Modernization Alone Is Not Enough; What Matters More Is “Chinese-Path”

Recently, students have come to ask: “When reading Jiang Tingfu’s *Modern Chinese History*, I find that society’s praise and criticism of this book, which uses modernization as the main thread to narrate modern Chinese history, are sharply divided. Some dismiss it as worthless, while others extol it as flawless. How should this book be viewed?” The question has been raised and cannot be evaded, hence this essay.

近来，时有学生来询：“在阅读蒋廷黻著《中国近代史》时，发现社会上对此书以现代化为主线叙述中国近代史褒贬不一，有的将之贬得一无是处，有的则将之捧得完美无缺，到底应该如何看待这本书？”问题提出来了，不能回避，爰成此篇。

In February 1938, Jiang Tingfu stepped down as China’s ambassador to the Soviet Union and returned home, awaiting a new appointment in Wuhan. During his time in Wuhan, Jiang wrote a *Modern Chinese History* of over 50,000 words in May and June. It was published as the seventh title in the “Yiwen Series” by the Yiwen Research Association and distributed by the Commercial Press. According to Jiang’s own account: “When I was teaching at Tsinghua, I originally planned to spend ten years writing a modern history. After the War of Resistance began, the possibility of realizing this plan seemed to diminish day by day. During those months in Hankou, though I had few books at hand, I thought I might as well take the opportunity to make a brief preliminary report on my views of China’s modern history. This is the nature of this book. I hope readers will treat it only as a preliminary report.”[1]1 The Jiaqing reign (1796–1820) and Daoguang reign (1820–1850) were the late Qing dynasty periods when China faced increasing Western pressure, culminating in the Opium War (1839–1842).(P1)

1938年2月，蒋廷黻卸任中国驻苏联大使回国，在武汉等待任命。在汉期间，蒋廷黻于五六月间撰成5万多字的《中国近代史》，作为“艺文丛书”的第七种，由艺文研究会出版、商务印书馆发行。据蒋廷黻自称：“我在清华教学的时候，原想费十年功夫写部近代史。抗战以后，这种计划实现的可能似乎一天少一天。我在汉口的那几个月，身边图书虽少，但是我想不如趁机把我对我国近代史的观感作一个简略的初步报告。这是这书的性质，望读者只把它作个初步报告看待。”[1](P1)

According to some people today, after its publication, Jiang’s *Modern Chinese History* was quite popular in the Kuomintang-controlled areas from the late 1930s to the 1940s. After the founding of New China, Jiang’s *Modern Chinese History* once disappeared from view; when occasionally mentioned by scholars, it appeared only as an object of criticism. Since reform and opening up, Jiang’s *Modern Chinese History* has become a bestseller again. Major publishing houses have vied to reprint it under titles such as *Modern Chinese History*, *Outline of Modern Chinese History*, *New Compilation of Modern Chinese History*, and *A Guided Reading of Modern Chinese History*. To date, there have been dozens of editions. The tone of evaluation of this book has also risen increasingly. From the author’s own positioning as a “preliminary report” on modern Chinese history, it has gradually been elevated to a “pioneering work” of modern Chinese history, “one of the most important masterpieces of 20th-century Chinese historiography,” reflecting “strong patriotism” and “the thought of national rejuvenation,” and so on.

据现在一些人士说，蒋著《中国近代史》出版后，在20世纪30年代末到40年代国统区，颇受欢迎。新中国成立后，蒋著《中国近代史》一度销声匿迹，偶有学者提及此书，也是作为批判的对象而出现的。改革开放以来，蒋著《中国近代史》再度畅销，各大出版社争相以“中国近代史”“中国近代史大纲”“中国近代史新编”“中国近代史导读”等为题陆续再版，迄今为止，版本已达数十种之多。而对此书的评价基调也越来越高，此书由原来作者自己定位的中国近代史“初步报告”，逐渐被升格为中国近代史的“开山之作”，“20世纪中国史学最重要的杰作之一”，反映了“强烈的爱国主义”和“民族复兴思想”等。

In fact, according to relevant historical materials from the time, when Jiang’s *Modern Chinese History* was first published, it did not receive the high-profile reaction that some people today claim it did in publishing circles and among intellectuals. For example, the fairly well-known media figure and publisher Cao Juren said very tactfully: “Someone asked an editor of a certain publication to recommend three works on modern Chinese history. That editor only recommended Jiang Tingfu’s *Modern Chinese History*. This thin little booklet, still the Changsha edition from the Commercial Press, perhaps most people have never seen it. A friend asked me what I thought. I said they were all experts, and I am just an old rustic who has taught for a few years—what opinion could I have? But in the last thirty years, I have almost concentrated my efforts on collecting and organizing historical materials on modern China. The historical works I have read must number over a thousand. To say that I cannot even find three worth recommending would be too ridiculous.”[2]2 The eight-legged essay (八股文) was a rigid, formulaic style of writing required for the imperial civil service examinations, often criticized as stifling original thought.(P98) The three works on modern Chinese history that Cao Juren recommended were: first, Chen Gonglu’s 650,000-word *Modern Chinese History*. Chen’s work “differs from other similar historical works in one respect”: the author made extensive use of foreign-language historical materials, “most of which can be said to be primary sources, making it far more ‘comprehensive’ than other historians who could only use Chinese-language materials.” Moreover, its analysis of the reasons for China’s defeat on both land and sea in the Opium War predated Jiang Tingfu’s by ten years. The second work Cao recommended was Huang Yuanyong’s *Posthumous Works of Yuansheng*. The third was Li Jiannong’s *Modern Chinese Political History*. Cao introduced them, saying: “In the early years of the Republic, Hunanese Li Jiannong and Jiangxi native Huang Yuansheng both participated in the parliamentary political movement and associated frequently with figures in and out of government, taking part in several political developments. I used Huang Yuansheng’s posthumous works in my *Modern China Comprehensive Mirror, Volume A*. Li Jiannong’s *Political History of China in the Last Thirty Years* was published by the Pacific Bookstore. Later, Li expanded the scope of his historical narrative while lecturing at Wuhan University, producing *Modern Chinese Political History*, published by the Commercial Press. Li’s historical insight is brilliant, his historical talent penetrating, and his historical judgment experienced and refined. He is truly a historian of his generation. From what I have seen, no one has surpassed him!”[2]2 The eight-legged essay (八股文) was a rigid, formulaic style of writing required for the imperial civil service examinations, often criticized as stifling original thought.(P99)

其实，据当时有关史料的反映，蒋著《中国近代史》初版之时，在出版界和知识分子中并没有受到像今天某些人所说的那样的高调反应，例如，当时颇有名气的媒体兼出版人曹聚仁就非常委婉地说过：“有人向某刊物主编请教，要他介绍三种中国近代史。那位主编只推介了蒋廷黻的《中国近代史》。这一薄薄的小册子，还是商务的长沙版，也许一般人没看到过。一位朋友问我有什么意见，我说他们都是专家，我只是一个土老儿，教过几年书，能有什么意见呢？不过近三十年间，我几乎集中心力在搜集、整理近代中国的史料，所看过的史著总在一千种以上，说是连三种值得介绍的史著都找不出来，那未免太可笑了。”[2](P98)曹聚仁推荐的三部中国近代史著作，第一部是陈恭禄编著的65万字的《中国近代史》，陈著“和其他的同类史著有一不同之点”，即作者大量利用了外文史料，“大部分可说是第一手史料，和其他史家只能使用汉文的史料，显得‘全面’得多”，而且对鸦片战争水陆皆败原因的分析等，比蒋廷黻早了十年。曹聚仁推荐的第二部是黄远庸《远生遗著》，第三部是李剑农《近代中国政治史》，并介绍说：“民国初年，湖南人李剑农、江西人黄远生，都曾参与国会政治运动，和朝野人士多所往还，若干政治动态都曾参与其事，黄远生遗著，我曾采用在《现代中国通鉴甲编》中。李剑农的《中国近三十年政治史》，曾由太平洋书店出版。后来李氏又在武汉大学讲座，扩充了述史的范围，成《近代中国政治史》，由商务出版。李氏史识高明，史才透辟，史评练达，诚一代之名史，依我所看到的来说，还没有谁胜过他呢！”[2](P99)

Cao Juren’s words were very tactful; he did not directly criticize Jiang’s *Modern Chinese History*. But by praising Chen Gonglu’s *Modern Chinese History* for its large size, strong academic quality, and publication by the Commercial Press a full ten years earlier, and by affirming Huang Yuanyong and Li Jiannong, saying that Li Jiannong’s *Modern Chinese Political History* “no one has surpassed,” he was in fact hinting to readers: Jiang’s *Modern Chinese History* was neither the most academically rigorous nor the earliest work on modern Chinese history at the time. If only three best works were to be recommended, this one would not make the cut. Cao Juren’s comment was quite representative of the views in journalistic, publishing, and academic circles at the time. However, a book that can traverse time and space and arouse the interest of readers from different eras naturally has its reasons.

