The “Tianxia View” and the Traditional Legal Cultural Origins of the Sense of Community for the Chinese Nation

The Qing Confucian Gu Yanwu, in his *Record of Daily Knowledge* (*Rizhi lu*), put forward the distinction between “the fall of the state” and “the fall of the world” (*tianxia*), which has become a cultural memory passed down through generations of Chinese: “There is the fall of the state, and there is the fall of the world. How do we distinguish the fall of the state from the fall of the world? The answer: when the ruling house changes its surname and title, that is called the fall of the state. When ‘benevolence and righteousness are blocked up,’ to the point that ‘men are driven to eat one another, and people will devour each other,’ that is called the fall of the world. … Therefore, only after knowing how to preserve the world can one know how to preserve the state. Preserving the state is the business of its ruler and ministers—‘those who eat meat scheme for it.’ Preserving the world is a responsibility that falls even upon the lowliest commoner.”

清儒顾炎武在《日知录》中提出的“亡国亡天下”之说已成为中国人世代相传的民族文化记忆：“有亡国，有亡天下。亡国与亡天下奚辨？曰：易姓改号，谓之亡国。‘仁义充塞’，而至于‘率兽食人，人将相食’，谓之亡天下。……是故知保天下，然后知保国。保国者，其君其臣，‘肉食者谋之’。保天下者，匹夫之贱，与有责焉耳矣。”

Since the Western Zhou, China’s legal order has taken not the “state” (*guo*) but the “world” (*tianxia*) as its highest political unit. The supreme ruler of the Western Zhou was called the “Son of Heaven” (*tianzi*). In Chinese, “world” is at once a geographical concept, referring to the world as the ancients could imagine it; a political-legal concept, referring to the vast territory the Son of Heaven could rule; and a cultural and ethical concept, referring to a moral-ethical order that human effort could pursue and sustain. Gu Yanwu’s phrase “people will devour each other, that is called the fall of the world” describes the great disorder at the end of the Wei dynasty, when the people had no means to live. But here, “world” is a civilizational order larger than the “state” and bearing more ethical meaning. The “world” belongs exclusively neither to a single-surname dynasty nor to any ethnic group in the modern sense, but to all living people on the earth.

自西周以来，中国的法律秩序就不是以“国”而是以“天下”为最高的政治单位。西周的最高统治者称为“天子”。“天下”在汉语中既是一个地理概念，指的是先民所能想象的世界；又是一个政治法律概念，指的是天子所能统治的广大领域；还是一个文化和伦理的概念，指的是一种人力可以追求和维系的道德伦理秩序。顾炎武所说的“人将相食，谓之亡天下”，描述的是魏末大乱、民不聊生的状况，但在这里，“天下”是一个比“国”更大也承载着更多伦理含义的文明秩序。“天下”不专属于一姓之王朝，也不专属于现代意义的哪一个族群，而是属于所有生活在大地上的生民。

Unlike the Western legal tradition, traditional China from the Western Zhou straight through to the end of the Qing never had a clear concept of the nation-state, nor did it explicitly put forward concepts of race or ethnicity in the modern sense. “Family” (*jia*), “state” (*guo*), and “world” (*tianxia*) were the basic categories of the legal order in traditional China. The design of law was mainly to maintain the ritual order within the clan; the “state” was an enlarged “family,” and the “world” was the ultimate concern and the basis of legitimacy in the traditional Chinese legal order. “The Chinese worldview, that is, the theory of *tianxia*, is the only theory that has considered the legitimacy of world order and world institutions, because only the Chinese worldview possesses the analytical perspective of ‘world’ at a level higher/larger than the ‘state.’” [1]1 Liang Qichao (1873–1929) was a late Qing reformer, scholar, and journalist. The Gongyang theory of the Three Ages (据乱世, 升平世, 太平世) is a cyclical view of historical progress derived from the Gongyang Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals, a text associated with the New Text school of Confucianism.

不同于西方法律传统的是，传统中国从西周直迄清末一直没有明确的民族国家概念，也没有明确提出现代意义的种族与民族概念。“家”“国”“天下”是传统中国法律秩序中的基本范畴，法律的设计主要是为了维系家族内部的礼治秩序，“国”是一个放大了的“家”， “天下”则是传统中国法律秩序中的终极关怀和合法性基础。“中国的世界观，即天下理论，是惟一考虑到了世界秩序和世界制度的合法性的理论，因为只有中国的世界观拥有‘天下’这个级别上高于/大于‘国家’的分析角度。”

The “view of the world” (*tianxia guan*), which originated in the pre-Qin period, is one of the core concepts in traditional Chinese legal culture. From its very inception, it defined the distinction between the two large groups of “Hua” (Chinese) and “Yi” (barbarians) primarily as a cultural difference, rather than a difference in geographical space or physiological traits. “Hua” and “Yi” could transform into each other, just as Han Yu’s *Inquiry into the Way* (*Yuan Dao*) states: “When Confucius wrote the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, if the feudal lords used barbarian rites, he treated them as barbarians; if they advanced into Chinese ways, he treated them as Chinese.” This transformation was bidirectional, not a one-way process of sinicization from “Yi” to “Hua.” The “view of the world” differs from the concept of empire in Western political-legal theory; it is the traditional legal cultural origin from which the sense of community for the Chinese nation germinated.

起于先秦的“天下观”是中国传统法文化中的核心概念之一，从其发端之初，就将“华”“夷”两大人群的区分主要界定为文化的差异，而非地理空间或生理特性上的差异。“华”和“夷”是可以相互转化的，正如韩愈《原道》所言：“孔子之作《春秋》也，诸侯用夷礼，则夷之；进于中国，则中国之。”这种转化是双向的，而非单向的“夷”向“华”的汉化过程。“天下观”不同于西方法政学说中的帝国概念，它是中华民族共同体意识得以萌发的传统法文化渊源。

I. Analysis of the “View of the World”

一、“天下观”辨析

(A) Tracing the Origins of the “View of the World”

（一）“天下观”溯源

Ancient Chinese political thought, whether in the feudal period or the autocratic period, and whatever its content, invariably took the “world” as its object of discussion. The concept of “world” is rich in meaning; it is one of the most comprehensive and expressive concepts in the ancient Chinese intellectual world, and it profoundly shaped the Chinese worldview. The Chinese view of the cosmos and the view of human life were closely linked: humans were situated within the cosmos, time and space interpenetrated, and humans were connected to heaven and earth. The ancient Chinese had a most primitive and simple understanding of the relationship among heaven, earth, and humanity—namely, that the history of the human world and human society was the time and space in which humans and heaven and earth coexisted and passed through together, and that all movements of human society everywhere embodied the will of heaven and earth. This simple mode of thinking laid the foundation for the later Chinese concept of “world.” For the ancient Chinese, “heaven” (*tian*) was not an abstract concept but a concrete existence. “Heaven” was the ancients’ imagination of the world, arising from their experience of standing on the earth and sharing a common existential situation with all things. The term “world” (*tianxia*) should have formally appeared in the early Zhou; in the *Book of Documents* (*Shangshu*), the chapter “Announcement of the Duke of Shao” (*Shao gao*) contains the phrase “used throughout the world, to manifest the king’s virtue.” But in ancient Chinese texts, the scope of “world” was understood sometimes as broad, sometimes as narrow. The geographical scope and size of “world” was sometimes understood as “under the vault of heaven,” sometimes as equivalent to “within the four seas,” and sometimes as limited to “the Central States” (*Zhongguo*). [2]2 The “loose-rein policy” (羁縻政策) was a system used by Chinese dynasties to administer frontier regions and non-Han peoples through indirect rule, granting local chieftains autonomy in exchange for nominal submission. This division of “world” by geography or orientation into the “Nine Provinces” and “beyond the Nine Provinces, within the four seas,” or into “the Central States” and the “four barbarians” (*siyi*), did not affect the unique “view of the world” of ancient China. “World” had no borders and no boundaries. “World” was composed of the “Central States” at the center, which “governed by means of the laws and standards of the *Odes*, *Documents*, rites, and music” (*Records of the Grand Historian*, “Basic Annals of Qin”), and the “four barbarians”—the Man, Yi, Rong, and Di peoples on the periphery, whose “food, drink, and clothing were not the same as those of the Hua” (*Zuo Commentary*, Duke Xiang, 14th year). The Chinese “view of the world” has a long history; a simple prototype was already gestating in the Xia and Shang dynasties, and it gradually matured through the Western Zhou and Spring and Autumn periods until the Warring States period. A “world system” interwoven with geography, hierarchy, and culture remained largely unchanged for a thousand years: whether the “Central States” or the surrounding ethnic groups, all belonged to the same “world.” This “view of the world” emphasized the organic order of the unity of heaven and humanity, shed a purely blood-based consciousness, and led the ancient Chinese to form a worldview that took culture as the main standard for civilizing and regulating the natural world, including the Man, Yi, Rong, and Di.

