Where Does Historical Initiative Come From?

In recent years, “the spirit of historical initiative” has become a signature concept in theoretical circles, and scholars have put forward many insightful views on how to carry forward this spirit. In fact, historical initiative is also an important strategic thinking that runs through the more than one hundred years of history of the Communist Party of China. As General Secretary Xi Jinping has said, from the moment the CPC stepped onto the political stage, “no matter how the situation and tasks changed, no matter what kind of stormy waves we encountered, our Party has always grasped historical initiative, anchored its goals of struggle, and forged ahead firmly along the correct direction.” Mao Zedong, as a great proletarian strategist, not only promoted the great practice of the Chinese revolution and construction, but also profoundly explained why the spirit of historical initiative has become a distinctive quality of Communists. Among his works, *On Protracted War* is a brilliant text that explains how to grasp historical initiative. Although this text discusses strategic policy for the war against Japan, it highlights a distinct spirit of historical initiative in every aspect and serves as a classic guide for us to grasp historical initiative and carry forward the spirit of historical initiative. Reinterpreting this classic work from the perspective of historical initiative has important methodological significance for us to develop an even stronger spirit of historical initiative in the New Era.

近年来，“历史主动精神”成为理论界探讨的一个标识性概念，学者们就如何发扬历史主动精神提出诸多真知灼见。事实上，历史主动也是贯穿中国共产党百余年历史的重要战略思维。正如习近平总书记所说，中国共产党从登上政治舞台那一刻起，“不管形势和任务如何变化，不管遇到什么样的惊涛骇浪，我们党都始终把握历史主动、锚定奋斗目标，沿着正确方向坚定前行”。毛泽东作为伟大的无产阶级战略家，不仅推动了中国革命和建设的伟大实践，而且深刻地阐释了历史主动精神何以成为共产党人的鲜明品格，其中《论持久战》就是阐释如何把握历史主动的光辉著作。该文虽是讨论对日作战的战略方针，但处处凸显着鲜明的历史主动精神，是我们把握历史主动、发扬历史主动精神的经典指南。从历史主动的视角重新解读这一经典著作，对我们在新时代发扬更为强烈的历史主动精神具有重要的方法论意义。

I. Correctly Understand the Situation, Overcome Blind Action, and Grasp Historical Initiative

一、正确认识形势，克服盲动，把握历史主动

The situation is the trend, state, and posture of the development of things. As the saying goes, act in accordance with the trend, move in response to the trend, and rise by riding the trend. Whether one can correctly understand and grasp the situation directly affects whether one can correctly grasp historical initiative. Mao Zedong’s *On Protracted War* begins by discussing how to understand the situation of the War of Resistance, analyzes two one-sided views of the situation, and puts forward his own unique insights based on the domestic and international situation.

形势是事物发展的趋向、状况和态势。正所谓顺势而为、应势而动、乘势而起，能否正确认识把握形势，直接关系着能否正确把握历史主动。毛泽东《论持久战》一文，开篇即从如何认识抗战形势谈起，并对两种片面的形势观进行分析，并根据国内外形势提出了自己的独到见解。

After the outbreak of the full-scale War of Resistance, doubts were widespread about how to judge the situation and the direction of the war, whether China could ultimately defeat Japan, and, if so, what strategies and tactics should be adopted. Some believed the situation was pessimistic, arguing that China’s economy and military equipment were backward, so that if it fought it would be defeated, and if it fought again it would perish. This pessimistic mood pervaded the upper levels, and even ordinary people thought that “China cannot win; it will perish.” Conversely, others believed the situation was optimistic. In their view, as long as China fought a few battles like the one at Tai’erzhuang, the War of Resistance could be won. Temporary victories on the battlefield blinded some people’s judgment of the situation, to the point that early in the War of Resistance some proposed fighting a “quasi-decisive battle,” claiming that the Japanese army was already in its “final struggle” and about to face its “doomsday judgment.” With the situation so optimistic, they argued, the Japanese army would not continue its offensive, the anti-Japanese forces did not need to be expanded, and the Anti-Japanese National United Front should not be broadened any further. This situation also appeared within the Party. Some believed that as long as the Red Army fought the Kuomintang, it could annihilate entire divisions of the Kuomintang’s organized forces, and that the Japanese army was nothing to fear, so they could “fight with large army corps operations.” These understandings did not conform to the actual situation and were misjudgments of it. The main reason for this erroneous tendency was looking at problems from a subjective and one-sided perspective.

全面抗战爆发后，如何判断形势和战局走向，中国能否最终战胜日本，如若战胜应该采取何种战略战术，这些疑惑广泛存在。有人认为形势悲观，中国经济和武器装备落后，如战必败再战必亡。这种悲观情绪在上层弥漫，即使普通民众也认为“中国打不胜，会亡”。相反，有人则认为形势乐观。在他们看来，中国只要打几个像台儿庄那样的战役，抗战就能获胜。战场上短暂的胜利迷惑了一些人对形势的判断，以致抗战初期就有人提出可以打“准决战”，认为日军在此时已处于“最后挣扎”，即将接受“末日审判”。形势如此乐观，日军不会继续进攻，抗日力量也无需增加，抗日民族统一战线不应再扩大，这种情形在党内也曾出现。有人认为，红军只要与国民党作战，就可以消灭国民党成建制整个师的力量，日军没什么了不起，可以“搞大兵团作战”。这些认识并不符合实际形势，是对形势的误判。这种错误倾向的主要原因就是从主观的和片面的角度看问题。

The theory of national subjugation, which held that China would “be defeated if it fought and perish if it fought again,” was a typical subjective and one-sided view of the situation. Its proponents believed that the ultimate result of the enemy being strong and we being weak must be that the strong power defeats the weak one, citing the repeated failures of China’s anti-aggression wars in modern times as evidence. The essence of this view of the situation was that it focused only on the contradictory phenomenon of the enemy being strong and we being weak, exaggerated this contradiction without limit, and took it as the entire basis for understanding the situation, while turning a blind eye to other contradictory phenomena. “They only mention the single point of the enemy being strong and we being weak—that is their one-sidedness; and they exaggerate this one-sided thing into the whole—that is their subjectivity.” The essence of the view of the situation held by the proponents of quick victory was that they ignored the objective situation of the enemy being strong and we being weak. They either exaggerated the temporary advantages on the battlefield without limit, or exaggerated China’s own advantages without limit, with the result that a single leaf before the eye shut out Mount Tai, “thus obliterating one aspect of the truth. They lacked the courage to acknowledge the limitations of their own strengths, and thus obliterated another aspect of the truth. From this they committed errors, large or small. Here too, subjectivity and one-sidedness were at work.” The common feature of the theory of national subjugation and the theory of quick victory was that they either made groundless subjective judgments based on only one manifestation of the situation, or subjectively exaggerated one manifestation of the situation into the whole, ultimately reaching specious conclusions.

认为中国“战必败再战必亡”的亡国论，是典型的主观片面的形势观。他们认为，敌强我弱的最终结果一定是强国打败弱国，近代中国反侵略战争的屡次失败就是例证。这种形势观的本质是只关注敌强我弱这一矛盾现象，并把这一矛盾无限夸大，以此作为他们认识形势的全部论据，至于其他矛盾现象则视而不见。“他们只提强弱对比一点，是他们的片面性；他们将此片面的东西夸大起来看成全体，又是他们的主观性。”速胜论者的形势观的本质是无视敌强我弱这一客观形势，要么对战场上暂时出现的优势无限放大，要么对中国本身的优势无限夸大，结果一叶障目不见泰山，“因此抹杀了真理的一方面。他们又没有勇气承认自己长处之有限性，因而抹杀了真理的又一方面。由此犯出或大或小的错误来，这里也是主观性和片面性作怪”。亡国论和速胜论的共通之处在于，他们只根据形势的一种表现作出毫无根据的主观判断，或者在主观上把形势的一种表现夸大为整体，最终得出似是而非的结论。

Failure to correctly understand the situation, holding a subjective and one-sided view of it, not only fails to achieve historical initiative but instead falls into the pit of blind action. As early as the Red Army period, Mao Zedong profoundly pointed out that this kind of thinking is very detrimental to analyzing the political situation and guiding work, “because a subjectivist analysis of the political situation and subjectivist guidance of work will inevitably lead either to opportunism or to putschism.” Therefore, only by overcoming the subjective and one-sided view of the situation, adhering to an objective and comprehensive analysis, and penetrating phenomena to understand the essence can one correctly understand the situation.

不能正确认识形势，持主观片面的形势观，非但不能实现历史主动，反而会掉入盲动的深坑。还在红军时期，毛泽东就深刻指出，这种思维对分析政治形势和指导工作都非常不利，“因为对于政治形势的主观主义的分析和对于工作的主观主义的指导，其必然的结果，不是机会主义，就是盲动主义”。因此，只有克服主观片面的形势观，坚持客观全面的分析，透过现象认识本质，才能正确认识形势。

Correctly understanding the situation requires grasping the characteristics of each side in the contradiction in order to strengthen historical initiative. The situation contains contradictions; understanding the situation requires grasping the characteristics of each side in the contradiction. If one does not grasp the characteristics of each side in the contradiction, “this is called looking at problems one-sidedly. Or it is called seeing only the part but not the whole, seeing only the trees but not the forest. In this way, one cannot find the method for resolving the contradiction, cannot accomplish the revolutionary task, and cannot do the work assigned well.” To understand the situation of the War of Resistance, one must grasp the respective characteristics of China and Japan, penetrating phenomena to understand the essence. Japan was an imperialist power; its political, economic, military, and organizational aspects were undoubtedly first-rate. But this was only one aspect of the problem. Japan also had inherent limitations—namely, its manpower, material resources, and financial resources could not sustain a long-term effort, and it would inevitably face increasing difficulties as the war consumed its resources; Japan’s imperialist nature determined that the war it launched was barbaric and regressive, and with pressure from international opposition forces, it would inevitably fall into the iron law of the unjust cause finding few supporters. These were the contradictory characteristics of Japan. China was a weak semi-colonial and semi-feudal country; its national strength was not a match for Japan’s, but it had a vast territory, abundant resources, and a large population—this was the material foundation for sustaining the war. China’s confrontation with Japan was a confrontation between justice and barbarism. A just war would inevitably win widespread sympathy and assistance at home and abroad, forming a situation and posture completely opposite to Japan’s unjust cause finding few supporters. These were China’s characteristics. The contest between China and Japan was in fact a contest of these contradictory characteristics; it determined the strategies and tactics of both sides, and also determined the basic direction that the war would ultimately be won by China. “If one forgets these characteristics in observing the Sino-Japanese war, one will inevitably make mistakes; even if certain opinions are believed for a time and seem correct, the course of the war will prove them wrong.” Contradictions are an objective situation; only by correctly understanding the situation and grasping the characteristics of each side in the contradiction can historical initiative be strengthened.

