Did Mao Zedong Really Negate the “Law of the Negation of the Negation”?

In *Dialectics of Nature*, Engels conducted a comprehensive and meticulous study of dialectics. In his view, “the laws of dialectics are abstracted from the history of nature and the history of human society. The laws of dialectics are nothing but the most general laws of these two aspects of historical development and of thought itself,” and these laws can be reduced to the following three: (1) the law of the transformation of quantity into quality; (2) the law of the unity of opposites; (3) the law of the negation of the negation. Since then, the view that materialist dialectics contains three basic laws has been regarded as truth by Marxists. However, interestingly, some in academic circles believe that Mao Zedong held a different view, on the grounds that he once said:

在《自然辩证法》中，恩格斯对辩证法做了全面而细致的研究。在他看来，“辩证法的规律是从自然界的历史和人类社会的历史中抽象出来的。辩证法的规律无非是历史发展的这两个方面和思维本身的最一般的规律”，并且这些规律可以被归结为如下三种：（1）量变质变规律；（2）对立统一规律；（3）否定之否定规律。自此，唯物辩证法包含三大基本规律的看法一直被马克思主义者视为真理。然而，有趣的是，学界有人认为，毛泽东对此有不同的看法，理由就在于他曾经说过：

I do not believe that those two categories, the mutual transformation of quality and quantity and the negation of the negation, are parallel and coordinate with the unity of opposites. This is trinitarianism, not monism. It is simply the unity of opposites. The mutual transformation of quality and quantity is the unity of opposites of quantity and quality. The unity of opposites also includes the negation of the negation. There is no negation of the negation. Affirmation—negation, affirmation—negation; each link is both affirmation and negation.

我不相信那两个范畴质量互变、否定之否定同对立统一平行并列。这是三元论，不是一元论。就是一个对立统一。质量互变就是量和质的对立统一。对立统一也包括否定之否定。没有什么否定之否定。肯定—否定，肯定—否定，每一个环节既是肯定，又是否定。

On this basis, some scholars assert that Mao Zedong explicitly negated the “law of the negation of the negation.” Although such a view is not mainstream, a small number of people still advocate it. For instance, Slavoj Žižek and Wang Nanshi use this passage from Mao as evidence to conclude that he rejected the “law of the negation of the negation.” In the preface to the English translation of *On Practice* and *On Contradiction*, Žižek, based on Mao’s rejection of “dialectical synthesis” and his advocacy of “one side simply vanquishing the other,” asserts that Mao refused the “law of the negation of the negation.” Wang Nanshi, drawing on Mao’s reading notes, conversations, or speeches, argues that “Mao’s negation of the ‘law of the negation of the negation’ … was not a momentary whim or arbitrary act … but a conclusion reached after long reflection.” These views to some extent continue the practice of Stalin. As is well known, in the chapter on dialectical materialism in the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course*, Stalin summarized four basic features of dialectics. These features include both connection and development, as well as the “law of the transformation of quantity into quality” and the “law of the unity of opposites,” but uniquely lack the “law of the negation of the negation.” Althusser highly praised this approach, believing that “excluding the negation of the negation from the field of Marxist dialectics can only show that the author (Stalin) possessed genuine theoretical sensitivity.”

据此，有学者断言，毛泽东明确地否定了“否定之否定规律”。这样的观点虽非主流，但也有小部分人在主张。譬如，齐泽克和王南湜就是用毛泽东的这段话作为论据，来断定他拒斥了“否定之否定规律”。在《实践论和矛盾论》的英译本序言中，齐泽克依据毛泽东摒弃“辩证综合”而主张“一方简单地战胜了另一方”，从而断言毛泽东拒绝“否定之否定规律”。而王南湜则根据毛泽东的读书笔记、谈话或讲话，认为“毛泽东对于‘否定之否定规律’的否定……非一时心血来潮，任性而为……而是经过长期的思考所得出的结论”。这些看法在某种程度上延续了斯大林的做法。众所周知，在《联共（布）党史简明教程》之辩证唯物主义篇章中，斯大林归纳了辩证法的四个基本特征。这些特征既包含联系和发展，也囊括了“量变质变规律”和“对立统一规律”，却唯独缺乏“否定之否定规律”。阿尔都塞高度赞扬这种做法，认为“把否定之否定从马克思主义辩证法的领域中排除出去只能表明作者（斯大林）具有真正的理论敏感”。

However, such a view clearly contradicts common understanding. For both Marx and Engels explicitly affirmed and applied this law. For example, in *Capital*, after conducting economic and historical research on the primitive accumulation of capital, Marx used the method of the negation of the negation to explain the transformation process from scattered private ownership to capitalist private ownership, and then to social ownership. And in *Anti-Dühring*, Engels forcefully rebutted Dühring’s criticism of the “law of the negation of the negation.” As a great Marxist of high standing, Mao Zedong should have adhered to the basic positions of Marxism. This inevitably raises a question for us: As a Marxist, did Mao Zedong truly violate the basic positions of Marxism and negate the “law of the negation of the negation”?

可是，这样的看法显然与人们的通常认知相违背。因为无论是马克思还是恩格斯，他们都明确地肯定并运用了这一规律。例如，在《资本论》中，马克思在对资本的原始积累做了经济研究和历史研究之后，就运用否定之否定的方法来说明分散的私有制向资本主义私有制，再向社会所有制的转变过程。而在《反杜林论》中，恩格斯针对杜林对“否定之否定规律”的批评做了有力的回击。毛泽东作为一位享有崇高地位的、伟大的马克思主义者，他理应坚守马克思主义的基本立场。这就不由地让我们产生出一个问题，那就是：作为马克思主义者的毛泽东，真的就违背了马克思主义的基本立场，否定了“否定之否定规律”吗？

To answer this question, we must first clarify what the “law of the negation of the negation” actually is. To this end, we will first examine Hegel’s general view of this law and explain Marx and Engels’ criticism of him, thereby deriving the scientific connotation of this law. This will be elaborated in detail in the first part of this article. In the second part, this article will comprehensively and meticulously examine the “negation” within the “law of the negation of the negation.” Clearly, this is extremely important for understanding this law. Once this series of preparatory work is completed, we can return to the original question: Did Mao Zedong truly negate the “law of the negation of the negation”? To provide an accurate answer, the third part of this article will compare the “negation” spoken of by Mao with the “negation” spoken of by Marx and Engels, thereby determining Mao’s true position. The conclusion of this article is: What Mao negated was not the “law of the negation of the negation,” but the foundational status of the “law of the negation of the negation.” Finally, regarding the potential challenges this conclusion may face, the fourth part of this article will provide relevant responses.

要想回答这个问题，必须首先弄清楚“否定之否定规律”到底是什么？为此，我们将首先考察黑格尔关于这个规律的一般看法，并就马克思、恩格斯对他的批评做出说明，从而得出这个规律的科学内涵。这将在本文的第一部分得到详细阐释。在第二部分，本文将全面细致地考察“否定之否定规律”中的“否定”。很明显，它对于理解这个规律来说是极其重要的。当这一系列准备工作完成之后，我们就可以回到最初的问题，即毛泽东是否真的否定了“否定之否定规律”。为了能够准确地给出答案，本文将在第三部分就毛泽东所说的“否定”与马克思、恩格斯所说的“否定”做一个对比，从而判定毛泽东的真实立场所在。本文的结论是：毛泽东否定的不是“否定之否定规律”，而是否定“否定之否定规律”所具有的基础性地位。最后，就这个结论可能会面临的挑战，本文将在第四部分给出相关回应。

I. Marx and Engels’ Inversion and Disenchantment of Hegel

一、马克思、恩格斯对黑格尔的颠倒与祛魅

The “law of the negation of the negation” was not first proposed by Marx and Engels, but originated from Hegel. Hegel was the first to explicitly formulate this law. He used the “negation of the negation” to describe the self-movement of the “absolute spirit” and employed it as the basic method for constructing his philosophical system. This basic method can be illustrated with the discussion in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline* (the *Shorter Logic*).