中国古代的政治思想，无论是在封建时期还是专制时期，也无论其内容如何，无不以“天下”为论说对象。“天下”观念意蕴丰富，是中国古代思想世界中最具概括力和表现力的观念之一，它深刻塑造了中国人的世界观。中国人的宇宙观和人生观密切相连，人在宇宙之间，时间与空间相通，人与天、地相连。远古时代的中国人对于天、地、人之间的关系就有一个最原始、最朴素的理解，即认为人类世界和人类社会的历史都是人类与天、地共存共度的时间和空间，人类社会的一切运动处处体现了天、地的意志。这一素朴的思维，奠定了日后中国之“天下”思想的基础。对于古代中国人来说，“天”并不是一个抽象的概念，而是一个切实的存在。“天”是先民源于站立在大地上时对自身与万物所共有的生存境域而产生的对于世界的想象。“天下”一词应是在周初正式出现，《尚书·召诰》中就有“用于天下，越王显”，但在中国古代文献中对“天下”范围的理解时大时小。对“天下”地理范围和大小的理解时而指“天穹之下”，时而等同于“四海之内”，时而又限定于“中国”。这种以地理或方位将“天下”划分为“九州”与“九州之外，四海之内”或“中国”与“四夷”的地理方位，均不影响古代中国特有的“天下观”。“天下”没有边，也没有界限。“天下”是由以“诗书礼乐法度为政”（《史记·秦本纪》）的居于中央的“中国”与“饮食衣服，不与华同” （《左传·襄公十四年》）处于四周的蛮、夷、戎、狄这“四夷”共同组成的。中国人的“天下观”源远流长，在夏、商之时就孕育出了朴素的原型，经历西周、春秋，直到战国逐步成熟。一个地理、层次与文化交织的“天下体系”历经千年而未有大变，无论“中国”还是周边民族集团，皆同属一个“天下”。这种“天下观”强调天人一体的有机秩序，摆脱了单纯的血缘意识，使古代中国人形成了一种以文化为主要标准，对包括蛮、夷、戎、狄在内的自然世界进行文明规制的世界观。

(B) “Central States,” “Five Zones of Service,” “Family-State-World,” and “World”

（二）“中国”“五服”“家国天下”与“天下”

The so-called “China” (中国) means “the center of the state” (国之中) and is a concept corresponding to the “barbarian” (夷狄). Based on the “tianxia” worldview formed by China’s relatively enclosed geographical location, Chinese scholar-officials from the very beginning took it for granted that “China” was the state geographically situated at the center of “all under heaven” (天下), hence its name “China.” The view that “China” is the center of “all under heaven” appears explicitly in the “Discourse on China” (《中国论》) by the Song-dynasty Neo-Confucian Shi Jie: “Heaven dwells above, Earth dwells below; that which dwells in the center of Heaven and Earth is called China, that which dwells at the periphery of Heaven and Earth is called the Four Barbarians. The Four Barbarians are outside, China is inside.” From a geographical perspective, “China” is contained within “all under heaven” and refers precisely to the center of “all under heaven”—the Central Plains region nurtured by the Yellow River basin, mainly referring to the various Xia states (诸夏列邦). The surrounding areas outside “China” are the so-called “Four Barbarians” (四夷). According to Professor Yao Dali’s view, the concept of “China” has continuously developed and changed, carrying different connotations in different historical periods. Modern China emphasizes a nation-state, whereas in ancient times “China” more often referred to a geographical concept. Through the recognition and emphasis on this central geographical position, ancient China formed its own distinctive “tianxia” worldview. This “tianxia” concept encompasses both a geographical-spatial notion and the idea of the centrality of Huaxia civilization. The “Five Zones” (五服) thought, originating from the system of service obligations, is an imaginary construct of the order between the civilized (夷夏) under the “tianxia” worldview. Regarding the “Five Zones,” the “Discourses of the States: Zhou Discourses” (《国语·周语》) records: “The system of the former kings: within the state is the Domain of Tribute (甸服), outside the state is the Domain of Lords (侯服). The domains of the Marquis and the Guardian are the Domain of Guests (宾服), the domains of the Man and Yi barbarians are the Domain of Restraint (要服), and the domains of the Rong and Di barbarians are the Domain of Wilderness (荒服).” The “Tribute of Yu” chapter of the “Book of Documents” (《尚书·禹贡》) also records: “Five hundred li [n] [3]3 The “four yi” (四夷) is a traditional Chinese term for the non-Han peoples on the four borders: the eastern yi (夷), southern man (蛮), western rong (戎), and northern di (狄). is the Domain of Tribute: within the first hundred li, they bring the whole stalk as tribute; within the second hundred li, they bring the ears; within the third hundred li, they bring the straw; within the fourth hundred li, they bring the husked grain; within the fifth hundred li, they bring the unhusked grain. Five hundred li is the Domain of Lords: within the first hundred li, they bring the produce of the fields; within the second hundred li, they perform the service of the male; within the third hundred li, they perform the service of the feudal lords. Five hundred li is the Domain of Pacification (绥服): within the first three hundred li, they cultivate the arts of civil instruction; within the remaining two hundred li, they display the martial defense. Five hundred li is the Domain of Restraint: within the first three hundred li, they are the Yi barbarians; within the remaining two hundred li, they are the Cai criminals. Five hundred li is the Domain of Wilderness: within the first three hundred li, they are the Man barbarians; within the remaining two hundred li, they are the exiles.” The above records illustrate that in the Eastern Zhou period, with the area around Luoyang where the “king” resided as the center, a “回”-shaped expanse of five thousand li in circumference was formed, extending outward in increments of five hundred li. This was the ancient Chinese spatial imagination of “all under heaven” or the world, extending from the center to the periphery. In the eyes of ancient Chinese, the inner “three zones” within the “Five Zones” belonged to Huaxia civilization, while the “Domain of Restraint” and the “Domain of Wilderness” were areas inhabited by minority ethnic groups such as the Man, Yi, Rong, and Di. Beyond reality, the ancient Chinese always held that the cosmos was structured as “round heaven and square earth” (天圆地方). The “Five Zones” were an ancient Chinese imaginary construct of the square earth, a division of the “all under heaven” pattern based on blood ties or political factors. This imagined pattern placed the Chinese themselves at the center of “all under heaven,” and the Huaxia civilization they represented was naturally culturally central, while the barbarians were only at the periphery of “China” and occupied a very small geographical space. Naturally, in the eyes of the ancient Chinese, the culture they represented was not comparable to Huaxia civilization.

所谓“中国”，就是“国之中”，是一个与夷狄相对应的概念。基于“中国”相对封闭的地理位置所形成的“天下观”，中国士大夫们一开始就理所当然地认为“中国”就是在地理位置上处于“天下”之中的国家，故得名“中国”。“中国”是“天下”的中心，这一观点明确地出现在宋代理学家石介的《中国论》中：“天处乎上，地处乎下，居天地之中者曰中国，居天地之偏者曰四夷。四夷外也，中国内也。”从地理概念上看，“中国”包含于“天下”之中，指的正是“天下”的中心，是孕育于黄河流域的中原地区，主要指诸夏列邦。而 “中国”之外的四周，即所谓的“四夷”。据姚大力教授的观点，“中国”这一概念是不断发展变化的，在不同的历史时期具有不一样的内涵。现代中国强调的是一个国家，而在古代“中国”更多指向一种地理概念，通过对这一地理中心位置的认识和强调，古代中国形成了自己特有的“天下观”。这种“天下”观念，既包涵一种地理空间概念，也有华夏文明中心观念。起源于服事制度的“五服”思想就是对“天下观”之下夷夏秩序的一种想象。关于“五服”，《国语·周语》有记载：“夫先王之制：邦内甸服，邦外侯服。侯、卫宾服，蛮夷要服，戎狄荒服。”《尚书·禹贡》里也记载：“五百里甸服:百里赋纳总，二百里纳铚，三百里纳秸服，四百里粟，五百里米。五百里侯服:百里采，二百里男邦，三百里诸侯。五百里绥服:三百里揆文教，二百里奋武卫。五百里要服:三百里夷，二百里蔡。五百里荒服:三百里蛮，二百里流。”上述记载说明了东周时期以“王”所在的洛阳一带为中心，以五百里依次向外构成一个“回”字型方圆五千里的大地，这就是古代中国人对“天下”或世界从中心向四周边缘延伸的空间想象。在古代中国人眼中，“五服”之中的内“三服”属于华夏文明，而“要服”和“荒服”则是蛮、夷、戎、狄这些少数民族居住的地区。古代中国人于现实之外，始终抱持着宇宙是“天圆地方”的构造，“五服”就是古代中国对方形大地存在的一种想象，是古人基于血缘或政治因素对“天下”格局所作的划分。这种格局划分想象中国人自己居于“天下”的中心，所代表的华夏文明也当然在文化上处于中心地位，而蛮夷只在“中国”的四周，且所占地理空间很小，当然在古代中国人眼中，他们所代表的文化也不足与华夏文明同日而语。