正确认识形势需要把握矛盾各方的特点，以增强历史主动。形势中蕴含着矛盾，认识形势需要把握矛盾各方的特点。如果不掌握矛盾各方的特点，“这就叫做片面地看问题。或者叫做只看见局部，不看见全体，只看见树木，不看见森林。这样，是不能找出解决矛盾的方法的，是不能完成革命任务的，是不能做好所任工作的”。认识抗战形势，就要抓住中日双方各自的特点，透过现象认识本质。日本是帝国主义强国，其政治经济军事和组织等方面无疑是一流的，但这只是问题的一个方面，日本尚有先天不足的局限性，即人力物力财力不能长时间支撑，必将会因战争消耗而愈加困难；日本的帝国主义本性决定了其发动这次战争是野蛮的和退步的，随着国际反对力量的施压，必将陷入失道寡助的铁律，这是日本的矛盾特点。中国是半殖民地半封建的弱国，国力虽不抵日本，但地域广阔、资源丰富、人口众多，这是支撑这场战争的物质基础；中国与日本的对抗，是正义与野蛮的对抗。正义的战争，必将获得国内外的广泛同情援助，形成与日本失道寡助完全相反的形势和局面，这是中国的特点。中日双方的较量实际就是这些矛盾特点的较量，它决定着双方的战略战术，也决定着战争最终的胜利属于中国这一基本走向。“观察中日战争如果忘记了这些特点，那就必然要弄错；即使某些意见一时有人相信，似乎不错，但战争的经过必将证明它们是错的。”矛盾是客观存在的形势，正确认识形势把握矛盾各方的特点，才能增强历史主动。

Correctly understanding the situation is for the purpose of mastering the situation, grasping historical initiative, and promoting the transformation of the situation in a favorable direction. The “theory of national subjugation” is a one-sided view of the situation, but in terms of the general situation, we do not deny that there is a danger of national subjugation; indeed, the possibility of national subjugation lies before us. On the one hand, this possibility stems from the weakness of national strength; on the other hand, it stems from the compromise and retreat of some people. But this danger can be overcome through a favorable situation. “Because although the enemy’s policy can be changed to a certain extent, a fundamental change is impossible. Within China there are social roots of compromise, but those who oppose compromise are in the majority. International forces also partly support compromise, but the main forces support the War of Resistance.” As for the “theory of quick victory,” on a general level we would of course welcome it; we especially hope to end the war and achieve liberation as early as possible. But as a weak semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, “the inevitability of the war and the impossibility of a quick victory for China also have their basis in this aspect.”

正确认识形势是为了驾驭形势，把握历史主动，推动形势向有利的方向转换。“亡国论”是一种片面的形势观，但就一般形势而言，我们并不否认有亡国的危险，摆在我们面前的确有亡国的可能。这种可能性一方面源于国力虚弱，另一方面源于一些人的妥协退让。但是这种危险是可以通过有利形势克服的。“因为敌人的政策即使可作某种程度的改变，但其根本改变是不可能的。中国内部有妥协的社会根源，但是反对妥协的占大多数。国际力量也有一部分赞助妥协，但是主要的力量赞助抗战。”至于“速胜论”，就一般层面而言当然乐见其成，我们尤其希望早一天结束战争获得解放，但是中国作为半殖民地半封建性质的弱国，“战争之不可避免和中国之不能速胜，又在这个方面有其基础”。

Since this is the case, we need to actively steer the situation on the basis of correctly understanding it, develop the spirit of historical initiative, push the situation in a direction favorable to liberation, escape the dangerous situation of national subjugation, and achieve victory as early as possible. A favorable situation can only be obtained by developing the spirit of initiative to create the conditions. To achieve final victory in the War of Resistance, it is necessary to discard the subjective and one-sided theory of quick victory, correctly understand and steer the situation, develop the spirit of historical initiative, and actively create the conditions. On this point, Mao Zedong clearly stated: “We advocate working for all the conditions necessary for final victory; the more conditions we have in place, and the earlier we have them in place, the greater the certainty of victory and the sooner the day of victory. We believe that only in this way can the process of war be shortened, and we reject the theory of quick victory that seeks easy gains and indulges in empty talk.” [1]1 The Battle of Tai’erzhuang (March–April 1938) was a major Chinese victory early in the Second Sino-Japanese War, often cited to boost morale. From this it can be seen that a favorable situation requires developing the spirit of initiative to actively create it; only in this way can we avoid the path to national subjugation and achieve the final victory of the War of Resistance Against Japan.

既然如此，就需要我们在正确认识形势的基础上积极驾驭形势，发扬历史主动精神，推动形势向有利于解放的方向发展，摆脱亡国的危险境地，早日实现胜利。有利的形势需要发扬主动精神创造条件方可获得。抗战要获得最终胜利，就要摒弃主观片面的速胜论，正确认识和驾驭形势，发扬历史主动精神积极创造条件。就此，毛泽东明确指出：“我们主张为着争取最后胜利所必要的一切条件而努力，条件多具备一分，早具备一日，胜利的把握就多一分，胜利的时间就早一日。我们认为只有这样才能缩短战争的过程，而排斥贪便宜尚空谈的速胜论。”由此可以看出，有利的形势需要发扬主动精神积极创造，唯如此才能避免走向亡国的境地，实现抗日战争的最后胜利。

Correctly understanding the situation is the basis for forming strategic guidelines and is also the policy foundation for further strengthening historical initiative. Correct strategic guidelines come from a comprehensive and scientific analysis of the subjective and objective situation. The objective situation—the enemy is strong and we are weak, the enemy is in a superior position and we are in an inferior position—determines that within a certain period, the enemy’s offensive will achieve considerable progress, while our side will suffer a considerable degree of defeat. However, neither side will achieve total victory or total defeat; rather, victory and defeat will occur to a certain degree and within a certain period of time. The reason is that the enemy’s strength and our weakness are relative; the enemy, though strong, has weaknesses, while we, though weak, have strengths. Both sides have strengths and weaknesses, which determines that the Japanese side will not achieve total victory, nor will our side achieve a quick victory, because “reaching the point sufficient to stop the enemy’s offensive and prepare for our counter-offensive still requires tremendous effort,” and therefore “it can only be a protracted war.” [2]2 “A single leaf before the eye shuts out Mount Tai” (一叶障目不见泰山) is a Chinese idiom meaning to be misled by a small detail and miss the big picture. As the situation shifts, the enemy’s advantages weaken and our advantages strengthen; when the balance of advantages and disadvantages undergoes a major change and enters a new stage, the final outcome will inevitably be the enemy’s defeat and our victory. This process shows that the war must be protracted, and final victory will be ours.

正确认识形势是形成战略方针的依据，也是进一步增强历史主动的政策基础。正确的战略方针来源于对主客观形势全面科学的分析。敌强我弱，敌处优势我处劣势，这一客观形势决定了在一定时期内，敌人的进攻会取得相当进展，我方则会出现相当程度的失败。但是敌我双方既不会全胜也不会全败，而是在一定程度一定时间内的胜败。原因在于敌强我弱是相对的，敌虽强但有弱点，我虽弱但有优点。双方互有优劣，决定了日方不会全胜，我方也不会速胜，因为“达到足以停止敌之进攻及准备我之反攻的程度则尚有待于巨大的努力”，因此“只能是持久战”。随着形势的转换，敌方的优势在减弱，我方的优势在增强，待到优劣形势发生重大变化而进入新的阶段，最终必然是敌败我胜。这个过程表明，战争一定是持久的，最后的胜利则是我们的。

Protracted war is the strategic guideline for our war against Japan and for achieving final victory. Mao Zedong’s conclusion that the War of Resistance Against Japan was necessarily a protracted war was a strategic guideline formed on the basis of a comprehensive and scientific comparative analysis of the subjective and objective situation. To realize this strategic guideline, there can be “no shortcuts or easy methods”; “all those who wish to shorten the duration of the war have no other way but to strive to increase their own strength and reduce the enemy’s strength.” [3]3 “The unjust cause finds few supporters” (失道寡助) is a classical Chinese phrase from Mencius, often used in CPC discourse to argue that aggressive wars are doomed to fail. That is to say, only by vigorously strengthening the spirit of historical initiative, adopting correct strategy and tactics militarily, continuously consolidating and expanding the united front politically, and actively seeking international assistance can this strategic guideline be implemented and transformed, and the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japan be achieved as early as possible.

持久战是我们开展对日作战并取得最后胜利的战略方针。毛泽东得出抗日战争必然是持久战的结论，是在对主客观形势进行全面科学的对比分析基础上形成的战略方针。要实现这一战略方针，不能“有任何取巧图便的法门”，“一切想要缩短战争时间的人们，惟有努力于增加自己力量减少敌人力量之一法”。也就是说，只有大力增强历史主动精神，在军事上采取正确的战略战术，政治上不断巩固和扩大统一战线，国际上积极争取援助，才能实现这一战略方针的落实转化，早日实现抗日战争的胜利。

From the introductory discussion in *On Protracted War*, it is not difficult to see Mao Zedong’s extreme emphasis on how to correctly understand the situation. Although the situation is the objective state of external things, it is an important basis for generating internal understanding and judgment, and also an important prerequisite for grasping historical initiative. What kind of view of the situation one holds will naturally produce corresponding historical results. That subjective and one-sided view of the situation not only fails to grasp historical initiative but instead falls into the pit of subjective and blind action. Especially at the critical moment of national survival, whether one can correctly understand and judge the situation is a matter of life and death for the future. Understanding the situation requires both scientific comprehensiveness and an objective grasp of the characteristics of each side of the contradiction; it requires understanding both the domestic situation and the international situation, including that within Japan; it requires understanding the impact of the international situation on the War of Resistance Against Japan, and also measuring the protracted war within the history of human warfare. Mao Zedong believed that the protracted war “is something that breaks historical records,” and that this war “will not only affect China and Japan, greatly promoting the progress of both countries, but will also affect the world, promoting the progress of all oppressed nations, starting with India.” [4]4 Mao Zedong, *On Protracted War* (May 1938), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, p. 476. The quote is from the section analyzing the international impact of the war. This also shows from another angle that correctly understanding the situation is conducive to grasping historical initiative, and grasping historical initiative will in turn create a more powerful situation. This is an important methodological direction of Mao Zedong’s article *On Protracted War*.

从《论持久战》的开篇引论，不难看出毛泽东对于如何正确认识形势的极端重视。形势虽是外在事物的客观态势，却是生成内在认识判断的重要依据，也是把握历史主动的重要前提。什么样的形势观，自然会产生相应的历史结果。那种主观片面的形势观，非但不能把握历史主动，反而会陷入主观盲动的深坑。尤其在民族危亡的紧急关头，能否正确认识判断形势，更是攸关前途命运。认识形势既要科学全面，又要客观把握矛盾各方的特点；既要认识国内形势，又要关注国际包括日本国内形势；既要认识国际形势对抗日战争的影响，也要将持久战置于人类战争史中衡量。毛泽东认为持久战“是突破历史纪录的东西”，这场战争“不但将影响到中日两国，大大推动两国的进步，而且将影响到世界，推动各国首先是印度等被压迫民族的进步”。这也从另一方面表明，正确认识形势有利于把握历史主动，把握历史主动又会创造出更为强大的形势。这是毛泽东《论持久战》一文的重要方法论指向。

II. Enhancing Subject Consciousness, Strengthening Political Responsibility, and Grasping Historical Initiative

二、提升主体自觉，强化政治责任，把握历史主动

Historical activity is the activity of human beings as subjects. As subjects, human beings “always make their history through each person’s pursuit of his own consciously intended goals.” [5]5 Friedrich Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (1886), *Marx Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 341. Who is the subject of history, and how to enhance subject consciousness to grasp historical initiative—these are major principled questions, and there have been debates within the Party on this issue.

