A Study of the High Compatibility between the Moral Views in Fine Traditional Chinese Culture and the Value Propositions of Scientific Socialism

The report of the 20th National Congress of the CPC points out: “Fine traditional Chinese culture is extensive and profound, and it is the crystallization of the wisdom of Chinese civilization. The concepts contained therein, such as common good for all under heaven, the people as the foundation of the state, governing with virtue, discarding the outdated and innovating, appointing the virtuous and capable, harmony between humanity and nature, unremitting self-improvement, embracing all with virtue, upholding good faith and amity, and being a good neighbor to others, are important manifestations of the worldview, view of the world, social view, and moral view accumulated by the Chinese people in their long-term production and life, and they are highly compatible with the value propositions of scientific socialism.” [1]1 The 20th National Congress of the CPC was held in October 2022. The report is a key political document outlining the Party’s line and policies for the next five years. Among these, the moral view is one of the core contents of fine traditional Chinese culture, primarily addressing how to handle issues concerning the individual and the self, the individual and others, and the individual and the group. Concepts in fine traditional Chinese culture such as “embracing all with virtue,” “benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and trustworthiness,” “unremitting self-improvement,” and “being a good neighbor to others” are all important manifestations of the moral view. Meanwhile, the discussions in the value propositions of scientific socialism concerning the individual and the collective, interests and morality, and responsibility and morality all embody the normative requirements of the moral view. Whether from the perspective of value concepts, development goals, value principles, or value logic, fine traditional Chinese culture and the value propositions of scientific socialism exhibit a high degree of compatibility at the level of the moral view.

党的二十大报告指出：“中华优秀传统文化源远流长、博大精深，是中华文明的智慧结晶，其中蕴含的天下为公、民为邦本、为政以德、革故鼎新、任人唯贤、天人合一、自强不息、厚德载物、讲信修睦、亲仁善邻等，是中国人民在长期生产生活中积累的宇宙观、天下观、社会观、道德观的重要体现，同科学社会主义价值观主张具有高度契合性。”其中，道德观是中华优秀传统文化的核心内容之一，主要回答应该如何处理个人与自我、个人与他人、个人与群体等相关问题。中华优秀传统文化中“厚德载物”“仁义礼智信”“自强不息”“亲仁善邻”等都是道德观的重要体现。而科学社会主义价值观主张中关于个人与集体、利益与道德、责任与道德等方面的论述都体现着道德观的应然性要求。无论是从价值理念、发展目标、价值原则还是从价值逻辑来看，中华优秀传统文化同科学社会主义价值观主张在道德观层面都具有高度契合性。

I. Compatibility of Value Concepts: “Cultivating the Self, Bringing Peace to Others, and Taking the World as One’s Responsibility” and “the Morality of Truly Human Beings”

一、价值理念的契合：“修己安人，天下己任”与“真正人的道德”

The moral view primarily addresses a series of questions such as “how does morality originate,” “what is the standard of morality,” and “what is the goal of morality.” These questions run through the inquiry into individual morality regarding “why,” “what,” and “how,” while also inherently encompassing the ultimate direction of moral value, namely, whether there is a significant difference in value concepts between individual-centeredness or society-centeredness. From the perspective of value concepts, the “cultivating the self, bringing peace to others, and taking the world as one’s responsibility” formed by the “integration of the internal and external paths” in fine traditional Chinese culture is highly compatible with the “morality of truly human beings” oriented toward the collective or universal interests of humanity in scientific socialism.

道德观主要回答“道德如何起源”“道德标准是什么”“道德目标是什么”等系列问题。这些问题贯穿着个体道德“缘何”“是何”“如何”的追问，同时内在涵摄着道德价值的最终走向，即在价值理念上存在着个人本位抑或社会本位的极大差异。从价值理念来看，中华优秀传统文化中“合内外之道”而形成的“修己安人，天下己任”，与科学社会主义价值观中以人类集体或者普遍利益为取向的“真正人的道德”具有高度契合性。

1. Source of Compatibility: The Value Generation of Endogenous Morality and Moral Self-Discipline

1.契合之源：道德内生与道德自律的价值生成

The moral view in fine traditional Chinese culture advocates the endogenous nature of the source of morality, emphasizing the cultivation of virtue centered on “benevolence and righteousness.” The traditional moral view explores moral issues within the “distinction between humans and beasts,” advocating the derivation of the source of “supreme goodness” from human nature itself, and emphasizing the extension from the individual moral concern of “cultivating the self and bringing peace to others” to the moral responsibility of “taking the world as one’s responsibility.” The “distinction between humans and beasts” is the logical starting point for the formation of Confucian ethics and also the logical premise for the formation of the moral view in fine traditional Chinese culture, containing an inquiry into the essential definition of human beings and emphasizing the inner self-awareness of the moral subject. Fine traditional Chinese culture advocates “harmony between humanity and nature” and “heaven and earth are born together with me, and all things are one with me” (Zhuangzi, “On the Equality of Things”), but among all things, “humans” are the most “noble” and “spiritual,” as seen in “of all the creatures under heaven, humans are the most noble” (Classic of Filial Piety, “The Governance of the Sage”), Dong Zhongshu’s “among the essence of heaven and earth that produces things, nothing is more noble than humans” (Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn Annals, “Humanity as the Counterpart of Heaven”), Zhou Dunyi’s “only humans receive the essence and are the most spiritual” (Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate), and Shao Yong’s “all things have essence, but humans are the spirit of all things” (Another Five Poems). One manifestation of the “nobility” of “humans” is that humans possess moral self-awareness and behavioral restraint, enabling them to consciously regulate their behavior through “benevolence” and “ritual propriety,” thereby “distinguishing themselves from beasts.” This is true of Confucius’s advocacy of “benevolence,” as in “the reason the gentleman differs from beasts is that he possesses the nature of benevolence and righteousness” (Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers of Henan, Volume 25); it is also true of the “ritual propriety” in the Book of Rites, as in “ritual propriety is used to teach people, enabling them to have propriety and know how to distinguish themselves from beasts” (Book of Rites, “Summary of the Rules of Propriety, Part 1”); and it is also true of the heavenly principle advocated by Song Confucians, as in “what makes a person a person is having heavenly principle; if heavenly principle is not preserved, how is one different from a beast?” (Cheng Brothers’ Essential Sayings, “On Humans and Things”). All these define the value and essential meaning of humans possessing morality through comparison with beasts. Humans can, through inner self-reflection and external practice, acquire the qualities of “benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and trustworthiness,” achieving the unity of truth, goodness, and beauty in “benevolent love” and “self-restraint.” Mencius once asked, “What distinguishes humans from beasts is slight” (Mencius, “Li Lou, Part 2”). Whether one can achieve supreme goodness and become “benevolent” depends crucially on “human nature,” that is, “what the gentleman considers his nature” (Mencius, “Jin Xin, Part 1”), meaning that humans themselves possess an inner capacity for moral generation.

中华优秀传统文化中的道德观主张道德来源的内生性，注重以“仁义”为核心的德性培养。传统道德观在“人禽之辨”中探究道德问题，主张从人性本身来推导“至善”之源，注重由个体“修己安人”的道德关怀推演到“天下己任”的道德责任。“人禽之辨”是儒家伦理形成的逻辑源点，也是中华优秀传统文化中的道德观形成的逻辑前提，蕴含着对人的本质规定性的追问，强调道德主体的内在自觉。中华优秀传统文化倡导“天人合一”“天地与我并生，而万物与我为一”（《庄子·齐物论》），但在万物之中“人”最为“贵”“灵”，正如“天地之性，人为贵”（《孝经·圣治》）、董仲舒的“天地之精所以生物者，莫贵于人”（《春秋繁露·人副天数》）、周敦颐的“惟人也得其秀而最灵”（《太极图说》）、邵雍的“万物有精英，人为万物灵”（《又五首》）等。而“人”之“贵”的体现之一就是人具有道德自觉性与行为约束力，能够在“仁”“礼”中自觉规范行为，以“别禽兽”。孔子倡导的“仁”如此，“君子所以异于禽兽者，以有仁义之性也”（《河南程氏遗书·卷二十五》）；《礼记》中的“礼”亦是如此，“为礼以教人，使人以有礼，知自别于禽兽”（《礼记·曲礼上》）；宋儒提倡的天理“人之所以为人者，以有天理也，天理之不存，则与禽兽何异矣”（《二程粹言·人物篇》）等，皆在与禽兽的比较中厘定人具有道德的价值与本质意义。人能够通过内在自省与外在践行，具备“仁义礼智信”的品格，在“仁爱”与“克己”中实现真善美的统一。孟子曾问“人之所以异于禽兽者几希”（《孟子·离娄下》），能否至善，能否成“仁”，关键在于“人性”，也就是“君子所性”（《孟子·尽心上》），即人自身有一种内在的道德生成能力。

This differs from the exogenous morality formed in the “distinction between humans and gods” in Western traditional moral views. Western traditional moral views originate from the “distinction between humans and gods,” primarily examining moral issues within the relationship between humans and gods. Human value is endowed by “gods,” and redemption from original sin is achieved through “gods,” manifesting as “doing good” compelled by external constraints. It is a morality of external transcendence realized through the “salvation” of gods, embodying a value orientation where humans are tools rather than ends. Christianity, in arousing believers’ desire for the external appeal of “ascending to the kingdom of heaven,” requires believers to endure all suffering and forgive the sins of others. As Marx stated, “the basis of religion is the heteronomy of the human spirit,” and Christianity “makes the inner universal essence of morality a subsidiary of religion.” [2]2 Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” Marx-Engels Collected Works, vol. 1, p. 162. The basic concepts of Western traditional morality developed from Christianity, advocating that everyone lives in original sins such as disloyalty to others, lying, and harming others, and that everyone’s original sin causes harm to others, so people must stay away from evil.