“Family-state-all under heaven” (家国天下), as a fixed Chinese expression, in the context of Chinese civilization signifies the universal and expansive realm of “all within the four seas are one family” (四海之内天下一家). This is a Chinese-style political time-space, as well as a transcendent and lofty ideal sentiment. In ancient China, a natural economy based on agriculture long dominated, and this agricultural economic unit was extremely simple—so simple that it required only the family as an economic unit. The family was a microcosm of ancient Chinese culture, extending from the governance of the family to the governance of the state. The family is the foundation of the state, and the order and principles of the state are amplifications of the order and principles of the clan. Emphasizing the family, blood ties, and ethics are inherent characteristics of Chinese culture. “To govern the state, one must first regulate the family” (欲治其国,先齐其家) from the “Great Learning” chapter of the “Book of Rites” (《礼记·大学》) is a basic Confucian principle that runs through ancient China. The isomorphism of family and state (家国同构) in ancient China meant governing the state in the manner of managing a family, transforming the ethical order “ritual” (礼) into the state order, thereby initiating the tradition of ethical politics and benevolent governance. In the ancient conception, there was no clear boundary between family and state. The isomorphism of family and state and the unity of ritual and law (礼法合一) constitute the cultural pattern in which we have been situated for thousands of years, fundamentally determining the fate of our nation and its various political institutional arrangements. They are the entry point for exploring traditional Chinese legal culture. Throughout ancient Chinese history, there were almost no purely public relations in China’s legal and political spheres. The human ties of the patriarchal clan were closely intertwined with and permeated the state’s political system and even its legal structure. Ancient China entered class society along the path from family to state, and patriarchal blood relations profoundly influenced society and the state. Patriarchy and politics were highly integrated; ritual was incorporated into law, and ritual and law were unified, thus forming the unique tradition of the isomorphism of family and state, the unity of kinship and nobility, and the unity of ritual and law. This directly influenced the subsequent construction of the concept of legal order. This unique tradition of the isomorphism of family and state further reinforced the ancient Chinese “tianxia” worldview. “Family,” “state,” and “all under heaven,” viewed from different perspectives, appear different but are in fact an integrated whole. “Family” refers to the blood-based patriarchal clan, “state” is the political sphere, and “all under heaven” is the civilizational community. “All under heaven” is composed of many “states” of the various Xia and barbarians; “state” is composed of many “families”; and “China” occupies the center. Since the Qin and Han dynasties, “China” was no longer merely a geographical concept but acquired the connotation of a nation-state, emphasizing the entire territory under the direct ruling power of the central dynasty. This formed a differential pattern (差序格局) centered on “China,” which could be extended to every corner, with the king having no outside, and thus “all under heaven is one family” (天下一家).

“家国天下”作为一个固定的汉语表达，在中国文明语境下意涵四海之内天下一家的普世寥廓意境。这是一种中国式政治时空，也是一种超迈的理想情怀。古代中国以农为本的自然经济长期占主导地位，而这种以农业为主的经济单位非常简单，简单到只需要家庭这一个经济单位。家庭是古代中国文化的一个浓缩，从治理家庭延伸到治理国家。家是国的基础，国家的秩序和原则就是家族秩序和原则的放大。重家族、重血缘、重伦理,是中国文化的固有特征,“欲治其国,先齐其家”（《礼记·大学》），这一儒家的基本理论贯穿古代中国。古代中国的家国同构,是以管理家庭的方式进行国家治理，将伦理秩序“礼”化为国家秩序,从而开启了伦理政治、仁政传统。在古人的观念里面，家与国没有明显的界限。家国同构、礼法合一是我们数千年来置身其中的文化格局，从根本上决定着我们民族及其各项政治制度安排的命运，是探究中国传统法律文化的入口。纵观中国古代历史，在中国的法律和政治领域几乎不存在纯粹的公共关系，宗法家族的人情纽带与国家的政治体系乃至法律结构紧密相连，彼此交织渗透。中国古代沿着由家而国的途径进入阶级社会，宗法血缘关系深刻地影响着社会和国家，宗法与政治高度结合，以礼入法，礼法合一，从而形成了家国同构、亲贵合一、礼法一体的特有传统，也直接影响着日后法律秩序观的构建。这种家国同构的特有传统，更加强化了古代中国的“天下观”。“家”“国”“天下”三者基于不同的视角，看似不同，实则浑然一体。“家”乃血缘宗法家族，“国”为政治场域，“天下”为文明共同体。“天下”由诸夏与蛮夷诸多的“国”组成，“国”由众多的“家”组成，“中国”居于中心。自秦汉以后，“中国”不再只是一个地理概念，而是拥有了国家的内涵，强调中央王朝直接统治权力所及的全部版图。这样就形成了一个以“中国”为中心的差序格局，可以推广到每一个角落，王者无外，进而“天下一家”。

II. The “Tianxia” Worldview and the Origins of the Sense of Community for the Chinese Nation

二、“天下观”与中华民族共同体意识的发端

(I) The “Great Unity” (大一统) under the “Tianxia” Worldview and the Sense of Community for the Chinese Nation It Contains

（一）“天下观”之下的“大一统”所蕴含的中华民族共同体意识

The “tianxia” (all under heaven) in the ancient Chinese “tianxia concept” is not only a geographical concept but, more importantly, a supreme ideal of cultural supremacy. Understood in this sense, the space of “tianxia” in ancient China was not a stable geographical location but an order of graded distinctions between inner and outer that was in elastic flux; there were only relative inner and outer, no absolute friend and foe. Hence “tianxia” was universal and absolute, while the yi and di (non-Chinese barbarians) were historical and relative. This conception can be glimpsed from Liang Qichao’s account of the Gongyang theory of the Three Ages: “First, the ‘Age of Disorder’: ‘make the state inner and the various Xia outer’; second, the ‘Age of Rising Peace’: ‘make the various Xia inner and the yi and di outer’; third, the ‘Age of Great Peace’: ‘all under heaven, far and near, great and small, become one; the yi and di advance to the rank of nobles’.” [1]1 Liang Qichao (1873–1929) was a late Qing reformer, scholar, and journalist. The Gongyang theory of the Three Ages (据乱世, 升平世, 太平世) is a cyclical view of historical progress derived from the Gongyang Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals, a text associated with the New Text school of Confucianism. In the long course of history, the Huaxia people of the Central Plains had no absolute racial boundary; the so-called “tianxia” was a continuous process of transforming the barbarians with Xia culture and converting barbarians into Xia. Looking across China’s successive dynasties, all regarded the surrounding ethnic groups as an inseparable part of “tianxia.” Almost every dynasty implemented a “loose-rein policy” (羁縻政策), [2]2 The “loose-rein policy” (羁縻政策) was a system used by Chinese dynasties to administer frontier regions and non-Han peoples through indirect rule, granting local chieftains autonomy in exchange for nominal submission. welcoming surrounding ethnic groups to “sinicize” through political, economic, and cultural exchanges. Based on the “tianxia” thought, the ancient Chinese people did not define “ethnic groups” solely by blood, race, or territory, but placed greater emphasis on customs, modes of production, and the forms of civilization—represented by modes of action and values—formed on that basis. On the other hand, we also see the historical fact of the coexistence of different ethnic groups within the territory of ancient China. Ancient China was a multi-stranded China, comprehensible from different dimensions: there was a China of Han civilization centered on the Central Plains, and there were also Chinas of the minority peoples dwelling on the grasslands, in forests, and on plateaus. These different ethnic groups together constituted the rich history of ancient China. How could “tianxia,” which included both the Huaxia and the “four yi” (四夷), [3]3 The “four yi” (四夷) is a traditional Chinese term for the non-Han peoples on the four borders: the eastern yi (夷), southern man (蛮), western rong (戎), and northern di (狄). move from “distinguishing Hua from yi” (华夷之辨) to “Hua and yi as one” (华夷一体)? How could the surrounding “yi and di” be incorporated into the Huaxia political system? How could the “tianxia concept,” which contained a “center-periphery” structure for imagining world space, become the guiding principle for realizing political order and political ideals? During the Warring States period, when Mencius was asked “How can tianxia be settled?” he replied, “It will be settled through unification” (定于一). (Mencius, King Hui of Liang) [4]4 This passage is from the Mencius, a classic Confucian text. The phrase “定于一” (settled through unification) expresses the idea that political order requires unity under a single ruler. The Gongyang Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals, First Year of Duke Yin: “What is the ‘first year’? It is the first year of the ruler’s reign. What is ‘spring’? It is the beginning of the year. Whom does ‘the king’ refer to? It refers to King Wen. Why is ‘king’ spoken before ‘the first month’? It is the king’s first month. Why speak of the king’s first month? It is the Great Unity (大一统).” [5]5 The Gongyang Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals (春秋公羊传) is a Confucian classic that interprets the Spring and Autumn Annals. The term “大一统” (Great Unity) here refers to the political and cultural ideal of unification under a single legitimate sovereign. The Gongyang Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals was the first to propose the idea of “Great Unity”; later, the Explanations and Commentaries on the Gongyang Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals also proposed that “all under heaven, great and small, become one,” so that “within the four seas, all are brothers.”