历史活动是作为主体的人的活动。作为主体的人“总是通过每一个人追求他自己的、自觉预期的目的来创造他们的历史”。谁是历史主体，如何提升主体自觉把握历史主动，这是一个重大原则问题，党内就这一问题曾有过争论。

After the full-scale outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party cooperated in the war. Wang Ming, who had returned from the Soviet Union and claimed to represent the Comintern line, believed that during the War of Resistance, “the Kuomintang is the leading superior force, and we have no strength; it is wrong to shout empty slogans about proletarian leadership,” and therefore “we should not say who leads whom.” [6]6 Wang Ming, “The Key to Saving the Current Situation” (December 1937). Wang Ming (1904–1974) was a senior CPC leader who, during the early period of the War of Resistance, advocated a line of “everything through the united front,” effectively subordinating the CPC to the Kuomintang. This view actually advocated relying on the Kuomintang army to achieve a quick victory. Holding this view, one had to “recognize that the Kuomintang is the leading superior force and the most important condition for ensuring continued resistance and winning the War of Resistance,” and therefore a unified national defense army under unified command should be established, and “the Eighth Route Army should also be unified under Chiang Kai-shek’s command.” [7]7 Ibid. In response to this view, Mao Zedong clearly pointed out that this view was incorrect: “The question of who attracts whom between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party does exist; it is not about attracting the Kuomintang to the Communist Party, but about making the Kuomintang accept the influence of the Communist Party.” [8]8 Mao Zedong, “The Situation and Tasks in the Anti-Japanese War After the Fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan” (November 12, 1937), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, p. 391. On the surface, this debate was about the question of “who leads whom” in the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation in the War of Resistance; in essence, it was a question of the subject consciousness and political responsibility of the historical subject. Whether one could recognize this point concerned not only the future of the War of Resistance but also the future and destiny of the Chinese revolution.

全面抗战爆发后，国共两党合作抗战。从苏联回国、自称代表共产国际路线的王明就认为，抗战中“国民党是领导的优势力量，而我们没有力量，空喊无产阶级领导是不行的”，因此“我们不应说谁领导谁”。这种主张实际上是幻想依靠国民党军队求得速胜。既有此主张，便要“承认国民党是领导的优势力量，是保障继续抗战和争取抗战胜利的最主要的条件”，就要建立全国统一的国防军统一指挥，“八路军也应该统一受蒋介石指挥”。针对这一主张，毛泽东明确指出，这种看法是不正确的，“国民党与共产党谁吸引谁这个问题是有的，不是说要将国民党吸引到共产党来，而是要国民党接受共产党的影响”。这一争论表面上是关于国共合作抗战中“谁领导谁”的问题，实质上是关于历史主体的自觉性和政治责任的问题。能否认识到这一点，既关乎抗战前途，也关乎中国革命的前途和命运。

In September 1937, in his report on the situation and tasks after the outbreak of the War of Resistance at a meeting of Party activists at the central level, Mao Zedong pointed out unequivocally that in the War of Resistance, whether it was “the bourgeoisie following the proletariat, or the proletariat following the bourgeoisie (the Kuomintang attracting the Communist Party, or the Communist Party attracting the Kuomintang)” was a major political question of consciousness or unconsciousness, and must be clearly understood. [9]9 Mao Zedong, “Report on the Situation and Tasks After the Outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War” (September 1937), cited in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, p. 392. If one failed to recognize this point, could not enhance subject consciousness and fulfill political responsibility, one would inevitably slide toward “right opportunism,” and there would inevitably be “the main danger for the whole Party.” [10]10 Ibid., p. 393. To avoid this danger, it was necessary to vigorously enhance subject consciousness and change the existing status. The Red Army must achieve the transformation “from the position of a ‘shock brigade’ to a position of actual leadership,” and the Communist Party of China must also achieve the transformation “from its current position to a position of actual leadership,” actively carrying out “a comprehensive, nationwide war.” [11]11 Ibid., p. 394. The term “shock brigade” (壮气军) refers to a vanguard force that inspires others by its example rather than by its numerical or material strength. Mao Zedong’s emphasis on “changing positions” was in fact an emphasis on enhancing the subject consciousness and political responsibility of the Communist Party of China and grasping historical initiative. This sober understanding, with great strategic vision, had already been formed before the full-scale War of Resistance.

1937年9月，毛泽东在党的中央一级积极分子会议上就抗战爆发后的形势与任务的报告中旗帜鲜明地指出，抗战中究竟是“资产阶级追随无产阶级，还是无产阶级追随资产阶级（国民党吸引共产党，还是共产党吸引国民党）”，这是自觉与不自觉的重大政治问题，必须有清晰认识。如果认识不到这一点，不能提升主体自觉，履行政治责任，势必会倒向“右倾机会主义”，势必会出现“全党的主要危险”。要避免这一危险，必须大力提升主体自觉，改变现有的地位。红军必须实现“由‘壮气军’地位到实力领导地位”的转变，中国共产党也必须实现“从现在地位到实力领导地位”的转变，积极开展“全面的全民族的战争”。毛泽东强调“地位转变”，实际就是强调要提升中国共产党的主体自觉与政治责任，把握历史主动。这一极具战略眼光的清醒认知还在全面抗战之前就形成了。

As early as 1936, in his conversation with Edgar Snow, Mao Zedong emphasized that during the ten years of civil war since 1927, the Communist Party of China had trained and mastered effective weapons to resist the enemy, and the Red Army had grown into an invincible force. In the war against Japan, even the Japanese side believed that “communism in China means the national liberation movement, freedom, and national sovereignty”; if “communism means resistance to Japan, means the national liberation struggle,” then “the whole nation urgently needs such communism, just as a hungry person needs rice.” [12]12 Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (1937), recording Mao Zedong’s interview in 1936. The quote reflects Mao’s argument that the Chinese Communist Party’s program of national liberation was the only one capable of mobilizing the masses against Japan. Mao Zedong’s conversation with Snow was again cited in *On Protracted War*, emphasizing that the Communist Party of China and the army it led were representatives of progressive forces. “With the Communist Party, with a politically progressive army—the Chinese Red Army led by the Communist Party—with decades of revolutionary traditional experience, especially the seventeen years of experience since the founding of the Communist Party of China,” [13]13 Mao Zedong, *On Protracted War* (May 1938), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, p. 469. this provided the conditions and possibilities for a protracted war of resistance and the final victory of the war. As long as the determination to fight to the end was firmly held, this war “will, because of the efforts of our Party and the people of the whole country, break through all obstacles and continue to advance and develop.” [14]14 Ibid., p. 470.

1936年毛泽东在同埃德加·斯诺的谈话中就强调，自1927年以来的十年内战中，中国共产党就练就掌握了有效的抗敌武器，红军业已成长为一支不可战胜的力量。在对日作战中，即便日本方面也认为“共产主义在中国意味着民族解放运动、自由和民族主权”，如果“共产主义意味着抗日，意味着民族解放斗争”，那么“全民族迫切需要这样的共产主义，正如饥饿的人需要大米一样”。毛泽东与斯诺的谈话在《论持久战》一文中再次得到征引，强调中国共产党及其领导的军队是进步因素的代表。“有了共产党，有了政治上进步的军队即共产党领导的中国红军，有了数十年革命的传统经验，特别是中国共产党成立以来的十七年的经验”，这就为持久抗战和战争的最后胜利提供了条件和可能。只要抱定抗战到底的决心，这场战争“必将因为我党和全国人民的努力，冲破一切障碍物而继续地前进和发展”。

From this it is not difficult to see that Mao Zedong’s writing of *On Protracted War* was not merely about expounding the proposition of protracted resistance, but also about emphasizing the leading position and political responsibility of the Chinese Communist Party within that protracted resistance. *On Protracted War* states at the outset that many people discuss protracted war, but most have no clear understanding of why it must be protracted or how to protract it, why victory will come or how it will be won—and, in particular, we Communists are not clear about it either. Mao therefore explicitly admonished the Communists: the sole direction of the Chinese Communist Party in the War of Resistance Against Japan is to unite all forces of resistance to defeat the Japanese aggressors. Hence, “in order that every Communist Party member may do his better and greater part in the War of Resistance, it is necessary to study protracted war with serious attention.” Clearly, one important purpose of Mao’s discussion of protracted war was to make clear to the Communists that the Chinese Communist Party must enhance its subjective self-awareness and exert its historical initiative in this war.

由此不难看出，毛泽东撰写《论持久战》，不仅在于阐释持久抗战主张，而且在于强调中国共产党在持久抗战中的主体地位和政治责任。《论持久战》开篇就指出，很多人谈论持久战，但是对于为何持久、怎样持久，为何胜利、怎样胜利的认识，多数人都没有认识清楚，特别是我们共产党人也不很清楚。毛泽东遂明确告诫共产党人，中国共产党在抗日战争中的唯一方向就是团结一切抗战力量战胜日寇。因此，“为了使每个共产党员在抗日战争中能够尽其更好和更大的努力，也有着重地研究持久战的必要”。很显然，毛泽东讨论持久战的一个重要目的就是向共产党人表明，中国共产党在这场战争中必须提升主体自觉，发挥历史主动。

Whether one can recognize and enhance the subjective self-awareness of the Communists is an important condition for grasping historical initiative. To recognize and enhance the subjective self-awareness of the Chinese Communist Party in the War of Resistance requires both political independence and self-reliance—upholding “the independence of the Communist Party”—and military independence and self-reliance—implementing “independent and self-reliant mountain guerrilla warfare.” If one does not insist on independence and self-reliance, does not focus on enhancing subjective self-awareness, and does not recognize that the Chinese Communist Party is the backbone of the War of Resistance, one will become a “shortsighted person” in politics and military affairs, politically “reducing the Communist Party to the level of the Kuomintang” and militarily losing the initiative. Mao emphasized the subjective self-awareness and political responsibility of the Communists in order to grasp historical initiative in the War of Resistance and thereby realize the general strategic policy of protracted war.

