Mao Zedong’s Theoretical Reflections and Strategic Planning on National Political Security

Political security is the foundation of national security. Political security concerns the stability of a country’s sovereignty, political power, system, and ideology; it is a country’s most fundamental and core need, and also a basic condition for the survival and development of any country. Consistently attaching great importance to safeguarding national political security is an important historical experience of our Party in governing the country. As a great proletarian revolutionary, strategist, and theorist, the principal founder of the People’s Republic of China and the core of the Party’s first generation of central collective leadership, Mao Zedong always harbored a strong sense of urgency and a tenacious spirit of struggle. He adhered to integrating the basic principles of the Marxist view of national security with China’s specific realities, and carried out a series of major theoretical reflections and strategic plans around what national political security is and how to achieve it, thereby laying the foundation and pioneering the path for a national security path with Chinese characteristics.

政治安全是国家安全的根本，政治安全涉及国家主权、政权、制度和意识形态的稳固，是一个国家最根本、最内核的需求，也是一切国家生存和发展的基础性条件。始终高度重视维护国家政治安全是我们党治国理政的重要历史经验。作为伟大的无产阶级革命家、战略家、理论家，中华人民共和国的主要缔造者和党的第一代中央领导集体的核心，毛泽东始终抱有强烈的忧患意识和坚韧的斗争精神，坚持把马克思主义国家安全观的基本原理同中国具体实际相结合，围绕什么是国家政治安全、如何实现国家政治安全展开了一系列重大的理论思考与战略谋划，为走出一条中国特色的国家安全道路起到了奠基与开拓的作用。

I. What Is Political Security: Mao Zedong’s Theoretical Reflections on National Political Security

一、何为政治安全：毛泽东关于国家政治安全的理论思考

Mao Zedong engaged in profound theoretical reflection on “what is political security,” conducting a comprehensive analysis and systematic explanation from the basic dimensions of political security’s “basic meaning,” “where it comes from,” and “where it is going.” The maintenance of national political security is a systemic project that “addresses both symptoms and root causes,” and “grasping the root” is the prerequisite for “addressing both symptoms and root causes.” The Marxist view of national security holds that the masses of the people are the creators of history, and also the original constructive force and ultimate service object of national political security. It is precisely along this theoretical extension that Mao Zedong’s answers to “where political security comes from” and “where it is going” mainly focus on the key factor of the people.

毛泽东围绕“什么是政治安全”进行了深邃的理论思考，从政治安全“有何基本涵义”“从何处来”“到何处去”的基本维度作了全面剖析与系统阐释。国家政治安全的维护是一个“标本兼治”的系统工程，而“抓住根本”则是“标本兼治”的前提。马克思主义国家安全观认为，人民群众是历史的创造者，也是国家政治安全的本源性建构力量与最终服务对象，也正是在这一理论延长线上，毛泽东关于政治安全“从何处来”“到何处去”的解答主要聚焦在人民这一关键因素上。

(1) The Orientation of Political Security: The Basic Meaning of Political Security and Its Inherent Requirements

（一）政治安全指向：政治安全的基本涵义及其内在要求

First, political security means sovereign integrity.

第一，政治安全意味着主权完整。

On the one hand, Mao Zedong believed that independence and self-reliance are the political prerequisites for defending national sovereignty and interests. He emphasized, “China must be independent, China must be liberated, China’s affairs must be decided and handled by the Chinese people themselves.” When Khrushchev proposed establishing a long-wave radio station and a joint fleet in China, Mao Zedong insisted on making no concessions on sovereignty issues and sternly rejected the Soviet Union’s unreasonable demands that infringed upon China’s sovereignty. On the other hand, the Taiwan issue has always been an important factor threatening national political security. On this issue, Mao Zedong advocated using the “One China” principle to oppose foreign interference and defend China’s sovereignty. During the shelling of Kinmen in 1958, Mao Zedong, in the orders of the Ministry of National Defense and the message to compatriots in Taiwan that he drafted, emphasized, “Achieving the reunification of the motherland is the sacred task of our 650 million people. This is China’s internal affair, and outsiders have no right to interfere, nor does the United Nations have the right to interfere,” and “There is only one China in the world, not two Chinas.” Thus it can be seen that Mao Zedong believed there were two main principles for safeguarding national political security from the sovereignty level: one is adhering to the principle of independence and self-reliance, and the other is adhering to the “One China” principle. It was precisely under the guidance of these two principles that the newborn Republic successfully safeguarded national sovereignty and territorial integrity amidst difficult and complex struggles, demonstrating the image of a major country that is independent and self-reliant.

一方面，毛泽东认为独立自主是捍卫国家主权和利益的政治前提，他强调，“中国必须独立，中国必须解放，中国的事情必须由中国人民自己作主张，自己来处理”。当赫鲁晓夫提出在中国建立长波电台和共同舰队时，毛泽东坚持主权问题寸步不让，严词拒绝了苏联意图侵犯中国主权的无理要求。另一方面，台湾问题始终是威胁国家政治安全的重要因素，毛泽东在此问题上主张以“一个中国”原则反对外国干涉、捍卫中国主权。在1958年金门炮击期间，毛泽东在起草的国防部命令以及告台湾同胞书中强调，“完成祖国统一，这是我们六亿五千万人民的神圣任务。这是中国内政，外人无权过问，联合国也无权过问”，“世界上只有一个中国，没有两个中国。”由此可见，毛泽东认为，从主权层面维护国家政治安全主要有两个原则，一个是坚持独立自主原则，一个是坚持“一个中国”原则，也正是在这两大原则的指引下，新生的共和国在艰难复杂的斗争中成功维护了国家主权和领土完整，展现出了独立自主的大国形象。

Second, political security means stable political power.

第二，政治安全意味着政权稳固。

The state power of the people’s democratic dictatorship, led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants, is a form of dictatorship that combines the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat with China’s specific realities. It is also a new type of political power in which the people are the masters of their own country, never before seen in Chinese history. Mao Zedong once pointed out that the people’s democratic dictatorship “is a powerful weapon for safeguarding the fruits of victory of the people’s revolution and opposing the restorationist plots of internal and external enemies; we must firmly grasp this weapon.” If the people’s democratic dictatorship were not implemented, “the revolution would fail, the people would suffer, and the country would perish.” The Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, which served as a “provisional constitution,” emphasized from the outset that “people’s democracy is the political foundation for the founding of the People’s Republic of China.” As early as June 30, 1949, Mao Zedong pointed out in “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship” that the political power of New China was “the people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class (through the Communist Party) and based on the alliance of workers and peasants.” Therefore, implementing the people’s democratic dictatorship has a default premise, which is upholding the leadership of the Communist Party of China. Thus it can be seen that implementing the people’s democratic dictatorship, ensuring the people’s nature of political power and the leading position of the Party, is the fundamental manifestation of stable political power and thus political security, and is also an inevitable measure for maintaining political security.

工人阶级领导的、以工农联盟为基础的人民民主专政的国家政权，是马克思列宁主义无产阶级专政学说同中国具体实际相结合的专政形式，也是中国历史上从未有过的人民当家作主的新型政权。毛泽东曾指出，人民民主专政“是保障人民革命的胜利成果和反对内外敌人复辟阴谋的有力武器，我们必须牢牢地掌握这个武器”，而如果不实行人民民主专政，“革命就要失败，人民就要遭殃，国家就要灭亡”。起到“临时宪法”作用的《中国人民政治协商会议共同纲领》开篇便强调，“人民民主主义为中华人民共和国建国的政治基础”。早在1949年6月30日，毛泽东就在《论人民民主专政》中指出新中国的政权是“工人阶级(经过共产党)领导的以工农联盟为基础的人民民主专政”，因此实行人民民主专政有一个默认的前提，那便是坚持中国共产党的领导。由此可见，实行人民民主专政，保障政权的人民性质和党的领导地位，是政权稳固进而是政治安全的根本表征，同时也是维护政治安全的必然举措。

Third, political security means institutional security.

第三，政治安全意味着制度安全。

The socialist system is the foundation of governing the country, and institutional security is the core content of political security. Mao Zedong believed that on institutional issues, it is necessary to continuously promote the self-improvement and development of the socialist system according to the country’s specific conditions, while resolutely preventing any change of course away from the socialist system. On the one hand, there is no system in human society that remains unchanged for a hundred generations. From the system of conferences of representatives of workers, peasants, and soldiers and the “Three-Thirds System” [1]1 Mao Zedong, “Oral Political Report at the Seventh National Congress of the CPC” (April 24, 1945), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 3 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1996), p. 316. during the revolutionary era, to the system of people’s congresses, the system of multi-party cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, and the system of regional ethnic autonomy after liberation, Mao Zedong believed that it is necessary to always adhere to the organic unity of history and reality, theory and practice, and continuously promote the improvement and innovation of the top-level design of the system. From 1956 to 1957, Mao Zedong successively pointed out: “It is inconceivable that the specific development process and forms of expression of the socialist system in various countries can only have a single, uniform pattern.” “Our country’s socialist system has only just been established; it has not yet been fully built, nor is it completely consolidated.” In 1958, Mao Zedong, while summing up the experiences and lessons of the early years after the founding of New China, also pointed out: “After eight years, we haven’t found a path; we don’t know how to do it. It’s also because the system hasn’t been reformed.” On the other hand, while Mao Zedong advocated learning “everything that is truly good” from other countries and nations in politics, economy, and other aspects, he resolutely opposed “taking things as they are” [2]2 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC” (November 15, 1956), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 5 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1977), p. 319. regarding systems. He pointed out, “The capitalist system of other countries has developed for several hundred years and is much more mature than the socialist system, but the capitalist road cannot work in China.” If China were to pursue capitalism, it could only become an appendage of others and ultimately sacrifice the fundamental interests of the working people.

