Excavating and Elucidating Fine Traditional Chinese Culture with Sinicized Marxism
林进平:以中国化的马克思主义挖掘和阐发中华优秀传统文化
The Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the CPC pointed out that “Chinese-path modernization is the modernization of material civilization and cultural-ethical progress in harmony. It is necessary to strengthen cultural confidence, develop advanced socialist culture, promote revolutionary culture, and inherit fine traditional Chinese culture” (Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Further Deepening Reform and Opening Up to Advance Chinese-Path Modernization, p. 32). To uphold, expand, and deepen Chinese-path modernization, it is imperative to continuously promote the creative transformation and innovative development of fine traditional Chinese culture. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to excavate and elucidate fine traditional Chinese culture with appropriate theoretical tools, to pass on the cultural torch, to continue the Chinese cultural lineage, to draw on and absorb all outstanding achievements of human civilization, to forge new brilliance for Chinese civilization, to construct a cultural system with Chinese characteristics, Chinese style, and Chinese manner, and to provide a continuous and powerful spiritual driving force for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. [1]1 This refers to the creative transformation and innovative development of fine traditional Chinese culture, a policy direction emphasized by the CPC to revitalize traditional culture in a modern context. Practice has proven that this appropriate theoretical tool is neither rationalized modern Western culture nor that kind of conservative Chinese culture, but can only be Sinicized Marxism.
党的二十届三中全会指出,“中国式现代化是物质文明和精神文明相协调的现代化。必须增强文化自信,发展社会主义先进文化,弘扬革命文化,传承中华优秀传统文化”(《中共中央关于进一步全面深化改革推进中国式现代化的决定》,第32页)。坚持、拓展和深化中国式现代化,必须持续推进中华优秀传统文化的创造性转化和创新性发展。为了实现这一目标,需要以恰当的理论工具对中华优秀传统文化进行挖掘和阐发,传承文化薪火,赓续中华文脉,借鉴吸收人类一切优秀文明成果,铸就中华文明新辉煌,构建具有中国特色、中国风格、中国气派的文化体系,为实现中华民族伟大复兴提供源源不断的强大精神动力。[1]实践证明,这一恰当的理论工具既不是理性化的现代西方文化,也不是那种因循守旧的中华文化,而只能是中国化的马克思主义。
I. Rationalized Modern Western Culture Is Unable to Effectively Excavate and Elucidate Chinese Culture
一. 理性化的现代西方文化难以有效挖掘和阐发中华文化
In terms of theory, “stones from other hills may serve to polish the jade of this one” (The Book of Songs, “He Ming”). In the process of excavating and elucidating Chinese culture, referencing and drawing lessons from the history of transformation and development of modern Western culture, which is heterogeneous to Chinese culture, and summarizing its strengths and weaknesses, can be considered a feasible method and perspective. This is because, on the one hand, modern Western culture has already undergone a modernization transformation, achieving reflection, critique, and transcendence of its own traditional culture, forming certain experiences and lessons that can be used for reference; on the other hand, with its unique theoretical perspective, modern Western culture can provide new discoveries different from the inherent perspective of Chinese culture, and may even evolve into cultural “new interpretations” or new cultural “forms.” As some scholars have pointed out, the discipline of the history of Chinese philosophy was established “under the inspiration of Western philosophy, through the re-narration of classical ideological concepts” (Chen Shaoming, p. 4), and works like Hu Shi’s Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy and Feng Youlan’s History of Chinese Philosophy are inseparable from their training in Western learning.
就理论而言,“他山之石,可以攻玉”(《诗经·鹤鸣》)。在挖掘和阐发中华文化的过程中,参照和借鉴异质于中华文化的现代西方文化的转型和发展史,总结其优劣得失,不失为一种可行的方法和视角。这是因为,一方面,现代西方文化业已历经现代化转型,实现了对自身传统文化的反思、批判和超越,形成了某些可资借鉴的经验和教训;另一方面,凭借其独特的理论视角,现代西方文化能够提供一些不同于中华文化固有视角的新发现,乃至会衍化出一些文化“新解”或新的文化“样式”。正如有学者指出的,中国哲学史学科就是“在西方哲学的启发下,通过对古典思想观念的重新叙述”(陈少明,第4页)建立起来的,像胡适的《中国哲学史大纲》、冯友兰的《中国哲学史》都离不开他们所受的西学训练。
However, this kind of “scrutiny” of Chinese culture from the perspective of modern Western culture has received mixed reviews. For example, for Bertrand Russell, Chinese culture had a unique charm and deserved special respect and equal treatment. He believed that “China has developed its own traditional culture completely independently, without any influence from Europe, and therefore has advantages and disadvantages that are completely different from those of the West. Trying to seek some kind of balance is futile; because, on the whole, no cautious person would dare to assert whether our current culture is superior or inferior to the culture of the Celestial Empire as seen by the missionaries of the 17th century, but it is certain that each has its own strengths and weaknesses in different aspects” (Russell, 1996, p. 2). But for Hegel, Weber, and others, it was a different story. Confined by their obsession with and even superstition about reason, they examined Chinese culture and Eastern culture from a rationalized perspective, almost regarding Chinese culture as a “dwarf” among cultures.
不过,这种基于现代西方文化视角对中华文化的“审视”也是褒贬不一。譬如,对于罗素来说,中华文化有着独特的魅力,是需要格外给予尊重和平等对待的。他认为,“中国在丝毫未受欧洲影响的情况下,完全独立地发展了自己的传统文化,因而具有与西方截然不同的优点和缺点。试图寻求某种平衡是徒劳的;因为从总体上说,我们现在的文化与17世纪的传教士所看到的天朝帝国的文化孰优孰劣,任何一个谨慎的人都不敢妄加断言,但在不同的方面各有短长却是肯定的”(罗素,1996年,第2页)。但对于黑格尔、韦伯等人来说又是另一种情形。囿于对理性的执着乃至迷信,他们以一种理性化的视角审视中华文化、东方文化,几乎认为中华文化是文化中的“矮子”。
In Hegel’s view, “The Chinese, like the Indians, have a great reputation for culture, but no matter how great their reputation for culture may be, and how numerous their books, upon closer acquaintance they are greatly diminished. The vast cultures of these two nations are all about religion, science, state governance, state institutions, poetry, technology and art, and commerce, etc.” (Hegel, 1959, p. 118). And Hegel did not think highly of these cultures.
在黑格尔看来,“中国人和印度人一样,在文化方面有很高的声名,但无论他们文化上的声名如何大、典籍的数量如何多,在进一步的认识之下,就都大为减低了。这两个民族的广大文化,都是关于宗教,科学,国家的治理、国家的制度、诗歌、技术与艺术和商业等方面的”(黑格尔,1959年,第118页)。而对于这些文化,黑格尔并没有高看。
Regarding Chinese religion, Hegel believed that neither Taoism, Buddhism, nor Confucianism, which was regarded as a religion, were mature religions (see Hegel, 2015, p. 309); and as for Confucianism being considered a religion, what it emphasized was nothing more than “a kind of moral life.” Therefore, “the religion of China can be called a moral religion (in this sense, atheism can be attributed to the Chinese)” (ibid., p. 240). However, his evaluation of the moral realm in China was also not high, believing that Chinese morality was more manifested as the morality of the state, rather than the morality of the individual. In his view, the Chinese submerged their inner feelings and subjective freedom either in the “Heaven” of the “unity of Heaven and man” or in the “state,” that is, “everything is on earth, and everything that has power submits to the emperor, and this is the individual self-consciousness that consciously implements this perfect governance” (ibid., p. 238), thus completely failing to see the struggle or resistance of individual subjective freedom or self-consciousness.
就中国的宗教而言,黑格尔认为不论是道教、佛教,还是被视同为宗教的儒教,都不是成熟的宗教(参见黑格尔,2015年,第309页);且就儒家被视为宗教来说,其强调的也无非是“一种道德生活”,因此,“中国的宗教可以称之为一种道德的宗教(在此意义上,人们可以把无神论归之于中国人)”(同上,第240页)。然而,他对中国道德领域的评价也不高,认为中国的道德更多地表现为国家的道德,而不是表现为人的道德。在他看来,中国人把主体内在的情感、主观的自由不是湮没于“天人合一”的“天”之中,就是湮没于“国家”之中,即“一切都在地上,而且凡有力量的一切都屈从于皇帝,而这就是以自觉的方式实行这种完美摄政的个别自我意识”(同上,第238页),从而完全看不到作为个人的主观自由或自我意识的挣扎或抗争。
As for the contributions of Chinese culture in state governance and legal systems, Hegel also found them unremarkable, believing that in China “only the emperor is the ruler” (ibid., p. 238), and the emperor “holds sway over natural things and their changes, and manages the various forces” (ibid., p. 238). “The Chinese have neither what we call law nor what we call morality. It is a morality of the state. When we speak of Chinese philosophy, of the philosophy of Confucius, and praise it, we must understand that what is spoken of and praised is only this morality. This morality includes the subject’s duty to the sovereign, the son’s duty to the father, the father’s duty to the son, and the duties between brothers and sisters. There are many excellent things in it, but when the duties that the Chinese value so highly are practiced, the practice of these duties is merely formal, not a free inner feeling, not subjective freedom” (Hegel, 1959, p. 125). “China remains in the abstract; when they transition to the concrete, what they call concrete in theory is the external connection of sensory objects; it is without (logical, necessary) order, and without fundamental intuition within. A further step into the concrete is morality” (ibid., p. 132).
至于中华文化在国家治理和法律制度方面的贡献,在黑格尔看来也是乏善可陈,认为在中国“只有皇帝是统治者”(同上,第238页),皇帝“掌握着对诸自然事物及其变化的统治,并管理着诸种力量”(同上,第238页)。“中国人既没有我们所谓法律,也没有我们所谓道德。那乃是一个国家的道德。当我们说中国哲学,说孔子的哲学,并加以夸羡时,则我们须了解所说的和所夸羡的只是这种道德。这道德包含有臣对君的义务,子对父、父对子的义务以及兄弟姊妹间的义务。这里面有很多优良的东西,但当中国人如此重视的义务得到实践时,这种义务的实践只是形式的,不是自由的内心的情感,不是主观的自由。”(黑格尔,1959年,第125页)“中国是停留在抽象里面的;当他们过渡到具体者时,他们所谓具体者在理论方面乃是感性对象的外在联结;那是没有(逻辑的、必然的)秩序的,也没有根本的直观在内的。再进一步的具体者就是道德。”(同上,第132页)
Hegel’s above judgments on Chinese culture were based, on the one hand, on the political experience of modern Western society, and on the other hand, were driven by his rationalized perspective. His way of examining and understanding Chinese culture, to a considerable extent, reflects the prejudices of most modern Western scholars [2]2 The term “modern Western scholars” here refers to thinkers like Hegel and Weber, who are critiqued for applying a rationalized, Eurocentric framework to non-Western cultures. who admire Western political experience, emphasize reason, and even regard reason as the standard for judging everything.