能不能认识和提升共产党人的主体自觉，是能否把握历史主动的重要条件。在抗日战争中认识和提升中国共产党的主体自觉，既要在政治上独立自主，坚持“共产党的独立性”，也要在军事上独立自主，实行“独立自主的山地游击战”。不坚持独立自主，不注重提升主体自觉，认识不到中国共产党是抗日战争的中坚力量，就会成为政治军事上的“近视眼”，在政治上“使共产党降低到国民党方面去”，在军事上失去主动。毛泽东强调共产党人的主体自觉与政治责任，目的是能在抗日战争中把握历史主动，以期实现持久抗战的战略总方针。

Historical activity is the cause of the masses. The subjective self-awareness of the masses, continuously heightened in the historical activity of seeking their own complete liberation, will inevitably give rise to a more enduring spirit of historical initiative. The War of Resistance, as a war of the entire nation, must fully recognize that “the deepest roots of the great power of war lie in the masses of the people.” One important reason Japan dared to invade China so aggressively was that the masses had not been organized—this was the lesson of the repeated failures of previous resistance movements. If the masses are mobilized, this limitation can be overcome. Once the masses become conscious and enhance their subjective self-awareness, they will form an indestructible force. The fire formation [n15] created by hundreds of millions of awakened masses will cause the Japanese aggressors to “be like a wild buffalo charging into a blazing fire; a single shout from us will give it a tremendous fright, and the wild buffalo will be burned to death.” Hundreds of millions of awakened masses will be an inexhaustible source of troop replenishment, becoming the rear support for the forces resisting Japan; hundreds of millions of awakened masses will also be an important foundation for sustaining the finances and economy of the resistance. As long as the masses can be broadly mobilized, “how could a country so vast in territory and population suffer from financial poverty?” In a word, once the subjective self-awareness of the masses is realized, “there will be no enemy under heaven, and a single Japanese imperialism will not be enough to fight.” Therefore, the prerequisite for persisting in protracted war is to mobilize and organize the masses; the final victory of the war depends entirely on mobilizing and organizing the broad masses.

历史活动是群众的事业。人民群众的主体自觉，在谋求自身彻底解放的历史活动中不断提高，必将会形成更为持久的历史主动精神。抗日战争作为全民族战争，必须充分认识到“战争的伟力之最深厚的根源，存在于民众之中”。日本之所以敢于大肆侵略中国，一个重要原因在于民众没有组织起来，这是以往历次抵抗运动屡遭失败的教训。如果把民众动员起来，就能克服这一局限。民众觉悟了，提升了主体自觉，就会形成无坚不摧的力量。数万万觉悟了的民众所形成的火阵，会使日本侵略者“像一匹野牛冲入火阵，我们一声唤也要把它吓一大跳，这匹野牛就非烧死不可”；数万万觉悟了的民众，将会是源源不绝的兵源补充，成为抗击日军的后盾力量；数万万觉悟了的民众，也是支撑抗日财政经济的重要基础。只要能广泛动员起民众，“岂有如此广土众民的国家而患财穷之理”？一言以蔽之，只要实现了人民群众的主体自觉，“便无敌于天下，个把日本帝国主义是不够打的”。因此，坚持持久抗战，先决条件是动员组织民众，抗战最终胜利，端赖于动员组织广大民众。

Although the broad masses harbored enormous potential, for a considerable period they were not mobilized or organized and had not yet formed a collective self-awareness. The reason was that the Kuomintang did not recognize and was unwilling to organize the broad masses to join the War of Resistance; on the contrary, it regarded the War of Resistance as a matter for the government and the army and used various means to restrict the broad masses from participating. However, “such a resistance may achieve partial victories, but it can never achieve final victory. On the contrary, such a resistance faces the serious possibility of defeat.” The Chinese Communist Party recognized very early on that enormous power lay latent in the masses. “In the long civil war launched by the counter-revolutionaries since 1927, the Chinese people had already gained considerable understanding of this force and found a good method of relying on the Communist Party to lead it in struggle. In their long political experience, the broad masses of the Chinese people had already mastered a very effective weapon for opposing the enemy.” Therefore, in this national war, the Chinese Communist Party, together with the broad masses of the people and their armed forces, was not only the most active force of resistance but also the backbone standing at the forefront of the struggle—the “core of the nationwide resistance.” Since this was the case, the Communists had to shoulder political responsibility: “not to relax for a single moment or miss a single opportunity to propagandize the masses, organize the masses, and arm the masses. As long as we can truly organize millions upon millions of people into the Anti-Japanese National United Front, the victory of the War of Resistance is beyond doubt.”

广大民众虽然积蓄着巨大的潜力，但是相当长的时期内并没有发动组织起来，尚未形成群体自觉。原因在于国民党没有认识也不愿意组织广大民众加入抗战，反而认为抗日战争是政府和军队的事，通过各种途径限制广大民众参加抗战。但是，“这种抗战可能取得局部的胜利，然而决不能取得最后胜利。相反的，这种抗战存在着严重失败的可能”。中国共产党很早就认识到民众中蕴藏着巨大的力量。“在一九二七年以来反革命发动的长期内战中，中国人民早已对这股力量有了很多认识，并且找到了一个依靠共产党来领导它斗争的好办法。中国人民大众在其长期的政治经验中，已经掌握了反对敌人的非常有效的武器。”因此，在这场民族战争中，中国共产党与全国广大民众及其武装力量，不仅是最积极的抗战力量，也是站在斗争最前线的中坚力量，是“全国抗战的核心”。既然如此，共产党人还要扛起政治责任，“不放松一刻工夫一个机会去宣传群众、组织群众、武装群众，只要真能组织千百万群众进入抗日民族统一战线，抗日战争的胜利是无疑义的”。

In this regard, the subjective self-awareness of the Chinese Communist Party and the subjective self-awareness of the broad masses complement each other and are fundamentally consistent. Together they constitute the fundamental force for historical development and progress, becoming the bearing subjects of the spirit of historical initiative. The Communists must possess a high degree of subjective self-awareness, clearly recognizing their own political responsibility and mission; the broad masses are the Party’s foundation and source of strength. This requires the Party to broadly mobilize and organize the masses and vigorously enhance their subjective self-awareness. Once the masses become conscious, they will provide inexhaustible supplies to the war, supporting the War of Resistance to final victory. “If China defeats Japan, it will mean that the broad masses of the Chinese people have awakened, have been mobilized, and have achieved independence.” This is the testimony of history, and it is also the essential meaning of enhancing subjective self-awareness and developing historical initiative.

就此而言，中国共产党的主体自觉与广大民众的主体自觉是相辅相成、根本一致的。二者共同构成了历史发展进步的根本力量，成为历史主动精神的承载主体。共产党人必须要有高度的主体自觉，认清自身的政治责任与使命担当，广大民众则是党的力量根基与源泉。这就要求党必须广泛发动组织民众，大力提升广大民众的主体自觉。群众觉悟了，就会在战争中给以无穷无尽的供给，支撑抗日战争走向最后胜利。“如果中国打败了日本，这将意味着中国人民大众已经觉醒了，已经动员起来，并已取得了独立”。这是历史的明证，也是提升主体自觉，发扬历史主动的题中之义。

III. Exerting Conscious Initiative, Creating Conditions, and Grasping Historical Initiative

三、发挥自觉能动，创造条件，把握历史主动

Conscious initiative is the conscious activity and effort of the historical subject; it is an important link in generating historical initiative. Its role is especially important in war. Mao Zedong paid particular attention to exerting people’s “conscious initiative.” In *On Protracted War* he not only explicitly put forward the concept of “conscious initiative” but also clearly emphasized that implementing protracted war requires “bringing into full play all conscious initiative in resisting Japan in order to achieve the goal. Sitting still and doing nothing will only lead to destruction.”

自觉能动性是历史主体的自觉活动和努力，是生成历史主动的重要环节。特别是在战争中，自觉能动性的作用尤为重要。毛泽东特别注重发挥人的“自觉能动性”，他在《论持久战》一文中不仅明确提出“自觉能动性”这一概念，而且明确强调实施持久战必须“统统发扬其抗日的自觉的能动性，才能达到目的。坐着不动，只有被灭亡”。

In war, the final determination of victory or defeat certainly requires the support of a series of objective conditions, but these conditions only determine the possibility of victory or defeat; they cannot in themselves produce the outcome. The final direction of the war still depends on subjective effort: grasping the laws of war, formulating plans based on objective conditions, seeking the initiative in mobile operations, exercising flexible command in the deployment of troops, and exploiting the enemy’s gaps at the first signs. Exerting conscious initiative in war is like “the art of swimming in the sea”: on the one hand, one must ensure that one does not sink; on the other, one must exert conscious initiative and proceed step by step according to plan to reach the opposite shore. Exerting conscious initiative in war is also “the stage for the activities of the war commander,” on which “many vivid, colorful, and magnificent dramas can be staged.” Conscious initiative in war requires not only the courage to face the enemy but also the subjective effort to master the changes and developments of the war—this is an important foundation for implementing the protracted strategy and also the ultimate aim of grasping historical initiative.

在战争中，决定最终的胜负，固然需要一系列客观条件的支撑，但这些条件只是决定着胜负的可能，本身并不能分出胜负结果。战争最终的走向，仍需通过主观努力，把握战争规律，根据客观条件制定计划，在机动作战中寻求主动，在排兵布阵中灵活指挥，在征兆端倪中乘敌之隙。在战争中发挥自觉能动性，犹如“大海中的游泳术”，一方面要确保自己不在海中沉没，同时要发挥自觉能动，按照计划安排有步骤地到达彼岸。在战争中发挥自觉能动性，也是“战争指挥员活动的舞台”，他们凭借这个舞台“可以导演出很多有声有色、威武雄壮的戏剧来”。战争中的自觉能动性，除了要有不惧敌人的勇气，更要有驾驭战争发展变化的主观努力，这是实施持久战略的重要基础，也是把握历史主动的旨归。

To exert conscious initiative and grasp historical initiative, one must pay attention to seizing the initiative. The initiative is correct understanding and action that proceed from the subjective to the objective. To exert conscious initiative, one must form correct ideas based on objective reality, put forward policies and guidelines that conform to the objective, and formulate specific strategies and tactics. Only by forming correct ideas can one guide correct action and seize the initiative. In war, the initiative and its opposite are closely related to the relative superiority or inferiority of the forces of the two sides. A position of superiority in strength enables one to seize the initiative. But superiority or inferiority in strength is not fixed; it is relative. The enemy has both strengths and weaknesses; we have both weaknesses and strengths. It all depends on whether we can, according to specific conditions, exert conscious initiative, turn weakness into strength, and actively seize the initiative. Although China was inferior in military and material strength, it was superior in geographical conditions, population and manpower, and morale. Combined with other favorable conditions, this would reduce the enemy’s superiority; with relative superiority, one would be in an active position. As long as we exert conscious initiative, resolutely carry out exterior-line quick-decision offensive warfare and guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines, and achieve local superiority and an active position, we can gradually build up strategic superiority and an active position and thus seize the initiative.