曹聚仁的话说得很委婉，没有直接批评蒋著《中国近代史》，但表扬陈恭禄所著《中国近代史》部头大、学术性强、商务正版出版时间比其早十年，肯定黄远庸和李剑农，说李剑农的《近代中国政治史》“还没有谁胜过他”，实际上是在暗示读者：蒋著《中国近代史》并非当时学术性最强、最早的中国近代史著作，如果只推荐三部最好的，那么，是轮不到这一本的。曹聚仁的评论很代表当时新闻出版界和学术界的看法。但是，一本书能够穿越时空，引起不同时代读者的兴趣，自然不无原因。

I. The Main Reasons for the Long-Standing Widespread Attention to Jiang Tingfu’s *Modern Chinese History*

一、蒋廷黻著《中国近代史》长期广受关注的主要原因

The fact that Jiang’s *Modern Chinese History* has been able to traverse time and space and attract readers from different eras, in the author’s view, has four main reasons.

蒋著《中国近代史》能够穿越时空，得到不同时代读者的关注，笔者认为，主要原因有四。

First, it raised perplexities and difficult problems that concerned people at the time. The author took science and modernization as the core and goal of modern history, using them to measure the figures and events of modern history. In the “General Introduction,” the author posed what has been called the “Jiang Tingfu Question” regarding the difficult problems of modern history: First, “By the nineteenth century, why did our nation encounter an unprecedented crisis?”[3]3 Yin-yang and the five phases (阴阳五行) are traditional Chinese cosmological concepts used to explain natural and social phenomena, here contrasted unfavorably with modern science.(P2) Second, “For the Chinese nation over the last hundred years, there has been fundamentally only one question, namely: Can the Chinese modernize? Can they catch up with Westerners? Can they use science and machinery? Can they abolish our clan and native-place concepts and organize a modern nation-state?”[3]3 Yin-yang and the five phases (阴阳五行) are traditional Chinese cosmological concepts used to explain natural and social phenomena, here contrasted unfavorably with modern science.(P3) The author not only raised the questions but also provided answers. For the first question, the answer was: “First, because our science was inferior to others’. In competition between individuals and between nations, nothing determines victory or defeat more than the level of knowledge. The contest between scientific knowledge and non-scientific knowledge is like a race between an automobile and a rickshaw. During the Jiaqing and Daoguang reigns [n], the foundations of Western science had already been laid, while our ancestors were still composing eight-legged essays [n] and discoursing on yin-yang and the five phases [n]. Second, the West had already begun in the mid-eighteenth century to use machinery to generate wealth and wage war, while our industry, agriculture, transportation, and military still preserved the appearance of the Tang and Song dynasties. Third, the political situation of the Western Middle Ages was very similar to China’s Spring and Autumn period [n], and the situation after the Renaissance resembled our Warring States period [n]. In the life of struggle among great powers, Westerners cultivated a fervent patriotism and a profound national consciousness. We, on the other hand, clung stubbornly to clan and native-place concepts. Therefore, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, although Western states were small, they were united as solid as iron and stone; our country, though large, was like a sheet of loose sand, utterly powerless. In short, by the nineteenth century, the Western world had already possessed what is called modern culture, while the Eastern world still remained mired in the Middle Ages—we had fallen behind!”[3]3 Yin-yang and the five phases (阴阳五行) are traditional Chinese cosmological concepts used to explain natural and social phenomena, here contrasted unfavorably with modern science.(P2-3) For the second question, or more precisely the second set of four questions, the author did not give a clear answer but only offered two hypothetical answers, leaving readers to choose and reflect for themselves: If we answer all four questions in the affirmative, then our nation’s future is bright; otherwise, there is no future. The reason is that, in the modern world, any country that can accept modern culture “will surely become rich and powerful,” otherwise it “will surely suffer a disastrous defeat, without exception.”[3]3 Yin-yang and the five phases (阴阳五行) are traditional Chinese cosmological concepts used to explain natural and social phenomena, here contrasted unfavorably with modern science.(P3) This kind of choice, which appears to offer options but in fact leaves no alternative except affirmation, naturally “forces” the reader onto the path of modernization.

第一，提出了当时人们关心的一些困惑和难题。作者把科学与现代化作为近代史的核心和目标，并以此来衡量近代史上的人物和事件。在“总论”部分，作者提出了被称为“蒋廷黻之问”的近代史“难题”：其一，“到了十九世纪，我民族何以遇着空前的难关呢？”[3](P2)其二，“近百年的中华民族根本只有一个问题，那就是：中国人能近代化吗？能赶上西洋人吗？能利用科学和机械吗？能废除我们家族和家乡观念而组织一个近代的民族国家吗？”[3](P3)作者不仅提出了问题，而且还给出了答案。对于第一个问题，其答案是：“第一是因为我们的科学不及人。人与人的竞争，民族与民族的竞争，最足以决胜负的，莫过于知识的高低。科学的知识与非科学的知识比赛，好像汽车与洋车的比赛。在嘉庆道光年间，西洋的科学基础已经打好了，而我们的祖先还在那里作八股文，讲阴阳五行。第二，西洋已于十八世纪中年起始用机械生财打仗，而我们的工业、农业、运输、军事，仍保存唐宋以来的模样。第三，西洋在中古的政治局面很像中国的春秋时代，文艺复兴以后的局面很像我们的战国时代。在列强争雄的生活中，西洋人养成了热烈的爱国心，深刻的民族观念。我们则死守着家族观念和家乡观念。所以在十九世纪初年，西洋的国家虽小，然团结有如铁石之固；我们的国家虽大，然如一盘散沙，毫无力量。总而言之到了十九世纪西方的世界已经具备了所谓近代文化，而东方的世界则仍滞留于中古我们是落伍了！”[3](P2-3)对于第二个问题，或者更准确地说是第二组四个问题，作者并未明确回答，而只给出了两个假设性的答案，让读者自己选择、思考：假如我们对上述四个问题都做出肯定的回答，那么，我们民族的前途是光明的，否则，就没有前途。原因在于，在近代世界上，凡是能接受近代文化的国家“必致富强”，否则“必遭惨败，毫无例外”。[3](P3)这种看似有所选择而实则除了肯定之外别无其他选择的选择，就把读者自然而然地“逼”到了近代化的道路上。