黑格尔之所以对中华文化作出上述评判,一方面是基于现代西方社会的政治经验,另一方面是其理性化的视角使然。他对中华文化的审视方式和理解在相当程度上反映了大多数崇尚西方政治经验、强调理性,乃至把理性视为评判一切的标准的现代西方学者[2]的成见。
Weber’s understanding of Chinese culture is very close to Hegel’s. In his book The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism, he made judgments about Chinese Confucianism, Taoism, political society, and the spiritual state of the people similar to Hegel’s, to the point of concluding that it was difficult for China to produce a “capitalist spirit” (see Weber, p. 299). For example, regarding Chinese society and culture, he believed that Chinese morality was the morality of the state, requiring compliance with the “cosmic order” (see ibid., p. 203); Chinese morality was this-worldly and secular, lacking the individual effort to live for the other world and seek salvation of the soul (see ibid., pp. 195–299); like all places under patrimonial bureaucracy, ancient China was also a “static” bureaucratic society, and the great enemy of Confucianism was “autocracy and the eunuch politics that supported it” (see ibid., pp. 188–189).
韦伯对中华文化的理解与黑格尔极为相近。他在其《儒教与道教》一书中,对中国的儒教、道教、政治社会和人们的精神状况都作出了类似于黑格尔的判断,以至得出中国很难产生“资本主义精神”的结论。(参见韦伯,第299页)譬如,对于中国社会和文化,他认为中国的道德是国家的道德,要求的是对“宇宙秩序”的顺应(参见同上,第203页);中国人的道德是此岸的、世俗的,缺乏为彼岸世界而生活并寻求灵魂得救的个人努力(参见同上,第195—299页);同所有处于世袭官僚制条件下的地方一样,古代中国也是一个“静态”的官僚社会,儒家的大敌就是“独裁制和为其撑腰的宦官政治”。(参见同上,第188—189页)
It is undeniable that when Western scholars such as Hegel and Weber examined Chinese culture from their respective cultural perspectives, they indeed discovered many characteristics of Chinese culture and affirmed its uniqueness and excellence, including some insightful observations. However, their examination and affirmation of Chinese culture were derived with rationalization and Western political experience as reference points, and the aspects that could enter their field of vision and be worthy of note were naturally not numerous. What they "noted" were primarily the characteristics of traditional Chinese political society (such as bureaucratic culture and feudal autocracy), mainstream social thought (such as Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism, with Confucian thought being called the foundation and core of Chinese culture), and the spiritual world of the people (mainly those situated in political society). In their view, the development of Chinese political society was immature, and the Chinese people lacked a spirit of subjectivity, both of which hindered China from entering modern society. But such judgments implicitly treat their own subjectivity and Western political experience uncritically.
不可否认,黑格尔、韦伯等西方学者在以各自的文化视角审视中华文化时,的确发现了中华文化的不少特性,并对其独特性及优秀之处都有所肯定,其中不乏独到的见地。但他们对中华文化的审视及肯定却是以理性化和西方政治经验为参照得出的,能够进入他们视野且可圈可点的方面当然也并不多,其所“圈点”的主要是中国传统政治社会的特点(如官僚文化、封建专制)、主流的社会思想(如儒家、道家、佛教等思想,且儒教的思想被他们称为中华文化的基础和核心)以及人们(主要是处在政治社会中的人)的精神世界等。在他们看来,中国政治社会的发育并不成熟,中国民众缺乏主体性精神,这些都有碍中国进入现代社会。但这样的论断隐含着无批判地对待自己的主体性和西方政治经验。
In essence, these judgments are derived from Western political experience and paradigms of political thought, and are uncritically taken by Hegel, Weber, and others as evaluative standards. We know that modern Western states are based on the separation of civil society from political society as their practical foundation—that is, political society is separated from civil society, private life is separated from public life, and each exhibits different orientations and pursuits. The political state thereby becomes a state in the modern sense, and correspondingly, law also becomes law in the modern sense. (See *Complete Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 3, 2002, p. 94; *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 1, pp. 30–54) This is a unique political phenomenon of modern Western society, but it is not of course a universally applicable political phenomenon. Thus, once "judgment" is made based on Western political experience and paradigms of thought, traditional Chinese culture appears in their eyes to have "little to recommend it"—because the state and law of traditional Chinese culture, characterized by the "integration of family and state," are not the political state and law of the modern sense; the individuals within it are not individuals with a spirit of subjectivity either. Whether individual or state, both are constrained by the ethical bonds of the "family." The state does not exhibit spiritual characteristics different from those of the "family," but is an enlarged family; the ruler of the state is exactly like the head of a family, and the head of a family is exactly like the ruler of a state. If we take Hegel's logical framework of "family–civil society–state" as a comparison, we find that China precisely lacks the spirit required by "civil society" within this framework, and the family and the political state exhibit a high degree of homogeneity. This cultural phenomenon of "integration of family and state" makes it easy for many people in Chinese society to exhibit in their personalities the characteristics of failing to distinguish between family and state and having a weak sense of public consciousness. (See Russell, 1996, p. 195) Moreover, whether it is Chinese Confucianism or Daoism, it is difficult for either to cultivate the independent personality and spiritual temperament required by civil society. What Hegel, Weber, and others saw was precisely this cultural phenomenon, which can also be called the "political" phenomenon of the Chinese people. But we must also see that this phenomenon is precisely "discovered" from the perspective of modern political society, or more bluntly, "discovered" from the perspective of the bourgeois paradigm of thought, namely liberalism. Whenever Chinese traditional culture is examined from such a perspective, it is not difficult to arrive at similar views. And such views are also quite common in many domestic works discussing traditional Chinese culture or the history of ancient political thought.
究其实,这些论断是基于西方的政治经验和政治思维范式得出的,并被黑格尔、韦伯等人无批判地视为评价标准。我们知道,现代西方国家以市民社会与政治社会的分离为现实基础,即政治社会从市民社会中分离出来,私人生活与公共生活分离开来,并表现出不同的指向和追求,政治国家因之成为现代意义的国家,与之相应,法律也成为现代意义的法律。(参见《马克思恩格斯全集》第3卷,2002年,第94页;《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷,第30—54页)这是近代西方社会独特的政治现象,但并不当然地属于普适性的政治现象。因而,一旦基于西方的政治经验和思维范式进行“裁断”,中华传统文化在他们眼中似乎“乏善可陈”——因为作为中华传统文化“家国同构”的国家、法律,并不是现代意义的政治国家和法律;其中的个人也不是具有主体性精神的个体,不论是个人或是国家,都处在“家”的伦理约束之中。国家并没有表现出不同于“家庭”的精神特质,而是一个扩大了的家庭,一国之君就恰如一家之长,家长又恰如一国之君。假如以黑格尔的“家庭-市民社会-国家”的逻辑架构作为比照,就会发现,中国在这个架构中恰好缺失了“市民社会”所需要的那种精神,家庭与政治国家表现出高度的同质性。而这种“家国同构”的文化现象,使中国社会中的很多人在人格上容易表现出家国不分、公共性意识不强的特征。(参见罗素,1996年,第195页)且不论是中国的儒教还是道教,都难以培育出市民社会所需要的独立人格和精神气质。黑格尔和韦伯等人所看到的正是这种文化现象,也可以说是中国人的“政治”现象。但我们同时也要看到,这种现象恰是基于现代政治社会的视角来审视并被“发现”的,或者更直白地说,是基于资产阶级的思维范式即自由主义的视角而“发现”的。大凡依据这样的视角来审视中华传统文化,都不难得出类似的观点。而这种观点在国内不少论述中华传统文化或古代政治思想史的著作中也较为多见。
It must be said that such an examination is undoubtedly flawed. [3]3 The author's argument here is that the Western perspective is flawed, and the following rhetorical questions elaborate this critique. The problem is: why must Chinese culture be viewed in a chain of historical development, even to the point of regarding Chinese culture as a feudal autocratic culture, that is, a backward predecessor of capitalist culture? Why must traditional Chinese political phenomena and culture be examined and judged from a rationalized perspective and modern Western political experience? Why must Chinese culture be viewed within a framework of binary opposition between "civil society and political state," even to the point of detecting that Chinese culture lacks the soil for cultivating civil society and the independent personality of individuals? Little do they know that the Chinese people do not live only within political society. The "law-abiding" Chinese people more often hope to live outside political society, harboring varying degrees of longing for non-political life. [4]4 The term "本分" (benfen) refers to a traditional Chinese virtue of knowing one's place and fulfilling one's duties, often translated as "law-abiding" or "dutiful." This is particularly reflected in Daoist thought, especially the thought of Zhuangzi. Even the Confucian concept of "entering the world" (rushi) does not mean devoting oneself entirely to political life, but advocates acting according to one's capacity: "If poor, one attends to one's own virtue in solitude; if advanced to dignity, one makes the whole world virtuous as well" (Mencius, *Jinxin I*). In "cultivating oneself, regulating the family, governing the state, and bringing peace to all under Heaven" (see *The Book of Rites, The Great Learning*), "cultivating oneself" is the "root" and what the noble person (junzi) must hold fast to. On this point, Confucianism even forms, together with Daoism and Buddhism, different insights into nature and different cares for life. And this is precisely the excellence and charm of Chinese culture. [5]5 "穷则独善其身,达则兼善天下" is a classical allusion from *Mencius*; "修身、齐家、治国、平天下" is from *The Great Learning*, a core Confucian text. Both are four-character idioms summarizing Confucian self-cultivation and political philosophy.