“否定之否定规律”并不是由马克思、恩格斯首倡，而是来自黑格尔。黑格尔是第一个明确提出这个规律的人。他用“否定之否定”来描述“绝对精神”的自我运动，并以此作为构造其哲学体系的基本方法。关于这一基本方法，我们可以用《小逻辑》中的论述来予以说明。

According to Hegel’s view, logical thought has three aspects in terms of form; these aspects do not constitute three parts of logic, but rather the moments of each concept. First, the moment of understanding, as the first moment, is what Hegel calls the fixed moment. At this stage, concepts or forms possess an apparently stable definition or determinacy, which understanding takes as things existing in themselves. The simple and immediate concept of pure being, with which logic begins, is considered representative of the moment of understanding. In contrast, the dialectical moment or the moment of negative reason is considered the unstable moment. For at this point, the determinacy from the moment of understanding begins to show its own one-sidedness, thereby shaking its own definition, leading to its self-negation and transition into its opposite. This is like when people think of “being,” they will eventually find that they are actually thinking of nothing, and therefore are actually thinking of “nothing.” But in the process of moving from “being” to “nothing,” this moment not only negates “being” but also preserves it, and in the third stage—the speculative moment or the moment of positive reason—achieves the unity of the two (“being” and “nothing”) in “becoming.” Clearly, Hegel does not follow the traditional method of *reductio ad absurdum* here, discarding the premises of the argument that produce the contradiction (i.e., the first two moments), but rather obtains a positive result in the process of negating the contradiction, from which a new, higher concept emerges. From this, we can see the famous principle of sublation (*Aufhebung*).

根据黑格尔的看法，逻辑思想就形式而论有三个方面，这些方面并不构成逻辑学的三个部分，而是每一概念的各个环节。首先，知性环节作为第一个环节，它是黑格尔所说的固定环节。在这一阶段，概念或者形式都拥有一个表面上稳定的定义或规定性，它们被知性思维当作本身自存的东西。逻辑学以之开始的简单而直接的纯存在概念，就被认为是知性环节的代表。而与之相对的辩证环节或否定理性环节则被认为是不稳固环节。因为此时来自知性环节的规定性开始显示出自身的片面性，从而动摇了自身的定义，导致自己否定了自己而进入到对立面当中。这就像人们在思维“存在”时，终将会发现自身其实没有思维任何东西，因此实际是在思维“无”。但这一环节在从“存在”走向“无”的过程中，虽然否定了“存在”，但也把它保留了下来，并在第三阶段当中——思辨环节或肯定理性环节——实现了二者（“存在”和“无”）的统一（“变易”）。很显然，黑格尔在此并没有遵循传统的归谬法，把产生矛盾的论证前提（即前两个环节）抛弃，而是在否定矛盾的过程中得到肯定的结果，一个新的、更高阶的概念由此产生。我们从中可以看到著名的扬弃原则。

Although such a process is presented by Hegel as a transition between concepts, this does not mean he remains only at the level of thought; he also concerns himself with the truth and necessity of reality, which is implied by the development of his theory. “In a fully self-critical, presuppositionless logic, we can only start from the thought of the indeterminate ‘is’; at the outset we cannot presuppose that the ‘is’ itself (or ‘existence’) transcends what thought is minimally aware of. If we are to set aside all our presuppositions—including those about the ‘is’—then we cannot simply assume that the ‘is’ constitutes an objective world external to thought, or that the ‘is’ in some respect transcends the realm of thought.” Therefore, for a fully self-critical philosopher, our thought of being can only be the thought of being itself. If someone believes there is a gap between thought and being, they are actually presupposing such a gap, which cannot be tolerated by freely self-determining thought. From this, it is not difficult to see that Hegel’s logic, while determining the structure of thought, also determines the structure of being. Thought and being achieve identity in his system. Being, as the Idea, is actually nature, that is, something spatialized-temporalized. This spatial-temporality is not externally added to the Idea, but derived from the Idea itself, revealing the existence inherently contained within it.

尽管这样的过程被黑格尔展示为概念与概念之间的转变，但这并不意味着他只停留在思想层面，他也关注现实的真理与必然性，这是由他的理论发展所蕴含的。“在一门完全地自我批判的、无预设的逻辑学中，我们只能从思想的无规定之是出发，我们在一开始不能预设是本身（或‘实存’）超出了思想在最低限度上意识到的东西。如果我们要把我们所有的预设——包括有关是的预设——都抛在一边，那么我们就不能简单地假定，是构成了一个外在于思想的对象世界，或假定是在某个方面超越了思想的范围。”因此，对于完全自我批判的哲学家来说，我们对存在的思想只能是对存在本身的思想。假如有人认为在思想和存在之间存在鸿沟，那他实际是在预设存在这样的鸿沟，这将不能为自由地自我规定的思想所容忍。由此，我们不难看出，黑格尔的逻辑学在规定思想结构的同时，也规定了存在的结构。思维与存在在他这里达成了同一。存在作为理念，实际就是自然，即时间-空间化了的东西。这种时间-空间性不是外在地附加给理念，而是从理念本身推导出来，把本来就蕴含其中的实存性揭示出来。

At this point, we can draw the following conclusions: (1) Hegel advocates an ontology of absolute idealism; (2) being is unified with thought and governed by thought. Marx and Engels took exception to this, believing that such a view would lead to the emergence of logical mysticism, and therefore “it must be inverted, in order to discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.”

至此，我们便可得到如下几个结论：（1）黑格尔主张绝对唯心主义的本体论；（2）存在统一于思维，并受思维支配。马克思、恩格斯对此持有异议，认为这样的看法会导致逻辑神秘主义的出现，因此“必须把它倒过来，以便发现神秘外壳中的合理内核”。

First, Marx held that Hegel had committed the error of inverting subject and predicate. This error is most clearly evident in the *Philosophy of Right*, especially in §262. There, Hegel argues that the family and civil society are produced by the Idea, and that their unification into the state is the Idea’s own process of development, a process in which the Idea itself separates them from itself; hence they are not self-determining real existences but are posited by a third party. In Marx’s view, this is mistaken: the Idea, which reflects the real dialectical structure, should not become the subject that produces that structure. The real situation should be: the actual differences possessed by the family and civil society are the subject, while these differences, as the determinations they possess, are the predicate. If, like Hegel, one posits various real differences as products of the Idea’s development, “grasps the real as the result of self-synthesizing, self-deepening, and self-moving thought,” then one commits the error of inverting subject and predicate and thereby falls into the illusion of pure thought.

首先，马克思认为黑格尔犯了主谓颠倒的错误。这一错误在《法哲学原理》中有着最为明显的体现，尤其是在第262节。在这里，黑格尔认为家庭和市民社会是由理念产生的，它们结合成国家的过程是理念自身的发展过程，是理念自身使它们从自身之中分离出来；因此，它们并不是自我规定着的真实存在，而是被第三者所设定。这种想法在马克思看来是错误的，反映现实辩证结构的理念不应成为产生这种结构的主体。真实的情况应该是：家庭和市民社会所具有的现实差别才是主体，而这些差别作为它们所具有的规定则是谓语。假如人们像黑格尔那样，把各种现实的差别设定为理念的发展产物，“把实在理解为自我综合、自我深化和自我运动的思维的结果”，那么就会犯主谓颠倒的错误，从而陷入纯思的幻觉中。

Second, Marx also criticized Hegel’s principle of identity. In his view, “only Hegel’s ‘Concept’ can objectify itself without external matter.” The unity corresponding to the Idea in thought is not “real”; only the reality people experience is true, living reality. In fact, the content Hegel ponders is empirical material drawn from the objective world, which he absorbs uncritically, reifies it, and eternalizes it, thereby manifesting it as the result of the reification of thought. But if one thinks more deeply, one finds that the empirical world is the hidden condition of this result. Therefore, for Marx, Hegel’s logical theory does not accord with his practice, because his dialectical development is shown to be driven by non-dialectical, more or less crude empirical considerations.

其次，马克思也对黑格尔的同一性原则展开了批判。在他看来，也就“只有黑格尔的‘概念’才无需外界物质而自行客体化”。与思维当中的理念相符的统一性根本就不是“现实的”，只有人们经验到的现实性才是真正的、鲜活的现实。事实上，黑格尔所思考的内容是从客观世界当中得到的经验材料，他无批判地予以吸收，并加以物化而使之永恒化，从而以思想实体化的结果表现出来。但只要深加思考，我们就会发现，经验世界是这一结果的隐蔽条件。因此，就马克思而言，黑格尔的逻辑理论与他的实践不符，因为他的辩证发展被证明是由非辩证的、多少有些粗糙的经验考虑促成的。

Based on these two criticisms, Marx accused Hegel of the error of logical mysticism, on the grounds that his Idea is in fact a synonym for God. In the *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, Hegel explicitly states: “The essence of God and the divine will are the same thing; it is what we call the Idea in philosophy.” Conversely, the Idea is what religion calls God. Such an understanding was perfectly natural for Marx. After all, he and Hegel lived in an era and a region where the Christian conception of God was dominant. In the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, we find such expressions as: “The ‘Concept’ is the ‘Idea’ (i.e., the Son of the Holy Father).” Therefore, if Hegel inverts the Idea into the subject and also holds that being is identical with the Idea and produced by it, it is no wonder Marx considered Hegel a mystical idealist. As an abstraction lacking real content, the Idea is itself “nothing.” And creation out of nothing can only occur in the religious “doctrine of creation,” hence it is a “crude mysticism.”