古代中国人的“天下观”中的“天下”不仅是一个地理概念，更是一个文化至上的最高理想。从这个意义上理解，古代中国“天下”空间不是一个稳定的地理方位，而是处于弹性变化之中内外有别的秩序，只有相对的内外，没有绝对的敌我，所以“天下”是普世的、绝对的，夷狄却是历史的、相对的。这种观念从梁启超对公羊三世说的叙述中便可略知一二：“第一‘据乱世’，‘内其国而外诸夏’；第二‘升平世’，‘内诸夏而外夷狄’；第三‘太平世’，‘天下远近大小若一，夷狄进至于爵’。”在漫长的历史长河中，中原的华夏民族没有绝对的种族界限，所谓的“天下”，是一个不断以夏变夷、化夷为夏的过程。纵观中国历代王朝，都将周边民族视为“天下”不可分割的一部分。几乎每个王朝都实行“羁縻政策”，通过政治、经济和文化的交流，欢迎周边民族“中国化”。中国先民们基于“天下”思想，对于“民族”的认识不是仅以血缘、种族、地域来划分，而是更注重生活习惯、生产方式以及在此基础上形成的以行动方式、价值观为代表的文明方式。从另一方面，我们也看到了古代中国疆域内不同民族共存的历史事实。古代中国是一个复线的中国，可以从不同维度进行理解：既有以中原为中心的汉族文明的中国，也有身处草原、森林和高原等地的少数民族的中国。这些不同的民族共同构成了古代中国丰富的历史。包括华夏与“四夷”在内的“天下”，如何能够从“华夷之辨”到“华夷一体”？如何把周边“夷狄”纳入华夏政治体系之下？如何使包含“中心—边缘”结构对于世界空间想象的“天下观”成为实现政治秩序和政治理想的纲领？战国时期，孟子面对“天下恶乎定”的提问，就对曰“定于一”。（《孟子·梁惠王》）《春秋公羊传·隐公元年》：“元年者何？君之始年也。春者何？岁之始也。王者孰谓？谓文王也。曷为先言王而后言正月？王正月也。何言乎王正月？大一统也。”《春秋公羊传》最早提出“大一统”思想，后《春秋公羊经传解诂》也提出“天下小大若一”，如此则“四海之内，皆兄弟也”。

As the philosophical foundation of ancient Chinese political culture, the “tianxia concept” emphasized a universal ideal that transcended territory and blood ties, advocating a global unity of culture and morality. In this conception, “tianxia” was not merely a political territorial unit but, more importantly, a moral and cultural unity. This idealistic perspective provided the philosophical and moral basis for the idea of unification in Chinese history, leading rulers to pursue higher integration and cultural assimilation in actual political practice. Complementing this, the idea of “Great Unity” placed greater emphasis on the path of political and administrative realization. “Great Unity” not only inherited the cultural and moral goals of the “tianxia concept” but also transformed this cultural ideal into reality through concrete political actions, such as territorial unification, legal unification, and political centralization. Under the political framework of “Great Unity,” the system of centralized power was regarded as a necessary means to maintain the stability and harmony of “tianxia,” while unified legal and administrative systems ensured effective governance from the center to the localities. Through this dual mechanism—the unifying perspective of morality and culture on the one hand, and the concrete implementation of politics and administration on the other—the “tianxia concept” and “Great Unity” together constructed a distinctive Chinese political-cultural tradition. This tradition not only promoted integration among various ethnic groups within the country but also provided a solid theoretical and practical foundation for the long-term stability and development of ancient Chinese empires.

“天下观”作为中国古代的政治文化哲学基础，强调了一种超越地域和血缘的普遍性理想，倡导文化和道德上的全球一体性。在这一观念中，“天下”不仅仅是一个政治的领土单位，更是一个道德和文化的统一体。这种理想主义的视角，为中国历史上的统一思想提供了哲学和道德基础，使得统治者在实际政治实践中追求更高的整合与文化同化。与之相辅相成的“大一统”思想，则更侧重于政治和行政的实现路径。“大一统”不仅继承了“天下观”的文化与道德目标，也通过实际的政治行动，如地域统一、法律统一和政治中央集权，将这一文化理想转化为现实。在“大一统”的政治框架下，中央集权制度被视为维护“天下”稳定与和谐的必要手段，而统一的法律和行政体制则确保了从中央到地方的有效治理。通过这样的双重机制——道德和文化的统一视角与政治和行政的具体实施，“天下观”与“大一统”共同构筑了中国特有的政治文化传统。这种传统不仅促进了国内各族群之间的融合，也为中国古代帝国的长期稳定和发展提供了坚实的理论和实践基础。

The idea of “Great Unity,” formed on the basis of the “tianxia concept” and encompassing the unification of politics, culture, territory, and ethnicity, played an extremely important role in the formation of China’s ancient multi-ethnic unified state. “Great Unity” advocated the ideal of “the king has no outer” (王者无外), [6]6 “The king has no outer” (王者无外) is a classical expression meaning that the king’s realm and authority encompass all, with no outside or excluded peoples. incorporating the “various Xia” and the “yi and di” into a dynamic framework of evolution, breaking through the racial boundaries defined by “distinguishing Hua from yi.” It was not only an ideological form but also a concrete political practice. Through the Shang Yang Reforms, [7]7 The Shang Yang Reforms (c. 356–338 BCE) were a series of legalist policies implemented in the state of Qin, including centralization, agricultural development, and military meritocracy, which laid the foundation for Qin’s eventual unification of China. the state of Qin, located on the periphery, achieved national wealth and military strength. In 221 BCE, Qin unified the six states. Qin Shi Huang unified currency and weights and measures, achieved standardized axle widths and written script, implemented the system of commanderies and counties, and established a “Great Unity” feudal dynasty. From the moment of its formation, China’s first centralized “Great Unity” dynasty was not limited to the Huaxia but also incorporated the minority peoples surrounding the Huaxia. The concept of “Great Unity,” formed on the basis of the deeply rooted “tianxia concept” in people’s minds, diluted the “distinction between Hua and yi,” ensured the realization of the political system of “Hua and yi as one,” laid the foundation for successive dynasties to adopt a multi-ethnic state model, and became the ideological source of the “common” (共同) meaning of the later sense of community for the Chinese nation. Premised on the “tianxia concept,” successive dynasties took “the unity of tianxia” as their responsibility and, through institutional design, strove to transform the four quarters with virtue, realizing the ideal situation of “harmonizing all states” (协和万邦). [8]8 “Harmonizing all states” (协和万邦) is a phrase from the Classic of History (尚书), expressing the ideal of peaceful relations among all polities under heaven. This concept was not only reflected in the political system but also profoundly influenced the ethnic composition and evolutionary process of the Chinese nation. In Chinese history, no single ethnic group had a pure composition; all continuously developed by absorbing other ethnic groups in the process of mutual integration. This developmental view of a multi-ethnic community runs through Chinese history, as Liang Qichao clearly pointed out: “The present-day Chinese nation (中华民族) is what is commonly called the Han ethnic group,” but he also demonstrated with facts that the various ethnic groups outside the Huaxia in the pre-Qin period ultimately mostly merged into the Huaxia, thereby proving that the Chinese nation “from the beginning was not a single ethnic group, but was actually formed by the mixing of many ethnic groups.”

在“天下观”基础上形成的涵盖政治、文化、疆域和民族一统的“大一统”思想，对中国自古多民族统一国家的形成发挥了极为重要的作用。“大一统”倡导“王者无外”的理想，将“诸夏”与“夷狄”纳入动态演变的框架，突破了“华夷之辨”所限定的种族界限，不仅是一种思想形态，更是一种具体的政治实践。通过商鞅变法，地处边缘地带的秦国实现了富国强兵。公元前221年，秦统一六国。秦始皇统一货币和度量衡，实现了车同轨、书同文，实行郡县制，建立了“大一统”的封建王朝。中国历史上首个中央集权的“大一统”王朝自它形成之日起，就不仅仅局限于华夏，而是将华夏周边的少数民族也纳入其范围。基于人们头脑中根深蒂固的“天下观”而形成的“大一统”理念淡化了“华夷之辨”，确保了“华夷一体”的政治制度的实现，为历代王朝采用多民族国家模式奠定了基础，成为日后中华民族共同体意识之“共同”意蕴的思想渊源。以“天下观”为前提，历代王朝以“天下一统”为责任，通过制度设计，努力以德感化四方，实现协和万邦的理想局面。这种理念不仅体现在政治制度上，也深刻影响了中华民族的民族构成和演变过程。在中国历史上，没有哪一个民族是成分单一的，都是在各民族相互交融过程中吸收其他民族而不断发展起来的。这种多民族共同体的发展观贯穿中国历史，正如梁启超明确指出“今之中华民族，即普通俗称所谓汉族者”，但同时又以事实进行论证，说明先秦时华夏族之外的各个民族，最终大都融入华夏族，从而证明中华民族“自始本非一族，实由多数民族混合而成”。

(II) The Fluidity of the “Distinction between Hua and Yi” Laid the Foundation for the Formation of the Sense of Community for the Chinese Nation

（二）“华夷之辨”的流动性奠定了中华民族共同体意识的形成

Due to the relatively closed geographical environment of ancient China, accompanied by a small-peasant economic structure, a unique cultural system was spawned, namely the so-called “distinction between Hua and yi.” In ancient times, “China” was called “Huaxia,” and “Huaxia” was the center of “tianxia”; Huaxia civilization was the highest form of civilization under heaven. Corresponding to “Huaxia” were the “yi and di.” The “Royal Regulations” chapter of the Book of Rites states: “The people of China and the yi and di, the five directions, each have their own nature, which cannot be altered. Those to the east are called yi; they wear their hair loose and tattoo their bodies, and some do not eat cooked food. Those to the south are called man; they tattoo their foreheads and have interlocking toes, and some do not eat cooked food. Those to the west are called rong; they wear their hair loose and dress in skins, and some do not eat grain. Those to the north are called di; they dress in feathers and furs and dwell in caves, and some do not eat grain.” The “four yi”—the eastern yi, western rong, southern man, and northern di—were clearly terms generated in correspondence to “China” or “Huaxia,” all referring to the surrounding ethnic groups and states scattered around the periphery of “Huaxia,” far from the center and located on the margins. The “distinction between Hua and yi,” inseparable from the “tianxia concept,” was one of the deeply rooted ideological concepts of traditional China. It originated in the late Western Zhou period, was established during the Spring and Autumn period, and thereafter persisted throughout China’s long historical process.