不得不说,这样一种审视无疑是有缺陷的。[4]问题在于,为何必须在一种历史的发展链条中来看待中华文化与现代西方文化的关系,乃至把中华文化视为封建专制文化,即资本主义文化的落后的前身?为何必须以理性化的视角和现代西方的政治经验来审视、评判中国传统的政治现象和文化?为何必须以一种“市民社会-政治国家”的二元对立的框架来看待中华文化,乃至查检出中华文化中缺失了培育市民社会及个人的独立人格的土壤?殊不知,中国民众并不是只生活在政治社会之中。“本分”的中国民众更多希望生活在政治社会之外,不同程度地对非政治生活充满向往。[5]这方面特别体现在道家思想,尤其是庄子的思想之中。即使是儒家讲的“入世”,也不是一味要求完全致力于政治生活,而是主张量力而行,“穷则独善其身,达则兼善天下”(《孟子·尽心上》)。在“修身、齐家、治国、平天下”(参见《礼记·大学》)中,“修身”是“本”之所在,也是君子所要固守的。在这点上,儒家甚至与道家、释家构成了对自然的不同感悟、对生命的不同关怀。而这恰是中华文化的卓越和迷人之处。[6]
If one fails to see the love for life and nature in Chinese culture, it is difficult to discover the longing for non-political life in Daoism and Buddhism, difficult to understand why Confucianism leaves room for non-political life, and difficult to discover the strengths and uniqueness of Chinese culture. Consequently, it is also difficult to give due affirmation to Chinese political culture, because the "root" of Confucian culture, which is the mainstream of Chinese political culture, is precisely intertwined with Daoist culture and Buddhist culture, and all contain reverence for life. Just as modern Western culture is accustomed to examining religion from a rationalized perspective and regards Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, etc., as inferior to Christianity, it also easily regards that political culture rooted in life and revering life [6]6 "本于生命、尊崇生命的政治文化" refers to a political culture rooted in and revering life, a concept the author uses to characterize traditional Chinese political culture in contrast to Western rationalized modernity. as a backward "predecessor" or "appendix" of modern political culture and negates it. This is precisely the reason why Western scholars such as Hegel and Weber often find it difficult to comprehend Chinese cultural thought about matters beyond political life—they not only struggle to fully grasp the status of Daoist and Buddhist thought in China, but even regarding the Confucian ideal of "all under Heaven is held in common" (tianxia wei gong) in the Great Harmony (datong) thought, Weber found it difficult to grasp its essence and considered it not Confucian thought. (See Weber, pp. 262–263) Relatively speaking, the reason they have some words of affirmation for Daoism is actually because Daoism is rich in dialectical thought, not because Daoism is rich in a longing for non-political life and a natural spirit that "takes Heaven and Earth as its model" (fa tiandi). (See Hegel, 1959, pp. 124–132)
看不到中华文化对生命、对自然的热爱,就很难发现道教和佛教对非政治生活的向往,很难理解儒家何以对非政治生活留有余地,很难发现中华文化的优势所在及其独特之处。由之,也就很难对中国政治文化给予应有的肯定,因为作为中国政治文化主流的儒家文化的“根”,恰是与道家文化、佛教文化盘根错节的,且都含有对生命的敬畏。正如现代西方文化习惯以理性化的视角去审视宗教,并将佛教、伊斯兰教、犹太教等都视为落后于基督教一样,它也很容易把那种本于生命、尊崇生命的政治文化[7]视为现代政治文化落后的“前身”或“阑尾”而加以否定。这也是黑格尔、韦伯等西方学者常常难以领悟中华文化关于政治生活之外的思想的缘由所在——他们不仅难以充分把握道家和佛家思想在中国的地位,甚至对儒家的“天下为公”的大同思想,韦伯都因难扼其要,而认为不是儒家的思想。(参见韦伯,第262—263页)相对而言,他们之所以对道家不乏肯定之辞,实因道家具有丰富的辩证法思想,而不是因为道家富有对非政治生活的向往和“法”天地的自然心灵。(参见黑格尔,1959年,第124—132页)
II. The Modernization of Chinese Culture Requires Avoiding Sticking to Old Ways and Resting on Its Laurels
二. 中华文化的现代化需要避免因循守旧、固步自封
Rationalized modern Western culture is certainly unable to effectively excavate and elucidate Chinese culture. However, if Chinese culture sticks to old ways and rests on its laurels, its excavation and elucidation will also proceed with difficulty, and the creative transformation and innovative development of fine traditional Chinese culture will face challenges.
理性化的现代西方文化固然难以有效挖掘和阐发中华文化。不过,中华文化若因循守旧、固步自封,对其的挖掘和阐发也将步履维艰,中华优秀传统文化的创造性转化、创新性发展也会面临难题。
Theoretically speaking, Chinese culture itself is the clearest and most authoritative in understanding the overall characteristics of Chinese culture—this may be what is meant by “the one who knows himself is wise.” Therefore, adopting a perspective inherent to Chinese culture to examine it is a fitting choice. Generally, scholars with deep cultivation in or reverent devotion to classical Chinese culture will unconsciously adopt this approach of being “within it,” engaging in close-range self-analysis and self-discovery. As Yao Chunpeng states in the preface to his annotated translation of the *Yellow Emperor’s Inner Classic*: “When reading the classics of Chinese culture, one must first set aside the interference of modern thinking patterns and enter into the thinking of the ancients to understand the original meaning of the classics. Borrowing the method by which Gongsun Cheng Yang once taught Cang Gong medicine—telling him to discard all his old learning—I ask readers to first suspend the ideas and concepts we have already formed, free ourselves from their constraints, and listen to the voices of the ancients.” (Yao Chunpeng, annotated translation, “Preface,” p. 4) This “requirement” of Yao Chunpeng is somewhat reminiscent of Zhuangzi’s instruction, through Confucius, for Yan Hui to practice the “fasting of the mind.” (See *Zhuangzi: The Human World*) The rationality of this “requirement” lies in the fact that the formation of Chinese cultural classics has its own unique experiential world, and it is within this experiential world that they are tested, even becoming classics or attaining “truthful” understanding. This “truthful” understanding is truthful only in relation to the experiential world it points to. Consequently, once viewed through the “enlightenment” or “prejudices” formed in a heterogeneous experiential world, the “classics” may appear untrustworthy or full of absurdity. It is in this sense that we must emphasize that the interpretation of Chinese culture should be based on the perspective inherent in traditional Chinese culture. Research conducted from this inherent perspective of traditional Chinese culture can naturally discover and elucidate many subtle and profound meanings within Chinese classical culture, thereby generating a “natural” respect and reverence for it. This approach is commonly seen in studies of traditional Chinese medicine, classical Chinese literature and art, and is especially evident in the writings of scholars renowned for their research in the classical studies tradition.[7]7 “The one who knows himself is wise” (自知者明) is a phrase from the *Dao De Jing* (Chapter 33), meaning that self-knowledge is a form of true wisdom. “Fasting of the mind” (心斋) is a concept from the *Zhuangzi* (Chapter 4, “The Human World”), referring to a meditative state of emptying the mind of preconceptions to achieve spiritual receptivity.
从理论上说,对于中华文化整体特征的理解,中华文化“自己”最清楚、最有发言权,这也许就是“自知者明”。因而,以基于中华文化固有的视角来审视中华文化不失为一种恰当的选择。一般来说,对中国古典文化有着深厚素养或保有虔诚敬意的学者,大多会不自觉地采用这种“身在其中”、近距离地自我分析和自我发现的方式。正如姚春鹏在译注《黄帝内经》的“前言”中所说:“阅读中国文化的经典,首先要排除现代思维定势的干扰,进入古人的思维之中,才可能理解经典的本来意蕴。借用当年公乘阳庆传授仓公医术时,让其尽弃其旧学的方法,请读者朋友先把我们已形成的思想观念悬搁起来,摆脱其束缚,倾听古人的声音。”(姚春鹏译注,“前言”第4页)姚春鹏的这番“要求”与庄子借孔子要求颜回“心斋”有些神似。(参见《庄子·人间世》)这一“要求”的合理性在于,中华文化经典的形成有其独特的经验世界,并在其经验世界中获得检验,乃至成为经典或具备了“真理性”认识,而这种“真理性”认识相对于其所指向的经验世界才是真理性认识。因而,一旦以一种异质性的经验世界所形成的“觉解”或“成见”来观照,就会觉得“经典”不可信或充满荒谬。正是在此意义上,我们有必要强调,对中华文化的读解要基于中华传统文化所内蕴的视角。这种从中华传统文化的固有视角出发所进行的研究,一般都能很自然地发现、阐发中国古典文化中的很多微言大义,并由此对中华传统文化生发出一种“自然”的尊重和敬意。这种情形多见于对中医、中国古典文学和艺术等的研究,尤其体现在以经学传统研究著称的学者的著述中。[8]
However, this attitude toward classical Chinese culture does not mean rejecting the reception of other cultures—that is, simultaneously looking down on other cultures while being complacent and stagnant. Rather, it requires discarding self-enclosure toward one’s own culture and achieving inclusiveness by recognizing the equality of other cultures. As Bertrand Russell pointed out in *The Problem of China*: “If the Chinese can adopt the good aspects of our civilization while discarding the bad, and combine them with their own traditional culture, they will surely achieve brilliant success. But in this process, two extreme dangers must be avoided. First, wholesale Westernization, abandoning traditions that distinguish them from other nations. That would merely add another restless, bellicose, intellectually developed industrial-military state to those already tormenting this unfortunate planet. Second, in resisting foreign aggression, forming a strongly xenophobic conservatism that rejects any Western civilization (except in military matters).” He also emphasized in *A History of Western Philosophy*: “If we are to live more comfortably in the world, we must in our thinking not only recognize Asia’s political equality but also its cultural equality. I do not know what changes this will bring, but I am convinced that these changes will be of the utmost profundity and significance.”