基于以上两点批评，马克思指责黑格尔犯了逻辑神秘主义错误，理由就在于他的理念其实就是上帝的代名词。在《世界史哲学讲演录》中，黑格尔就明确地表示过：“上帝和神圣意志的本质是同一事物，它就是我们在哲学当中所说的理念。”反过来说，理念就是宗教中所说的上帝。这样的理解对于马克思来说再自然不过了。毕竟他和黑格尔生活的时代和地区，基督教的上帝观占据着支配地位。我们在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中就能看到这样的表述：“‘概念’是‘观念’（即理念）的即圣父的圣子”。因此，假如黑格尔把理念颠倒为主体，而又认为存在与理念同一，并由其产生，那么也就不怪马克思认为黑格尔是个神秘的唯心主义者了。作为一种缺乏现实内容的抽象物，理念自身就是“无”。而无中生有的情况也就只有发生在宗教的“创世说”中，因而是一种“露骨的神秘主义”。

Faced with this situation, the correct understanding is to invert Hegel’s proposition. The real subject becomes the objective things existing in the empirical world, while the predicate becomes the concepts people cognize from the external world. Marx and Engels restored subject and predicate to their proper positions and shattered the speculative mystical identity between thought and being. Social reality, which for Hegel was merely a mediation, was brought to the fore, thereby gaining ontological and epistemological priority. In this way, “dialectics, as the negative principle of movement and creation,” was endowed by Marx and Engels with a new understanding. The “negation of the negation,” which “Hegel had treated in his idealist fashion as the purely logical law of thought,” was transformed by them into an objective law operating in a materialist manner. At this point, the development of things is no longer confined to thought, as in Hegel, but is realized through their own internal contradictory movement in the form of self-negation. The reason such development occurs is that, within any thing, it contains not only an affirmative aspect but also a negative aspect, and these aspects interact as mutually contradictory sides. Therefore, when the negative aspect of a thing rises to a dominant position, it moves from its own affirmative state of being to its own negative state of being, and then from its own negative state of being to a higher-stage affirmative state of being. Repeating in this way, it spirals upward. Things develop continuously in this process. This is what Marx and Engels called the “law of the negation of the negation”; it reveals the complete process and essence of things developing themselves.

面对这种情况，正确的认知应该是把黑格尔的主张颠倒过来。真正的主体变成经验世界中存在的客观事物，而谓语则是人们从外部世界中认识到的观念。马克思、恩格斯将主体与谓语放回到应有的位置上，并粉碎了思维与存在之间的思辨的神秘同一。黑格尔仅仅作为中介的社会现实被突显出来，从而在本体论上与认识论上取得了优先地位。这样一来，“辩证法，作为推动原则和创造原则的否定性”，便被马克思、恩格斯赋予了新的认识。那“曾经被黑格尔按照其唯心主义的方式当做纯粹的思维规律”的“否定之否定”，就被他们改造成了按照唯物主义方式运行的客观规律。此时，事物的发展不再像黑格尔那样囿于思维当中，而是通过其内在矛盾运动以自我否定的方式来实现。这样的发展之所以会发生，原因就在于，在任何事物内部，它不仅包含着肯定的方面，也包含着否定的方面，并且这些方面作为相互矛盾着的双方彼此作用。因此，当一个事物自身的否定方面上升到支配地位时，它就会由自身的肯定存在状态走向自身的否定存在状态，再由自身的否定存在状态走向更高阶段的肯定存在状态。如此往复，螺旋上升。事物就在这样的过程当中，得到了不断地发展。这就是马克思、恩格斯所说的“否定之否定规律”，它揭示出了事物自己发展自己的完整过程及本质。

Clearly, in this process, “negation” plays an extremely important role. Therefore, to accurately grasp this law, we must thoroughly clarify the concept of “negation.”

很明显，在这个过程当中，“否定”扮演着极其重要的角色。因此，要想准确地把握这个规律，我们还得彻底地弄清楚“否定”这个概念。

II. Clarification and Definition of the Concept of “Negation”

二、“否定”概念的澄清与厘定

First, the “negation” of materialist dialectics is not the “negation” of formal logic. In formal logic, any proposition appears either in an affirmative form or in a negative form; it cannot be both affirmative and negative. If affirmative and negative aspects appear simultaneously in one thing, that violates the law of non-contradiction. Such a view is unproblematic regarding the form of things, but it does not correspond to the real situation of the content of things. We can illustrate this with the example of motion. For instance, the reason a thing moves is not that it is here now and there at another now, but that at one and the same now, it is both here and not here. Therefore, “genuine, natural, historical, and dialectical negation” proceeds “on the basis of experience.” The contradictory character of materialist dialectics differs from the simple binary opposition (i.e., the either-or character) of formal logic; the relations they involve are interdependent in content (or meaning).

首先，唯物辩证法所说的“否定”不是形式逻辑当中的“否定”。在形式逻辑中，任何一个命题要么是以肯定的形式出现，要么是以否定的形式出现，不能既是肯定又是否定。假如肯定的方面和否定的方面同时出现在一个事物当中，那就违背了不矛盾律。这样的看法就事物的形式来说没有问题，但并不符合事物内容的真实情况。我们可以以运动为例进行说明。例如，一个事物之所以发生运动，并不是因为它现在在这儿，而在另一个现在它又在那儿，而是因为在一个完全相同的现在，它既在这儿，又不在这儿。因此，“真正的、自然的、历史的和辩证的否定”是在“经验的基础上”进行的。唯物辩证法的矛盾特征与形式逻辑的简单二元对立（即非此即彼特征）不同，它们所涉及的关系在内容（或者意义）上是相互依存的。

Second, the “negation” of materialist dialectics is not “negation” as a category of evaluation. Because “negation” as a category of evaluation is used to express the subject’s attitude toward the object. This attitude is often determined by the value concepts and value needs of the subject, or by the class interests to which he belongs. As a result, the evaluative conclusion obtained often carries strong subjective coloring and emotional factors, and may even be distorted to serve the individual’s or class’s interests. Therefore, in Engels’s view, “negation” as a category of evaluation can only be “purely subjective, personal negation, which is not a stage of development of the thing itself but an opinion externally imposed upon it”; the “negation” of materialist dialectics should be the objective basis of such negation. Without this objective basis, the mere mental act of “expressing disagreement” becomes an arbitrary expression of personal feeling or cognition, and not an indispensable link in the process of cognition.

其次，唯物辩证法所说的“否定”不是作为评价范畴的“否定”。因为作为评价范畴的“否定”，被用来表明主体对对象的态度。这一态度的得出往往是由主体所具有的价值观念和价值需求所决定的，或是由他所在的阶级利益所决定的。这样一来，所得到的评价结果常常带有强烈的主观色彩和情感因素，甚至因要服务其个人的或阶级的利益而被歪曲。因此，在恩格斯眼中，作为评价范畴的“否定”就只能是“纯粹主观的、个人的否定，它不是事物本身的一个发展阶段，而是由外部硬加进去的意见”，唯物辩证法所说的“否定”应该是这种否定的客观依据。如果没有这种客观依据，那么仅仅“表示不同意”的精神行为就成为个人感受或认知的随心所欲的表达，而成不了认识过程当中的一个不可或缺的环节。

In this way, we have drawn a boundary for “negation.” But strictly speaking, this method of definition is only negative; it does not positively clarify what “negation” is. Therefore, we cannot help but ask: What exactly does “negation” in the materialist dialectical “law of the negation of the negation” refer to? What are its basic contents? Faced with these questions, we can answer them based on the relevant discussions of Marx and Engels.