发挥自觉能动，把握历史主动，要注意掌握主动权。主动权是主观见之于客观的正确认识和行动。想要发挥自觉能动，就必须根据客观现实，形成正确的思想，提出符合客观的方针政策，制定具体的战略战术。只有形成正确的思想，才能指导正确的行动，才能把握主动权。体现在战争中，主动与被动和战争双方力量的优劣休戚相关。处于力量优势的地位，就能把握主动权。但力量的优劣并不是恒定不变的，而是处于相对状态。敌方有优势也会有劣势，我方有劣势也有优势，端赖我们能够根据具体条件，发挥自觉能动性，变劣势为优势，积极把握主动权。中国虽然在军力、物力方面处于劣势，但是在地理条件、人口兵员和士气方面却处于优势，再加上其他的优势条件，便会减灭敌方的优势，有了相对的优势便会处于主动地位。只要发挥自觉能动，坚决执行外线速决进攻战和敌后游击战争，在局部取得优势和主动地位，便可逐渐形成战略优势和主动地位，就能掌握主动权。

War has its own special organization and methods; it is a particular form of activity in which the two sides, enemy and ourselves, each exploit their own strengths and the other’s weaknesses, constructing their own advantages to attack the other’s disadvantages. This requires that the commander of a war must break free from routine habits, give full play to conscious activity, actively create partial superiority and partial initiative, and strive to reduce the enemy’s advantages. Forming subjectively correct guidance in the concrete conduct of operations can likewise affect the transformation of superiority and inferiority. Historical instances of defeating a numerically superior force with a smaller one, or overcoming a stronger enemy with a weaker one, all relied on correct guidance to turn the situation around, thereby achieving a position of superiority and initiative and ultimately winning victory. Offense and defense are the normal state on the battlefield, but one must also pay attention to defense within the offensive and offense within the defensive. When facing an enemy offensive, defense is naturally the main approach, but it should not be passive and purely defensive; rather, there should be offense within the defense, and on the whole, conscious activity must be brought into play to seek advantages and launch offensives. Even if one is at a disadvantage for a considerable period, subjective effort must be exerted to strive for strategic and tactical breakthroughs, accumulating small victories into big ones, and promoting quantitative change to bring about qualitative change. As long as subjective effort is made to continuously alter the relative superiority and inferiority between enemy and ourselves on the battlefield, and to achieve the transformation of strength and weakness in a dynamic process, the overall situation will change, and a situation of transformation will take shape in which the strong become weak and the weak become strong. War is, after all, a contest of strength. Although objective factors in war provide the possibility for the transformation of superiority and inferiority, “to realize this possibility requires correct policies and subjective effort. At this point, subjective action becomes decisive.” [16]16 Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War” (1938), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, p. 491. [Return to text] This kind of active effort is inseparable from the war commander’s analysis of various mutually opposing basic factors, and also inseparable from correct strategic and tactical guidance.

战争有其特殊的组织和方法，是敌我双方相互利用己之所长、彼之所短，构建自身优势攻击对方劣势的特殊活动形态。这就要求战争指挥者必须跳出常规习惯，发挥自觉能动性，积极创造局部优势和局部主动，着力消减敌方的优势。在具体作战中形成主观正确的指导，同样会影响优劣转换。历史上以少胜多、以劣胜优的实例，都是依赖正确的指导转换局势，形成了优势主动地位最终得以取胜。进攻和防御是战场常态，但也要注意进攻中的防守与防守中的进攻。面对敌方进攻自然要以防御为主，但不是消极单纯的防御而是在防御中有进攻，在整体上要发挥自觉能动性寻求优势展开进攻。即便是相当长时期内处于劣势，也要发挥主观努力，着力寻求战略战术突破口，积小胜为大胜，以量变促质变。只要通过主观努力，在战场上不断改变敌我之间优劣形势，在动态之中实现强弱转换，就会推动总的形势的变化，强者变弱、弱者变强的优劣转换局面便会形成。战争终究是力量比拼。战争中的客观因素虽然为优劣转换提供了可能，“但实现这种可能性，就需要正确的方针和主观的努力。这时候，主观作用是决定的了”。这种主动努力离不开战争指挥者分析各种互相对立的基本因素，也离不开正确的战略战术指导。

To give full play to conscious activity and grasp historical initiative, one must pay attention to flexibility. As a subjective activity, conscious activity must at all times adapt to changed realities and flexibly adopt corresponding measures. Not long ago, some dogmatists paid no attention to flexibility, “mechanically applying a formula they considered unchangeable everywhere, which could only lead to setbacks for the revolution or ruin things that were originally done well.” [17]17 Mao Zedong, “On Contradiction” (1937), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 1, p. 323. [Return to text] The essential error of dogmatism lies in its failure to recognize that different contradictions must be resolved by different methods, thereby bringing serious consequences to the Chinese revolution. Grasping flexibility means insisting on resolving different contradictions with different methods and flexibly adapting to concrete realities. The same applies to directing war. As a special form of social activity, war “must break away from ordinary habits and become accustomed to war before victory in war can be won.” [18]18 Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War” (1936), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 1, p. 182. [Return to text] As the saying goes, there is no deceit in war; one must take the enemy by surprise, feign attack in the east while striking in the west. Implementing such flexible tactics makes the enemy “become blind and deaf, and throws their commanders’ minds into as much confusion as possible.” [19]19 Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War” (1938), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, p. 493. [Return to text] In this way, uncertainty is created for the enemy, while the greatest possible certainty is created for oneself.

发挥自觉能动，把握历史主动，要注重灵活性。自觉能动作为一种主观活动，必须随时因应变化了的实际，灵活机动地采取相应的对策。曾几何时，一些教条主义者不注重灵活性，“只是千篇一律地使用一种自以为不可改变的公式到处硬套，这就只能使革命遭受挫折，或者将本来做得好的事情弄得很坏”。教条主义的错误本质，就是没有认识到不同的矛盾必须用不同的方法解决，由此给中国革命带来严重后果。把握灵活性，就是要坚持用不同的方法解决不同的矛盾，灵活因应具体实际。指导战争亦是如此。战争作为一种特殊的社会活动形态，“必须脱出寻常习惯，而习惯于战争，方能争取战争的胜利”。正所谓兵不厌诈、出其不意、声东击西，实施这种灵活的战术，使敌方“变成瞎子和聋子，要把他们的指挥员的心尽可能地弄得混乱些”。这样一来，就给敌方造成不确定性，为自己创造尽可能大的确定性。

As a director of war, one must not only understand these tactics but also flexibly use and vary them. That is to say, in concrete operations, one must actively give full play to conscious activity, and actively and flexibly organize and employ forces. Flexible command on the battlefield is not easy, and flexible employment of forces is especially not easy. Particularly in situations where the enemy is strong and we are weak, it is necessary to actively give full play to conscious activity, so that when organizing forces one can be flexible without chaos and orderly, seize opportunities amid rapidly changing military intelligence, grasp the key points, and sort out the threads; when employing forces, one must achieve “the subtlety of application lies in the mind” [20]20 A classical Chinese phrase from the *History of the Song Dynasty*, referring to the subtle and ingenious application of military tactics that depends on the commander’s insight. [Return to text] and flexibly and nimbly vary the use of tactics. Whether one can be flexible and mobile on the battlefield depends entirely on the commander’s ability to size up the situation. Possessing this ability enables one to find the enemy’s weak points, transform the relative superiority and inferiority between enemy and ourselves, and “final victory will belong to us.” [21]21 Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War” (1938), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, p. 494. [Return to text] To achieve flexibility in war, it is necessary to vigorously bring conscious activity into play; only then can one seize the right moment to flexibly deploy forces, grasp the initiative, and achieve practical results.

作为战争的指导者，不仅要懂得这些战术，更要灵活使用变换这些战术。也就是说，要在具体作战中积极发挥自觉能动性，主动灵活地组织和使用兵力。在战场上灵活指挥并不容易，灵活使用兵力尤其不容易。特别是在敌强我弱的情况下，需要积极发挥自觉能动性，在组织兵力时能做到灵活不乱、秩序井然，在瞬息万变的军情中抓住战机、找到关节、理出头绪，在使用兵力时能“运用之妙，存乎一心”，灵活机动地变换使用战术。能否在战场上灵活机动，端赖指挥员的审时度势能力。具备这一能力，就能找到乘敌之隙，转变敌我优劣形势，“最后胜利就属于我们了”。想要实现战争中的灵活性，就需要大力发挥自觉能动性，如此才能找准时机灵活用兵，把握主动收到实效。

To give full play to conscious activity and grasp historical initiative, one must pay attention to understanding and grasping laws. Laws are universally present; anyone who wishes to direct war must understand and grasp the laws of war. Although laws are universally present, they do not appear automatically; we must understand and grasp them in concrete practice and use the laws within them to guide war. The judgment that the War of Resistance Against Japan would be a protracted war was a major strategic judgment based on laws such as “a just cause enjoys abundant support while an unjust cause finds little support,” [22]22 A classical Chinese saying from the *Mencius*, referring to the moral advantage of a just cause. [Return to text] “know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles without peril,” [23]23 A classical Chinese saying from Sunzi’s *The Art of War*. [Return to text] “war is the continuation of politics,” [24]24 A formulation derived from Clausewitz’s *On War*, frequently cited by Mao Zedong. [Return to text] and “the soldiers and the people are the foundation of victory,” [25]25 Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War” (1938), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, p. 511. [Return to text] and on the interrelationship of all enemy and our own factors and the actual state of China’s political and economic imbalance. The “theory of national subjugation” and the “theory of quick victory” were erroneous precisely because they either regarded the enemy as gods and ourselves as grass, or regarded the enemy as grass and ourselves as gods, failing to recognize the laws of this war.

发挥自觉能动，把握历史主动，要注意认识和把握规律。规律是普遍存在的，任何想要指导战争的人，必须认识和把握战争规律。规律虽普遍存在，但规律不会自动出现，需要我们在具体实践中认识和把握，并利用其中的规律指导战争。抗日战争是持久战，就是按照“得道多助，失道寡助”“知彼知己，百战不殆”“战争是政治的继续”“兵民是胜利之本”等规律为基础，根据全部敌我因素的相互关系、中国政治和经济不平衡的实际状态，形成的重大战略判断。“亡国论”和“速胜论”之所以错误，就在于它们要么视敌如神、视己如草，要么视敌如草、视己如神，没有认识到这场战争的规律。

The War of Resistance Against Japan was a total war under modern conditions, so it was necessary to understand and grasp the laws of modern warfare and strengthen technological innovation. Without strengthening technological conditions, it would be impossible to drive the Japanese army out of China; modern warfare requires flexible and active strategy and tactics, and without paying attention to this, victory cannot be achieved; modern warfare also requires attention to political work in the army, and without progressive political spirit, victory cannot be achieved either—this point is even more important. “Without a progressive political spirit infused into the army, without progressive political work to carry out this infusion, it is impossible to achieve genuine unity between officers and men, impossible to arouse the maximum anti-Japanese fervor among officers and men, and all technology and tactics cannot obtain the best foundation to exert their due effectiveness.” [26]26 Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War” (1938), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, p. 511. [Return to text] This is a basic law of modern warfare, and it must be taken seriously in implementing protracted war. To give full play to conscious activity, one must fully recognize the reality that the enemy is strong and we are weak. Actively giving full play to conscious activity in fighting the Japanese army absolutely does not mean treating every battle passively; all subjective and formalist illusions must be discarded. Under the objective condition of the enemy being strong and we being weak, one must resolutely avoid strategic decisive battles that gamble the fate of the nation, refrain from fighting any campaigns that are completely uncertain, and only decisively implement battles that are certain. Staking everything on a single throw, regardless of the stakes, is not conscious activity; it also violates the law that “things move in twists and turns,” [27]27 Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War” (1938), in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 2, p. 509. [Return to text] and the result can only be subjective and formalist illusions.