Second, the structure is simple and the key points are prominent. Following the main thread of modernization, the author sorts out and analyzes four different plans for national salvation since modern times and the reasons for their failure. The first plan was the “Self-Strengthening Movement” led by Yixin, Wenxiang, Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang, and Zuo Zongtang, which he considers “the first plan in China’s modern history to cope with the great changes and save the nation and the people.” “This plan was to learn to use and manufacture Western weapons to deal with the Westerners. It was an incomplete plan, and later it was incompletely implemented.” In the same period, Japan “not only accepted Western science and machinery, but also accepted part of the Western national spirit and political system. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 was a victory for a highly Westernized and modernized Japan over a lowly Westernized and modernized China.”[3]3 Yin-yang and the five phases (阴阳五行) are traditional Chinese cosmological concepts used to explain natural and social phenomena, here contrasted unfavorably with modern science.(P107-108) The second plan was the Reform Movement led by Kang Youwei. The author believes that “the main purpose of this plan was to change the political system, and its ultimate goal was to establish a constitutional monarchy, so that the national spirit and the cause of reform could be fully developed and advanced under a constitutional government.” This movement “was undoubtedly more Westernized and modernized than the Self-Strengthening Movement,” but because Empress Dowager Cixi was willing to serve as the center of the conservative forces, the Reform Movement ended in failure.[3]3 Yin-yang and the five phases (阴阳五行) are traditional Chinese cosmological concepts used to explain natural and social phenomena, here contrasted unfavorably with modern science.(P108) The third plan was the Boxer Movement, which was completely opposed to the first two plans, being anti-Westernization and anti-modernization. Its “miserable defeat was entirely natural,” and its failure proved that the Chinese nation “absolutely could not turn back the clock if it wanted to survive.”[3]3 Yin-yang and the five phases (阴阳五行) are traditional Chinese cosmological concepts used to explain natural and social phenomena, here contrasted unfavorably with modern science.(P109) The fourth was the plan proposed by Sun Yat-sen. The author points out, “Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles and revolutionary strategy were undoubtedly the only path for the rejuvenation of our nation.”[3]3 Yin-yang and the five phases (阴阳五行) are traditional Chinese cosmological concepts used to explain natural and social phenomena, here contrasted unfavorably with modern science.(P114) The Xinhai Revolution overthrew the Qing dynasty and removed the obstacles to national rejuvenation. However, when it came time to build a new country after the revolution’s success, various obstacles such as domestic warlords emerged.

第二，结构简单，重点突出。作者按照现代化这一主线，梳理分析了近代以来四个不同的救国方案及其失败原因。第一个方案是由奕訢、文祥、曾国藩、李鸿章、左宗棠领导的“自强运动”，认为这是“我国近代史上第一个应付大变局的救国救民族的方案”，“这个方案是要学习运用及制造西洋的军器来对付西洋人。这是一个不彻底的方案，后来又是不彻底的实行”，而同一时期的日本“不但接受了西洋的科学和机械，而且接受了西洋的民族精神及政治制度之一部分。甲午之战是高度西洋化近代化之日本战胜了低度西洋化近代化之中国”。[3](P107-108)第二个方案是康有为所领导的变法运动。作者认为，“这个方案的主旨是要变更政治制度，其最后目的是要改君主立宪，以期民族精神及维新事业得在立宪政体之下充分发挥和推进”。这一运动“无疑的是比自强运动更加西洋化近代化”，但因有慈禧太后甘心作顽固势力的中心，遂致变法运动以失败告终。[3](P108)第三个方案是义和团运动，它与前两个方案完全对立，是反西化、反现代化的，其“惨败是极自然的”，它的失败证明中华民族“要图生存绝不可以开倒车”。[3](P109)第四个是孙中山所提出的方案。作者指出，“孙中山先生的三民主义和革命方略无疑的是我民族惟一复兴的路径”。[3](P114)辛亥革命推翻了清朝，扫除了民族复兴的障碍，但是，等到革命成功以后要建设新国家的时候，国内军阀等各种障碍便出现了。

Third, it examines modern China within the context of the world environment at the time. The author does not discuss China in isolation but places modern China in the global environment of the time, narrating modern Chinese historical events through comparisons between China and foreign countries, interspersing narration with commentary. For example, the “General Introduction” begins by stating: “The Chinese nation entered a special period in the nineteenth century.” Before this, human development could be divided into two worlds: one was the East of Asia, and the other was the West of Europe and America. Although these two worlds had had relations in history, these relations were not solid or stable, but intermittent and dispensable. In the Eastern world, China was the leader, the big brother. China regarded itself as the big brother, and other Asian neighbors, including Japan, also acknowledged China’s superior position. However, by the 19th century, the situation was completely different. “Those who came to trouble us were not our little brothers in the Eastern world, but the Western world, with which we were entirely unfamiliar and whose culture was fundamentally different.”[3]3 Yin-yang and the five phases (阴阳五行) are traditional Chinese cosmological concepts used to explain natural and social phenomena, here contrasted unfavorably with modern science.(P1) To illustrate this point, the author cites examples of Japan, Russia, and Turkey, which became prosperous and strong through reform, modernization, and thorough acceptance of modern culture, saying, “These three countries accepted modern science, machinery, and nationalism, and thus they revived and became prosperous and strong.”[3]3 Yin-yang and the five phases (阴阳五行) are traditional Chinese cosmological concepts used to explain natural and social phenomena, here contrasted unfavorably with modern science.(P5) The author hopes that by drawing on the historical experience of Japan, Russia, and Turkey, which had similar or comparable situations to China in the early modern period and became prosperous and strong by learning from the West, he can inspire the Chinese people that to save the nation, they must learn modern scientific culture and nationalist thought.

第三，把近代中国放到当时所在世界环境中考察。作者不是就中国论中国，而是把近代中国放到当时的全球大环境中加以考察，在中外对比、夹叙夹议中讲述中国近代史事。如“总论”部分开门见山即指出：“中华民族到了十九世纪就到了一个特殊时期。”在此以前，人类的发展可分为两个世界，一个是东方的亚洲，一个是西方的欧美。这两个世界历史上虽曾有过关系，但是，它们之间的关系并不是牢固、稳定的，而是时有时无，可有可无。在东方世界里，中国是领袖，是老大哥，中国以老大哥自居，包括日本在内的其他亚洲邻国也承认中国的优越地位。但是，到了19世纪，情况就完全不同了，“来和我们打麻烦的不是我们东方世界里的小弟们，是那个素不相识而且文化根本互异的西方世界”。[3](P1)为了说明这一观点，作者列举了日本、俄国、土耳其等通过变法维新、彻底接受近代文化而走向富强的例子，说“这三国接受了近代的科学、机械及民族主义，于是复兴了，富强了”。[3](P5)作者希望通过对近代初期与中国境遇相同或相近的日、俄、土三国学习西方而致富强的历史经验，启发国人要救民族必须学习近代科学文化和民族主义思想。

