮脏的目的，而国民却无力对付这两大政客集团，这些人表面上是替国民服务，实际上却是对国民进行统治和掠夺”的局面，而且，西方民主在世界其他发展中国家和地区的试验，也竟然交出了与西方政客关于民主自由的最响亮最漂亮许诺相对立的一幅让人极度失望的讽刺画！政客们尔虞我诈，相互倾轧，整个国家秩序被几个竞选的政客骗子搞得混乱不堪。议会成为全武行的混战，选票成为贿赂，政治献金成为投桃报李的权钱交易，这种政治制度带来了严重的政治危机和社会危机。

Mao Zedong studied Western political theories and systems in detail and deeply understood that, compared with feudal autocracy, the political systems of bourgeois states represented a great historical advance. However, the bourgeois parliamentary system and the democratic system of separation of powers [4]4 “Separation of powers” (三权鼎立) refers to the Western doctrine of separating governmental powers into legislative, executive, and judicial branches., which Western countries extol in every possible way, are in essence bourgeois dictatorship; copying this system would be of no benefit to maintaining social stability and national security in New China. Mao knew well the lessons of the repeated failed experiments with the bourgeois parliamentary system in modern Chinese history. At the September meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee [5]5 The “September meeting” of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee was held in 1948 in Xibaipo, Hebei Province, to discuss strategic tasks for the final stage of the Chinese Civil War and the founding of a new state. held one year before the founding of New China, Mao spoke on “establishing a people’s democratic dictatorship led by the proletariat and based on the worker-peasant alliance, to overthrow the reactionary dictatorship of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat-capitalism,” and proposed: “The class nature of our political power is led by the proletariat, based on the worker-peasant alliance, with the participation of bourgeois democratic elements. We adopt the system of people’s congresses under democratic centralism, and do not adopt the bourgeois parliamentary system. It is very suitable to adopt democratic centralism in China, and we will not adopt the bourgeois congressional system or separation of powers.” In fact, here Mao was defining the state system of New China as the people’s democratic dictatorship and the government system as the system of people’s congresses. After the founding of New China, “a state power of the people’s democratic dictatorship, i.e., the dictatorship of the proletariat, led by the working class and based on the worker-peasant alliance, was established and consolidated. It is a new type of state power in Chinese history, where the people are the masters of the country, and it is the fundamental guarantee for building a socialist, prosperous, strong, democratic, and culturally advanced modern country.” Only by adhering to the people’s democratic dictatorship can the vast majority of all citizens, rather than a minority, become masters of the country, enjoy democratic power, unleash soaring enthusiasm for building and defending the country, and throw themselves with vigor and vitality into the unprecedented upsurge of socialist construction. A cause in which the broadest masses of the people participate will certainly not be a desolate cause, but a vibrant and flourishing one. A country supported by the broadest masses of the people will certainly be one with strong power to withstand various risks and tests. Only by adhering to the people’s democratic dictatorship and establishing state forces including the military and police can internal stability be maintained, the lives and property of the people be protected, external aggression be repelled, and national security be upheld. Without a people’s army, the people have nothing; the principle of the Party commanding the gun is as firm as a rock; the people’s army has played the role of a strong pillar of the people’s democratic dictatorship and is the Great Wall of steel for the socialist country. Only by adhering to the people’s democratic dictatorship did New China “defeat the aggression, sabotage, and armed provocations of imperialism and hegemonism, maintain national security and independence, and victoriously carry out the struggle to defend the motherland’s borders.” If New China had chosen the Western system of separation of powers at its founding, it would certainly have led to the situation described by Deng Xiaoping: “The result would be that neither democracy would be realized nor the economy developed; there would only be national chaos and a loss of popular confidence. … Adopting the Western system would be even worse. If our one billion people were to engage in multi-party elections, it would certainly lead to the chaotic situation of ‘all-out civil war’ like during the ‘Cultural Revolution’ [6]6 The “Cultural Revolution” (1966–1976) was a sociopolitical movement launched by Mao Zedong, marked by widespread social upheaval, factional conflict, and a breakdown of state order.,” endangering the overall social stability of socialist China and the security of political power. Mao advocated not adopting the bourgeois congressional system or separation of powers, but chose the political system of the people’s democratic dictatorship, thereby avoiding the chaotic situation of Western partisan strife and laying the fundamental political prerequisite and institutional foundation for breaking free from the cycle of rise and fall.

毛泽东详细地研究了西方国家的政治学说和政治制度，深刻地了解资产阶级国家的政治制度，相较于封建专制制度是一大历史进步，但被西方国家百般美化的资产阶级的议会制和三权鼎立的民主制度，实质上就是资产阶级专政，照搬这套制度对于维护新中国的社会稳定和国家安全没有益处。毛泽东深知中国近代史上不止一次经历的资产阶级议会制度试验失败的教训。新中国成立前一年召开的中共中央政治局九月会议上，毛泽东讲了“关于建立无产阶级领导的以工农联盟为基础的人民民主专政，打倒帝国主义、封建主义和官僚资本主义的反动专政”的问题，提出：“我们政权的阶级性，是无产阶级领导的，以工农联盟为基础，还有资产阶级民主分子参加。我们采用民主集中制的人民代表会议制度，而不采用资产阶级议会制。在中国采取民主集中制是很合适的，不搞资产阶级的国会制和三权鼎立等。”实际上，毛泽东在这里讲到了新中国的国体是人民民主专政，政体是人民代表大会制度。新中国成立后，“建立和巩固了工人阶级领导的、以工农联盟为基础的人民民主专政即无产阶级专政的国家政权。它是中国历史上从来没有过的人民当家作主的新型政权，是建设社会主义的富强民主文明的现代化国家的根本保证。”只有坚持人民民主专政，才能让占全体公民最大多数而不是少数的人民当家作主，享有民主的权力，发挥出建设国家、保卫国家的冲天激情，意气风发地投身于从来不曾有过的社会主义建设热潮中。最广大人民群众参与的事业，一定不会是冷冷清清的事业，而一定是生机勃勃、兴旺发达的事业。最广大人民群众拥护的江山，一定是拥有强大力量抵御各种风险考验的江山。只有坚持人民民主专政，建立包括军队、警察在内的国家力量，才能对内维护稳定，保卫人民生命财产安全，对外反击侵略，维护国家安全。没有人民的军队，就没有人民的一切，党指挥枪的原则坚如磐石，人民军队发挥了人民民主专政的坚强柱石作用，是社会主义江山的钢铁长城。只有坚持人民民主专政，新中国才“战胜了帝国主义、霸权主义的侵略、破坏和武装挑衅，维护了国家的安全和独立，胜利地进行了保卫祖国边疆的斗争。”如果新中国成立时选择西方三权分立的政治制度，肯定会出现邓小平所说的“结果是既实现不了民主，经济也得不到发展，只会出现国家混乱、人心涣散的局面。……搞西方那一套更不行。如果我们现在十亿人搞多党竞选，一定会出现‘文化大革命’中那样‘全面内战’的混乱局面”,危及社会主义中国的社会稳定大局和政权的安全。毛泽东主张不实行资产阶级的国会制和三权鼎立制，选择了人民民主专政的政治制度，避免了西方党派纷争的混乱局面，奠定了摆脱治乱兴衰周期率的根本政治前提和制度基础。

In modern world history, there are two main forms of state structure: federalism, a composite state structure in which two or more political entities (states, provinces, member states) form a compound state; and unitarism, which is “a system in which a single sovereign state is composed of several administrative regions. A state adopting this system is called a unitary state. It has only one constitution and one supreme state organ, and is the subject of international relations.” [7]7 A classical Chinese allusion from the *Book of Changes* (《周易》), emphasizing foresight and preventive action. Comparing the two, the security and stability of unitarism are superior to those of federalism. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union adopted federalism to unite various states formed along Soviet lines, a choice forced by the historical conditions of the time. Some experts believe that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was caused by multiple factors, but it must be said that the federal state structure adopted by the Soviet Union gave separatist forces an opening. In its early days, the Chinese Communist Party once imitated the Soviet approach by proposing the establishment of a Chinese federal republic and the principle of national self-determination. As experience accumulated and understanding of national conditions deepened, the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong recognized that if China adopted a federal state structure, it would face the great danger of being manipulated and exploited by great powers, leading to national disintegration. Therefore, they ultimately advocated replacing federalism with unitarism and replacing national self-determination with regional ethnic autonomy. At the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC in 1938, Mao Zedong proposed that ethnic minorities should “join with the Han nationality to establish a unified state.” [8]8 The last emperor of the Ming dynasty (r. 1627–1644), who hanged himself as rebel forces entered Beijing. During the preparatory period of the First Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Mao Zedong consulted Li Weihan on whether the new China should adopt federalism or a unified republic with regional ethnic autonomy. Li Weihan believed that China’s ethnic minority population and distribution differed from those of the Soviet Union, and that the domestic and international circumstances at the time of the Soviet Union’s adoption of federalism were different, so federalism was not suitable. The Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong adopted this suggestion. The Common Program adopted by the new Political Consultative Conference stipulated “making the People’s Republic of China a big family of fraternal cooperation among all ethnic groups” and “a unified national military system.” [9]9 Quoted from Guo Moruo’s *The 300th Anniversary of the Fall of the Ming Dynasty*. Only one week after the adoption of the Common Program, Mao Zedong, while reviewing a telegram from the CPC Central Committee to the Second Field Army Front Committee on the issue of ethnic minority “self-determination rights,” pointed out that after the birth of the new China, it was no longer appropriate to emphasize the slogan of national self-determination, which had been raised in the past to win over ethnic minorities in opposition to the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang, “lest it be exploited by imperialists and reactionary elements among the domestic ethnic minorities, thereby putting us in a passive position. Today, emphasis should be placed on the fraternal cooperation, mutual assistance, and solidarity of all Chinese ethnic groups.” [10]10 A massive peasant rebellion (1850–1864) that established the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, often analyzed by Chinese Marxists for its internal failings. In resolving the Tibet issue, Mao Zedong’s advocacy of replacing federalism with unitarism and national self-determination with regional ethnic autonomy was also reflected. The Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful

在世界近现代历史上，国家结构形式主要有两种，一种是联邦制，是由两个或多个政治实体（州、邦、成员国）组成的复合制国家的国家结构形式。另外一种是单一制，就是“由若干行政区域构成单一主权国家的制度。采取这种制度的国家称单一国。它只有单一宪法和一个最高国家政权机关，是国际交往中的主体。”二者相比较，单一制的安全稳定性优越于联邦制。苏联共产党采取联邦制把按照苏维埃形式组成的各个国家联合起来，是依据当时的历史条件不得不做出的选择。有专家认为，苏联解体由多种原因引致，但不得不说苏联采取的联邦制的国家结构形式让分裂势力有机可乘。早期的中国共产党曾经效仿苏俄的做法提出过建立中华联邦共和国和民族自决的主张。随着经验的积累，对国情有了更加深刻的了解，党中央和毛泽东认识到中国如果采取联邦制的国家结构，将存在着被大国操纵和利用，导致国家分崩离析的巨大危险，所以，最终主张以单一制代替联邦制，以民族自治代替民族自决。毛泽东在1938年召开的中共六届六中全会上提出，少数民族“与汉族联合建立统一的国家”。在第一届中国人民政治协商会议筹备期间，毛泽东就新中国到底是搞联邦，还是搞统一共和国、少数民族区域自治的问题，征求李维汉的意见。李维汉认为，中国同苏联的少数民族人数和分布情况不同，同苏联实行联邦制时的国内外境遇不同，不宜实行联邦制。党中央和毛泽东采纳了这个建议。新政协通过的《共同纲领》规定了“使中华人民共和国成为各民族友爱合作的大家庭”“统一的国家军事制度”。通过《共同纲领》后仅一个星期，毛泽东审阅中共中央关于少数民族“自决权”问题给二野前委的电报时指出：新中国诞生后，不宜再强调过去为争取少数民族，以反对国民党的反动统治而提出的民族自决权的口号，“以免为帝国主义及国内各少数民族中的反动分子所利用，而使我们陷于被动的地位。在今天应强调，中华各民族的友爱合作和互助团结”。在解决西藏问题时，同样体现了毛泽东以单一制代替联邦制，以民族自治代替民族自决的主张。1951年5月23日的《中央人民政府和西藏地方政府关于和平解放西藏办法协议》里，明确写道：“西藏人民回到中华人民共和国祖国大家庭中来”“根据《共同纲领》规定的民族政策，在中央人民政府统一领导之下，西藏人民有实行民族区域自治的权利”“西藏军队逐步改编为人民解放军，成为中华人民共和国国防武装的一部分”“中央人民政府统一处理西藏地区的一切涉外事宜”。第二天，毛泽东给西藏地方领导人的信里提到：“西藏地方政府和西藏人民在伟大祖国大家庭中，在中央人民政府统一领导下，得以永远摆脱帝国主义的羁绊和异民族的压迫”。这些都体现了我国实行单一制的特点，体现了在军事、外交等方面的中央事权。