社会主义制度是治国理政的根本，制度安全是政治安全的核心内容。毛泽东认为，在制度问题上既要根据本国国情不断推动社会主义制度自我完善和发展，同时也要坚决杜绝对社会主义制度的改弦易张。一方面，人类社会没有施之百代而不变的制度，从革命年代的工农兵代表会议制度、“三三制”，再到解放后的人民代表大会制度、中国共产党领导的多党合作和政治协商制度、民族区域自治制度等等。在毛泽东看来，要始终坚持历史和现实、理论和实践的有机统一，不断推动制度顶层设计的完善与创新。1956年至1957年，毛泽东先后指出：“不可能设想，社会主义制度在各国的具体发展过程和表现形式，只能有一个千篇一律的格式。”“我国的社会主义制度还刚刚建立，还没有完全建成，还不完全巩固。”1958年，毛泽东又在总结新中国成立初期的经验教训时指出：“搞八年没有摸到一条路，不会搞。也是因为制度没有改革。”另一方面，毛泽东在主张其他国家和民族政治、经济等方面“一切真正好的东西都要学”的同时，坚决反对在制度上搞“拿来主义”，他指出，“人家资本主义制度发展了几百年，比社会主义制度成熟得多，但中国走资本主义道路走不通”，中国搞资本主义只能成为别人的附庸并最终牺牲劳动人民的根本利益。

Fourth, political security means ideological security.

第四，政治安全意味着意识形态安全。

Ideological security is a deeper and more complex category of political security, with a subtle yet crucial impact on political security. In socialist China, upholding and developing Marxism is the fundamental requirement for maintaining ideological security. On the one hand, Mao Zedong believed that “the victories of our revolution and construction are all victories of Marxism-Leninism.” One of the most important methods used by foreign imperialists and reactionaries to undermine our cause is “to use bourgeois ideology to oppose Marxist ideology.” To resist the erosion of our ideology by capitalism, it is necessary “to propagate dialectical materialism and historical materialism among intellectuals and the broad masses of the people, and to achieve victory on this ideological front.” On the other hand, Mao Zedong believed: “Marxism must certainly advance; it must develop with the development of practice, and cannot stagnate. If it stagnates, always remaining the same set of things, it will have no life.” In Mao Zedong’s view, “rigid adherence” absolutely does not equal “security.” A stagnant Marxism would cause the Party and the state power to lose their advanced nature. Only a “living” Marxism can truly provide theoretical support and ideological guarantee for national political security.

意识形态安全是一种更为深层更为复杂的政治安全范畴，对于政治安全的影响是潜移默化而又至关重要的。在社会主义中国，坚持和发展马克思主义是维护意识形态安全的根本要求。一方面，毛泽东认为，“我国的革命和建设的胜利，都是马克思列宁主义的胜利”，外国帝国主义和反动分子破坏我们事业的最重要的方法之一，“就是用资产阶级的思想反对马克思主义的思想”，而要想抵御资本主义对我国意识形态的侵蚀，就“必须在知识分子和广大人民中宣传辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义思想，并在这个思想战线上取得胜利”。另一方面，毛泽东认为：“马克思主义一定要向前发展，要随着实践的发展而发展，不能停滞不前。停止了，老是那么一套，它就没有生命了。”在毛泽东看来，“固守”绝不等于“安全”，停滞不前的马克思主义会导致党和国家政权丧失先进性，而只有“活”的马克思主义才能真正为国家政治安全提供理论支撑与思想保障。

(2) Where Political Security “Comes From” and “Where It Is Going”: Political Security Relying on the People and Serving the People

（二）政治安全“从何处来”“到何处去”:政治安全依靠人民、服务人民

Marx pointed out: “Of all the instruments of production, the greatest productive force is the revolutionary class itself.” [3]3 The “three magic weapons” of the Chinese Communist Party during the New Democratic Revolution are the united front, armed struggle, and Party building. As early as the period of the New Democratic Revolution, Mao Zedong stressed: “Hundreds of millions of people who sincerely support the revolution – these are the real iron walls of bronze, which no force can break.” [4]4 Mao Zedong, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Is a Fighting Force and a Working Force” (December 1949), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 4 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1991), p. 1425. On the issue of safeguarding national political security, Mao Zedong held that “the key to all problems lies in politics, and the key to all politics lies in the masses,” [5]5 The 1958 shelling of Kinmen (also known as the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis) was a military confrontation between the People’s Liberation Army and the Republic of China (Taiwan) armed forces, aimed at deter always regarding the human factor as the fundamental element affecting the success or failure of a cause, and emphasizing the need to rely on and mobilize the masses to achieve political security. The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, as the first foreign war after the founding of New China, had historic significance for guaranteeing China’s political security. On September 12, 1953, at the 24th Meeting of the Central People’s Government Council, Mao Zedong succinctly summarized the victorious experience of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, stating: “Our experience is: rely on the people, plus a relatively correct leadership, and we can use our inferior equipment to defeat an enemy with superior equipment.” [6]6 Mao Zedong, “On the Policy of the Anti-Japanese United Front,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 2. [7] Mao Zedong, “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 4. [8] Mao Zedong, “Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 4. [9] The “Five-Anti” movement (1952) was a campaign targeting private business owners for bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and stealing state economic intelligence. [10] The Three Great Transformations refers to the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicraft industry, and capitalist industry and commerce in China, largely completed by 1956. [11] Mao Zedong, “On Coalition Government,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 3. [12] Mao Zedong, “Serve the People,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 3. [13] Mao Zedong, “On Coalition Government,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 3. [14] Mao Zedong, “On Coalition Government,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 3. [15] Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 1. [16] Mao Zedong, “The Chinese People Have Stood Up,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 5. [17] This is a paraphrase of Mao’s statements during the Korean War period. [18] The “First Five-Year Plan” (1953–1957), “Second Five-Year Plan” (1958–1962), and “Third Five-Year Plan” (1966–1970) were national economic development plans. [19] “Two Bombs, One Satellite” refers to the development of nuclear bombs, missiles, and artificial satellites in China during the 1960s and 1970s. [20] The Third Front construction was a massive industrialization and defense project initiated by Mao in the mid-1960s to develop a strategic industrial base in China’s interior, away from potential invasion routes. In 1957, Mao Zedong again pointed out at the Supreme State Conference: “The consolidation of our country is first of all due to the fact that we have a Communist Party and a People’s Liberation Army tempered through decades of revolutionary struggle, and a working people tempered through decades of revolutionary struggle,” [7]7 “不变质、不变色、不变味” (not deteriorating, not changing color, not changing flavor) is a Party slogan emphasizing the need to preserve the CPC’s fundamental nature, political integrity, and popular character. and that the roots of the Party and the army are deeply embedded in the people, their bloodline is in the people, and their strength lies in the people.

马克思指出：“在一切生产工具中，最强大的一种生产力是革命阶级本身。”早在新民主主义革命时期，毛泽东就强调：“千百万真心实意地拥护革命的群众，这是真正的铜墙铁壁，什么力量也打不破的”。在维护国家政治安全问题上，毛泽东认为“一切问题的关键在政治，一切政治的关键在民众”，始终把人的因素作为影响事业成败的根本因素，强调要依靠和发动人民群众来实现政治安全。抗美援朝战争作为新中国建立后的第一场对外战争，对于保障中国的政治安全具有历史性意义。1953年9月12日，毛泽东在中央人民政府委员会第二十四次会议上提纲挈领地总结了抗美援朝的胜利经验，他指出：“我们的经验是：依靠人民，再加上一个比较正确的领导，就可以用我们的劣势装备战胜优势装备的敌人。”1957年，毛泽东又在最高国务会议上指出，“我们国家的巩固，首先是由于我们有经过几十年革命斗争锻炼的共产党和解放军，有经过几十年革命斗争锻炼的劳动人民”，而党和军队的根基深埋于人民，其血脉在人民、力量在人民。

From the perspective of realizing political security, a strict and complete institutional system is also an important guarantee and concrete lever for political security. Mao Zedong’s emphasis on the key factor of the people does not represent a neglect of the institutional factor. In fact, on the eve of the revolutionary victory, he used the metaphor of “clearing the foundation” and “building the house” to stress the need to decisively abolish the old system representing the exploiting classes and establish a new socialist system. [8]8 Mao Zedong, “On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism” (1935). It was precisely under the strong leadership and active promotion of the Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their chief representative, that the Chinese people successfully completed the socialist revolution, established the basic system of socialism, and laid the fundamental political prerequisite and institutional foundation for all development and progress in contemporary China. However, compared with institutions as instrumental means, Mao Zedong, who consistently integrated the Marxist idea of the people as the subject with the practice of political security, always believed that the human factor was more decisive. In September 1949, in his article “The Bankruptcy of the Idealist Conception of History,” Mao Zedong pointed out: “Of all things in the world, people are the most precious.” [9]9 Mao Zedong, speech at a meeting of the Supreme State Conference (1958). Later, he explicitly stated: “It should be acknowledged that the socialist system is very young and therefore imperfect, but the system is not omnipotent; it requires people to apply it, and the results of its application vary according to the different methods of thinking and working of each individual.” [10]10 Mao Zedong, speech at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the CPC (1949). In Mao Zedong’s view, a “good” system originates from human creation, and a “good” system also cannot do without human application. In the primary stage of socialism, the capitalist system, having a longer history of development, is generally more complete than the newly born socialist system. At such a time, what can determine the future and destiny and guarantee political security in the contest between the two systems is often the factor of the people. This is what Mao Zedong meant when he said: “Under the leadership of the Communist Party, as long as there are people, any human miracle can be created.” [11]11 Mao Zedong, “Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership” (1943).

