Mao Zedong’s Working Method of “Having ‘Figures’ at Heart”

The law of the mutual transformation of quality and quantity is one of the basic laws of dialectical materialism. Mao Zedong creatively applied it to the practice of leading China’s revolution and construction, forming the working method of “having ‘figures’ at heart.” In March 1949, in his conclusion at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the CPC, he summarized twelve working methods for Party committees, the seventh of which was to achieve “having ‘figures’ at heart.” He pointed out: “This means that we must attend to the quantitative aspect of a situation or problem and make a basic quantitative analysis. Every quality manifests itself in a certain quantity, and without quantity there can be no quality. Many of our comrades still do not understand that they must attend to the quantitative aspect of things—the basic statistics, the main percentages, and the quantitative limits that determine the qualities of things. They have no ‘figures’ in their minds and as a result cannot avoid making mistakes.”

质量互变规律是唯物辩证法的基本规律之一，毛泽东将其创造性运用到领导中国革命和建设事业的实践中，形成了胸中有“数”的工作方法。1949 年3 月，他在党的七届二中全会上所作的结论中总结了12 条党委会的工作方法，其中第7 条就是要做到“胸中有‘数’”。他指出：“这是说，对情况和问题一定要注意到它们的数量方面，要有基本的数量的分析。任何质量都表现为一定的数量，没有数量也就没有质量。我们有许多同志至今不懂得注意事物的数量方面，不懂得注意基本的统计、主要的百分比，不懂得注意决定事物质量的数量界限，一切都是胸中无‘数’，结果就不能不犯错误。”

In ordinary usage, “having figures at heart” or “having numbers in mind” means “having a basic understanding of a situation or problem and being able to handle matters with a certain degree of confidence.” Here, however, Mao Zedong specifically placed the character “数” (shù) in quotation marks, rendering it as “having ‘figures’ at heart,” precisely to distinguish it from common usage and to emphasize the meaning of “figures.” The “数” here takes its literal meaning, namely “numerals” or “quantity.” The working method of “having ‘figures’ at heart” is a valuable experience Mao Zedong distilled from the practice of China’s revolution and construction, a creative development of the laws of Marxist philosophy adapted to the Chinese context, and it possesses rich ideological connotations.

通常情况下，胸中有数、心中有数，是指“对情况和问题有基本的了解，处理事情有一定的把握”。而这里，毛泽东特别给“数”这个字加上引号，表述为胸中有“数”，正是为了和通常的用法加以区别，突出强调“数”的含义。这里的“数”，所取的正是该字的直意，即“数字”“数量”。胸中有“数”的工作方法，是毛泽东从中国革命和建设实践中总结得出的宝贵经验，是对马克思主义哲学规律的中国化的创造性发展，具有丰富的思想内涵。

I. Scientific and Refined Work Requirements

一、科学化精细化的工作要求

All things in the world possess a certain quality; quality is the intrinsic determination that distinguishes one thing from another. However, things have not only qualitative determinations but also quantitative ones. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, while reading Marxist philosophical works, Mao Zedong annotated: “Quality and quantity exist simultaneously (not separately) and develop together; the two are unified.” “Because quantitative change produces qualitative change, and in turn qualitative change produces quantitative change.” “Scientific research should recognize things not only in terms of qualitative differences but also from the complexity of their quantity.” Therefore, in understanding things, distinguishing their quality is the starting point and the premise for recognizing quantity; moving from quality to quantity is the deepening and precision of understanding. On the basis of recognizing quality, further grasping quantity allows one to obtain a relatively clear understanding of things and thus correctly guide practice. The working method of “having ‘figures’ at heart” requires raising the analysis of the particularity of contradictions to a precise and accurate level, thereby setting scientific and refined requirements for leadership work.

世界上一切事物都有一定的质，质是一事物区别于他事物的内在规定性。然而事物不仅有质的规定性，而且还有量的规定性。抗战时期，毛泽东在阅读马克思主义哲学著作时曾批注，“量与质是同时存在（非分割的），同时发展，二者是统一的”，“因为量的变化产生了质的变化，反过来质的变化又产生了量的变化”，“科学的研究，不但在质的区别上，也应从量的复杂性上去认识它”。因此，对事物的认识，区分其质是开始，是认识量的前提，由质进到量，才是认识的深化和精确化。在认识质的基础上又进一步把握量，就能获得对事物较为清晰的认识，从而正确指导实践。胸中有“数”的工作方法要求把对矛盾特殊性的分析上升到精密准确的程度，这就给领导工作提出了科学化精细化的要求。

“Having ‘figures’ at heart” requires that for any important work or decision, a basic quantitative analysis must be conducted, and policies, strategies, and guidelines must be formulated on a scientific and accurate basis. Therefore, leading cadres must adhere to proceeding from reality in everything, act according to objective laws, enhance sensitivity to key figures, be adept at observing, thinking, and calculating, learn to conduct “quantitative analysis,” discover internal connections and regular characteristics from chaotic phenomena, and carry out work scientifically and precisely.

胸中有“数”要求对待任何重要的工作和决策，必须要进行基本的数量的分析，把政策、策略、方针的制订建立在科学准确的基础之上。因此，领导干部要坚持一切从实际出发，按客观规律办事，增强对关键数字的敏感性，善于观察、思考和计算，学会进行“数量的分析”，善于从杂乱无章的现象中发现内在关联和规律特点，科学精准地开展工作。

At the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, after proposing the working method of “having ‘figures’ at heart,” Mao Zedong cited the example of land reform to illustrate its meaning. He said: “For example, to carry out land reform, we must understand the numbers of landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, and poor peasants as proportions of the population, and how much land each group holds. Only with these figures can we formulate correct policies.” He cited the example of land reform because he deeply recognized the extreme importance of doing this work well. He pointed out: “If we can universally and thoroughly solve the land problem, we will have obtained the most basic condition for defeating all enemies.” To carry out land reform—a task with high demands in both policy and strategy—it was necessary to grasp details accurately from all sides, conduct basic surveys, statistics, analysis, and calculations, and thereby formulate correct policies and strategies. As Mao Zedong emphasized: “We must recognize that mass work and land reform work are extremely meticulous tasks that require the study of leadership art.” “In any mass movement, we must have a basic investigation and basic analysis of how many people actively support it, how many oppose it, and how many are in an intermediate state. We must not decide issues without basis or subjectively.”

在党的七届二中全会上，毛泽东在提出胸中有“数”的工作方法后，举了土地改革的例子来说明其内涵。他说：“例如，要进行土地改革，对于地主、富农、中农、贫农各占人口多少，各有多少土地，这些数字就必须了解，才能据以定出正确的政策。”之所以举土地改革的例子，是因为毛泽东深刻认识到做好这一工作的极端重要性。他指出：“如果我们能够普遍地彻底地解决土地问题，我们就获得了足以战胜一切敌人的最基本的条件。”而要做好土地改革这一政策性、策略性要求都很高的工作，就必须从各方面细致准确掌握，搞好基础调查统计和分析测算，据此制定正确的政策和策略。正如毛泽东强调的，“必须认识，群众工作、土改工作是极细致的工作，必须研究领导艺术”，“在任何群众运动中，群众积极拥护的有多少，反对的有多少，处于中间状态的有多少，这些都必须有个基本的调查，基本的分析，不可无根据地、主观地决定问题”。

Striving to master the working method of “having ‘figures’ at heart” greatly benefits enhancing the scientific spirit, training the mind’s meticulousness and accuracy, and improving the capability and level of leading cadres. If one consistently insists on being careful and meticulous in doing things, paying attention to thinking about and analyzing problems from a quantitative perspective, and frequently calculating, comparing, and analyzing, over time it is easy to develop rigorous and cautious habits. Conversely, if one always relies on “more or less,” “roughly,” or “perhaps” to make decisions and do things, and the mind remains vague and without “figures” about situations and problems, in a state of blindness, over time not only will errors easily occur in work, but one’s own capability and level will also find it hard to truly improve. Zhou Enlai said: “When we do work, we must always have figures in mind and calculate accounts clearly.” Chen Yun also said: “One-sidedness always comes from being busy deciding policies without studying actual conditions.” “I am of the calculating faction; my mind has numbers.”