Fourth, the writing is plain and vivid, with strong readability. Based on his profound academic accumulation from over a decade of teaching and researching “Modern Chinese History” at Nankai University and Tsinghua University, the author uses a plain, vivid, almost colloquial language to vividly narrate the main threads of Chinese historical development from the Opium War to the early period of the National War of Resistance Against Japan, as well as its representative figures, political parties, and their salvation routes. Apart from the general introduction, the main body of the book consists of 4 chapters and 23 sections. Chapter One, “Suppressing the Barbarians and Pacifying the Barbarians,” is composed of 7 sections: “Britain Asks China to Establish Diplomatic Relations,” “The British Engage in the Opium Trade,” “East and West Clash,” “The Nation Loses Twenty Years of Time,” “Unequal Treaties Begin,” “The Suppression-of-Barbarians Faction Rises Again,” and “The Suppression-of-Barbarians Faction Collapses,” narrating and reflecting on the general process of China’s defeat during the two Opium Wars. Chapter Two, “Hong Xiuquan and Zeng Guofan,” consists of 4 sections: “Old Society Moves in Cycles,” “Hong Xiuquan Attempts to Build a New Dynasty,” “Zeng Guofan Refurbishes Old Society,” and “Hong Xiuquan’s Defeat,” summarizing the reasons for Hong Xiuquan’s failure and Zeng Guofan’s success. Chapter Three, “Self-Strengthening and Its Failure,” is divided into 5 sections: “Internal and External Cooperation for Self-Strengthening,” “Stepping Forward Step by Step,” “Advance Encounters Obstacles,” “The Scholar-Officials Act Rashly,” and “The First Decisive Battle between China and Japan,” narrating the partial success and ultimate failure of the Westernization Movement, as well as the “rash actions” of the scholar-officials that led to the defeat in the Sino-Japanese War. Chapter Four also has 7 sections, including “Li Hongzhang Invites the Wolf into the House,” “Kang Youwei Assists Emperor Guangxu in Reform,” “The Conservative Forces Mobilize Fully,” “Premier Sun Proposes a Plan for National Rejuvenation,” “The Nation Clears Away Obstacles to Rejuvenation,” “Fifteen Years of Warlord Separatist Rule,” and “Generalissimo Chiang Carries Out the Premier’s Behests,” narrating the historical overview from Li Hongzhang’s signing of a secret treaty with Russia after the Sino-Japanese War, inviting the wolf into the house, Kang Youwei’s promotion of the Hundred Days’ Reform, the conservatives using the Boxers to launch attacks, Sun Yat-sen’s launching and leadership of the Xinhai Revolution, the separatist rule and conflicts of the Beiyang warlords, and the period since the Northern Expedition. The entire book has a coherent train of thought and concise writing, as if written in one go. It rarely cites historical sources and lacks the footnotes common in general academic works. Even ordinary readers without any professional training in modern history can follow the dramatic characters and historical plots narrated by the author and unconsciously finish reading the entire book.

第四，文字通俗生动，可读性强。作者在其十多年于南开大学和清华大学两校教研“中国近代史”的深厚学术积累的基础上，以平实而生动、近乎口语化的语言，栩栩如生地讲述了从鸦片战争到全国抗日战争初期中国历史发展的主要脉络及其代表性人物、党派及其救亡路线。全书除总论外，主体部分共4章23节。第一章“剿夷与抚夷”，由“英国请中国订立邦交”“英国人作鸦片买卖”“东西对打”“民族丧失二十年的光阴”“不平等条约开始”“剿夷派又抬头”“剿夷派崩溃”等7节构成，讲述并反思两次鸦片战争期间中国失败的大体过程。第二章“洪秀全与曾国藩”由4节构成，即“旧社会走循环套”“洪秀全企图建新朝”“曾国藩刷新旧社会”“洪秀全失败”，总结洪秀全失败、曾国藩成功的原因。第三章“自强及其失败”分“内外合作以求自强”“步步向前进”“前进遇着阻碍”“士大夫轻举妄动”“中日初次决战”等5节，叙述洋务运动的部分成功与最终失败的原因，以及士大夫的“轻举妄动”导致甲午战争的失败。第四章也有7节之多，包括“李鸿章引狼入室”“康有为辅助光绪变法”“顽固势力总动员”“孙总理提民族复兴方案”“民族扫除复兴的障碍”“军阀割据十五年”“蒋总裁贯彻总理的遗教”，叙述甲午战争失败后李鸿章与俄国签订密约引狼入室，康有为推动戊戌变法，顽固派利用义和团发难，孙中山发动和领导辛亥革命，北洋军阀割据混战及北伐以来的历史概况。全书思路贯通，行文简要，犹如一气呵成，很少引用史料，也没有一般学术著作常见的注释，即使没有受过近代史方面任何专业训练的普通读者，也可以循着作者所讲的一个个戏剧化的人物和历史情节，不知不觉地读完全书。

These characteristics make Jiang’s *Modern History of China* a reader on modern Chinese history that still has some influence today. However, it should be particularly pointed out that since reform and opening up, the main reason for the popularity of Jiang’s *Modern History of China* in mainland China has been the rise and spread of Western modernization thought in the ideological and theoretical circles of the new era. Jiang Tingfu’s ideological tendency of completely leaning towards Western modernization is the more primary reason why his book is sought after by some people in the 21st century. The Western modernization he proposed in *Modern History of China* has been fashioned into a “modernization paradigm.” What is more, some even attempt to use the so-called “modernization paradigm” to replace the “revolutionary history” main theme of modern Chinese history led by historical materialism. It seems that the most important and urgent problem in modern China was not the revolution against imperialism and feudalism, but whether or not to pursue modernization. In this way, the great historical significance of the revolutionary practice of the modern Chinese people, especially the Chinese Communists, led by Marxism-Leninism and mobilizing the broad masses of the people, against imperialism and feudalism, is obliterated. The necessity of establishing an independent and sovereign People’s Republic for modernization is also ignored, making it impossible to discuss the only path for the Chinese nation to strive for rejuvenation. As a favored protégé of Chiang Kai-shek, it is not surprising that Jiang Tingfu accepted this Western logic. His stance of “loyalty to Chiang and opposition to the Communist Party” makes the academic value of his work even inferior to that of his student, an American scholar, Professor John King Fairbank of Harvard University.

上述这些特点，使得蒋著《中国近代史》成为一部今日仍然具有一定影响的中国近代史读本。但是，应当特别指出的是，改革开放以来，蒋著《中国近代史》在中国大陆受欢迎的主导原因，是新时期思想界、理论界中西方现代化思潮的兴起和传播。蒋廷黻那种完全倒向西方现代化的思想倾向，是他的书籍在21世纪受到一些人追捧的更为主要的原因。他在《中国近代史》中提出的西方现代化，被制作成一种“现代化范式”。更有甚者妄图以所谓“现代化范式”替代历史唯物主义引领的中国近代史的“革命史”主调。似乎中国近代最主要、最迫切的问题不是反对帝国主义和封建主义的革命，而成了搞不搞现代化。如此一来，近代中国人民，特别是中国共产党人领导的、在马克思列宁主义指导下、动员广大人民群众参加的反帝反封建的革命实践的伟大历史意义就遭到抹杀，建立一个独立自主的人民共和国对于现代化的必要性也被无视，从而使得中华民族争取复兴的必由之路无从谈起。作为颇受蒋介石赏识的红人，蒋廷黻接受这种西方逻辑也在意料之中。他的“忠蒋反共”的立场，使得他的著作的学术价值，甚至不及他教过的学生、一位美国学者、哈佛大学的费正清教授。

II. The Theoretical Framework of Jiang Tingfu’s *Modern History of China* Is Seriously Westernized

二、蒋廷黻著《中国近代史》的理论框架严重西化

When we study Jiang’s *Modern History of China*, we must not only see its academic strengths but also its academic weaknesses.

我们研读蒋著《中国近代史》，不仅要看到其学术上的优点，同时还要看到其学术上的缺点。

From an academic perspective, the greatest shortcoming of Jiang’s *Modern

从学术角度看，蒋著《中国近代史》最大的缺点，是其理论框架严重西化。蒋廷黻对中国历史上形成的“正史”和“正统”观念弃而不用，分析史事、评骘历史人物时，完全运用西化的理论框架。例如，作者根据近代西方的民族国家理论，以种族为标准，将中国历史上非汉族创建的王朝与近代西方帝国主义列强相提并论。蒋廷黻认为，700年以前的蒙古人还在游牧时代，无资本也无工业，但是他们对中国的“侵略”，比近代资本主义国家还厉害；并且认为，300年以前满洲人入主中原也是如此。这就把历史上中国多民族统一国家形成和融合发展进程中内部各民族之间的矛盾冲突，错误地描述成了外来侵略者与中华民族之间的侵略和反侵略的斗争。同时，作者把古代中国定性为“帝国主义”，称“中国原来自己是个帝国主义”，[3](P77)法国侵略云南，进攻当时与中国有朝贡关系的越南，中国“起初是暗中接济越南军费和军器，后来果然引起中法战争”。[3](P79)这样一种表述，给读者造成的印象是：第一，中国也是帝国主义，与英、法等帝国主义没有本质差别；第二，中法战争不是法国殖民主义侵略中、越两国而引起的战争，而是由中国援助越南抗法而引起的战争，错不在侵略者法国殖民主义者，而是被侵略者清朝援助越南人民抗法。如此逻辑，将因果完全倒置，读来让人不得不怀疑作者的立场究竟是站在被侵略者中国、越南一方，还是站在侵略者法国殖民主义者一方？作者用西方的这一逻辑，实质上就颠倒了近现代社会侵略和被侵略的界限，抹杀了西方殖民主义和帝国主义对其他国家和民族的侵略和掠夺，散播了替西方侵略行为做掩护的舆论烟幕。