古代中国由于所处的地理环境相对封闭，以及与此相伴随的小农经济结构，催生了独特的文化体系，即所谓的“华夷之辨”。古代“中国”称为“华夏”，“华夏”即是“天下”的中心，华夏文明乃是普天之下最高的文明样式。与“华夏”对应的是“夷狄”。《礼记·王制篇》 曰:“中国夷狄,五方之民,皆有性也,不可推移。东方曰夷,被发文身, 有不火食者矣;南方曰蛮,雕题交趾,有不火食者矣;西方曰戎,被发衣皮,有不粒食者矣;北方曰狄,衣羽毛穴居,有不粒食者矣。”东夷、西戎、南蛮、北狄这“四夷”显然是相对应“中国”或“华夏”而产生的名词，均指散布围绕在“华夏”周边，远离中央、地处边缘的周边民族与国家。与“天下观”密不可分的“华夷之辨”是传统中国根深蒂固的思想观念之一，它源于西周末年，在春秋时期得到确立，此后便一直存在于中国漫长的历史进程中。

As an important proposition of Confucian doctrine, the “distinction between Hua and Yi” [9]9 “Hua” (华) and “Yi” (夷) are classical Chinese terms: “Hua” (also “Xia” 夏) refers to the culturally and politically dominant peoples of the Central Plains, while “Yi” (also “Di” 狄, “Rong” 戎, “Man” 蛮) refers to non-Chinese peoples on the periphery. The “distinction between Hua and Yi” (华夷之辨) is a core Confucian doctrine for defining cultural and political identity. was universally accepted in all dynasties of ancient Chinese society. So what is “Hua-Xia,” and what is “Yi-Di”? Although the pre-Qin Confucians held views such as “The Yi and Di with their rulers are not equal to the Xia without one” (The Analects, “Ba Yi”) [10]10 The Analects, “Ba Yi” (八佾), Chapter 5. The full passage reads: “The Yi and Di with their rulers are not equal to the Xia without one.” It expresses a hierarchy favoring the Chinese states. and “treat the Xia as internal and the Yi and Di as external,” Confucius also proposed that anyone who accepted the Zhou rites could become “Hua-Xia,” while those who did not accept the Zhou rites, even if they were originally “Hua-Xia,” could become “Yi-Di.” From this it can be seen that “all-under-heaven” (天下) was absolute, but Yi and Xia were relative. Although there were objective differences between Yi and Xia in terms of bloodline, ethnicity, territory, and customs, the most essential distinction lay in whether one accepted and observed the ritual order (礼教秩序). Confucianism took the cultural standard of “ritual” (礼) as the core of the “distinction between Hua and Yi.” As Mr. Qian Mu stated: “In ancient conceptions, there was another standard for distinguishing the Four Yi from the Xia, and this standard was not ‘bloodline’ but ‘culture.’” The Japanese scholar Miyazaki Ichisada, in his article “The Essence of Chinese Culture,” distinguished the “distinction between Hua and Yi” as follows: the presence or absence of “martiality” (武) cannot be decisive, but the presence or absence of “refinement” (文) can determine the difference between Hua and Yi. In other words, “refinement” exists only within “Hua,” and it is precisely because of “refinement” that “Hua” becomes “Hua.” The core of “refinement” lies in “ritual.” It was by the observance of ritual-music civilization that the boundary between Hua and Yi was judged. Hence Han Yu said: “When Confucius wrote the Spring and Autumn Annals, if a feudal lord used Yi rites, he treated him as Yi; if he advanced to the Central States, he treated him as Chinese.” [11]11 Han Yu (韩愈, 768–824), a leading Tang-dynasty Confucian scholar and official. The quotation is from his essay “On the Origin of the Way” (原道). Clarifying the origins and development of the “distinction between Hua and Yi,” it is not difficult to see that once a “Yi” person accepted the rites of Chinese culture, he was regarded as a “Hua-Xia” person. Conversely, someone originally “Hua-Xia” who abandoned his own cultural tradition could also be regarded as “Yi.” “Hua-Xia” and the “Four Yi” were entirely interchangeable; their identity attributes were not static but in a state of dynamic flux. The core of this change lay in “ritual.” “Hua-Xia” people confirmed the superiority of their own culture and recognized that the教化 (civilizing transformation) of the “Yi-Di” had to be accomplished through “virtue” (德) or “ritual.” The “Four Yi,” by acquiring “ritual” through后天 (acquired) learning, could fully become “Hua-Xia,” while at the same time, “Hua-Xia” who lost “virtue” or “ritual” would become “the Central States also become new Yi-Di” (Gongyang Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals, the 23rd year of Duke Zhao). [12]12 The Gongyang Commentary (春秋公羊传) is one of the three major commentaries on the Spring and Autumn Annals. The passage cited refers to the idea that Chinese states that abandon ritual and righteousness become barbarian. For this reason, the essence of the “distinction between Hua and Yi” was in fact a civilizational view of Hua and Yi. As the Japanese scholar Danjo Kan emphasized: “On the one hand, if the Yi-Di are assimilated by Chinese ritual and righteousness, they become Chinese subjects; on the other hand, even Chinese subjects, if they lose Chinese ritual and righteousness, are no different from the Yi-Di.” Moreover, successive dynasties strove to transform the thought of “great unity” (大一统) into objective reality, committing themselves to establishing a “great unity” dynasty that was politically unified, culturally unified, and ethnically unified. Against this historical background and social foundation, the “distinction between Hua and Yi” was, by the Qing dynasty, fully realized as “Hua-Yi integration” (华夷一体), transcending the traditional view of “Hua-Yi.” Virtue matching Heaven (以德配天) became the basis of ruling legitimacy, and this concept of ethnic “great unity” of “Hua-Yi as one family” (华夷一家) also became the core principle for handling ethnic relations in dynasties pursuing “great unity.” Later, modern concepts of the state, the nation, and the “Five Races Under One Union” (五族共和) [13]13 “Five Races Under One Union” (五族共和) was a founding principle of the Republic of China (1912), recognizing the five major ethnic groups—Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui (Muslim), and Tibetan—as equal components of a single republic. replaced Man, Yi, Rong, and Di, and up to the formation of the sense of community for the Chinese nation, the shadow of “Hua-Yi integration” can be found everywhere. This traditional thought of the “distinction between Hua and Yi” became the historical gene for the emergence of the sense of community for the Chinese nation.

作为儒家学说重要主张的“华夷之辨”，在中国古代社会的各个王朝中都得到了普遍的接受。那么，何为“华夏”，何为“夷狄”？尽管在先秦儒家心目中有“夷狄之有君，不如诸夏之亡”（《论语·八佾》）以及“内诸夏而外夷狄”的观点，但是孔子也提出了只要接受周礼,就可以变成“华夏”,不接受周礼的,即使是“华夏”也可以变为“夷狄”。由此可见， “天下”是绝对的，但夷夏却是相对的，尽管夷夏之间在血缘、种族、地域和风俗等方面有着客观的差异，但最本质的区分在于是否接受和遵守礼教秩序。儒家以“礼”这一文化标准作为“华夷之辨”的核心。正如钱穆先生所说：“在古代观念上，四夷与诸夏实在另有一个分别的标准，这个标准，不是‘血统’，而是‘文化’。”日本学者宫崎市定在《中国文化的本质》一文中如此区分“华夷之辨”：“武”的有无，不能决定。但“文”的有无，却可确定华与夷的区别。换言之，“文”只存在于“华”之中，正是由于有“文”，“华”才得以成为“华”。“文”的核心在于“礼”， 以礼乐文明的遵循来判断华夷之界分，故此韩愈才说:“孔子之作《春秋》也，诸侯用夷礼，则夷之;进于中国，则中国之。”厘清“华夷之辨”的来龙去脉，不难发现一旦接受了华夏文化之礼，“夷”人就会被当成“华夏”之人。反之，原来是“华夏”之人，因为放弃自己原来的文化传统，也会被看作“夷”。“华夏”与“四夷”是完全可以转换的，他们的身份属性不是静态的，而是处于一种动态的流动变化中。而变化的核心在于“礼”，“华夏”之人确认了自身文化的优越性，并认识到对于“夷狄”的教化要通过“德”或“礼”来完成。“四夷”通过后天的学习掌握了“礼”完全可以成为“华夏”，同时“华夏”由于“德”或“礼”的失去，则“中国亦新夷狄也”（《春秋公羊传·昭公二十三年》）。职是之故，“华夷之辨”的本质其实是一种文明论的华夷观。正如日本学者檀上宽所强调的：“一方面，如果夷狄被中华礼义同化，就会成为中华子民；另一方面，即便是中华子民，如果丧失了中华礼义，则与夷狄无异。”加之历代王朝都努力将“大一统”思想转化为客观现实，致力于建立一个政治统一、文化统一、民族统一的“大一统”王朝。“华夷之辨”在这样的历史背景和社会基础之下，至清代完全实现了“华夷一体”，超越了传统的“华夷”观，以德配天成为统治合法性的基础，这种“华夷一家”的民族“大一统”理念也成为追求“大一统”的王朝处理民族关系的核心原则。后来近代国家观念、民族观念以及“五族共和”取代蛮、夷、戎、狄，直至中华民族共同体意识的形成，随处都可寻到“华夷一体”的影子。“华夷之辨”这一传统思想，成为中华民族共同体意识产生的历史基因。