这与西方传统道德观在“人神之辨”中形成的外生性道德不同。西方传统道德观源于“人神之辨”，主要把道德问题置于人与神的关系中审视，人的价值由“神”赋予，通过“神”来实现原罪的救赎，体现为因外在约束而不得不“行善”，是在神的“救赎”中实现外在超越的道德，体现着人是工具而非目的的价值取向。基督教在激发教徒对“升入天国”这一外在诉求的渴望中要求教徒忍受一切苦难、宽恕他人罪恶。正如马克思所言，“宗教的基础则是人类精神的他律”，基督教“把道德的内在的普遍本质说成是宗教的附属物”。西方传统道德的基本观念从基督教发展而来，主张每个人都生活在对他人不忠、撒谎、侵害他人等原罪中，每个人的原罪都会对他人造成伤害，因此人要远离罪恶。

Marx and Engels, in works such as The German Ideology, The Holy Family, Anti-Dühring, Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, and Capital, explored the origin, development, essence, function, characteristics, and issues of equality and justice inherent in morality, criticized the hypocrisy of religious morality and capitalist morality, and elucidated the moral view of scientific socialism. Marx and Engels emphasized the immanence of morality, advocating that morality is based on human dignity or value demands, rather than the satisfaction of desires. Marx criticized the morality advocated by religion as conforming to religious needs, a “special, actual morality,” and proposed that morality should break free from external authoritative forces like “gods,” stating that “the basis of morality is the autonomy of the human spirit.” [3]3 Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” Marx-Engels Collected Works, vol. 1, p. 162. As early as his high school graduation thesis, Marx emphasized the importance of individual “self-discipline”: “How can a person who cannot overcome the factors that struggle within themselves withstand the fierce blows of life and engage in activities quietly?” [4]4 Karl Marx, “Reflections of a Young Man on the Choice of a Profession,” Marx-Engels Collected Works, vol. 1, p. 4. Furthermore, Marx clearly pointed out: “If I did not exist at all, how could I have virtue?” [5]5 Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” Marx-Engels Collected Works, vol. 1, p. 162. This is highly compatible with the value concepts of moral immanence and autonomy in fine traditional Chinese culture.

马克思恩格斯在《德意志意识形态》《神圣家族》《反杜林论》《黑格尔法哲学批判》《政治经济学批判》《资本论》等著作中探讨了道德的起源、发展、本质、功能、特性及其蕴含的平等、正义等问题，批判了宗教道德观与资本主义道德的虚伪性，阐明科学社会主义道德观。马克思恩格斯强调道德的内在性，主张道德建立在人的尊严或价值诉求之上，而不是欲望的满。马克思曾批判宗教所倡导的道德是合乎宗教需求的，是“特殊的现实的道德”，主张道德应摆脱像“神”一样存在的外在权威力量，提出“道德的基础是人类精神的自律”。早在中学毕业论文中，马克思就强调个人“自律”的重要性，“一个不能克服自身相互斗争的因素的人，又怎能抗御生活的猛烈冲击，怎能安静地从事活动呢？”此外，马克思明确指出：“如果我根本不存在，我又怎么能有美德呢？”这与中华优秀传统文化中道德内在性与自主性的价值理念高度契合。

2. Foundation of Compatibility: Value Orientation Prioritizing Collective Demands and the Common Interests of Humanity

2.契合之本：集体诉求为主与人类共同利益为先的价值取向

Moral judgment and moral behavior need to address the value orientation of whether matter or spirit comes first, and whether the collective or the individual comes first. Different moral views contain different value pursuits and embody different moral principles. Consequentialism concerns material circumstances, focusing on the satisfaction or lack thereof of sensory material forms; deontology, on the other hand, emphasizes the role of universal norms in moral judgment. The moral view in fine traditional Chinese culture emphasizes the shaping of general moral norms and the social regulation of individual moral cultivation, where individual morality serves society and the collective. This is a society-centered moral view, which is highly compatible with the value propositions of scientific socialism.

道德判断、道德行为需要回答物质还是精神为先、集体还是个人为先的价值取向问题，不同的道德观蕴含不同的价值追求，体现不同的道德原则。后果论关切物质境遇，注重感性物质形态的满足与否；道义论则更注重普遍规范在道德评判中的作用。中华优秀传统文化中的道德观注重一般性道德规范的塑造，注重社会对个体德性养成的规约，个体道德服务于社会、集体，是一种社会本位的道德观，这同科学社会主义价值观主张高度契合。

From Confucius’s “wisdom, benevolence, and courage” to Mencius’s “benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and faithfulness,” all embody both the individual’s inner value pursuit of “supreme goodness” and the social-standard value demand for “harmonious and stable” order. Whether it is Mencius’s “innate goodness of human nature” or Xunzi’s “innate evil of human nature,” moral cultivation is ultimately to be achieved through social education, realizing the transformation from the self as it is to the self as it ought to be, and cultivating people in the true sense who conform to social moral norms. The moral views in fine traditional Chinese culture emphasize adherence to universal social norms, reflecting the unity of the inner and outer aspects of morality. “Conscience” in morality originates from the inner mind and is the source of “supreme goodness,” but it requires not only inner self-reflection but also external “learning,” to acquire “knowledge” of universal moral norms, to complete oneself and complete others so as to attain “supreme goodness.” This can be glimpsed from the fact that the first chapter of the *Analects* is “Xue Er” (To Learn) and the first chapter of the *Xunzi* is “Quan Xue” (Encouraging Learning). The *Great Learning* states at the very beginning: “The way of the Great Learning lies in illuminating luminous virtue, in loving the people, and in resting in the highest good.” [6]6 *Liji* (Book of Rites), “Da Xue” (The Great Learning). “Ming ming de” (illuminating luminous virtue) refers to making manifest the innate virtuous nature; “qin min” (loving the people) is often interpreted as “xin min” (renewing the people), meaning to help others reform themselves. “Illuminating luminous virtue” is the mastery of universal value principles, encompassing the study of the “Way of Heaven” and the “Way of Man,” that is, the objective laws of the world and the laws of human existence and development, which concern the overall survival and continuity of human society. “Loving the people” embodies the norms governing human relationships and reflects adherence to universal value principles that meet the requirements of social legitimacy. The highest realm of learning is “ritual propriety”: “Learning reaches its limit when it arrives at ritual propriety, and then it stops.” [7]7 *Xunzi*, “Quan Xue” (Encouraging Learning). “Ritual propriety” embodies universal social norms; whether one acts according to ritual propriety is one of the criteria for judging whether one is moral or not, whether one is “human”: “To practice it is to be a human; to abandon it is to be a beast.” [8]8 *Xunzi*, “Quan Xue” (Encouraging Learning). It can be said that the moral views in fine traditional Chinese culture maintain that individual moral behavior embodies the affirmation and adherence to universal social norms, highlighting the demand of social standard. Furthermore, the moral views in fine traditional Chinese culture revolve around debates on human versus beast, principle versus desire, righteousness versus profit, and reason versus emotion. However, whether it is “righteousness is paramount,” “valuing righteousness and slighting profit,” “valuing principle and slighting desire,” or “preserving heavenly principle and extinguishing human desire,” they all embody the moral principle of prioritizing collective interests and the value orientation of social standard, that is, what Chen Lai calls “the group is higher than the individual.”

从孔子的“智仁勇”到孟子的“仁义礼智信”都既体现个体对“至善”的内在价值追求，又体现秩序“和谐稳定”的社会本位价值诉求。无论是孟子的“性善”还是荀子的“性恶”最终都要通过社会教化来实现道德培养，实现本然之我向应然之我的转化，培养符合社会道德规范的、真正意义上的人。中华优秀传统文化中的道德观强调普遍性社会规范的遵循，体现道德内在与外在的统一。道德中“良知”发源于内心，是“至善”之源，但不是只需要内在自我省思，而是也需要外在之“学”，获取对普遍道德规范之“知”，成己成物以达“至善”，这一点从《论语》首篇为《学而》、《荀子》首篇为《劝学》中可窥一二。《大学》开篇便点明“大学之道，在明明德，在亲民，在止于至善”（《礼记·大学》）。“明明德”是对普遍价值原则的掌握，包含着对“天道”“人道”也就是世界之客观规律与人之存在发展规律等关切人类社会总体性生存与延续性内容的学习。“亲民”则体现对人与人关系的规范，体现着合乎社会正当性要求的普遍性价值原则的遵循。学的最高境界是“礼”，“学至乎礼而止矣”《荀子·劝学》。“礼”体现普遍的社会规范，是否依礼而行是道德与否、是否“为人”的评判标准之一，“为之，人也；舍之，禽兽也”（《荀子·劝学》）。可以说，中华优秀传统文化中的道德观主张个体道德行为体现对社会普遍性规范的肯认与遵循，凸显社会本位诉求。此外，中华优秀传统文化中的道德观围绕着人与禽、理与欲、义与利、理与情展开辩论，但无论是义为上、重义轻利、重理轻欲还是存天理、灭人欲，都体现着集体利益为主的道德原则和社会本位的价值取向，即陈来所言的“群体高于个人”。

This is entirely different from the Western traditional moral view that esteems reason and pursues individual interests. After experiencing the Renaissance and the Reformation, the Western “logic of divine power” gave way to the “logic of humanism,” and “the individual’s God,” “the happiness of mortals,” and “the this-worldliness of morality” became core topics of discussion in moral views. The shift from a “God”-centered to a “human”-centered approach saw the rise of human individuality and subjectivity in the ideological sphere. Theocentric morality gave way to humanistic morality, and individual interest once became the foundation and starting point of all morality and values. Subsequently, two moral values supporting capitalist civilization gradually formed: one is the rationalist moral value that esteems natural laws and causality, and the other is the utilitarian moral value with happiness and pleasure as its core meaning. Although these two moral values differ, they both embody the value orientation of individual standard, weaken human sociality, highlight the pre-givenness and independence of the human being, privatize “goodness,” dissolve collective goodness, and to a certain extent deconstruct the “supreme goodness” of the community, making individual desire the most prioritized choice in the value order. In the 17th century, Descartes’s “I think, therefore I am” [9]9 René Descartes (1596–1650), French philosopher and mathematician, whose statement “Cogito, ergo sum” (I think, therefore I am) is a foundational element of Western rationalism and subjectivist metaphysics. as a metaphysics of subjectivity prominently manifested in morality and values as individual standard, taking individual value, interest, and demand as important considerations for whether something is moral. The utilitarian moral view represented by Bentham and Mill [10]10 Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), British philosophers and founders of utilitarianism, which holds that the moral worth of an action is determined by its contribution to overall happiness or pleasure. even more so pursues the greatest happiness and pleasure for people, establishes the moral principle of egoism, and regards morality as a means for individuals to obtain benefits.