努力掌握胸中有“数”的工作方法，对于增强科学精神、锻炼头脑的细致准确性，提高领导干部的能力水平大有益处。因为平时若总坚持细心细致地做事情，注意从数量角度思考和分析问题，多算账、比较、分析，长此以往就容易养成严谨、谨慎的习惯。反之，若总是靠“差不多”“大概”“或许”去作决定、干事情，头脑里对情况和问题的了解始终模模糊糊、胸中无“数”，处在盲目状态，时间久了，不仅工作上容易出差错，自身的能力水平也难有真正的提高。周恩来就说：“我们做工作，总要心中有数，要把账算清楚。”陈云也说：“片面性总是来自忙于决定政策而不研究实际情况”，“我是算账派，脑子里有数目字”。

II. Having “Figures” Comes from Investigation and Research

二、有“数”来自调查研究

How can one achieve “having ‘figures’ at heart”? Mao Zedong pointed out: “At the beginning of everything, one always has no figures in mind.” “For newly emerging problems, who can have figures in mind?” “Having no figures is not serious; we can study the problem carefully.” “Without investigation and research, it is impossible to produce correct and specific policies.”

怎样才能做到胸中有“数”呢？毛泽东指出，“一切事情开头的时候总是心中无数的”，“对于新出现的问题，谁人心中有数呢？”“无数并不要紧，我们可以把问题好好研究一下”，“没有调查研究，是不能产生正确的具体政策的”。

Mao Zedong placed great importance on investigation and research work, while also emphasizing the need to conduct correct investigations and ensure their quality. He proposed: “No investigation, no right to speak.” “Without correct investigation, likewise no right to speak.” He advocated that in conducting investigation and research, one must “dismount to look at flowers,” not “view flowers from horseback,” but “examine flowers carefully, analyze one ‘flower,’ dissect one ‘sparrow,’” to truly understand and thoroughly grasp the problem. Mastering a large amount of vivid, authentic, first-hand data and conducting meticulous statistical analysis of it is an important lever for conducting correct investigations and ensuring their quality.

毛泽东非常重视调查研究工作，同时强调要开展正确调查、保证调查质量。他提出，“不做调查没有发言权”，“不做正确的调查同样没有发言权”；他主张做调查研究一定要“下马看花”，不能“走马观花”，要“过细看花，分析一朵‘花’，解剖一个‘麻雀’”，把问题真正摸清吃透。而掌握大量鲜活真实的第一手数据并对其作细致的统计分析，是开展正确调查、保证调查质量的一个重要抓手。

During the Great Revolution, while serving as director of the Guangzhou Peasant Movement Training Institute, Mao Zedong presided over the drafting of 36 items, including land rent rates, land taxes, landlord origins, rent resistance and reduction, and rural organizational conditions, guiding students from various provinces at the institute to conduct investigations. He required students to carefully fill in the investigation items based on the conditions in their hometowns. After the failure of the Great Revolution, amid the long and harsh practice of revolutionary struggle, Mao Zedong still attached great importance to investigation and research work.

大革命时期，在担任广州农民运动讲习所所长期间，毛泽东就主持拟定了地租率、田赋、地主来源、抗租减租、农村组织状况等 36个项目，引导来自各省区的农讲所学生作调查，并要求学生把家乡的情况，按调查项目认真填写。大革命失败后，在长期严酷的革命斗争实践中，毛泽东仍然高度重视调查研究工作。

Taking his Xunwu investigation conducted in May 1930 as an example, the final report of over 80,000 characters resulting from this investigation not only covered all aspects of the local situation but also contained a large number of statistical figures, involving products, commerce, population, and land ownership. These figures were extremely detailed and specific; the commodities listed alone were divided into 14 major categories, each with a dedicated analysis, among which miscellaneous goods were enumerated in as many as 131 types, with prices and trade volumes meticulously noted. Even the profit and loss of a small “barbershop” was recorded clearly in the report: “To open a barbershop requires a capital of forty to fifty yuan. Usually two masters are hired, at least one, at most three. Wages calculated on a half-year basis are at least thirty to forty yuan, usually fifty to sixty yuan, and at most eighty yuan. In a barbershop with good business, each person can earn one yuan of business per day. Usually, there is one boss and two workers, with an average daily income of three yuan, and an annual income of around one thousand yuan. Expenses include wages of over one hundred yuan, the rest goes to the boss, plus expenses for meals (calculated at seventy-five yuan per person for four people), shop rent (around thirty yuan), and tool depreciation (within one hundred yuan), yielding a profit of around four hundred yuan (including the boss’s own wages).” Another example: when explaining the “composition of the rural population” in Xunwu, the report’s statistics were also extremely precise: big landlords (those collecting over 500 dan of rent) accounted for 0.045%; middle landlords (those collecting between 200 and 500 dan of rent) accounted for 0.4%; small landlords (those collecting under 200 dan of rent) accounted for 3%; bankrupt households accounted for 1%; newly rich households accounted for 2%; rich peasants (those with surplus grain and money to lend) accounted for 4%; middle peasants (those with enough to eat and no debt) accounted for 18.255%; poor peasants (those with insufficient food and in debt) accounted for 70%; handicraft workers (various artisans, boatmen, specialized porters) accounted for 3%; vagrants (unemployed) accounted for 1%; and hired farm laborers (long-term workers and those doing odd jobs) accounted for 0.3%. These are only a small part of the over-80,000-character report, yet the degree of attention paid to quantitative issues is evident.

以 1930年5月他所作的寻乌调查为例，这个调查最后形成的 8万多字的报告中不仅涉及当地方方面面的情况，而且包含大量的统计数字，涉及物产、商业、人口及土地占有等情况。这些数字非常细致具体，仅论列的商品货物就有 14大类，每类都设专项分析，其中杂货就列举了 131种之多，并详细注明价格及贸易量。即使一个很小的“开理发店”的盈亏问题，报告也记载得清清楚楚：“开理发店要四五十元本，师父普通请两个，少的一个，至多三个。工价以半年计至少三四十元，普通五六十元，最多八十元。生意好的理发店，每天每人可以做一块钱生意，普通是一个老板两个工人，平均每天能进三元，每年能进千元内外。开销工钱百多元，其余都归老板，再开销伙食（以四个人计每人七十五元）、店租（三十元左右）和器具的消耗（百元以内），可赚四百元内外（老板自己的工钱在内）。”再比如，当说明寻乌的“农村人口成分”问题时，报告的统计也十分精确：大地主（收租 500石以上的）占 0.045%；中地主（收租 500石以下 200石以上的）占 0.4%；小地主（收租 200石以下的）占 3%；破落户占 1%；新发户占 2%；富农（有余钱剩米放债的）占 4%；中农（够食不欠债的）占 18.255%；贫农（不够食欠债的）占 70%；手工工人（各种工匠，船夫，专门脚夫）占 3%；游民（无业的）占 1%；雇农（长工及专门做零工的）占0.3%。这些都还只是 8万余字报告很小的一部分，其中对数量问题的关注程度可见一斑。

Through such painstaking, detailed investigation, statistics, and research work, Mao Zedong came to understand the conditions of urban commerce and grasped the various circumstances of land distribution, providing a practical basis for formulating policies toward the urban poor and the commercial bourgeoisie correctly, and for determining the principle of “exchanging fertile land for barren land” [5]5 “Exchanging fertile land for barren land” (chou fei bu shou) was a principle in the land reform of the Chinese Soviet Republic period, whereby rich peasants were required to give up their better-quality land in exchange for poorer land from poor peasants, as a method to limit the rich peasant economy. to restrict rich peasants in land distribution. Mao Zedong later recalled, “It was only after I conducted the Xunwu investigation that I clarified the issue of rich peasants and landlords and came up with a method to solve the rich peasant problem.”