III. The Formation of the Sense of Community for the Chinese Nation and Its Legal Connotations

三、中华民族共同体意识的形成及其法律内涵

(I) Making “All-under-Heaven” into a Nation-State

（一）使“天下”成为民族国家

Traditional China was deeply influenced by the “thought of all-under-heaven” (天下思想). While emphasizing the “distinction between Hua and Yi,” it also advocated “Hua-Yi as one family.” This all-under-heaven doctrine both took Chinese civilization as its core and, with great inclusiveness, incorporated the cultures of the Man-Yi, thereby forming a more open civilization. But this “all-under-heaven” was still an “all-under-heaven” centered on “Hua-Xia,” with the Man-Yi always in a marginal position. There is no doubt that the “all-under-heaven” thought was a self-centered thought, and the fact that the Central Plains dynasties for thousands of years led the surrounding states in economy, military affairs, and culture also served as its support. Over the long millennia of history, traditional Chinese culture, containing the “all-under-heaven” thought, continuously assimilated other cultures. It was not until the gates of the Qing dynasty were blasted open by the Western powers’ warships and cannons that ancient China still harbored the notion of the supremacy of Chinese civilization, immersed in the illusion of Chinese honor and Yi inferiority, believing that beyond China there were only Man-Yi, that only “when the Man-Yi enter the Central States they become Chinese,” and that beyond “all-under-heaven” there was no other “all-under-heaven.” While the Qing dynasty was developing a highly advanced agricultural civilization in a relatively closed space, the Western European states, armed with warships, cannons, and advanced industrial productive forces, hammered at ancient China. During the Opium War, the Qing government lacked understanding of the actual situation in the outside world, and this confrontation left the vast Qing government at a loss, ultimately ending in a disastrous defeat. Thereafter, China suffered repeated defeats in successive confrontations, losing sovereignty and territory. After many failures, China’s men of insight believed that as long as they had warships and cannons and reorganized the military, China could become strong again. It was not until the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 that the Chinese realized that China was no longer the Celestial Empire and that China needed to abandon the Hua-Yi order influenced by the “all-under-heaven” concept. In the Sino-Japanese War, the Beiyang Fleet, which China had built up over many years, was completely annihilated, and the Qing government was forced to sign the humiliating Treaty of Shimonoseki with Japan, by which Japan extorted a huge indemnity from China and incorporated Taiwan into its territory. China had always regarded Japan as a “tiny Eastern country,” but its crushing defeat by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War greatly shocked the Chinese. Emperor Guangxu and the various reform ministers realized that they could not rely solely on the Westernization Movement (洋务运动) [14]14 The Westernization Movement (洋务运动, c. 1861–1895) was a series of self-strengthening reforms in the late Qing dynasty, focused on adopting Western military technology, industry, and education while preserving Confucian institutions. as the path to self-strengthening; comprehensive reform was necessary. China and Japan were both Eastern countries. Japan, learning from the West, had established a strong sense of nationalist belonging through the Meiji Restoration, promoting the formation of a modern nation-state, and had actually defeated China in a single battle in the Sino-Japanese War. After the war, the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki triggered a sense of crisis of national subjugation and extinction and a sense of shame at being unable to stand in the world, prompting traditional China to change the “all-under-heaven” concept of “defense against the Yi-Xia” (夷夏之防). China was forced into the nation-state order set by the West and ultimately chose to seek a path to modern civilization by constructing a nation-state, while the traditional “all-under-heaven” concept gradually withdrew from the historical stage. Against this background, Liang Qichao was the first to introduce the theory of nation-building (民族建国理论) into China and proposed the concept of the “Chinese nation” (中华民族). Since 1902, when Liang Qichao first proposed the concept of the “Chinese nation” in his article “On the Trends of Change in Chinese Academic Thought,” the term “Chinese nation” was widely used, but understandings of the connotation of this appellation were diverse. In 1988, Mr. Fei Xiaotong, at the invitation of the “Tanner Lecture” at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, delivered the important lecture “The Plurality and Unity of the Chinese Nation,” opening a new phase in research on the Chinese nation. Mr. Fei Xiaotong first gave a clear definition of the meaning of the “Chinese nation.” He pointed out: “I will use the term ‘Chinese nation’ to refer to the one billion people within the current territory of China who possess a national identity. The more than fifty ethnic units it includes are the plurality, and the Chinese nation is the unity.” Through his insight into Chinese history, Fei Xiaotong proposed that attention should be paid to the process of the Chinese nation moving from plurality to unity, and also pointed out that the Han nationality is the core of the pluralistic-unitary structure. Although the Han are regarded as the core, they are still in a parallel position with other nationalities or ethnic groups, together constituting the unified “Chinese nation.”

传统中国深受“天下思想”的影响，既强调“华夷之辨”，又提倡“华夷一家”，这种天下主义既以华夏文明为核心，又以极强的包容性纳入蛮夷的文化，从而形成了一个更具有开放性的文明。但这个 “天下”仍是以“华夏”为中心的“天下”，蛮夷总是处于边缘性的位置。毫无疑问，“天下”思想是一种以自我为中心的思想，而中原王朝数千年来无论是经济、军事还是文化都领先于周边各国的事实，也成为“天下”思想的支撑。在几千年的漫长历史中，包含着“天下”思想的中国传统文化不断同化其他文化，直到清王朝的大门被西方国家用坚船利炮轰开的时候，古代中国还怀揣华夏文明至上的观念，沉浸在华尊夷卑的幻想之中，以为中国之外都是蛮夷，只有“蛮夷进中国则中国之”，“天下”之外再无“天下”。当清王朝在相对封闭的空间内发展着高度发达的农业文明之时，西欧诸国挟着坚船利炮和先进的工业生产力捶打到古老的中国头上。鸦片战争期间，清政府对外部世界的实际情况缺乏了解，这次对决使偌大的清政府手足无措，最终惨败。此后，中国在接连的对抗中屡次失利，丧失主权和领土。经过多次失败后，中国的有识之士认为，只要有坚船利炮，重新整军经武，中国就可以再次强大。直至甲午战争，中国人才意识到中国已不是天朝上国，中国需要摒弃受“天下观”影响的华夷秩序。甲午之战中，中国多年经营的北洋舰队全线覆灭，清政府被迫与日本签订了屈辱性的《马关条约》，日本向中国勒索巨额赔款，将台湾纳入了自己的版图。中国一向视日本为东方“蕞尔小国”，但在甲午战争中却惨败于日本，这极大地刺激了中国人。光绪帝与当时的维新诸臣都意识到不能仅以洋务运动为自强之道，还必须进行全面改革。中国和日本同样是东方国家，日本学习西方，经过明治维新确立了民族主义的强烈归属感，促成了一个现代的民族国家，居然在甲午之战中一战击败中国。战后《马关条约》的签订，引发了亡国灭种的危机感和难以立足于世界的耻辱感，促使传统中国改变“夷夏之防”的“天下”观念，中国被迫卷入西方设定的民族国家秩序之中，最终选择通过构建民族国家寻求一条走上现代文明的道路，传统“天下观”逐渐退出历史舞台。在这样的背景下，梁启超率先将民族建国理论引进中国，并提出了“中华民族”的概念。自1902年梁启超在其《论中国学术思想变迁之大势》一文中最早提出“中华民族”这一概念以来，“中华民族”一词被广泛使用，然而对于“中华民族”这一称谓内涵的理解却多种多样。1988年，费孝通先生应邀在香港中文大学的“特纳讲座”中发表了《中华民族的多元一体格局》这一重要演讲，开创了关于中华民族研究的新局面。费孝通先生首先对“中华民族”的含义作出了明确的界定，他指出：“我将把中华民族这个词用来指现在中国疆域里具有民族认同的十亿人民。它所包括的五十多个民族单位是多元，中华民族是一体。”费孝通先生通过对中国历史的洞察，提出要重视中华民族从多元走向一体的过程，同时也指出了汉族是多元一体结构凝聚的核心，汉族虽然被视为核心，但是其在地位上仍然与其他民族或族群属于并列部分，共同构成了一体的“中华民族”。

(II) From the “Chinese Nation” to the “Sense of Community for the Chinese Nation”

（二）从“中华民族”到“中华民族共同体”