从政治安全的实现上看，严格完善的制度体系也是政治安全的重要保障与具体抓手，毛泽东对于人民这一关键因素的强调并不代表着对制度因素的忽视。事实上，在革命胜利前夕，他就以“铲地基”“起房子”的比喻来强调要果断废除代表剥削阶级的旧制度，建立社会主义的新制度。也正是在以毛泽东同志为主要代表的中国共产党人坚强领导和积极推动下，中国人民才成功完成社会主义革命，确立社会主义基本制度，为当代中国一切发展进步奠定了根本政治前提和制度基础。只不过，相较于作为工具手段的制度，坚持将马克思主义人民主体思想与政治安全实践相结合的毛泽东，始终认为人的因素更具有决定性。1949年9月，毛泽东在《唯心史观的破产》一文中指出：“世间一切事物中，人是第一个可宝贵的。”此后他又明确指出：“应当承认社会主义制度很年轻因而不完善，但制度不是万能的，它要人们运用，运用的结果因各人的思想方法和工作方法的不同而不同。”在毛泽东看来，“好”的制度来源于人的创造，“好”的制度也离不开人的运用。在社会主义的初级阶段，资本主义制度因其发展的历史更久，因而比新生的社会主义制度总体上是要完善些的，而此时能够在两种制度较量中决定前途命运、保证政治安全的往往就是人民的因素，也就是毛泽东所说的，“在共产党领导下，只要有了人，什么人间奇迹也可以造出来。”

While clarifying the basic meaning and relying forces of national political security, Mao Zedong also incorporated the forward-looking and directional political question of “where political security is headed” into his theoretical perspective. Political security, people’s security, and the supremacy of national interests are organically unified. From the perspective of the value orientation of political security, people’s security occupies a central position. While political security is achieved by relying on the people, it is ultimately also for the purpose of safeguarding the people’s interests and serving the masses. As early as December 1942, Mao Zedong had already begun systematic thinking on political power building and proposed: “Our first aspect of work is not to take things from the people, but to give things to the people.” [12]12 Mao Zedong, “The Work of Propaganda and Education in the Party” (1942). These “things” that should be given to the people include both “visible” material benefits and “invisible” spiritual content such as political consciousness and cultural level, as well as the secure and stable political and social environment necessary for the people’s survival and development. In short, providing political security for the people is the mission and obligation of the democratic political power under the leadership of the Communist Party of China. In June 1949, in his article “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” Mao Zedong explicitly pointed out: “The state of the people is for the protection of the people.” [13]13 Mao Zedong, “Instructions on Strengthening Ideological Work” (1957). In the mid-1960s, when the United States expanded its war of aggression against Vietnam and brought the flames of war to the Sino-Vietnamese border, and the Soviet Union massively increased its troops in border areas and continuously provoked incidents, China’s political security environment continued to deteriorate.

在明晰国家政治安全基本涵义与依靠力量的同时，毛泽东也将“政治安全向何处去”这一具有前瞻性和方向性的政治问题纳入了理论视野。政治安全、人民安全、国家利益至上是有机统一的，从政治安全的价值旨归来看，人民安全居于中心地位，政治安全在依靠人民实现的同时归根到底也是为了保障人民利益、服务人民群众的。早在1942年12月，毛泽东就已经开始围绕政权建设展开系统思考，并提出：“我们的第一方面的工作并不是向人民要东西，而是给人民以东西。”这种所应给予人民的“东西”既包括“看得见”的物质福利，也囊括政治觉悟与文化程度等“看不见”的精神内容，同时还包括为人民生存发展所必须营造的安全稳定的政治社会环境。简言之，为人民提供政治安全保障是中国共产党领导下的民主政权的使命与义务。1949年6月，毛泽东在《论人民民主专政》一文中明确指出：“人民的国家是保护人民的。”20世纪60年代中期，美国扩大侵越战争并将战火引至中越边境，苏联在边境地区大量增兵并不断挑起事端，中国的政治安全环境持续恶化。毛泽东审时度势，高瞻远瞩地提出“备战、备荒、为人民”的战略思想，并强调“第一是老百姓，不能丧失民心”，要把“备战、备荒”落实到“为人民”上，这一战略思想后来成为了中国在较长一段时间内的基本国策，在遏制大国的侵略企图和保障人民基本生活需要方面发挥了重要作用。毋庸置疑，在毛泽东的理论思考中，中国人民的根本利益不仅是政治安全的核心内容，而且也是社会主义国家推行国家政治安全战略的出发点与落脚点，这充分彰显了中国共产党人先进的政治道德观和“以人为本”的政治价值取向。

II. How to Achieve Political Security: Mao Zedong’s Strategic Planning on National Political Security

二、如何实现政治安全：毛泽东关于国家政治安全的战略谋划

Mao Zedong continuously promoted the “concrete” realization of the Marxist outlook on national security in China, adhering to the principle of “addressing both symptoms and root causes” and the value orientation of “people-centeredness” in the strategic planning of national political security, achieving great success in practice and exploring a path of national security with Chinese characteristics.

毛泽东不断推动马克思主义国家安全观在中国的“具体化”实现，在国家政治安全的战略谋划中坚持“标本兼治”的原则和“以人为本”的价值取向，在实践中获得了巨大成功，探索出了一条具有中国特色的国家安全道路。

(I) Providing a Fundamental Guarantee for National Political Security through the Party’s Perpetual Incorruptibility

（一）以党的永不变质为国家政治安全提供根本保证

Safeguarding national political security is a dynamic process; “long-term stability and security” cannot be achieved in a single effort. Especially after the founding of New China, factors affecting and threatening China’s political security continued to increase, posing more severe tests in terms of how to “lastingly” hold the bottom line of political security and accurately grasp the correct orientation of work. Mao Zedong clearly stated: “The core force leading our cause forward is the Chinese Communist Party.” He profoundly recognized that only if the Chinese Communist Party remains perpetually incorruptible can the “backbone” of the national political security system avoid “rickets” and forever provide reliable and strong support for national political security.

维护国家政治安全是一个动态的过程，“长治久安”不可能毕其功于一役，尤其新中国成立以后，影响和威胁我国政治安全的因素持续增加，在如何“长久”地守好政治安全底线、准确把握正确工作导向上也相应提出了更为严峻的考验。毛泽东明确指出：“领导我们事业的核心力量是中国共产党”。他深刻认识到，只有中国共产党永不变质，国家政治安全体系建设的“主心骨”才不会得“软骨病”，才能永远可靠、坚强地为国家政治安全提供有力支撑。

