Mao Zedong’s Strategic Guidance in the Great War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea

Employing superb art of war guidance to defeat a superior enemy with inferior forces is a fine tradition and military magic weapon forged by the Chinese Communist Party in its long-term war practice. In the early days of the founding of New China, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee made the historic decision to resist US aggression and aid Korea and defend the homeland, guiding the Chinese People’s Volunteers to win this war of national foundation under conditions of extreme disparity in forces between the enemy and ourselves. General Secretary Xi Jinping profoundly pointed out that the great victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea “is a declaration that the Chinese people have stood up and taken their place in the East, an important milestone in the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and has major and far-reaching significance for both China and the world.” On the occasion of the 130th anniversary of Comrade Mao Zedong’s birth, reviewing and summarizing the art of strategic guidance of the founding leader of New China in this war has major practical revelatory significance for us today in carrying forward and promoting the great spirit of resisting US aggression and aiding Korea, and effectively responding to new risks and new challenges that are increasingly turbulent and complex.

运用高超的战争指导艺术以劣胜优、战胜强敌，是中国共产党在长期战争实践中锻造形成的优良传统和军事法宝。新中国成立之初，毛泽东和党中央领导作出抗美援朝、保家卫国的历史性决策，指导中国人民志愿军在敌我力量极其悬殊条件下打赢了这场立国之战。习近平总书记深刻指出，抗美援朝战争伟大胜利，“是中国人民站起来屹立于世界东方的宣言书，是中华民族走向伟大复兴的重要里程碑，对中国和世界都有着重大而深远的意义”。在毛泽东同志诞辰130周年之际，回顾总结新中国的开国领袖在这场战争中的战略指导艺术，对于我们今天赓续弘扬伟大抗美援朝精神，有效应对风高浪急、日趋复杂的新风险新挑战，具有重大现实启示意义。

Coordinating the overall political situation and the overall strategic situation, making the major decision to fight abroad with extraordinary courage and boldness

统筹政治大局和战略全局，以非凡气魄和胆略作出出国作战重大决策

On June 25, 1950, the Korean civil war broke out. In early October of the same year, the US military flagrantly crossed the 38th parallel, bringing the flames of war to the China-Korea border. The Korean Party and government requested China to directly dispatch troops to provide assistance. The newly born New China regime faced a very perilous war choice and severe test. Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee stood high and looked far, while resolutely making up their minds to send troops to Korea, they carefully planned the scale and method of the war, achieving the goal of stopping a large war with a small war and achieving the purpose of interior-line defense through exterior-line operations.

1950年6月25日，朝鲜内战爆发，同年10月初美军悍然越过三八线，把战火烧到中朝边境，朝鲜党和政府请求中国直接出动军队给予援助。刚诞生不久的新中国政权，面临着十分艰险的战争抉择和严峻考验。毛泽东和党中央站高望远，在毅然下定出兵朝鲜决心的同时，精心筹划战争规模、战争方式等，实现了以小战止大战、以外线作战达成内线防御目的。

Adhering to safeguarding long-term interests and properly handling “fighting” and “construction.” The decision in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea was extremely difficult to make. After comprehensively weighing the pros and cons, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee formally made the strategic decision to resist US aggression and aid Korea and defend the homeland, mainly considering that “one punch opened up, lest a hundred punches come,” to safeguard our long-term interests. First, adhering to promoting construction through fighting and promoting fighting through construction, ensuring the long-term stability and security of the country. Mao Zedong pointed out: “In short, we believe we should participate in the war, we must participate in the war. The benefits of participating in the war are extremely great, and the harms of not participating in the war are extremely great.” Starting from the goal of building a modern socialist country, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee coordinated the two major tasks of “grasping construction” and “ensuring survival,” shifting the military strategic focus from the southeast to the northeast, using the anti-aggression war to provide security for national construction, and using national construction to provide material support for winning the war. Second, carrying forward the great spirit of internationalism and supporting the world national liberation movement. Mao Zedong considered the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea within the context of the trends of the times; an important intention was to strike down the arrogance of domestic and international reactionaries and avoid an unfavorable situation that might arise for the revolution in the East or even the world. History has proven that this war shattered the myth of the invincibility of the US military and powerfully promoted the cause of world peace and human progress.