不过,这种对待中国古典文化的态度并不是要排斥对其他文化的接纳,即一边傲视其他文化,一边固步自封,而是要同时摒弃对自身文化的自我封闭,以承认其他文化的平等性来实现自身的包容性。正如罗素在《中国问题》中所指出的:“中国人如能对我们的文明扬善弃恶,再结合自身的传统文化,必将取得辉煌的成就。但在这个过程中要避免两个极端的危险。第一,全盘西化,抛弃有别于他国的传统。那样的话,徒增一个浮躁好斗、智力发达的工业化、军事化国家而已,而这些国家正折磨着这个不幸的星球;第二,在抵制外国侵略的过程中,形成拒绝任何西方文明的强烈排外的保守主义(只有军事除外)。”他在《西方哲学史》中还强调:“假如我们打算在世界上生活得更舒适,那末我们就必须在思想中不仅承认亚洲在政治方面的平等,也要承认亚洲在文化方面的平等。我不知道,这种事将要引起什么变化,但是我确信,这些变化将具有极其深刻和极其重要的意义。”
In fact, the vitality and dynamism that Chinese culture has shown in its development to this day lie precisely in its adherence to the spirit of equality and inclusiveness, through which it has continuously evolved.[8]8 Joseph Needham (1900–1995) was a British biochemist and historian of Chinese science, author of the multi-volume *Science and Civilisation in China*. (See Joseph Needham, pp. 147, 165) While maintaining a full understanding and respect for one’s own culture, adopting an open mind to absorb and accept foreign cultures not only does not bring about a crisis for one’s own culture but can instead stimulate its vitality. This point is especially important because Chinese culture itself possesses a “homogeneous” and highly stable character. As many scholars have recognized, within the ideological core of traditional Chinese culture, Confucian culture occupied a dominant position in traditional Chinese society, becoming the guiding ideology of Chinese political society after the Qin and Han dynasties, or, in other words, the official ideology.
事实上,中华文化发展至今所展现的生机和活力,正在于秉持平等、包容的精神而得到不断发展的。[9](参见李约瑟,第147、165页)在保有对自身文化的充分理解和尊重中,持有一种开放的心胸,吸收接纳外来文化,不仅不会带来自身文化的危机,反而能够激发自身文化的活力。这一点之所以格外重要,还在于中华文化本身具有一种“同质性”的、高稳定性的特点。正如诸多学者所意识到的,在中华传统文化的思想内核中,儒家文化在中国传统社会中占有支配性地位,几乎成为秦汉以后中国政治社会的指导思想,或者说是官方的意识形态。
As for Confucian thought, what it revered was precisely the political ideal of the Western Zhou period—the advocacy of the “homology of state and family” based on “loyalty and filial piety.” This means that “family” and “state” share a common ethical standard, that is, the “state” is the “state” of the “family”—the state of the imperial family, the state of one clan and one surname; while the “family” is the “family” under the “state”—the “family” itself is situated within political society.[9]9 The “homology of state and family” (家国同构) is a Confucian concept describing the structural and ethical isomorphism between the patriarchal family and the imperial state in traditional Chinese political thought. The inherent logic latent in the “homology of state and family” is: although political society is superior to private society (just as “loyalty” is superior to “filial piety”), private society (family, clan, village society) is ultimately the foundation of political society (just as “filial piety” is the foundation of “loyalty,” and “loyalty” is the “upgrade” of “filial piety”). In any case, the “homology of state and family” based on “loyalty and filial piety” implies a high degree of homogeneity between “family” and “state.” Although Confucianism differs from Daoism and Buddhism, its “self-cultivation” is directed toward “entering the world” (i.e., being loyal to the court and the state), this “loyalty” is based on “filial piety,” and the norms of political society’s operation derive from the ethical standards of the family.[10]10 “Entering the world” (入世) is a Confucian term contrasting with Daoist and Buddhist “world-transcendence,” denoting active engagement in social and political life. It can be said that this Confucian political ideal of the “homology of state and family” not only reflects the characteristics of traditional Chinese politics but also serves as a defense of traditional Chinese political society, while simultaneously functioning as an ideology. It made Chinese political society more stable and secure, and the long, ultra-stable feudal society of China is inseparable from the role of Confucian thought.
就儒家思想而论,其追崇的正是西周时期的政治理念——崇尚基于“忠孝”的“家国同构”。这意味着“家”与“国”有着共同的伦理准则,即所谓“国”是“家”之“国”——帝皇之家的国,一家一姓之国;而“家”则是“国”之下的“家”——“家”本身就在政治社会之中。[10]“家国同构”中潜藏的内在逻辑是:尽管政治社会高于私人社会(正如“忠”高于“孝”一样),但私人社会(家庭、宗族、乡村社会)终归是政治社会的基础(正如“孝”是“忠”的基础,“忠”是“孝”的“升级”一样)。无论如何,基于“忠孝”的“家国同构”意味着“家”“国”具有高度的同质性。尽管儒家不同于道家和佛家,其“修身”指向在于“入世”(即忠于朝廷、忠于国家),但这一“忠”却是以“孝”为基础的,政治社会运作的准则源于家庭的伦理规范。[11]可以说,儒家这种“家国同构”的政治理念既反映了中国传统政治的特点,也是对中国传统政治社会的辩护,同时发挥着意识形态的效能。它使中国政治社会更趋于牢靠和稳固,中国漫长的超稳定的封建社会与儒家思想的作用密不可分。
The Confucian thought of the “homology of state and family” based on “loyalty and filial piety” endowed Chinese political society with the demand for “benevolent governance” and the political imagination of the “family.” On the one hand, it imposed ethical demands on actual politics derived from the “family.” It required that rulers (the “Son of Heaven”) must act like a “family head,” and local officials must act like the parents of the people (hence the term “parent officials”). The governing philosophy of these “parent officials” is what we are familiar with in traditional Chinese political society: “holding office for one term, benefiting one region” and “if not a good minister, then a good doctor.” On the other hand, it imposed specific political demands on the self, namely, that officials should serve the state as they would serve their own family, and at a level higher than serving the family—that is, they should elevate from their own “small family” to the “big family” of the “state” and even to the “family under heaven.” This is the ideological role that Confucian thought played in traditional Chinese political society.
基于“忠孝”的“家国同构”的儒家思想为中国政治社会赋予了“仁政”的诉求和“家”之政治想象。一方面,它对现实政治提出了源于“家”的伦理要求。它要求统治者(“天子”)必须像“家长”一样,地方官员必须像民之父母一样(即所谓的“父母官”)。这些“父母官”的做官理念就是我们所熟悉的中国传统政治社会的“为官一任,造福一方”“不为良相就为良医”。另一方面,它对自身提出了特定的政治要求,即官员服务国家要像服务自己的家一样,而且比服务家庭还要高一个层级,即要从自己的“小家”提升到“国”这一“大家”乃至“天下之家”。这就是儒家思想在中国传统政治社会中所发挥的意识形态的作用。
However, during China’s two-thousand-year feudal society, the ruling class ostensibly followed Confucian thought, but in substance it practiced Legalist thought—what academia calls “ostensible Confucianism, covert Legalism” or “Confucian exterior, Legalist interior”—and the role of Confucian thought in China’s traditional political society was often compromised. On this point, Zhang Taiyan, Liang Qichao, and others have made observations.[11]11 Zhang Taiyan (1868–1936) and Liang Qichao (1873–1929) were late-Qing and early-Republican scholars and reformers who critiqued traditional Chinese political thought. First, in terms of actual politics or within the ruling stratum itself, Confucian thought was not well observed. This is perfectly clear if one looks at the many coups d’état contrary to “loyalty and filial piety” that occurred in struggles for the throne, or the various overt and covert political struggles within the palace. Second, not only did the upper ruling stratum fail to abide by the Confucian concepts of “loyalty and filial piety,” but even officials who embraced the Confucian ideal of engagement in the world often experienced vicissitudes or frequent misfortune in actual politics. We can roughly understand this through certain character images shaped in traditional Chinese culture and the fates of some political figures in real politics. For example, Song Jiang in *Water Margin* can be said to have attempted to enter officialdom with “Confucian” political ideals, but his political ideal based on “filial piety” ultimately led to his destruction in real politics. And Su Dongpo, a man with a Confucian personality model and talent for saving the world, was repeatedly demoted and exiled in real politics, finally finding spiritual liberation only amid mountains and waters. A survey of the history of Chinese feudal society reveals that the laws governing traditional Chinese political society actually comprised two kinds: one was morality and legal principle as a means of coordinating interests; the other was ritual law and human relations as a bond linking blood ties and kinship. The former is considered the domain of Legalism, the latter the domain of Confucianism. The ritual law and human relations revered by Confucianism represented, in a certain sense, an ideal and a faith of political society, but such an ethical appeal cannot be called an appeal of political ethics; it is more appropriately called an appeal of family ethics (at most, human relations). On this point, it is indeed not inappropriate, like Weber, to regard Confucianism as a religion, for it does possess some properties of religion; it can be seen as a remedial method and an appeal to conscience in China’s traditional political society. Only, this “remedy” and “appeal to conscience” came more from a beautification of and nostalgia for the past, or from a naturalistic contemplation,[12]12 “Naturalistic contemplation” refers to a worldview that sees nature as the ultimate standard, often associated with Daoist thought. and therefore inevitably carried a certain conservatism. Because the development of political society inevitably and continuously breaks free from the constraints of the “family way,”[13]13 “Family way” (家道) here denotes the principle of organizing political society on the model of the family, central to Confucian political ethics. turning the “family way” into a kind of quasi-religious sacred scene, an ideological promise. For this reason, China’s traditional political society became a society that ideologically emphasized kinship and human relations, but in reality had to resort to interests and morality (or legal principle)—that is, a so-called “Confucian exterior, Legalist interior” society.