这与西方传统道德观中崇尚理性、追求个人利益截然不同。经历文艺复兴与宗教改革后，西方“神权逻辑”让位于“人本逻辑”，“个人的上帝”“凡人的幸福”“道德的此岸”等成为道德观讨论的核心议题之一。以“神”为中心转向以“人”为中心，人的个体性、主体性在思想领域日渐崛起，神本主义让位于人本主义道德观，个人利益一度成为一切道德和价值观念的基础与出发点。此后，逐渐形成了支撑资本主义文明的两种道德价值观，一种是崇尚自然规律和因果性的理性主义道德价值观，另一种是以快乐和幸福为核心意蕴的功利主义道德价值观。尽管这两种道德价值观有差异，但都体现个人本位的价值取向，弱化人的社会性，彰显人的先在性与独立性，将“善”私人化，集体至善被消解，一定程度上解构着共同体的“至善”，个人欲望成为价值排序中最优先的选择。17世纪笛卡尔“我思故我在”的主体性形而上学思维在道德和价值上突出表现为个人本位，将个人的价值、利益与要求作为道德与否的重要考量因素。而以边沁、穆勒为代表的功利主义道德观更是追求人最大的快乐和幸福，确立利己主义的道德原则，将道德视为个人获得利益的手段。

The individual-standard moral view is prevalent in Western capitalist society. On the one hand, it stimulates the competitive spirit of modernity; on the other hand, it leads to the rise of modern moral concepts oriented towards external interests such as efficiency and utility, the decline of self-restraining morality based on self-cultivation and inner substance, and the proliferation of pseudo-morality and false morality driven by privatization, interest-seeking, and instrumentalization. Scientific socialism formed a new moral view in the process of criticizing the pseudo-morality and false morality of capitalist society. The value propositions of scientific socialism advocate the realization of “truly human morality,” ultimately oriented towards the overall or universal interests of humanity, embodying a social-standard morality. Marx and Engels maintained that “the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its actuality it is the ensemble of the social relations,” [11]11 Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach” (1845), Thesis VI. which is consistent with the value concept of fine traditional Chinese culture that positions individual morality within the family-state-world framework. Engels emphasized: “Men, consciously or unconsciously, derive their moral ideas in the last resort from the practical relations on which their class position is based—from the economic relations in which they carry on production and exchange.” [12]12 Friedrich Engels, *Anti-Dühring* (1878), Part I, Chapter X. Marx and Engels used the morally charged concept of “exploitation” to critique the capitalist system, while explicitly opposing moral views formed on the basis of individual interests and desires, maintaining that individual interests must ultimately develop into common interests. Marx and Engels criticized Stirner’s egoism, [13]13 Max Stirner (1806–1856), German philosopher and a key figure in the Young Hegelians, whose work *The Ego and Its Own* advocates a radical egoism that Marx and Engels criticized in *The German Ideology*. pointing out that after eliminating the material roots of opposition, private interests can be transformed into universal interests: “Private interest is itself already a socially determined interest, which can be achieved only within the conditions laid down by society and with the means provided by society; hence it is bound to the reproduction of these conditions and means.” [14]14 Karl Marx, *Grundrisse* (1857–1858), Notebook I. The quotation is adapted from the original; the standard English translation reads: “Private interest is itself already a socially determined interest, which can be achieved only within the conditions laid down by society and with the means provided by society; hence it is bound to the reproduction of these conditions and means.” They indicated that individual interests must be subordinated to collective interests.

个人本位道德观在西方资本主义社会普遍存在，一方面激发了现代性竞争精神，另一方面也导致以效率、实用等外在利益为价值导向的现代性道德观念兴起，修养和内涵式的自我约束型道德式微，私人化、利益化、工具化驱动下的伪道德、假道德泛滥。科学社会主义在批判资本主义社会伪道德、假道德的过程中形成新的道德观。科学社会主义价值观主张要实现“真正人的道德”，最终以人类的整体利益或普遍利益为取向，体现社会本位的道德。马克思恩格斯主张，“人的本质不是单个人所固有的抽象物，在其现实性上，它是一切社会关系的总和”，这与中华优秀传统文化在家国天下中定位个体道德的价值理念一致。恩格斯强调：“人们自觉地或不自觉地，归根到底总是从他们阶级地位所依据的实际关系中——从他们进行生产和交换的经济关系中，吸取自己的道德观念。”马克思恩格斯用“剥削”这样一个具有道德意味的概念来对资本主义制度进行批判，同时明确反对立足个人利益和欲望而形成的道德观，主张个人利益最终要发展为共同利益。马克思恩格斯批判了施蒂纳的利己主义，指出个人利益在消除对立的物质根源后能够转化为普遍利益，“私人利益总是违反个人的意志而发展为阶级利益，发展为共同利益”，指明个人利益要服从集体利益。

In summary, in the process of criticizing the capitalist individual-standard moral view, scientific socialism constructed a social-standard moral view, advocating “truly human morality”: “A really human morality becomes possible only at a stage of society which has not only overcome class antagonisms but has even forgotten them in practical life.” [15]15 Friedrich Engels, *Anti-Dühring* (1878), Part I, Chapter X. “Truly human morality” is no longer a morality confined to class interests, but a morality with universality and purity, taking the overall interests of humanity as its reference. Fine traditional Chinese culture was born in “pre-capitalism,” where individual morality is embedded in the common development of society, and its value concepts serve the “common” interests of society and the state, embodying the moral value concept of social standard, which is highly compatible with the value propositions of scientific socialism.

总之，在批判资本主义个人本位道德观的过程中，科学社会主义建构了社会本位道德观，提倡“真正人的道德”，“只有在不仅消灭了阶级对立，而且在实际生活中也忘却了这种对立的社会发展阶段上，超越阶级对立和超越对这种对立的回忆的、真正人的道德才成为可能”。“真正人的道德”不再是局限于阶级利益基础上的道德，而是以人类整体利益为参照，形成具有普遍性、纯粹性的道德。中华优秀传统文化诞生于“前资本主义”，个体道德内嵌于社会的共同发展，其价值理念服务于社会和国家的“共同”利益，体现社会本位的道德价值理念，与科学社会主义价值观主张高度契合。

II. Compatibility of the Goals of Individual Moral Development: The Unity of Knowledge, Emotion, and Will and the Comprehensive Development of the Human Person

二、个体道德发展目标的契合：知情意统一与人的全面发展

How the moral view handles the relationship between the individual and the self—"what kind of person to become, how to cultivate an ideal personality, and how to become an ideal, perfected person"—is one of its important topics. The "way of becoming a person" (chengren zhi dao) in fine traditional Chinese culture embodies the unity of knowledge, emotion, and will, and the comprehensive development of truth, goodness, and beauty, which is highly compatible with the scientific socialist value proposition of the all-round development of the human person. The ideal personality in fine traditional Chinese culture embodies the unity of knowledge, emotion, and will, and the pursuit of truth, goodness, and beauty. The shaping of the ideal personality mainly deals with the relationship between the individual and the self; it is the process by which the person acquires intrinsic value and obtains self-strength. The ideal personality relies on moral self-cognition, self-choice, self-cultivation, and self-realization, embodying moral consciousness and initiative, such as "The gentleman seeks [the cause] in himself; the petty man seeks it in others" (Analects, Wei Ling Gong), "To practice benevolence depends on oneself—does it depend on others?" (Analects, Yan Yuan), and "perfecting oneself" (cheng ji) in the Doctrine of the Mean. Moral initiative is mainly manifested through self-introspection, i.e., "self-cultivation" (xiushen): "From the Son of Heaven down to the common people, all must regard self-cultivation as the root" (Book of Rites, The Great Learning). Moral formation relies on self-discipline and has its own power of autonomous choice: "Whether one obtains wealth and honor is a matter of Heaven; as for morality, it lies in seeking it in oneself, and one who seeks it never fails to obtain it" (Zhang Zai Ji, Jingxue Likui). On this point, it is completely different from mechanical materialism, which disregards human subjective initiative, and is highly compatible with the scientific socialist value proposition that individuals, as "the self-conscious, self-existent being of society that is thought and perceived,"[16]16 Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," in Marx and Engels Collected Works, vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 299. The full quotation reads: "Man is a species-being, not only because in practice and in theory he adopts the species as his object (his own as well as those of other things), but – and this is only another way of expressing it – also because he treats himself as the actual, living species; as a universal and therefore a free being." exercise their subjective initiative. Of course, fine traditional Chinese culture contains many discussions of the ideal personality: Confucius's "courtesy, magnanimity, good faith, diligence, and kindness" (Analects, Yang Huo), Mencius's "benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and good faith" (Mencius, Gaozi I), Wang Yangming's "the innate knowledge of the mind is called sagehood" (Complete Works of Wang Yangming, Wenlu V, Letter to Wei Shimeng), and so on. Abstracting from the specific factors of these ideal personalities and distilling the "common" factors in handling the relationship with the self, we can see that they all, as a whole, embody the unity of "knowledge, emotion, and will" and the pursuit of truth, goodness, and beauty. This is highly compatible with the scientific socialist proposition of the free and all-round development of the human person: "In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."[17]17 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," in Marx and Engels Collected Works, vol. 6 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 506.