坚持维护长远利益处理好“打”与“建”。抗美援朝战争决策，极其难以下定。经过全面衡量利弊，毛泽东和党中央正式作出抗美援朝、保家卫国的战略决策，主要考虑是“打得一拳开，免得百拳来”，维护我们的长远利益。首先，坚持以打促建、以建促打，保障国家长治久安。毛泽东指出：“总之，我们认为应当参战，必须参战。参战利益极大，不参战损害极大。”从建设现代化的社会主义国家这一目标出发，毛泽东和党中央统筹“抓建设”与“保生存”两大任务，把军事战略重心从东南转移到东北，以反侵略战争为国家建设提供安全保障，以国家建设为打赢战争提供物质支撑。其次，发扬伟大国际主义精神，支持世界民族解放运动。毛泽东把抗美援朝战争纳入时代大势中来考量，一个重要用意是打击国内国际反动气焰，避免东方乃至世界革命可能出现不利局势。历史证明，这场战争打破了美军不可战胜的神话，有力推动了世界和平与人类进步事业。

Adhering to stopping a larger-scale war of aggression with a local war. In order to maintain the overall peace of the country and avoid or reduce the impact and interference on the overall political situation of the country, Mao Zedong carefully designed the decision to send troops to Korea, keeping the war within a limited scope as much as possible. First, it was decided to dispatch troops in the name of “volunteers” rather than the “People’s Liberation Army,” which avoided giving the United States a pretext to declare war on China. Second, the war was limited to the Korean Peninsula region, which facilitated the localization of the war’s scale. Third, the war aim was strictly limited; after the Fifth Campaign, the war aim was changed from completely driving the US military out of Korea to restoring the pre-war state, which reduced the risk of the war escalating and even triggering a world war. Finally, it was insisted that if you don’t fight, that’s fine, but if you fight, you must fight to hurt and frighten the opponent; by severely punishing the US-led “UN forces,” they were made to deeply realize that provoking the Chinese people is “not easy to deal with,” which truly achieved the goal of stopping war through war.

坚持以局部战争制止更大规模侵略战争。为了维护国家的总体和平，避免或减少对国家政治全局的干扰冲击，毛泽东在决策出兵朝鲜问题上精心设计，尽可能把战争控制在有限范围内。首先，确定以“志愿军”而不是“解放军”的名义出兵，这就避免了给美国对中国宣战以口实。其次，将战争限定在朝鲜半岛区域，这就促成了战争规模的局部化。再次，严格限定战争目的，在第五次战役之后将战争目的由彻底把美国军队驱逐出朝鲜转变为恢复战前状态，这就减少了战争越打越大甚至引发世界大战的风险。最后，坚持不打则已、打则必打痛打怕对方，通过狠狠教训以美军为首的“联合国军”，使其深刻认识到惹翻了中国人民是“不好办的”，这就真正达到了以战止战的目的。

Adhering to achieving the purpose of strategic defense through exterior-line counterattack operations. In practice, several border self-defense counterattack operations after the founding of New China mostly adhered to the principle that if the enemy can come, we can go; after the enemy launched a military invasion against us and we obtained the right to self-defense counterattack, we adopted exterior-line counterattack operations to defeat the enemy. While making the decision to resist US aggression and aid Korea and defend the homeland, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee also clearly adopted the method of fighting outside the country, achieving strategic defense through exterior-line counterattack operations. History has proven that this decision was very necessary and correct. In order to support the Korean government and military and maintain the tranquility of China’s northeastern border, the Volunteers had to go to Korea to fight the “UN forces.” If we had waited until the United States had completely defeated the Korean government and military before sending troops, we could only prepare to fight the United States on the border line, and we would have to be on constant guard against the US military suddenly crossing the Yalu River and bringing the flames of war to China’s northeast, which would put us in a great strategic passive position. From a longer-term perspective, if the United States was emboldened by its victory in the Korean War, its war ambitions would further expand, which would greatly reduce China’s security coefficient and increase national security risks.