这样一来，我们就给“否定”划清了界线。但这种界定方式严格说来只是消极的，它并没有正面地说清楚“否定”。因此，我们不禁要问：唯物辩证法“否定之否定规律”中的“否定”到底指什么？它的基本内容又有哪些？面对这些问题，我们可以根据马克思、恩格斯的有关论述来回答。

First, “negation” is the self-“negation” of things.

第一，“否定”是事物的自我“否定”。

This is clearly expounded in *Capital*. Here, Marx takes private ownership as his starting point and meticulously analyses the historical tendency of capitalist accumulation. In his view, small-scale production can develop fully only “where the labourer is the private owner of his own means of labour.” But this mode of production excludes the concentration of the means of production, excludes division of labour and co-operation, and therefore inherently excludes the free development of the social productive forces. “It is compatible only with a system of production, and a society, moving within narrow and more or less primitive bounds.” Hence, “at a certain stage of development it brings forth the material agencies for its own destruction.” This clearly shows that private ownership in the form of small-scale production negates itself. And the capitalist mode of production that arises from it likewise “creates its own negation with the inexorability of a law of Nature.” From this it is not difficult to see that whether it is the first negation or the second negation of the thing formed after the first negation, both are self-negations. This makes it clear that the “negation” in the “law of the negation of the negation” can only be the self-“negation” of the thing.

这在《资本论》中有着明确的论述。在这里，马克思以私有制为起点，细致地分析了资本主义积累的历史趋势。在他看来，“只有在劳动者是自己使用的劳动条件的自由私有者”的地方，小生产才能得到充分地发展。但这种生产方式排斥了生产资料的积累，排斥了分工协作，因而也就内在地排斥了社会生产力的自由发展。“它只同生产和社会的狭隘的自然产生的界限相容。”因此，当“它发展到一定的程度，就产生出消灭它自身的物质手段”。这明确地显示出，以小生产方式存在的私有制是自己否定了自己。而由此产生出来的资本主义生产方式，同样也“由于自然过程的必然性，造成了对自身的否定”。由此不难看出，不管是第一次发生的否定，还是否定过后形成的事物发生的再次否定，它们均是自我否定。这就清楚地表明，“否定之否定规律”的“否定”只能是事物的自我“否定”。

Second, “negation” is the developmental link of the thing.

第二，“否定”是事物的发展环节。

As Engels says in *Anti-Dühring*: “I must not only negate, but also sublate the negation again. Therefore, when I perform the first negation, I must make it possible for the second negation to occur or to be able to occur.” This means that no thing is immutable. After it undergoes “negation” and produces a new thing, this new thing must still be “negated.” Each “negation” contains the occurrence of the next “negation”; there is no end-point that is not “negated.” Marx’s early exploration of communism can serve as an example of this. For instance, in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, when Marx views social development from the specific perspective of private property, he regards class society as the “negation” of primitive communist society, and communist society as the “negation” of class society. The communist society thus developed, although it is “the affirmation as the negation of the negation,” is “not the goal of human development”; it is only “a real, necessary link in the next stage of historical development for the emancipation and rehabilitation of man.” Thus it can be seen that “negation” is not a one-time act, nor does it end after being performed twice; rather, it is a movement that must continue each time after the old thing completes its transformation into the new, providing an inexhaustible driving force for the development of things.

正如恩格斯在《反杜林论》中所说：“我不仅应当否定，而且还应当再扬弃这个否定。因此，我第一次否定的时候，就必须使第二次否定能够发生或者将会发生。”这就意味着，任何事物都不是一成不变的。当它经历“否定”而产生出新事物之后，这个新事物依然要被“否定”。每一次“否定”都蕴含着下一次“否定”的发生，不存在不被“否定”的终点。马克思早期就共产主义所做的探索可以被用来例证这一点。例如，在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》中，当马克思从私有财产这一特定视角来看待社会发展时，他就将阶级社会看作是对原始共产主义社会的“否定”，而共产主义社会则是对阶级社会的“否定”。这样发展得到的共产主义社会，尽管是“作为否定的否定的肯定”，但它“并不是人类发展的目标”，它只是“人的解放和复原的一个现实的、对下一段历史发展来说是必然的环节”。由此可见，“否定”并不是一次性行动，也不是进行两次之后就完结，而是每次在旧事物完成向新事物转变之后仍要继续进行的运动，为事物的发展提供着不竭的动力。

Third, “negation” is the connecting link of the thing.

第三，“否定”是事物的联系环节。

This may seem somewhat incredible, since what is commonly called negation means breaking off all relations with each other—so how can there be any connection? If people think this way, then they are still trapped by the negation spoken of in formal logic. But we have already argued that dialectical “negation” is different from the negation of formal logic. Hegel pointed out explicitly: “What is self-contradictory does not dissolve into zero or abstract nothingness, but essentially only negates its own particular content.” This view was clearly also endorsed by Marx and Engels, as can be seen from their series of discussions on social development. “When Marx analyses the series of social development from the specific quality of the relationship between the individual and the ownership of the means of production, he considers capitalist society and feudal society to be qualitatively different; when Engels analyses the series of social development from the specific quality of land ownership, he considers capitalist society, feudal society, and slave society to have no qualitative difference. This tells us clearly that when examining more complex things, qualitative change is always concrete, always referring to the change in a specific quality of a certain aspect of the thing.” Therefore, when a thing is negated, it is not negated completely, but with something retained. Those rational factors that conform to the developmental trend of the thing are retained and continue to exist within the new thing, thereby becoming the link connecting the old and new things.

这看起来有些不可思议，毕竟常说的否定就是彼此一刀两断，那又何谈存在联系？假使人们这样认为，那么他们就仍被形式逻辑所说的否定所困。但我们之前已经论述过，辩证的“否定”不同于形式逻辑的否定。黑格尔就曾明确地指出：“自相矛盾的东西并不是消解为零或抽象的虚无，而是在本质上仅仅否定了自己的特殊内容。”这一观点显然也为马克思、恩格斯所认可，这从他们谈论社会发展的系列可知。“当马克思从个人和生产资料所有制的关系这一特定的质上去分析社会发展的系列时，他认为资本主义社会和封建社会有质的不同；而当恩格斯从土地所有制这一特定的质上去看待社会发展的系列时，他认为资本主义社会和封建社会、奴隶社会并无质的区别。这就明确告诉我们，在考察较为复杂的事物时，质变总是具体的，总是指事物某方面的特定的质的变化。”因此，当一个事物被否定时，它不是被彻底地否定，而是有所保留。那些符合事物发展趋势的合理因素会被保留下来，继续存在于新事物当中，从而成为新旧事物之间联系的纽带。

Fourth, the essence of dialectical “negation” is “sublation” (扬弃).

第四，辩证“否定”的实质是“扬弃”。

This can be deduced from the second and third points. Because, according to Marx’s view, so-called “sublation” is “the combination of negation and preservation, i.e., affirmation.” “Negation” as the developmental link of the thing, in the process of the thing’s development, actually overcomes its negative factors, thereby producing a new thing that conforms to the laws of development; while “negation” as the connecting link of the thing emphasises that, in the process of the thing’s development, its positive factors must be preserved, so that a connection exists between the old and new things. Clearly, the two dimensions of negation and preservation are both contained within dialectical “negation,” thus conforming to Marx’s concept of “sublation.”

这可以由第二点和第三点推论得出。因为按照马克思的观点，所谓的“扬弃”就是“把否定和保存即肯定结合起来”。作为事物发展环节的“否定”，在事物的发展过程中，实际就是在克服其消极因素，从而产生出符合发展规律的新事物；而作为事物联系环节的“否定”则在强调，在事物的发展过程当中，它的积极因素要被保存下来，从而使新旧事物之间存在联系。很明显，否定和保存这两个维度同时蕴含在辩证的“否定”当中，因而符合马克思所说的“扬弃”。

The above is the basic connotation of dialectical “negation,” which constitutes the Marxist dialectical view of negation. With this analysis as a foundation, we can now return to the original question: Did Mao Zedong really deny the “law of the negation of the negation”? To give an accurate answer, let us first see whether Mao Zedong’s “negation” differs from that of Marx and Engels.