道德观中如何处理个人与自我的关系，“成为怎样的人、如何培养理想人格，成为理想、完善之人”是其重要议题之一。中华优秀传统文化中的“成人之道”体现知情意的统一、真善美的全面发展，与科学社会主义价值观主张中人的全面发展具有高度契合性。中华优秀传统文化中理想人格体现着知情意的统一，体现着对真善美的追求。理想人格的塑造主要处理个人与自我的关系，是人获得内在价值、获取自我力量的过程。理想人格依托于道德的自我认知、自我选择、自我涵养与自我实现，体现着道德自觉性和主动性，如“君子求诸己，小人求诸人”（《论语·卫灵公》）、“为仁由己，而由人乎哉”（《论语·颜渊》）、《中庸》中的“成己”等。道德主动性主要通过自我内省即“修身”体现，“自天子以至于庶人，壹是皆以修身为本”（《礼记·大学》）。道德养成依托于自律，有其自主选择权，“富贵之得不得，天也，至于道德，则在己求之而无不得者也”（《张载集·经学理窟》）。这一点与机械唯物主义无视人的主观能动性完全不同，与作为“被思考和被感知的社会的自为的主体存在”的个体发挥主观能动性的科学社会主义价值观主张则高度契合。当然，中华优秀传统文化中关于理想人格有颇多论述，孔子提出的“恭、宽、信、敏、惠”（《论语·阳货》）、孟子指出的“仁、义、礼、智、信”（《孟子·告子上》）、王阳明主张的“心之良知是谓圣”（《王阳明全集·文录五·书魏师孟卷》）等。抽离这些理想人格的具体因素、提炼出处理自我关系上的“共性”因素可知，它们整体上都体现着“知情意”的统一和对真善美的追求。这与科学社会主义主张人的自由全面发展高度契合，“代替那存在着阶级和阶级对立的资产阶级旧社会的，将是这样一个联合体，在那里，每个人的自由发展是一切人的自由发展的条件”。

First, in the aspect of knowledge (zhi), moral shaping in the ideal personality originates from the acquisition, edification, and identification with "what ought to be the rule" (dangran zhi ze), realizing a value progression from "what is so" (dangran) to "what ought to be" (yingran). Cognizing "what is so" and "what ought to be" is the prerequisite for shaping the ideal personality. "If one does not know [ren], how can one be ren?" (Analects, Gongye Chang); moral conduct is based on rational cognition. "Knowledge" is an important means of cultivating human rationality and plays the role of intellectual judgment in morality. Attaining "rationality" or a sound spiritual realm through "knowledge" is indispensable; it is the key to morality transforming from being-in-itself to being-for-itself and forming moral consciousness and initiative, as in "If one wishes to make their intentions sincere, one must first extend their knowledge. Extending knowledge lies in the investigation of things" (Book of Rites, The Great Learning), and "Knowledge, benevolence, and courage—these three are the universal virtues of the world" (Doctrine of the Mean, Chapter 20). "Knowledge" means knowing "benevolence and righteousness," so as to distinguish right from wrong, good from evil, honor from disgrace, shame from disgust, etc., and to attain "understanding the good" (mingshan) and "the highest good" (zhishan), moving from knowledge to wisdom: "When wisdom is clear, then strength advances of itself," embodying the pursuit of "truth" and "goodness." "The sense of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom" (Mencius, Gongsun Chou I), "To know shame is close to courage" (Doctrine of the Mean, Chapter 20), "In one's conduct, to have a sense of shame" (Analects, Zilu), and "Having a sense of shame, they will correct themselves" (Analects, Weizheng) all emphasize the important content of "knowledge." "Knowing shame" is the moral baseline of the ideal personality, and "correcting themselves" also embodies the moral requirement of forming self-restraint through knowledge.

一是知的方面，理想人格中道德塑造源自对“当然之则”的获知、熏陶、认同，实现从“当然”到“应然”的价值演进。认知“当然”与“应然”是理想人格塑造的前提。“未知，焉得仁”（《论语·公冶长》），道德行为以理性认识为依据，“知”是人类理性养成的重要手段，在道德中发挥着理智判断的作用。由“知”以达“理性”或健全的精神境界不可或缺，是道德从自在转为自为形成道德自觉性和主动性的关键，正如“欲诚其意者，先致其知。致知在格物”（《礼记·大学》），“知、仁、勇，三者天下之达德也”（《中庸·第二十章》）等。“知”即知晓“仁义”，以明辨是非、善恶、荣辱、羞恶等，以达“明善”“至善”，由知识通往智识，“智识明，则力量自进”，体现对“真”“善”的追求。“是非之心，智之端也”（《孟子·公孙丑上》）、“知耻近乎勇”（《中庸·第二十章》）、“行己有耻”（《论语·子路》）、“有耻且格”（《论语·为政》）等强调的都是“知”的重要内容，“知耻”是理想人格的道德底线，同时“且格”也体现着由知而形成自我约束的道德要求。

Second, in the aspect of emotion (qing), the ideal personality advocates the emotion of "utmost sincerity" (zhicheng). "Emotion" is originally what is inherent in the self: "Emotion is the substance of nature" (Xunzi, Zhengming). Among these, "sincerity" (cheng) was regarded by Song-Ming Neo-Confucians both as the moral substance—"Sincerity is the foundation of the sage"—and as the prerequisite for self-cultivation: "Making one's intentions sincere is the first step in self-cultivation" (Collected Commentaries on the Four Books, Commentary on The Great Learning), and "If one wishes to cultivate their person, one must first rectify their mind. If one wishes to rectify their mind, one must first make their intentions sincere" (Book of Rites, The Great Learning). "The emotion of utmost sincerity" contains qualities such as genuineness, reverence, good faith, and trustworthiness, embodying the moral demand for a sound emotional life of the individual. It is a value pursuit of "truth" and "goodness" and is also one of the qualities of the sage. "Sincerity is the Way of Heaven; to practice sincerity is the Way of man. Sincerity, attained without effort and understood without thought, is the Way of the sage who is in harmony with the Mean" (Doctrine of the Mean, Chapter 20).

二是情的方面，理想人格主张“至诚”之情。“情”原本就是自我所本有之物，“情者，性之质也”（《荀子·正名》）。其中，“诚”既被宋明理学家认为是道德本体，“诚者，圣人之本”，也被视为修身的前提，“诚其意者，自修之首也”（《四书章句集注·大学章句》）、“欲修其身者，先正其心。欲正其心者，先诚其意”（《礼记·大学》）。“至诚之情”蕴含着真诚、笃敬、诚信等品质，体现着个体健全情感的道德诉求，是对“真”和“善”的价值追求，也是圣人的品质之一。“诚者，天之道也；诚之者，人之道也。诚者不勉而中，不思而得，从容中道，圣人也。”（《中庸·第二十章》）

Third, in the aspect of will (yi), the ideal personality contains the "will" of firm resolve. "Will" corresponds to what Confucius called "courage" (yong). In fine traditional Chinese culture, it is often associated with "aspiration" (zhi); will embodies the character of steadfastness. "Aspiration" is one of the three great virtues; the will governs the steadfastness and persistence of morality. For example, Lu Jiuyuan emphasized, "People only worry about lacking aspiration; with aspiration, nothing is unattainable." Wang Yangming pointed out, "Without establishing aspiration, nothing in the world can be accomplished." Zhu Xi mentioned "the scholar esteems aspiration," and so on. "Firmness of resolve" is the spiritual driving force for the moral subject to practice moral principles; it is not easily shaken by external factors: "If the resolve is firm and steadfast, then ridicule and slander cannot move it; on the contrary, they all become occasions for tempering and polishing." Willpower is also manifested in the effectiveness of self-restraint and the self-awareness when alone, i.e., vigilance in solitude (shendu), inner introspection (neixing), self-restraint (keji), and self-discipline (zilü). "Therefore the gentleman is watchful over what he does not see, and fearful over what he does not hear. There is nothing more visible than what is hidden, nothing more manifest than what is subtle. Therefore the gentleman is vigilant in solitude" (Doctrine of the Mean, Chapter 1). "Perfecting oneself" (cheng ji) requires, under the control of the will, constant reflection on erroneous thoughts, selfish desires, and evil intentions, manifesting moral self-awareness and self-discipline: "One moment of overcoming selfish thoughts makes one a sage." At the same time, one must continuously temper oneself and achieve self-affirmation, "becoming a person" (chengren) through "self-restraint" (keji): "Only by being able to restrain oneself can one perfect oneself."

三是意的方面，理想人格蕴含着志坚之“意”。“意”即孔子所言之“勇”，在中华优秀传统文化中常与“志”关联，意志体现着坚毅的品格。“志”为三大德之一，意志主宰着道德的坚定性与持久性，如陆九渊强调“人惟患无志，有志无有不成者”，王阳明指出“志不立，天下无可成之事”，朱熹提到“士尚志”等。“志坚”是道德主体践行道德准则的精神动力，不会轻易被外界动摇，“志苟坚定，则非笑诋毁不足动摇，反皆为砥砺切磋之地矣”。意志力还体现为自我约束的效力以及自我独处时的自觉性，也就是慎独、内省、克己、自律等。“是故君子戒慎乎其所不睹，恐惧乎其所不闻。莫见乎隐，莫显乎微，故君子慎其独也。”（《中庸·第一章》）“成己”需要在意志的掌控下时刻反思错误思想、私欲与邪念，彰显道德自觉性与自律性，“一克念即圣人矣”，同时不断自我磨炼并实现自我肯定，在“克己”中“成人”，“能克己，方能成己”。

In dealing with the issue of the individual and the self, fine traditional Chinese culture advocates “knowing shame and discerning goodness,” “utmost sincerity and emotion,” “firm will,” and so forth, forming a goal of individual moral development that unifies cognition, emotion, and will. This is a type of introspective moral view that appeals to self-enlightenment, differing from the Western moral view that appeals to God, because Christianity takes the existence of God as the prerequisite for the individual to obtain goodness and happiness, emphasizing the heteronomy of God and doctrine. The goal of moral development as “the unity of cognition, emotion, and will” affirms the balanced development of the human person in multiple aspects, and is highly compatible with the value proposition of scientific socialism concerning the all-round development of the human person. Marx emphasizes: “Man appropriates his comprehensive essence in a comprehensive way, that is, as a whole man.” The all-round development of the human person means that people can choose their occupations according to their own talents, specialties, and preferences, and develop their intellectual and physical abilities in an all-round way. A person can be a hunter, fisherman, or herdsman engaged in physical labor, or a critic engaged in mental labor. Of course, Marx emphasizes exerting human subjective initiative to realize the moral construction from the self-as-it-is to the self-as-it-ought-to-be, to confirm self-worth, and to form ideal-type moral concepts through transformation. Through subjective initiative, people transform themselves, achieving the elevation of ideological and moral qualities and ideological and cultural qualities. Furthermore, in the early dissemination of Marxism, besides extensively translating and introducing Marxist theory, intellectuals paid particular attention to introducing Marx’s personal practice of the Confucian ideal personality. For example, in 1919, Chen Poxian, in “The Struggling Life of Marx, the Founder of Modern Socialism,” mentioned that during the writing of *Capital*, Marx lived in extreme poverty and misery, yet displayed “his indomitable determination and the lofty realm of the spirit of self-sacrifice to save the world.” This spirit of saving the world reminded intellectuals of the time of the Confucian mandate of “becoming a person,” and they then wrote: “When Heaven is about to place a great responsibility on a person, it must first strain his sinews and bones, starve his body and skin. And Marx’s great work was actually accomplished in such circumstances; this is perhaps how Heaven created Marx.” [18]18 A classical allusion to *Mencius*, “Gaozi II,” often cited to describe a person enduring hardship before undertaking a great mission. Li Ji, an early member of the Communist Party of China, when writing a biography of Marx, believed that Marx was not only “a fearless warrior” but also “a profound and subtle scholar.” “Anyone who writes a biography for him, if they neglect either of these two points, will only depict ‘half of Marx.’” Thus it can be seen that the Confucian ideal personality traits manifested in Marx’s person and deeds also attracted the attention and admiration of Chinese intellectuals; this is another aspect of the compatibility.