经过下气力搞这样细致、深入的调查统计和研究工作，毛泽东懂得了城市商业状况，掌握了分配土地的各种情况，为制定正确对待城市贫民和商业资产阶级的政策，为确定土地分配中限制富农的“抽肥补瘦”的原则，提供了实际依据。毛泽东后来回忆，“我作了寻乌调查，才弄清了富农与地主的问题，提出解决富农问题的办法”。

Another example: to gain an in-depth understanding of rural conditions in various regions, in April 1931, Mao Zedong, in his capacity as Director of the General Political Department of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, issued the “Notice of the General Political Department on Investigating Population and Land Conditions.” The Notice stated: “We have now prescribed two types of investigation forms for population and land. These two forms are mainly intended to calculate the proportion of each class’s land and population, and to answer many of our current questions more concretely with ironclad facts.” “It is earnestly hoped that the political departments of the Red Army will take care to fill them out wherever they go, and that local government organs will fill them out township by township. It is especially hoped that every responsible person in the Red Army and the government will conduct such investigations and statistics anytime and anywhere.” The Notice also made specific provisions on how to ensure the “truthfulness and accuracy of the materials obtained from investigations,” one of which was that “the investigator must not fear trouble.” “When investigating a township, one must find their land and population investigation books for land distribution, find the land committee members who handled the land distribution in that township and those familiar with the situation in that township, first clarify the class status of each family and which class each mu of land belongs to (landlord, rich peasant, middle peasant, poor peasant…), then use hard calculation methods to tally them clearly, and fill them in according to the actual numbers.”

又比如，为了深入了解各地农村的情况，1931年 4月，毛泽东以中央革命军事委员会总政治部主任的名义，发出《总政治部关于调查人口和土地状况的通知》。《通知》指出：“我们现规定了人口和土地两种调查表格。这两种表格主要地是要统计各阶级土地和人口比例，更具体地以铁的事实来解答我们现在许多问题。”“深望红军政治部每到一处注意填写，地方政权机关逐乡去填写，尤望红军中和政府中每个负责人随时随地做此种调查和统计。”《通知》还对如何保证“调查所得的材料真实正确”作了具体规定，其中一条就是“调查的人要不怕麻烦”，“调查这一乡，必须找到他们的分田的人口和土地调查本子，找到这一乡的经手分田的土地委员和熟悉这一乡情形的人，先把每一家人的阶级成分和每一亩田为哪个阶级占有（属于地主、富农、中农、贫农……）分别清楚，再用硬算的办法统计清楚，按照实际数目填写上去”。

Why was such meticulous investigation and statistics necessary? Mao Zedong explained in the Notice: “In the past, many places often neglected the investigation of actual facts, relying only on their own empty ideas to decide work plans and guide lower-level work, with the result that plans were unworkable and guidance was mistaken.” “Now, if we can fill in these two forms carefully, with profound attention to actual and correct statistics, they can solve many of our problems, especially the many practical problems in current land distribution.”

为什么要这般细致地作调查统计呢？毛泽东在《通知》中解释说：“过去许多地方往往忽视实际事实的调查，只凭自己空想去决定工作计划，去指导下级工作，结果计划是行不通的，指导是错了的。”“现在这两种表格，我们如能照深刻注意实际的正确的统计填写起来，是能解决我们许多问题的，特别是现在分配土地中的许多实际问题。”

It can be said that it was through continuous investigation and research, by dissecting small “sparrows” like Xunwu and one by one minute numerical proportions, that the Chinese Communists calculated the great accounts of China’s revolutionary development, achieving “figures in mind” on a series of fundamental questions—what revolutionary path to take, whom to rely on, unite with, and strike at in the revolution, and who are our enemies and who are our friends—thereby laying a solid foundation for the subsequent victory of the revolution.

可以说，中国共产党人正是通过不断调查研究，从解剖寻乌等一只只小“麻雀”和一个个细小的数字比例中，算清了中国革命发展的大账目，对走怎样的革命道路，革命中依靠谁、团结谁、打击谁，谁是我们的敌人、谁是我们的朋友等一系列根本问题，做到胸中有“数”，才为后来革命的胜利打下了坚实的基础。

After the founding of New China, Mao Zedong still repeatedly emphasized achieving “figures in mind” through investigation and research. He proposed, “Leading cadres should rely on their own personal investigation and research to solve problems. Written reports can also be read, but this is different from one’s own personal investigation. One should go around everywhere or settle down for a week to ten days of investigation, mainly settling down to conduct a systematic investigation and research.” Through going deep among the masses and into reality for investigation and research, “now that there are no figures in mind, gradually there will be figures.”

新中国成立后，毛泽东仍然反复强调要通过调查研究做到胸中有“数”。他提出，“做领导工作的人要依靠自己亲身的调查研究去解决问题。书面报告也可以看，但是这跟自己亲身的调查是不相同的。自己到处跑或者住下来做一个星期到十天的调查，主要是应该住下来做一番系统的调查研究”，经过深入群众和实际的调查研究，“现在心中无数，慢慢就会有数”。

III. To Observe the General Picture, Calculate the Great Accounts, and Plan the Great Numbers

三、要观大略、算大账、谋大数

To achieve “figures in mind,” one must not only know how to calculate fine accounts and discern the minutest detail, but also embrace the overall situation, grasp the fundamentals of things, select and analyze figures from an overall and strategic perspective, observe the general picture, calculate the great accounts, and plan the great numbers, mastering the ability to see the whole from a single clue and know the whole from a part.

要做到胸中有“数”，既要懂得算细账，明察秋毫，还要胸怀全局，抓住事物根本，从全局和战略高度择选、分析数字，观大略、算大账、谋大数，掌握见微知著、一叶知秋的本领。

Why must this be done?

为什么非要这样做呢？

First, the quantity of things is multifaceted; people do not need to and cannot examine all quantities, but should examine certain aspects of quantity based on the needs of social practice. And it is not easy to discover valuable and persuasive figures and proportional relationships from complex social life. Lenin explicitly opposed indiscriminately listing examples without analysis, pointing out, “In the field of social phenomena, there is no method more widespread and more untenable than that of grabbing random individual facts and playing with examples.” “Picking any example is effortless, but this has no meaning, or has a purely negative meaning.” “If facts are not grasped in their entirety, in their connection, if they are fragmentary and arbitrarily chosen, then they are nothing but a game, or even worse than a game.” He further pointed out: “If facts are grasped in their entirety, in their connection, then facts are not only ‘stubborn things,’ but also absolutely conclusive evidence.”