不过,在中国两千多年的封建社会,统治阶级表面上遵循的是儒家思想,但实质上奉行的却是法家思想,即学界所称的“阳儒阴法”“外儒内法”,而儒家思想在中国传统政治社会中的作用常常是打折扣的。对此,章太炎、梁启超等人都有所指述。[13]首先,就现实政治或统治者内部来说,并没有很好地遵循儒家思想,这一点只要看看历史中诸多为争夺帝位所发生的有悖“忠孝”的政变或宫廷当中各种明争暗斗的政治事件就非常清楚了。其次,不仅上层统治者不守儒家的“忠孝”观念,就是秉承儒家入世思想的官员们在现实政治中也常常历经沧桑或频遭厄运。这一点我们透过中华传统文化中所塑造的一些人物形象以及现实政治中一些政治人物的命运就能大致了解。比如,《水浒传》中的宋江可以说是试图以“儒家”的政治理念走上仕途,但他基于“孝”的政治理念却最终带来了在现实政治中的覆灭。而苏东坡这位有着儒家人格典范和济世之才的人,在现实政治中也是屡遭贬斥和流放,最终在山水之间才获得心灵的解放。概览中国封建社会的历史就会发现,主导中国传统政治社会的法则其实包含两种:一是作为协调利益的道义和法理;二是作为联结血缘、亲情的礼法和人伦。前者被认为是法家所能事,后者被认为是儒家所能事。而儒家所推崇的礼法和人伦在某种意义上代表了政治社会的一种理想、一种信仰,但这样一种伦理呼唤不能称为政治伦理的呼唤,更适宜称之为家庭伦理(至多是人伦)的呼唤。就这一点来说,的确不妨像韦伯那样把儒家视为儒教,因其的确具有宗教的一些性质,它可以被视为中国传统政治社会中的补救方式和对良知的呼唤。只不过这种“补救”和“对良知的呼唤”更多不是来自对未来的设想,而是有着对过去的美化和眷顾,或者是基于一种自然主义的观照,[15]因而不可避免地带有一定的保守性。因为政治社会的发展必然会不断摆脱“家道”的约束,[16]而使“家道”成为一种类似宗教的神圣景象、一种意识形态的承诺。正因如此,中国传统政治社会成了一个在意识形态上强调亲情和人伦、在现实上又不得不诉诸利益和道义(或者说是法理)的社会,即所谓的“外儒内法”的社会。
But on the margins of political society, or in rural society outside it, things might be quite different. Because villages were often bound by blood ties and clans and thus relatively distant from politics,[14]14 “Relatively distant from politics” means that rural society was less directly governed by the imperial state apparatus, allowing greater autonomy for local customs and kinship networks. they were more likely to sincerely recognize Confucian concepts, dilute their political coloring, and blend them with folk beliefs, becoming a way of life that had a certain ideological flavor (ideology already permeated into social psychology) yet was “used daily without awareness.” Hence, paradoxically, the true “arena of action” for Confucian thought was among the people—the “folk” within political society. It was precisely in folk society, where political power could not effectively penetrate, that Confucian thought fully exerted its ideological function, realizing its civilizing function for the masses, and ultimately making the masses, with their concept of “loyalty and filial piety,” devote themselves to the state (the court) (see Chen Chunsheng, pp. 35–43; *Folk Beliefs and Social Space*, pp. 42–107), thereby constructing the foundation of legitimacy for the rule of Chinese feudal society. Thus, when we examine the status of traditional Chinese culture (Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist culture) in traditional and modern Chinese society, we find that Confucian values often had a utopian or ideological flavor in political society. Their ethical appeal in real politics often failed due to “naivety” and could hardly truly function in actual politics; the field where they could function was mainly in rural society and the family, where political power was relatively weak. It was precisely here that Confucian culture (especially filial piety culture) played a fundamental cohesive role, providing continuous ethical support for China’s political society.
而在政治社会边缘或在政治社会之外的乡村社会,就可能是另一回事。乡村因多以血缘、宗族为纽带从而相对远离政治的缘故,[18]更容易发自内心地认可儒家的观念,并淡化其政治色彩,从而与民间信仰糅合在一起,成为一种既有一定的意识形态意味(已经将意识形态渗入社会心理)而又“日用而不知”的生活方式。因而,吊诡的是,儒家思想的真正“用武之地”是在民间——处在政治社会中的“民间”。正是在政治权力难以有效渗入的民间社会,儒家思想充分发挥了它的意识形态功能,对民众实现了教化功能,终使民众以其“忠孝”理念尽忠于国家(朝廷)(参见陈春声,第35—43页;《民间信仰与社会空间》,第42—107页),从而构筑了中国封建社会的统治的合法性基础。因而,当我们考察中华传统文化(儒家、道家和释家文化)在中国传统社会和现代社会中的地位时就会发现,儒家的价值理念在政治社会中常常具有一种乌托邦或意识形态的意味。它在现实政治中的伦理呼唤常常会失于“天真”而难以在现实政治中真正发挥作用,其能够发挥作用的场域主要是在政治权力较为弱化的乡村社会和家庭。也正是在这里,儒家文化(特别是孝文化)发挥了基础性的凝聚作用,为中国的政治社会提供了源源不断的伦理支持。
Moreover, because China’s rural society was often an area where political power was relatively ineffective, it became the “arena of action” for folk beliefs, especially Buddhism and Daoism, and even a place where various “schools” competed for followers. In their insights and reflections on individual life, Buddhism and Daoism not only complemented Confucian culture but also brought vitality and cultural prosperity to China’s political society. China’s social progress was often hidden in the response and integration of other thoughts by Confucian thought as ideology. Of course, considering that today’s rural society is no longer traditional rural society, and the family is no longer the family under agrarian civilization but the family regulated by industrial civilization, the Confucian traditional concept of “filial piety” is even more difficult to apply unchanged to modern society. This means that the concept of “filial piety” in China’s rural society and family will, like the concept of “loyalty” in traditional society, play a “quasi-utopian” role, existing as a value appeal to rural society and the family. In this regard, the theoretical tool for excavating and elucidating Chinese culture should not be one that only suits traditional rural society, but rather a theoretical tool sufficient to move forward into the future and embrace modernity together with China’s rural society.
不仅如此,中国的乡村社会还因其常常是政治权力相对失效的区域,而成为民间信仰特别是释、道两家的“用武之地”,乃至成为各“家”竞相争夺信众之地。释、道两家在对个体生命的体悟和思考上,不仅有着与儒家文化相得益彰之效,而且为中国政治社会带来了活力和文化繁荣。中国社会的进步常常隐藏在作为意识形态的儒家思想对其他思想的应对和整合之中。当然,考虑到今日的乡村社会已不再是传统的乡村社会,家庭也不再是农耕文明下传统的家庭,而是工业文明规整下的家庭,因而作为儒家传统的“孝”的观念,更加难以原封不动地应用于现代社会。这意味着“孝”的观念在中国的乡村社会和家庭中,将会类似“忠”的观念在传统社会中一样,发挥着一种“准乌托邦”的作用,作为对乡村社会和家庭的价值呼唤而存在。就此来说,挖掘和阐发中华文化的理论工具不宜是仅与传统乡村社会相适应的理论工具,而应是足以与中国乡村社会一起奔向未来、迎接现代的理论工具。
III. Sinicized Marxism Is the Appropriate Theoretical Tool for Excavating and Elucidating Chinese Culture
三.中国化的马克思主义是挖掘和阐发中华文化的恰当理论工具
Although a perspective based on traditional Chinese culture can make us understand the characteristics of our own culture, relying solely on this is insufficient to lead traditional Chinese culture into modernity; modern Western culture, while able to see some limitations of traditional Chinese culture from the perspective of modern civilization, cannot truly understand traditional Chinese culture and lacks due respect for it. Therefore, neither of these is an appropriate theoretical tool for excavating and elucidating fine traditional Chinese culture. An appropriate theoretical tool must possess the advantages of both while avoiding their limitations. In this regard, Sinicized Marxism is precisely such a theoretical tool.
基于中华传统文化的视角虽然能使我们明了自身文化的特性,但仅凭于此并不足以将中华传统文化引向现代;现代西方文化虽然能基于现代文明视角看到中华传统文化的一些局限,却又无法真切了解中华传统文化,对中华传统文化缺乏应有的尊重。因而,这两者都不是挖掘和阐发中华优秀传统文化的恰当的理论工具。恰当的理论工具必须既拥有两者的优势,又能避免两者的局限。就此而言,中国化的马克思主义恰是这样一种理论工具。
First, because Marxism has achieved the disenchantment of the “rationalization” of modern Western culture, it has a greater advantage in excavating and elucidating fine traditional Chinese culture. This is because, although Marxism originates from Western culture, it has a critical reflection on Western culture, especially being able to see the defects of the “rationalization” of modern Western culture, and strives to avoid and transcend certain blind spots in Western culture’s cognition. This enables it to discover the advantages and potential of Chinese culture that other modern Western cultures cannot see, and to see the role that material production could play in modern China and the power of the Chinese people. When Marx and Engels discussed China being drawn into the “world market,” they fully affirmed the revolutionary impact that the Chinese people could have on Britain, Europe, and the world, believing that a China moving toward modernity would bring revolutionary changes to the world (see *Marx and Engels on China*, pp. 126–128, 144–145). When modern Western scholars heaped disparagement on Chinese people’s culture and morality, Marx and Engels, through the laws of material production and market logic, could see the imminent rise of the Chinese nation, avoiding the limitation of modern Western scholars who judged Chinese culture solely from a cultural perspective.
首先,马克思主义因其实现了对现代西方文化的“理性化”的祛魅,使其在挖掘和阐发中华优秀传统文化上更显优势。这是因为,马克思主义固然源于西方文化,却对西方文化有着批判性反思,特别是能够看到现代西方文化“理性化”的缺陷,并力求避免和超越西方文化在认识上的一些盲区,这使其能够发现其他现代西方文化所未能看到的中华文化的优势和潜力,看到物质生产在近代中国所能发挥的作用和中国人民的力量。马克思、恩格斯在谈到中国被卷入“世界市场”时,充分肯定了中国人民对英国、对欧洲、对世界所可能产生的革命性影响,认为一个走向现代的中国将给世界带来革命性的变革。(参见《马克思恩格斯论中国》,第126—128、144—145页)当现代西方学者对中国人的文化、道德横加贬抑时,马克思、恩格斯却能透过物质生产规律和市场逻辑看到中华民族的即将崛起,避免了现代西方学者仅仅从文化视角去评判中华文化的局限。
Of course, among Western cultures, thinkers who recognized the inherent defects of modern Western culture and attempted to critique and transcend it include not only Marx and Engels, nor only the Marxist school alone. Thinkers such as Feuerbach, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche all offered critical reflections, and even conservatism and postmodernism within Western culture have critiques from different dimensions. Yet comparatively, Marx and Engels’ critique of Western culture is the most forceful and the most self-reflexive. They reversed the Western cultural approach of grasping the world through concepts and regarding itself as a universal truth [15]15 The author uses “普适性真理” (universal truth) in a critical sense, referring to the tendency in Western thought to treat its own concepts as universally valid regardless of context. without considering concrete actual circumstances, demanding that one “always take the historical conditions of the time as the point of departure” (Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 2, p. 5). These are precisely the essence and charm of the Marxist materialist conception of history.