以上就是辩证“否定”的基本内涵，它构成了马克思主义的辩证否定观。有了这些分析做基础，现在我们就可以回到最初的那个问题：毛泽东真的否定了“否定之否定规律”吗？为了能够准确地给出答案，让我们先来看看毛泽东所说的“否定”是否与马克思、恩格斯所说的“否定”不同。

III. Mao Zedong’s Determination and Explanation of “Negation”

三、毛泽东的“否定”判定与说明

In fact, Mao Zedong never systematically expounded the “law of the negation of the negation”; there are only some fragmentary expressions. However, these expressions span several decades, which seems to indicate that they are not casual remarks made on a whim, but the result of long-term reflection. Apart from the *Chronicle of Mao Zedong* [1]1 *Chronicle of Mao Zedong* (毛泽东年谱) is a multi-volume chronological record of Mao’s life and activities, compiled by the Party history research authorities. mentioned earlier, there are also references in other works, especially in the *Collected Annotations on Philosophy by Mao Zedong* [2]2 *Collected Annotations on Philosophy by Mao Zedong* (毛泽东哲学批注集) is a collection of Mao’s marginal notes and annotations on philosophical works, published posthumously., where we can find many relevant expressions. These are excerpted below for comparison with the “negation” of Marx and Engels.

实际上，毛泽东关于“否定之否定规律”并未做过系统的阐释，有的只是一些零星的表达。但是，这些表达横跨数十年之久，似乎又表明它们并非是一时兴起的随口之说，而是长期思考的结果。除了之前提到的《毛泽东年谱》之外，在其他著作里面也有涉及，尤其是在《毛泽东哲学批注集》当中，我们可以看到非常多的相关表达。现将其摘编如下，以同马克思、恩格斯的“否定”进行对比。

(1a) To say this is incorrect. … This is an external connection, a surface phenomenon, schematism, not an internal connection and the development of the essence. The law of the negation of the negation is a theory of internal connection.

（1a）这样说是不对的。……这是外的连〈联〉结，表面现象，图式主义，不是内的联结与本质发展的东西。否定之否定律是论内的联结的理论。

(1b) The error of formal logic lies in regarding negation as an external negation between processes, and furthermore as absolute negation—this is a view that completely fails to understand reality. Dialectical materialism, i.e., the scientific investigation, is the opposite: matter is self-moving, and this self-movement is interconnected. Every process moves forward by itself through the struggle of contradictions.

（1b）形式论理学的错误在于把否定看作过程与过程间的外的否定，再则看作绝对的否定，这是完全不理解现实的看法。辩证唯物论即科学的考察与此相反，物质的现实是自己运动的，并且这自己运动是互相联结的。任何过程都是由于矛盾的斗争而自己向前运动。

(2a) Within a process, the new quality struggles with the old quality; because the old quality is in a dominant position, it can often defeat the new quality. However, the defeated party continues to accumulate strength (quantitative change), and when it itself becomes dominant, it can defeat the old quality, completing a qualitative change of negation.

（2a）过程内部新质与旧质斗争，因旧质处于优势，故常能打败新质。然败者继续积蓄力量（量变），到了自己处于优势时，就能打败旧质，完成一个质变的否定。

(2b) Each process is affirmation relative to the next process, negation relative to the previous process, and negation of the negation relative to the process before that. To say that there are three stages of qualitative change within a single process is incorrect.

（2b）每一过程对下一过程言是肯定，对上一过程言是否定，对再上一过程言是否定之否定。说一过程内部有质变三阶段是不对的。

(3) Negation is not destroying everything, making a clean break, not absolute negation; rather, what comes before contains what comes after, and what comes after contains what comes before. Without the movement of negation, there is no movement of affirmation. This is true of all processes.

（3）否定不是破坏一切，一刀两断，不是绝对的否定，而是先行的东西中间包含有后来的东西，后来的东西中间包含有先行的东西。没有否定的运动，也就没有肯定的运动。一切过程都是如此。

(4) Dialectical negation is the motive force of the development of a process. This kind of negation has two aspects of expression: on the one hand, it is expressed as sublation, i.e., overcoming the main unsuitable elements of the old thing; on the other hand, it is expressed as affirmation, i.e., preserving and giving legitimate status to those elements of the old thing that are still temporarily suitable for survival.

（4）辩证法否定是过程发展之动因，这种否定有两方面的表现：一方面表现为扬弃，即克服旧物事〈事物〉之主要的不适于保存的东西；一方面表现为肯定，即把旧事物中某些还暂时适于生存的东西给以合法的地位而保存起来。

From the above discussions, it can be seen that what Mao Zedong called “negation” is no different from what Marx and Engels called “negation.” Just as in (1a) and (1b), he explicitly opposes viewing “negation” as an external “negation” of things; it should occur within the things themselves, thus coinciding with the view advocated by Marx and Engels — that “negation” is the self-“negation” of things. And in (2a) and (2b), Mao Zedong holds that the development of things originates from the “negation” of the old quality by the new quality; moreover, this “negation” is not completed after only three stages (i.e., affirmation — negation — negation of the negation); the definition of each stage is relative to its counterpart, and there are no absolute stages of affirmation, negation, and negation of the negation; each stage is the object of “negation” for the next stage, so the entire process is continuous. This is consistent with Marx and Engels’ view that “‘negation’ is the developmental link of things.” As for the discussion in (3), we need not elaborate; it clearly aligns with the third point of the previous section. “The preceding contains the subsequent, and the subsequent contains the preceding” — is this not precisely an emphasis on the interconnection between things? But (4) is not so obvious, because it differs slightly from the last point of the previous section. Here, “sublation” (扬弃) is treated as an aspect of manifestation, whereas for Marx and Engels, it is the combination of negation and affirmation. However, as long as we carefully grasp Mao Zedong’s supplementary explanation of “sublation,” then substituting it for Marx’s negation is not inappropriate. After all, “overcoming the main unsuitable elements of old things” means overcoming the negative factors within things, and thus it is precisely the negative aspect of Marx’s “sublation.” From this, it can be seen that the connotation of (4) is actually no different from the last point of the previous section; both emphasize that the essence of dialectical “negation” is “sublation.”

从以上这些论述来看，毛泽东所说的“否定”和马克思、恩格斯所说的“否定”并无二致。就像在（1a）和（1b）当中，他明确地反对把“否定”看作事物的外部“否定”，它应该发生在事物自身之中，因而与马克思、恩格斯所主张的观点—“否定”是事物的自我“否定”—相吻合。而在（2a）和（2b）当中，毛泽东则认为，事物的发展是源自新质对旧质的“否定”；并且这一“否定”并不是只经历三个阶段（即肯定—否定—否定之否定）便告完成；每个阶段的界定相对于它的对比项而言，并没有绝对的肯定环节、否定环节和否定之否定环节；每一个环节都是下一环节的“否定”对象，因而整个过程是持续不断的。这同马克思、恩格斯所主张的“‘否定’是事物的发展环节”相符。至于（3）的论述，我们无需赘言，它明显与上一节的第三点相一致。“先行的东西中间包含有后来的东西，后来的东西中间包含有先行的东西”，这不就是在强调事物之间的相互联系吗？但（4）就没有那么明显了，因为它与上一节的最后一点稍有出入。在这里，“扬弃”是作为一个表现方面，而在马克思、恩格斯那里，它是作为否定和肯定的结合。可是，只要我们认真领会毛泽东对“扬弃”所做的补充说明，那么将其与马克思所说的否定互换，也没有什么不妥，毕竟“克服旧物事〈事物〉之主要的不适于保存的东西”就是克服事物内部的消极因素，因而也就是马克思所说的“扬弃”之否定面相。由此可见，（4）的内涵实际同上一节的最后一点没有差别，都是在强调辩证“否定”的实质是“扬弃”。

This raises a question: Since Mao Zedong’s concept of “negation” is almost identical to that of Marx and Engels, why is there a discrepancy in their views on the “law of the negation of the negation”? How should we understand the passage from Mao Zedong quoted at the beginning of this article? Here, we may perhaps draw on another discussion in Mao Zedong’s Philosophical Annotations (毛泽东哲学批注集) for an explanation.