Jiang Tingfu used this inverted logic to assess modern Sino-Western relations, stating that before the Opium War, China did not recognize the equality of other nations, and after the failure of the Macartney mission sent by the British government to China in the late Qianlong reign, foreign countries from then on “knew that the path of peaceful negotiation was impassable.”[3]3 Yin-yang and the five phases (阴阳五行) are traditional Chinese cosmological concepts used to explain natural and social phenomena, here contrasted unfavorably with modern science.(P11) Jiang Tingfu believed that the “peculiarity” of Sino-Western relations lay in the fact that before the Opium War, China was unwilling to treat foreign countries equally; after the Opium War, foreign countries were unwilling to treat China equally. Such commentary seems intended to tell the reader: the West sought equality with China, peaceful negotiation was not feasible, and only launching war could solve the problem. However, the historical facts are: first, when Britain first sent the Macartney mission to China, the key issue it contested was not equality or inequality, but rather it bluntly presented demands to China such as the cession of the Zhoushan Islands, and its aggressive claims were naturally rejected by China. The subsequent Opium War and others were merely Britain’s use of military force to realize the aggressive claims it had initially failed to achieve through “peaceful” means. Second, the inability of foreign countries to treat China equally after the Opium War was essentially the Western powers’ use of force and other means to invade China, which was fundamentally different in nature from China’s rejection of their aggressive demands before the Opium War; the two cannot be mentioned in the same breath. Of course, the above viewpoint was not originally created by Jiang Tingfu, but was a viewpoint used by the Western powers after the Opium War to justify their crimes of aggression against China; Jiang Tingfu merely appropriated it to narrate modern Chinese history.

蒋廷黻用这种颠倒的逻辑来评析近代中西关系，说鸦片战争前中国不承认别国的平等，乾隆末年英国政府派来出使中国的马嘎尔尼使团失败后，外国从此“知道和平交涉的路走不通”。[3](P11)蒋廷黻认为中西关系的“特别”之处在于：鸦片战争以前，中国不肯平等对待外国；鸦片战争以后，外国不肯平等对待中国。这样的评论，似乎是要告诉读者：西方要争取与中国平等，和平交涉是行不通的，只有发动战争才能解决问题。但是，历史事实是：第一，英国首次派马嘎尔尼使团来华，所争的关键不在平等不平等，而是毫不客气地向中国提出了割让舟山群岛等要求，其侵略主张理所当然地被中国所拒绝。后来的鸦片战争等，只不过是英国为了用武力来实现其最初用“和平”方式所未能实现的侵略主张。第二，鸦片战争后外国不能平等对待中国，其实质是西方列强用武力等手段侵略中国，与鸦片战争前中国拒绝其侵略要求，性质完全不同，不可同日而语。当然，上述观点并非蒋廷黻首创，而是鸦片战争后西方列强为其侵华罪行辩护的观点，蒋廷黻不过是将之拿来叙述中国近代史而已。

Tracing back to the source, Jiang’s *Modern Chinese History* did not break free from the mold of “Western-centrism” and the “theory of Chinese stagnation.” As early as the late 18th and early 19th centuries, along with European expansion and rapid industrialization, Western self-centered consciousness developed rapidly. The West regarded itself as a superior race, seeing itself as the embodiment of “civilization” and “progress,” while uniformly viewing non-Western countries and peoples, including China, as “barbaric,” “backward,” and “stagnant.” The most representative figure was the German philosopher Hegel. In his *Philosophy of History*, he pointed out: “History must begin with the Chinese Empire, for according to historical records, China is indeed the most ancient state… China very early reached the condition which it still has today; but because there is still a lack of opposition between its objective existence and subjective movement, no change can occur, and a fixed thing that remains forever the same replaces a truly historical thing. China and India can be said to lie outside world history, merely anticipating and waiting for the combination of certain factors before they can attain lively and vigorous progress.”[4]4 The Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE) was a time of political fragmentation and interstate rivalry in ancient China.(P117) In their view, China had been in a state of long-term rigidity, barbarism, backwardness, and stagnation for thousands of years, lacking the endogenous impetus for progress on its own. Without external force, China could never move toward modernity; only when the Western powers, “representing” “civilization,” “progress,” and “modernization,” “entered” China could China gain the momentum to escape “stagnation” and begin its “modernization” process. Such a theory clearly stems from Western arrogance and prejudice and is the theoretical support for Western colonialist and imperialist aggression and expansion abroad. The person who earlier and more systematically applied the “theory of Chinese stagnation” specifically to the study of modern Chinese history was Hosea Ballou Morse, who had long served as a senior official in the Chinese Maritime Customs Service and, after retirement, became a professor of Sinology at Harvard University. In his *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, Morse compared modern China to the late medieval West, stating that “China in government, as in general culture, is nearer to the Europe of two or three centuries ago than to the Europe of today”;[5]5 The Warring States period (475–221 BCE) was a later era of intense warfare among competing states, ending with the unification of China under the Qin dynasty.(P4) “The historian will always recall the administrative systems of Europe three or four centuries ago, and if he has some understanding of China, he will also find many similarities between them and China’s situation, although these are now things we are discarding.”[5]5 The Warring States period (475–221 BCE) was a later era of intense warfare among competing states, ending with the unification of China under the Qin dynasty.(P28) Jiang Tingfu attended missionary schools in his youth, later studied in the United States for over ten years, and also spent a year in France in between. Immersed for a long time in the intellectual environment of “Western-centrism” in European and American societies, he was deeply influenced by it.[6]6 The “Self-Strengthening Movement” (自强运动), also known as the Westernization Movement (洋务运动), was a series of institutional and military reforms initiated by Qing officials in the 1860s-1890s aimed at adopting Western technology while preserving Confucian values.(P45-84) At the same time, he was “extremely interested” in Morse’s study of modern Chinese history, regarding it as a “standard work” in the field, and his use of English-language sources was almost “flawless.”[6]6 The “Self-Strengthening Movement” (自强运动), also known as the Westernization Movement (洋务运动), was a series of institutional and military reforms initiated by Qing officials in the 1860s-1890s aimed at adopting Western technology while preserving Confucian values.(P95) Jiang Tingfu’s *Modern Chinese History* almost completely absorbed the “Western-centrism” and “theory of Chinese stagnation” from Morse’s book, stating that “our weapons and army are a medieval army, our government is a medieval government, our people, including the scholar-official class, are medieval people.” Therefore, despite desperate resistance since the Opium War, they ultimately failed, because “that was natural” and “inescapable.”[3]3 Yin-yang and the five phases (阴阳五行) are traditional Chinese cosmological concepts used to explain natural and social phenomena, here contrasted unfavorably with modern science.(P20-21) The entire book centers on Sino-Western relations, takes modernization as the main thread, equates modernization with Westernization, and treats modern history as a history of Westernization. Its presupposed premise is that any country or nation has no way out except by accepting European culture. Based on this, Jiang Tingfu evaluated successive plans for national salvation in modern China according to whether the acceptance of European culture was conscious and the degree to which it was thorough. In this way, the history of modern China’s tenacious and unyielding struggle against foreign aggression was reduced to a history of accepting Western culture. This kind of beautification of Western colonial aggression, taking the degree of Westernization as the standard for measuring modernization, and explaining the driving force and process of China’s modernization with the “impact-response” model, is entirely supported by the theoretical framework of “Western-centrism” and the “theory of Chinese stagnation.”