As early as the New Democratic Revolution period, Mao Zedong engaged in profound reflection on maintaining the Party’s advanced nature and purity. For example, Mao recognized very early that the question of work style was essentially a question of Party spirit, directly related to the Party’s survival or extinction. Consequently, he proposed continuously promoting fine traditions such as hard struggle, and explicitly stated, “A firm and correct political orientation is inseparable from a work style of hard struggle.” [6]6 Mao Zedong, “On the Policy of the Anti-Japanese United Front,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 2. [7] Mao Zedong, “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 4. [8] Mao Zedong, “Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 4. [9] The “Five-Anti” movement (1952) was a campaign targeting private business owners for bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and stealing state economic intelligence. [10] The Three Great Transformations refers to the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicraft industry, and capitalist industry and commerce in China, largely completed by 1956. [11] Mao Zedong, “On Coalition Government,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 3. [12] Mao Zedong, “Serve the People,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 3. [13] Mao Zedong, “On Coalition Government,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 3. [14] Mao Zedong, “On Coalition Government,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 3. [15] Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 1. [16] Mao Zedong, “The Chinese People Have Stood Up,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 5. [17] This is a paraphrase of Mao’s statements during the Korean War period. [18] The “First Five-Year Plan” (1953–1957), “Second Five-Year Plan” (1958–1962), and “Third Five-Year Plan” (1966–1970) were national economic development plans. [19] “Two Bombs, One Satellite” refers to the development of nuclear bombs, missiles, and artificial satellites in China during the 1960s and 1970s. [20] The Third Front construction was a massive industrialization and defense project initiated by Mao in the mid-1960s to develop a strategic industrial base in China’s interior, away from potential invasion routes. Thereafter, he repeatedly pointed out, “We should be modest, prudent, and free from arrogance and rashness, and serve the Chinese people wholeheartedly,” [7]7 “不变质、不变色、不变味” (not deteriorating, not changing color, not changing flavor) is a Party slogan emphasizing the need to preserve the CPC’s fundamental nature, political integrity, and popular character. and “The comrades must be taught to remain modest, prudent, and free from arrogance and rashness, and to preserve the style of hard struggle.” [8]8 Mao Zedong, “On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism” (1935). In the early period after the founding of New China, Mao, with great foresight, raised the need to guard against the erosion of the Party by bourgeois ideology. Proceeding from the strategic overall situation of upholding and consolidating socialism, he repeatedly emphasized opposing “bureaucratism that is indifferent to the sufferings of the masses” and continuing to maintain the style of modesty, prudence, and freedom from arrogance and rashness, as well as the style of hard struggle. At the practical level, Mao led the Chinese Communist Party in a series of political explorations for governing the Party from both internal and external dimensions and from multiple aspects including work style, discipline, and ideology. For example, from the external side, in February 1952, the Central Committee of the CPC launched the “Five-Anti” movement [9]9 Mao Zedong, speech at a meeting of the Supreme State Conference (1958). among private industrialists and merchants, targeting bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and stealing state economic intelligence, severely curbing the corrosion of Party and government cadres by the bourgeoisie. Internally, even before the basic completion of the Three Great Transformations [10]10 Mao Zedong, speech at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the CPC (1949). in 1956, the Party Central Committee issued in rapid succession a series of documents, including the “Decision on the Establishment of Discipline Inspection Committees at the Central and All Levels,” the “Directive on Launching a Rectification Movement in the Entire Party and Army,” the “Decision on Streamlining Administration, Increasing Production and Practicing Economy, and Opposing Corruption, Waste, and Bureaucracy,” the “Plan for Training All High- and Middle-Ranking Party Cadres and Adjusting Party Schools,” the “Directive on Propagating Materialist Thought and Criticizing Bourgeois Idealist Thought,” and the “Regulations on the Self-Study of Marxism-Leninism by High-Ranking Party Cadres.” From the aspects of organizational structure, theoretical education, and the cadre rotation system, these comprehensively and multi-dimensionally advanced the Party’s self-construction under conditions of governance, achieving notable results in resisting corruption and preventing degeneration.

早在新民主主义革命时期，毛泽东就围绕保持党的先进性和纯洁性进行了深邃思考。例如，毛泽东很早便认识到作风问题本质上是党性问题，直接关系到党的生死存亡，由此，他提出要不断发扬艰苦奋斗等优良作风，并明确表示，“坚定正确的政治方向，是与艰苦奋斗的工作作风不能脱离的”。此后他又多次指出，“我们应该谦虚，谨慎，戒骄，戒躁，全心全意地为中国人民服务”，“务必使同志们继续地保持谦虚、谨慎、不骄、不躁的作风，务必使同志们继续地保持艰苦奋斗的作风”。新中国成立初期，毛泽东就极具预见性地提出要警惕资产阶级思想对党的侵蚀，并从坚持和巩固社会主义的战略全局出发，多次强调要反对“不关心群众痛痒的官僚主义”，继续保持谦虚谨慎、戒骄戒躁、艰苦奋斗的作风。在实践层面，毛泽东领导中国共产党从内、外两个维度以及作风、纪律、思想等多个方面开展了一系列管党治党的政治探索。例如：从外部着手，1952年2月，中共中央在私营工商业者中发起以反行贿、反偷税漏税、反盗骗国家财产、反偷工减料、反盗窃国家经济情报为主要内容的“五反”运动，严厉遏制资产阶级对党政干部的腐蚀。对内，仅在1956年三大改造基本完成之前，中共中央就密集发出《关于成立中央及各级党的纪律检查委员会的决定》《关于在全党和全军开展整风运动的指示》《关于实行精兵简政、增产节约、反对贪污、反对浪费和反对官僚主义的决定》《关于轮训全党高中级干部和调整党校的计划》《关于宣传唯物主义思想批判资产阶级唯心主义思想的指示》《关于党的高级干部自修马克思列宁主义办法的规定》等一系列文件，从组织机构、理论教育、干部轮训制度等方面，全方位、立体化推进执政条件下党的自身建设，在拒腐防变上取得了显著成效。

Historically, as a product of class struggle at a certain stage of development and the axial force of the modern state political system, the value pursuit, political character, leadership level, and spiritual outlook that a political party presents and maintains are directly related to whether national political security can be durably realized. The sudden collapse of the Soviet regime and system was fundamentally caused by the degeneration and transformation of the Soviet Communist Party as the ruling force, or more precisely, the ideological and political degeneration of the leadership group from Khrushchev to Gorbachev. In a certain sense, one reason why China was later able to stand firm in the face of the tremendous shock of the drastic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was that Mao Zedong, as the core of the Party’s first generation of collective leadership, carried out far-sighted strategic planning around the Party’s eternal non-degeneration. This endowed the Chinese Communist Party, in its long-term practice, with the political courage for self-revolution and the strategic resolve to adhere to the correct path.

历史地看，作为阶级斗争发展到一定阶段的产物和现代国家政治体系的中轴力量，政党所呈现和葆有的价值追求、政治品格、领导水平和精神样貌直接关系到国家政治安全能否持久实现。苏联政权与制度的骤然崩塌，其根本原因就是作为执政力量的苏联共产党的蜕化变质，或者说从赫鲁晓夫到戈尔巴乔夫领导集团在思想上政治上的蜕化变质。从一定意义上讲，中国后来之所以能够在苏东剧变带来的巨大冲击面前站稳脚跟，其部分原因就在于，作为党的第一代领导集体核心的毛泽东围绕党的永不变质进行了高瞻远瞩的战略谋划，从而在长期实践中赋予了中国共产党勇于自我革命的政治魄力和坚守正道的战略定力。

(II) Building a Strong People’s Army and the Modern Defense Industry That Serves It

（二）建设强大的人民军队和为之服务的现代国防工业

National defense and military construction are the strong backing for national political security and an important channel for the masses, as the main force, to participate in safeguarding national political security. As Mao Zedong said, “Without a people’s army, the people have nothing.” [11]11 Mao Zedong, “Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership” (1943). The people’s army is a main component of state power, a strong pillar of the people’s democratic dictatorship, and a Great Wall of steel protecting the people’s security. Whether from the perspective of constructing the force for maintaining political security itself, or from the ultimate value orientation of political security in serving the people, it requires building a strong people’s army. On the one hand, the people’s army is meant to serve the people. In his essay “Serve the People,” Mao stated clearly at the outset: “Our Communist Party and the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies led by our Party are battalions of the revolution. These battalions of ours are wholly dedicated to the liberation of the people and work entirely in the people’s interests.” [12]12 Mao Zedong, “The Work of Propaganda and Education in the Party” (1942). In “On Coalition Government,” published in 1945, Mao again emphasized: “This army is powerful because all its members have a conscious discipline; they have come together and they fight not for the private interests of a few individuals or a narrow clique, but for the interests of the broad masses of the people and for the interests of the whole nation. The sole purpose of this army is to stand firmly with the Chinese people and to serve them wholeheartedly.” [13]13 Mao Zedong, “Instructions on Strengthening Ideological Work” (1957). On the other hand, the main body and leaders of the people’s army should come from the broad masses of working people. Mao once pointed out: “To strive to create a Chinese people’s army is the responsibility of the entire nation.” [14]14 “Four Confidences” (四个自信): confidence in the path, theory, system, and culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics. In his view, the strength of the army ultimately depends on all the people who compose it. Only when the army is composed of and led by the working masses, who are the main body of society’s basic members, can it possibly fight for the interests of the broad masses of the people, rather than for the private interests of a few or a narrow clique. At the same time, only when the army is armed with the lofty spirit of “serving the people” can the ideological preparation for preparing for war and fighting to defend the people be formed, and can the army truly become “strong” in spirit.