坚持以外线反击作战达成战略防御目的。从实践看，新中国成立后的几场边境自卫反击作战，大都是坚持敌可以来、我就可以去，在敌人对我发动军事入侵、我们取得自卫反击权力后，采取外线反击作战打败敌人。毛泽东和党中央在作出抗美援朝、保家卫国战争决策的同时，也明确采取境外作战方式，以外线反击作战达成战略防御。历史证明，这一决策是十分必要、正确的。为了支援朝鲜政府和军队、维护我国东北边疆安宁，志愿军必须到朝鲜境内迎战“联合国军”。如果等到美国把朝鲜政府和军队完全打垮后我们再出兵，我们只能做边境线上迎战美国的准备，并且必须随时防止美军突然越过鸭绿江，把战火烧到中国东北，这将使我处于很大的战略被动。从更长远来看，如果美国从朝鲜战争的胜利中受到鼓舞，战争野心会进一步膨胀，这将大大降低我国安全系数，增大国家安全隐患。

Mao Zedong’s resolute strategic decision to fight abroad profoundly enlightens us: War is a great affair of the state; war decisions concern the future and destiny of the country and the nation. On the decision-making issue of “whether to fight” in a war, the key is to proceed from the overall strategic situation, adhere to military subordination to politics, and adhere to the subordination of immediate interests to long-term interests.

毛泽东毅然作出出国作战的战略决策，深刻启示我们：兵者国之大事，战争决策事关国家和民族前途命运。在战争“打不打”这一决策问题上，关键是要从战略大局出发，坚持军事服从政治，坚持眼前利益服从长远利益。

Striving to grasp the initiative in the evolution and development of the war, doing a good job in war preparation, opening, transition, and conclusion

力争掌握战争发展演变的主动权，做好战争准备、开局、转换和收局

Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee deeply understood and grasped the laws of war, skillfully utilized the uncertainties in war, led the Volunteers to prepare for war based on the worst possible scenario, flexibly adjusted combat plans according to the changes in the battlefield development, timely transitioned to strategic counteroffensive and strategic defense, meticulously planned the conclusion of the war, promoted the orderly transition of war hinges and the organic connection of war stages, and directed a vivid, spectacular, and powerful war drama.

毛泽东和党中央深刻认识和把握战争规律，娴熟利用战争中的不确定性，领导志愿军立足最坏可能做好战争准备，并根据战场发展变化灵活调整作战计划，适时转入战略反攻、战略防御，周密筹划战争收局，推动战争枢纽有序转换、战争阶段有机衔接，导演了一幕有声有色威武雄壮的战争活剧。

Carrying out war deployment in advance based on the worst possible scenario. In the preparation for the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, Mao Zedong emphasized basing on the most difficult and complex situations, making preparations in advance for strategic pre-positioning, especially deploying combat forces to ensure victory in the initial battle. Shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee quickly decided to form the Northeast Border Defense Army, mobilizing 4 corps and 3 artillery divisions and other units, positioning them in the China-Korea border area (later adding 1 more corps), while also mobilizing 6 corps in the second and third lines as strategic mobile units, preparing to deal with complex situations. Regarding the war situation that our army might face after entering the war, three estimates were made: first, annihilating and expelling the US and other aggressor troops within Korea; second, failing to annihilate large numbers of US troops in Korea, leading to a stalemate; third, being able to persist in fighting in Korea, forcing the United States to resolve the issue through negotiations. Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee’s attitude was to strive for the emergence of the third situation, guard against and prepare for the second situation; the general principle later established was “on a stable and reliable basis, strive for all possible victories.” These sufficient war preparations gave our forces positioned on the China-Korea border a relative advantage over the enemy forces, laying the foundation for the Volunteers’ victory in the initial battle.

立足最坏可能提前进行战争布局。在抗美援朝战争准备上，毛泽东强调立足于最困难最复杂情况，未雨绸缪搞好战略预置，特别是展开作战力量布势，确保初战必胜。朝鲜战争爆发不久，毛泽东和党中央迅即决策组建东北边防军，调集4个军及3个炮兵师等部队，摆在中朝边境地区（后又增调1个军），同时又在二线、三线调集6个军作为战略机动部队，做好应付复杂局势的准备。对于我军参战后可能面临的战争局势，作了三种估计：一是在朝鲜境内歼灭和驱逐美国及其他侵略军；二是在朝鲜不能大量歼灭美军，战争形成僵局；三是能够在朝鲜坚持作战，迫使美国通过谈判解决问题。毛泽东和党中央的态度是争取第三种情况的出现，防范和准备出现第二种情况，后来确立的总原则是“在稳当可靠的基础上争取一切可能的胜利”。这些充分的战争准备工作，使摆在中朝边境的我军兵力对敌军形成相对优势，为志愿军初战一举取胜打下了基础。