当然,在西方文化中,意识到现代西方文化存在内在缺陷并试图对其进行批判和超越的思想家并不只有马克思、恩格斯,也不仅只是马克思主义一家。费尔巴哈、叔本华、尼采等思想家都不乏批判性思考,甚至西方文化中的保守主义和后现代主义也都有着不同维度的批判。但相较而言,马克思、恩格斯对西方文化的批判是最有力度、自反性最强的一种。他们一反西方文化以观念把握世界,并将自身视为一种普适性真理[20]而不考虑具体实际情形的思维方式,要求“随时随地都要以当时的历史条件为转移”(《马克思恩格斯文集》第2卷,第5页)。这些正是马克思主义唯物史观的精髓和魅力所在。
Second, when the Marxist materialist conception of history is applied to China, it necessarily demands “Sinicization.” One major feature distinguishing Marxism from modern Western culture is its wariness of rationalization and its refusal to approach the world through concepts. The classical Marxist writers reversed the Western tradition of revering rational speculation and indulging in metaphysical myths, emphasizing the understanding and transformation of the world through concrete, material productive practice. This meant that once Marxism was introduced to China and applied in practice, it manifested two mutually reinforcing forces: on the one hand, treating the basic viewpoints of Marxism as truth; on the other hand, being wary of and opposing the treatment of Marxism as dogma. The former emphasizes the universal power of Marxism, while the latter demands proceeding from China’s concrete realities and serving China’s concrete practice. This implies that while regarding Marxism as a principle, one must also be wary of treating Marxism as dogma. Marx and Engels always maintained such a wariness and strongly disliked having their thoughts and views regarded as a philosophy of history, a formula, or a truth applicable everywhere. In their view, if their thoughts and views were treated as eternal truths detached from reality, that would place Marxism high in the clouds as a metaphysical conceptual existence. In that case, Marxism would appear to have its “form” but would actually have lost its “spirit.” For Marxism to descend from the clouds, to come to the land of China and manifest its inner spirit, it must proceed from China’s actual conditions and be applied and developed in ever-changing social practice. That is, Marxism in China must be “Sinicized.”
其次,马克思主义唯物史观在运用于中国之时,必定要求实现“中国化”。马克思主义不同于现代西方文化的一大特色,就是警惕理性化,不以观念的方式对待世界。马克思主义经典作家们一反西方崇尚理性思辨、耽于形而上学迷思的观念传统,强调以现实的具体的物质生产实践认识世界、改造世界。这使马克思主义一经介绍到中国,运用于实践,就表现出两股相辅相成的力量:一方面把马克思主义的基本观点视为真理,另一方面又警惕和反对把马克思主义当作教条。前者强调马克思主义具有普适性的力量,后者则要求从中国的具体实际出发,服务于中国的具体实践。这意味着在把马克思主义视为原理的同时,必须警惕把马克思主义视为教条。马克思、恩格斯一直有着这样一种警惕,非常反感把他们的思想和观点视为一种历史哲学和公式,视为放之四海而皆准的真理。在他们看来,如果把他们的思想和观点视为可以脱离实际、永恒不变的真理,那是让马克思主义高居云端,作为形而上学的观念性存在。这样,马克思主义貌似有其“形”,实则失去了其“神”。马克思主义要从云端下来,来到中国大地要发挥其内在精神,就必须从中国实际出发,在不断变化发展的社会实践中得到运用和发展。也就是说,马克思主义在中国就必须“中国化”。
On this point, Mao Zedong had deep understanding. In his “How to Study the History of the Chinese Communist Party,” he pointed out: “Lenin combined the stand and method of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Russian revolution, creating a Bolshevism. With this theory and strategy, he carried out the February Revolution and the October Revolution. Stalin then carried out three Five-Year Plans and created a socialist Soviet Union. We must act in the same spirit. We must apply the methods of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin to China and create something new in China. If we have only general theory and do not apply it to China’s reality, we cannot defeat the enemy. But if we apply theory to reality, use the Marxist stand and method to solve China’s problems and create something new, then it can be used” (Collected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 2, pp. 407–408).
对此,毛泽东深有体会,他在《如何研究中共党史》中指出:“列宁把马克思主义的立场、方法与俄国革命的具体实践结合起来,创造了一个布尔什维主义,用这个理论和策略搞了二月革命、十月革命,斯大林接着又搞了三个五年计划,创造了社会主义的苏联。我们要按照同样的精神去做。我们要把马、恩、列、斯的方法用到中国来,在中国创造出一些新的东西。只有一般的理论,不用于中国的实际,打不得敌人。但如果把理论用到实际上去,用马克思主义的立场、方法来解决中国问题,创造些新的东西,这样就用得了。”(《毛泽东文集》第2卷,第407—408页)
Finally, the “Sinicization” of Marxism necessarily involves how to treat China’s actual conditions, especially how to treat the relatively stable Chinese culture and the Chinese nation within those conditions. Chinese culture, like China’s material production, belongs to China’s “actual conditions,” and compared with fluid material production, Chinese culture is a relatively stable “actuality.” Thus, the “Sinicization” of Marxism means that one must treat China’s actual conditions well, and treat the history, culture, and nation within those conditions well—just as Qian Mu pointed out in his Outline of National History: “Those who have some knowledge of their own country’s history must especially attach to it a warmth and respect for that country’s past history” (Qian Mu, “Readers Please First Possess the Following Beliefs Before Reading This Book,” p. 1). In this regard, Mao Zedong not only treated this “actuality” well but also viewed it dialectically. In his “On New Democracy,” he pointed out: “In China’s long feudal society, a splendid ancient culture was created. To clear away the feudal dross and absorb the democratic essence from the development of ancient culture is a necessary condition for developing a new national culture and enhancing national self-confidence. But we must never swallow anything and everything uncritically. We must distinguish between all the decadent things of the ancient feudal ruling classes and the excellent ancient popular culture, that is, those things with a more or less democratic and revolutionary character. China’s present new politics and new economy have developed from China’s ancient old politics and old economy, and China’s present new culture has also developed from China’s ancient old culture. Therefore, we must respect our own history and must never cut off history. But this respect is to give history a certain scientific status, to respect the dialectical development of history, not to eulogize the past at the expense of the present, nor to praise any feudal poison” (Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 2, pp. 707–708).
最后,马克思主义的“中国化”必然涉及如何对待中国实际,特别是如何对待这一实际中较为牢靠的中华文化和中华民族的问题。中华文化与中国的物质生产一样都属于中国的“实际”,而且相较于流变的物质生产来说,中华文化属于相对稳定的“实际”。由是,马克思主义的“中国化”意味着必须善待中国实际,善待这一实际中的历史、文化和民族,一如钱穆在《国史大纲》中所指出的,“对其本国历史略有所知者,尤必附随一种对其本国以往历史之温情与敬意”(钱穆,“凡读本书请先具下列诸信念”,第1页)。在这方面,毛泽东不仅是善待这一“实际”,更是辩证地看待这一“实际”。他在《新民主主义论》中指出:“中国的长期封建社会中,创造了灿烂的古代文化。清理古代文化的发展过程,剔除其封建性的糟粕,吸收其民主性的精华,是发展民族新文化提高民族自信心的必要条件;但是决不能无批判地兼收并蓄。必须将古代封建统治阶级的一切腐朽的东西和古代优秀的人民文化即多少带有民主性和革命性的东西区别开来。中国现时的新政治新经济是从古代的旧政治旧经济发展而来的,中国现时的新文化也是从古代的旧文化发展而来,因此,我们必须尊重自己的历史,决不能割断历史。但是这种尊重,是给历史以一定的科学的地位,是尊重历史的辩证法的发展,而不是颂古非今,不是赞扬任何封建的毒素。”(《毛泽东选集》第2卷,第707—708页)
As Marx and Engels pointed out, “Chinese socialism may be to European socialism what Chinese philosophy is to Hegelian philosophy” (Marx and Engels on China, p. 144). Sinicized Marxism is neither Europeanized Marxism, nor a copy of Soviet Marxism, nor dogmatic Marxism. Rather, it is Marxism rooted in China’s actual conditions, integrated into Chinese culture, and penetrating into millions of households. For Marxism to become an effective theoretical tool for excavating and elucidating fine traditional Chinese culture, it cannot be formal, dogmatic, abstract, or universalized; it must be substantive, concrete, lively, and vital. Only then can the Sinicization of Marxism avoid being a copy of modern Western culture and instead become a Chinese-style rooting, achieving the organic integration of the “soul vein” and the “root vein.” [16]16 “魂脉” (soul vein) and “根脉” (root vein) are terms used in contemporary Chinese Marxist discourse to refer respectively to the guiding role of Marxism and the foundational role of traditional Chinese culture in the development of Chinese socialism.
正如马克思、恩格斯所指出的,“中国社会主义之于欧洲社会主义,也许就像中国哲学之于黑格尔哲学一样”(《马克思恩格斯论中国》,第144页)。中国化的马克思主义既不同于欧洲化的马克思主义,也不是照搬苏联的马克思主义,不是教条化的马克思主义,而是扎根中国实际、融入中华文化、深入千家万户的马克思主义。马克思主义要能成为挖掘和阐发中华优秀传统文化的有效理论工具,就不能是形式的、教条的、抽象的、普适化的,而必须是实质的、具体的、活泼的、有生机的。唯此,马克思主义中国化才不是对现代西方文化的复制,而是中国式的扎根,实现了“魂脉”与“根脉”的有机结合。
IV. How Sinicized Marxism Excavates and Elucidates Fine Traditional Chinese Culture
四. 中国化的马克思主义如何挖掘和阐发中华优秀传统文化
Since Sinicized Marxism is the appropriate theoretical tool for excavating and elucidating fine traditional Chinese culture, there arises a methodological question of “how to excavate and elucidate.” This is a relatively profound prerequisite question in practice; here I will only briefly discuss three points.
中国化的马克思主义既然是挖掘和阐发中华优秀传统文化的恰当的理论工具,就有一个“如何挖掘和阐发”的方法论问题。这是一个在实践上较为艰深的前提性问题,这里仅择要谈三点。
First, one must learn to respect and understand traditional Chinese culture. It is undeniable that Chinese culture, or Chinese civilization, is an inexhaustible “rich mine,” and its position in the history of human civilization is dazzling. On this, scholars such as Gu Hongming and Qian Mu advocated self-love and reverence, while Huntington and Toynbee offered qualified affirmation. (See Huntington, pp. 29, 102; Toynbee and Ikeda, p. 352) The existence and value of Chinese culture in human history are sufficient to stand above worldly evaluations without needing to be concerned. However, as a “resource,” what it first awaits is respect and understanding; this can be said to be the prerequisite for excavation and elucidation. Only by giving due respect to traditional Chinese culture can one reasonably understand and develop it, and avoid a cynical or nihilistic treatment. Only by learning to respect can one avoid subjective and arbitrary analysis and elucidation, and can one also go deep into history, maintaining sympathetic understanding within the historical context.