In the early period after the founding of New China, the Communists represented by Mao Zedong, after solemn consideration, adopted a unitary sovereign state structure and a system of regional ethnic autonomy within a unitary state. The state has only one constitution, only one supreme legislative body, only one central government, citizens have only one nationality, and the central government exercises diplomatic power uniformly. While centralizing power, a certain degree of local autonomy is also implemented; the powers exercised by each locality derive from central authorization and are subject to the unified leadership of the central government. All provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the central government, and special administrative regions are inalienable components of the People's Republic of China, and the central government has the power to revoke inappropriate administrative acts of local governments. This system conforms to the historical fact of ethnic integration and pluralistic unity that has existed in our country since ancient times, and also meets the practical needs of consolidating and developing the socialist system. It is conducive to eliminating historically residual ethnic estrangement and discrimination, developing socialist ethnic relations of equality, solidarity, and mutual assistance, promoting the happy life of all ethnic groups within the unified great family of the motherland, and fostering the common prosperity of all ethnic groups. This system enables the Party and the people to occupy the legal and moral high ground in the subsequent struggle against separatism, and renders any attempt by separatist forces at home and abroad to detach a part of the People's Republic of China through means such as "referendums," "federations," or "one

在新中国成立初期，以毛泽东为代表的共产党人经过郑重思考，采取单一主权国家结构形式和单一制国家中的民族区域自治制度，国家只有一部宪法，只有一个最高立法机关，只有一个中央政府，公民只有一种国籍，中央政府统一行使外交权。在中央集权的同时也实行某种程度的地方自治，各地方行使的权力来源于中央授权，接受中央政府的统一领导。各省、自治区、直辖市、特别行政区都是中华人民共和国不可分割的组成部分，中央政府有权撤销地方政府的不适当的行政行为。这种体制，符合我国自古以来民族融合多元统一的历史事实，也符合巩固和发展社会主义制度的现实需要，有利于消除历史上残留的民族隔阂和歧视，发展平等、团结、互助的社会主义民族关系，促进各族人民幸福地生活在统一的祖国大家庭里，促进各民族的共同繁荣。这种体制，使得党和人民在以后的反分裂斗争中取得法理和道义的制高点，使得境内外分裂势力妄想采取任何“公投”“联邦”“一中一台”的方式将中华人民共和国的一部分分离出去的做法，不言而喻地失去任何法理依据，必将遭到全中国人民、全世界华人和全世界公正舆论的谴责。总之，毛泽东等老一辈无产阶级革命家的远见卓识，提供了中华民族牢不可破的制度安排，提供了粉碎借助“公投”“建联邦”等伎俩分裂中华人民共和国图谋的法理基础，提供了防范民族分裂主义和反华势力分裂中国罪恶阴谋的制度基础，维护了国家长治久安。

II. Resisting Corruption and Preventing Degeneration: Political Sobriety in Breaking the Cycle of Rise and Fall

二、防腐拒变：跳出治乱兴衰周期率的政治清醒

The future and destiny of a political party and a regime depend on the will of the people. The masses most detest all forms of negative corruption and privilege. Allowing corruption to erode the Party’s healthy organism risks losing popular support and forfeiting political

一个政党，一个政权，其前途和命运取决于人心向背。人民群众最痛恨各种消极腐败现象，痛恨各种特权现象。听任腐败现象侵蚀党的健康肌体，将发生失去民心，丧失政权的危险。习近平总书记说过：“中国历史上因为统治集团严重腐败导致人亡政息的例子比比皆是，当今世界上由于执政党腐化堕落、严重脱离群众导致失去政权的例子也不胜枚举啊！”改革开放以来，全党的工作重心是经济建设，但党中央并没有明确地把经济建设问题提升为决定党和国家生死存亡的大事，而是明确地把执政党的党风或反腐败斗争当成关系党和国家生死存亡的大事。无论在革命战争年代，还是在新中国成立后，毛泽东对腐败现象保持高度的警觉，采取有力措施拒腐防变，为当代中国共产党跳出治乱兴衰周期率提供了宝贵经验。

“The wise prevent calamity before it sprouts; the prudent plan for danger before it arises.” [7]7 A classical Chinese allusion from the *Book of Changes* (《周易》), emphasizing foresight and preventive action. The extraordinary quality of the great historical figure Mao Zedong was that, even before the Communist Party of China had taken power nationwide, he foresaw the severe tests that governance would bring to the Party, and he promptly warned the entire Party to guard against small errors, guard against arrogance and impetuosity, and continue to maintain a style of arduous struggle. In 1944, Guo Moruo wrote *The 300th Anniversary of the Fall of the Ming Dynasty*, arguing that the Ming dynasty and the Li Zicheng regime, two irreconcilably opposed political powers, both collapsed for the same reason: their own corruption. Political decay and darkness, with the people living in misery, were the fundamental causes of Chongzhen’s [8]8 The last emperor of the Ming dynasty (r. 1627–1644), who hanged himself as rebel forces entered Beijing. national ruin. Li Zicheng left behind the painful lessons that arrogance leads to defeat, corruption leads to defeat, and division leads to defeat. In stark contrast to the Chiang Kai-shek clique, which strongly resisted and rejected Guo Moruo’s sobering admonitions, Mao Zedong took history as a mirror. He paid particular attention to how Li Zicheng “took Beijing in no more than three days” with “the force of a hurricane sweeping away withered grass,” yet “having achieved excessive success in an excessively short period, this caused Li Zicheng and his followers, such as Niu Jinxing and Liu Zongmin, to sink into excessive intoxication. … In a flurry and a daze, everyone seemed to think the world was already at peace. The great enemy just beyond the pass, right at their doorstep, they seemed to pay no attention at all.” [9]9 Quoted from Guo Moruo’s *The 300th Anniversary of the Fall of the Ming Dynasty*. Military preparedness decayed, and they extorted illicit funds, leading to the historical tragedy of the Great Shun regime’s collapse. Mao Zedong called on Communists to take Li Zicheng as a warning. *Liberation Daily* published Guo Moruo’s *The 300th Anniversary of the Fall of the Ming Dynasty* and the Soviet writer Korneichuk’s play *The Front*, both of which opposed arrogance, and the Xinhua News Agency broadcast them in full. During the Yan’an Rectification Movement, Mao said: “Recently we printed Guo Moruo’s article on Li Zicheng, also to call on comrades to take it as a warning and not to repeat the mistake of arrogance in victory.” He also personally wrote to Guo Moruo: “We treat your *The 300th Anniversary of the Fall of the Ming Dynasty* as a rectification document. Arrogance after small victories, even more arrogance after great victories, suffering defeat time and again—how to avoid this defect is truly worth attention. If you could write a piece on the experience of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom with your masterful pen, it would be very beneficial.” [10]10 A massive peasant rebellion (1850–1864) that established the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, often analyzed by Chinese Marxists for its internal failings. On the eve of seizing national power, Mao Zedong considered the victory of the nationwide revolution only the first step in a long march of ten thousand li, a short prelude to a long drama; the work ahead would be even greater and even more arduous. He issued the call of the “Two Musts” [11]11 “The comrades must be taught to remain modest, prudent and free from arrogance and rashness in their style of work, and the comrades must be taught to preserve the style of arduous struggle.” to the entire Party. Before entering Beiping to govern, Mao Zedong realized that the Communist Party would face the test of governance. He compared entering the city to govern to “taking the imperial examination in the capital,” saying, “If we retreat, we will fail. We will never be Li Zicheng. We all hope to get a good score.” Even when China became prosperous and strong in the future, and work achieved extremely great results, they must continue to maintain a modest and prudent style. “We must guard against the future. Ten or twenty years from now will be dangerous; forty or fifty years from now will be even more dangerous.” “Everyone must be cautious and careful, whether alternate members of the Central Committee, full members of the Central Committee, or members of the Politburo. Everyone must be cautious and careful. Do not forget yourself when your blood is up.” When Mao Zedong was in partial governance, he was modest and prudent, prevented corruption and resisted degeneration, reflecting the sober-mindedness needed to break the cycle of rise and fall.

“明者防祸于未萌，智者图患于将来”。历史伟人毛泽东的过人之处，表现在中国共产党尚未全面执政时，就预判到执政将给党带来的严峻考验，及时提醒全党防微杜渐，戒骄戒躁，继续保持艰苦奋斗的作风。1944年，郭沫若写下《甲申三百年祭》，认为明王朝和李自成两个不共戴天地对立的政权，恰恰均覆灭于同一个原因：自身腐败。政治腐朽与黑暗，民不聊生，是崇祯亡国的根本原因。李自成留下骄傲必败、腐化必败、分裂必败的沉痛教训。与蒋介石集团强烈抵触排斥郭沫若的醒世良言的做法迥然不同，毛泽东以史为鉴，特别关注李自成“没三天功夫便把北京城打下了”“真如有摧枯拉朽的急风暴雨的力量”，然而，“在过短的时期之内获得了过大的成功，这却使自成以下如牛金星、刘宗敏之流，似乎都沉沦进了过分的陶醉里去了。……纷纷然，昏昏然，大家都象以为天下就已经太平了的一样。近在肘腋的关外大敌，他们似乎全不在意”,军备废弛，搜刮赃款，导致大顺政权覆灭的历史悲剧，要共产党人以李自成为鉴。《解放日报》发表郭沫若《甲申三百年祭》和苏联人高涅楚克的剧本《前线》，并由新华社全文广播，两文都是反对骄傲的。毛泽东在延安整风时说：“近日我们印了郭沫若论李自成的文章，也是叫同志们引为鉴戒，不要重犯胜利时骄傲的错误。”还亲自致信郭沫若：“你的《甲申三百年祭》，我们把它当作整风文件看待。小胜即骄傲，大胜更骄傲，一次又一次吃亏，如何避免此种毛病，实在值得注意。倘能经过大手笔写一篇太平军经验，会是很有益的”。在即将获取全国政权之时，毛泽东认为夺取全国胜利仅是万里长征走完的第一步，是一出长剧的一个短小的序幕，以后的工作更加伟大，更加艰苦，向全党发出“两个务必”的号召；进北平执政前，毛泽东意识到共产党将面临执政的考验，把进城执政比作“进京赶考”，说“退回去就失败了。我们决不当李自成，我们都希望考个好成绩。”即便以后中国富强了，工作得到了极其伟大的成绩，也要继续保持谦虚谨慎的作风，“我们要预防将来，十年、二十年以后就危险了，四十年、五十年以后就更危险了。”“大家要谨慎小心，无论是候补中央委员、中央委员、政治局委员，都要谨慎小心。不要心血来潮的时候，就忘乎所以。”毛泽东在局部执政时，谦虚谨慎，防腐拒变，体现了跳出治乱兴衰周期率的清醒。

It is difficult to seize a state, and it is also difficult to hold and consolidate it. People are familiar with Mao Zedong’s teaching of the “Two Musts” at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, [12]12 Held in March 1949, this plenary session set the course for the CPC’s transition from rural revolution to national governance. taking it as the motto of the Communist Party of China in preventing corruption and resisting degeneration. In fact, at that same plenary session, he also spoke a thought-provoking passage: “‘Achieve everything in one fell swoop’—I say this only in the sense of bloody revolution, that is, there will be only one bloody revolution. The future transition from the new-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution will not require bloodshed and may be resolved peacefully. But this is only a possibility. Whether there will be no bloodshed in the future still depends on the efforts of our work. If the state, mainly the People’s Liberation Army and our Party, becomes corrupt, and the proletariat cannot hold state power, then there will still be problems.” Mao Zedong did not indulge in the joy of soon seizing national power. Instead, he soberly foresaw the enormous risk of corruption facing the Communist Party after it became the ruling party, reminding people to be modest and prudent, to continue arduous struggle, and to avoid the “bloody” situation of losing power once gained. After the CPC entered the cities, indeed a considerable number of leading cadres failed to withstand the sugar-coated bullets of the bourgeoisie, indulging in pleasure-seeking and becoming corrupt and degenerate. Mao Zedong solemnly warned the entire Party: “Since we occupied the cities two to three years ago, serious cases of corruption have occurred continuously, proving that the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee in the spring of 1949 was entirely correct in pointing out the inevitability of bourgeois erosion of the Party and the necessity of preventing and overcoming this great danger. Now is the critical moment for the entire Party to mobilize and earnestly implement this resolution. If we do not earnestly implement this resolution, we will make a big mistake.”