在处理个人与自我的问题上，中华优秀传统文化主张“知耻明善”“至诚情感”“坚定意志”等，形成知情意统一的个体道德发展目标。这是一种诉诸自我明悟的内省型道德观，与西方诉诸上帝的道德观不同，因为基督教将上帝存在作为个体获得善与幸福的前提，强调上帝、教义的他律性。“知情意统一”的道德发展目标肯定人多方面的平衡发展，与科学社会主义价值观主张中人的全面发展高度契合。马克思强调：“人以一种全面的方式，就是说，作为一个完整的人，占有自己的全面的本质。”人的全面发展意味着人可以按照自己的天赋、特长与爱好选择从事的职业，全面发展人的智力与体力。人既可以是从事体力劳动的猎人、渔夫或牧人，也可以是从事脑力劳动的批判者。当然，马克思强调发挥人的主观能动性实现本然之我向应然之我的道德建构，确证自我价值，在改造中形成理想型的道德观念。人通过主观能动性改造自身，实现思想道德素养、思想文化素养的提升。此外，在马克思主义早期传播中，知识分子除了大量译介马克思主义学说外，尤其注重介绍马克思对儒家理想人格的躬身力行。例如，1919年陈溥贤在《近世社会主义鼻祖马克思之奋斗生涯》中提到马克思在写作《资本论》期间，生活极为贫困悲惨，却表现了“其坚忍不拔之决心，献身救世之精神的崇高境界”，此救世之心让彼时知识分子联想到儒家“成人”之命定，遂又写到“天之将降大任于斯人也，必劳其筋骨，饿其体肤。而马氏之大著作，实成就于此种境遇之中，此殆天所以造就马氏者欤”。早期中国共产党人李季在撰写马克思传记时认为，马克思不仅是“一个奋勇无匹的战士”，还是“一个精思玄妙的学者”，“凡替他作传的人对于这两点倘若忽略了一点，则这种传记便只描写出‘半个马克思’”。由此可见，马克思其人其事所彰显的儒家理想人格特质，同样也引起中国知识分子的关注和推崇，此乃契合性的另一面。

III. Compatibility of Social Moral Value Principles: Delighting in Community and Esteeming Harmony, and “Developing One’s True Nature in Society”

三、社会道德价值原则契合：乐群尚和与“在社会中发展自己的真正的天性”

How to handle the relationship between the individual and others is another important topic in moral views. The moral view in fine traditional Chinese culture advocates the unity of the inner self and the outer self, and of self-realization and social shaping. The individual must both realize self-value and attend to social value, obtaining group identity. It can be said that the “self” in the ideal personality is not a completely independent, individualized self, but a civilized, socialized, and collectivized self. Whether one can “form a community” is regarded as an important distinction between humans and beasts. Confucius emphasized: “One cannot associate with birds and beasts; if I am not to be a person among this people, then with whom am I to associate?” (*The Analects*, “Weizi”). “Benevolence” is an important value principle for handling the relationship between the individual and others, and the ideal social moral realm of “harmony is most precious” embodies the species-essence of the moral subject, as it is said: “Heaven’s timing is not as good as earthly advantage; earthly advantage is not as good as human harmony” (*Mencius*, “Gongsun Chou II”). This is highly compatible with the value proposition of scientific socialism that “develops one’s true nature in society,” opposes detached, absolute, pure individualism, and esteems socialized moral norms. Marx believes that the essence of the human person is objectified practice: “All human relations to the world… are the appropriation of the object, the appropriation of human reality, through his objective relation, that is, through his relation to the object.”

如何处理个人与他人的关系是道德观的另一个重要议题。中华优秀传统文化中的道德观主张内在之我与外在之我，自我实现与社会塑造的统一，个体既要实现自我价值又要关照社会价值，获得群体认同。可以说，理想人格中的“自我”不是完全独立的、个性化的自我，而是文明化、社会化、群体化的自我。是否“能群”被视为人与禽兽的重要区别，孔子强调“鸟兽不可与同群，吾非斯人之徒与而谁与”（《论语·微子》）。“仁”是处理个人与他人关系的重要价值原则，而“和为贵”的理想社会道德境界体现道德主体的类本质，正所谓“天时不如地利，地利不如人和”（《孟子·公孙丑下》）。这与科学社会主义价值观中“在社会中发展自己的真正的天性”，反对脱离社会的、绝对的、纯粹的个人主义，推崇社会化道德规范的价值观主张高度契合。马克思认为人的本质是对象化的实践，“人对世界的任何一种人的关系……是通过自己的对象性关系，即通过自己同对象的关系而对对象的占有，对人的现实的占有”。

First, the benevolent person loves others. Although “benevolence” has different views in fine traditional Chinese culture, such as ontology and cosmology, the value it elicits is relatively constant, namely, its core is “loving others,” referring to love directed toward others rather than toward oneself, as in “the benevolent person loves others” (*Mencius*, “Li Lou II”) and “the benevolent person extends love from what he loves to what he does not love” (*Mencius*, “Jinxin II”). The “others” to which “benevolence” points are broad, embodied as “universal love” rather than a specific group, as Han Yu said: “Universal love is called benevolence” (*Collected Works of Han Yu*, “On the Way”) and Dong Zhongshu said: “Precede with universal love, teach with benevolence” (*Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn Annals*, “For the People, Heaven”). However, the love embodied by “benevolence” itself manifests as an outward radiation from familial affection and ethical relations. “Benevolence” is first embodied as love for relatives, as in “loving one’s kin is benevolence” (*Mencius*, “Gaozi II”) and “the substance of benevolence is serving one’s parents” (*Mencius*, “Li Lou I”). This is highly compatible with the value propositions of scientific socialism. Marx emphasizes: “Assume man to be man and his relation to the world to be a human one: then you can only exchange love for love, trust for trust.”

首先，仁者爱人。尽管“仁”在中华优秀传统文化中有本体论和宇宙论等不同的观点，但其所引出的价值较为恒定，即核心为“爱人”，指向他人而非自身之爱，如“仁者爱人”（《孟子·离娄下》）、“仁者以其所爱及其所不爱”（《孟子·尽心下》）。“仁”指向的他人具有广泛性，体现为“博爱”而非特定群体，正如韩愈的“博爱之谓仁”（《韩愈集·原道》）、董仲舒的“先之以博爱，教以仁也”（《春秋繁露·为人者天》）。只是“仁”所体现的爱本身呈现着亲情伦常的向外辐射。“仁”首先体现为亲人之爱，正如“亲亲，仁也”（《孟子·告子下》）、“仁之实，事亲是也”《孟子·离娄上》。这与科学社会主义价值观主张高度契合。马克思强调，“假定人就是人，而人对世界的关系是一种人的关系，那么你就只能用爱来交换爱，只能用信任来交换信任”。

Second, the way of loyalty and reciprocity. For others, “benevolence” is not an abstract value appeal, but advocates treating them with empathy, extending from oneself to others, treating others equally, and the way of loyalty and reciprocity that compares hearts with hearts. “Reciprocity” is “the method of benevolence,” the specific principle, method, and path of “benevolence,” and is the embodiment of loving others: “Reciprocity is the application of benevolence” (*The Surviving Works of the Cheng Brothers*, vol. 15). The moral view in fine traditional Chinese culture advocates respecting and caring for others, and putting oneself in others’ shoes to consider their interests and demands, as in: “Is reciprocity not the word? What you do not wish for yourself, do not do to others” (*The Analects*, “Wei Ling Gong”) and “The benevolent person, wishing to establish himself, establishes others; wishing to advance himself, advances others” (*The Analects*, “Yong Ye”). The way of loyalty and reciprocity is a principle for treating others derived from the self, containing the moral requirement of not indulging the self and restraining selfish desires and selfish intentions in handling the relationship between self and other. At the same time, the way of loyalty and reciprocity also requires tolerance, forgiveness, and kindness toward others, embodying the moral requirement of being strict with oneself and lenient with others. Only then can the exemplary person carry the world with great virtue. The way of loyalty and reciprocity embodies the principle of empathy. On this point, Marx discusses it using the phrase “conforming to human nature.” He points out: “As long as man is human, and hence his feelings, etc., are also human, then the affirmation of the object by another is likewise his own enjoyment.”

其次，忠恕之道。对于他人，“仁”并不是抽象的价值诉求，而是主张同理心以处之，推己及人，平等待人，以心比心的忠恕之道。“恕”是“仁之方”，是“仁”的具体原则、方法与途径，是爱他人的体现，“恕则仁之施”（《二程遗书·卷十五》）。中华优秀传统文化中的道德观主张对他人要尊重关心，设身处地考虑他人的利益诉求，如“其恕乎！己所不欲，勿施于人”（《论语·卫灵公》）、“夫仁者，己欲立而立人，己欲达而达人”（《论语·雍也》）。忠恕之道是一种从自我出发衍生出的对待他人之原则，蕴含着在处理自我与他者关系过程中不放纵自我、抑制私欲与私心的道德要求。同时，忠恕之道也要求对他人宽容、宽恕、与人为善，体现严于律己、宽以待人的道德要求，如此君子方能厚德载物。忠恕之道体现的是同理性原则，对于这一点马克思用“合乎人的本性”进行论述。他指出，“只要人是合乎人性的，因而他的感觉等等也是合乎人性的，那么对象为别人所肯定，这同样也就是他自己的享受”。