首先，事物的量是多方面的，人们不必要也不可能考察所有的量，而应该根据社会实践的需要考察一定方面的量。而从纷繁复杂的社会生活中发现有价值和有说服力的数字及比例关系并不容易。列宁明确反对不加分析地随意罗列事例，他指出，“在社会现象领域，没有哪种方法比胡乱抽出一些个别事实和玩弄实例更普遍、更站不住脚的了”，“挑选任何例子是毫不费劲的，但这没有任何意义，或者有纯粹消极的意义”，“如果不是从整体上、不是从联系中去掌握事实，如果事实是零碎的和随便挑出来的，那么它们就只能是一种儿戏，或者连儿戏也不如”。他进一步指出：“如果从事实的整体上、从它们的联系中去掌握事实，那么，事实不仅是‘顽强的东西’，而且是绝对确凿的证据。”

What holds for examples holds for figures as well. Mao Zedong proposed: “The characteristic of dialectical materialism lies in grasping the core of facts, the essence of facts, the internal laws of development of facts, not in respecting the surface of facts.” That is to say, the typicality and profundity of figures stem from the grasp of the strategic overall situation and the fundamentals of problems, and from selecting and refining figures by discarding the false and retaining the true from a large number of vivid figures with purpose and direction.

对事例来说如此，对数字来说依然如此。毛泽东提出：“辩证唯物论的特点，在于抓住事实的核心，事实的本质，事实的内部发展规律性，不在于尊重事实的表面。”也就是说，数字的典型性和深刻性来源于对战略全局及问题根本的把握，来源于带着目的和方向从大量鲜活的数字中去伪存真、提炼选择。

Furthermore, the quantity of things includes both quantity relevant to quality and quantity irrelevant to quality; in work, one must pay attention to grasping the quantity that determines the nature and direction of things. Mao Zedong set an example in this regard; throughout his work he always kept the overall situation in view, seized the principal contradiction, calculated the big accounts, and planned the big figures. For instance, he always paid attention to the question of majority and minority, advocating that in the struggle against the enemy one should “make use of contradictions, win over the majority, oppose the minority, and crush them one by one”; [6]6 This is a tactical principle from Mao’s strategy for the united front during the War of Resistance Against Japan, first articulated in his 1940 essay “On Policy.” he advocated that the establishment of a democratic government should take as its starting point the ability to “unite over 90 percent of the Chinese people to strive together”; he advocated that in building socialist politics it was necessary to perfect democratic centralism, so that “the initiative of the masses both inside and outside the Party can be mobilized, and over 95 percent of the people can be united”; he advocated that in handling international relations “the scope of unity should be expanded, uniting together over 90 percent of the people of all Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the whole world, except the imperialists and the reactionaries of various countries.” In short, it is necessary to unite all forces that can be united, to establish a solid united front, and to gather popular support and strength for overcoming various difficulties and challenges on the road forward. This is the far-sightedness of calculating the big accounts.

再则，事物的量既有有关质的量，又有无关质的量，在工作中必须注意掌握决定事物的性质和方向的量。毛泽东在这方面作出了典范，他在工作中始终着眼全局抓主要矛盾，算大账、谋大数。比如，他始终注意到多数和少数的问题，主张对敌斗争要“利用矛盾，争取多数，反对少数，各个击破”；主张建立民主政府要以能够“团结中国百分之九十以上的老百姓一道奋斗”为出发点；主张搞社会主义政治建设要健全民主集中制，这样“就能把党内、党外广大群众的积极性调动起来，就能使占人口百分之九十五以上的人民大众团结起来”；主张处理国际关系时“要扩大团结的范围，把全亚洲、非洲、拉丁美洲以及全世界除了帝国主义和各国反动派以外的百分之九十以上的人民团结在一起”。总之，要团结一切可以团结的力量，建立巩固的统一战线，为战胜前进道路上的各种困难挑战凝聚人心、凝聚力量。这就是算大账的远见卓识。

Another example: he put forward the theory of people’s war, emphasizing that “the deepest roots of the great power of war lie in the masses of the people.” [7]7 This quotation is from Mao’s 1938 essay “On Protracted War.” It was precisely because our Party firmly relied on the people, united and led them, organized and mobilized them, and unleashed the great power of war latent in the broad masses, that it was able to lead the people’s army to repeatedly defeat powerful enemies. After the victory in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, [8]8 The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea (1950–1953) was China’s military intervention in the Korean War, framed as a defense against U.S. imperialism. Mao Zedong summarized: “Our experience is: rely on the people, plus a relatively correct leadership, and we can use our inferior equipment to defeat enemies with superior equipment.” This is the breadth of vision and spirit of planning the big figures.

再比如，他提出人民战争理论，强调“战争的伟力之最深厚的根源，存在于民众之中”。正因为我们党紧紧依靠人民，团结带领、组织动员人民，激发了蕴藏于广大民众中的战争伟力，才能领导人民军队不断战胜各路强敌。抗美援朝战争胜利后，毛泽东总结说：“我们的经验是：依靠人民，再加上一个比较正确的领导，就可以用我们劣势装备战胜优势装备的敌人。”这就是谋大数的胸怀气魄。

During the War of Resistance Against Japan, [9]9 The War of Resistance Against Japan (1937–1945) was China’s war against Japanese invasion, later incorporated into the narrative of the global anti-fascist war. in his work *On Protracted War*, Mao Zedong insisted on observing the general outline, calculating the big accounts, and planning the big figures, comprehensively analyzing the era in which the Sino-Japanese War took place and the basic characteristics of both sides. Regarding the holders of the views of national subjugation and quick victory, Mao Zedong pointed out: “Their method of looking at problems is subjective and one-sided; in a word, it is unscientific.” In other words, both were calculating small accounts and partial accounts: the national subjugationists saw only the one characteristic of the enemy being strong and we being weak, while the quick victoryists completely forgot this characteristic of the enemy being strong and we being weak. Mao Zedong, however, from the height of the overall situation and strategy, calculated a big account for the Sino-Japanese War, concluding — “Will China be subjugated? The answer: No, the final victory will be China’. Can China win quickly? The answer: No, the War of Resistance Against Japan will be a protracted war.”

抗日战争时期，毛泽东在《论持久战》这篇著作中就坚持观大略、算大账、谋大数，全面分析了中日战争所处的时代和中日双方的基本特点。关于亡国论和速胜论观点的持有者，毛泽东指出：“他们看问题的方法都是主观的和片面的，一句话，非科学的。”换句话说，两者都是在算小账、算局部账，亡国论者只看到敌强我弱这一个特点，速胜论者则根本忘记敌强我弱这一特点。而毛泽东则从全局和战略的高度为中日战争算了篇大账目，得出结论——“中国会亡吗？答复：不会亡，最后胜利是中国的。中国能够速胜吗？答复：不能速胜，抗日战争是持久战”。

Mao Zedong analyzed: “The Sino-Japanese War is not any other war; it is a life-and-death war between semi-colonial and semi-feudal China and imperialist Japan, fought in the 1930s.” The two sides in the war had many mutually contradictory characteristics; the basic characteristics were that “Japan’s military, economic, and political organizational strength is strong, but its war is retrogressive and barbaric, its manpower and material resources are insufficient, and its international situation is unfavorable. China is the opposite: its military, economic, and political organizational strength is relatively weak, but it is in a progressive era, its war is progressive and just, and it has the condition of being a large country sufficient to sustain a protracted war, and the majority of the world’s countries will aid China.” “These characteristics prescribe and determine all political policies and military strategy and tactics on both sides, and prescribe and determine the protracted nature of the war and that the final victory belongs to China, not to Japan.”