这就引发一个问题：既然毛泽东的“否定”概念和马克思、恩格斯的“否定”概念几乎一致，那他们对“否定之否定规律”的看法为什么会有偏差呢？我们要如何来理解本文开头毛泽东所说的那段话呢？这里，我们也许可以借助《毛泽东哲学批注集》中的另一个论述来进行解释。

The core of dialectics is the law of the unity of opposites; other categories, such as the mutual transformation of quality and quantity, the negation of the negation, connection, development, and so on, can all be explained within the core law. So-called connection is the interconnection of opposites in time and space, and so-called development is the result of the struggle of opposites. As for the mutual transformation of quality and quantity and the negation of the negation, they should be explained under the guidance of the core law, along with essence and phenomenon, form and content, and so on. The old philosophical method of listing several laws side by side is inappropriate; this was already basically resolved by Lenin, and our task is to add explanation and elaboration. As for the various categories (there may be a dozen or more), they must all be explained by the contradiction and unity of opposites in things.

辩证法的核心是对立统一规律，其他范畴如质量互变、否定之否定、联系、发展……等等，都可以在核心规律中予以说明。盖所谓联系就是诸对立物间在时间和空间中互相联系，所谓发展就是诸对立物斗争的结果。至于质量互变、否定之否定，应与现象本质、形式内容等等，在核心规[律]的指导下予以说明。旧哲学传下来的几个规律并列的方法不妥，这在列宁已基[本]上解决了，我们的任务是加解释和发挥。至于各种范畴（可以有十几种），都要以事物的矛盾对立统一去说明。

From this passage, we can see that Mao Zedong did not really negate the “law of the negation of the negation,” but rather negated the equal status of the “law of the negation of the negation” and the “law of the unity of opposites.” In his view, “the old philosophical method of listing several laws side by side is inappropriate”; only the “law of the unity of opposites” is the core of materialist dialectics, as already explained in Lenin’s Abstract of Hegel’s Science of Logic. Only in this way does materialist dialectics uphold monism, not triplism. This explains why Mao Zedong said: “I do not believe that the two categories — the mutual transformation of quality and quantity, and the negation of the negation — are parallel and coequal with the unity of opposites. This is triplism, not monism.” Moreover, Engels also explicitly pointed out that development or the negation of the negation is caused by contradiction. From an ontological perspective, this actually emphasizes the priority of the law of contradiction (the law of the unity of opposites) over laws such as the “negation of the negation,” so it is not inappropriate to assert from the perspective of origin that “there is just the unity of opposites.” Furthermore, since “the various categories … must all be explained by the contradiction and unity of opposites in things,” the statement that “the mutual transformation of quality and quantity is the unity of opposites between quantity and quality, and the unity of opposites also includes the negation of the negation” is entirely acceptable. And because the “law of the unity of opposites” contains the “law of the negation of the negation,” there is no need to separately mention the latter law; therefore, “there is no negation of the negation.” This does not really negate its existence, but is merely a matter of theoretical conciseness. Thus, Mao Zedong’s view on the “law of the negation of the negation” not only conforms to the spirit of Marxism but also represents a significant development of Marxist thought. In his framework, the relationship among the three laws of materialist dialectics is clarified, and their respective positions are clearly defined.

从这段话当中，我们便可以看出，毛泽东并不是真的否定“否定之否定规律”，而是否定“否定之否定规律”与“对立统一规律”具有同等地位。在他看来，“旧哲学传下来的几个规律并列的方法不妥”，只有“对立统一规律”才是唯物辩证法的核心，这在列宁的《黑格尔〈逻辑学〉一书摘要》当中已经得到说明。只有这样，唯物辩证法坚持的才是一元论，而不是三元论。这也就解释了毛泽东为什么会说：“我不相信那两个范畴质量互变、否定之否定同对立统一平行并列。这是三元论，不是一元论。”况且，恩格斯也曾明确地指出，发展或否定的否定是由矛盾引起的。这从本体论的视角来看，实际是在强调矛盾规律（对立统一规律）相较于“否定之否定”等规律所具有的优先性地位，因而从本原的角度主张“就是一个对立统一”，并无不妥。此外，既然“各种范畴……都要以事物的矛盾对立统一去说明”，那么“质量互变就是量和质的对立统一，对立统一也包括否定之否定”的说法完全可取。并且，由于“对立统一规律”包含着“否定之否定规律”，那就没必要再单独提后面这个规律，因此“没有什么否定之否定”。这并不是真的否定了它的存在，而只是从理论的简洁性来说。由此可见，毛泽东关于“否定之否定规律”的看法不仅符合马克思主义精神，而且还是对马克思主义思想的一个极大发展。在他这里，唯物辩证法三大规律之间的关系得到了说明，各自之间的地位得到了明确界定。

At this point, we can give a clear answer to the question posed at the beginning: As a Marxist, Mao Zedong did not violate the basic stance of Marxism, nor did he negate the “law of the negation of the negation”; what he did was merely to define the status of this law.

至此，我们就可以对开头的问题给出明确的回答：作为马克思主义者的毛泽东，没有违背马克思主义的基本立场，没有否定“否定之否定规律”，有的只是对这一规律的地位进行规定。

IV. Responses to Different Views in Academia

四、对学界不同看法的回应

Although the above conclusion is based on meticulous analysis and precise comparison, it is undeniable that it also faces rebuttals. As mentioned earlier, some scholars believe that Mao Zedong negated the “law of the negation of the negation.” In response to these different views, we offer the following replies.

尽管上述结论的得出是基于细致的分析与精确的对比，但不可否认，它也面临着反驳。正如前述所说，有学者认为，毛泽东否定了“否定之否定规律”。面对这些不同的看法，我们作出以下回应。

Specifically, Stalin’s approach has nothing to do with Mao Zedong; he merely excluded the “law of the negation of the negation” from the basic features of dialectics. Our mention of him only indicates that other scholars’ discussions follow his tradition. Althusser is slightly different. Although he comments on Stalin’s approach, placing this comment within his overall discussion shows a close connection with Mao Zedong. However, what he seeks to exclude from Marxist dialectics is the “negation of the negation” entirely in the Hegelian sense. We fully agree with this, as can be seen from the first part of this article. The focus of our debate is whether Mao Zedong really negated the Marxist “law of the negation of the negation”; therefore, in terms of the relevance of the topic, we do not need to respond to Althusser’s view. As for Žižek, his view is most directly related to Mao Zedong, but a close reading of his argument shows it is not difficult to refute. In Žižek’s view, the reason Mao Zedong negated the “law of the negation of the negation” is that he abandoned “dialectical synthesis.” However, according to (3) and (4) we provided earlier, Mao Zedong did not do this. On the contrary, he held a position of “dialectical synthesis.” This is also reflected in the Chronicle of Mao Zedong (毛泽东年谱). For example, when discussing “what is meant by analysis and synthesis,” he took the struggle between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party as an example, pointing out: “In war, we devoured the Kuomintang’s army bit by bit; most of its soldiers were absorbed into the People’s Liberation Army, and its weapons and ammunition were used by us. Is this not synthesis? Analysis and synthesis must be done this way.” This shows that Žižek’s understanding of “one side simply defeating the other” is incomplete; Mao Zedong also spoke of synthesis. We need only point this out to refute Žižek’s view.

具体来说，斯大林的做法与毛泽东无关，他只是把“否定之否定规律”从辩证法的基本特征中排除出去；而我们对他的提及，也只是表明其他学者的论述遵循着他的传统。阿尔都塞则略有不同。虽说他是对斯大林的做法进行评论，但将这个评论放入他的整个讨论当中，是与毛泽东有着紧密联系的。只是他要从马克思主义辩证法当中排除出去的“否定之否定”。完全是黑格尔意义上的“否定之否定”。对此，我们完全赞同，这从本文的第一部分便可看出。我们的争论焦点在于，毛泽东是否真的否定马克思主义意义上的“否定之否定规律”，因而从论题的相关性来看，我们不需要回应阿尔都塞的观点。至于齐泽克，他的观点同毛泽东的关系最为直接，但是细读他的论证，其实并不难以反驳。在齐泽克看来，毛泽东之所以否定“否定之否定规律”，原因就在于他摒弃“辩证综合”。但是，根据我们之前提供的（3）和（4）来看，毛泽东并没有这样做。相反，他持有“辩证综合”的立场。这在《毛泽东年谱》中也有体现。例如，在谈到“什么叫分析综合”时，他以国共两党的斗争为例，指出：“在战争中，我们一口一口吃掉国民党的军队，它的士兵大部分吸收参加了解放军，它的武器、弹药归我们使用。这不是综合吗？要这样分析综合才行。”这就表明，齐泽克的“一方简单地战胜了另一方”的理解并不全面，毛泽东也讲综合。我们只需指明这些，就足以反驳齐泽克的观点。

At this point, we still have one final view to address. According to this view, “Mao Zedong’s negation of the ‘law of the negation of the negation’ is both an elaboration of Marx’s materialist ‘inversion’ of Hegelian dialectics and consistent with Marx’s fundamental principle of ‘man as objective activity’; therefore, the rationale for this negation fully conforms to the basic principles of Marxist philosophy.” This is clearly related to the theme of this article but contradicts its conclusion, so it is necessary to respond. To make the response targeted, let us first summarize the arguments supporting this view.