追根溯源，蒋著《中国近代史》没有摆脱“西方中心论”和“中国停滞论”的窠臼。早在18世纪末、19世纪初，伴随欧洲的扩张及工业化的快速发展，西方的自我中心意识迅速发展，西方以优越人种自居，自视为“文明”“进步”的化身，而把包括中国在内的非西方国家和民族一律视为“野蛮”“落后”“停滞不前”。最有代表性的就是德国哲学家黑格尔。他在其《历史哲学》中指出：“历史必须从中华帝国说起，因为根据史书的记载，中国实在是最古老的国家……中国很早就已经进展到了它今日的情状；但是因为它客观的存在和主观运动之间仍然缺少一种对峙，所以无从发生任何变化，一种终古如此的固定的东西代替了一种真正的历史的东西。中国和印度可以说还在世界历史的局外，而只是预期着、等待着若干因素的结合，然后才能够得到活泼生动的进步。”[4](P117)在他们看来，中国几千年来一直处于长期僵化、野蛮落后、停滞不前的状态，自身不具备进步的内生动力，没有外力的推动，中国就永远不可能走向现代，只有等到“代表”着“文明”“进步”和“现代化”的西方列强“进入”中国，中国才能获得摆脱“停滞”的动力，开始其“现代化”进程。这样的理论显然出自西方人的傲慢与偏见，是西方殖民主义、帝国主义对外侵略扩张的理论支撑。而较早、较系统地把“中国停滞论”具体应用于中国近代史研究的，则是曾经长期在中国海关担任高级官员、退休后在美国哈佛大学担任汉学教授的马士。马士在其《中华帝国对外关系史》中，把近代中国比作中世纪后期的西方，说“中国在政府方面，如同在一般文化方面一样，和两三世纪前的欧洲要比今天的欧洲更相近些”；[5](P4)“历史学者总会想起三四世纪前欧洲的行政制度，倘使他对于中国有一些了解的话，也会发现它们和中国的情形有很多相似的地方，虽然这些现在已是我们要废弃的。”[5](P28)蒋廷黻少年时期入教会学校读书，后留美学习十多年，中间还曾赴法一年，长期浸润于欧美社会“西方中心主义”思想环境之中，深受其影响。[6](P45-84)同时又对马士的中国近代史研究“极感兴趣”，视之为中国近代史研究领域的“标准书籍”，在英美文献的使用方面几乎“无懈可击”。[6](P95)蒋廷黻所著《中国近代史》几乎完整地吸收了马士书中的“西方中心主义”“中国停滞论”等观点，说“我们的军器和军队是中古的军队，我们的政府是中古的政府，我们的人民，连士大夫阶级在内，是中古的人民”，所以，鸦片战争以来虽拼命抵抗，但终归失败，因为“那是自然的”，是“逃不脱”的。[3](P20-21)全书以中西关系为重心，以现代化为主线，将现代化等同于西化，把近代史视为西化史。他预设的前提是任何国家和民族只有接受欧洲文化，才有出路。基于此，蒋廷黻以接受欧洲文化是否自觉及其程度是否彻底来评价中国近代的历次救国方案。这样一来，近代中国顽强不屈的反侵略斗争史，就被简化成了西方文化接受史。这种美化西方殖民侵略，将西化程度高低作为衡量现代化的标准，以“冲击—反应”模式解释中国现代化的动力与进程的做法，其背后的理论支撑，完全是“西方中心论”和“中国停滞论”那一套东西。

III. Two Major Political Defects in Jiang Tingfu’s *Modern Chinese History*

三、蒋廷黻著《中国近代史》在政治上存在两大缺陷

When we study Jiang’s *Modern Chinese History*, we must not only examine the literal meaning of the text but also understand the author and his times, seeing the views hidden behind the words. Examining the historical context of this book reveals that it is a work directly serving the mainstream ideology of the Kuomintang, with serious political defects.

我们研读蒋著《中国近代史》，不仅要研究其文本字面意义，还要知人论世，看到其文字背后所暗藏的观点。考察此书的历史语境可知，这是一本直接为国民党主流意识形态服务的作品，政治上存在严重缺陷。

First, Jiang Tingfu’s book is not an isolated work but one of the “Yiwu Series” published by the Yiwu Research Association. The Yiwu Research Association was a Kuomintang propaganda and cultural organization established in Wuhan in February 1938, with “face-to-face instructions” from Chiang Kai-shek and a substantial financial allocation from him, nominally led by Wang Jingwei, with Chen Gongbo and Tao Xisheng responsible for its concrete operations. Its two stated purposes were: “First, to establish an independent theory and oppose the Communist Party’s domination; second, to create a public opinion that would enable the government to decide between war and peace as circumstances permit.” [7]7 The Boxer Movement (义和团运动) was an anti-foreign, anti-Christian uprising in China from 1899 to 1901, suppressed by an eight-nation alliance.(P397) Its four basic principles were “nationalism,” “democratic politics,” “industrialization and socialization,” and “modern science.” [8]8 The Three People’s Principles (三民主义) are Sun Yat-sen’s political philosophy of nationalism, democracy, and people’s livelihood.(P6-7) These four principles were each specially defined by Tao Xisheng and others, each carrying specific political implications, coordinating with the two major purposes, while political anti-communism and diplomatic compromise and appeasement toward Japan were its core positions. At the end of December of that year, the association’s main leaders, Wang Jingwei, Chen Gongbo, Tao Xisheng, and others, publicly betrayed the country and surrendered to the enemy, becoming national traitors, and the association was forced to disband in Chongqing. [9]9 The Xinhai Revolution (辛亥革命) of 1911 overthrew the Qing dynasty and established the Republic of China.(P36)

首先，蒋廷黻此书并不是一部孤立的著作，而是艺文研究会组织出版的“艺文丛书”的一种。艺文研究会是经蒋介石“面谕”并拨巨款支持成立，汪精卫出面领导，陈公博和陶希圣等具体负责运作的国民党文宣组织，1938年2月在武汉建立，其宗旨有二：“第一，要树立独立自主的理论，反对共产党的笼罩；第二，要造成一个舆论，使政府可战可和”。[7](P397)其基本原则有四，即“民族主义”“民主政治”“工业化与社会化”“现代科学。”[8](P6-7)这四条原则都经过了陶希圣等人的特别界定，各有特殊政治含义，与其两大宗旨互相配合，而政治上反共、外交上对日妥协求和是其核心主张。当年12月底，该会的主要领导人汪精卫、陈公博、陶希圣等公开叛国投敌，成为民族罪人，该会也不得不在重庆宣告解散。[9](P36)

Mentioning this relationship between the booklet and the Yiwu Research Association and the “Yiwu Series” is merely to remind readers of the political orientation of this book and to illustrate that Jiang Tingfu ideologically endorsed the association’s purposes and principles. In fact, Jiang Tingfu not only endorsed the purposes and principles of the Yiwu Research Association but also strove to implement and embody them in his book.