打江山难，守江山和巩固江山也难。人们熟知毛泽东在七届二中全会上提出的“两个务必”的教导，将之作为中国共产党防腐拒变的座右铭。其实，在七届二中全会上，他还讲过一段发人深思的话：“‘毕其功于一役’，我是在流血的革命这一点上说的，就是说流血的革命只有这一次，将来由新民主主义革命转变到社会主义革命那一次就不用流血了，而可能和平解决。但这只是可能，将来是否不流血，还要看我们工作的努力情况。如果国家，主要的就是人民解放军和我们的党腐化下去，无产阶级不能掌握住这个国家政权，那还是有问题的。”毛泽东没有自我陶醉于即将获取全国政权的喜悦中，而是清醒地预判了中国共产党成为执政党后面临腐化的巨大风险，提醒人们谦虚谨慎，继续艰苦奋斗，避免政权得而复失的“流血”局面。中共进城后，果然有相当多的领导干部没有经得住资产阶级糖衣炮弹的袭击，贪图享乐，腐化堕落。毛泽东严肃地告诫全党：“自从我们占领城市两年至三年以来，严重的贪污案件不断发生，证明一九四九年春季党的二中全会严重地指出资产阶级对党的侵蚀的必然性和为防止及克服此种巨大危险的必要性，是完全正确的，现在是全党动员切实执行这项决议的紧要时机了。再不切实执行这项决议，我们就会犯大错误。”

Mao Zedong absolutely would not allow “any political dust or political microbe to defile our clean faces or erode our healthy bodies.” Graft and waste were the greatest crimes. In the early years of the founding of New China, Mao Zedong directed the sharp sword of anti-corruption at graft, waste, and bureaucracy, resolutely and decisively launching the “Three-Anti” Campaign, [13]13 A 1951–1952 campaign targeting corruption, waste, and bureaucracy within the Party and state apparatus. issuing instructions: “The matter of anti-graft and anti-waste is truly a major task for the entire Party. We have told you to pay serious attention to it. We believe a thorough cleanup of the entire Party is needed to completely expose all large, medium, and small cases of graft… Only then can we stop the extremely dangerous phenomenon of many Party members being corroded by the bourgeoisie, and only then can we overcome the situation already foreseen by the Second Plenary Session and realize the policy of preventing corrosion set by that session.” Mao Zedong, who hated evil as an enemy, demanded that “the struggle against graft, waste, and bureaucracy be regarded as important as the campaign to suppress counter-revolutionaries.” [14]14 A 1950–1951 campaign to eliminate remnants of Kuomintang agents, bandits, and other perceived counter-revolutionaries. Minor cases would be dealt with by criticism and education; serious cases would be removed from office, punished, sentenced to imprisonment (reform through labor), and even the most serious grafters would be executed, only then could the problem be solved. There would be no leniency because a grafter held a high position, had great merit, or wielded great influence. Given that corruption within Party and government organs often resulted from collusion with illegal businessmen outside the system, and to support the in-depth development of the “Three-Anti” Campaign, Mao Zedong decided to launch the “Five-Anti” Campaign [15]15 A 1952 campaign targeting bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and stealing state economic intelligence by private businesses. in large and medium-sized cities against the illegal activities of the bourgeoisie, beating back the rampant attacks of lawless capitalists on the Party and the socialist state-owned economy, and maintaining normal economic order. When Mao Zedong launched the “Three-Anti” and “Five-Anti” campaigns, the country was a wasteland waiting to be rebuilt, and the tasks of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, [16]16 The Chinese name for the Korean War (1950–1953), framed as a war to defend China and aid North Korea. suppressing counter-revolutionaries, land reform, and restoring the national economy were all intertwined. According to the recollections of a participant in the “Three-Anti” Campaign, Mao Zedong, amidst his myriad daily tasks, during the tense days of the campaign “still listened to my reports almost every evening, and often sat in at the Central Committee’s meetings, giving personal guidance.” Mao Zedong launched the “Three-Anti” and “Five-Anti” campaigns with vigor and decisiveness, severely punishing corrupt elements, addressing both inside and outside the system, cleaning up the social soil that bred corruption, and safeguarding social and economic development. This provided valuable experience for the contemporary Communist Party of China in exercising comprehensive and strict governance of the Party and in deeply advancing the great new project of Party building in the New Era.

毛泽东绝不允许“任何政治的灰尘、政治的微生物来玷污我们的清洁的面貌和侵蚀我们的健全的肌体”。贪污和浪费是极大的犯罪。新中国成立初期，毛泽东把反腐的利剑指向贪污、浪费和官僚主义，坚决果断地发动“三反”运动，发出指示：“反贪污、反浪费一事，实是全党一件大事，我们已告诉你们严重地注意此事。我们认为需要来一次全党的大清理，彻底揭露一切大、中、小贪污事件，……才能停止很多党员被资产阶级所腐蚀的极大危险现象，才能克服二中全会所早已料到的这种情况，并实现二中全会防止腐蚀的方针”。疾恶如仇的毛泽东要求“把反贪污、反浪费、反官僚主义的斗争看作如同镇压反革命的斗争一样的重要”,轻者批评教育，重者撤职、惩办、判处徒刑（劳动改造），直至枪毙一批最严重的贪污犯，才能解决问题，而绝不会因为大贪污犯的地位高、功劳大、影响大而得到宽容。鉴于党政机关内部的贪腐往往是体制外非法商人勾结而来，为配合“三反”运动纵深开展，毛泽东决定在大中城市发动反对资产阶级违法乱纪的“五反”运动，打退了不法资本家向党和社会主义国营经济的猖狂进攻，维护了正常的经济秩序。毛泽东发动“三反”“五反”运动时，国家百废待兴，抗美援朝、镇压反革命、土地改革、国民经济恢复的工作千头万绪。据“三反”运动的亲历者回忆说，日理万机中的毛泽东在“三反”运动紧张的日子里，仍然“几乎每天晚上都要听取我的汇报，甚至经常坐镇中节委，参加办公会议，亲自指点。”毛泽东发动“三反”“五反”运动，雷厉风行，严惩腐败分子，体制内外兼修，清理滋生腐败的社会土壤，保障社会经济发展，为当代中国共产党全面从严治党，深入推进新时代党的建设新的伟大工程，提供了宝贵经验。

Although the “Three-Anti” and “Five-Anti” campaigns achieved great victories, Mao Zedong soberly recognized that the struggle against corruption and for the rejection of degeneration was a serious, long-term struggle that could not be won in a single battle. Shortly after the conclusion of the “Five-Anti” campaign, in his directive launching the “New Three-Anti” campaign against bureaucracy, commandism, and violations of the law and discipline, he stated: “Bureaucracy and commandism are a major problem in our Party and government not only at present but also for a very long period to come.” [17]17 The “Three-Anti” campaign (1951–1952) targeted corruption, waste, and bureaucracy within the Party and government; the “Five-Anti” campaign (1952) targeted bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and stealing state economic information among private industrialists and merchants. The “New Three-Anti” campaign (1953) targeted bureaucracy, commandism, and violations of law and discipline. During the period of the transformation of capitalist industry and commerce, he commented in an instruction: “The corrosion of us by bourgeois elements and our struggle against their corrosion will be protracted; this problem cannot be completely resolved quickly.” [18]18 The transformation of capitalist industry and commerce (1953–1956) was the socialist transformation of private enterprises into state-owned or joint state-private enterprises. As late as the 1960s, Mao hoped to eradicate completely the lordly style, bureaucratic style, and commandist style among the leadership, yet he also soberly recognized: “Bureaucratism, this bad legacy left over from the old society, will sprout again with the spring breeze if it is not swept away with a broom once a year.” [19]19 “Sprouts again with the spring breeze” (春风吹又生) is a classical allusion to a poem by Bai Juyi (772–846), originally describing the resilience of weeds; here it is used metaphorically. “To achieve this goal cannot be accomplished in a short time; it requires a long process, a rectification campaign once every year, to thoroughly criticize those lordly, bureaucratic, and commandist people and to change their shortcomings.” [20]20 “Rectification campaign” (整风) refers to the Party-wide ideological and organizational rectification movements, notably the 1942–1944 Yan’an Rectification Movement and subsequent periodic campaigns. This soberness, persistence, and perseverance in unremittingly guarding against corruption and rejecting degeneration are still worthy of our study today.

尽管“三反”“五反”运动取得了伟大胜利，但毛泽东清醒地认识到，防腐拒变斗争是一场严重的长期的斗争，不可毕其功于一役。“五反”运动结束后不久，他在发动反对官僚主义、命令主义和违法乱纪的“新三反”的指示里说：“官僚主义和命令主义在我们的党和政府，不但在目前是一个大问题，就是在一个很长的时期内还将是一个大问题。”在资本主义工商业改造期间，他批示道：“资产阶级分子腐蚀我们和我们反对资产阶级分子对于我们的腐蚀的斗争将是长期的，这个问题不是很快就可以完全解决的。”一直到20世纪60年代，毛泽东都希望把领导上的老爷式作风、官僚主义作风、命令主义作风，完全消灭得干干净净，但同时又清醒地认识到：“官僚主义这种旧社会遗留下来的坏作风，一年不用扫帚扫一次，就会春风吹又生了。”“要达到这个目的，不是短时间内所能完成的，需要一个长期过程，需要每一年整风一次，彻底批判那些老爷式的和官僚主义、命令主义的人们，把他们的缺点改变过来。”这种对拒腐防变常抓不懈的清醒、执着和坚持，依然值得今天的我们学习。

III. Great Wisdom and Great Courage in Balancing Development and Security Amid Complex and Perilous Circumstances

三、复杂险峻局势中统筹发展与安全的大智大勇

From the very day of its birth, socialist China faced hostility from international imperialism. Containment and counter-containment, peaceful evolution and counter-peaceful evolution, were the main forms of struggle between socialist China and Western capitalism under the background of “one globe, two systems.” International anti-China and anti-communist forces, relying on their advantages in the economic, technological, military, and cultural fields, comprehensively contained the development of socialist China. The speed and quality of economic construction directly concerned the rise and fall of Chinese socialism. Mao, who was adept at learning from history, certainly knew that no powerful era in Chinese or world history—such as the Restoration of Guangwu, the Reign of Zhenguan, or the High Qing Era [21]21 The Restoration of Guangwu (25–57 CE) revived the Han dynasty after a brief interregnum; the Reign of Zhenguan (627–649 CE) was a golden age under Emperor Taizong of the Tang dynasty; the High Qing Era (roughly 1680s–1790s) refers to the peak of the Qing dynasty under Emperors Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong.—was built on a foundation of national poverty and popular weakness with a shortage of material goods. Mao believed that only by building China into a great socialist country and catching up with the strongest capitalist countries in the world could we “change the situation of backwardness, of being looked down upon, of being in a sorry plight, that has lasted for over a hundred years.” [22]22 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Conference of the Supreme State Conference” (1956). “This is a responsibility. You have so many people, you have such a big piece of land, resources are so abundant, and it is said you have built socialism, which is supposed to have superiority; yet after fifty or sixty years you still cannot surpass the United States—what kind of figure would you cut? Then you would be expelled from the earth’s roster of nations!” [23]23 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Conference of the Supreme State Conference” (1956). The phrase “expelled from the earth’s roster of nations” (开除球籍) is a famous metaphor for national extinction or irrelevance. Mao’s “theory of expulsion from the roster of nations” embodied his sense of urgency concerning the nation’s future and destiny. To completely shake off the danger of being expelled from the roster of nations, Mao proposed building a powerful socialist country in about one hundred years. In 1962, he said: China has the superiority of the socialist system, but its economic base is weak. “To greatly develop the productive forces, to catch up with and surpass the most advanced capitalist countries in the world, I think it will not do without a period of over one hundred years.” [24]24 Mao Zedong, “Speech at an Enlarged Central Work Conference” (1962). This judgment coincides with the second centenary goal proposed by our Party. [25]25 The second centenary goal refers to building China into a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, and harmonious by the mid-21st century, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (2049). He proposed that “from now on, within fifty to one hundred years, it will be a great era of thorough change in the world’s social systems, an earth-shaking era, incomparable to any historical era in the past. Living in such an era, we must prepare for a great struggle whose forms of struggle have many characteristics different from those of past eras.” [26]26 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Beidaihe Conference” (1962). This coincides with the judgment of “changes unseen in a century” and “a great struggle with many new historical features” proposed in the New Era.