Seizing the opportunity and flexibly promoting the transition of war stages. Mao Zedong was good at seeing the big from the small, synthesizing various information, especially the enemy-our situation on the battlefield, scientifically predicting the direction of war development, accurately grasping the hinges of war, and taking preemptive measures to promote the war process to develop in a direction favorable to us. At the beginning of sending troops to Korea, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee seized the complete surprise of the enemy, ordered the Volunteers to adjust their combat policy, changing from the originally planned defensive operations to annihilating the enemy in mobile warfare, immediately launching a strategic counteroffensive and conducting several consecutive campaigns, catching the “UN forces” off guard. As the war stalemated around the 38th parallel, Mao Zedong timely formulated the combat policy of “protracted operations, active defense”; the Volunteers took positional warfare as the main form of combat, closely coordinating combat with negotiations, thus transitioning to the strategic defense stage. In this stage, Mao Zedong instructed our army to raise vigilance, prepare for enemy attacks from the air, ground, and sea during the negotiations, and continuously consolidated our army’s front lines. The final outcome was that the stronger we fought, the more favorable conditions were created for the subsequent successful armistice.

把握先机灵活推动战争阶段转换。毛泽东善于见微知著，综合各类信息特别是战场上敌我态势，科学预判战争发展走向，准确把握战争关节枢纽，以先发制人举措推动战争进程向有利于我的方向发展。出兵朝鲜之初，毛泽东和党中央抓住完全出敌意料的突然性，下令志愿军调整作战方针，由原定的防御作战转为在运动中歼敌，立即发起战略反攻并连续进行几次战役，打了“联合国军”一个措手不及。随着战争在三八线地区出现相持局面，毛泽东适时制定“持久作战、积极防御”作战方针，志愿军以阵地战为主要作战形式，作战与谈判紧密配合，由此转入战略防御阶段。这一阶段，毛泽东指示我军提高警惕，做好谈判期间应对敌人来自空中、地面以及海上进攻的准备，不断巩固了我军战线。最终的结局是，我们越战越强，这就为后来胜利实现停战创造了有利条件。

Planning the conclusion of the war based on the ebb and flow of enemy and our forces. As early as June 1951, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee, taking comprehensive account of the domestic and international situation and the balance of forces on the battlefield, set for the Chinese People’s Volunteers the strategic policy of “fully preparing for protracted operations and striving to reach an end to the war through negotiations,” deciding to conclude the war through political talks. The goal for ending the war was to restore the pre-war state and make every effort to stabilize the front line near the 38th parallel. This both met the requirements of our country’s overall political situation and was basically consistent with the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves. Over the following two years and more, we waged unremitting struggle around this war aim, finally forcing the United States to sign the Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953, bringing the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea to a victorious conclusion.

根据敌我力量消长筹划战争收局。早在1951年6月，毛泽东和党中央综合考虑国内外形势及战场力量态势，为志愿军确定“充分准备持久作战和争取和谈达成结束战争”的战略方针，决定通过政治谈判结束战争。战争结束目标是恢复战前状态，全力把战线稳定在三八线附近，这既适应我国政治大局的要求，又与敌我双方力量对比状况基本相符。其后两年多，我们围绕这一战争目的进行不懈斗争，终于迫使美国于1953年7月27日签订停战协定，抗美援朝战争至此胜利结束。

Mao Zedong’s experience and methods in steering the course of war development profoundly enlighten us: military operations have no constant form, just as water has no constant shape; uncertainty is a prominent feature of modern warfare. We must vigorously enhance our ability to steer warfare, using scientific subjective guidance to overcome the uncertainty of war development and cause it to evolve in a direction favorable to us.

毛泽东驾驭战争发展进程的经验做法，深刻启示我们：兵无常势水无常形，不确定性是现代战争的突出特征。我们必须大力增强驾驭战争能力，以科学的主观指导来克服战争发展不确定性，使其向着有利于我的方向发展演变。

Adhere to “you fight your way, I fight my way,” [5]5 “You fight your way, I fight my way” (你打你的，我打我的) is a classic Maoist military maxim emphasizing the principle of seizing the initiative and imposing one’s own operational logic on the enemy, rather than reacting to the enemy’s moves. maximize strengths and avoid weaknesses, and create new strategies and tactics to defeat the enemy.