毛泽东分析说：“中日战争不是任何别的战争，乃是半殖民地半封建的中国和帝国主义的日本之间在二十世纪三十年代进行的一个决死的战争。”战争的双方存在互相矛盾的许多特点，基本的特点是“日本的军力、经济力和政治组织力是强的，但其战争是退步的、野蛮的，人力、物力又不充足，国际形势又处于不利。中国反是，军力、经济力和政治组织力是比较地弱的，然而正处于进步的时代，其战争是进步的和正义的，又有大国这个条件足以支持持久战，世界的多数国家是会要援助中国的”。“这些特点，规定了和规定着双方一切政治上的政策和军事上的战略战术，规定了和规定着战争的持久性和最后胜利属于中国而不属于日本。”

Mao Zedong also, based on the various mutually contradictory factors of the enemy and ourselves and the development and changes of these factors in the course of the war, foresaw the three stages that China’s protracted resistance would go through: “The first stage is the period of the enemy’s strategic offensive and our strategic defensive. The second stage is the period of the enemy’s strategic consolidation and our preparation for the counter-offensive. The third stage is the period of our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy’s strategic retreat.” He meticulously analyzed the situation of the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves at that time, pointing out: “The first stage is not yet over. The enemy’s aim is to capture Guangzhou, Wuhan, and Lanzhou, and to link these three points. To achieve this aim, the enemy must deploy at least fifty divisions, about 1.5 million troops, taking one and a half to two years, and costing over 100 billion yen. The enemy’s difficulties in penetrating so deeply are very great, and the consequences will be unimaginable.” “China is a vast country; even if Japan can occupy an area with a population of 100 to 200 million, we are still far from being defeated.” At the same time, he pointed out: “In the first stage, there are also two kinds of changes on the enemy’s side. The first is a downward change, manifested in: hundreds of thousands of casualties, the consumption of weapons and ammunition, the decline of morale, discontent among the domestic population, the reduction of trade, expenditures of over 100 billion yen, the censure of international public opinion, and so on. This aspect, in turn, provides us with the basis for protracting the war and for final victory. However, we must also estimate the enemy’s second kind of change, that is, an upward change. That is, he has expanded his territory, population, and resources. On this point, in turn, arises the basis for our resistance being a protracted war and not a quick victory.”

毛泽东还根据敌我双方互相矛盾着的各种因素以及这些因素在战争过程中的发展变化，预见了中国持久抗战将经历的三个阶段：“第一个阶段，是敌之战略进攻、我之战略防御的时期。第二个阶段，是敌之战略保守、我之准备反攻的时期。第三个阶段，是我之战略反攻、敌之战略退却的时期。”他细致分析了当时敌我力量对比的情况，指出：“第一阶段，现在还未完结。敌之企图是攻占广州、武汉、兰州三点，并把三点联系起来。敌欲达此目的，至少出五十个师团，约一百五十万兵员，时间一年半至两年，用费将在一百万万日元以上。敌人如此深入，其困难是非常之大的，其后果将不堪设想。”“中国是一个庞大的国家，就是日本能占领中国一万万至二万万人口的区域，我们离战败还很远呢。”同时指出：“第一阶段中，敌人方面也有两种变化。第一种是向下的，表现在：几十万人的伤亡，武器和弹药的消耗，士气的颓靡，国内人心的不满，贸易的缩减，一百万万日元以上的支出，国际舆论的责备等等方面。这个方面，又给予我们以能够持久和最后胜利的根据。然而也要估计到敌人的第二种变化，即向上的变化。那就是他扩大了领土、人口和资源。在这点上面，又产生我们的抗战是持久战而不能速胜的根据。”

On the basis of these scientific analyses, Mao Zedong further put forward a series of fundamental strategic and tactical principles for defeating Japanese imperialism, greatly strengthening the Chinese people’s confidence in victory in the protracted war, and pointing the correct direction for winning the War of Resistance Against Japan. This is the far-sightedness of calculating the big accounts.

在这些科学分析的基础上，毛泽东进而提出了战胜日本帝国主义的一系列根本的战略、战术方针，极大坚定了中国人民持久抗战的胜利信心，为夺取抗日战争的胜利指明了正确方向。这就是算大账的远见卓识。

IV. Pay Attention to Grasping “Measure”

四、注意把握“度”

Paying attention to grasping “measure” is a deeper ideological requirement of the working method of “having figures in mind.” The so-called “measure” refers to “the quantitative limit that determines the quality of a thing.” The theoretical source of the working method of “having figures in mind” is the law of the transformation of quantity into quality in dialectical materialism. In fact, “having figures in mind” not only emphasizes the importance of the question of quantity, but also encompasses the requirement of grasping the dialectical unity of quality and quantity. Only by scientifically understanding the “measure” of things can one grasp the laws of development of things and put forward correct guidelines for guiding practical activities.

注意把握“度”，是胸中有“数”工作方法更深一层的思想要求。所谓“度”，即“决定事物质量的数量界限”。胸中有“数”工作方法的理论源头是唯物辩证法的质量互变规律。事实上，胸中有“数”不只强调数量问题的重要性，同时还涵盖着把握质与量辩证统一关系的要求。只有科学认识事物的“度”，才能把握事物发展规律，提出指导实践活动的正确方针。

Mao Zedong paid great attention to scientifically demarcating the stages of revolutionary development by accurately grasping “measure,” in order to push the revolution forward. In 1947, during the period when the Central Committee of the CPC moved from place to place in northern Shaanxi, [10]10 In 1947, the CPC Central Committee under Mao evacuated Yan’an and moved through northern Shaanxi to evade the Kuomintang offensive, a period known as the “turning movement in northern Shaanxi.” the Northwest Field Army won three successive victories, and then achieved victory in the Battle of Shajiadian. [11]11 The Battle of Shajiadian (August 18–20, 1947) was a key engagement in the Northwest theater of the Chinese Civil War, where the People’s Liberation Army defeated a Kuomintang force. The day after the Battle of Shajiadian, that is, on August 23, Mao Zedong pointed out that this battle was indeed well fought, that it had decisive significance for the Northwest war situation, and that the most difficult period had already passed. To use our Hunan dialect, after fighting this battle, we had crossed the ridge. [12]12 “Crossing the ridge” (过坳) is a Hunan colloquialism meaning to pass a critical point or turning point. The facts were indeed so: this battle broke the Kuomintang army’s key-point offensive against northern Shaanxi, enabling the Northwest Field Army to shift from interior-line defense to interior-line offense. It is worth pointing out that the “crossing the ridge” mentioned here not only referred to the Northwest battlefield, but also reflected Mao Zedong’s grasp of the national battlefield at that time. A few days later, on September 1, Mao Zedong, synthesizing the situation on the national battlefield, proposed to the entire Party and army that the “basic task for the second year of the War of Liberation is: to launch a nationwide counter-offensive, that is, to send the main forces to fight on exterior lines, to carry the war into Kuomintang areas,” [13]13 This directive is from Mao’s September 1, 1947 instruction “The Present Situation and Our Tasks After the Second Year of the War of Liberation.” “that is, to shift from the stage of strategic defense to the stage of strategic offense.”

毛泽东十分注意通过准确把握“度”，科学划分革命发展阶段，来推动革命向前发展。1947年中共中央转战陕北期间，西北野战军三战三捷，而后又取得沙家店战役的胜利。沙家店战役结束后第二天，即 8月 23日，毛泽东就指出，沙家店这一仗确实打得好，对西北战局有决定意义，最困难的时期已经过去了。用我们湖南话来说，打了这一仗，就过坳了。事实也正是如此，这场战役打破了国民党军队对陕北的重点进攻，使西北野战军由内线防御转入内线进攻。值得指出的是，这里所说的“过坳”不仅是指西北战场，还反映出毛泽东当时对全国战场的把握。数日后的 9月 1日，毛泽东即综合全国战场的形势向全党全军提出，解放战争“第二年作战的基本任务是：举行全国性的反攻，即以主力打到外线去，将战争引向国民党区域”，“也就是由战略防御阶段转入战略进攻阶段”。

On this basis, he led the formulation of strategic principles and policies and tactics adapted to this new stage, greatly accelerating the process of victory in the War of Liberation. Why was Mao Zedong able to grasp “measure” so accurately? It was based on precise and concrete calculations of the military strength of the enemy and ourselves.