社会主义中国从诞生那天开始，就面临着来自国际帝国主义的敌视。围堵与反围堵，和平演变与反和平演变，是“一球两制”背景中的社会主义中国与西方资本主义斗争的主要形式。国际反华反共势力凭借经济科技军事文化领域的优势，全方位遏制社会主义中国的发展。经济建设的速度和质量问题，直接关系到中国社会主义的治乱兴衰。善于以史为鉴的毛泽东，当然知道中国历史和世界历史上的任何一个强盛时代，如光武中兴、贞观之治、康乾盛世，没有一个是建立在物质产品供给匮乏的国弱民穷的基础之上。毛泽东认为，把中国建成一个伟大的社会主义国家，赶上世界上最强大的资本主义国家，才能“改变过去一百多年落后的那种情况，被人家看不起的那种情况，倒霉的那种情况”，“这是一种责任。你有那么多人，你有那么一块大地方，资源那么丰富，又听说搞了社会主义，据说是有优越性，结果你搞了五六十年还不能超过美国，你像个什么样子呢？那就要从地球上开除你的球籍！”毛泽东的“球籍论”，体现了对国家前途命运的忧患意识。为了彻底摆脱被开除球籍的危险，毛泽东提出用一百年左右的时间，建设强大的社会主义国家。1962年，他说：中国有社会主义制度的优越性，但经济基础薄弱，“要使生产力很大地发展起来，要赶上和超过世界上最先进的资本主义国家，没有一百多年的时间，我看是不行的。”这个论断，与我党提出的第二个百年奋斗目标相吻合。他提出“从现在起，五十年内外到一百年内外，是世界上社会制度彻底变化的伟大时代，是一个翻天覆地的时代，是过去任何一个历史时代都不能比拟的。处在这样一个时代，我们必须准备进行同过去时代的斗争形式有着许多不同特点的伟大的斗争”，与新时代提出的“百年未有之大变局”和“许多具有新的历史特点的伟大斗争”的判断相吻合。

It was not that Mao did not want to concentrate wholeheartedly on large-scale socio-economic construction immediately after gaining national power. In his works *On Coalition Government* and *On New Democracy*, he already had a vision for building the country. On the eve of the founding of New China, he stated: “The task of nationwide economic construction has already been placed before us,” and the Party and the people’s government “will lead the people of the whole country to overcome all difficulties, carry out large-scale economic and cultural construction, sweep away the poverty and ignorance left by old China, and gradually improve the people’s material life and raise their cultural life.” [27]27 Mao Zedong, “Address to the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference” (1949). But New China was situated at the forefront of the confrontation between the two post-World War II camps, the US-led and the Soviet-led, in Asia, and could not completely extricate itself from international disputes. The generation of leaders under Mao faced a dual task: on the one hand, actively engaging in national construction; on the other hand, having to be a hundred times more vigilant and to overcome subversion, attack, blockade, and other acts from imperialism and hegemonism, cautiously seeking a secure international environment for the construction of the Republic.

毛泽东不是不想在获得全国政权后立即心无旁骛地集中精力从事大规模社会经济建设。他在《论联合政府》《新民主主义论》里，已经有了一个建设国家的构想。即将成立新中国之际，他讲到：“全国规模的经济建设工作业已摆在我们面前”，党和人民政府“将领导全国人民克服一切困难，进行大规模的经济建设和文化建设，扫除旧中国所留下来的贫困和愚昧，逐步地改善人民的物质生活和提高人民的文化生活。”但新中国处于二战后形成的美苏两大阵营在亚洲对峙的最前沿，不可能完全摆脱国际纷争的干扰。毛泽东那一代领导集体面临着双重任务，一方面积极进行国家建设，另一方面不得不百倍警惕并战胜来自帝国主义和霸权主义的颠覆、攻击、封锁等行为，谨慎地为共和国的建设找寻安全的国际环境。

Under circumstances where the state of confrontation with Western countries was difficult to change, Mao adopted the policy of “leaning to one side,” seeking friends within the socialist camp to secure a safe environment and economic-technical support for large-scale national construction. The 156 large-scale construction projects laid the initial foundation for New China’s industrialization; [28]28 The 156 projects were Soviet-aided industrial projects under the First Five-Year Plan (1953–1957), forming the core of China’s heavy industry. they provided the Chinese people with extremely valuable construction experience and technical backbone—a group of students who studied in the Soviet Union became the backbone in many fields of the Republic; and they secured thousands of kilometers of safe northern borders. The most populous country and the largest country, joining hands, promoted the development of the world socialist movement. During the period of socialist construction, Mao took the Soviet Union as a mirror, explored China’s own path of building socialism, and was vigilant against the Soviet leaders’ growing hostility toward China, avoiding becoming a subservient Soviet satellite state. Only after the upheavals of a series of drastic changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union did people come to realize that Mao’s exploration of an independent path of socialist construction, his defense of national independence and sovereignty, and his willingness to engage in uncompromising polemics and a break with the Soviet Union, were a typical case of a great decision made with far-reaching historical impact, demonstrating his great wisdom and great courage in solving extremely difficult and complex historical tasks under severe and complex circumstances.

在与西方国家对立状态难以改变的情况下，毛泽东采取了“一边倒”的政策方针，在社会主义阵营里寻找朋友，为大规模国家建设寻求安全环境和经济技术支援。156项大型建设项目奠定了新中国工业化的初步基础；获得了对于中国人民来说极为宝贵的建设经验和技术骨干，留学苏联的一批学生成为共和国多个领域的骨干力量；获得了北方数千公里的安全边界。一个人口最多的国家和一个面积最大的国家，联起手来，推动了世界社会主义运动的发展。在社会主义建设时期，毛泽东以苏为鉴，探索中国自己的建设社会主义的道路，警惕苏联领导人对中国日益增强的敌视，避免成为言听计从的苏联卫星国。经过东欧和苏联一系列剧变的动荡后，人们才感知到毛泽东探索独立自主的社会主义建设道路，维护国家的独立主权，不惜与苏联进行毫不妥协的论战和决裂，是他一生中遇到严峻复杂局势时做出的具有长远历史影响的、表现他解决无比艰难复杂的历史性课题的大智大勇的伟大决策的典型案例。

Mao Zedong understood very clearly the historical dialectics of peace and war: do not want war, do not fear war, and use victorious war to protect the environment for peaceful construction. When imperialism threatened the newly founded People’s Republic of China from Korea and Vietnam—the two directions adjacent to China’s north and south—Mao resolutely decided to resist US aggression and aid Korea, and to aid Vietnam in resisting France. Premier Zhou Enlai said: “Mao Zedong believed that if we did not make up our minds at this critical juncture, not only would Korea be occupied, but our own construction would also become impossible.” [29]29 Zhou Enlai, “Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Military Commission” (July 1958), in Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, vol. 2 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1984), p. 137. Using inferior equipment, New China defeated the fully modernized US invading army, winning the prestige of the Chinese people and securing New China’s position in the international arena. Mao said: “Now the Chinese people have been organized; they are not to be provoked. If they are provoked, it will not be easy to deal with.” [30]30 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Supreme State Conference” (September 1959), in Manuscripts of Mao Zedong since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 8 (Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 1993), p. 523. The United States, having been severely punished by the Chinese people, never again dared to underestimate them. During the Vietnam War in the 1960s, the Americans had to accept the Chinese warning and did not dare to cross the 17th parallel. [31]31 The 17th parallel was the demarcation line between North and South Vietnam established by the 1954 Geneva Accords. War inevitably entails sacrifice, but a just war mobilized the masses; the whole nation united as one, sharing a common hatred for the enemy, and the three-year plan for national economic recovery was completed on schedule. After the Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea War and the Resist US Aggression and Aid Vietnam War, the Chinese people ushered in a relatively stable period of construction since the founding of New China. At the National Conference of the Party held in March 1955, Mao said: “We have entered a period in which what we are doing, thinking about, and delving into is delving into socialist industrialization, delving into socialist transformation, delving into modernized national defense, and beginning to delve into atomic energy—a new period in history.” [32]32 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China” (March 1955), in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 5 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1977), p. 144. The state formulated the Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology from 1956 to 1967, “determining 57 important scientific and technological tasks and 616 central issues, of which 12 were key tasks,” and “focusing on the development of atomic energy, jet propulsion and rocketry, computers, semiconductors, electronics, and automation technology.” [33]33 Bo Yibo, A Review of Several Major Decisions and Events (Beijing: Central Party School Press, 1991), vol. 1, p. 511. This resolved a number of scientific and technological issues urgently needed for national economic construction and national defense, greatly narrowing the gap with the world’s advanced science and technology.

毛泽东十分清楚地理解和平与战争的历史辩证法，不要战争，不怕战争，用胜利的战争保卫和平建设环境。当帝国主义从朝鲜和越南—邻近中国南北两个方向，威胁刚成立的新中国时，毛泽东毅然决策抗美援朝、援越抗法。周总理说：“毛泽东认为如果在这个关键时刻不下决心，不仅朝鲜被占领，就是我们自己的建设也将成为不可能。”新中国用劣势装备，打败了完全现代化装备的美国侵略军，打出了中国人民的威望，打出新中国在国际上的地位。毛泽东说：“现在中国人民已经组织起来了，是惹不得的。如果惹翻了，是不好办的。”遭到中国人民痛击的美国，再也不敢轻视中国人民了。在1960年代的越南战争中，美国人不得不接受中国人的警告，没有敢越过北纬17度线。战争不可避免有所牺牲，但是正义的战争动员了人民群众，全国人民团结一致，同仇敌忾，三年国民经济恢复计划按时完成。经过抗美援朝和抗美援越，中国人民迎来了新中国成立以来比较平稳的建设时期。在1955年3月召开的党的全国代表会议上，毛泽东说：“我们进入了这样一个时期，就是我们现在所从事的、所思考的、所钻研的，是钻社会主义工业化，钻社会主义改造，钻现代化的国防，并且开始要钻原子能这样的历史的新时期。”国家制定1956年到1967年科学技术发展远景规划，“确定了57项重要科技任务和616个中心问题，其中重点任务是12项”“重点发展原子能、喷气与火箭、计算机、半导体、电子学和自动化技术”，解决了国家经济建设和国防建设中迫切需要解决的一批科技问题，大大缩小了同世界先进科学技术水平的差距。

Balancing the relationship between development and security is a strategic issue that real socialism must confront. In his essay “On the Ten Major Relationships,” Mao argued: “In the past, the Korean War was still going on, and the international situation was still tense, which inevitably affected our view of coastal industry. Now, a new war of aggression against China and a new world war are estimated not to break out in the short term; there may be a decade or even longer of peace. In this case, it would be wrong not to fully utilize the equipment capacity and technical strength of coastal industry. Even if it is not ten years, even if it is five years, we should run coastal industry well for four years, and then move when the fifth year comes and war breaks out.” [34]34 Mao Zedong, “On the Ten Major Relationships” (April 1956), in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 5 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1977), p. 270. In this speech, Mao also discussed adjusting the proportions of agriculture, light industry, and heavy industry; reducing military and administrative expenditures to an appropriate proportion to free up more wealth for economic construction, and so on. But storms gather without warning; the world situation did not leave socialist China more time to devote itself to construction in peace. In the 1960s, the clouds of war once again hung over socialist China. The complex international environment and perilous surrounding circumstances affected the order of development of heavy, light, and agricultural industries, the ratio of accumulation to consumption, the economic layout, and the mode of national mobilization. Mao deployed work on the premise that China might be attacked. When arranging the Third Five-Year Plan, Mao had to adjust the “food, clothing, and daily necessities” plan into a war-preparedness plan, giving priority to national security and carrying out the strategic layout of the first, second, and third fronts. [35]35 The Third Front was a massive industrialization and defense project in China’s interior provinces initiated in the mid-1960s to prepare for potential invasion. He was uneasy about the construction of the Panzhihua iron and steel base and the related transportation, coal, and electricity projects, saying: “The Jiuquan and Panzhihua steel plants still have to be built; if they are not built, I will always be uneasy. What will happen if war breaks out?” [36]36 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Military Commission” (December 1964), in Manuscripts of Mao Zedong since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 11 (Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 1996), p. 265. The Third Front construction was a Western Development Drive during the war-preparedness period. By geographically dispersing the layout and achieving strategic depth, it established a complete national defense industrial system and strategic rear base in China’s central and western regions, exerting a far-reaching impact on safeguarding national security, improving the national industrial layout, and promoting the development of China’s inland areas. Mao prepared materially and spiritually for a surprise attack by imperialism, proposing “dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony,” [37]37 Mao Zedong, “Instruction on the Question of War Preparedness” (August 1972), in Manuscripts of Mao Zedong since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 13 (Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 1998), p. 317. and “we are prepared to do some foolish things, to build underground factories and underground railways, year by year.” [38]38 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Military Commission” (December 1964), in Manuscripts of Mao Zedong since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 11, p. 267. Even a beggar needs a stick to fend off dogs. He attached great importance to developing cutting-edge weapons, instructing: “As for the death ray, we must organize a group of people to specialize in studying it.” [39]39 Mao Zedong, “Instruction on the Research of the Death Ray” (1964), cited in Nie Rongzhen, Memoirs of Nie Rongzhen (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Press, 1984), vol. 3, p. 812. “And as for the atomic bomb, it is said to be such a small thing; without it, people say you don’t count. All right, then, we will make a little. Making a few atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, and intercontinental missiles—I think it is entirely possible within ten years.” [40]40 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Military Commission” (June 1958), in Manuscripts of Mao Zedong since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 7 (Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 1992), p. 272. During the three years of natural disaster, Mao did not waver in his determination to develop cutting-edge technology and weapons, and finally succeeded in producing the great national treasures of the “two bombs and one satellite,” [41]41 “Two bombs and one satellite” refers to the atomic bomb, hydrogen bomb, and artificial satellite developed by China in the 1960s and 1970s. demonstrating the superhuman wisdom of a great power leader. Reflecting on the sanctions and containment imposed by Western countries on Iraq, Iran, and North Korea for developing nuclear weapons since the 1990s, we cannot but admire Mao’s extraordinary courage in pushing China into the international nuclear club back then.