In September 2014, General Secretary Xi Jinping proposed at the Central Conference on Ethnic Affairs: “To strengthen the great unity of the Chinese nation, the long-term and fundamental task is to enhance cultural identity, build a shared spiritual home for all ethnic groups, and actively cultivate the sense of community for the Chinese nation.” [15]15 The Central Conference on Ethnic Affairs (中央民族工作会议) is a high-level meeting convened by the CPC Central Committee to set policy directions on ethnic work. The 2014 meeting was the fourth such conference. In October 2017, “forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation” was historically written into the report of the 19th National Congress of the CPC. The shift from “the Chinese nation” to “the Chinese nation community” is by no means a mere lexical change, nor is “the Chinese nation community” a simple word combination of “the Chinese nation” and “community.” “The Chinese nation community” is one of many terms derived from “the Chinese nation,” a compound concept composed of the two concepts “the Chinese nation” and “community.” To analyze this concept, it is necessary to link the ethnic question with community theory for examination. “Community” is a concept proposed by Western academia that is rich in connotation but quite controversial. Sociologists often understand it as a community or neighborhood, while in a broad sense “community” refers to groups and organizations at various levels that exist in society and are formed on the basis of subjective or objective common characteristics (these characteristics include race, ideas, status, experience, tasks, identity, etc.) or similarities. It can refer to small-scale spontaneous community organizations, also encompass higher-level political organizations, and even extend to the highest-level holistic concept of the nation or state, that is, an ethnic community or a national community. It can refer to both tangible and intangible communities. Under the dual context of ethnology and sociology, the Chinese nation community emphasizes that the various ethnic groups constituting the Chinese nation together form an organic unity, rather than a simply additive union. This unity is in a state of inseparability and close interrelation, with each having the other within itself. The Chinese nation community understands the Chinese nation from the perspective of community, highlighting that the Chinese nation is an organic unity. The formation of the Chinese nation can be seen both as the result of the long-term coexistence and mutual integration of various ethnic groups in Chinese history and as a product of the construction of the Chinese nation-state. Clearly, the Chinese nation is not Anderson’s “imagined community,” but a national-ethnic entity formed by all ethnic groups in China during the historical process of evolution, sharing collective memory, bearing common responsibilities, and forging a shared destiny. The essential attribute of the Chinese nation community is political. In other words, the Chinese nation community is the collective term for “political Chinese people,” a political community that transcends culture and ethnicity.

2014年9月，习近平总书记在中央民族工作会议上提出：“加强中华民族大团结，长远和根本的是增强文化认同，建设各民族共有精神家园，积极培养中华民族共同体意识。”2017年10月，“铸牢中华民族共同体意识”被历史性地写入了党的十九大报告。从“中华民族”到“中华民族共同体”的转变，绝不仅仅是词汇上的简单变化，“中华民族共同体”也不是“中华民族”和“共同体”的简单词语叠加。“中华民族共同体”是由“中华民族”衍生出来的众多词语之一，是由“中华民族”和“共同体”两个概念组成的一个复合概念，分析这一概念，需要把民族问题和共同体理论联结起来考察。“共同体”是西方学界提出的一个内涵丰富但颇具争议的概念。社会学家往往把它理解为社群、社区，而广义上的“共同体”指社会中存在的、基于主观上或客观上的共同特征（这些特征包括种族、观念、地位、遭遇、任务、身份等等）或相似性而组成的各种层次的团体、组织，它既可以指小规模的社区自发组织，也涵盖更高层次的政治组织，甚至延伸至国家和民族这一最高层次的整体概念，即民族共同体或国家共同体。既可指有形的共同体，也可指无形的共同体。在民族学和社会学的双重语境下，中华民族共同体强调构成中华民族的各民族共同构成一个有机统一体，而不是一个简单相加的联合体，这个统一体处于你中有我、我中有你这样一种不可分离、紧密相关的状态。中华民族共同体是以共同体的视域来理解中华民族，凸显了中华民族是一个有机统一体。中华民族的形成，可以看成既是中国历史上各民族群体长期共存、相互交融的结果，也是中国民族国家构建的产物。显然，中华民族不是安德森所谓的“想象的共同体”，而是中华各民族在历史演进过程中结成的共享集体记忆、共担责任、共创命运的国家民族实体。中华民族共同体的本质属性是政治性。换言之，中华民族共同体是“政治的中国人”的统称，是超越文化与族裔的政治共同体。

(III) The Formation of the Sense of Community for the Chinese Nation and Its Legal Connotation

（三）中华民族共同体意识的形成及其法律内涵

“China,” as a constantly changing complex community, has undergone thousands of years of evolution and development, ultimately forming a complex system that is continuously renewed and expanded, becoming a community to which all ethnic groups belong and identify. The sense of community for the Chinese nation is a subjective consciousness formed on the basis of the entity of the Chinese nation community. Therefore, without the multi-ethnic China, it is impossible to discuss the Chinese nation community, nor to form the sense of community for the Chinese nation. The relationship between them is interdependent and dialectically unified. The formation of the sense of community for the Chinese nation is gradually realized through identification with the multi-ethnic China and the Chinese nation. These identifications include, from ancient times, identification with “China,” to today’s identification with the People’s Republic of China; from identification with the Huaxia nation, to today’s identification with the Chinese nation as the state nation. Running through all this is identification with Chinese culture, which constitutes an important foundation for the long-term maintenance of the sense of community for the Chinese nation.

“中国”作为一个不断变化的复杂共同体，经历了数千年的演变与发展，最终形成一个不断更新、不断扩大的复杂系统，成为各个民族共同归属和认同的共同体。中华民族共同体意识是以中华民族共同体这一实体为基础而形成的一种主观意识。因此，离开多民族的中国，就无法谈论中华民族共同体，也无法形成中华民族共同体意识。它们之间的关系是相互依存、辩证统一的。中华民族共同体意识的形成是通过对多民族中国及中华民族的认同逐步实现的。这些认同包括了从古代对于“中国”的认同，到今天对于中华人民共和国的认同；从对华夏民族的认同，到今天对作为国族的中华民族的认同。贯穿其中的是对中华文化的认同，这一文化认同构成了长期维系中华民族共同体意识的重要基础。

First, one of the cores of the sense of community for the Chinese nation is national identity. As Ernest Renan once said: “Between memory and forgetting, seeking a balance between the past and the future... The nation presupposes a history, and this history, at the present moment, is reduced to an obvious fact, that is, national identity.” The national identity of modern China refers to the cognition of members of the Chinese nation regarding “China” as a unified multi-ethnic political community. And modern nation-state identity is the identity with the modern state of the People’s Republic of China.

首先，中华民族共同体意识的核心之一就是国家认同。正如厄内斯特·勒南曾说：“在记忆与遗忘之间，在过去与未来之间寻求一个平衡……国家预设一段历史，这段历史到了现在便化约成一项明显的事实，那就是国家认同。”近代中国的国家认同，指的是中华民族成员对“中国”作为一个统一的多民族政治共同体的认知。而现代民族国家认同，就是对中华人民共和国这个现代国家的认同。

Second, the sense of community for the Chinese nation also includes identification with the Chinese nation. “The Chinese nation,” as a concept that emerged only in modern times, is not a nation in the ordinary sense; “the Chinese nation” is a state nation (state nation) forged along with the emergence of the modern nation-state. In China, who is qualified to represent the whole of China? Mr. Fei Xiaotong pointed out that although the Han ethnic group has a large population, it is only one element among the diverse grassroots of the Chinese nation, and each minority ethnic group is likewise only one element among the diverse grassroots. It can be seen that no single group can represent the whole of China; only the ethnic entity of “the Chinese nation,” composed of the 56 ethnic groups within the country, can truly represent China. Through long-term ethnic interaction and integration, and with the impetus of various ethnic policies formulated and implemented by the Communist Party of China, the status of the Chinese nation as the state nation has gained widespread recognition among all ethnic groups.

其次，中华民族共同体意识还包括了对中华民族的认同。“中华民族”作为一个近代才出现的概念，它不是一般意义上的民族，“中华民族”是伴随着近代民族国家的出现而被打造的国族（state nation）。在中国，谁有资格代表整个中国呢？费孝通先生指出，虽然汉族人口众多，但它只是中华民族多元基层中的一元，各个少数民族也同样只是多元基层中的一元。由此可见，没有任何单一群体能够代表整个中国，唯有由境内56个民族构成的“中华民族”这一民族实体，才能真正代表中国。通过长期的民族交往融合，以及在中国共产党制定和实施的各项民族政策的助推下，“中华民族”的国族地位得到了各个民族的普遍认同。

Finally, the sense of community for the Chinese nation also encompasses identification with Chinese culture. General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: “Cultural identity is the deepest level of identity, the root of ethnic unity and the soul of ethnic harmony.” In an important speech on October 27, 2023, General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized: “We must focus on building the modern civilization of the Chinese nation and continuously construct a shared spiritual home for all ethnic groups. We must conform to the major development trend of the Chinese nation moving from history to the future, from tradition to modernity, and from diversity to integration, deeply understand and grasp the outstanding characteristics of Chinese civilization, continuously construct a shared spiritual home for all ethnic groups at the new historical starting point, and lay a solid spiritual and cultural foundation for forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation.” The genes of Chinese culture and the historical logic of the Chinese nation together constitute a solid foundation for forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation. Cultural identity is not only the deepest level of identity but also the key to constructing the sense of community for the Chinese nation.