在此基础上，他领导制定了适应这一新阶段的战略方针和政策策略，大大加速了解放战争胜利的进程。毛泽东为什么能够这样准确地把握“度”？是基于对敌我兵力的精确、具体的计算。

On August 22, 1947, in a telegram drafted for the Central Military Commission, Mao Zedong specifically introduced the situation on the Northwest battlefield after the main force of the enemy’s 36th Division was annihilated in the Shajiadian Campaign. After a detailed analysis of how the main divisions of Hu Zongnan’s forces had been struck by our army and their deployment, Mao pointed out: after this battle, “not only is the entire southern Shaanxi devoid of regular troops, and the greater Guanzhong area extremely empty, but even most parts of northern Shaanxi are now free of the enemy; Hu Zongnan’s rampant period has passed.” On March 7, 1948, in his commentary “On the Great Victory in the Northwest and on the New-Style Army Consolidation Movement of the People’s Liberation Army,” Mao again disclosed the precise grasp the Central Committee of the CPC had of the situation on the Northwest battlefield. This commentary was published after the PLA’s great victory at Yichuan in the spring of 1948. The text enumerated in detail the circumstances under which the three main divisions among “the twenty-eight brigades of the so-called ‘Central Army’ directly commanded by Hu Zongnan” had been successively annihilated or struck by the PLA: “The 1st Brigade of the Reorganized 1st Division was annihilated by us once in September of the year before last at Fushan in southern Shanxi; the main force of its 167th Brigade was annihilated by us once in May of last year at Panlongzhen in northern Shaanxi; the 123rd and 165th Brigades of the Reorganized 36th Division were annihilated by us once in August of last year at Shajiadian in Mizhi, northern Shaanxi; this time the Reorganized 90th Division was completely annihilated. Of the remaining Hu forces, only the 78th Brigade of the Reorganized 1st Division and the 28th Brigade of the Reorganized 36th Division have not yet suffered annihilation.” The text then pointed out: “Therefore, it can be said that the entire Hu Zongnan army has no elite backbone left.” “After this Yichuan annihilation battle, of the twenty-eight regular brigades Hu Zongnan formerly directly commanded, only twenty-three brigades remain.” The text then listed the specific deployments of these brigades, noting that some were “already dead pieces,” some were “rear-adjustment brigades” composed entirely of new recruits, and some “had been dealt annihilating blows by our army.” “These troops are not only very weak, but the vast majority are assigned to defensive duties.”

1947年 8月 22日，毛泽东在为中央军委起草的一份电报里，专门介绍了沙家店战役敌第三十六师主力被歼灭后西北战场的情况。在详细分析完胡宗南主力师各部被我军打击及其部署情况后，毛泽东指出：此战后，“不但整个陕南无正规部队，大关中极其空虚，即陕北大部分地方亦已无敌，胡宗南猖獗时期已经过去”。1948年 3月 7日，毛泽东在《评西北大捷兼论解放军的新式整军运动》的评论中，再次披露了中共中央对西北战场精确掌握的情况。该评论发表于 1948年春解放军宜川大捷之后，文中细数了“胡宗南直接指挥的所谓‘中央军’二十八个旅中”三个主力师先后被解放军歼灭打击的情况，“整编第一师之第一旅，前年九月在晋南浮山被我歼灭一次，其一六七旅主力，去年五月在陕北蟠龙镇被我歼灭一次，整编三十六师之一二三旅、一六五旅，于去年八月在陕北米脂沙家店被我歼灭一次，这次整编九十师又被全歼，剩下的胡军主力，就只有整编第一师的七十八旅和整编三十六师的二十八旅，还没有受到过歼灭”。文中接着指出：“因此，整个胡宗南军队，可以说已经没有什么精锐骨干了。”“经过此次宜川歼灭战，胡宗南过去直接指挥的正规兵力二十八个旅，现在只剩下二十三个旅。”文中随后列举了这些旅的具体部署，指出有的“已成死棋”，有的是“后调旅”，“全系新兵”，有的“曾被我军给以歼灭性打击”，“这些部队不但很弱，而且极大部分分任守备”。

On March 20, 1948, in another circular to the Party, Mao disclosed the precise grasp the Central Committee of the CPC had of the situation on the national battlefield. This text, through a similarly meticulous analysis of the circumstances under which various regular units of the Kuomintang army had been struck and annihilated in the past, as well as the current speed at which the PLA was “annihilating an average of one regular division of the Kuomintang army per month,” arrived at the judgment that “the possibility exists of annihilating the entire Kuomintang army in about five years (counting from July 1946).” On November 14, in his commentary for the Xinhua News Agency, “The Great Change in China’s Military Situation,” Mao, based on the new situation in the balance of forces between enemy and ourselves after the Liaoshen Campaign, and again on an analysis of the military forces of both sides, re-estimated the time needed for victory in the People’s War of Liberation. He pointed out that “China’s military situation has now entered a new turning point, that is, a fundamental change has occurred in the balance of forces between the two sides in the war,” and stated that starting from November 1948, it would take about one more year to overthrow the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang. The subsequent development of the battlefield situation fully confirmed Mao’s prediction. From these materials, one can see Mao’s having “numbers” in mind regarding the battlefield of liberation, and it is also clear that there is nothing mysterious about grasping “measure”; it can only come from arduous research work based on practice.

而 1948年 3月 20日，毛泽东在另一份对党内的通报中，则披露了中共中央对全国战场精确掌握的情况。该文同样是通过细致分析国民党正规军各部以往被打击歼灭的情况，以及解放军目前“平均每个月消灭国民党正规军”的速度，得出“五年左右（一九四六年七月算起）消灭国民党全军的可能性是存在的”判断。11月 14日，毛泽东在为新华社写的《中国军事形势的重大变化》的评论中，又根据辽沈战役以后敌我力量变化的新形势，同样基于敌我兵力的分析，对人民解放战争胜利的时间重新作了估计，提出“中国的军事形势现已进入一个新的转折点，即战争双方力量对比已经发生了根本的变化”，指出从 1948年 11月起，再有1年左右的时间，就可以打倒国民党的反动统治。后来战场形势的发展，完全印证了毛泽东的这个预见。从这些材料中可以看到毛泽东对解放战场的胸中有“数”，也能看得出，对“度”的把握没有什么神秘可言，只能是来自实践基础上的艰苦的研究工作。

Besides scientifically dividing stages, grasping specific policy boundaries also involves the issue of “measure.” The general line of land reform was to rely on the poor peasants, unite with the middle peasants, step by step and with discrimination eliminate the feudal system of exploitation, and develop agricultural production; the basic strategic policy was to “unite about 92 percent of the households and about 90 percent of the population in the countryside, that is, all the working people in the countryside, to establish a united front against the feudal system.” For this reason, scientifically analyzing the proportions of poor peasants and middle peasants in the countryside was of utmost importance; it concerned major issues such as the delineation of policy boundaries for land reform and the judgment of its nature. In February 1948, in a telegram, Mao emphasized “different strategies for implementing the Land Law in different areas.” He believed that in the old liberated areas, “the majority of the former poor peasants have risen to become middle peasants, and middle peasants now constitute the majority of the rural population.” Based on this, he proposed that in such areas it was necessary to firmly unite with the middle peasants and “draw in activists from among the middle peasants to participate in the leadership work of the countryside.” In areas liberated between September 1945 and August 1947, “middle peasants are in the minority” and “poor peasants are in the majority.” Based on this, he proposed that in such areas “it is necessary to organize poor peasant leagues, and it is necessary to establish the leading position of the poor peasant leagues in the peasant associations and in the rural political power.” This fully embodies Mao’s dialectical thinking that emphasizes grasping “measure.”