统筹发展与安全的关系，是现实社会主义必须面对的战略性课题。毛泽东在《论十大关系》里认为：“过去朝鲜还在打仗，国际形势还很紧张，不能不影响我们对沿海工业的看法。现在，新的侵华战争和新的世界大战，估计短时期内打不起来，可能有十年或者更长一点的和平时期。这样，如果还不充分利用沿海工业的设备能力和技术力量，那就不对了。不说十年，就算五年，我们也应当在沿海好好地办四年的工业，等第五年打起来再搬家。”这篇讲话中，毛泽东还讲到调整农轻重比例；把军政费用降低到一个适当的比例，以省出更多的财富来用于经济建设等。天有不测风云，世界局势没有留给社会主义中国进一步安心从事建设以更长的时间。20世纪的60年代，战争阴云重新笼罩了社会主义中国。复杂的国际环境，险峻的周边环境，影响了重轻农业的发展次序、积累与消费比例、经济布局、国家动员方式等。毛泽东以可能挨打为出发点来部署工作。在安排第三个五年计划时，毛泽东不得不将“吃穿用”计划调整为战备计划，优先考虑国家安全，进行一、二、三线战略布局。他放心不下攀枝花钢铁工业基地以及与此相联系的交通、煤、电项目的建设，说“酒泉和攀枝花钢铁厂还是要搞，不搞我总是不放心，打起仗来怎么办？”三线建设是战备时期的西部大开发，通过地理分散布局和战略深度，在我国中西部地区建立起完整的国防工业体系和战略后方基地，对保障国家安全，改善全国工业布局和促进我国内陆地区发展产生了极其深远的影响。毛泽东在精神和物质上准备帝国主义的突然袭击，提出“深挖洞，广积粮，不称霸”，“我们准备做一些蠢事，要搞地下工厂、地下铁道，逐年地搞”。要饭还要有根打狗棒。他重视研制尖端武器，指示“死光，要组织一批人专门去研究它。”“还有那个原子弹，听说就这么大一个东西，没有那个东西，人家就说你不算数。那么好，我们就搞一点。搞一点原子弹、氢弹、洲际导弹，我看有十年功夫是完全可能的。”三年自然灾害时期，毛泽东没有动摇发展尖端技术和武器的决心，终于成功搞出大国重器“两弹一星”，体现了一个大国领袖超人的智慧。联想到二十世纪九十年代以来西方国家对伊拉克、伊朗、朝鲜等国家发展核武器的制裁、遏制，我们不得不佩服毛泽东当年推动中国挤进国际核大国俱乐部的过人胆识。

After experiencing the rapid economic expansion of a restorative nature in the 1950s and 1960s, the economic growth rate of Western countries slowed down in the 1970s. The domestic economy fell into severe “stagflation.” The United States, eager to extricate itself from Asia, signaled goodwill to ease relations with China. The far-sighted Mao Zedong used “ping-pong diplomacy,” with the small ball driving the big ball, to invite Nixon to visit China, creating a legend in world diplomatic history. [42]42 “Ping-pong diplomacy” refers to the exchange of table tennis teams between China and the United States in 1971–1972, which paved the way for President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972. New China restored its lawful seat as one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, becoming one of the few major powers responsible for world security, and established diplomatic relations with over 100 countries, providing favorable international conditions for the Communist Party of China to soon formulate the policy of reform and opening up. Subsequently, Mao seized the opportunity when Western capitalist countries were eager to find export markets to escape the economic crisis and trade conditions were relatively favorable for China, approving a plan to import approximately US$4.3 billion worth of equipment from the West, including 13 advanced chemical fertilizer production lines. [43]43 This was the “43-billion-dollar import plan” approved in 1973, a major initiative to import Western industrial equipment. This was another large-scale import of technology and equipment after the massive import of Soviet technology and equipment, reflecting the policy direction of strengthening agriculture and light industry to meet the people’s needs for food, clothing, housing, and daily necessities. China’s agriculture increased production and income in the late 1970s, and the Chinese people basically solved the problem of having enough to eat. Apart from the factor of implementing the household contract responsibility system, this was largely related to the strengthening of farmland capital construction, seed improvement, and the large-scale application of chemical fertilizers produced by the imported fertilizer equipment during the Mao era.

在经历了20世纪五六十年代带有恢复性质的高速经济扩张以后，西方国家的经济增长速度在七十年代缓慢下来。国内经济陷入严重的“滞涨”，急于从亚洲脱身的美国，向中国释放缓和关系的善意。高瞻远瞩的毛泽东以“小球带大球”的乒乓外交，邀请尼克松访华，成就了世界外交史上的一段传奇。新中国恢复在联合国安全理事会五大常任理事国的合法席位，成为少数几个为世界安全负责任的大国之一，有了一百多个建交国，为不久以后中国共产党制定改革开放的政策提供了良好的国际条件。随后，毛泽东抓住西方资本主义国家急于寻找出口市场以摆脱经济危机，贸易条件对我国比较有利的机会，批准了从西方进口约43亿美元的包括13条先进化肥设备在内的进口方案,这是继大规模进口苏联技术设备以后的又一次大规模引进技术设备，反映了国家加强农业、轻工业，以满足人民吃穿住用需要的政策走向。中国农业在20世纪70年代末增产增收，中国人民基本解决了吃饭问题，除了实行联产承包责任制这个因素外，很大程度上与毛泽东时代加强农田基本建设、种子改良和农民大规模施用由进口化肥设备产出的大量化肥有关。

From the mid-1950s onward, Western imperialism gradually formed a strategic concept of implementing “peaceful evolution” [44]44 “Two bombs, one satellite” refers to China’s successful development of atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, and artificial satellites in the 1960s and 1970s, a major symbol of national scientific and technological achievement. against Chinese socialism, exerting influence in ideological, economic, cultural and other spheres to wage a war without gunpowder, thereby altering the nature of China as a socialist state. Mao Zedong keenly detected this conspiracy: “Peaceful transformation of whom? It is to transform countries like ours, to carry out subversive activities, to turn us internally to conform to their thinking. That is, they want to maintain their order, not to disturb it, but to disturb us, using peaceful transformation to corrode us.” He promptly and explicitly put forward the strategic thinking of preventing and opposing “peaceful evolution.” He focused the prevention of “peaceful evolution” on a series of major issues, such as waging struggles in the ideological sphere, clearly opposing revisionism in both international and domestic struggles, and training successors for the cause of the proletarian revolution, and launched a series of movements to forestall the occurrence of “peaceful evolution.” He believed that if people’s democracy and inner-Party democracy were not fully developed, and if a socialist economy were not established, China “would become a revisionist state, in fact a bourgeois state, and the dictatorship of the proletariat would transform into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, and moreover a reactionary, fascist-style dictatorship. This is a matter that deserves great vigilance.” He also held that within the Party there were people of impure character and style, “and some who hang out the signboard of Communist Party membership but do not represent the working class; rather, they represent the bourgeoisie. The Party is not pure; this must be recognized, otherwise we will suffer

二十世纪五十年代中期以后，西方帝国主义逐步形成对中国社会主义实施“和平演变”的战略思想，在意识形态、经济、文化等方面施加影响，打一场没有硝烟的战争，进而改变中国社会主义国家的性质。毛泽东敏锐地察觉到了这一阴谋：“和平转变谁呢？就是转变我们这些国家，搞颠覆活动，内部转到合乎他的那个思想。就是说，他那个秩序要维持，不要动，要动我们，用和平转变，腐蚀我们”,及时而明确地提出防止和反对“和平演变”战略思想。他把防止“和平演变”的重点放在进行意识形态领域的斗争、在国际和国内斗争中旗帜鲜明地反对修正主义、培养无产阶级革命事业接班人等一系列重大问题上，并发动了一系列运动来预防“和平演变”的发生。他认为，如果不充分发扬人民民主和党内民主，如果不建立社会主义经济，中国“就会变成修正主义的国家，变成实际上是资产阶级的国家，无产阶级专政就会转化为资产阶级专政，而且会是反动的、法西斯式的专政。这是一个十分值得警惕的问题”。他还认为：党内存在一些品质不纯和作风不纯的人，“还有些人挂着共产党员的招牌，但是并不代表工人阶级，而是代表资产阶级。党内并不纯粹，这一点必须看到，否则我们是要吃亏的。”习近平总书记曾提到过毛泽东的这段话：“帝国主义说，对我们的第一代、第二代没有希望，第三代、第四代怎么样，有希望。帝国主义的话讲得灵不灵？我不希望它灵，但也可能灵。”毛泽东把培养接班人当作防止和平演变的战略性措施，提出“为了保证我们的党和国家不改变颜色，我们不仅需要正确的路线和政策，而且需要培养和造就千百万无产阶级革命事业的接班人”,并进一步提出著名的无产阶级革命事业接班人的五项条件。在社会主义、资本主义两大阵营对立的国际背景下，毛泽东提出反“和平演变”这一命题，展示了跳出治乱兴衰周期率的政治远见和战略眼光。国际共产主义运动所遭遇的严重挫折和失误充分证明，毛泽东关于防止“和平演变”的思想极为深刻，值得后人给予足够重视。

In short, what he took over was a country that had endured over a century of war and crisis, extremely backward and impoverished. When he left his country and people forever, China had already “established an independent and relatively complete industrial system and national economic system, independently developed the ‘two bombs, one satellite’[44]44 “Two bombs, one satellite” refers to China’s successful development of atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, and artificial satellites in the 1960s and 1970s, a major symbol of national scientific and technological achievement., become a major country with significant influence in the world, and accumulated important experience in socialist construction in such a large Eastern country with a very low level of social productive forces,”[45]45 This is a quotation from the official Party historical resolution on the period of Mao’s leadership. laying a solid foundation for China’s bright future. Facing an extremely complex and perilous domestic and international environment, Mao Zedong, with his exceptional wisdom, coordinated development and security, made full use of the situation of great changes in the world, sought ways and opportunities to develop socialist China in the international community, fended off interference and encirclement by international hostile forces, safeguarded national security, and provided valuable experience for contemporary Chinese Communists in the era of changes unseen in a century on how to be safe without forgetting danger, survive without forgetting perdition, govern without forgetting chaos, how to judge the situation from a strategic height, how to coordinate development and security with foresight, and how to prevent, manage, and handle national security risks with bold vision, turning danger into safety and crisis into stability.

总之，他接管的是一个经历了一百多年的战乱、危机，极其落后贫穷的国家。当他永远离开他的国家和人民时，中国已“建立起独立的比较完整的工业体系和国民经济体系，独立研制出‘两弹一星’，成为在世界上有重要影响的大国，积累起在中国这样一个社会生产力水平十分落后的东方大国进行社会主义建设的重要经验”，为我国迈向光明的未来奠定了坚实基础。面临极其复杂险峻的国内外环境的毛泽东，以卓越的智慧统筹发展与安全，充分利用世界大变局的形势，在国际社会中寻找发展社会主义中国的出路和机会，摆脱国际敌对势力的干涉、围堵，维护了国家安全，为身处百年未有之大变局的当代中国共产党人如何安而不忘危，存而不忘亡，治而不忘乱，如何高屋建瓴地判断局势，如何高瞻远瞩地统筹发展与安全，如何高掌远跖地防范、管理、处理国家安全风险，化险为夷、转危为安，提供了宝贵的经验。

IV. Finding the New Path of People’s Democracy of “Two Onlys” to Break the Cycle of Rise and Fall

四、找到跳出治乱兴衰周期率的“两个只有”的人民民主新路

“The people, and the people alone, are the motive force in the making of world history”[46]46 Mao Zedong, “On Coalition Government” (1945). — this is a famous saying of Mao Zedong. In his dialogue with Huang Yanpei[47]47 Huang Yanpei (1878–1965) was a Chinese educator and political figure who, in 1945, famously asked Mao how the CPC would avoid the historical cycle of dynastic rise and fall. on the cycle of rise and fall, he applied the historical view of the masses to the practice of how to break the cycle of rise and fall, proposing the new path of people’s democracy of the “Two Onlys”: “This new path is democracy. Only by letting the people supervise the government will the government not dare to slack off. Only when everyone takes responsibility will there be no end of governance with the death of the ruler.”[48]48 This is the famous “cycle of rise and fall” dialogue between Mao and Huang Yanpei in Yan’an in 1945. Mao Zedong firmly believed that for the Communist Party of China to break the cycle of rise and fall, it must draw strength from the masses of the people, just as it did in the era of revolutionary war, and rely on the masses of the people.