坚持你打你的、我打我的，扬长避短创造新的制敌战略战术

In the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee, focusing on the new form of warfare, the operational adversary, and the actual battlefield conditions, innovatively developed new, materialist, truth-seeking methods of employing troops, successively solving problems such as “whether we can fight, whether we can hold ground, and whether we can guarantee supply transport,” and applying flexible and mobile strategy and tactics to the utmost.

在抗美援朝战争中，毛泽东和党中央着眼新的战争样式、作战对手及战场实际，创新发展实事求是的唯物主义用兵新法，先后解决了“能不能打、能不能守、能不能保证给养运输”等问题，把灵活机动的战略战术运用到极致。

Learn warfare from warfare and promptly transform concepts of war. Mao Zedong pointed out: “In wartime, war is learning.” [6]6 This is a paraphrase of Mao Zedong’s statement from his 1936 work “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War.” After the founding of New China, the nature of the war faced by our military shifted from a domestic war of unification to a war of external resistance against aggression, and the form of warfare also shifted from a domestic war with a low degree of modernization to a modern war involving a powerful enemy. The engagement with the US military in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea made Mao Zedong deeply aware of this. He believed that we had fought for over twenty years, and in modern warfare we could not cling to old operational experience; using old methods to fight wars of annihilation no longer suited the new situation. To this end, he proposed that the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea was a great school, and demanded that the entire military promptly adapt to the new form of warfare, shifting from coping with domestic war with a low degree of modernization to coping with modern war. This guided officers and soldiers throughout the military to break free from the constraints of domestic war thinking, and to earnestly study and master new methods and tactics for winning modern warfare.

从战争学习战争及时转变战争观念。毛泽东指出：“战争时期，战争就是学习。”新中国成立后，我军面临的战争性质由国内统一战争转变为对外反侵略战争，战争样式也由现代化程度不高的国内战争转变为有强敌介入的现代化战争。抗美援朝战争与美军的交手，让毛泽东深切地认识到这一点。他认为，我们过去打了二十多年仗，在现代化战争中不能抱着老的作战经验不放，用老办法打歼灭战就不适应新情况了。为此，他提出抗美援朝战争是个大学校，要求全军抓紧适应新的战争样式，由应对现代化程度不高的国内战争向应对现代化战争转变。这就引导全军官兵打破了国内战争思维观念的束缚，抓紧学习研究掌握打赢现代化战争的新战法打法。

Emphasize knowing oneself and the enemy to ascertain the weaknesses and strengths of a formidable foe. On the Korean battlefield, our military encountered for the first time a strange and powerful adversary like the US military, and faced great challenges for a time. Mao Zedong deeply analyzed the contradictions and problems faced by the US-led Western camp, pointing out that a protracted war was unfavorable to the United States. Through a period of engagement, we gradually gained a clear picture of the US military: its strengths were a high degree of mechanization in weaponry and equipment, and command of the air and sea; its weaknesses were low troop morale, inflexible tactics, and especially fear of close-quarters combat and night combat; overall, it was “more steel, less spirit.” [7]7 “More steel, less spirit” (钢多气少) is a Maoist characterization of the US military, contrasting its material superiority (steel) with its perceived lack of fighting spirit (spirit), as opposed to the Chinese forces’ “less steel, more spirit” (钢少气多). Compared with the US military, our military’s weakness was backward weaponry and equipment and a very low level of military modernization; our military’s strengths were broad popular support, flexible tactics, high morale, and strong will to fight. The troops carried forward the fighting spirit of “fearing neither hardship nor death,” and the officers and soldiers’ conscious initiative was fully brought into play; overall, we were “less steel, more spirit.” Accordingly, Mao Zedong emphasized maximizing strengths and avoiding weaknesses, guiding our military to use our strengths to overcome the enemy’s weaknesses, and to use “less steel, more spirit” to forcefully overcome “more steel, less spirit.”