除了科学划分阶段，把握具体的政策界限也涉及“度”的问题。土地改革的总路线是依靠贫农，团结中农，有步骤地、有分别地消灭封建剥削制度，发展农业生产；基本战略方针是“团结农村中户数百分之九十二左右，人数百分之九十左右，即全体农村劳动人民，建立反对封建制度的统一战线”。正因如此，科学分析农村中贫农和中农的比例至关重要，这关系到土改政策界限划定及性质判断等重大问题。1948年 2月，毛泽东在一封电报中强调了“在不同地区实施土地法的不同策略”，认为在老解放区，“过去的贫农大多数已升为中农，中农已占乡村人口的大多数”，并以此为根据提出在这种地区必须坚定团结中农，“吸收中农中的积极分子参加农村的领导工作”。而在1945年 9月至 1947年 8月之间解放的地区，“中农占少数”，“贫农占大多数”，并据此提出在这种地区“必须组织贫农团，必须确定贫农团在农会中、在农村政权中的领导地位”。这充分体现了毛泽东注重把握“度”的辩证思维。

Accurately grasping “measure” also helps to avoid “going beyond the limit is as bad as falling short” or “the timing is not yet ripe.” In February 1939, while discussing philosophical issues such as “the Mean,” Mao used “going beyond the limit is as bad as falling short” to reveal, to a certain extent, the dialectical unity of quality and quantity. He pointed out: “‘Going beyond the limit is as bad as falling short’ is a method of two-front struggle and one of the important methods of thinking.” “To find and determine a certain quality from the quantity of a thing, to set boundaries for it, to distinguish it from other different qualities—this is the purpose of waging a two-front struggle.” He explained concretely: “What ‘goes beyond’ is ‘Left’ things; what ‘falls short’ is Right things. According to our present viewpoint, ‘going beyond’ and ‘falling short’ refer to the movement of a certain thing in time and space. When it develops to a certain state, one should find and determine its certain quality from the quantitative relations; this is the ‘Mean’ or ‘the Mean,’ or ‘timely Mean.’ To say that this thing is no longer in this state but has entered another state is a different quality; this is ‘going beyond’ or ‘Left’ deviation. To say that this thing is still in its original state with no development is an old thing, a stagnation of concepts, conservatism and obstinacy, Right deviation, ‘falling short.’” That is to say, a certain quality is always linked to a certain quantity; an excess or deficiency in quantity may change the quality of a thing. “Within certain limits, although quantity changes, the thing remains the same thing. Only within a certain stage, under certain conditions, can the development of quantity seek a change in quality; at that time the thing loses its old quality and changes into a new qualitative thing.”

准确把握“度”，还有利于避免“过犹不及”或“火候未到”。1939年 2月，在探讨“中庸”等哲学问题时，毛泽东用“过犹不及”在一定程度上揭示了质与量的辩证统一关系。他指出：“‘过犹不及’是两条战线斗争的方法，是重要思想方法之一”，“从事物的量上去找出并确定那一定的质，为之设立界限，使之区别于其他异质，作两条战线斗争的目的在此”。他具体解释说：“‘过’的即是‘左’的东西，‘不及’的即是右的东西。依照现在我们的观点说来，过与不及乃指一定事物在时间与空间中运动，当其发展到一定状态时，应从量的关系上找出与确定其一定的质，这就是‘中’或‘中庸’，或‘时中’。说这个事物已经不是这种状态而进到别种状态了，这就是别一种质，就是‘过’或‘左’倾了。说这个事物还停止在原来状态并无发展，这是老的事物，是概念停滞，是守旧顽固，是右倾，是‘不及’”。也就是说，一定的质与一定的量总是联系在一起的，量的过与不及都可能会改变事物的质，而“在一定限度内，量虽变化，该事物仍为该事物。只有在一定阶段内，在一定条件下，量的发展才能求质的变化，事物此时就失去旧质而变到新质事物”。

V. From Having “Numbers” to Taking Action

五、从有“数”到有为

Having “numbers” in mind regarding circumstances and problems helps us stand high and see far. In this way, when we make decisions, our determination is great, and when we seek methods, the methods are correct. People often say, “Chairman Mao used troops as if he were a god.” In fact, this largely stems from his thorough and comprehensive understanding of the war situation, his many calculations, and his penetrating calculations. As Hu Qiaomu said, Mao’s “brilliance lay in his ability to penetrate surface phenomena to grasp the essence of things, to make sober assessments of the situation, to foresee changes and developments in things, to guide the situation accordingly, and to organize and mobilize all forces to promote the transformation of things from quantitative change to qualitative change, step by step leading the Chinese revolution to a new high tide.”

对情况和问题做到胸中有“数”，可以帮助我们站得高、望得远，这样，去下决心，决心就大，找方法，方法也就对。人们常说“毛主席用兵真如神”，其实这在很大程度上源于他对战争情况了解得深入全面，算得多、算得透。正如胡乔木所说，毛泽东的“英明之处就是善于透过表面现象抓住事物的本质，对时局能作出清醒的估量，能预见到事物的变化和发展，因势利导地组织和调动一切力量促成事物从量变转为质变，一步一步地使中国革命走向新的高潮”。

Mao emphasized fighting no battle unprepared, fighting no battle without certainty of victory. He proposed, “Our strategy is ‘pitting one against ten,’ and our tactics are ‘pitting ten against one.’” The essence of war is “preserving oneself and annihilating the enemy.” In fighting, one must “concentrate superior forces to annihilate the enemy one by one.” To achieve such goals, one must first know oneself and know the enemy, thoroughly understand and precisely calculate the situation of both sides. The same applies to fighting as to doing other work well. Only by clarifying the situation in advance and having “numbers” in mind can one identify the main direction of attack and mobilize all factors and forces that can be mobilized to achieve the set goals.

毛泽东强调不打无准备之仗，不打无把握之仗，提出“我们的战略是‘以一当十’，我们的战术是‘以十当一’”，战争的本质就是“保存自己消灭敌人”，打仗要“集中优势兵力，各个歼灭敌人”。而要实现这样的目标，首先就要做到知己知彼，对敌我情况摸清吃透、计算精确。打仗如此，做好其他工作依然如此。只有事先把情况搞清楚，做到胸中有“数”，才能找准主攻方向，调动一切可以调动的因素和力量，去实现既定的目标。

Using figures to explain problems and clarifying principles through calculation and comparison can greatly enhance the effect of persuasion. Mao Zedong was highly adept at using concise and vivid figures to elucidate major principles. He once said that the founding of New China meant that “the Chinese, who comprise one-quarter of the world’s population, have since stood up”; the phrase “one-quarter” alone vividly and thoroughly expressed the great significance of the founding of New China. He also said, “Even after ten thousand years, we must still struggle. The Communist Party must struggle, must serve the people wholeheartedly, and must not serve them half-heartedly or with two-thirds of a heart and two-thirds of a will”; the terms “ten thousand years,” “whole,” “half,” and “two-thirds” succinctly and penetratingly depicted the fundamental tenet that Communists must uphold forever.