Finally, regulate profit with righteousness. “Benevolence” (ren) and “righteousness” (yi) are linked; “benevolence and righteousness” embody the moral principles that should be adopted when correctly handling interest relations, especially when facing conflicts of interest in coordinating self and others, and individual interests and group interests. In fine traditional Chinese culture, different thinkers held different attitudes toward the relationship between righteousness and profit, but overall they embodied the moral principle of “valuing righteousness” (shang yi), advocating that righteousness be taken as paramount, group interests as paramount, and that individuals obtain profit legitimately, while opposing seizure by force, exploitation of others. Examples include Confucius’s “The gentleman takes righteousness as paramount” (The Analects, Yang Huo) and “The gentleman understands righteousness, the petty person understands profit” (The Analects, Li Ren); Mencius’s “Righteousness is the proper path for man” (Mencius, Li Lou I). Righteousness is the standard of what ought to be, a criterion that accords with the Way and principle, and it possesses purity, untainted by the inducement of external “profit.” In the relationship between righteousness and profit, emphasis is placed on righteousness taking precedence, with universal moral standards prioritized over the acquisition of profit, negating utilitarian value orientations, as in “He who puts righteousness before profit is honored; he who puts profit before righteousness is disgraced” (Xunzi, On Honor and Disgrace). Moreover, the handling of the righteousness-profit relationship embodies the moral principle that when individual interests conflict with collective interests, collective interests and common interests take precedence—that is, “righteousness is paramount.” In addition, it advocates obtaining profit legitimately, not taking unrighteous wealth. Handling the righteousness-profit relationship does not completely negate obtaining profit; rather, it advocates “promoting profit” and “benefiting all” in non-moral spheres, as in “Thus the sage promotes profit for the world” (Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn Annals, Examining Merits and Titles). Of course, the moral views in fine traditional Chinese culture oppose obtaining unrighteous wealth: “Wealth and rank obtained through unrighteousness are to me like floating clouds” (The Analects, Shu Er). At the same time, they oppose one-sidedly pursuing “profit” while departing from “righteousness”: “If one sees only profit, one will surely suffer harm” (Xunzi, On Ritual); indeed, one’s character will degenerate: “To preserve profit and abandon righteousness is called the greatest thief” (Xunzi, On Self-Cultivation). In short, in correctly handling the relationship between self and others, achieving the social moral goal of “harmony” (he) is key. “Harmony” is an important force for alleviating social conflict and tension and for condensing society’s internal strength. The moral views in fine traditional Chinese culture advocate achieving individual delight in community and valuing harmony to promote social harmony through moral principles such as “benevolence and love,” “loyalty and reciprocity,” and “righteousness as paramount.”

最后，以义制利。“仁”与“义”关联，“仁义”体现着正确处理利益关系，尤其是面临利益纠纷如何协调自我与他人、个人利益与群体利益时应采取的道德原则。在中华优秀传统文化中，不同思想家对义利关系的态度不同，但总体上体现着“尚义”之道德原则，主张义以为上，群体利益为上，个体正当获利，反对巧取豪夺、剥削他人，如孔子的“君子义以为上”（《论语·阳货》）、“君子喻于义，小人喻于利”（《论语·里仁》）；孟子的“义，人之正路也”（《孟子·离娄上》）等。义为当然之则，是合乎道与理的准则，且具有纯洁性，不掺杂外在之“利”的诱引。在义利关系上，强调义为先，普遍道德标准优先于利益获取，否定功利主义价值取向，如“先义而后利者荣，先利而后义者辱”（《荀子·荣辱》）。而且，义利关系的处理上体现着个人利益与集体利益冲突时集体利益和共同利益至上的道德原则，也就是“义为上”。此外，主张正当获利，不取不义之财。处理义利关系并不是完全否定获利，而是在非道德的领域中主张“兴利”“兼利”，如“故圣人之为天下兴利也”（《春秋繁露·考功名》）。当然，中华优秀传统文化中的道德观反对获取不义之财，“不义而富且贵，于我如浮云”（《论语·述而》）。同时，反对离开“义”片面追求“利”，“苟利之为见，若者必害”（《荀子·礼论》），甚至人格上会沦陷，“保利弃义谓之至贼”（《荀子·修身》）。总之，在正确处理自我与他人的关系上，实现“和”这一社会道德目标是关键。“和”是缓解社会冲突与紧张、凝聚社会内在力的重要力量。中华优秀传统文化中的道德观主张通过“仁爱”“忠恕”“义以为上”等道德原则实现个体乐群尚和以推动社会和谐。

The moral views in fine traditional Chinese culture advocate caring for others, emphasizing the collective, and embodying the unity of the inner self and the outer self. This is completely different from many Western scholars who advocate excluding others for personal interest; in the latter, the inner, authentic self is in a tense, antagonistic relationship with the social, outer self. For example, Nietzsche asserted, “Life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of peculiar forms, incorporation, and at the least, putting it mildest, exploitation.” [19]19 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Helen Zimmern (New York: Macmillan, 1907), §259. In capitalist society, individuals are gradually atomized, isolated, and interest-driven; its value propositions constitute an exclusive form of moral self-construction. On the basis of criticizing capitalist morality, scientific socialism advocates that individuals develop their true nature in society, and promotes the realization of people’s free and comprehensive development through integration into social group life: “Only in the community with others has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; hence personal freedom becomes possible only within the community.” [20]20 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, in Marx/Engels Collected Works, vol. 5 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 78. The value propositions of scientific socialism advocate, in real social practice and within the overall tension between social being and social consciousness, revealing the objective laws of the change of morality and its norms as “social consciousness,” promoting the moral subject’s inner spiritual construction and self-redemption in the self-movement of social life, and realizing the transformation of the mode of moral existence from moral abstraction to ethical concreteness, from moral hypocrisy to moral sincerity, and from spiritual emptiness to spiritual fullness. Moreover, the value propositions of scientific socialism advocate that morality be founded on the idea of “species-being,” highlighting collectivity and sociality. Marx believed that people’s free and comprehensive development and liberation are all based on “species-being”; only when the real individual “has become a species-being, and when man has recognized and organized his ‘forces propres’ as social forces, and consequently no longer separates social power from himself in the shape of political power, only then will human emancipation have been accomplished.” [21]21 Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” in Marx/Engels Collected Works, vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 168. Marx held that man is always a social being; the formation of morality cannot be separated from attention to social relations, and only in social relations can people truly realize free and comprehensive development: “Man’s relation to himself only becomes objective and actual for him through his relation to other men.” [22]22 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in Marx/Engels Collected Works, vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 299. This is highly compatible with the moral views in fine traditional Chinese culture, which advocate constructing morality that meets the needs of socialization and collectivization through “benevolence and love” and “loyalty and reciprocity.”

中华优秀传统文化中的道德观主张关爱他人，注重集体，体现内在自我与外在自我的统一。这与很多西方学者主张为个人利益而排斥他人完全不同，后者内在、本真的自我与社会、外在之自我处于紧张、对立关系。例如，尼采主张，“生命本质上就是占有、伤害、征服异己和弱者，压制、历难、按人自己的方式进行欺诈、吞并，而且最起码也是利用”。资本主义社会中个体逐渐被离散化、原子化、利益化，其价值观主张是一种排他式的自我道德建构。科学社会主义在批判资本主义道德观的基础上，提倡个人在社会中发展自己真正的天性，主张在融入社会群体生活中实现人的自由全面发展，“只有在集体中，个人才能获得全面发展其才能的手段，也就是说，只有在集体中才可能有个人自由”。科学社会主义价值观主张在现实社会实践中，在社会存在和社会意识的总体性张力关系中，揭示作为“社会意识”的道德及其规范性的变迁的客观规律，推动道德主体在社会生活的自我运动中实现内在的精神建构和自我救赎，实现道德存在方式从道德抽象走向伦理具体，从道德伪善走向道德真诚，从精神虚无走向精神充盈。而且，科学社会主义价值观主张道德建立在“类存在”思想的基础上，凸显集体性、社会性。马克思认为人的自由全面发展、解放等都建立在“类存在”基础上，只有当现实的个人“成为类存在物的时候，只有当人认识到自身‘固有的力量’是社会力量，并把这种力量组织起来因而不再把社会力量以政治力量的形式同自身分离的时候，只有到了那个时候，人的解放才能完成”。马克思认为人始终是社会人，道德的形成离不开对社会关系的关照，人只有在社会关系中才能真正实现自由全面发展，“人对自身的关系只有通过他对他人的关系，才成为对他来说是对象性的、现实的关系”。这与中华优秀传统文化中的道德观主张通过“仁爱”“忠恕”建构符合社会化、集体化需求的道德观高度契合。

IV. The Logic of Political Moral Value Compatibility: Taking the World as One’s Responsibility and Seeking Liberation for Humanity

四、政治道德价值逻辑契合：天下己任与为人类求解放

How to handle the relationship between the self and the state—the normative value orientation in the political sphere—is another important issue in moral views. In fine traditional Chinese culture, moral cultivation, although originating in self-cultivation, ultimately points to the state and the world (tianxia), advocating the unity of inner sagehood and outer kingliness, which also embodies the unity of self-realization and state responsibility: “The gentleman’s conduct is to cultivate his person and thereby bring peace to the world” (Mencius, Jinxin II). The value propositions of scientific socialism, on the other hand, advocate realizing the leap of human society to the “realm of freedom.” Marx emphasized, “The chief thing that must guide us is the happiness of mankind and our own perfection,” and “Man can only achieve his perfection by working for the perfection and happiness of his contemporaries.” [23]23 Karl Marx, “Reflections of a Young Man on the Choice of a Profession,” in Marx/Engels Collected Works, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 8. It can be said that the self-perfection and working for the happiness of contemporaries in scientific socialism, and the “self-cultivation” and “bringing peace to the world” in fine traditional Chinese culture, both follow a value logic that proceeds from self-improvement to the flourishing development of the state and society, and ultimately points to human happiness.