最后，中华民族共同体意识还涵盖了对中华文化的认同。习近平总书记指出：“文化认同是最深层次的认同，是民族团结之根、民族和睦之魂。”在2023年10月27日的重要讲话中，习近平总书记强调：“要着眼建设中华民族现代文明，不断构筑中华民族共有精神家园。必须顺应中华民族从历史走向未来、从传统走向现代、从多元凝聚为一体的发展大趋势，深刻理解把握中华文明的突出特性，在新的历史起点上不断构筑中华民族共有精神家园，为铸牢中华民族共同体意识奠定坚实的精神和文化基础。”中华文化基因和中华民族的历史逻辑共同构成了铸牢中华民族共同体意识的坚实基础。文化认同不仅是最深层次的认同，更是构筑中华民族共同体意识的关键所在。

Against this background, traditional legal culture, as an important component of fine traditional Chinese culture, has a profound impact on forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation. Historically, traditional Chinese legal culture was not only a tool for governing the country but also, through concepts such as “the combination of rites and law” and “virtue as the principal, punishment as the auxiliary,” emphasized social harmony and the coexistence of diverse cultures. These legal thoughts played a key role in promoting ethnic unity and maintaining social stability, enabling people of all ethnic groups to form a strong sense of belonging and community consciousness on the basis of identifying with common legal rules. Entering the New Era, the inheritance and development of traditional legal culture have provided strong cultural and institutional support for forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation. General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: “We must base ourselves on the long history of the Chinese nation and integrate Marxist ethnic theory with China’s specific realities and with fine traditional Chinese culture.” This statement provides a theoretical basis for our deep understanding of the value of traditional legal culture in modern rule-of-law construction. By creatively transforming the governance wisdom in traditional legal culture, we can better promote the interaction and integration of all ethnic groups within the framework of modern rule of law, further consolidating the sense of community for the Chinese nation.

在这一背景下，传统法文化作为中华优秀传统文化的重要组成部分，对于铸牢中华民族共同体意识具有深远的影响。历史上，中华传统法文化不仅是治国理政的工具，更通过“礼法结合”“德主刑辅”等理念，强调社会和谐与多元文化的共存。这些法律思想在促进民族团结和维持社会稳定中发挥了关键作用，使各族人民在认同共同法律规则的基础上形成了强烈的归属感与共同体意识。进入新时代，传统法文化的继承与发展为铸牢中华民族共同体意识提供了有力的文化与制度支撑。习近平总书记指出，“要立足中华民族悠久历史，把马克思主义民族理论同中国具体实际相结合、同中华优秀传统文化相结合”。这一论述为我们深刻理解传统法文化在现代法治建设中的价值提供了理论依据。对传统法文化中的治理智慧进行创造性转化，能够更好地推动各民族在现代法治框架下的交往融合，进一步巩固中华民族共同体意识。

At the same time, we should also note that “the Chinese nation” was written into the Constitution in March 2018, providing constitutional-level safeguards for forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation, while also laying a solid jurisprudential foundation for national identity and for the Chinese nation as a community composed of 56 ethnic groups. At the 2021 Central Conference on Ethnic Affairs, General Secretary Xi Jinping condensed and summarized the important thinking of the Chinese Communist Party on strengthening and improving ethnic work as the “Twelve Musts,” emphasizing that “the system of regional ethnic autonomy must be upheld and improved.” This system embodies the collective political wisdom and governance philosophy of the Chinese Communists, providing an institutional legal vehicle for forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation. At the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the CPC held in 2024, the legislative trend of the “Law on the Promotion of Ethnic Unity and Progress” once again received high attention. This law is not only a special law implementing the constitutional principle of ethnic unity, but also works in concert with the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy to consolidate the sense of community for the Chinese nation among all ethnic groups by strengthening commonality and promoting interaction, exchange, and integration. Furthermore, the Law on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language, enacted in 2000, also provides an expressive vehicle applicable to the community of the Chinese nation for forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation. Language is the foundation of mutual communication among people and the prerequisite for achieving identity. The promotion and use of the standard spoken and written Chinese language have laid a more solid guarantee for forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation.

与此同时，我们还应看到，“中华民族”在2018年3月被写入《宪法》，为铸牢中华民族共同体意识提供了宪法层面的保障，同时也为国家认同及中华民族作为由56个民族构成的共同体奠定了坚实的法理基础。在2021年中央民族工作会议上，习近平总书记将中国共产党关于加强和改进民族工作的重要思想凝练概括为“十二个必须”，强调“必须坚持和完善民族区域自治制度”。这一制度蕴含着中国共产党人的集体政治智慧和治国理念，为铸牢中华民族共同体意识提供了法律制度载体。在2024年召开的党的二十届三中全会中，“民族团结进步促进法”的立法动向再次受到高度关注。该法不仅是落实宪法中民族团结原则的专项法律，且与《民族区域自治法》共同作用，通过强化共同性，推动各民族在交往、交流、交融中巩固中华民族共同体意识。此外，我国在2000年制定的《国家通用语言文字法》，也为铸牢中华民族共同体意识提供了一个适用于中华民族共同体的表达载体。语言是人们相互交流的基础，是实现认同的前提。国家通用语言文字的推广与使用，为铸牢中华民族共同体意识奠定了更为坚实的保障。

IV. Conclusion

四、结语

As one of the core ideas of ancient Chinese Confucianism, the “tianxia concept” [16]16 The “tianxia concept” (天下观) is a traditional Chinese worldview that envisions “all under heaven” as a single, morally ordered realm, often implying a universal political and cultural order centered on the Chinese civilization. contains rich cultural and political connotations. Over five thousand years, it has continuously evolved and developed, becoming an important ideological pillar of Chinese civilization. At the cultural level, the “tianxia concept” embodies the inclusive spirit of “the Hua and the Yi as one family,” [17]17 “Hua and Yi as one family” (华夷一家) is a classical Chinese expression denoting the ideal of unity and equality between the Huaxia (civilized core) and the Yi (peripheral or non-Han peoples), rejecting ethnic exclusivity. manifesting the openness and diversity of Chinese civilization; at the political level, the holistic identity of “family,” “state,” and “all under heaven” has been continuously strengthened, constructing and maintaining a multi-ethnic community. Under the influence of the “tianxia concept,” Huaxia culture and the cultures of surrounding ethnic groups, as well as the Han people and other ethnic groups, have maintained long-term interaction and exchange. The cultural identity thus formed became the prerequisite and foundation for the formation of an ethnic community and the soul and root of the sense of community. The “tianxia concept” not only shaped the worldview of the Chinese people, enabling Chinese civilization to transcend the limitations of blood lineage, but also gradually evolved into the theory of the modern nation-state through historical changes and the baptism of war. The sense of community for the Chinese nation, starting from the identity with “Huaxia” and “China,” gradually developed into an identity with the “Chinese nation” and the “People’s Republic of China,” becoming the core force driving ethnic unity and social stability. In 2018, “the Chinese nation” was formally written into the Constitution, providing constitutional safeguards and jurisprudential basis for further consolidating the sense of community for the Chinese nation centered on the “tianxia concept,” and further promoting the deep integration of national identity and cultural identity.

“天下观”作为中国古代儒家核心思想之一，蕴含着丰富的文化与政治内涵。五千年来，它不断发展演变，成为中华文明的重要思想支柱。在文化层面，“天下观”体现了“华夷一家”的包容精神，彰显了中华文明的开放与多元；在政治层面，“家”“国”“天下”的整体认同不断强化，构建并维系了多民族共同体。在“天下观”的影响下，华夏文化与周边民族文化、汉族与其他民族保持了长期的互动与交流，由此形成的文化认同成为民族共同体形成的前提与基础，并成为共同体意识的灵魂与根本。“天下观”不仅塑造了中国人的世界观，使中华文明超越了血缘的局限，还在历史变迁与战争洗礼中逐步演化为现代民族国家理论。中华民族共同体意识由对“华夏”和“中国”的认同，逐步发展为对“中华民族”和“中华人民共和国”的认同，成为推动民族团结与社会稳定的核心力量。2018年，“中华民族”被正式写入《宪法》，为进一步巩固以“天下观”为核心的中华民族共同体意识提供了宪法保障与法理依据，进一步推动了国家认同与文化认同的深度融合。

Looking to the future, we should strengthen the implementation of the constitutional principle of ethnic unity, improve and perfect the relevant special legal systems, accelerate the legislative process of the “Law on the Promotion of Ethnic Unity and Progress,” and provide more systematic rule-of-law guarantees for extensive exchanges and deep integration among all ethnic groups. By continuously strengthening the construction of cultural identity and ethnic identity, deepening the understanding and sense of belonging of people of all ethnic groups to the community of the Chinese nation, we will continuously consolidate and forge a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation in the New Era, laying a solid ideological and cultural foundation for realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

展望未来，我们应加大《宪法》中民族团结原则的落实力度，完善健全相关专项法律体系，加快推进“民族团结进步促进法”的立法进程，为各民族间的广泛交流与深度融合提供更加系统的法治保障。通过持续加强文化认同与民族认同建设，深化各族人民对中华民族共同体的认知和归属，不断巩固和铸牢新时代的中华民族共同体意识，为实现中华民族的伟大复兴奠定坚实的思想和文化基础。

Source: Tianfu New Theory, November 27, 2024

文章来源：《天府新论》2024年11月27日

Online Editor: Jing Mu

网络编辑：静穆