提及这本小册子与艺文研究会及“艺文丛书”之间的这种关系，不过是要提醒读者注意此书的政治倾向，说明蒋廷黻从思想上赞成该会的宗旨和原则。事实上，蒋廷黻不仅赞成艺文研究会的宗旨和原则，而且在其书中尽力贯彻、体现之。

For example, when Jiang Tingfu applied the Yiwu Research Association’s principles of “industrialization” and “modern science” to his analysis of the history of China’s anti-aggression wars in modern times, as mentioned earlier, he depicted the Chinese people’s anti-aggression wars since modern times as wars doomed to failure: “That was natural, inescapable.” [3]3 Yin-yang and the five phases (阴阳五行) are traditional Chinese cosmological concepts used to explain natural and social phenomena, here contrasted unfavorably with modern science.(P21)

例如，蒋廷黻把艺文研究会的“工业化”和“现代科学”原则运用到对中国近代反侵略战争史的分析时，如前所述把近代以来中国人民的反侵略战争描绘成必然失败的战争，“那是自然的，逃不脱的”。[3](P21)

In Jiang Tingfu’s view, any resistance by a scientifically and industrially backward China against the aggression of the great powers could not achieve victory but could only end in defeat; only after “modernization” could this situation possibly change. Following this logic, he adopted a disparaging and sarcastic attitude toward Lin Zexu, who led the anti-British struggle, and Zuo Zongtang, who recovered Xinjiang from the aggressors, claiming that Lin Zexu was “extremely lucky” [3]3 Yin-yang and the five phases (阴阳五行) are traditional Chinese cosmological concepts used to explain natural and social phenomena, here contrasted unfavorably with modern science.(P31) to have preserved his reputation by dying early from a serious illness, and that Zuo Zongtang’s successful recovery of Xinjiang was merely because his “luck was extremely good,” as he “encountered no strong resistance.” [3]3 Yin-yang and the five phases (阴阳五行) are traditional Chinese cosmological concepts used to explain natural and social phenomena, here contrasted unfavorably with modern science.(P75)[3]3 Yin-yang and the five phases (阴阳五行) are traditional Chinese cosmological concepts used to explain natural and social phenomena, here contrasted unfavorably with modern science.(P23) As for Li Hongzhang and others, who originally hoped to avoid war on one hand while striving for self-strengthening on the other, “unfortunately, the people of the time would not allow them; they obstructed the cause of self-strengthening in many ways and acted rashly in foreign relations, and the result was to betray the country.” [3]3 Yin-yang and the five phases (阴阳五行) are traditional Chinese cosmological concepts used to explain natural and social phenomena, here contrasted unfavorably with modern science.(P92)

在蒋廷黻看来，科学和工业落后的中国，对列强侵略的任何抵抗都不可能取得胜利，而只能失败，只有等“近代化”了，才有可能改变此种情况。按照这种逻辑，他对领导反英斗争的林则徐、从侵略者手中收复新疆的左宗棠等，都采取了贬斥、讥讽的态度，说林则徐“运气真好”，[3](P31)因病重早死而侥幸保全了名誉；认为左宗棠成功收复新疆，只不过是因为他的“运气真好”，“没有遇着坚强的抵抗”。[3](P75)[3](P23)李鸿章等原本希望一面避战，一面竭力自强，“不幸，时人不许他们，对自强事业则多方掣肘，对邦交则好轻举妄动，结果就是误国”。[3](P92)

Developing science and industry was the global trend of modern times. When Jiang Tingfu wrote this book, no political party in China opposed industry and science; what everyone opposed was Chiang Kai-shek’s policy of compromise and non-resistance toward foreign powers. When the aggressor had already broken through the door, occupied our territory, violated our sovereignty, and killed, enslaved, and oppressed our people, to fantasize about “avoiding war on one hand while striving for self-strengthening on the other,” to fantasize about humiliating compromise for peace and waiting until science and industry were developed before bargaining with the aggressor—such a view of “scientism,” that is, “weapon fetishism,” was essentially a pessimistic “theory of national subjugation.” This so-called “scientific” research had not even reached the level of understanding of the advanced elements of the late Qing period. At that time, Yan Fu and others, who had studied natural science and military affairs in Europe and returned to China, had already pointed out painfully: The fundamental reason for China’s defeat in modern times was not backward weaponry, but the authorities’ consistent policy of compromise and appeasement toward foreign powers. “The single word ‘peace’ has misled the world so much that it cannot be recorded even on all the bamboo slips,” and “peace leads to final destruction, while war can gradually bring about revival.” [10]10 The Beiyang warlords (北洋军阀) were military factions that controlled northern China after the 1911 Revolution until the Northern Expedition (1926-1928).(P39) In the mid-20th century, Jiang Tingfu, who had studied history in the United States, instead raised such “lofty discourse” under the banner of “science” and “modernization”—the gap between the two periods is evident.

发展科学和工业，这是近代以来的世界大势。蒋廷黻撰写此书时，中国并没有哪一个党派反对工业和科学，大家所反对的只是蒋介石对外妥协、不抵抗。当侵略者已经破门而入、侵占我国土、破坏我主权、杀戮奴役我人民时，却幻想“一面避战，一面图自强”，幻想忍辱求和、等科学和工业发达了再去跟侵略者讨价还价，这样一种“唯科学论”亦即“唯武器论”的观点，实质上是一种悲观主义的“亡国论”。这种所谓的“科学”的研究，甚至还没有达到晚清先进分子的认识水平。那时，留学欧洲学习自然科学和军事归国的严复等人已经痛切指出：近代中国的失败，根本原因并不是武器落后，而是当权者对外一味妥协求和，“和之一言，其贻误天下，可谓罄竹难书”，“和则终亡，而战可期渐振”。[10](P39)20世纪中叶，留美学习历史的蒋廷黻反而打着“科学”和“近代化”的旗号，发了这样一番“高论”，前后差距可见一斑。

Second, Jiang’s *Modern History of China* speaks extensively of national rejuvenation, but entrusts it to the wrong person. As is well known, historians always have a commitment in their writings; this commitment actually involves the historian’s planning for the direction of reality and future development, and is the concentrated embodiment of the historian’s moral integrity and historical perspective. A historian must “take the reasons for right and wrong, success and failure, rise and fall, order and chaos as models and warnings, and must find the right person to entrust [this commitment] to before it can be transmitted for a long time.” If the wrong person is entrusted, then not only will “extraordinary achievements and virtuous deeds be obscured and not manifest,” but the forms of treachery and evil may thereby “fortunately be concealed.” [11]11 The Northern Expedition (北伐) was a military campaign led by the Kuomintang and the Communist Party from 1926 to 1928 to unify China by defeating the warlords.(P105) Therefore, in evaluating a historian, one must look not only at his “talent” and “learning,” but even more at his “virtue” and “insight,” and at whether the person to whom he “entrusts” [his commitment] is worthy. Jiang’s *Modern History of China* has 4 chapters and 24 sections, and the entire focus of the book rests on the very last section, namely “President Chiang Carries Out the Premier’s Bequeathed Teachings.” [16]16 “President Chiang” refers to Chiang Kai-shek; “the Premier” refers to Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic of China, who held the title of “Premier” of the Kuomintang. This section states that after Sun Yat-sen’s death, Chiang Kai-shek took up “the heavy burden of the revolution,” with three outstanding manifestations: First, “consistently taking Mr. Sun Yat-sen’s bequeathed teachings as the foundation”; second, “urging the whole nation to march forward on the great road of modernization”; third, since the September 18th Incident, “for the sake of the nation, enduring domestic criticism and the enemy’s insolence, never lightly speaking of war, and never relaxing the promotion of national modernization.” From the September 18th Incident to the July 7th Incident, the seven precious years of construction that China was able to obtain were entirely “the result of Mr. Chiang’s deep foresight and long-term vision.” As for the Chinese Communist Party and other patriotic parties and anti-Japanese groups that took the lead in resisting Japan, they were openly slandered as “reactionary elements” and “fake patriots,” with the claim that “some reactionary elements harbored other schemes, thinking that fighting Japan would eliminate the central government’s power, so they used the beautiful name of patriotism to incite early war.” [3]3 Yin-yang and the five phases (阴阳五行) are traditional Chinese cosmological concepts used to explain natural and social phenomena, here contrasted unfavorably with modern science.(P126-127) In Jiang Tingfu’s writing, “modernization” became the highest goal of history, and Chiang Kai-shek became the main promoter of “modernization.” For the sake of “modernization,” one “never lightly speaks of war.” The Northeast was lost, North China was lost, the whole country was in danger—none of it mattered, as long as “modernization” could proceed. But what is “modernization” for? Moreover, the so-called “never lightly speaking of war” by Chiang Kai-shek for the sake of “modernization” applied only to the Japanese aggressors. Domestically, even within the Kuomintang itself, Chiang Kai-shek would fight whenever he wanted, never stinting on a war. The Chiang-Gui War, the Chiang-Feng War, the Central Plains War, the five encirclement campaigns against the Red Army—none of these showed any restraint. When Jiang Tingfu wrote this book, the smoke of Chiang Kai-shek’s civil wars had not long dissipated, the sound of gunfire was still ringing in people’s ears, and immeasurable human, material, and financial resources had been spent on fighting civil wars. How much was left to be used for “modernization”?