抗日战争是现代化背景下的总体战，也就必须认识把握现代战争规律，加强技术革新。不加强技术条件，不可能将日军赶出中国；现代战争需要灵活主动的战略战术，不注重这一点不可能取得胜利；现代战争也必须注重军队政治工作，没有进步的政治精神也不可能取得胜利，这一点更为重要。“没有进步的政治精神贯注于军队之中，没有进步的政治工作去执行这种贯注，就不能达到真正的官长和士兵的一致，就不能激发官兵最大限度的抗战热忱，一切技术和战术就不能得着最好的基础去发挥它们应有的效力。”这是现代战争的基本规律，在实施持久战中需要认真对待。发挥自觉能动，需充分认识敌强我弱的现实。积极发挥自觉能性与日军作战，绝不可消极对待每一次战争，必须摒弃一切主观主义和形式主义的幻想。在敌强我弱的客观条件下，坚决避免赌国家命运的战略决战，不打一切毫无把握的战役，只对有把握的战斗果断实施。孤注一掷不惜赌本，不是自觉能动，也违反了“事物是往返曲折”这一规律，结果只能是主观主义和形式主义的幻想。

From this perspective, the conscious activity of the historical subject is not reckless action or blind movement, nor is it subjective illusion; rather, it is the understanding, grasping, and utilization of laws based on objective concrete reality, turning inferiority into superiority, passivity into initiative, and actively seizing the initiative. Only by actively giving full play to conscious activity, actively grasping the transformation of superiority and inferiority, deeply penetrating historical laws, making subjective efforts to advance history, and unifying purposefulness with regularity, can one grasp historical initiative. In this sense, conscious activity, as the conscious action and effort of human beings, is the basic essence of grasping historical initiative and an important link in developing historical initiative.

就此看来，历史主体的自觉能动，不是妄动盲动，也不是主观幻想，而是依据客观具体实际认识把握利用规律，变劣势为优势，变被动为主动，积极把握主动权。只有积极发挥自觉能动性，对优劣转换的主动把握，对历史规律的深刻洞察，对推动历史前进的主观努力，将目的性与规律性统一起来，才能把握历史主动。从这个意义上讲，自觉能动作为人的自觉活动和努力，是把握历史主动的基本要义，也是发扬历史主动的重要环节。

IV. Emphasize Scientific Foresight, Broaden Vision, and Grasp Historical Initiative

四、注重科学预见，扩展眼界，把握历史主动

A prominent feature of historical initiative is the ability to accurately judge the situation and scientifically foresee trends amid the evolution of the times, thereby enhancing the planning, foresight, and creativity of work. Mao Zedong’s essay “On Protracted War” is a model of emphasizing scientific foresight and grasping historical initiative. From the structural layout of raising problems, analyzing problems, and solving problems, the entire essay is filled with the strategic vision and strategic thinking of using scientific foresight to grasp historical initiative; it can be called an extremely vivid classic guide to grasping historical initiative through scientific foresight.

历史主动的一个突出特点，就是能在时代发展演变中准确判定形势、科学预见趋势，增强工作的计划性、预见性和创造性。毛泽东《论持久战》一文，就是一篇注重科学预见，把握历史主动的范本。从提出问题、分析问题到解决问题的结构布局，全篇充满科学预见把握历史主动的战略视野和战略思维，堪称是通过科学预见把握历史主动极为生动的经典指南。

Emphasizing scientific foresight and grasping historical initiative requires discarding “shortsightedness” in politics, military affairs, and strategy. *On Protracted War* opens by criticizing two erroneous forecasts of the situation — “national subjugation” and “quick victory” — pointing out that these are subjective, one-sided, and unscientific forecasts. They appear to have an outline but are in fact vague; they sound somewhat reasonable but are actually groundless, belonging to specious empty talk. This is political “shortsightedness.” The main forms of combat in the War of Resistance Against Japan were mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare, whose chief characteristics were advance and retreat, flow and flux. When to advance and when to retreat requires foresight and judgment. Advancing without retreating is desperate adventurism; retreating without advancing is flightism; both are forms of military “shortsightedness.” Focusing on only one aspect while neglecting others, failing to recognize the military struggle strategy under the actual situation where the enemy is strong and we are weak. To implement protracted resistance, one must accurately forecast the battlefield situation, fight only battles with certainty, resolutely avoid decisive engagements without assurance, and understand the need to unhesitatingly abandon one city or one stronghold, using vast space to wage protracted war against the enemy. Rashly seeking a quick decision with the enemy is strategic “shortsightedness.” Its essence is the inability to scientifically judge the situation, the failure to see that protracted war is our strategic tactic for resisting the Japanese army, and the lack of recognition of the simple truth that “as long as the green hills remain, there will be no shortage of firewood.” In a confrontation between a weak country and a strong one, one must avoid the enemy’s锋芒 (sharp edge), wait for a favorable opportunity, and if one stakes everything on a single throw, there will be no capital left for another gamble. Contracting “shortsightedness” not only prevents recovering lost territory but may even lead to losing all land, resulting in the danger of national subjugation.

注重科学预见，把握历史主动，要摒弃政治军事和战略上的“近视眼”。《论持久战》开篇即对“亡国论”和“速胜论”两种错误的形势预见提出了批评，指出这是主观片面和非科学的预见，看上去似有轮廓，实则模糊不清；听起来似有几分道理，实际毫无根据，属于似是而非的空谈。这是政治上的“近视眼”。抗日战争主要作战形式是运动战和游击战，进退流动是其主要特点。何时进何时退，需要预见判断。只进不退是拼命主义，只退不进是逃跑主义，二者属于军事上的“近视眼”。只注重一个方面而忽略其他方面，没有认识到敌强我弱这个实际形势下的军事斗争策略。实施持久抗战，要准确预见战场形势，只打有把握的仗，坚决避免毫无把握的决战，要懂得不惜放弃一城一池，利用广阔空间与敌人展开持久战。鲁莽地与敌人速决，这是战略上的“近视眼”。其本质是不能科学判断形势，看不到持久战是我们抵抗日军的战略战术，没有认识到“留得青山在，不怕没柴烧”的朴素道理。在弱国与强国的对抗中，必须避开敌人锋芒，等待于我有利的时机，孤注一掷就无再赌的资本。患上“近视眼”，不仅不能收复失地，甚将会失去全部土地，导致走向亡国的危险。

Political, military, and strategic “shortsightedness” is, in the final analysis, a matter of vision. Without vision there is no foresight; understanding the situation does not take the overall situation into account but proceeds only from the partial, paying attention neither to the connection between today and tomorrow nor to the relationship between the part and the whole, “clinging stubbornly to a part or a moment and never letting go,” which inevitably leads to specious conclusions. This is a very poor level of vision and must be discarded. To improve vision, “one should use telescopes and microscopes.” Because telescopes and microscopes are tools for us to understand things and foresee the situation, they are “extensions of the eyes.”

政治军事和战略上的“近视眼”，说到底是眼界问题。没有眼界不会有预见，认识形势不会通观全局只从局部出发，既不注重今天与明天的联系，也不注重部分与全体的关联，“捉住一局部一时间的东西死也不放”，必然会出现似是而非的结论。这是很不高明的眼界，必须摒弃。提高眼界“应该借助于望远镜和显微镜”。因为望远镜和显微镜是我们认识事物预见形势的工具，是“眼睛的延长”。

“With a large telescope, we see more stars.” *On Protracted War* points out that the War of Resistance Against Japan would ultimately move toward victory, and this is a scientific foresight made by relying on the “telescope.” From the international background, apart from Japan’s allies, most countries in the world were important forces against fascism. As long as we united these anti-fascist forces and established an international united front, it would be favorable for our resistance to move toward victory. From this, one could clearly foresee that this would be a war of “interlocking” in the history of human warfare. As manifested in China, this would be a war that “breaks historical records.” With the “telescope,” we could further foresee that this war would have the character of permanent peace. This war, launched by imperialist countries, was the eruption of the general crisis of world capitalism. With the rise of the consciousness of the world’s people, there would be a worldwide revolutionary war to counter the war of aggression, and this war would also carry the character of fighting for permanent world peace. “The liberation of the Chinese nation will be won from this war. The future liberated new China is inseparable from the future liberated new world. Therefore, our War of Resistance Against Japan contains the character of fighting for the struggle for permanent peace.”

“有了大望远镜，我们看到的星星就更多了。”《论持久战》指出，抗日战争终将走向胜利，就是靠“望远镜”做出的科学预见。从国际大背景看，除了日本盟友之外，世界上的多数国家是反法西斯的重要力量。只要联合这些反法西斯力量，建立起国际统一战线，就有利于我们的抗战走向胜利。由此便可清楚地预见到，这将是人类战争史上一场“犬牙交错”的战争。体现在中国，这将是一场“突破历史记录”的战争。有了“望远镜”，我们更可以预见，这场战争将具有永久和平的性质。由帝国主义国家发动的这场战争，是世界资本主义总危机的爆发。随着世界人民觉悟的提高，将会出现世界性的革命战争，以应对侵略战争，由这场战争也将带有为世界永久和平而战的性质。“中华民族的解放将从这个战争中得来。将来的被解放了的新中国，是和将来的被解放了的新世界不能分离的。因此，我们的抗日战争包含着为争取永久和平而战的性质。”

With a microscope, one can “see far and see truly.” *On Protracted War* points out that the War of Resistance Against Japan would ultimately rely on the protracted strategy to move toward victory, and this is a scientific foresight made by relying on the “microscope.” The microscope helps to clearly observe things, correctly understand things, and deeply analyze things. Using this tool, we can both see the enemy’s disadvantages and see our own advantages; we can both recognize the characteristics of our own operations and recognize the characteristics of the enemy’s operations; we can both see the evolving trend of the war and see the specific features of each stage. In this way, we can scientifically and reasonably foresee and conceive, pointing out “certain major outlines in the trend of the war,” and “draw a rough sketch” for strategic guidance and the war’s trend, that is, the three stages of “China from inferiority to equilibrium to superiority, Japan from superiority to equilibrium to inferiority; China from defense to stalemate to counteroffensive, Japan from offense to consolidation to retreat.” These three stages are “the inevitable trend of the Sino-Japanese war.” Thus, the subjective and one-sided mechanistic understanding is overturned, the purpose and essence of the war are recognized, inferiority is compensated for and superiority is developed, concrete strategic and tactical principles for the War of Resistance Against Japan are formed, the initiative is grasped, the enemy’s gaps are exploited to seize the initiative, and all favorable conditions are used to achieve the final victory of the war of resistance.

有了显微镜，就可以“看得远，看得真”。《论持久战》指出抗日战争终将依靠持久战略走向胜利，就是靠“显微镜”做出的科学预见。显微镜有助于清晰观察事物，正确认识事物，深入分析事物。利用这一工具，我们既能看清敌方的劣势，又能看清我方的优势；既能认清我方作战的特点，又能认清敌人作战的特点；既能看清战争的演变趋势，又能看清每一阶段的具体特征。这样就可以科学合理地预见设想，指出“战争趋势中的某些大端”，为战略指导和战争趋势“画一个轮廓”，即“中国由劣势到平衡到优势，日本由优势到平衡到劣势，中国由防御到相持到反攻，日本由进攻到保守到退却”三个阶段，这三个阶段就是“中日战争的必然趋势”。由此，也就推翻那种主观片面的机械论认识，从而认清战争的目的和本质，弥补劣势发扬优势，形成抗日战争具体的战略战术方针，掌握主动权，乘敌之隙把握主动，利用一切有利条件实现抗战的最后胜利。

Emphasizing scientific foresight and grasping historical initiative requires overcoming blindness and embodying objectivity. Scientific foresight is not subjective blind fantasy mired in a quagmire; judgments made based on subjective feelings and will are mostly manifestations of blindness separated from objectivity and practice. All those who rely on subjective will and think of doing great things in a big way are either subjectivism or putschism, which in terms of ideological roots belong to idealism and mechanism. This kind of blindness that completely disregards objective conditions can only be a “reckless fellow” rather than a “prophet,” because “what is not based on and does not conform to objective facts is fantasy, is false reasoning, and if acted upon, will lead to failure.” Scientific foresight is based on judgments of objective facts, and judgments of objective facts are based on clear identification and analysis of things. Subjective understanding without any basis, judgments made only based on a temporary manifestation or one side, are not far-sighted scientific foresight but will ultimately fall into the situation of “a blind man riding a blind horse, approaching a deep pool at midnight,” falling into the pit of blind action. Based on this, Mao Zedong pointed out sharply: “Blindness means no foresight and hinders foresight. Dogmatism and empiricism cannot have foresight.” Only by discarding blind tendencies and basing oneself on an objective and comprehensive perspective is the correct method of scientific foresight.