人民，只有人民，才是创造世界历史的动力，这是毛泽东的名言。他与黄炎培对话治乱兴衰周期率时，把群众史观运用于如何打破治乱兴衰周期率的实践，提出“两个只有”的人民民主新路：“这条新路，就是民主。只有让人民来监督政府，政府才不敢松懈。只有人人起来负责，才不会人亡政息。”毛泽东坚信，中国共产党要跳出治乱兴衰周期率，就要像革命战争年代那样从人民群众中汲取力量，依靠人民群众。

In Mao Zedong’s view, the masses of the people contain the power to enable the people’s political power to overcome its enemies. Any seemingly powerful reactionary regime that is hostile to the people, such as those of the Tsar, Hitler, and Mussolini, is a paper tiger in the face of the people and will be overthrown by them. Conversely, a seemingly weak people’s political power supported by the people, such as the Soviet regime led by Lenin after the October Revolution and the newly founded New China, can turn danger into safety when encountering risks and trials. He said: “Relying on the people, all difficulties can be overcome, and any powerful enemy can be defeated; leaving the people, nothing can be accomplished.”[49]49 Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War” (1938). “What is a true bastion of iron? It is the masses, the millions upon millions of people who genuinely and wholeheartedly support the revolution. That is a true bastion of iron, which no force can break, absolutely cannot break.”[50]50 Mao Zedong, “Be Concerned with the Well-Being of the Masses, Pay Attention to Methods of Work” (1934). However, the initiative of the masses of the people in creating history does not spontaneously and naturally come into play. The key to breaking the cycle of rise and fall is whether the Party can successfully educate, mobilize, and organize the broadest masses of the people to actively participate in it. Awakening the consciousness of the masses to unite and devote themselves to the proletarian cause is the prerequisite for “everyone taking responsibility.” If leading cadres “subjectively want everyone to get moving and do things, but do not let everyone know what is to be done and how to do it, how can everyone get moving, and how can things be done well?”[51]51 Mao Zedong, “Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership” (1943). To enable the masses to “take responsibility,” it is necessary to make the masses understand that all the work undertaken by the Party and government is needed to satisfy the interests and wishes of the masses, so that the masses can unite around the Party and government. “Any work that requires the participation of the masses, if it lacks the consciousness and voluntariness of the masses, will inevitably become a mere formality and fail.”[52]52 Mao Zedong, “On Coalition Government” (1945). An undertaking that relies solely on leaders issuing orders without making efforts to explain it clearly to the led will inevitably be a cold and cheerless undertaking involving only a minority. An undertaking that strives to mobilize the masses and stimulate their initiative and creativity will inevitably be a vigorous and thriving undertaking that the majority is willing to participate in. Mao Zedong’s view of relying on the people to break the cycle of rise and fall fully conforms to Lenin’s assertion that “the strength of a country lies in the consciousness of the masses. Only when the masses know everything, can judge everything, and consciously do everything, does the country have strength,”[53]53 V. I. Lenin, “What Is to Be Done?” (1902), paraphrased. and also aligns with the excellent traditional Chinese culture of “everyone is responsible for the rise and fall of the world.”[54]54 A classical Chinese idiom from the Qing dynasty scholar Gu Yanwu, expressing the idea that every individual has a duty to the nation.

在毛泽东看来，人民群众蕴藏着让人民政权克敌制胜的力量，任何与人民为敌的貌似强大的反动政权，如沙皇、希特勒、墨索里尼的政权，在人民面前都是纸老虎，都会被人民推翻，而人民拥护的看似弱小的人民政权，如十月革命后列宁领导的苏维埃政权、刚成立的新中国，遭遇风险考验时都能够转危为安。他说：“依靠民众则一切困难能够克服，任何强敌能够战胜，离开民众则将一事无成。”“真正的铜墙铁壁是什么？是群众，是千百万真心实意地拥护革命的群众。这是真正的铜墙铁壁，什么力量也打不破的，完全打不破的。”但是，人民群众创造历史的积极性，不是自发地天然地发挥作用的。跳出治乱兴衰周期率，关键是党能否成功地教育、动员、组织最广大人民群众积极地参与其中。启发群众团结起来投身于无产阶级事业的觉悟，是“人人起来负责”的前提。如果领导干部“他们主观上也要大家动手动脚去做，但是不让大家知道要做的是怎么一回事，应当怎样做法，这样，大家怎么能动起来，事情怎么能够办好？”要让群众“人人起来负责”，必须使群众知道党和政府所从事的一切工作都是满足群众利益和愿望所需要的，群众才能团结在党和政府的周围。“凡是需要群众参加的工作，如果没有群众的自觉和自愿，就会流于徒有形式而失败。”仅靠领导发号施令而不努力向被领导者讲清楚的事业，必然是少数人参与的冷冷清清的事业。努力发动群众，激发起群众积极性和创造力的事业，必然是大多数人愿意参与其中的热气腾腾的事业。毛泽东依靠人民打破治乱兴衰周期率的观点，完全符合列宁提出的“一个国家的力量在于群众的觉悟。只有当群众知道一切，能判断一切，并自觉地从事一切的时候，国家才有力量”的论断，也契合了“天下兴亡，匹夫有责”的中华优秀传统文化。

The Communist Party of China is the vanguard of the working class, but it constitutes only a very small part of the Chinese population. Only when the Party’s line, principles, and policies reflect the opinions of the majority and work for their interests can it break the cycle of rise and fall. The stability of China’s socialist system depends on the support of the broad masses of intellectuals and peasants. Mobilizing all positive factors and organizing a mighty army to participate in the cause of revolution and construction was a concept Mao Zedong consistently emphasized. Mao Zedong believed that the more people there are, the more opinions, the higher the enthusiasm, and the greater the drive. During the revolutionary war years, Mao Zedong called for “organizing millions upon millions of the masses and mobilizing a mighty revolutionary army.” [55]55 Mao Zedong, “On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism” (December 27, 1935), Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 1. During the period of socialist construction, Mao Zedong put forward a famous slogan: “We must strive to mobilize all positive factors, both inside and outside the Party, both domestic and international, direct and indirect, and build our country into a powerful socialist state.” Mao Zedong believed that a class regime could not function without its own intellectuals. He lamented that about five million intellectuals were far too few for such a large country as ours. History posed to the ruling Communist Party of China the great task of creating a vast contingent of working-class intellectuals: “Before this vast new contingent of working-class intellectuals is formed, the revolutionary cause of the working class will not be fully consolidated.” The worker-peasant alliance is the foundation of our state power: “The situation of the peasants has a very great bearing on the development of our economy and the consolidation of our political power.” He advocated turning negative factors into positive ones, saying: “Although the reactionary forces are a negative factor, we must still do our work well and try our best to turn negative factors into positive ones.” Turning negative factors into positive ones also included correctly treating comrades who had made mistakes, helping them recognize and correct their mistakes, and continuing to bring their initiative into play. Mao Zedong said, “Treating those who have made mistakes with good intentions can win people over and unite people.” Since breaking the cycle of rise and fall is a cause of the masses, the more numerous, the more sustained, the broader, and the deeper the masses’ participation in the Party’s cause, the more successfully the cycle of rise and fall can be broken.

中国共产党是工人阶级先锋队，但在中国人口中只占很小部分，只有党的路线方针政策反映了大多数人的意见，并为他们的利益而工作时，才能够跳出治乱兴衰周期率。中国社会主义制度的稳固，要靠广大知识分子、农民的拥护。调动一切积极因素，组织浩浩荡荡的大军参加革命和建设事业是毛泽东一直强调的思想。毛泽东认为，人多议论多，热气高，干劲大。革命战争年代，毛泽东号召“组织千千万万的民众，调动浩浩荡荡的革命军”。建设社会主义时期，毛泽东提出了一个著名口号：“我们一定要努力把党内党外、国内国外的一切积极的因素，直接的、间接的积极因素，全部调动起来，把我国建设成为一个强大的社会主义国家。”毛泽东认为，一个阶级的政权，没有自己的知识分子那是不行的。他感叹：五百万左右的知识分子，对于我们这样一个大国来说太少了。历史向执政的中国共产党提出造就宏大的工人阶级知识分子队伍的伟大任务，“在这个工人阶级知识分子宏大新部队没有造成以前，工人阶级的革命事业是不会充分巩固的。”工农联盟是我国国家政权的基础：“农民的情况如何，对于我国经济的发展和政权的巩固，关系极大。”他主张化消极因素为积极因素，说：“反动势力虽是一种消极因素，但是我们仍然要作好工作，尽量争取化消极因素为积极因素。”化消极因素为积极因素，还包括正确对待犯错误的同志，帮助他们认识和改正错误，继续发挥他们的积极性。毛泽东说“好意对待犯错误的人，可以得人心，可以团结人。”既然跳出治乱兴衰周期率是群众的事业，那么群众参与党的事业的人数越多，越持久，越广泛，越深入，越能成功地跳出治乱兴衰周期率。

The historical creativity of the masses is directly expressed in their sense of responsibility for the Party’s cause and government work, and in their daring and ability to supervise and criticize leading organs and leading cadres who have committed errors, from a standpoint of goodwill. The people’s supervision of the Party and government is an expression of the people’s responsibility for the Party’s cause and the proletarian regime, and a manifestation of the masses, as creators of history, conveying their trust, support, and endorsement of the Party’s cause and the proletarian regime. The Party and government can, through the people’s supervision, examine the effectiveness of implementing the Party’s line, principles, and policies, absorb the masses’ opinions, overcome shortcomings, and improve work. Mao Zedong worked diligently for the country all his life, seeking in history the laws of social development and the rise and fall of states, from which he derived the principles of governing the country, the Party, and the military, and hoped to receive supervision. In a letter to Guo Moruo on November 21, 1944, he said: “Although I work diligently, fearing that something might go wrong, I cannot tell from where a mishap might come; if you see any errors or shortcomings, I hope you will let me know at any time.” [56]56 Guo Moruo (1892–1978) was a prominent Chinese writer, poet, historian, and revolutionary, who served in various cultural and political roles after 1949. Mao Zedong also answered, from the height of the nature and purpose of the Party and the regime, the question of why the Communist Party can and must accept supervision by the masses. This is because “the Communist Party is a political party that seeks the interests of the nation and the people; it itself has no private interests to pursue. It should be subject to the supervision of the people and must never act against the people’s will.” “Because we serve the people, we are not afraid of criticism if we have shortcomings. No matter who points them out, we will correct them if they are right. If what you say is beneficial to the people, we will act accordingly.” The Communist Party of China carries out criticism and self-criticism, mutual supervision among comrades, and actively corrects its own faults; this is an “internal attack.” To overcome the fault of not seeing the forest for the trees, it is also necessary to invite non-Party personages and non-Party comrades to criticize, help, and accept their supervision. Mao Zedong regarded this as an “internal and external pincer attack.” He said: “The Communist Party is sincerely determined to run state affairs well. But we still have many faults. We are not afraid to admit our faults; we must correct them. We must strengthen intra-Party education to eliminate these faults, and we must also eliminate them through democratic cooperation with non-Party personages. Only with such an internal and external pincer attack can we cure our faults and truly run state affairs well.” He elaborated in detail on the supervision of democratic parties: “The fact that the various parties supervise each other has long existed, that is, the various parties offer opinions and criticisms to each other. So-called mutual supervision is, of course, not one-sided; the Communist Party can supervise the democratic parties, and the democratic parties can also supervise the Communist Party. Why should the democratic parties be allowed to supervise the Communist Party? This is because a party, like a person, needs to hear different voices.” Mao Zedong explicitly proposed that the Communist Party of China and the democratic parties should “exist side by side for a long time and supervise each other.” [57]57 This slogan was first proposed by Mao Zedong in his speech “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People” (February 27, 1957). Thereafter, whenever major matters concerning the national economy and people’s livelihood arose, before decisions were made, forums would be held with leaders of the democratic parties and non-Party democrats to brief them on the situation, solicit opinions, conduct democratic consultation, and accept supervision. This method was institutionalized and continues to this day, becoming an important manifestation of whole-process people’s democracy. Mao Zedong regarded the people’s right to manage state affairs as the greatest right of laborers under the socialist system, and regarded the people’s letters and visits as an important channel for the Party and government to maintain contact with the masses and accept their supervision. He instructed leading cadres to “regard this as a method for the Communist Party and the people’s government to strengthen their ties with the people, and not adopt a bureaucratic attitude of treating it lightly or ignoring it.” This proposal led to the establishment of institutions at and above the county level in China for handling people’s letters and visits, and the system whereby leading cadres at all levels personally read people’s letters and receive people’s visits.