国防和军队建设是国家政治安全的坚强后盾，也是作为主体力量的人民群众参与国家政治安全保障的重要途径。如毛泽东所说的那样，“没有一个人民的军队，便没有人民的一切”，人民军队是国家政权的主要成分，是人民民主专政的坚强柱石，也是保障人民安全的钢铁长城。无论是从维护政治安全本身的力量建构，还是从政治安全最终要求服务人民的价值旨归来说，都要求建设一支强大的人民军队。一方面，人民军队是要为人民服务的。在《为人民服务》一文中，毛泽东开篇明义地指出：“我们的共产党和共产党所领导的八路军、新四军，是革命的队伍。我们这个队伍完全是为着解放人民的，是彻底地为人民的利益工作的。”在1945年发表的《论联合政府》中，毛泽东再次强调：“紧紧地和中国人民站在一起，全心全意地为中国人民服务，就是这个军队的唯一的宗旨。”另一方面，人民军队的主体和领导者应当来源于广大劳动群众。毛泽东曾指出：“为创造中国人民的军队而奋斗，是全国人民的责任。”在他看来，军队的力量归根到底取决于所有参加这个军队的人，只有军队是由作为社会基本成员主体的劳动群众构成并领导时，它才有可能为着广大人民群众的利益而不是为着少数人的或狭隘集团的私利去战斗。同时，也只有当军队被“服务人民”的崇高精神所武装时，备战打仗、保卫人民的思想准备才会形成，军队才能从精神上真正“强大”起来。

Revolutionary will is an important support for the army’s combat effectiveness, but it must also be noted that Communists are not military voluntarists. Looking to the future with a developmental perspective, army building and military struggle must also be supported by a strong defense industry. Mao always believed that adequate war preparation could effectively deter war. As early as the New Democratic Revolution period, he explicitly stated, “A military expert cannot hope to win a war by going beyond the limits permitted by the material conditions.” [15]15 Mao Zedong, “On the Question of Agricultural Cooperation” (1955). On September 21, 1949, in his speech titled “The Chinese People Have Stood Up,” he pointed out: “Our national defense will be consolidated, and no imperialists will be allowed to invade our territory again.” [16]16 Mao Zedong, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People” (1957). During the two years and nine months of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, the Chinese People’s Volunteers, relying on “millete plus rifles” and an indomitable steel will, successfully turned the tide and won the war, effectively safeguarding national security and establishing New China’s status as a major power. After this war, Mao keenly realized the urgency of modernizing the defense industry. During the war, he repeatedly emphasized: “Regardless of the outcome of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, we must carry out the construction of the defense industry and military production.” [17]17 Xi Jinping, speech at the Central Conference on Economic Work (2015). Subsequently, the defense industry was successively listed as one of the development priorities of the national “First Five-Year Plan,” “Second Five-Year Plan,” and “Third Five-Year Plan.” [18]18 This phrasing appears in official documents related to the 14th Five-Year Plan period, referring to a coordinated system of primary (market-based), secondary (government-led redistribution), and tertiary (voluntary charitable) distribution. The construction of a modern defense industry system was launched comprehensively, and the level of the defense industry rapidly improved, basically forming an independent and complete defense industry system within a relatively short period. At the same time, facing the complex international situation, Mao also actively responded to the needs of war from the strategic overall situation of national security, decisively making important strategic decisions such as developing the “Two Bombs, One Satellite” [19] cause and advancing the Third Front construction, [20] thereby effectively curbing the threat of war. Historically, Mao scientifically assessed and planned ahead in areas such as the leadership system of the defense industry, the construction of defense industry infrastructure, and the layout of the defense industry, laying the theoretical and material foundation for guiding the construction of China’s modern defense industry. This has immense theoretical value and practical significance for the realization of national political security.

革命意志是军队战斗力的重要支撑，但也需注意的是，共产党人绝不是军事上的唯意志论者，以发展的眼光看未来，军队建设与军事斗争还必须要有强大的国防工业作为支撑。毛泽东始终认为，充分的战争准备能够有效慑止战争，早在新民主主义革命时期，他就明确提出，“军事家不能超过物质条件许可的范围外企图战争的胜利”。1949年9月21日，他在题为《中国人从此站立起来了》的讲话中指出：“我们的国防将获得巩固，不允许任何帝国主义者再来侵略我们的国土。”在历时两年九个月的抗美援朝战争中，中国人民志愿军靠着“小米加步枪”和不畏强暴的钢铁意志成功扭转局势、打赢战争，成功捍卫了国家安全，奠定了新中国的大国地位。经此一战，毛泽东敏锐地意识国防工业现代化的紧迫性，他在战争期间就多次强调：“无论抗美援朝战争的结果如何，都要搞国防工业的建设与军工生产。”此后，国防工业被先后列为国家“一五”“二五”“三五”计划建设的发展重点之一，现代国防工业体系建设全面展开，国防工业水平快速提升，在较短的时间内就基本形成了独立完整的国防工业体系。与此同时，面对复杂的国际形势，毛泽东还从国家安全的战略全局出发积极应对战争需要，果断作出发展“两弹一星”事业、推进三线建设等重要战略决策，从而有效遏制了战争威胁。历史地看，毛泽东在国防工业领导体制、国防工业基础设施建设、国防工业布局等方面科学研判、超前谋划，奠定了指导我国现代国防工业建设的理论与物质基础，对于国家政治安全的实现具有极大的理论价值和实践意义。

(III) Persistently Wielding the Important Magic Weapon of “Struggle”

（三）坚持用好“斗争”这个重要法宝

The political security of a country does not arise out of thin air; it is born from struggle and must also be maintained through struggle. Fundamentally, struggle is the main practical form in which the masses of the people, as the acting subjects, consolidate national political security. Mao Zedong always emphasized the need to carry forward the spirit of struggle and make good use of the magic weapon of struggle. In his oral political report at the Seventh National Congress of the CPC, he pointed out: “There is a word ‘struggle’ in this world; our comrades must not forget it. Some people say that our Party’s philosophy is called the ‘philosophy of struggle’… I say, ‘You are right.’” [1]1 Mao Zedong, “Oral Political Report at the Seventh National Congress of the CPC” (April 24, 1945), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 3 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1996), p. 316. Later, he profoundly discussed from a philosophical dimension: “Without contradiction and struggle, there would be no world, no development, no life, and nothing at all.” [2]2 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC” (November 15, 1956), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 5 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1977), p. 319. During the period of the New Democratic Revolution, one of the “three magic weapons” for defeating the enemy was “armed struggle.” [3]3 The “three magic weapons” of the Chinese Communist Party during the New Democratic Revolution are the united front, armed struggle, and Party building. Faced with the complex domestic and international situation after the founding of New China and the ever-increasing security threats, the Party’s first generation of central collective leadership, with Comrade Mao Zedong at its core, inherited the tradition of struggle, set the direction, made strategic plans, and waged resolute struggles, successfully defending the country’s political security in the military, diplomatic, economic, and cultural fields. For example, Mao Zedong believed that one must fully estimate the possibility of imperialist military adventures infringing upon China’s sovereignty and must not relax vigilance against imperialist retaliatory plots; otherwise, it would be “politically disarming oneself.” [4]4 Mao Zedong, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Is a Fighting Force and a Working Force” (December 1949), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 4 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1991), p. 1425. Military struggle has always been an important aspect of struggle and a bottom-line means of achieving security. History also shows that Mao Zedong, with his superior strategic thinking, accurately analyzed the security situation, soberly assessed the threat of war, and successfully led major military operations after the founding of New China. The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea successfully defended the peace of the Northeast region and blocked the war beyond the national borders; the 1958 shelling of Kinmen [5]5 The 1958 shelling of Kinmen (also known as the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis) was a military confrontation between the People’s Liberation Army and the Republic of China (Taiwan) armed forces, aimed at deter thwarted the U.S. plot to create “two Chinas”; the 1962 Sino-Indian border self-defense counterattack, the 1969 Zhenbao Island self-defense counterattack, and the 1974 Xisha Islands self-defense counterattack defended China’s territorial integrity and legitimate rights and interests.

国家的政治安全不是凭空产生的，它既产生于斗争，也需要依靠斗争来维护，从根本上讲，斗争就是作为行动主体的人民群众在巩固国家政治安全时的主要实践形式。毛泽东向来强调要发扬斗争精神、善用斗争法宝，他在中共七大上所作的口头政治报告中就指出：“这世界上有一个‘争’字，我们的同志不要忘记了。有人说我们党的哲学叫‘斗争哲学’……我说‘你讲对了’”，此后他又从哲学维度深刻论述到，“没有矛盾和斗争，就没有世界，就没有发展，就没有生命，就没有一切”。新民主主义革命时期战胜敌人的“三大法宝”之一就是“武装斗争”，而面对新中国成立以后纷繁复杂的国内外形势以及与日俱增的安全威胁，以毛泽东同志为核心的党的第一代中央领导集体继承斗争传统，举旗定向、谋篇布局、坚决斗争，在军事、外交、经济、文化等领域成功捍卫了国家的政治安全。例如，毛泽东认为，要充分地估计到帝国主义者侵犯我国主权的军事冒险可能，不可放松对于帝国主义者报复阴谋的警惕性，否则就是“在政治上解除武装”，而军事斗争始终是斗争的重要方面和实现安全的保底手段。历史也表明，毛泽东以其超强的战略思维准确分析了安全形势，清醒预判了战争威胁，成功领导了新中国成立以后的重大军事行动。抗美援朝战争成功保卫了东北地区的安宁，并将战争阻断在国土之外；1958年的金门炮击挫败了美国制造“两个中国”的图谋；1962年的对印自卫反击战、1969年的珍宝岛自卫反击战、1974年的西沙群岛自卫反击战捍卫了我国的领土完整与合法权益。