如何处理自我与国家的关系，政治方面的应然性价值取向也是道德观的另一重要议题。中华优秀传统文化中道德修养尽管源于自我修身但最终指向的是国家、天下，提倡内圣与外王的统一，也体现着自我实现与国家责任的统一，“君子之守，修其身而天下平”（《孟子·尽心下》）。而科学社会主义价值观主张要实现人类社会向“自由王国”的飞跃。马克思强调，“我们应该遵循的主要指针是人类的幸福和我们自身的完美”，“人只有为同时代人的完美、为他们的幸福而工作，自己才能达到完美”。可以说，科学社会主义中的自身完美、为同时代人谋幸福等与中华优秀传统文化中的“修身”“平天下”等，都遵循着由自我完善到国家社会繁荣发展、最终指向人类幸福的价值逻辑。

The moral views in fine traditional Chinese culture ultimately seek the transcendence and integration of the “small self” into the “great self,” moving from individual self-cultivation to collective national responsibility and the mission of the world—that is, the self serves the nation and assumes moral responsibility and commitment. The “sage” as an ideal personality is one who is selfless and upholds the public interest, as stated: “The sage has no fixed mind; he takes the mind of the people as his mind” (Dao De Jing, Chapter 49). [24]24 The *Dao De Jing* (also *Tao Te Ching*) is a foundational text of Daoism traditionally attributed to Laozi (6th century BCE). Chapter 49 discusses the sage’s selfless identification with the people. At the same time, whether one prioritizes the people, the nation, and the world is also the distinction between the noble person and the petty person. “What the noble person’s aspirations consider—how could they be limited to his own person? They extend directly to the world and its myriad generations. The petty person’s concerns are for a single moment’s anger, and he does not even have time to care for his own person.” [25]25 This quotation is from the Song dynasty Neo-Confucian Zhu Xi (1130–1200), likely from his *Classified Conversations of Master Zhu*. First, there is the promotion of the Way and the stabilization of the state. The ultimate value orientation of moral views is the realization of social ideals, to stabilize the state and bring peace to the world, “to broadly bestow benefits upon the people and to be able to aid the multitude” (Analects, Yong Ye). [26]26 The *Analects* (*Lunyu*) is a collection of sayings and ideas attributed to Confucius (551–479 BCE) and his disciples. “Yong Ye” is the sixth book. Moreover, the individual realizes the self in the process of practicing social ideals: “It is man who can enlarge the Way, not the Way that enlarges man” (Analects, Wei Ling Gong). [27]27 “Wei Ling Gong” is the fifteenth book of the *Analects*. Second, the world takes precedence. In fine traditional Chinese culture, the self-identification of the individual is integrated with national development; the survival and flourishing of the nation are embedded in the individual’s moral aspirations: “To protect the world, even the lowliest commoner has a responsibility.” [28]28 This phrase is from the Ming-Qing scholar Gu Yanwu (1613–1682), from his *Record of Daily Knowledge* (*Rizhi Lu*), often paraphrased as “everyone is responsible for the rise and fall of the world.” In fact, from Mencius’s “if successful, benefit the whole world” (Mencius, Jin Xin I) [29]29 *Mencius* (*Mengzi*) is a Confucian classic attributed to Mencius (372–289 BCE). “Jin Xin I” is the first part of the seventh book. to Lu You’s “though low in rank, never forget concern for the nation” (Written When Rising from Illness), [30]30 Lu You (1125–1210) was a Southern Song poet. *Written When Rising from Illness* (*Bing Qi Shu Huai*) expresses his patriotic concern despite personal hardship. from Fan Zhongyan’s “be the first to worry about the world’s troubles and the last to enjoy its pleasures” (Record of Yueyang Tower) [31]31 Fan Zhongyan (989–1052) was a Northern Song statesman and writer. *Record of Yueyang Tower* (*Yueyang Lou Ji*) is a famous essay. to Zhang Hengqu’s “to establish a heart for Heaven and Earth, to establish a destiny for the people, to continue the lost teachings of past sages, and to open up peace for ten thousand generations” (Complete Works of Master Zhang), [32]32 Zhang Hengqu (Zhang Zai, 1020–1077) was a Northern Song Neo-Confucian philosopher. The “four sentences” are his famous articulation of scholarly mission. all reflect the conscious awareness of Chinese literati in embedding national sentiment into individual political and moral cultivation. Of course, the elevation of individual political and moral cultivation can also be transformed into the external effect of national stability, as stated: “To judge the world, correct oneself; even in chaos, one does not drift with it. To establish oneself and then extend it to the world—then the violent restrain their brutality, the deceitful curb their cunning, the stubborn are corrected in their folly. Even if one wishes to throw the world into chaos, the world will not be chaotic.” [33]33 This quotation is from Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692), a Ming-Qing Confucian philosopher, from his *Commentary on the Comprehensive Mirror* (*Du Tongjian Lun*). Third, there is sacrifice and dedication. The individual in the moral views of fine traditional Chinese culture should possess a strong sense of mission and responsibility: “If I am to bring peace to the world, who else but me in this age?” (Mencius, Gongsun Chou II). [34]34 “Gongsun Chou II” is the second part of the second book of *Mencius*. When the nation is in peril or when social righteousness demands it, one should offer dedication and sacrifice, highlighting the individual’s value to national development, as seen in Confucius’s “sacrifice one’s life to achieve benevolence” (Analects, Wei Ling Gong), Mencius’s “sacrifice one’s life to achieve righteousness” (Mencius, Gaozi I), [35]35 “Gaozi I” is the first part of the sixth book of *Mencius*. Cao Zhi’s “sacrifice one’s life to face national calamity, seeing death as a return home” (The White Horse), [36]36 Cao Zhi (192–232) was a poet of the Three Kingdoms period. *The White Horse* (*Bai Ma Pian*) celebrates a warrior’s patriotic sacrifice. Wang Fuzhi’s “since one takes the world as one’s responsibility, death or defeat is not an unexpected calamity,” [37]37 Wang Fuzhi, from his *Commentary on the Book of Changes* (*Zhouyi Waizhuan*). and Lin Zexu’s “if it benefits the nation, I would sacrifice my life for it” (Recited on Departure for the Frontier). [38]38 Lin Zexu (1785–1850) was a Qing official known for his opposition to the opium trade. This line is from a poem written on his exile. This is clearly different from Western utilitarian moral views based on rational calculation, whose moral core is “respect for and protection of individual desires, interests, and rights.” Confucius emphasized “cultivate oneself to bring peace to others” (Analects, Xian Wen) and “cultivate oneself to bring peace to the people” (Analects, Xian Wen), [39]39 “Xian Wen” is the fourteenth book of the *Analects*. requiring that in “self-cultivation” one achieve self-improvement while also “bringing peace to others” and “bringing peace to the people,” seeking social stability and national prosperity, ultimately pointing to taking the world as one’s responsibility. The Book of Rites, Great Learning discusses the proactive worldly thought of “cultivate oneself, regulate the family, govern the state, and bring peace to the world,” [40]40 The *Great Learning* (*Daxue*) is a chapter of the *Book of Rites* (*Liji*), a Confucian classic, later elevated as one of the “Four Books.” presenting a value transmission from individual self-cultivation to national responsibility, advocating the extension of the internal construction of individual virtue into universal norms, achieving the “supreme good” of the community formed by society within natural principles and universal reason.

中华优秀传统文化中的道德观最终要实现“小我”向“大我”的超越与融合，从个体性的自我修身最终走向集体性的国家责任、天下使命，即自我服务于国家，承担道德责任与担当。理想人格中的“圣人”是无私心而持公心之表率，正如“圣人恒无心，以百姓心为心”（《道德经·第四十九章》）。同时，是否以百姓、国家、天下为先也是君子与小人的区别。“君子之志所虑者，岂止其一身？直虑及天下千万世。小人之虑，一朝之忿，曾不遑恤其身。”一是弘道安邦。道德观最后的价值指向是实现社会理想，以安邦济世，治国平天下，“博施于民而能济众”（《论语·雍也》）。而且，个体在践行社会理想的过程中得以实现自我，“人能弘道，非道弘人”（《论语·卫灵公》）。二是天下为先。中华优秀传统文化中个体的自我确认与国家发展存在一体性，国家存亡与兴盛内嵌于个体的道德憧憬，“保天下者，匹夫之贱与有责焉耳矣”。事实上，从孟子的“达则兼善天下”（《孟子·尽心上》）到陆游的“位卑未敢忘忧国”（《病起书怀》），从范仲淹的“先天下之忧而忧，后天下之乐而乐”（《岳阳楼记》）到张横渠的“为天地立心，为生民立命，为往圣继绝学，为万世开太平”（《张子全书》），都体现着中国文人将国家情怀嵌入个体政治道德素养的自觉意识。当然，个体政治道德修养的提升亦可以转化为国家安定的外在效应，正如“裁之于天下，正之于己，虽乱而不与俱流。立之于己，施之于天下，则凶人戢其暴，诈人敛其奸，顽人砭其愚，即欲乱天下而天下犹不乱也”。三是牺牲奉献。中华优秀传统文化道德观中的个体应具有强烈的使命担当，“如欲平治天下，当今之世，舍我其谁”（《孟子·公孙丑下》）。在国家危急存亡或者社会道义所需之时应奉献与牺牲，凸显个体对国家发展的价值，正如孔子的“杀身以成仁”（《论语·卫灵公》）、孟子的“舍生而取义”（《孟子·告子上》）、曹植的“捐躯赴国难，视死忽如归”（《白马篇》）、王夫之的“既以身任天下，则死之与败，非意外之凶危”、林则徐的“苟利国家生死以”（《赴戍登程口占示家人》）等。这显然与建立在理性计算基础上的西方功利主义道德观不同，后者的道德核心是“对个体欲望、利益、权力的尊重与维护”。孔子强调“修己以安人”（《论语·宪问》）、“修己以安百姓”（《论语·宪问》），要求在“修身”中实现自我涵养提升，同时实现“安人”“安百姓”，求得社会安稳、国家昌盛，最终指向的是以天下为己任。《礼记·大学》论述了“修身齐家治国平天下”的积极入世思想，呈现着由个体自我修养到国家责任之间的价值传导，倡导将个体德性的内在建构衍化为普遍规范，在当然之则与普遍之理中实现社会形成之共同体的“至善”。

The value logic inherent in the political moral views of fine traditional Chinese culture—from self-cultivation to national responsibility—is entirely different from the value logic inherent in Western political moral views—from national responsibility to self-development. Western political moral views are based on “natural human rights” and “contract theory,” emphasizing the responsibility and obligation of the government, state, and society to ensure individual freedom, equality, and justice, highlighting a moral presupposition “oriented toward individual rights.” Many Western philosophers advocate that society and the state are means to help individuals achieve their ends, while also acknowledging that national and social development can sometimes hinder or constrain individual development, giving rise to anarchism, utilitarianism, liberalism, extreme individualism, and so on. The political moral views nurtured by capitalist society place greater emphasis on the legitimacy and legality of safeguarding individual rights or the interests of certain groups, as well as the responsibility of the government. Particularly in individualist political morality, the existence of government is primarily to protect the inalienable rights of individuals: “the sole purpose of politics is to protect and maintain the individual’s lawful pursuit of the maximization of his own reasonable private interests,” rather than pursuing overall goodness or universal justice.