首先,要学会尊重、理解中华传统文化。无可否认,中华文化抑或中华文明是一个取之不尽、用之不竭的“富矿”,其在人类文明史上的地位更是耀眼生辉。对此,辜鸿铭、钱穆等学者主张要自爱和推崇,亨廷顿、汤因比等人予以了有限度的肯定。(参见亨廷顿,第29、102页;汤因比、池田大作,第352页)中华文化在人类历史上的存在与价值足可傲视人世间的评价而无须理会。不过,就其作为“资源”来说,首先有待得到的是尊重和理解,这可以说是挖掘和阐发的前提。唯有对中华传统文化给予应有的尊重,才可能对其进行合理的理解和发展,才不会有犬儒主义或虚无主义式的对待。唯有学会尊重,才能避免主观随意地分析和阐发,也才能走向历史深处,在历史的境域中抱持同情式的理解。
Clearly, this requires us to constantly shorten the distance to traditional Chinese culture and maintain a sense of “intimacy” toward it. To achieve this, we should not be unfamiliar with traditional Chinese culture but familiar with it; we should not adopt an attitude of “white-haired like strangers” [17]17 “White-haired like strangers” (白发如新, bai fa ru xin) is a Chinese idiom meaning that two people have known each other for so long their hair has turned white, yet they remain as unfamiliar as strangers; it denotes a lack of genuine mutual understanding despite long acquaintance. or “Lord Ye’s love of dragons” [18]18 “Lord Ye’s love of dragons” (叶公好龙, Ye gong hao long) is a Chinese idiom from a fable about a man who professed to love dragons but was terrified when a real dragon appeared; it refers to professed fondness for something that one actually fears or does not truly understand., but rather learn to “listen” to what traditional Chinese culture recounts in history, even its “muttering to itself.” In this respect and understanding, we can readily discover many things in history that seem “as if we have seen them before” and find that many things “already existed long ago.” For instance, when reading the account in *Zhenguan Essentials of Governance* [19]19 *Zhenguan Essentials of Governance* (贞观政要, Zhenguan zhengyao) is a Tang-dynasty historical text compiled by Wu Jing, recording the political discussions and policies of Emperor Taizong (Li Shimin, r. 626–649) and his ministers during the Zhenguan reign, often cited as a model of effective governance. of Li Shimin discussing with Fang Xuanling and Wei Zheng whether “founding was difficult” or “consolidation was difficult,” one naturally develops a consciousness of “preserving the original aspiration” and “self-revolution”; and when continuing to read their views on “the way of the sovereign,” one even feels a sense of a Li Shimin and Wei Zheng version of the “Cave Dialogue” [20]20 The “Cave Dialogue” (窑洞对, yaodong dui) refers to a famous 1945 exchange in Yan’an between Mao Zedong and the democratic figure Huang Yanpei, in which Huang warned that historical cycles of dynastic rise and fall could only be broken if the Communist Party found a way for the people to supervise the government; Mao later cited this as a rationale for whole-process people’s democracy and self-revolution..
显然,这需要我们不断地拉近与中华传统文化的距离,保持一种“亲近感”。而要做到这一点,我们对中华传统文化就不应该是陌生的,而应该是熟悉的;不应该是“白发如新”或“叶公好龙”式的,而应该是学会“倾听”中华传统文化在历史中的诉说,乃至其“喃喃自语”。在这种尊重和理解中,我们不难发现历史中的很多“似曾相识”,会发现很多“早已有之”。或如我们在阅读《贞观政要》关于李世民与房玄龄、魏征讨论“草创难”还是“守成难”的一段记述时,会油然生发出“永葆初心”和“自我革命”的自觉性;而在继续阅读他们关于“君道”的主张时,甚至会有一种李世民与魏征版的“窑洞对”的感觉。
In the tenth year of the Zhenguan reign [636 CE], Emperor Taizong said to his attendants: “For the enterprise of an emperor, which is more difficult, founding or consolidation?” Fang Xuanling, Left Vice Director of the Department of State Affairs, replied: “In the chaos of heaven and earth’s inception, heroes rose in contention; only after attacking and defeating them did they submit, only after fighting and conquering did they prevail. From this perspective, founding is difficult.” Wei Zheng replied: “An emperor’s rise must follow a period of decline and chaos. He overthrows the benighted and cunning; the people joyfully support him, the four seas submit to his mandate; heaven grants it and men give it—this is not difficult. Yet after attaining it, his aspirations turn to pride and indulgence; the people desire tranquility but corvée labor never ceases; the people are worn down but extravagant undertakings continue unabated; the decline and decay of the state always arise from this. From this perspective, consolidation is difficult.” Taizong said: “Fang Xuanling formerly followed me in pacifying the empire, enduring every hardship, escaping death a myriad times to find life once—thus he sees the difficulty of founding. Wei Zheng, together with me, secures the empire, worrying that the seeds of pride and indulgence will surely lead to a place of peril and ruin—thus he sees the difficulty of consolidation. Now the difficulty of founding has already passed; as for the difficulty of consolidation, we should think carefully about it together with you, my lords.” (Pian Yuqian, trans. and annot., pp. 7–8) [21]21 The quoted passage is from the *Zhenguan Essentials of Governance*, with the citation referring to a modern annotated edition by Pian Yuqian.
贞观十年,太宗谓侍臣曰:“帝王之业,草创与守成孰难?”尚书左仆射房玄龄对曰:“天地草昧,群雄竞起,攻破乃降,战胜乃克。由此言之,草创为难。”魏征对曰:“帝王之起,必承衰乱。覆彼昏狡,百姓乐推,四海归命,天授人与,乃不为难。然既得之后,志趣骄逸,百姓欲静而徭役不休,百姓凋残而侈务不息,国之衰弊,恒由此起。以斯而言,守成则难。”太宗曰:“玄龄昔从我定天下,备尝艰苦,出万死而遇一生,所以见草创之难也。魏征与我安天下,虑生骄逸之端,必践危亡之地,所以见守成之难也。今草创之难,既已往矣,守成之难者,当思与公等慎之。”(骈宇骞译注,第7—8页)
As stated above, “respect” implies shortening the distance, implies learning to understand, and implies an intrinsic value that exists independently of the judgments of contemporaries. Only thus do respect and understanding constitute the prerequisite for our excavation and elucidation of Chinese culture.
诚如上述,“尊重”蕴含着距离的拉近,蕴含着学会去理解,蕴含着不为世人的评判而存在的自在价值。唯此,尊重、理解才构成了我们挖掘和阐发中华文化的前提。
Secondly, “excavation and elucidation” is a necessary form of cultivation and protection for fine traditional Chinese culture. Emphasizing respect for traditional Chinese culture by no means hopes to leave it stranded and sealed in the depths of history, turning it into a cultural “mummy”; rather, it emphasizes that in the process of excavating and elucidating it, we must both safeguard its roots and cultivate and protect its vibrant vitality. In this sense, “excavation and elucidation” is a positive cultivation and protection of traditional Chinese culture.
其次,“挖掘和阐发”对于中华优秀传统文化而言是一种必要的培护。强调尊重中华传统文化,绝不是希其滞留、封存于历史的深处,使其成为文化的“木乃伊”,而是强调在对其挖掘和阐发的过程中,既要呵护其根本,还要培护其活泼的生命力。就此来说,“挖掘和阐发”就是对中华传统文化的一种积极的培护。
If “respect” requires us to learn to move toward the depths of history, then “excavation and elucidation” propels traditional Chinese culture toward the present; if “respect” implies viewing traditional Chinese culture as a “being-in-itself,” then “excavation and elucidation” means that traditional Chinese culture becomes a “being-for-itself” for people today. It is precisely in the interplay between “respect” and “excavation and elucidation,” between “being-in-itself” and “being-for-itself,” that the vitality and dynamism of traditional Chinese culture are transmitted and manifested.
如果说“尊重”要求我们学会走向历史的深处,那么“挖掘和阐发”就是助推中华传统文化走向当下;如果说“尊重”蕴含着视中华传统文化为一种“自在的存在”,那么“挖掘和阐发”就意味着中华传统文化成为今人的“自觉的存在”。正是在“尊重”与“挖掘和阐发”、“自在”与“自觉”之间,中华传统文化的生机和活力得以承传和彰显。
“Excavation and elucidation” seems to imply that we regard traditional Chinese culture as a resource that can be used by us and is beneficial to us—this is from the perspective of the interpreter. But from the perspective of fine traditional Chinese culture itself, “excavation and elucidation” is also the mode in which traditional Chinese culture unfolds in time and space, meaning that traditional Chinese culture is not sealed away, not “blooming alone, with no master” [22]22 “Blooming alone, with no master” (寂寞开无主, ji mo kai wu zhu) is a line from Lu You’s (1125–1210) poem “Song of Divination: Ode to the Plum Blossom,” describing a plum blossom blooming in solitude without an owner, symbolizing unrecognized virtue. (from Lu You’s “Song of Divination: Ode to the Plum Blossom”), but rather, through our excavation and elucidation, it steps out of its original existential circumstances, moves toward a broader time and space, transmits its life force in an extension of time and space, and “opens up a new vista” in an already changed environment.
“挖掘和阐发”似乎意味着我们将中华传统文化视为能够为我所用、对我们有助益的资源,这是从阐释者的角度来说的。但从中华优秀传统文化自身来说,“挖掘和阐发”也是中华传统文化在时空中的展现方式,意味着中华传统文化不是被封存的,不是“寂寞开无主”(语出陆游《卜算子·咏梅》),而是借助我们的挖掘和阐发走出其原有的生存境地,走向更为宽广的时空,在一种时空的延展中承传其生命的活力,在一种已经变化的环境中去“别开生面”。
For this reason, even if traditional Chinese culture is regarded as a “resource,” it is a “resource” that partakes of the correctness of heaven and earth and possesses a powerful life force. Manifested in Chinese civilization, this “resource” possesses the characteristics of continuity, innovativeness, unity, inclusiveness, and peacefulness pointed out by General Secretary Xi Jinping (see Xi Jinping, pp. 5–6). [23]23 The reference is to Xi Jinping’s speech on cultural heritage, likely from his address at a symposium on cultural inheritance and development, where he outlined the five characteristics of Chinese civilization. And precisely because this resource “rides on the correctness of heaven and earth” (Zhuangzi, “Free and Easy Wandering”), [24]24 “Rides on the correctness of heaven and earth” (乘天地之正, cheng tian di zhi zheng) is a phrase from the Zhuangzi, chapter “Free and Easy Wandering,” describing the ideal of acting in harmony with the natural order of the universe. its “excavation and elucidation” should imitate nature, cultivate its life force, and assist its momentum of growth. Hence, the excavation and elucidation of traditional Chinese culture is, in its essence, not like mining oil or natural gas—non-renewable resources—but rather like how one treats organic life: the question of how to enable it to continue, develop, and grow strong.