Of course, Mao Zedong, who was well versed in the essence of the Marxist theory of contradiction, was by no means a reckless man blindly “seeking struggle.” He believed that struggle does not always manifest itself in the form of confrontation; confrontation is only “one form” of struggle, not “all forms” of struggle. Therefore, he also applied the struggle experience of the “united front” from the revolutionary era to diplomatic work in order to secure a safe environment for national development. On December 11, 1954, in a conversation with Burmese Prime Minister U Nu, Mao Zedong stated: “The Five Principles are a long-term policy, not a temporary expedient. These Five Principles are suited to China’s situation; China needs a long-term peaceful environment. The Five Principles are also suited to the situation of your country and to the situation of the vast majority of countries in Asia and Africa.” [6]6 Mao Zedong, “On the Policy of the Anti-Japanese United Front,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 2. [7] Mao Zedong, “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 4. [8] Mao Zedong, “Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 4. [9] The “Five-Anti” movement (1952) was a campaign targeting private business owners for bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and stealing state economic intelligence. [10] The Three Great Transformations refers to the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicraft industry, and capitalist industry and commerce in China, largely completed by 1956. [11] Mao Zedong, “On Coalition Government,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 3. [12] Mao Zedong, “Serve the People,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 3. [13] Mao Zedong, “On Coalition Government,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 3. [14] Mao Zedong, “On Coalition Government,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 3. [15] Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 1. [16] Mao Zedong, “The Chinese People Have Stood Up,” Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 5. [17] This is a paraphrase of Mao’s statements during the Korean War period. [18] The “First Five-Year Plan” (1953–1957), “Second Five-Year Plan” (1958–1962), and “Third Five-Year Plan” (1966–1970) were national economic development plans. [19] “Two Bombs, One Satellite” refers to the development of nuclear bombs, missiles, and artificial satellites in China during the 1960s and 1970s. [20] The Third Front construction was a massive industrialization and defense project initiated by Mao in the mid-1960s to develop a strategic industrial base in China’s interior, away from potential invasion routes. In May of the following year, in a conversation with Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo, he further proposed: “Even with Western countries, as long as they are willing, we are also willing to cooperate with them. We are willing to use peaceful methods to resolve existing problems. War is always bad, especially for Western countries, it will not lead to good results.” [7]7 “不变质、不变色、不变味” (not deteriorating, not changing color, not changing flavor) is a Party slogan emphasizing the need to preserve the CPC’s fundamental nature, political integrity, and popular character. In addition, Mao Zedong believed: “External causes are the conditions of change, internal causes are the basis of change, and external causes become operative through internal causes.” [8]8 Mao Zedong, “On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism” (1935). Therefore, he also placed great emphasis on grasping the decisive factor of internal causes, advocated “internal struggle,” and made unremitting explorations in the struggles against corruption and in the ideological field. Historically, Mao Zedong insisted on using the Marxist scientific world outlook and methodology to guide concrete struggle practices, and at the spiritual level, he dared to struggle and dared to win, successfully enabling China’s national political security system to be continuously consolidated and improved through struggle.

当然，深谙马克思主义矛盾学说精髓的毛泽东绝不是盲目“求斗”的莽夫，他认为，斗争并不总是以对抗的形式呈现，对抗只是斗争的“一种形式”，而不是斗争的“一切形式”，因此他还把革命年代“统一战线”的斗争经验运用于外交工作中以争得国家发展的安全环境。1954年12月11日，毛泽东在对缅甸总理吴努的谈话中指出：“五项原则是一个长期的方针，不是为了临时应付的。这五项原则是适合我国的情况的，我国需要长期的和平环境。五项原则也是适合你们国家的情况的，适合亚洲、非洲绝大多数国家的情况的。”次年5月在同印尼总理沙斯特罗阿米佐约的谈话中他又提出，“就是西方国家，只要它们愿意，我们也愿意同它们合作。我们愿意用和平的方法来解决存在的问题。打仗总是不好的，特别是对西方国家没有好的结果的”。除此之外，毛泽东认为：“外因是变化的条件，内因是变化的根据，外因通过内因而起作用。”因此，他还极为强调抓住内因这个决定性因素，主张“对内斗争”，在反腐败斗争、意识形态斗争等方面作出了不懈探索。历史地看，毛泽东坚持以马克思主义的科学世界观与方法论指导具体斗争实践，并在精神层面敢于斗争、敢于胜利，成功地让中国的国家政治安全体系在斗争中不断巩固和完善起来。

(4) Striving to Cultivate and Train Successors to the Proletarian Revolutionary Cause

（四）着力培养和造就无产阶级革命事业接班人

Political security has never been a practical category divorced from class attributes. The political security of a socialist country must necessarily be premised on the stability of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Fundamentally, this self-construction of political security also depends on the revolutionary will, value identification, and political support of the proletariat. Therefore, to effectively build a solid line of defense for national political security from the subjective dimension, it is necessary to strive to cultivate and train millions of successors to the proletarian revolutionary cause. After the beginning of the Cold War, the competition and confrontation between the two social systems and two ideologies became increasingly fierce. Western politicians represented by John Foster Dulles proposed in the 1950s the strategic idea of “peaceful evolution” of socialist countries, which raised higher requirements for us to guard against the ideological infiltration and color revolution risks of Western powers.

政治安全从不是一个脱离阶级属性的实践范畴，社会主义国家的政治安全必然是以无产阶级专政的稳固为基本前提的，从根本上讲，这种政治安全的自我建构也是取决于无产阶级的革命意志、价值认同与政治拥护的。也因此，要想切实从主体维度筑牢国家政治安全的防线，就必须着力培养和造就千百万无产阶级革命事业的接班人。冷战开始以后，两种社会制度、两种意识形态的竞争较量日趋激烈，以约翰·福斯特·杜勒斯(John Foster Dulles)为代表的西方政客在20世纪50年代提出了“和平演变”社会主义国家的战略设想，这对我们防范西方大国的意识形态渗透和颜色革命风险提出了更高的要求。

Mao Zedong very early on keenly grasped the shift in the strategic focus of imperialism towards socialism. As early as 1955, in the “Directive of the Central Committee of the CPC on Propagating Materialist Thought and Criticizing Bourgeois Idealist Thought,” Mao Zedong pointed out that foreign imperialism would undermine the socialist cause through ideological corrosion. [9]9 Mao Zedong, speech at a meeting of the Supreme State Conference (1958). Subsequently, at a meeting on November 12, 1959, discussing the Sino-Indian border issue and the international situation, he clearly stated that Dulles’s “peaceful transformation” “means transforming our countries, carrying out subversive activities, and making the interior conform to his ideology.” [10]10 Mao Zedong, speech at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the CPC (1949). So, how to respond to the Western scheme of evolution? Mao Zedong gave the answer: “Imperialism says that for our first and second generations, there is no hope; what about the third and fourth generations? There is hope.” “We must prepare for the aftermath; we must cultivate revolutionary successors.” [11]11 Mao Zedong, “Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership” (1943). Mao Zedong deeply understood that cultivating and selecting successors was a major issue concerning the fate of the Party and the country, and also a century-long plan to prevent “peaceful evolution.” If future generations “cannot always maintain high vigilance, cannot gradually raise the consciousness of the masses, if socialist education work is not done deeply and thoroughly, if leadership at all levels is not in the hands of true Marxists but is usurped by revisionists, then our country might still have to take a path of capitalist restoration.” [12]12 Mao Zedong, “The Work of Propaganda and Education in the Party” (1942). Mao Zedong firmly believed that as long as there were reliable successors to the proletarian revolutionary cause, political security could be effectively consolidated, and the Western plot of “peaceful evolution” would ultimately fail.

毛泽东很早便敏锐地抓住帝国主义对社会主义战略策略重点的转变，早在1955年的《中共中央关于宣传唯物主义思想批判资产阶级唯心主义思想的指示》中，毛泽东就指明了外国帝国主义会通过思想腐蚀来破坏社会主义事业。此后，他在1959年11月12日讨论中印边境问题和国际形势问题的会议上又明确指出，杜勒斯的“和平转变”，“就是转变我们这些国家，搞颠覆活动，内部转到合乎他的那个思想。”那么，如何应对西方的演变图谋?毛泽东给出了答案，“帝国主义说，对我们的第一代、第二代没有希望，第三代、第四代怎么样，有希望。”“我们要准备后事，要培养革命接班人”。毛泽东深刻认识到，培养和挑选接班人是关系党和国家命运的重大问题，也是防止“和平演变”的百年大计，而如果后代“不能时刻提高警惕，不能逐步提高人民群众的觉悟，社会主义教育工作做得不深不透，各级领导权不是掌握在真正的马克思主义者手里，而被修正主义者所篡夺，则我国还可能要走一段资本主义复辟的道路。”毛泽东深信，只要有了无产阶级革命事业的可靠接班人，政治安全就能得到有效的巩固，西方国家“和平演变”的图谋也就终将破产。

So how to cultivate successors to the proletarian revolutionary cause? Mao Zedong believed: “Whoever wants to overthrow a political power must first create public opinion, must first do work in the ideological sphere. This applies to revolution as well as counter-revolution.” [13]13 Mao Zedong, “Instructions on Strengthening Ideological Work” (1957). To safeguard the stability and security of the proletarian regime, one should also start from the ideological sphere. Based on this, he placed “understanding some Marxism-Leninism” as the first criterion for cultivating successors to the proletarian revolution. In practice, faced with the urgent situation where imperialism attempted to erode the Party’s body and the people’s world outlook from the ideological perspective, Mao Zedong believed: “The core of any form of bourgeois ideology is the idealist world outlook. Therefore, the most fundamental task of the Party in ideological work is to propagate materialist thought and oppose idealist thought.” [14]14 “Four Confidences” (四个自信): confidence in the path, theory, system, and culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics. The theoretical foundation of Marxism-Leninism is dialectical materialism and historical materialism. He advocated using the ideological weapon of Marxism-Leninism to prevent the broad masses of the people from being captured by the bourgeois idealist world outlook, and to raise the people’s consciousness in striving for socialist construction. At the same time, Mao Zedong recognized that the working class does not naturally possess “correct ideas,” and on this basis proposed: “In the process of building a socialist society, everyone needs to be remoulded; the exploiters need remoulding, and the working people also need remoulding.” [15]15 Mao Zedong, “On the Question of Agricultural Cooperation” (1955). The working class must continuously learn in the course of work and gradually overcome its own shortcomings, replacing non-Marxist viewpoints with Marxist viewpoints.