中华优秀传统文化中政治道德观所蕴含的从自身修养到国家责任的价值逻辑与西方政治道德观中蕴含的从国家责任到自我发展的价值逻辑截然不同。西方政治道德观建立在“自然人权”“契约论”基础上，强调政府、国家、社会保障个体自由、平等和正义等的责任和义务，凸显着“以个体权利为导向”的道德预设。不少西方哲学家主张社会、国家是帮助个体实现目的的手段，同时承认国家与社会发展有时会妨碍甚至约束个体发展，由此形成无政府主义、功利主义、自由主义、极端个人主义等。资本主义社会孕育的政治道德观更加强调维护个体权益或者某一部分群体利益的正当性和合法性以及政府的责任等。特别是在个人主义政治道德中，政府的存在主要是为了维护个人不可让渡的权利，“政治的惟一目的就是保护、维持个人通过合法形式追求个人合理私利的最大化”，而非追求整体至善、普遍正义。

The value logic embedded in the moral view of scientific socialism is highly consistent with that embedded in the moral view of fine traditional Chinese culture; both ultimately advocate the integration of the individual self and the greater self, pointing toward human happiness. The prerequisite for human happiness and the free and comprehensive development of the individual is the achievement of political emancipation, that is, the seizure of state power by the proletariat. The capitalist state is “nothing more than the form of organization which the bourgeois necessarily adopt both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interests.” [41]41 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology*, in *Marx & Engels Collected Works*, vol. 5 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1976), p. 90. In capitalist states, what prevails everywhere is “callous ‘cash payment’” [42]42 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, in *Marx & Engels Collected Works*, vol. 6 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1976), p. 487. and “indescribable poverty.” [43]43 Frederick Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, in *Marx & Engels Collected Works*, vol. 4 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975), p. 326. Marx criticized the capitalist system for turning all social relations into naked, pure monetary relations, reducing those engaged in awe-inspiring and revered professions to “wage labourers whom they pay.” [44]44 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, in *Marx & Engels Collected Works*, vol. 6, p. 487. The bourgeoisie drowns the sacred emotions of piety “in the icy water of egotistical calculation,” [45]45 Ibid., p. 487. engages in “shameless, direct, brutal exploitation,” [46]46 Ibid., p. 487. and “resorts to immoral means to attain immoral ends.” [47]47 Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, in *Marx & Engels Collected Works*, vol. 6, p. 163. In contrast, the values of scientific socialism advocate grasping the corresponding moral norms within the economic relations of production and exchange. Morality changes with changes in economic relations and social relations; capitalist morality will ultimately be replaced by communist morality. In capitalist society, the proletariat possesses “a very strong sense of its own dignity,” [48]48 Frederick Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, in *Marx & Engels Collected Works*, vol. 4, p. 410. enjoys “intellectual and moral superiority,” [49]49 Ibid., p. 410. and represents the overwhelming majority of all members of society, whose “interests coincide with the interests of the whole of humanity.” [50]50 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Holy Family*, in *Marx & Engels Collected Works*, vol. 4, p. 36. The proletariat possesses a noble moral consciousness of striving for the interests of humanity. The values of scientific socialism advocate that the working class unite to overthrow bourgeois rule, achieve human emancipation, and realize a communism of “true freedom and true equality.” [51]51 Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France*, in *Marx & Engels Collected Works*, vol. 22 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1986), p. 335. Communist morality is built on the basis of the positive sublation of human self-alienation and embodies the dialectical unity of individual morality and social development. On the one hand, morality has a universal purposiveness; the good of the state, society, and the collective is precisely the integration and subsumption of the good of the individual, while individual interests gain legitimacy by conforming to the direction of national development. The individual depends on a “real collective” rather than a false one; collective interests are the aggregation of numerous individual interests, achieving the greatest possible unity with the legitimate demands of the individual, so that “the common interest has become the fundamental principle, and public and private interests are no longer different.” [52]52 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology*, in *Marx & Engels Collected Works*, vol. 5, p. 81. Legitimate individual interests necessarily conform to the universal and ultimate value goal of each person’s free and comprehensive development. Consistent with the moral view in fine traditional Chinese culture, the moral view of scientific socialism acknowledges the legitimacy of obtaining interests when dealing with the issue of interests: “Everything that people fight for is related to their interests.” [53]53 Karl Marx, *Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood*, in *Marx & Engels Collected Works*, vol. 1 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975), p. 262. On the other hand, when individual interests conflict with the interests of all humanity, individual interests should yield to the “public” interest represented by the “righteousness” of human interests. Marx and Engels believed that “since the correctly understood interest is the principle of all morality, it follows that people’s private interests must be made to conform to the interests of humanity.” [54]54 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Holy Family*, in *Marx & Engels Collected Works*, vol. 4, p. 131. Individual morality is built on the basis of a correct view of interests and should conform to the direction of human social development. In short, in communist society, the individual truly takes possession of his own essence, returns to himself and to social humanity, and the self-affirmation of personal value should be consistent with the overall direction of national development. This is highly compatible with the value logic of political morality in fine traditional Chinese culture.

科学社会主义道德观中蕴含的价值逻辑与中华优秀传统文化中道德观蕴含的价值逻辑高度一致，最终都主张实现小我与大我的融通，指向人类幸福。人类幸福和人的自由全面发展的前提是实现政治解放，也就是无产阶级夺取国家政权。资本主义国家“不外是资产者为了在国内外相互保障各自的财产和利益所必然要采取的一种组织形式”。在资本主义国家，到处充斥的是“不近人情的冷淡和铁石心肠的利己主义”和“无法形容的贫穷”。马克思批判资本主义制度将一切社会关系变成了赤裸裸的、纯粹的金钱关系，使一切从事令人敬畏和尊崇职业的人变成“出钱招雇的雇佣劳动者”。资产阶级把情感的神圣“淹没在利己主义打算的冰水之中”，进行着“没有良心”的贸易、“公开的、无耻的、直接的、露骨的剥削”，并“采取不道德的手段来达到不道德的目的”等。与之不同，科学社会主义价值观主张在生产与交换的经济关系中把握相应的道德规范。道德随着经济关系、社会关系的变革而变革，资本主义道德终将被共产主义道德所替代。在资本主义社会中，无产阶级“自尊心非常强”，具有“智力上和道义上的优势”，而且代表全体社会成员中的绝大多数，其“利益和全人类的利益相一致”。无产阶级具有为人类利益而奋斗的高尚道德意识，科学社会主义价值观主张工人阶级联合起来推翻资产阶级统治，实现人类解放，实现“真正的自由和真正的平等”的共产主义。共产主义道德建立在积极扬弃人的自我异化的基础上，蕴含着个体道德与社会发展的辩证统一关系。一方面，道德具有普遍的合目的性，国家、社会、集体之善本就是对个体之善的整合与统摄，同时个体利益在符合国家发展方向中获得合法性。个体所依赖的是“真实的集体”而非虚假的集体，集体利益是众多个人利益的集合，最大程度实现与个人正当利益诉求的统一，“利益的共同已经成为基本原则、公共利益和个人利益已经没有什么差别”。正当的个人利益必然符合每个人获得自由全面发展这一普遍性、终极性价值目标。与中华优秀传统文化中的道德观一致，科学社会主义道德观在处理利益问题上承认获取利益的正当性，“人们为之奋斗的一切，都同他们的利益有关”。另一方面，当个体利益与全人类利益对立时，个体利益应让位于人类利益这一“义”所代表的“公”利。马克思恩格斯认为，“既然正确理解的利益是全部道德的原则，那就必须使人们的私人利益符合于人类的利益”。个体道德建立在正确利益观的基础上，应符合人类社会发展的方向。总之，在共产主义社会中，人真正占有自身的本质，向自身、社会的人复归，个人价值自我确认应与国家整体发展方向一致，这与中华优秀传统文化中政治道德的价值逻辑具有高度契合性。

The form of ownership under which fine traditional Chinese culture was generated and developed belongs to what Marx termed the Asiatic form, in which “the individual is not independent vis-à-vis the commune.” [55]55 Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, in *Marx & Engels Collected Works*, vol. 29 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1987), p. 400. Although fine traditional Chinese culture produced moral views of different schools in different periods, the economic base determined that its dominant moral view necessarily entailed the subsumption and regulation of individual morality by collective and social morality. Scientific socialism is built on the basis of criticizing capitalism, which includes a moral critique of religious pseudo-morality, money-worship, individualism, and utilitarianism; the ultimate direction of its moral view is also the “return” of value concepts to the collective and society. As General Secretary Xi Jinping stated, “Marxism grasps the essence of the human being from the perspective of social relations, while Chinese culture also places the human being within the family, the state, and the world; both oppose viewing the human being as an isolated individual.” [56]56 Xi Jinping, speech at the symposium on cultural heritage and development, June 2, 2023. From this perspective, the moral view in fine traditional Chinese culture is highly compatible with the value propositions of scientific socialism in terms of value concepts. Specifically, at the level of individual moral development goals, the unity of cognition, emotion, and will is compatible with the free and comprehensive development of the individual; at the level of social morality, the principles of delighting in community and valuing harmony are compatible with the value principle embodied in “developing one’s true nature in society”; [57]57 Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, in *Marx & Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975), p. 298. and at the level of political morality, taking the world as one’s own responsibility is compatible with the value logic of seeking emancipation for humanity.

中华优秀传统文化生成与发展的所有制形式属于马克思所论述的亚细亚形式，其中“单个人对公社来说不是独立的”。中华优秀传统文化尽管在不同时期形成了不同流派的道德观，但经济基础决定了其主导道德观必然蕴含着集体道德、社会道德对个体道德的统摄与规约。科学社会主义建立在批判资本主义的基础上，其中蕴含着对宗教伪道德、金钱主义、个人主义、功利主义的道德批判，其道德观的最终指向也是价值理念向集体与社会的“复归”。正如习近平总书记所言，“马克思主义从社会关系的角度把握人的本质，中华文化也把人安放在家国天下之中，都反对把人看作孤立的个体”。从这个角度看，中华优秀传统文化中的道德观同科学社会主义价值观主张在价值理念上高度契合。具体而言，在个体道德发展目标层面知情意统一与人的自由全面发展契合，在社会道德层面乐群尚和与“在社会中发展自己的真正的天性”体现的价值原则契合，在政治道德层面天下己任与为人类求解放体现的价值逻辑契合。

Source: *Research on New Era New Thought*, November 12, 2024

文章来源：《新时代新思想研究》2024年11月12日

Online editor: Jing Mu

网络编辑：静穆