强调知彼知己摸清强敌的弱点强项。在朝鲜战场上，我军首次遭遇美军这样陌生的强大对手，一度面临很大挑战。毛泽东深入分析以美国为首的西方阵营面临的矛盾问题，指出战争长期打下去对美国不利。通过一段时间的较量，逐渐摸清了美军情况：其长处是武器装备机械化程度高，拥有制空权和制海权；弱点是军队士气不高，战术不灵活，尤其怕近战、夜战，总体看来是“钢多气少”。与美军相比，我军的弱点是武器装备落后，军队现代化水平很低；我军的长处是有人民的广泛支持，战术灵活，士气高涨，战斗意志旺盛，部队发扬“一不怕苦、二不怕死”的战斗精神，官兵自觉能动性得到了充分发挥，总体看来是“钢少气多”。据此，毛泽东强调扬长避短，指导我军以己之长克敌之短，以“钢少气多”力克“钢多气少”。

Summarize practical experience in war to create new tactics and methods. Throughout his long military career, Mao Zedong led our military to promptly summarize battlefield experience after each battle, creating and inventing new tactics and methods, continuously enriching and developing our military’s strategic and tactical arsenal. Focusing on annihilating the enemy’s effective strength, he summarized experience and proposed using the method of “nibbling away like eating a piece of toffee” [8]8 “Nibbling away like eating a piece of toffee” (零敲牛皮糖) is a colloquial Chinese metaphor for a strategy of piecemeal attrition, breaking the enemy down bit by bit rather than seeking a single decisive battle. to annihilate the enemy, and later proposed “fighting more small-scale wars of annihilation,” creating our military’s superiority in campaigns and battles through concentrating forces. In response to the trend toward protracted war, Mao Zedong decided to adopt a policy of rotating troops in Korea, which both solved the problems of battlefield rest and sustained operations for the Chinese People’s Volunteers and effectively trained the troops. Mao Zedong guided the Chinese People’s Volunteers to construct a solid defensive system with tunnels as the backbone in positional defense, creating a set of tactics for offensive and defensive operations relying on tunnels, and accumulating rich experience in positional warfare. He also guided our military to use the night to gain freedom of action, creating an effective set of night combat tactics; seizing on the weakness of the US military’s modern equipment’s heavy dependence on rear areas and roads, he boldly implemented outflanking and encircling tactics and cut off the enemy’s rear; adopting all feasible means to establish an “indestructible steel transport line”; and so on. This series of new tactics and methods greatly limited the role of the US military’s superior weaponry and equipment, gave better play to the Chinese People’s Volunteers’ advantages and strengths, and solved a series of new problems of how to defeat a powerful enemy under conditions of extreme disparity in forces between the enemy and ourselves.

总结战争实践经验创造新战法打法。毛泽东在长期军事生涯中，领导我军每打一仗就及时总结战场经验，创造发明新的战法打法，不断丰富发展了我军战略战术宝库。他着眼歼灭敌军有生力量，总结经验提出用“零敲牛皮糖”办法歼灭敌军，以后又提出“多打小规模的歼灭战”，通过集中兵力造成了我军在战役战斗中的优势。毛泽东针对战争呈现长期化趋势，决定在朝鲜采取轮番作战方针，既解决了志愿军战场休整和持续作战问题，又有效地锻炼了部队。毛泽东指导志愿军在坚守防御中构筑了以坑道为骨干的坚固防御体系，创造了一套依托坑道进行攻防作战的战术，积累了丰富的阵地战经验。他还指导我军利用夜间争取行动自由，创造了一套有效的夜战战术；抓住美军现代化装备对后方和道路依赖性大的弱点，大胆实施迂回包围战术并切断敌军后路；采取一切可行手段，建立打不烂、炸不断的“钢铁运输线”；等等。这一系列新的战法打法，极大限制了美军优势武器装备的作用，较好发挥了志愿军的优势特长，解决了在敌我力量极其悬殊条件下如何制胜强敌的一系列新问题。

Mao Zedong’s experience and methods in creating new tactics and methods profoundly enlighten us: no matter what form warfare takes, the most fundamental principle on the battlefield is “preserving oneself and annihilating the enemy.” Those who direct war must firmly base themselves on the material and technological conditions of their era, deeply analyze and grasp the strengths and weaknesses of both the enemy and ourselves, flexibly utilize the factors of battlefield time and space, and explore and invent methods to maximize strengths, avoid weaknesses, and defeat a powerful enemy through asymmetric means.