其次，蒋著《中国近代史》大讲民族复兴，而所托非人。众所周知，史家著述必有所寄托，这种寄托实际上涉及史家对现实和未来发展方向的规划，是史家史德史观的集中体现。史家要“以是非得失兴坏理乱之故而为法戒，则必得其所讬（同“托”）而后能传于久”，若所托非人，则不仅“殊功韪德非常之迹，将暗而不章”，而奸回凶慝之形反因此而“可幸而掩也”。[11](P105)因此，评价历史学家，不仅要看其“才”“学”，更要看其“德”“识”，看其所“托”是否得人。蒋著《中国近代史》共4章24节，而全书重心所寄，则全在最后一节，即“蒋总裁贯彻总理的遗教”。该节称：蒋介石在孙中山逝世后接过“革命的重担”，有三大突出表现：第一，“一贯的以中山先生遗教为本”；第二，“鞭策全国向近代化这条大路上迈进”；第三，九一八以来，“为民族计忍受国人的非议和敌人的无礼，绝不轻言战，亦绝不放松民族近代化之推进”，从“九一八事变”到“七七事变”，中国能够得着七年宝贵的建设光阴，完全“是蒋先生深谋远见的结果”。而对于率先奋起抗日的中国共产党及其他爱国党派与抗日团体，则公然诬蔑为“反动分子”“假爱国”，说“有些反动分子另怀阴谋，以为向日抗战，就能消灭中央势力，于是假爱国之美名，鼓动早战”。[3](P126-127)在蒋廷黻的笔下，“近代化”成了历史的最高目标，蒋介石成了“近代化”的主要推动者，为了“近代化”而“绝不轻言战”，东北亡了，华北丢了，全国危了，都没有关系，只要能“近代化”就行。但是，“近代化”到底是为什么？更何况所谓的蒋介石为了“近代化”而“绝不轻言战”，只是对日本侵略者而言，对于国内，甚至国民党党内，蒋介石是想打就打，绝不吝惜一战，蒋桂战争、蒋冯战争、中原大战、五次围剿红军，未见有所顾忌。蒋廷黻写作此书时，蒋介石打内战的硝烟散去未久，枪炮声余音犹在耳边，无量的人力物力财力都花在了打内战上，能够用在“近代化”上的又有几许？

Issues of this kind all involve the main theme, main line, and major matters of principle in modern Chinese history. As a politician and diplomat, Jiang Tingfu was loyal to the Chiang Kai-shek government and served the mainstream ideology of the Kuomintang. He was indeed a person of outstanding talent and characteristics, truly rare among senior Kuomintang officials of the time. However, as a historian, Jiang Tingfu’s virtue and insight were insufficient. He saw only the trend of primary, externally expansionist modernization in the developed capitalist countries of Europe and America, but deliberately overlooked this major fact: For a large, backward, semi-colonial and semi-feudal country like modern China, facing imperialist aggression, without mobilizing the people to complete the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution, it was impossible either to stop imperialist aggression and achieve national independence and people’s liberation, or to truly develop science and realize the country’s industrialization. And to entrust the historical task of achieving modernization and saving the nation from peril to Chiang Kai-shek, who compromised and did not resist foreign aggression and who delighted in “stabilizing the interior before resisting external threats” [17]17 “Stabilizing the interior before resisting external threats” (安内攘外) was a policy slogan of Chiang Kai-shek, prioritizing the suppression of the Chinese Communist Party over resistance against Japanese invasion. by fighting civil wars, was to entrust it to the wrong person. Later history also proved that such an entrustment was a great historical misunderstanding. To speak only of modernization, without speaking of the correct path and necessary prerequisites for achieving modernization, and without recognizing who is the true leader of modernization, can only result in drawing water with a bamboo basket—all in vain—and the dream of modernization cannot be realized.

诸如此类的问题，都是涉及中国近代史的主题主线和大是大非的问题。作为政治家、外交家的蒋廷黻，忠于蒋介石政府、服务于国民党的主流意识形态，是一位具有突出才华和特点的人物，在当时国民党的高级官员中，确属凤毛麟角。但是，作为历史学家的蒋廷黻，其德识是不足的。他只看到了欧美发达资本主义国家原发性、对外扩张型现代化的潮流，而却刻意忽略了这样一个重大事实：像近代中国这样一个半殖民地半封建的落后大国，面对帝国主义的侵略，不发动人民起来完成反帝反封建的革命，就既无法阻止帝国主义的侵略，实现民族独立、人民解放，也无法真正发展科学事业、实现国家的工业化。而把实现现代化、挽救国家危亡的历史重任寄托在对外妥协不抵抗、专喜“安内攘外”打内战的蒋介石身上，所托非人，后来的历史也证明，这种寄托实在是一个莫大的历史误会。只讲现代化，不讲实现现代化的正确道路和必备的前提，不认清谁是现代化的真正领导者，其结果只能是竹篮打水一场空，其现代化的梦想亦无法实现。

Conclusion

结语

From the above analysis it can be seen that Jiang Tingfu’s *A History of Modern China* made academic contributions and had influence, but its theoretical framework was severely Westernized and it contained major political defects. These characteristics were directly verified in the life experience of Jiang Tingfu’s later years. After 1949, Jiang Tingfu, as the “representative” [18]18 Jiang Tingfu (Tsiang T’ing-fu, 1895–1965) served as the Republic of China’s permanent representative to the United Nations from 1947 until his death, representing the Kuomintang regime after its retreat to Taiwan. of Chiang Kai-shek stationed at the United Nations, lived long-term in the United States until his death there. The graduate student he supervised, John King Fairbank, who by then had become a Harvard professor and the founder and leading figure of the American field of modern Chinese history, while accepting Jiang Tingfu’s academic paradigm for the study of modern Chinese history, opposed his political stance of being loyal to Chiang and anti-communist, and called on the U.S. government to take a long-term strategic view and recognize early the New China led by the Chinese Communist Party. For this reason, the teacher and student had a fierce argument, parted on bad terms, and nearly broke off relations entirely. This episode between Jiang Tingfu and Fairbank is quite thought-provoking, and today’s readers may perhaps draw some inspiration from it.

从以上分析可以看出，蒋廷黻所著《中国近代史》在学术上有贡献、有影响，但其理论框架严重西化，政治上存在重大缺陷。这些特点在蒋廷黻晚年的人生经历中得到了直接验证。1949年后，蒋廷黻作为蒋介石派驻联合国的“代表”，长期居留美国，直至最后在美去世。他所指导的研究生，时已成为哈佛大学教授、美国中国近代史学科的开创者和领军人物的费正清，在接受蒋廷黻的中国近代史研究学术范式的同时，却反对其忠蒋反共的政治主张，呼吁美国政府应该从长远战略着想，及早承认中国共产党所领导的新中国。为此，师生大吵一番，不欢而散，几至绝交。蒋廷黻和费正清之间所发生的这一幕故事，颇耐人寻味，今天的读者或许可以从中得到一些启示。

(Author bios: Wang Xianming, professor and doctoral supervisor at the School of Marxism, Tsinghua University; Liu Yanhong, doctoral student at the School of Marxism, Tsinghua University)

（作者简介：王宪明，清华大学马克思主义学院教授、博士生导师；刘艳红，清华大学马克思主义学院博士研究生）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心