注重科学预见，把握历史主动，要克服盲目性体现客观性。科学预见不是陷入泥潭的主观盲目幻想，凭借主观感情和意志所做的判断多是与客观和实践相分离的盲目性的体现。一切凭借主观意志想着大干一场的，不是主观主义就是盲动主义，在思想认识根源上属于唯心论和机械论。这种完全不顾客观条件的盲目性，只能是“鲁莽家”而不是“预言家”，因为“不根据和不符合于客观事实，是空想，是假道理，如果照了做去，就要失败”。科学的预见基于客观事实的判断，客观事实的判断基于对事物的清晰辨认和分析。毫无根据的主观认识，只根据一时表现和一个侧面做出的判断，非但不是高瞻远瞩的科学预见，最终反而会陷入“盲人骑瞎马，半夜临深池”的境地，掉入盲动的深坑。基于此，毛泽东一针见血地指出：“盲目性是没有预见的，是妨碍预见的。教条主义、经验主义是不可能有预见的。”只有摒弃盲目倾向，以客观全面的视角为基础，才是科学预见的正确方法。

Scientific foresight that embodies objectivity is a logical judgment formed based on the objective situation and concrete reality. Making judgments and carrying out work entirely according to objective concrete reality — this is our basic policy. Adhering to this policy, even on a rapidly changing battlefield, one can see the signs and clues that have just emerged, discovering the traces and hints among them. By deeply studying and judging the signs and clues that have already appeared, one can make scientific foresight so as to make plans and preparations in advance. Scientific foresight that embodies objectivity is also an important ability that Marxists need to cultivate. The scientific foresight of Communists is “to seriously study the past and present of China’s politics, military affairs, economy, and culture based on the standpoint and method of Marxism-Leninism, to seriously study the practical experience of the Chinese revolution, and to draw conclusions as the guide to action for the Chinese revolution.” Scientific foresight that embodies objectivity is also a form of leadership. As the saying goes, “without foresight there is no leadership.” For the sake of leadership, foresight “often requires seeing farther, that is, when something has just emerged above the horizon, just shown its head, when it is still small and not widespread, one can see it and see its future universal significance.” In this way, one can foresee the development trend of things with far-sightedness, transform this foresight into concrete practice, grasp historical initiative, and achieve predetermined goals.

体现客观性的科学预见，是基于客观形势和具体实际形成的合乎逻辑的判断。一切按照客观具体实际做出判断开展工作，这是我们的基本方针。坚持这一方针，即便在瞬息万变的战场上，也能看到刚刚显露的征兆端倪，发现其中的蛛丝马迹。深入研判业已显现的征兆端倪和蛛丝马迹，便可做出科学预见，以便提前做出计划准备。体现客观性的科学预见，也是马克思主义者需要练就的重要能力。共产党人的科学预见，就是“根据马克思列宁主义的立场和方法来认真研究中国的政治、军事、经济、文化的过去和现在，认真研究中国革命的实际经验，得出结论，作为中国革命的行动指南”。体现客观性的科学预见，还是一种领导方式。正所谓“没有预见就没有领导”。为着领导的预见，“常常是要求看得更远，就是说在地平线上刚冒出来一点的时候，刚露出一点头的时候，还是小量的不普遍的时候，就能看见，就能看到它的将来的普遍意义”。如此，便可高瞻远地预见事物发展趋势，并将这种预见转变为具体实践，就可把握历史主动，实现预定目标。

Emphasizing scientific foresight and grasping historical initiative requires planning. For everything, preparation ensures success, and lack of preparation leads to failure. [31]31 A classical Chinese saying from *The Book of Rites* (《礼记·中庸》). This is especially true in war, where foresight and planning are essential. To conduct a campaign, one must have an overall plan for the entire campaign. When fighting the first battle of a campaign, one must plan and consider how each subsequent battle should be fought. Regardless of the impact of each battle’s outcome—victory or defeat—on the overall war situation, planning and foresight are indispensable. “To drift with the passage of time, though working hard, still cannot achieve victory, and may even bring the danger of harming the revolutionary cause.” [32]32 Mao Zedong, *On Protracted War* (1938). A strategic director, in particular, must make plans and preparations; when at a certain strategic stage, he should plan for the subsequent stages. Although the further ahead one looks, the more unpredictable changes become, and the more distant the prospects, the more elusive foresight grows, planning and preparation, along with forecasting prospects, are essential steps. One must “calculate the counter-offensive stage during the retreat stage, calculate the offensive stage during the counter-offensive stage, and calculate the retreat stage during the offensive stage. Without such calculation, being bound by immediate gains and losses is the path to defeat,” [33]33 Mao Zedong, *Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War* (1936). and one will miss opportunities and fall into passivity.

注重科学预见，把握历史主动，要体现计划性。凡事预则立不预则废。特别在战争中，更要有预见有计划。执行一次战役，就要有战役的全盘计划。打战役第一仗，就要有计划考虑随后每一场战斗该如何进行。不管每次胜败结局对战争全局产生哪些影响，都得有计划有预见。“跟着时间迁流，虽然也在努力工作，却不能取得胜利，反而有使革命事业受到损害的危险”。一个战略指导者尤其要做好计划准备，当处于某一个战略阶段之时，就应该为随后的多个阶段做计划。虽然越往后变化越难测，距离越远能够预见的越渺茫，但计划准备和前景预测是必不可少的步骤，要在“退却阶段时必须计算到反攻阶段，反攻阶段时必须计算到进攻阶段，进攻阶段时又须计算到退却阶段。没有这种计算，束缚于眼前的利害，就是失败之道”，就会坐失机会陷于被动。

Although objective reality is complex and tortuous, especially the uncertainty of war, the foresight made can only outline a rough contour. “What is sketched cannot fully match future facts and will be corrected by facts, but for the sake of firm and purposeful strategic guidance in a protracted war, sketching the contour is still necessary.” [34]34 Mao Zedong, *On Protracted War* (1938). The view that war, due to its uncertainty and fluidity, therefore lacks planning and fixed strategic principles, is that of a “relativist” regarding war. Although war plans and principles must be revised according to changes in the situation, the uncertainty and fluidity of war manifest only as quantitative changes, not qualitative changes, within a certain period. Therefore, plans and principles within a certain period possess relative fixity, especially those concerning “quality”; such plans and principles “are by no means fluid within a certain period.” [35]35 Mao Zedong, *On Protracted War* (1938). Hence, making plans based on foresight is not only necessary but imperative, and a strategic director, in particular, must do so.

尽管客观现实是复杂曲折的，特别是战争更具有不确定性，所做的预见只能描绘大致轮廓，“描画的东西不能尽合将来的事实，而将为事实所校正，但是为着坚定地有目的地进行持久战的战略指导起见，描画轮廓的事仍然是需要的”。那种认为战争具有不确定性和流动性，因而不具有计划性，也没有固定的战略方针的认识，是战争的“相对主义”者。战争的计划和方针虽然要根据形势的变化修正，但是战争的不确定性和流动，在一段时间内只体现为量的变化而不是质的变化。因此，一定时间内的计划和方针具有相对的固定性，特别是关于“质”的计划方针，“在一定时间内是决不流动的”。因此，根据预见做出计划不仅必要而且必须，一个战略指导者尤需如此。

Emphasizing scientific foresight is, in the final analysis, aimed at grasping historical initiative and turning prior conceptions into reality. In concrete practice, it is necessary to expand one’s vision based on objective reality and the laws of development of things, to form a scientific foresight that broadly conforms to the objective movement process, and to formulate this foresight into ideas, theories, plans, and programs for implementation, in order to achieve predetermined or phased goals. Of course, in a complex and ever-changing world, it is impossible to make foresight that completely aligns with reality; it will be subject to many constraints. Revising original ideas, theories, plans, and programs is only natural, and it may even require multiple failures before correction is achieved. In this process, it is necessary to form new foresight based on new understanding, to revise existing ideas, theories, plans, and programs to adapt to new situational demands, and ultimately to turn foresight into reality.

注重科学预见，归根结底是为了把握历史主动，把先前的设想变为现实。在具体实践中，需要根据客观实际和事物发展规律，扩展眼见，形成大体上符合客观运动过程的科学预见，并将这种预见制定成思想、理论、计划、方案予以实施，以期达到预定的或阶段性目标。当然，在纷繁复杂的世界里做出与现实完全一致的预见并不可能，会受到诸多条件的限制，对原有的思想、理论、计划、方案进行修正实属自然，甚至要经过多次失败才能得以纠正。在此过程中，需要依照新的识见形成新的预见，修正既有的思想、理论、计划、方案，以适应新的形势要求，最终将预见变为现实。

V. Drawing on the Power of Classics to Create the Great Historical Time of the Chinese Nation

五、汲取经典力量，创造中华民族的伟大历史时间

Great thought “is not a collection of ready-made things, but a collection of processes.” [36]36 Friedrich Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (1886). Although *On Protracted War* was written to correctly judge the situation of the War of Resistance, scientifically foresee the trend of the war, and precisely implement strategic deployment, its impact has completely transcended historical time and space, possessing enduring and lasting contemporary value. When vigorously promoting the spirit of historical initiative has become the call of the New Era, past historical experience is undoubtedly the living source. The text *On Protracted War* is precisely a classic work that is revisited at every critical juncture.