至此，我们还有最后一个看法需要回应。根据这个看法，“毛泽东对于‘否定之否定规律’的否定，既是对于马克思对黑格尔辩证法之唯物主义‘颠倒’的阐发，亦契合于马克思的‘人是对象性活动’之基本原理，因而这一否定的理据完全符合马克思主义哲学的基本原则”。这显然与本文的主题相关，但又与本文的结论相左，因而有必要进行回应。为了使回应能够做到有的放矢，让我们先把支持这个看法的论述总结如下。

First, it demonstrates that the “law of the negation of the negation” is inseparable from the Hegelian idealist system.

第一，证明“否定之否定规律”与黑格尔唯心主义体系不可剥离。

To achieve this goal, it first uses Engels’s formulation in *Dialectics of Nature*, namely that the “law of the negation of the negation” is the “basic law governing the construction of the entire system” of Hegel, along with Hegel’s view that “the whole is the ‘truth’ of the parts,” from which it is concluded that “the law of the negation of the negation is therefore the more essential element in Hegel’s dialectical system”; then it uses Engels’s statement — “these laws are forced upon nature and history as laws of thought, not derived from them” — to explain the idealist character of Hegel’s system.

为了达到这个目的，先是利用恩格斯在《自然辩证法》中的表述，即“否定之否定规律”是黑格尔“构筑整个体系的基本规律”以及黑格尔“整体是部分的‘真理’”的观点，由此得到“否定之否定规律在黑格尔辩证法体系中便是更具本质性的东西”；而后又利用恩格斯的表述——“这些规律是作为思维规律强加于自然界和历史的，而不是从它们中推导出来的”——来说明黑格尔体系的唯心主义性质。

Second, it proves that the “law of the negation of the negation” is inseparable from idealism.

第二，证明“否定之否定规律”与唯心主义不可剥离。

Here it uses a comment by Marx in the *Manuscripts* about Hegel, equating the “negation of the negation” with “thought returning to its own birthplace,” and maintains that only in this way can the necessity of the “law of the negation of the negation” be preserved. And “a materialism that acknowledges … the existence of the external world cannot recognize a ‘law of the negation of the negation’ that returns to its ‘birthplace’ or ‘starting point,’ which can only be established within the horizon of idealism”; hence the “law of the negation of the negation” has nothing to do with materialism.

这里使用了马克思在《手稿》中关于黑格尔的一个评论，把“否定之否定”同“回到自己的诞生地的思维”等同起来，并且认为只有这样才能保持“否定之否定规律”的必然性。而“承认……外部世界存在的唯物主义，是不能承认那种只有在唯心主义视域中才能成立的回归到其‘诞生地’或‘出发点’的‘否定之否定规律’的”，因而“否定之否定规律”与唯物主义无关。

With these two proofs in hand, the following argument can be constructed to explain the rationality of Mao Zedong’s negation of the “law of the negation of the negation.”

有了这两个证明，就可以构造出下述论证，以说明毛泽东否定“否定之否定规律”的合理性。

1. Marx’s “inversion” of Hegel’s dialectics is the “inversion” of materialism over idealism;

1.马克思对于黑格尔辩证法的“颠倒”乃是唯物主义对于唯心主义的“颠倒”；

2. The “negation of the negation” is essentially integrated with, or inseparable from, Hegel’s idealist system;

2.“否定之否定”本质上是与黑格尔唯心主义体系一体的，或是不可剥离的；

3. Therefore, the “inversion” of Hegel’s idealist dialectics necessarily includes the “inversion” or “negation” of (Hegel’s) “negation of the negation”;

3.因此，对于黑格尔唯心主义辩证法的“颠倒”必然包含着对于（黑格尔）“否定之否定”的“颠倒”或“否定”；

4. And the “law of the negation of the negation” has nothing to do with materialism; it is connected only with idealism;

4.而“否定之否定规律”与唯物主义无关，它只同唯心主义相连；

5. Therefore, the “inversion” of idealism by materialism also necessarily includes the “inversion” or “negation” of the “negation of the negation”;

5.因此，唯物主义对于唯心主义的“颠倒”也必然包含对于“否定之否定”的“颠倒”或“否定”；

6. Mao Zedong is a materialist and, like Marx, advocates that “man is objective activity”;

6.毛泽东是一个唯物主义者，同时像马克思一样主张“人是对象性活动”；

7. Therefore, Mao Zedong negates the “law of the negation of the negation.”

7.因此，毛泽东否定“否定之否定规律”。

Regarding this argument, I consider it quite insightful. Not only is the mode of argumentation unique, but the explanatory approach is also novel. Unfortunately, it cannot be fully established, for the reason that point 4 has not been effectively justified. Here, the necessity of the “law of the negation of the negation” is guaranteed by thought’s ability to “return to its own birthplace” (see the second proof above). If one were to separate them and express it as “advancing in wave-like motion” or “tortuous development,” it would lead to the following two results.

对于这个论证，我认为它很有洞见。不仅论证方式独特，而且解释思路新颖。但遗憾的是，它并不能够完全成立，理由就在于4没有得到有效的证成。在这里，“否定之否定规律”的必然性是由思维能“回到自己的诞生地”来保障的（见上述第二个证明）。假如人们将它们剥离开来，而将之表述为“波浪式前进”或“曲折发展”，就会导致如下两个结果。

a. It would completely lose the necessity it had in Hegel, becoming a contingent empirical observation that cannot be rationally demonstrated, and in no way could it be called a “law.”

a.完全失去了在黑格尔那里的必然性，成为某种无法予以理性论证的偶然性的经验之谈，无论如何也称不上“规律”了。

b. It would neither be able to logically deduce a triadic schema applicable to Hegel, nor be able to illustrate it with universally valid examples. The examples chosen to demonstrate the triadic schema are often ridiculed by critics who cite examples of a fourfold or fivefold schema.

b.既无法合乎逻辑地推导出适应于黑格尔的三段论，也无法以具有普遍性的例证说明之。那些挑选来论证三段论的例子，亦常常被批评者举以四段或五段论例子嘲讽之。

This method of justification seems to use a “proof by contradiction,” but it conforms neither to the views of Marx and Engels nor to those of Hegel.

这样的证成方式似乎使用了“反证法”，但它既不符合马克思、恩格斯的观点，也不符合黑格尔的观点。

Specifically, result a is completely at odds with Engels’s discussion in *Anti-Dühring*. Here, in response to Dühring’s accusation against Marx — that “hardly any thoughtful person will be convinced of the necessity of the common ownership of land and capital on the strength of such Hegelian nonsense as the negation of the negation” — Engels clearly states, “Marx only proves historically, and here briefly summarizes, that just as small production, by its own development, necessarily creates the conditions for its own destruction, i.e., the expropriation of the small proprietors, so too the capitalist mode of production has itself created the material conditions for its own inevitable destruction.” This process is called by Marx the negation of the negation, and it is a negation of the negation with historical necessity, not, as Dühring claims, that Marx relies on the negation of the negation to prove the necessity of this process. From this response, it is not difficult to see that, in Engels’s eyes, even if the “law of the negation of the negation” describes a linear process such as “the development from individual ownership to capitalist private ownership and then to social ownership,” rather than a circular movement of “returning to one’s own birthplace,” it is still necessary. This clearly shows that separating the “law of the negation of the negation” from “returning to one’s own birthplace” does not cause it to lose its necessity; it still qualifies as a law.