用数字来说明问题，通过算账比较来阐明道理，还可以大大增强说服的效果。毛泽东很善于用简练鲜明的数字来说明大道理。他曾说，新中国的成立使“占人类总数四分之一的中国人从此站立起来了”，其中的“四分之一”，寥寥一语就把新中国成立的重大意义淋漓尽致地表达了出来；他还曾说过，“一万年以后，也要奋斗。共产党就是要奋斗，就是要全心全意为人民服务，不要半心半意或者三分之二的心三分之二的意为人民服务”，其中的“一万年”“全”“半”“三分之二”，言简意赅就把共产党人必须永远坚持的根本宗旨入木三分地刻画了出来。

Mao Zedong greatly admired the method of using calculation to clarify issues, believing it to be far more effective than simply expounding principles or stating viewpoints. In 1955, while presiding over the editing of the book *The Socialist Upsurge in China’s Countryside*, he wrote a commentary for an article titled “A Good Experience in Rectifying a Cooperative,” which introduced the experience of a production cooperative. In it, he fully affirmed the propaganda method of grassroots cadres known as “four comparisons and five calculations” [17]17 “Four comparisons and five calculations” (四对比、五算账): A propaganda method used by grassroots cadres during the agricultural cooperative movement in the 1950s, comparing the advantages of socialist collectivization over individual farming and capitalism through concrete numerical contrasts. (the “four comparisons” are: first, compare which is better—the cooperative, the mutual-aid team, or the individual household; second, compare which is better—socialism or capitalism; third, compare which is better—the exploitative system or the system without exploitation; fourth, compare which is better—individual development or common prosperity. The “five calculations” are: first, calculate the disaster account; second, calculate the account of increased income from sideline occupations; third, calculate the account of increased work points from mobilizing labor enthusiasm; fourth, calculate the account of mutual benefit and increased production between poor peasants and middle peasants in cooperation; fifth, calculate the account of overcoming difficulties in production and livelihood). He considered this “a very good method for explaining to peasants which of the two systems is better and which is worse, a method that makes people understand at once. This method has strong persuasive power. It is not like the approach of some comrades who are not good at propaganda, who simply mention vaguely ‘either take the road of the Communist Party or take the road of Chiang Kai-shek,’ trying to intimidate the audience with big labels, having no appealing content in hand. Instead, it uses the experience of local peasants to make a detailed analysis for the peasants, which gives it strong persuasive power.”

毛泽东很推崇用算账来说明问题的方法，认为这比单纯讲道理、说观点，效果要好得多。1955年，他在主持编辑《中国农村的社会主义高潮》一书时，在为其中一篇介绍生产合作社经验的《一个整社的好经验》的文章写的按语中，充分肯定了基层干部“四对比、五算账”（“四对比”是：一比社、组、户哪个好；二比社会主义和资本主义哪个好；三比剥削制度和没有剥削制度哪个好；四比个人发展和共同富裕哪个好。“五算账”是：一算灾害账；二算搞副业增加收入账；三算发挥劳动积极性增加工分账；四算贫农中农合作互利增产账；五算克服生产、生活困难账。）的宣传方法，认为这“是向农民说明两种制度谁好谁坏、使人一听就懂的一种很好的方法。这种方法有很强的说服力。它不是像有些不善于做宣传的同志那样，仅仅简单地提到所谓‘或者走共产党的道路，或者走蒋介石的道路’，只是企图拿大帽子压服听众，手里并无动人的货色，而是拿当地农民的经验向农民作细致的分析，这就具有很强的说服力”。

Mao Zedong also directly used the principle of quantitative change leading to qualitative change to inspire morale and defeat the enemy. In 1951, during the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, [18]18 War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea (抗美援朝): The Chinese name for the Korean War (1950–1953), in which the People’s Volunteer Army fought alongside North Korean forces against the U.S.-led UN coalition. the battlefield was in a tense stalemate between the enemy and ourselves. In response to the difficult situation where the U.S. military had significant advantages in weaponry, air superiority, and mobility, making it hard for the Chinese People’s Volunteers to encircle and completely annihilate an enemy force of about regimental strength, Mao Zedong proposed the combat policy of “nibbling away like chewing cowhide candy” [19]19 “Nibbling away like chewing cowhide candy” (零敲牛皮糖): A military tactic named after a traditional Chinese chewy candy, referring to the strategy of destroying enemy forces piecemeal through small, repeated attacks rather than large-scale encirclements. to break the deadlock and achieve greater victories. He demanded that the Volunteers “take the complete and clean annihilation of one enemy battalion as the goal for each army in one operation” and instructed the Volunteers’ headquarters to “clearly explain the protracted nature and hardships of the Korean war situation, so that all cadres and soldiers have full understanding and ideological preparation.” This put forward a strategy of accumulating small gains into large ones, turning small victories into big ones, and transforming quantitative change into qualitative change, pointing the direction for the Volunteers’ victorious operations.

毛泽东还直接用量变引起质变的道理来鼓舞斗志、克敌制胜。1951年抗美援朝战场上处于敌我胶着紧张相持状态，针对美军在武器装备、制空权、机动性等方面具有较大优势，志愿军很难合围并彻底消灭对方一个团左右兵力的困难情况，为打破僵局、取得更大胜利，毛泽东提出“零敲牛皮糖”的作战方针，要求志愿军“每军一次以彻底干脆歼敌一个营为目标”，并且叮嘱志愿军司令部，要“将朝鲜战局的长期性、艰苦性讲清，使全体干部和战士有充分认识与思想准备”。这就提出了积少成多、积小胜为大胜、转量变为质变的策略，为志愿军的胜利作战指明了方向。

In summary, Mao Zedong was the proposer of the working method of “having figures in mind” and also a great exemplar who practiced this method. For a long time, the working method of “having figures in mind” has played an important role in educating and guiding the Party’s vast number of cadres to improve their leadership capabilities and levels and to refine their leadership methods. Today, in the process of comprehensively advancing the building of a strong country and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation through Chinese-path modernization, we will inevitably encounter a large number of entirely new issues that have never appeared before, as well as various difficulties and obstacles, and undergo major tests of high winds and rough waves, even raging storms. All these place higher demands on Party cadres to perform their duties scientifically, precisely, and with full accountability. “Precision” is both a work requirement and an important manifestation of Marxist epistemology and methodology. It requires us to adhere to the ideological line of seeking truth from facts, be adept at grasping the dialectical unity of the quality and quantity of things, achieve “having figures in mind,” and act with method. Mao Zedong’s working method of “having figures in mind” provides intellectual wisdom and beneficial inspiration for meeting the scientific and precise work requirements.

总之，毛泽东是胸中有“数”工作方法的提出者，同时也是践行这一工作方法的伟大典范。长期以来，胸中有“数”的工作方法对于教育指导广大党员干部提高领导能力和水平、改进领导方法发挥了重要作用。今天，在以中国式现代化全面推进强国建设、民族复兴伟业的进程中，我们必然会遇到大量从未出现过的全新课题，也会遭遇各种艰难险阻，经受许多风高浪急甚至惊涛骇浪的重大考验，这些都对党员干部科学精准履职尽责提出了更高要求。“精准”既是工作要求，又是马克思主义认识论和方法论的重要体现，它要求我们必须坚持实事求是思想路线，善于把握事物质与量的辩证统一，做到胸中有“数”，行之有方。毛泽东胸中有“数”的工作方法，为达到科学精准的工作要求提供了思想智慧和有益启示。

(Author: Lü Zhen, Associate Researcher at the Institute of Party History and Literature of the CPC Central Committee)

（作者：吕臻，中共中央党史和文献研究院副研究员）

Online Editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心