人民群众的历史创造力，直接表现为对党的事业和政府工作的负责精神，敢于和善于从爱护观点出发监督、批评犯有错误的领导机关和领导干部。人民对党和政府的监督，是人民对党的事业和无产阶级政权负责的表现，是人民群众以历史创造者的身份表达着对党的事业和无产阶级政权的信赖、拥护和支持。党和政府可以从人民的监督中检查实施党的路线方针政策的成效，吸收群众的意见，克服缺点，改进工作。毛泽东一生兢兢业业地为国操劳，在历史中寻求社会发展、国家兴亡的规律，从中悟出治国、治党、治军的道理，希望得到监督。他在1944年11月21日给郭沫若的信中说：“我虽然兢兢业业，生怕出岔子，但说不定岔子从什么地方跑来；你看到了什么错误缺点，希望随时示知。”毛泽东还从党和政权的性质和宗旨的高度，回答了共产党为什么能够接受和必须接受人民群众监督的问题，这是因为“共产党是为民族、为人民谋利益的政党，它本身决无私利可图。它应该受人民的监督，而决不应该违背人民的意旨。”“因为我们是为人民服务的，所以，我们如果有缺点，就不怕别人批评指出。不管是什么人，谁向我们指出都行。只要你说得对，我们就改正。你说的办法对人民有好处，我们就照你的办。”中国共产党开展批评与自我批评，同志间互相监督，主动地纠正自己的毛病，这是“内攻”。要克服身居庐山不识庐山的毛病，还需要请党外人士和党外同志批评、帮助和接受他们的监督，毛泽东视之为“内外夹攻”。他说：“共产党是真心实意想把国事办好的。但是我们的毛病还很多。我们不怕说出自己的毛病，我们一定要改正自己的毛病。我们要加强党内教育来清除这些毛病，我们还要经过和党外人士实行民主合作来清除这些毛病。这样的内外夹攻，才能把我们的毛病治好，才能把国事真正办好起来。”他详细阐述了民主党派的监督：“各党派互相监督的事实，也早已存在，就是各党派互相提意见，作批评。所谓互相监督，当然不是单方面的，共产党可以监督民主党派，民主党派也可以监督共产党。为什么要让民主党派监督共产党呢？这是因为一个党同一个人一样，耳边很需要听到不同的声音。”毛泽东明确提出，中国共产党同各民主党派要“长期共存，互相监督”。此后，遇有涉及国计民生的重大事情，在决策之前，都要召开各民主党派负责人和无党派民主人士座谈会，通报情况，听取意见，民主协商，接受监督，这个办法形成制度延续至今，成为全过程人民民主的重要体现。毛泽东把人民群众管理国家事务的权利当作社会主义制度下劳动者最大的权利，把人民群众的来信来访看作是党和政府联系人民群众和接受人民群众监督的一个重要渠道，让领导干部“要把这件事看成是共产党和人民政府加强和人民联系的一种方法，不要采取掉以轻心置之不理的官僚主义的态度。”此提议，形成了目前我国县以上各级党和政府设立的处理人民来信来访的机构，各级领导干部亲自阅看人民来信、接待人民来访的制度。

V. Build the Communist Party of China into a Vigorous and Progressive Marxist Party

五、把中国共产党建成朝气蓬勃的马克思主义先进政党

To break the cycle of rise and fall, a vigorous advanced Marxist political party is needed, and to build the Communist Party of China into such a party requires, first and foremost, unswervingly upholding and developing Marxism in both theory and practice. Mao Zedong fully recognized the significance of Marxism for the growth and strengthening of the Party’s cause. He said: “If we have one hundred to two hundred comrades who have systematically, rather than fragmentarily, and practically, rather than abstractly, mastered Marxism-Leninism, it will greatly enhance the fighting capacity of our Party.” [58]58 Mao Zedong, “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War” (October 1938), Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 2. He also said: “Once the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism is integrated with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, the face of the Chinese revolution takes on an entirely new look.” [59]59 Mao Zedong, “Reform Our Study” (May 1941), Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 3. Here Mao articulated at least two layers of meaning. First, Marxism is a universal truth that the Communist Party of China must uphold and that applies everywhere; “the theoretical foundation guiding our thinking is Marxism-Leninism,” [60]60 Mao Zedong, “Opening Address at the First Session of the First National People’s Congress” (September 1954), Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 5. and the entire Party must earnestly study and master this theoretical weapon. Second, the universal truth of Marxism must be integrated with the actual conditions of the Chinese revolution before it can become a weapon with which the Chinese people can win every battle. Therefore, “their theory should not be regarded as a dogma, but as a guide to action. We should not just learn the phrases of Marxism-Leninism, but should learn it as a revolutionary science.” [61]61 Mao Zedong, “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War” (October 1938), Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 2. A very important reason why the Communist Party of China has been able to grow and strengthen through all kinds of hardships and dangers is that Mao cultivated the fine tradition of the entire Party attaching importance to building the Party ideologically and strengthening it theoretically. In its infancy, the Communist Party of China lacked the ability to integrate Marxism with China’s actual conditions; dogmatism gained the upper hand, the revolution was placed in a dangerous situation, and the Central Red Army was forced to undertake a strategic shift. [62]62 This refers to the Long March (1934–1935), the strategic retreat of the Chinese Red Army from its base areas in the south to the northwest, forced by the failure of the urban-centered revolutionary strategy and the military encirclement campaigns of the Kuomintang. Mao taught Party cadres “to distinguish between creative Marxism and dogmatic Marxism,” [63]63 Mao Zedong, “Rectify the Party’s Style of Work” (February 1942), Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 3. opposed book worship, relied on Marxism to formulate correct lines that suited China’s actual conditions, and, through long revolutionary practice, tempered and cultivated a proletarian party that maintained unified thinking, firm will, coordinated action, and strong fighting capacity. “We have not only forged a strong Marxist political line, but also a strong Marxist military line. We not only know how to use Marxism to solve political problems, but also how to use Marxism to solve problems of war; we have not only produced a large number of capable backbone cadres for governing the Party and the state, but also a large number of capable backbone cadres for commanding the army.” [64]64 Mao Zedong, “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War” (October 1938), Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 2. This was said by Mao in 1938. Today, we can comfort Mao with this: his thought has nurtured generations of Chinese Communists, and among the tens of millions of Communist Party members in the New Era, thousands upon thousands of experts in governing the Party, the state, and the military have emerged, who are already able to skillfully apply Marxism to solve the practical problems encountered in China’s reform, and have already provided the political guarantee for leading the people to break the cycle of rise and fall.

跳出治乱兴衰周期率，需要一个朝气蓬勃的马克思主义先进政党，而把中国共产党建成朝气蓬勃的马克思主义先进政党，需要首先在理论与实践上坚定不移地坚持和发展马克思主义。毛泽东充分认识到，马克思主义对于党的事业发展壮大的重要意义。他说：“如果我们党有一百个至二百个系统地而不是零碎地、实际地而不是空洞地学会了马克思列宁主义的同志，就会大大地提高我们党的战斗力量”。他还说：“马克思列宁主义的普遍真理一经和中国革命的具体实践相结合，就使中国革命的面目为之一新”。毛泽东在这里至少讲了两层含义，一是马克思主义是中国共产党必须坚持的放之四海而皆准的普遍真理，“指导我们思想的理论基础是马克思列宁主义”,全党必须认真学习掌握马克思主义这个理论武器。二是马克思主义的普遍真理，必须与中国革命的实际相结合，才能成为中国人民百战百胜的武器，所以，“不应当把他们的理论当作教条看待，而应当看作行动的指南。不应当只是学习马克思列宁主义的词句，而应当把它当成革命的科学来学习。”中国共产党之所以能够历经艰难险阻而不断发展壮大，很重要的一个原因是毛泽东培育出全党重视思想建党、理论强党的优良传统。幼年期的中国共产党将马克思主义与中国实际相结合的能力不够，教条主义占了上风，革命被置于危险的境地，中央红军不得不战略转移。毛泽东教导党员干部“要分清创造性的马克思主义和教条式的马克思主义”,反对本本主义，靠马克思主义制定了符合中国实际的正确的路线，在长期的革命实践中锻炼培养了一个保持统一的思想、坚定的意志、协调的行动、强大的战斗力的无产阶级政党，“不但锻炼出来了一条坚强的马克思主义的政治路线，而且锻炼出来了一条坚强的马克思主义的军事路线。我们不但会运用马克思主义去解决政治问题，而且会运用马克思主义去解决战争问题；不但造就了一大批会治党会治国的有力的骨干，而且造就了一大批会治军的有力的骨干。”这是毛泽东在1938年讲的，时至今日，我们可以告慰毛泽东的是：他的思想培育了几代中国共产党人，新时代数千万的中国共产党人队伍里已经涌现出成千上万的治党治国治军的能手，已经能够得心应手地运用马克思主义解决中国改革遇到的实际问题了，已经有了带领人民跳出治乱兴衰周期率的政治保障。

A vigorous advanced Marxist political party capable of breaking the cycle of rise and fall must inevitably be a Marxist political party full of fighting capacity and creative vitality. Mao used the method of upholding and improving democratic centralism to unleash the Party’s initiative and creativity. Democratic centralism was not originally Mao’s creation, but Mao thoroughly elucidated the dialectical relationship between democracy and centralism from a philosophical perspective. He held that democracy and centralism are two contradictory aspects of a single unity, mutually dependent and mutually constraining: centralism is centralism on the basis of democracy, and democracy is democracy under the guidance of centralism. To emphasize centralism while divorcing it from democracy, allowing leading cadres to have the final say, easily blocks channels of expression within the Party, resulting in a state of dead silence and stagnant water, and the Party’s vitality and creativity are lost. To emphasize democracy while divorcing it from centralism, worshipping the spontaneity of the masses and breaking away from the Party’s centralized unified leadership, easily gives rise to the bad tendency of laxity and indiscipline, leading to a situation where everyone acts as they please and the Party is like a sheet of loose sand. In such a case, the Party will have no fighting capacity and will be unable to accomplish its historical tasks. Erroneous ideas within the Party, such as liberalism, factionalism, departmentalism, localism, and mountain-stronghold mentality, [65]65 “Mountain-stronghold mentality” (山头主义) refers to a tendency within the Party for groups from different revolutionary base areas or military units to form cliques, prioritizing their own local or unit interests over the Party’s overall unity. all violate democratic centralism from the angle of breaking away from the Party’s centralized unified leadership. Meanwhile, the patriarchal style, the practice of “what I say goes,” commandism, and the punitive approach violate democratic centralism from the angle of overemphasizing centralism while divorcing it from democracy. Although these erroneous ideas differ in form, they all have the effect of weakening and disintegrating the Party’s fighting capacity and hindering the Party’s unity and strength. Mao dialectically combined democracy with centralism, giving full play to the principle of democratic centralism under China’s specific national conditions, thereby enhancing the Party’s vitality and unity. He believed that democratic centralism provides the source of the Party’s strength: “To make the Party strong, we must rely on the implementation of democratic centralism to mobilize the initiative of the entire Party.” [66]66 Mao Zedong, “The Struggle in the Jinggang Mountains” (November 1928), Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 1. “Through the implementation of democracy, we bring the initiative of the entire Party into play. Through bringing the initiative of the entire Party into play, we temper a large number of cadres, eliminate the remnants of factionalism, and unite the Party as solid as steel.” [67]67 Mao Zedong, “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War” (October 1938), Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 2. “As long as the Communists are united and of one heart and one mind, any powerful enemy and any difficult environment can be overcome by us.” [68]68 Mao Zedong, “On the Coalition Government” (April 1945), Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 3. Relying on the implementation of democratic centralism to mobilize the initiative of the entire Party, and relying on expanding inner-Party democracy to consolidate and develop the Party—this is Mao’s scientific conclusion regarding the important position and role of the organizational principle of democratic centralism in Party building. The situation of “six haves” that he sought to achieve was “to create a political situation in which there is both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness,” [69]69 Mao Zedong, “A Political Situation of Centralism, Democracy, Discipline, Freedom, Unity of Will, and Personal Ease of Mind” (July 1957), Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 5. because such a situation “is conducive to the socialist revolution and socialist construction, makes it easier to overcome difficulties, enables the relatively rapid construction of our modern industry and modern agriculture, and makes the Party and state relatively consolidated and better able to withstand risks.” [70]70 Ibid. The “withstanding risks” here naturally includes withstanding the risk of rise and fall.