具体而言，结果a与恩格斯在《反杜林论》中的论述完全相悖。在这里，面对杜林对马克思的指控，即“未必有一个深思熟虑的人，会凭着否定的否定这一类黑格尔蠢话的信誉而确信土地和资本公有的必然性”，恩格斯明确指出，“马克思只是历史地证明并在这里简略地概述：正像以往小生产由于自身的发展而必然造成消灭自身，即剥夺小私有者的条件一样，现在资本主义生产方式也自己造成使自己必然走向灭亡的物质条件”。这样的过程被马克思称之为否定的否定，并且是具有历史必然性的否定的否定，而非像杜林所说的那样，他要凭借否定的否定来证明这个过程的必然性。从这个回应当中，我们不难看出，在恩格斯的眼中，即使“否定之否定规律”所描述的是“个人所有制向资本主义私有制再向社会所有制发展”这样的线性过程，而不是“回到自己的诞生地”的圆圈式运动，它也依然是必然的。这就明确地显示出，“否定之否定规律”与“回到自己的诞生地”相剥离，并不会失去自身的必然性，它仍有资格被称为规律。

Similarly, in the *Manuscripts*, Marx’s discussion of communism also challenges result a. Here, he explicitly states: “Communism is the positive expression of the negation of the negation, and therefore it is a real, necessary moment of human emancipation and recovery for the next stage of historical development. Communism is the necessary form and the dynamic principle of the near future.” Clearly, in Marx’s view, communism must be realized, and it is realized through the mode of the negation of the negation. If one further considers that communism is the result of “development from (primitive) communal land ownership to private land ownership and then to (higher) communal land ownership,” then it is also not a movement of “returning to one’s own birthplace,” yet it still possesses necessity. Although the opposing view also recognizes this counterexample and responds with the statement — “this formulation contradicts the basic principle that ‘man is objective activity,’ and can therefore be regarded as merely a vestige of idealist teleology” — I consider this response to presuppose that the “law of the negation of the negation” must “return to its own birthplace,” thereby equating the “law of the negation of the negation” with Hegel’s “law of the negation of the negation” and assuming that there is only this one kind. This not only violates the premise of the “proof by contradiction” (the counter-thesis) but also evaluates Marx’s view of communism from Hegel’s standpoint. And we already know that their standpoints are inverted relative to each other, so it is not surprising that the “law of the negation of the negation” contradicts the basic principle that “man is objective activity,” and it is reasonable that this formulation in the *Manuscripts* is regarded as a “vestige of idealist teleology,” but this mode of response is debatable.

同样，在《手稿》中，马克思就共产主义的论述也对结果a构成了挑战。在此，他明确指出：“共产主义是作为否定的否定的肯定，因此，它是人的解放和复原的一个现实的、对下一段历史发展来说是必然的环节。共产主义是最近将来的必然的形态和有效的原则。”很明显，在马克思看来，共产主义必然要实现，并且是以否定之否定方式来实现的。如果再考虑共产主义是“从（原始的）土地公有制发展到土地私有制再发展到（更高级的）土地公有制的”结果，那它也不是“回到自己的诞生地”的运动，但却仍然具有必然性。虽然与我们相左的看法也意识到这个反例，并用这个表述——“这一表述与‘人是对象性活动’的基本原理是相矛盾的，因而可以看作不过是唯心主义目的论的遗迹”——来回应。但我认为，这个回应预设了“否定之否定规律”必然要“回到自己的诞生地”，因而是把“否定之否定规律”等同于黑格尔的“否定之否定规律”，并且认为有且仅有这一种。这不仅违背了“反证法”的前提假设（反论题），而且也是在用黑格尔的立场来评估马克思的共产主义观。而我们已经知道，他们的立场是彼此颠倒着的，因此出现“否定之否定规律”与“人是对象性活动”这一基本原理相矛盾的情况不足为奇，并且《手稿》中的这个表述被视为“唯心主义目的论的遗迹”也在情理之中，但这样的回应方式值得商榷。

As for result b, it can only be established on the basis of a misunderstanding of Hegel. Indeed, many scholars maintain that Hegel’s dialectics proceeds in the form of a “triadic schema,” especially the “Being—Nothing—Becoming” which provides a model for this understanding. However, as far as Hegel himself is concerned, he never said that he used a triadic schema of “thesis—antithesis—synthesis”; even Marx only used it in *The Poverty of Philosophy*, and for the purpose of mockery; the important philosophers who actually used this method of argumentation were Fichte and Schelling. Therefore, “being unable to logically deduce a triadic schema applicable to Hegel” is a correct view. Moreover, in Hegel’s exposition, we indeed “cannot illustrate the triadic schema with universally valid examples.” For instance, in the *Science of Logic*, when Hegel discusses the transition from “measure—measurelessness—essence,” “measurelessness” is defined as “measure” again before its transition to “essence.” Thus, the transition from “measure” to “essence” does not follow the pattern “measure—measurelessness—essence,” but rather “measure—measurelessness—measure—essence.” This is not a triadic schema but a fourfold one. From this, it can be seen that the emergence of result b does not create any difficulty for separating the “law of the negation of the negation” from “returning to one’s own birthplace”; on the contrary, it helps us to reflect on our understanding of Hegel.

至于结果b，它也必须建立在对黑格尔的错误理解之上才能成立。的确，很多学者都主张，黑格尔的辩证法是以“三段论式”的形式进行的，尤其是“存在—无—变易”提供了这种理解的典范。但是，就黑格尔本人来说，他从未说过自己使用了“正题—反题—合题”式的三段论；即使是马克思，他也只在《哲学的贫困》当中使用过，并且是出于嘲讽的目的；真正用过这种论证方法的重要哲学家是费希特和谢林。因此，“无法合乎逻辑地推导出适应于黑格尔的三段论”，这是正确的看法。并且，在黑格尔的论述当中，我们也确实“无法以具有普遍性的例证（来）说明”三段论。例如，在《小逻辑》中，当黑格尔论述“尺度—无尺度—本质”的转变过程时，“无尺度”在向“本质”转变之前又被定义为“尺度”。这样一来，从“尺度”到“本质”的转变就没有遵从“尺度—无尺度—本质”这个模式，而是遵从“尺度—无尺度—尺度—本质”。这就不是三段论了，而是四段论。由此可见，结果b的出现并不会对“否定之否定规律”与“回到自己的诞生地”相剥离造成任何困境，相反，它还有助于我们反思有关黑格尔的理解。

At this point, we have responded to the differing views raised in the introduction. In fact, Marx, “while criticizing Hegel’s idealism, extracted from it the dialectics of the negation of the negation and gave this dialectics a positive affirmation.” If Mao Zedong truly adhered to the inner logic of Marxist philosophy, then he should, as we have argued, still have affirmed the “law of the negation of the negation.”

至此，我们就对引言中的不同看法做出了回应。实际上，马克思“在批判黑格尔唯心主义的同时，从中将否定之否定的辩证法剥离出来，并对这一辩证法给予了积极的肯定”。如果毛泽东真的坚持了马克思主义哲学的内在理据，那他就应该如我们所说的那样，仍然肯定“否定之否定规律”。

Conclusion

结语

In summary, it can be seen that Mao Zedong’s attitude toward the “law of the negation of the negation” was one of affirmation; only while affirming it, he negated the foundational status of this law. This conclusion is drawn, on the one hand, from our genealogical analysis of this law, and on the other hand, from our detailed comparison of its core concepts. By elucidating Hegel’s discussion of this law, this article clarifies Marx’s and Engels’ critique and development of it, and provides a definition of the law’s content. And through the clarification of the concept of “negation” and the determination of its specific content, this article compares Mao Zedong’s propositions with the views of Marx and Engels, finding no substantive divergence between them, only inheritance and development. Regarding the differing views in academic circles, this article responds on the basis of a thorough analysis of the opposing arguments. Whether the viewpoint held in this article is correct or not is left to the reader’s judgment.

综上所述，我们可以看出，毛泽东对“否定之否定规律”的态度是肯定的，只是在肯定的同时，他否定了这一规律所具有的基础性地位。这一结论的得出，一方面是根据我们就这个规律所做的溯源分析，另一方面是根据我们就它的核心概念所做的细致对比。通过阐明黑格尔有关这个规律的论述，本文弄清楚了马克思、恩格斯对他的批评与发展，并就这一规律的内涵给出了界定；而借助对“否定”这个概念的澄清，以及它的具体内涵的厘定，本文对毛泽东的主张与马克思、恩格斯的看法进行了一番比对，发现他们之间并无实质性的分歧，有的只是继承和发展。关于学界的不同看法，本文在充分分析对方论证的基础上进行了回应。本文所持观点对错与否，留待读者品鉴。

(Author’s bio: Fu Zhiwei, Assistant Professor, School of Marxism, Xiamen University)

（作者简介：傅志伟，厦门大学马克思主义学院助理教授）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心