毛泽东创造新战法打法的经验做法，深刻启示我们：无论什么形态的战争，战场上最根本的一条就是“保存自己、消灭敌人”。战争指导者必须牢牢立足于所处时代的物质技术条件，深入分析和把握敌我双方的优劣长短，灵活利用战场时间与空间因素，探索发明扬长避短、以非对称方式制胜强敌的方法。

Carry forward the fine tradition of people’s war, comprehensively utilize multiple means of struggle to defeat the opponent.

发扬人民战争优良传统，综合运用多种斗争手段战胜对手

The War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea was in fact an all-round contest between the two great powers of China and the United States. When Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee directed this war, they used the power of the state apparatus to mobilize and integrate the resources of the entire nation, employed multiple means of struggle to open a second front, effectively coordinated with the frontal battlefield operations, and gathered the great power of a people’s war of total resistance to defeat the powerful enemy.

抗美援朝战争实际上是中美两个大国之间的全面较量。毛泽东和党中央在指导这场战争时，使用国家政权力量动员整合举国资源，运用多种斗争手段开辟第二条战线，有力配合了正面战场作战，汇聚形成制胜强敌的人民战争总体战伟力。

Widely mobilize the masses of the people to enhance the sustainability of the war. Mao Zedong adhered to the principle that “soldiers and the people are the foundation of victory,” [9]9 This is a paraphrase of Mao Zedong’s statement from his 1938 work “On Protracted War.” believing that “the deepest roots of the great power of war lie in the masses of the people.” [10]10 This is a direct quotation from Mao Zedong’s 1938 work “On Protracted War.” After the start of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee firmly relied on and organized and mobilized the broad masses of the people, mobilizing people of all ethnic groups and from all walks of life across the country to participate in and support the war in various ways, fully stimulating the patriotic enthusiasm and work and production initiative of the people nationwide, and effectively supporting and ensuring the restoration of national construction. When summarizing the experience of victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, Mao Zedong said with deep feeling: “This is mainly because our war is a people’s war, supported by the people of the whole country, and the people of China and Korea fought shoulder to shoulder.” [11]11 This is a paraphrase of Mao Zedong’s statement from his 1953 speech “The Great Victory of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea.”

广泛发动人民群众增强战争可持续力。毛泽东坚持“兵民是胜利之本”，认为“战争的伟力之最深厚的根源，存在于民众之中”。抗美援朝战争开始后，毛泽东和党中央紧紧依靠和组织动员广大人民群众，动员全国各族各界人民以各种方式参与和支持战争，充分激发了全国人民的爱国热情和工作生产积极性，有力支援和保证了国家建设的恢复。毛泽东在总结抗美援朝胜利的经验时深情地指出：“主要是因为我们的战争是人民战争，全国人民支援，中朝两国人民并肩战斗”。

Actively carry out political, economic, diplomatic, and other struggles to coordinate with battlefield operations. Mao Zedong, based on the complex contradictions among great powers, maneuvered with great skill, allied with the Soviet Union to resist the United States, and personally led the conduct of these struggles, effectively winning sympathy and support from the international community and striking at the war-mongers led by the US government. On the one hand, he united with the Soviet Union and North Korea to establish an international united front against the United States. On a series of issues concerning the dispatch of troops, combat operations, and armistice negotiations in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea coordinated, closely cooperated, and supported each other, providing important conditions for winning the war. On the other hand, he actively and proactively carried out political, economic, diplomatic, and other struggles against the United States. During the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee, with the goal of isolating and striking the main enemy, the United States, conducted extensive public opinion propaganda at home and abroad, denounced US aggression against Korea and China’s Taiwan on various diplomatic occasions, sought by every means to break the US-led economic blockade and embargo against China through the United Nations, countered the US isolation and restriction of China inside and outside the UN with anti-isolation and anti-restriction measures, won over international friends to establish an international front against the United States, and so on. All these effectively coordinated with the combat operations on the battlefield.