那么怎样培养无产阶级事业的革命接班人?毛泽东认为，“凡是要推翻一个政权，总要先造成舆论，总要先搞意识形态方面的工作。无论革命也好，反革命也好。”而为了保卫无产阶级政权的稳定和安全，也应当从意识形态领域着手。基于此，他将“懂得一些马列主义”放在了无产阶级革命接班人培养的第一条。在实践中，面对帝国主义试图从思想上侵蚀党的肌体和人民世界观的紧迫情况，毛泽东认为，“任何形式的资产阶级思想的核心就是唯心主义世界观。因此，党在思想工作中最根本的任务，就是宣传唯物主义的思想，反对唯心主义的思想”，而马克思列宁主义的理论基础就是辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义，主张要运用马克思列宁主义这个思想武器，防止广大人民群众被资产阶级唯心主义的世界观所俘虏，提高人民为建设社会主义而奋斗的觉悟。与此同时，毛泽东认识到工人阶级不是天然具有“正确思想”的，并就此提出，“在建设社会主义社会的过程中，人人需要改造，剥削者要改造，劳动者也要改造”，工人阶级必须在工作中不断学习并逐步客服自己的缺点，以马克思主义的观点代替非马克思主义的观点。

III. Contemporary Implications of Mao Zedong’s Leadership in National Political Security Work

三、毛泽东领导国家政治安全工作的当代启示

Mao Zedong’s theoretical and practical explorations centered on national political security from the people’s standpoint not only successfully solved the historical governance challenge of building a solid national political security barrier for the newborn socialist regime, but also provided useful reference and profound inspiration for adhering to and implementing the holistic approach to national security and consolidating a new security pattern in the New Era.

毛泽东从人民立场出发围绕国家政治安全所进行的理论与实践探索，不仅成功解决了新生社会主义政权筑牢国家政治安全屏障这一国家治理中的历史性难题，其思想精髓也为新时代坚持和贯彻总体国家安全观、夯实新安全格局提供了有益借鉴与深刻启迪。

(I) Strengthening Core Leadership: Continuously Enhancing Leadership Capability and Level in Upholding the Party’s Overall Leadership over National Political Security Work

（一）强化核心引领：在坚持党对国家政治安全工作的全面领导中不断提高领导能力和水平

The strong and effective leadership of the Communist Party of China is the most essential characteristic of socialism with Chinese characteristics and the fundamental guarantee for safeguarding national political security. This requires us to always adhere to the fundamental political principle of upholding the Party’s leadership throughout the entire process of maintaining national political security. At the same time, upholding the Party’s leadership does not mean that statically acknowledging and placing the Party in a core leadership position will solve everything. Only on the basis of ensuring that the Party never deteriorates, changes its color, or changes its flavor [7]7 “不变质、不变色、不变味” (not deteriorating, not changing color, not changing flavor) is a Party slogan emphasizing the need to preserve the CPC’s fundamental nature, political integrity, and popular character., and by effectively enhancing the Party’s leadership capability and level in maintaining national political security, can upholding the Party’s leadership avoid becoming empty words, can it avoid losing its due role in practice, and can it truly consolidate the political guarantee for the modernization of the national security system and capability. Specifically, it is necessary to enhance the following capabilities of the entire Party.

中国共产党坚强有力的领导是中国特色社会主义最本质的特征，也是维护国家政治安全的根本保证，这就要求我们始终将坚持党的领导这一根本政治原则贯穿于维护国家政治安全的全过程。同时，坚持党的领导并不意味着静态地承认并把党置于领导核心地位就一切都万事大吉了，只有在确保党永远不变质、不变色、不变味的基础上，切实提升党维护国家政治安全的领导能力和水平，坚持党的领导才不会沦为空话，才能不在实践中丧失其应然作用，才能真正筑牢国家安全体系与能力现代化的政治保证。具体来说，要提升全党以下几方面的能力。

First, improve the ability for strategic thinking. Mao Zedong emphasized possessing a “strategic mind” as a prerequisite for leading cadres to do their work well. He pointed out, “Marxists look at problems not only from the part but also from the whole.” [8]8 Mao Zedong, “On the Tactics of Fighting Japanese Imperialism” (1935). “One must be good at observing the situation and not let one’s mind become rigid.” [9]9 Mao Zedong, speech at a meeting of the Supreme State Conference (1958). “Foresight means seeing the trend and direction in advance. If there is no foresight, can it be called leadership? I say it cannot be called leadership.” [10]10 Mao Zedong, speech at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the CPC (1949). Thinking and planning from a strategic perspective is also an inevitable requirement for maintaining national political security. Attention should be paid to establishing a systemic concept and an overall concept, using forward-looking judgments of the situation to facilitate scientific strategic planning, thereby always seizing the strategic initiative amid increasingly diversified security threats. Second, improve the ability to organize and mobilize the masses. Mao Zedong once pointed out, “In all the practical work of our Party, all correct leadership is necessarily ‘from the masses, to the masses.’” [11]11 Mao Zedong, “Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership” (1943). In practical work, the principle of “combining leadership with the masses” and “combining general calls with individual guidance” should be adhered to, fully organizing and mobilizing the masses, and stimulating the initiative and creativity of the broad masses. Only then can national political security work avoid becoming the “futile busyness” of a few. Third, improve the ability to lead struggle in the ideological sphere. Mao Zedong clearly pointed out, “Mastering ideological leadership is the first priority in mastering all leadership.” [12]12 Mao Zedong, “The Work of Propaganda and Education in the Party” (1942). Ideological struggle is an important form of class struggle. In today’s world, changes unseen in a century are accelerating, and the struggle between the two ideologies of socialism and capitalism is unfolding in a very sharp and complex manner. Efforts should be focused on strengthening theoretical armament and institutional requirements, enhancing the sense of responsibility, the spirit of struggle, and the ability to discern ideology. At the same time, attention should be paid to grasping the Internet as the “biggest variable,” improving the comprehensive capacity for online governance, and resolutely winning the struggle for online ideology.

第一，提高战略思维能力。毛泽东把拥有“战略头脑”作为领导干部做好工作的先决条件来强调，他指出，“马克思主义者看问题，不但要看到部分，而且要看到全体。”“要善于观察形势，脑筋不要硬化。”“预见就是预先看到前途趋向。如果没有预见，叫不叫领导?我说不叫领导。”而从战略上进行思考和筹谋也是维护国家政治安全的必然要求，要注意树立系统观念、全局观念，以预见性的形势判断促成科学的战略谋划，从而在安全威胁日趋多元化的情况下时刻掌握战略主动权。第二，提高组织动员群众的能力。毛泽东曾指出，“在我党的一切实际工作中，凡属正确的领导，必须是从群众中来、到群众中去。”在实际工作中，应坚持“领导和群众相结合”“一般号召和个别指导相互结合”的原则，充分组织和动员群众，激发广大群众的积极性与创造性，如此国家政治安全工作才能避免成为少数人的“空忙”。第三，提高领导意识形态领域斗争的能力。毛泽东曾鲜明指出，“掌握思想领导是掌握一切领导的第一位。”意识形态斗争是阶级斗争的一种重要形式，当今世界，百年未有之大变局加速演进，社会主义与资本主义两种意识形态的斗争正以十分尖锐而复杂的方式展开。应着力强化理论武装与制度要求，提高责任意识、斗争精神和意识形态鉴别力。同时，还应注意把握互联网这一“最大变量”，提高网络综合治理能力，坚决打赢网络意识形态斗争。

(II) Activating Subject Support: Fully Leveraging the Principal Role of the People in Safeguarding National Political Security

(二)激活主体支撑：充分发挥人民群众维护国家政治安全的主体作用

Although there may be a superficial “peaceful coexistence” between socialist and capitalist countries in areas such as military and diplomacy for a certain period, socialism and capitalism, as two fundamentally opposing ideologies and social systems, primarily interact through antagonistic competition and contestation. Meanwhile, the international monopoly bourgeoisie will never relax its corrosion and inducement of the people in socialist countries from covert dimensions such as ideology and culture. Mao Zedong maintained a high degree of political sobriety regarding this. On the one hand, he placed the ideological armament of the people in an important position in the work of the entire Party, emphasizing that “Party committees at all levels must truly regard ideological leadership as their primary responsibility” [13]13 Mao Zedong, “Instructions on Strengthening Ideological Work” (1957)., and striving to correct erroneous ideological trends among the people. On the other hand, he regarded safeguarding national political security as a common responsibility of the entire Party and the whole society, extensively mobilizing the people to participate in the practice of national political security, and striving to build a people’s line of defense for maintaining national political security.