伟大的思想“不是既成事物的集合体，而是过程的集合体”。《论持久战》虽为正确判断抗战形势、科学预见战争趋势、精确实施战略布势而作，但所产生的影响完全超越了历史时空，具有恒久绵延的时代价值。当大力发扬历史主动精神成为新时代的呼唤，曾经的历史经验无疑是源头活水。《论持久战》一文，就是每到关键必重温的经典之作。

Drawing on the power of classics, fully recognize and vigorously promote the unique character of historical consciousness and historical confidence possessed by Communists. The historical consciousness and historical confidence of Communists stem from the correct understanding and grasp of the trends of historical development, and a clear cognition of their own historical position and historical mission. This is the unique character and realm of Communists. During the War of Resistance, although protracted war was a basic consensus, how to sustain it and how to win through protracted war was mostly unclear; “many people demanded a summary explanation.” [37]37 Mao Zedong, *On Protracted War* (1938). This was Mao Zedong’s original intention in writing *On Protracted War*, and it is also a vivid example of the historical consciousness and historical confidence demonstrated by the Communists represented by Mao Zedong at a major historical juncture. In *On Protracted War*, Mao Zedong emphasized that the reason Abyssinia perished was because “it had no Communist Party, no such army as China’s, and even less an army like the Eighth Route Army.” [38]38 Mao Zedong, *On Protracted War* (1938). Abyssinia (Ethiopia) was conquered by Fascist Italy in 1936. China would not perish because the Communist Party of China was best able to “rely on the majority of the masses and win their support,” best able to realize set goals with unlimited initiative and loyalty, and was also the most far-sighted, most willing to sacrifice, and most possessed of “unity of thought and strictness of discipline.” [39]39 Mao Zedong, *On Protracted War* (1938). Thus, a large number of capable cadres were cultivated who were good at governing the Party, the state, and the military; these cadres were “revolutionary flowers watered by the blood of countless martyrs.” [40]40 Mao Zedong, *On Protracted War* (1938). The spirit of historical initiative is the political advantage and unique label of Communists. This conclusion is consistent with the fundamental question raised in the New Era: “What is the Communist Party of China and what should it do?” [41]41 A formulation from the Resolution of the 19th Central Committee of the CPC on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century (2021). Keeping this fundamental question firmly in mind is not only the deep foundation of the historical confidence of Communists in the New Era but also the proper character required to promote the spirit of historical initiative.

汲取经典力量，充分认识并大力发扬共产党人所独具的历史自觉和历史自信的品格。共产党人的历史自觉与历史自信，源于对历史发展趋势的正确认识与把握，对自身历史方位与历史使命的清晰认知。这是共产党人独具的品格境界。抗战时期，尽管持久战是基本共识，但是如何持久、怎样通过持久战获胜，多半都不清楚，“很多人要求做个总结性的解释”。这是毛泽东撰写《论持久战》一文的初衷，也是以毛泽东为代表的共产党人，在重大历史关头体现历史自觉和历史自信的生动范例。毛泽东在《论持久战》一文中强调，阿比西尼亚之所以灭亡，是因为“没有共产党，没有中国这样的军队，更没有如同八路军这样的军队”。中国不会灭亡，是因为中国共产党最能“依靠群众的多数，得到群众的拥护”，最能以无限的积极性和忠诚实现既定目标，也是最有远见、最富于牺牲精神，最具有“思想的统一性，纪律的严格性”的政党。由此，造就了一大批会治党会治国会治军的有力骨干，这些骨干“是无数先烈的热血浇灌出来的革命的鲜花”。历史主动精神是共产党人的政治优势和独特标签。这一结论，与新时代所提“中国共产党是什么、要干什么”这一根本问题一脉相承。牢记这个根本问题，既是新时代共产党人历史自信的深厚根基，也是发扬历史主动精神应有的品格。

Drawing on the power of classics, fully emphasize the methodology of promoting the spirit of historical initiative in the process of raising and solving problems. The problems of each era “can only be answered and resolved by using new problems to respond to and solve old problems; there is no other method.” [42]42 Mao Zedong, *On Protracted War* (1938). Over the past century and more, the Communist Party of China has identified the crux of problems based on the general trend of historical development, derived methods for solving problems from comparisons between Chinese and foreign history, enabling people to “strengthen their confidence in a bright new world and a bright new China,” [43]43 Mao Zedong, *On Protracted War* (1938). thereby achieving historical initiative; the Communist Party of China, based on the contradictions and problems in objective reality, formulated political programs, carried out political mobilization, and turned the Party’s policies into the masses’ policies, thereby achieving historical initiative; the Communist Party of China actively promoted conscious initiative, integrating initiative, flexibility, and planning into the path of solving specific problems, thereby achieving historical initiative; in understanding and solving problems, the Communist Party of China emphasized scientific foresight, raising the cognition of “which direction the world will develop, which direction China will develop, whether the world will soon become a bright world, and whether China will soon become a bright China,” [44]44 Mao Zedong, *On Protracted War* (1938). turning foresight into reality, thereby achieving historical initiative. The Communist Party of China, with its overall strategic thinking, whole-process strategic thinking, and strategic foresight art, has accumulated and formed a rich and profound spirit of historical initiative, becoming “a powerful guarantee for the Party to overcome countless risks and challenges and continuously march from victory to victory.” [45]45 A formulation from the Resolution of the 19th Central Committee of the CPC on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century (2021). In the New Era of carrying forward the past and opening up the future, Mao Zedong’s classic work remains an important guide for us to meet risks and challenges, face difficulties, and forge ahead courageously.

汲取经典力量，充分注重在提出和解决问题过程中发扬历史主动精神的方法论。每个时代的问题，“除了用新问题来回答和解决老问题之外，没有别的方法”。百余年来，中国共产党根据历史发展大势提出了问题的症结，从中外历史比较中得出解决问题的方法，使人们“对光明的新世界和光明的新中国增强信心”，由此实现了历史主动；中国共产党根据客观现实中的矛盾和问题，制定政治纲领，开展政治动员，将党的方针变成群众方针，由此实现了历史主动；中国共产党积极发扬自觉能动，将主动性、灵活性、计划性，融入具体问题的解决路径，积极发扬自觉能动，由此实现了历史主动；中国共产党在认识解决问题中注重科学预见，提出了“世界将向哪个方向发展，中国将向哪个方向发展，是否世界将很快成为光明的世界，中国将很快成为光明的中国”的认知，预见变成现实，由此实现了历史主动。中国共产党以战略总体思维、战略全程思维、战略前瞻艺术，积淀形成丰富厚重的历史主动精神，成为“党战胜无数风险挑战、不断从胜利走向胜利的有力保证”。在继往开来的新时代，毛泽东的这篇经典之作依然是我们应对风险挑战，迎难而上奋勇前行的重要指南。

Drawing on the power of classics, continue to create the great historical time of the Chinese nation. Over its century-long journey, the Communist Party of China has achieved a series of breakthrough advances through great transformative practice, creating great miracles rarely seen in the world. “Continuing to create the great historical time of the Chinese nation within the great historical time of humanity” [46]46 Xi Jinping, speech at the ceremony marking the centenary of the CPC (2021). is the mission call on the new journey of the New Era. The great historical time is the continuation of the more than 5,000-year history of Chinese civilization, the continuation of more than 500 years of socialism, and the continuation of the Party’s century-long journey. Vigorously promoting the spirit of historical initiative in the New Era means firmly establishing historical confidence in the dialectical unity of historical continuity and historical orientation, and means active creation based on a problem-oriented approach. The classics in the historical process are both past ideas and pointers for real-world problems. As the saying goes, “It is not history that creates principles, but principles that create history.” [47]47 A paraphrase of a line from Mao Zedong’s *Reading Notes on Soviet Textbook “Political Economy”* (1961–1962). The more comprehensively we understand and grasp the more than 5,000-year history of Chinese civilization, the more than 500-year history of socialism, and the Party’s century-long historical process, the deeper our understanding of historical trends and historical laws will inevitably become, the richer the accumulation of the spirit of historical initiative will be, the clearer our understanding of problems will be, and the more proactive our solutions to problems will be. The classics in the historical process once created a great historical time, and they will surely create a new great historical time in the New Era.

汲取经典力量，继续创造中华民族的伟大历史时间。中国共产党的百余年历程，通过伟大变革实践，获得系列突破性进步，创造了世所罕见的伟大奇迹。“继续在人类的伟大时间历史中创造中华民族的伟大历史时间”，是新时代新征程上的使命召唤。伟大历史时间，是中华文明5000多年历史的承续，是社会主义500多年的接续，是党的百余年历程的延续。新时代大力发扬历史主动精神，是在历史延续和历史方位的辩证统一中坚定历史自信，是以问题导向为基础的主动创造。历史进程中的经典是曾经的思路，也是现实问题的指针。正所谓“不是历史创造原理，而是原理创造历史”。对中华文明5000多年历史、社会主义500多年历史和党的百年历史进程认识把握得越全面，必然对历史趋势和历史规律的认识就越深刻，发扬历史主动的精神积淀就越丰厚，对问题的认识就越清晰，对问题的解决也就越主动。历史进程中的经典曾经创造了伟大历史时间，也必将在新时代创造新的伟大历史时间。

Of course, classics have their own spatiotemporal logic. Although the essay *On Protracted War* is a classic work of strategic foresight, Mao Zedong also clearly pointed out that objective reality is tortuous and complex, and that “no one can produce an almanac of the Sino-Japanese War.” As for how many months or years the protracted war will last, “no one can predict this in advance; it can only be determined entirely by the degree of change in the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves.” The only thing that can be done is to mobilize all positive factors and work hard, “and there is no other shortcut or easy way out.” This also shows that although the spirit of historical initiative contains elements of subjective emotion and will, it must be clearly recognized that the spirit of historical initiative is, after all, a practical spirit. The unity of the subjective and the objective, and the unity of theory and reality, are inseparable for even a moment. All blind action and subjective arbitrariness absolutely do not conform to the basic essence of the spirit of historical initiative. Striving in the New Era, promoting the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation through Chinese-path modernization, likewise requires down-to-earth, steady and solid work, carrying forward the “spirit of driving nails,” finding the right spot and hammering one blow at a time, “driving one nail firmly before driving the next.” If one swings the hammer wildly, it is very likely that “not a single nail will be driven in or driven firmly.” Turning the target blueprint into reality requires stitching one stitch at a time. If one looks left and right and gazes around, even the best blueprint becomes a scrap of paper, and even the closest goal becomes a castle in the air. This is an important conclusion revealed by the essay *On Protracted War*, and it is also the proper orientation for actively promoting the spirit of historical initiative in the New Era.

当然，经典有其自身的时空逻辑。《论持久战》一文虽是一篇战略预见的经典之作，但毛泽东也明确指出，客观现实是曲折复杂的，“谁也不能造出一本中日战争的‘流年’来”，持久战究竟“将经过多少年月则谁也不能预断，这个完全要看敌我力量变化的程度才能决定”，唯一能做的是调动一切积极因素艰苦努力，“此外不能有任何取巧图便的法门”。这也表明，历史主动精神固然有主观情感和意志的成分，但必须清晰地认识到，历史主动精神终归是一种实践精神。主观与客观符合，理论与实际统一，须臾不可分割。一切盲动和主观随意，绝不符合历史主动精神的基本要义。奋力新时代，以中国式现代化推动中华民族伟大复兴，同样需要脚踏实地稳打稳扎，发扬“钉钉子的精神”，找准位置一锤一锤敲，“钉牢一颗再钉下一颗”，如果东一榔头西一棒子，很可能“一颗钉子都钉不上、钉不牢”。目标蓝图变为现实，需要一针一针绣。左顾右盼东张西望，再好的蓝图也是一纸空文，再近的目标也是空中楼阁。这是《论持久战》一文所昭示的重要结论，也是新时代积极发扬历史主动精神的应有指向。

(The author is a professor at the School of Marxism, Tianjin University)

（作者：天津大学马克思主义学院教授）

Online editor: You Heng

网络编辑：有恒