积极开展政治、经济、外交等斗争配合战场行动。毛泽东立足大国间复杂矛盾纵横捭阖、联苏抗美，亲自领导开展这些领域的斗争，有力争取了国际社会的同情和支持，打击了以美国政府为首的战争贩子。一方面，联合苏联、朝鲜建立国际抗美统一战线。在抗美援朝战争出兵、作战、停战谈判等一系列问题上，中、苏、朝三方协同一致，密切配合、相互支持，为赢得战争胜利提供了重要条件。另一方面，积极主动开展对美政治、经济、外交等斗争。抗美援朝战争期间，毛泽东和党中央以孤立和打击美国这个主要敌人为目标，在国内外开展广泛的舆论宣传，在各种外交场合控诉美国侵略朝鲜和我国台湾的罪行，想方设法打破美国通过联合国操纵西方国家对我实行的经济封锁、禁运，针对美国在联合国内外对我的孤立和限制进行反孤立、反限制，争取国际朋友建立反美国际战线，等等。这些都有力地配合了战场上的作战行动。

Adhering to the unity of principle and flexibility, fighting to facilitate negotiations. Mao Zedong believed that the most important aspect of implementing the strategy of fighting and talking was to achieve military superiority—that is, to fight while negotiating, to use fighting to promote negotiations, and to use fighting to promote peace. The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea lasted 2 years and 9 months, with negotiations lasting nearly 2 years and 1 month. The two sides engaged in fierce struggles successively over the military demarcation line and the repatriation of prisoners. On the eve of the armistice, in order to strike at the Syngman Rhee clique [12]12 Syngman Rhee clique: Refers to the government of South Korea under President Syngman Rhee (1875–1965), which opposed the armistice negotiations and sought to continue the war to unify Korea under its rule., which openly sabotaged the agreement on prisoner repatriation, the Chinese People’s Volunteers launched the Battle of Kumsong [13]13 Battle of Kumsong: The final major offensive of the Korean War, launched by the Chinese People’s Volunteers in July 1953 to compel South Korean forces to accept the armistice terms., crippling four divisions of the South Korean army and effectively coordinating with the armistice negotiations. Because we held the initiative on the battlefield, the United States lacked the ability to break the military stalemate and faced enormous domestic and international pressure. In the end, it had no choice but to sign the armistice agreement and accept the fact that it had lost this war. In guiding the implementation of the strategy of fighting and talking, Mao Zedong adhered to a high degree of unity between principle and flexibility. On major issues of principle involving fundamental interests, he did not yield an inch, even at the risk of the collapse of negotiations. However, on the premise of not harming fundamental interests, he made certain concessions as circumstances dictated, in order to demonstrate our sincerity in seeking peace. Ultimately, an agreement was reached that conformed to our strategic objectives, creating a postwar arrangement favorable to our interests.

坚持原则性与灵活性相统一以打促谈。毛泽东认为，实施打打谈谈的策略原则，最重要的就是必须取得军事优势，即边打边谈，以打促谈，以打促和。抗美援朝战争历时2年9个月，谈了近2年1个月，双方先后围绕军事分界线和遣返俘虏两个问题展开激烈斗争。在停战前夕，为了打击公然破坏战俘遣返协议的李承晚集团，志愿军发起金城战役，将南朝鲜军4个师打残，有力配合了停战谈判。由于我们掌握了战场主动权，美国没有能力在军事上打破僵局，并且面临国内外的巨大压力，最后不得不在停战协议上签字，接受输掉了这场战争的事实。毛泽东在指导实施打打谈谈策略上，坚持原则性与灵活性的高度统一，在涉及根本利益的重大原则问题上不让半步，甚至不怕谈判破裂，但在不损害根本利益的前提下又视情况做出某些让步，以体现我们争取和平的诚意，最终达成符合我战略目的的协议，形成了有利于我方利益的战后安排。

Mao Zedong’s experience and practices in waging people’s war profoundly enlighten us: although there are various channels for achieving victory in modern warfare, the most fundamental is still to rely closely on the masses of the people and to maximize the advantages of the nation’s overall war capability. At present, contradictions and conflicts in great-power competition are extremely intense, and the risk of war is on the rise. We must hold high the banner of just war, persist in combining military struggle with political, economic, and diplomatic struggle, and strive to consolidate and improve the integrated national strategic system and capabilities.

毛泽东开展人民战争的经验做法，深刻启示我们：现代战争虽然制胜渠道多种多样，但最根本的还是要紧紧依靠人民群众，最大限度发挥国家总体战的优势。当前，大国博弈矛盾冲突十分激烈，战争风险呈上升趋势，我们必须高举正义战争的旗帜，坚持军事斗争与政治、经济、外交斗争相结合，努力巩固提高一体化国家战略体系和能力。

Online editor: Huihui

网络编辑：慧慧