尽管在一定时期内可能存在社会主义国家与资本主义国家在军事外交等领域表象上的“和平共处”，但社会主义与资本主义作为两种根本对立的意识形态和社会制度，其互动关系主要还是表现为对抗性的竞争与较量，同时国际垄断资产阶级也绝不会放松从思想文化等隐蔽维度对社会主义国家人民的腐蚀与诱导。毛泽东对此保有高度的政治清醒，一方面把对人民群众的思想武装放在全党工作的重要位置，强调“各级党委必须真正做到把思想领导当做自己领导的首要职责”，着力纠正人民群众中存在的错误思潮；另一方面把维护国家政治安全当作全党全社会共同的责任，广泛动员人民群众参与国家政治安全实践，努力筑牢维护国家政治安全的人民防线。

Facing the new characteristics and new situations of the New Era and the new journey, it is necessary to continue consolidating the people’s line of defense and fully leverage the principal role of the people in safeguarding national political security. First, promote “action” through “identification.” On the basis of investigation and research, strengthen the analysis of the situation in the ideological sphere, adhere to the working method of combining the general with the individual, innovate propaganda methods and means, and focus on strengthening the people’s confidence in the path, theory, system, and culture [14]14 “Four Confidences” (四个自信): confidence in the path, theory, system, and culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics., enhancing the people’s political identification, ideological identification, theoretical identification, and emotional identification. On this basis, strengthen political security education for the people, and enhance the sense of responsibility and mission of the entire population to participate in safeguarding national political security. Second, promote “action” through “coverage.” Increase propaganda supply in different fields such as schools, enterprises, public places, and cyberspace, while simultaneously improving and smoothing reporting and feedback channels, and effectively protecting the personal information and personal safety of whistleblowers. Finally, promote “action” through “incentives.” Further improve the commendation and incentive mechanism and detailed rules, and do a good job of rewarding reports of acts endangering national security by the people and related propaganda and guidance.

面对新时代新征程的新特点新情况，要继续夯实人民防线，充分发挥人民群众维护国家政治安全的主体作用。首先，要以“认同”促“行动”。在调查研究的基础上加强意识形态领域的形势分析，坚持一般和个别相结合的工作方法，创新宣传方式与手段，着力强化人民群众的道路、理论、制度和文化自信，增进人民群众的政治认同、思想认同、理论认同与情感认同。在此基础上，加强对人民群众的政治安全教育，提高全民参与维护国家政治安全的责任感与使命感。其次，要以“覆盖”促“行动”，要在学校、企业、公共场所、网络空间等不同场域增加宣传供给，同时着力健全和畅通举报反馈渠道，切实保障举报人的个人信息与人身安全。最后，要以“激励”促“行动”，应进一步完善表彰激励机制与细则，做好人民群众举报危害国家安全行为的奖励及相关宣传引导工作。

(III) Consolidating Material Guarantees: Steadily Advancing Common Prosperity for All the People in the Process of Chinese-Path Modernization

(三)夯实物质保障：在中国式现代化进程中扎实推进全体人民共同富裕

The issue of national political security, as part of the superstructure, fundamentally depends on the economic base constituted by the sum total of relations of production determined by the socialist productive forces. In other words, national political security is built on the dynamic balance between development and distribution. Mao Zedong, when discussing the “relationship between agricultural cooperation and the bourgeoisie” in 1955, pointed out that to consolidate state power, it is necessary to “enable the peasant masses to become prosperous together, the poor to become rich, all peasants to become prosperous, and the degree of prosperity to greatly exceed that of the current prosperous peasants.” [15]15 Mao Zedong, “On the Question of Agricultural Cooperation” (1955). There are two layers of meaning here: one is to achieve common prosperity for the peasant masses from the perspective of distribution; the other is to achieve transcendence of the past from the perspective of development. Only the superposition of these two layers can achieve the stability of socialism. By 1957, Mao Zedong summarized: “The consolidation of our country is also due to the fact that our economic measures are fundamentally correct; the people’s livelihood is stable and is gradually improving.” [16]16 Mao Zedong, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People” (1957). From this, it can also be seen that the practice at the beginning of reform and opening up of “sacrificing a certain degree of fair distribution in exchange for the speed of development and catch-up” had historical rationality but was ultimately an expedient measure. As the total size of the national economy continues to increase and the problem of income distribution disparity becomes prominent, how to handle the relationship between efficiency and fairness, and between development and distribution, has become a key issue in correctly handling contradictions among the people and maintaining social stability and unity.

作为上层建筑领域的国家政治安全问题，根本上取决于社会主义生产力所决定的生产关系总和构成的经济基础，换言之，国家的政治安全是建立在发展与分配的动态平衡基础上的。毛泽东曾在1955年论及“农业合作化与资产阶级关系问题”时指出，巩固国家政权就要“使农民群众共同富裕起来，穷的要富起来，所有农民都要富裕，并且富裕的程度要大大地超过现在的富裕农民”。此处有两层含义，一是从分配的角度要实现农民群众的共同富裕，二是从发展的角度要实现对以往的超越，两层叠加方能实现社会主义的稳固。到了1957年，毛泽东总结性地指出：“我们国家的巩固，还由于我们的经济措施根本上是正确的；人民生活是稳定的，并且逐步有所改善”。由此也可知，改革开放之初“以牺牲一定的公平分配为代价来换取发展赶超的速度”的做法虽具有历史合理性，但终究只是权宜之计，伴随着国民经济总量的不断增大与收入分配差距问题的凸显，如何处理好效率与公平、发展与分配之间的关系已经成为正确处理人民内部矛盾、维护社会安定团结的关键议题。

First, it is necessary to solidly advance Chinese-path modernization and promote high-quality economic development. “Development is the foundation; without economic development, everything else is out of the question.” [17]17 Xi Jinping, speech at the Central Conference on Economic Work (2015). Development must be high-quality development. Low-quality development cannot support the guarantee of national political security; on the contrary, due to low production efficiency, it may give rise to a series of problems such as ecological and environmental degradation that hinder the improvement of people’s living standards, thereby eroding the social foundation of national political security. Second, in terms of understanding, great importance must be attached to distribution issues. Under the superimposed impact of domestic and international unexpected factors, the relative slowdown of economic growth is an indisputable fact. At this time, one must not blindly apply remedies in a panic; one must be very vigilant against those remarks that one-sidedly emphasize the supremacy of efficiency and growth, and must never separate the relationship between development and distribution. Third, in practice, it is necessary to promote the “construction of a basic institutional arrangement for the coordinated and supporting roles of primary distribution, redistribution, and tertiary distribution.” [18]18 This phrasing appears in official documents related to the 14th Five-Year Plan period, referring to a coordinated system of primary (market-based), secondary (government-led redistribution), and tertiary (voluntary charitable) distribution. The realization of common prosperity cannot be entirely pinned on “tertiary distribution” based on “voluntariness.” It is necessary to effectively enhance the intensity and precision of regulatory means such as taxation, social security, and transfer payments. For example, in the tax system, measures such as improving the classification of income, expanding the scope of comprehensive income taxation, optimizing the special additional deduction system, and establishing a dynamic adjustment mechanism can be adopted to better highlight the function of personal income tax in regulating income distribution.

第一，要扎实推进中国式现代化，推动经济高质量发展。“发展是基础，经济不发展，一切都无从谈起。”发展必须是高质量的发展，低质量的发展不仅无法支撑国家政治安全的保障，反而会因生产效率低下而衍生出生态环境恶化等一系列迟滞人民生活水平改善的问题，从而侵蚀国家政治安全的社会基础。第二，在认识上，要高度重视分配问题。在国内外超预期因素叠加冲击下，经济增速相对放缓已是不争的事实，此时更不能病急乱投医，要十分警惕那些片面强调效率与增长至上原则的言论，决不能割裂发展与分配的关系。第三，在实践中，要推动“构建初次分配、再分配、三次分配协调配套的基础性制度安排”，不能将共同富裕的实现完全寄希望于建立在“自愿”基础上的“三次分配”，要切实提高税收、社保、转移支付等调节手段的力度与精准性。例如，在税收制度上，可以通过完善所得分类、扩大综合所得征收范围、优化专项附加扣除制度、建立动态调整机制等措施更好地突出个人所得税的调节收入分配职能。

(About the authors: Ye Zipeng, Lecturer, Department of Party Building, Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC (National Academy of Governance); Zheng Yifan, Doctoral Candidate, School of Marxism, Tsinghua University)

（作者简介：叶子鹏，中共中央党校（国家行政学院）党的建设教研部讲师；郑宜帆，清华大学马克思主义学院博士研究生）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心