一个能够跳出治乱兴衰周期率的朝气蓬勃的马克思主义先进政党，必然是富有战斗力的充满创造活力的马克思主义政党。毛泽东用坚持和健全民主集中制的办法，发挥党的积极性和创造力。民主集中制原本不是毛泽东的首创，但毛泽东从哲学的高度透彻地阐释了民主与集中的辩证关系，认为民主和集中是一个统一体的两个矛盾的方面，相互依存，相互制约，集中是民主基础上的集中，民主是集中指导下的民主。脱离民主去强调集中，搞领导干部一言堂，容易堵塞党内言路，造成鸦雀无声，一潭死水的状态，党的活力和创造力丧失了；脱离集中去强调民主，崇拜群众的自发性，脱离党的集中统一领导，容易引发自由散漫的不良风气，造成各行其是，一盘散沙的局面，党就不会有战斗力，就不可能完成自己的历史任务。党内的错误思想，如自由主义、宗派主义、本位主义、地方主义和山头主义等，都是从脱离党的集中统一领导的角度违背了民主集中制，而家长制作风、一言堂作风、命令主义和惩办主义，则从脱离党的民主而过分强调集中的角度违背了民主集中制。这些错误思想，形式上不同，但都造成了涣散和瓦解党的战斗力，妨碍党的团结有力的影响。毛泽东将民主与集中辩证地结合起来，在中国特殊国情里发挥了民主集中制原则，增强了党的活力和团结统一。他认为民主集中制赋予党的力量源泉，“要党有力量，依靠实行党的民主集中制去发动全党的积极性。”“用民主制的实行，发挥全党的积极性。用发挥全党的积极性，锻炼出大批的干部，肃清宗派观念的残余，团结全党像钢铁一样。”“只要共产党人团结一致，同心同德，任何强大的敌人，任何困难的环境，都会被我们战胜的。”依靠实行民主集中制去发动全党的积极性，靠扩大党内民主去巩固和发展党，是毛泽东对于民主集中制的组织原则在党的建设中重要地位和作用的科学结论。他力图达到的“六个有”的局面，那就“是想造成一个又有集中又有民主，又有纪律又有自由，又有统一意志、又有个人心情舒畅、生动活泼，那样一种政治局面”，因为这样的局面，“利于社会主义革命和社会主义建设，较易于克服困难，较快地建设我国的现代工业和现代农业，党和国家较为巩固，较为能够经受风险。”这里的“经受风险”，当然包括经受得住治乱兴衰的风险。

To build the Communist Party of China into a vigorous advanced Marxist political party, it is necessary to maintain the style of hard struggle and to overcome the lazy and decrepit atmosphere of seeking pleasure and comfort. Shortly after the founding of the People’s Republic, Mao wrote to the cadres and masses in Yan’an and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region: “I also hope that all revolutionary workers throughout the country will forever maintain the style of hard struggle that the workers in Yan’an and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region had over the past ten years and more.” [71]71 Mao Zedong, “Letter to the Cadres and Masses of Yan’an and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region” (October 1949), Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 5. Just as China entered the period of comprehensive socialist construction, Mao stated that the people’s army won the people’s support precisely by relying on hard struggle: “I have always advocated that the army should practice hard struggle and set an example.” [72]72 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Military Affairs Commission” (December 1956), Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 5. “Now the army’s meals have improved; it is no longer the same as when we only ate pickled vegetables. But the fundamental point is that we must advocate hard struggle; hard struggle is our political本色.” [73]73 Mao Zedong, “Talk on the Question of Democratic Centralism” (January 1962), Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 8. The term “政治本色” (political本色) is a four-character idiom meaning “political intrinsic quality” or “political true character.” He criticized those comrades whose “revolutionary will has somewhat declined and revolutionary enthusiasm is somewhat insufficient,” who “make an issue of position, make an issue of reputation, are particular about eating, particular about dressing, compare salaries, and strive for fame and gain,” [74]74 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China” (November 1956), Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 5. and proposed: “The Communist Party is for struggle, for serving the people wholeheartedly, not half-heartedly or with two-thirds of a heart. Those whose revolutionary will has declined must be revitalized through rectification.” [75]75 Ibid. “We must maintain that same drive, that same revolutionary enthusiasm, that same death-defying spirit we had during the revolutionary war period, and carry the revolutionary work through to the end.” [76]76 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China on Propaganda Work” (March 1957), Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 5. “As long as people are not starving to death, they must do revolutionary work and struggle. Ten thousand years from now, they must still struggle.” [77]77 Mao Zedong, “Talk on the Question of Democratic Centralism” (January 1962), Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 8.

把中国共产党建成朝气蓬勃的马克思主义先进政党，就要保持艰苦奋斗的作风，就要克服贪图享乐的慵懒暮气。开国不久，毛泽东致信延安和陕甘宁的干部群众：“我并且希望，全国一切革命工作人员永远保持过去十余年间在延安和陕甘宁边区的工作人员中所具有的艰苦奋斗的作风。”刚进入全面建设社会主义时期，毛泽东讲人民军队得民心靠的就是艰苦奋斗：“我是历来主张军队要艰苦奋斗，要成为模范的。”“现在部队的伙食改善了，已经比专吃酸菜有所不同了。但根本的是我们要提倡艰苦奋斗，艰苦奋斗是我们的政治本色。”他批评有部分同志“革命意志有些衰退，革命热情有些不足”“闹地位，闹名誉，讲究吃，讲究穿，比薪水高低，争名夺利”的现象，提出“共产党就是要奋斗，就是要全心全意为人民服务，不要半心半意或者三分之二的心三分之二的意为人民服务。革命意志衰退的人，要经过整风重新振作起来。”“我们要保持过去革命战争时期的那么一股劲，那么一股革命热情，那么一种拼命精神，把革命工作做到底。”“人没有饿死，就要做革命工作，就要奋斗。一万年以后，也要奋斗。”

Mao Zedong viewed the relationship between cadres and the masses from the perspective of order and chaos, rise and fall: “There are several hundred thousand cadres at the county level and above, and the fate of the country lies in their hands. If they do not do a good job, if they become divorced from the masses and do not practice hard struggle, then the workers, peasants, and students have reason to disapprove of them. We must be vigilant, not allow bureaucratic styles to grow, and not allow the formation of an aristocratic stratum divorced from the people.” He discovered three unique skills for building a vigorous Marxist advanced political party: first, rectification. Mao regarded rectification as “a method of resolving contradictions within the Party through criticism and self-criticism, and also a method of resolving contradictions between the Party and the people.” Rectification was meant to eliminate the ideological filth hidden within the Party, to rid Party members of their erroneous elements, and to make the Party stronger. Whenever the thinking and style of Party members became unsuited to the great social revolution led by the Party, Mao launched rectification campaigns to unify thinking and cultivate fine styles. He initiated many rectification campaigns in his lifetime; the first large-scale rectification during the period of socialist construction “was to rectify the three styles—to rectify bureaucracy, sectarianism, and subjectivism. Through rectification, we must fully carry forward the Party’s tradition of hard struggle.” Second, economization. The pursuit of luxury and extravagance is a manifestation of the decline of revolutionary will, an element that saps enthusiasm and vigor for work, and endangers the Party’s combat effectiveness. Revolutionaries must maintain a sober mind, strictly enforce economic discipline, eliminate waste, preserve vigorous revolutionary斗志, and resist corruption. Shortly after the Red Army reached northern Shaanxi after the arduous Long March, Mao anticipated that improved conditions would bring about a decline in revolutionary will and warned Party leading cadres: “Those who have suffered long may easily fail to hold themselves steady when faced with splendor, so this should be taken as a problem, and education and vigilance should be carried out among comrades.” In the brilliant document “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,” one of the twelve chapters is “On Economization,” which proposes launching an economization movement to oppose extravagance and waste: “This economization movement must be carried out thoroughly and persistently.” By “persistent,” he meant like the habit of washing one’s face every day. Mao had already endowed the economization movement with a significance beyond economics, saying: “Economization ‘is not only of great economic significance but also of great political significance.’” He regarded economization as a method to overcome the dangerous tendencies of bureaucracy and hedonism. Third, cadres’ participation in labor. Mao discovered that “among many of our staff, there is now a dangerous tendency to be unwilling to share hardships with the masses and to be fond of calculating personal fame and gain,” and “streamlining organs, sending cadres down to lower levels, and having a considerable number of cadres return to production is one method to overcome this dangerous tendency.” He also placed rectification on a par with having major Party and government cadres spend part of each year doing rural labor, as the main methods for opposing subjectivism and bureaucracy and correctly handling contradictions among the people. Mao believed that leading cadres should “engage in a small portion of physical labor that they are capable of (even if very little) together with workers and peasants. In this way, the Party and the masses will become one, and subjectivism, bureaucracy, and the style of the overlord can be greatly reduced, presenting a new look.” Cadres’ participation in labor “will make our Party even more glorious, even greater, and even more correct, and will make our cadres truly good cadres who understand both politics and professional work, who are both red and expert, who do not float on the surface, act as overlords, or become divorced from the masses, but who are integrated with the masses and supported by them.” “If such an atmosphere appears among nearly one-quarter of humanity, our contribution to internationalism will be even greater.” Otherwise, “it would be inevitable that a nationwide counterrevolutionary restoration would occur, the Marxist-Leninist Party would inevitably become a revisionist party, a fascist party, and the whole of China would change color.” He elevated whether cadres could participate in productive labor to the level of whether bureaucracy, revisionism, and dogmatism could be avoided, whether the Party and the state would change color, and whether the Party could forever remain invincible.

毛泽东从治乱兴衰的角度看待干群关系：“县委以上的干部有几十万，国家的命运就掌握在他们手里。如果不搞好，脱离群众，不是艰苦奋斗，那末，工人、农民、学生就有理由不赞成他们。我们一定要警惕，不要滋长官僚主义作风，不要形成一个脱离人民的贵族阶层。”他找到了建成朝气蓬勃的马克思主义先进政党的三个独门绝技：一是整风。毛泽东把整风当成“用批评和自我批评解决党内矛盾的一种方法，也是解决党同人民之间的矛盾的一种方法。”整风是为了祛除暗藏在党内的思想污垢，把党员身上的错误东西整掉，使党变得更加强大。每当党员的思想和作风不适应党领导的伟大社会革命时，毛泽东就要发动整风运动，统一思想，培育优良作风。他一生发动了多次整风运动，社会主义建设时期的第一次大规模整风，“就是整顿三风，整顿官僚主义、宗派主义和主观主义。要经过整风，把我们党艰苦奋斗的传统好好发扬起来。”二是节约。追求奢华奢靡的生活，是革命意志衰退的表现，是对于工作失去热忱与振奋精神的元素，危及党的战斗力。革命者要保持清醒的头脑，严格执行经济纪律，杜绝浪费，保持旺盛的革命斗志，抵御腐化。红军经过艰苦卓绝的长征到达陕北后不久，毛泽东预料到环境的改善将带来革命意志衰退的问题，提醒党的领导干部：“苦久了的人难免见风华而把握不住，故应作为一个问题，对同志做教育与警戒的工作。”在《关于正确处理人民内部矛盾的问题》这篇光辉文献里的十二个章节里有一个章节就是“关于节约”，提出要发动节约运动，反对铺张浪费，“这一次节约运动必须彻底地持久地进行。”所谓持久，就像人们每天都要洗脸的习惯。毛泽东已经将节约运动赋予超经济的意义，说：节约“不但在经济上有重大意义，在政治上也有重大意义。”毛泽东把节约当作克服官僚主义和享乐主义危险倾向的方法。三是干部参加劳动。毛泽东发现“在我们的许多工作人员中间，现在滋长着一种不愿意和群众同甘苦，喜欢计较个人名利的危险倾向”，而“精简机关，下放干部，使相当大的一批干部回到生产中去，就是克服这种危险倾向的一个方法。”还把整风与党政主要干部每年抽一部分时间下乡劳动并列，作为反对主观主义、官僚主义，正确处理人民内部矛盾的主要方法。毛泽东认为：领导干部“和工人农民一道从事可能胜任的一小部分体力劳动（哪怕是很少一点）。这样一来，党和群众就打成一片了，主观主义，官僚主义，老爷作风，就可以大为减少，面目一新。”干部参加劳动，“使我们的党进一步成为更加光荣、更加伟大、更加正确的党，使我们的干部成为既懂政治、又懂业务、又红又专，不是浮在上面，做官当老爷、脱离群众，而是同群众打成一片、受群众拥护的真正好干部。”“差不多占地球四分之一的人类出现了这样的气象，我们的国际主义的贡献也就会更大了。”不然的话，“就不可避免地要出现全国性的反革命复辟，马列主义的党就一定会变成修正主义的党，变成法西斯党，整个中国就要改变颜色了。”他把干部能否参加生产劳动，提高到能否免除官僚主义、修正主义和教条主义的高度，提高到党和国家会不会改变颜色的高度，提高到党能否永远立于不败之地的高度。

(Project: Research findings of the National Social Science Fund Key Project “Research on the Strategy of Clean Governance since the 18th National Congress of the CPC” (20AKS022) and the National Social Science Fund Project “Research on the Theory and Practice of Deepening the Construction of Party Conduct, Clean Government, and the Anti-Corruption Struggle in the New Era” (23VRC008))

（项目：国家社会科学基金重点项目“党的十八大以来廉政治理方略研究”(20AKS022) 和国家社会科学基金项目“新时代深入推进党风廉政建设和反腐败斗争理论与实践研究”(23VRC008)的研究成果）

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