正因如此,中华传统文化即使被视为“资源”,也堪称是得天地之正、有着强大生命力的“资源”。这一“资源”表现在中华文明上,就具有了习近平总书记所指出的连续性、创新性、统一性、包容性、和平性的特性。(参见习近平,第5—6页)且正因这一资源“乘天地之正”(《庄子·逍遥游》),故对其的“挖掘和阐发”就宜效法自然,培护其生命活力,助其生长之势。因而,对中华传统文化的挖掘和阐发,在其本质上不是类似开采石油、天然气等不可再生资源,而是类似如何对待有机生命,使其绵延、发展、壮大的问题。
In this regard, the excavation and elucidation of traditional Chinese culture should certainly respect its history and origins, but this does not mean sealing this cultural resource in history, turning it into a “cultural fossil” that has lost its orientation toward the present and even the future; rather, it means cultivating and protecting it so that it moves in the present and advances toward the future. Thus, “excavation and elucidation” is by no means a matter of discarding what is full of life in traditional Chinese culture, but rather discarding those elements limited by region and era—that is, “shaking off the shackles that have become incompatible with the stage of development they have already reached, so that it can be further developed” (Marx and Engels Collected Works, Vol. 1, p. 572). [25]25 The citation is from Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology* (1845–1846), in the context of discussing how productive forces and forms of intercourse develop historically.
就此而论,对中华传统文化的挖掘和阐发固然要尊重其历史和渊源,但也不是将这一文化资源封存于历史之中,使其成为失去面向现在乃至未来的“文化化石”,而是要培护其行于当下,走向未来。如是,“挖掘和阐发”就绝不是舍弃中华传统文化中富有生命的东西,而是舍弃那些具有地域局限和时代局限的东西,即“摆脱已经和他们所达到的发展阶段不相适应的桎梏,从而使它得到进一步的发展”(《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷,第572页)。
This also means that our excavation and elucidation of traditional Chinese culture involves a process of creative transformation and innovative development, as General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out: “We must strengthen the excavation and elucidation of fine traditional Chinese culture, strive to realize the creative transformation and innovative development of traditional Chinese virtues, promote the cultural spirit that transcends time and space, surpasses national boundaries, possesses eternal charm, and has contemporary value, and disseminate the innovative achievements of contemporary Chinese culture that inherit fine traditional culture while promoting the spirit of the times, are rooted in the nation while facing the world. As long as the Chinese nation pursues lofty and beautiful moral realms generation after generation, our nation will forever be full of hope” (Xi Jinping: The Governance of China, Vol. 1, p. 106). [26]26 The quotation is from Xi Jinping’s speech at a forum on philosophy and social sciences, included in *Xi Jinping: The Governance of China*, Vol. 1, emphasizing the creative transformation of traditional culture.
这也意味着我们对中华传统文化的挖掘和阐发有一个创造性转化、创新性发展的过程,即习近平总书记所指出的,“要加强对中华优秀传统文化的挖掘和阐发,努力实现中华传统美德的创造性转化、创新性发展,把跨越时空、超越国度、富有永恒魅力、具有当代价值的文化精神弘扬起来,把继承优秀传统文化又弘扬时代精神、立足本国又面向世界的当代中国文化创新成果传播出去。只要中华民族一代接着一代追求美好崇高的道德境界,我们的民族就永远充满希望”(《习近平谈治国理政》第一卷,第106页)。
Finally, in the dialogical generation of cultural subjectivity, we inherit the excellent elements of traditional Chinese culture. When we excavate, elucidate, and creatively transform and innovatively develop traditional Chinese culture, there is one point that requires self-reflection and vigilance: we should avoid treating traditional Chinese culture with a “prophetic” posture. For once this posture is adopted, it is easy to harm traditional Chinese culture. The consequences of this harm can be illustrated by a fable from the *Zhuangzi*. In the chapter “Responding to Sovereigns,” Zhuangzi tells a story: “The emperor of the South Sea was Shu, the emperor of the North Sea was Hu, and the emperor of the Center was Hundun [Chaos]. Shu and Hu often met in Hundun’s territory, and Hundun treated them very well. Shu and Hu plotted to repay Hundun’s kindness, saying: ‘All people have seven orifices for seeing, hearing, eating, and breathing; only this one has none. Let us try boring them.’ Each day they bored one orifice, and on the seventh day Hundun died.” (Zhuangzi, “Responding to Sovereigns”) [27]27 The fable of Shu, Hu, and Hundun is from the *Zhuangzi*, chapter “Responding to Sovereigns” (应帝王, Ying diwang), illustrating the harm of imposing external order on a natural state of wholeness.
最后,在文化的主体性对话与生成中传承中华传统文化中的优秀因子。当我们在对中华传统文化进行挖掘、阐发以及创造性转化和创新性发展的过程中,有一点需要自省和警惕,即应避免以一种“先知”式的姿态对待中华传统文化。因为一旦抱持这种方式,就容易对中华传统文化构成伤害。这种伤害导致的后果可以《庄子》中的一则寓言为鉴。庄子在《应帝王》篇中讲过一个故事:“南海之帝为儵,北海之帝为忽,中央之帝为浑沌。儵与忽时相与遇于浑沌之地,浑沌待之甚善。儵与忽谋报浑沌之德,曰:‘人皆有七窍以视听食息,此独无有,尝试凿之。’日凿一窍,七日而浑沌死。”(《庄子·应帝王》)
Of course, excavating and elucidating traditional Chinese culture through sinicized Marxism should not give rise to such concerns. For Marx and Engels never regarded themselves as prophets, nor did they ever consider their theory a universal truth applicable to all historical stages. And sinicized Marxism, moreover, integrates the basic tenets of Marxism with China’s specific realities, endowing Marxism with Chinese characteristics. Nevertheless, some necessary vigilance and prudence are still required, especially vigilance against and prevention of the cognitive tendency to detach from China’s actual conditions, to dogmatize the basic tenets of Marxism, and to regard traditional Chinese culture merely as an outdated “resource.”
当然,以中国化的马克思主义挖掘和阐发中华传统文化不应该有此担忧。因为,马克思、恩格斯从来没有以先知自居,也从来没有把自己的理论视为适用于一切历史阶段的普适性真理。而中国化的马克思主义更是把马克思主义基本原理同中国具体实际相结合,赋予马克思主义以中国特性。不过,一些必要的警惕和审慎还是需要的,特别要警惕和防止那种脱离中国实际,把马克思主义基本原理教条化,把中华传统文化仅仅视为过时的“资源”的认识倾向。
It is worth noting that any “excavation and elucidation” is the act of a specific historical subject within a specific historical context, and both the specific historical situation and the specific historical subject have their own historical limitations. This means that, in the process of “excavation and elucidation,” one must maintain a kind of self-reflection on the part of the subject, so as to avoid breeding subjective arrogance or even hubris. Viewed historically, the subject of the present will inevitably become a subject in history, and the self-awareness of the subject of the present will also be a historical self-awareness. Just as we, standing in the present, regard past cultures as cultures in history, the “present” will eventually become history in the future, and both the “present” and the “past” will be historical existences. This means that, when we excavate and elucidate Chinese culture, we must discard the prejudice or arrogance that places ourselves above traditional culture, and must learn to engage in cross-temporal dialogue with traditional culture, helping Chinese traditional culture integrate into the present and move toward the future through equal dialogue and understanding.
值得注意的是,任何“挖掘和阐发”都是特定历史语境下的特定历史主体的作为,而特定的历史境域、特定的历史主体又都有其历史的局限性。这就意味着,在“挖掘和阐发”之时要坚守一种主体的自我反思,避免滋生主体性的傲慢甚至狂妄。历史地看,当今的主体必然会成为历史中的主体,作为当下主体的觉解也将是历史的觉解。正如我们立足当下而把过往的文化视为历史中的文化,“当下”在未来也终将成为历史,“当下”与“过去”也都将是历史性的存在。这就意味着,我们在挖掘和阐发中华文化之时,必须摒弃那种凌驾于传统文化之上的偏见或傲慢,而必须学会与传统文化展开跨时空的对话,在平等的对话与理解中助力中华传统文化融入当下,走向未来。
From the perspective of equal dialogue, Chinese culture should not be understood merely as a “resource” to be “excavated and elucidated”; rather, it possesses its own subjective status. The subjective status of Chinese culture stands in parallel with the subject of the current “excavation and elucidation,” and, comparatively speaking, the subject of “traditional culture” possesses greater strength. This is because the “present” is, in a certain sense, a product of tradition, and the “present” can only gain a firm foothold and demonstrate its position and role in future history by properly respecting and understanding the developmental momentum inherent in tradition.
从平等对话的视角来看,中华文化不宜仅仅被理解为一种“挖掘和阐发”下的“资源”,而是有其主体性的地位。中华文化的主体性地位与当下的“挖掘和阐发”的主体处于并立之势,且相较而言,“传统文化”这一主体具有更强大的力量。因为,“当下”在某种意义上是传统的产物,而“当下”只有很好地尊重并理解传统所蕴含的生发之势才能站稳脚跟,才能呈现其在未来历史中的地位和作用。
Understanding this, we will realize that any judgment of the fine elements within Chinese culture must try to avoid the misjudgment of being obsessed with the “present,” for we are ultimately historical existences. Therefore, the determination of what constitutes “fine” in Chinese culture will depend on our understanding of Chinese culture and of our own historical limitations. If there is a single ultimate judgment of what is “fine,” then that judgment can never be given in advance by the present; it must be left to the ultimate future to decide. If “fine” is not a single ultimate judgment, then different eras may give different determinations of what is “fine.” That is to say, what was considered “fine” yesterday may be denounced today; similarly, what is considered “fine” today may, in a future historical context, become a “past” that is difficult to reproduce.
理解了这一点我们就会意识到,任何对中华文化中的优秀因子的判定,都要尽量避免出现执迷于“当下”的误判,因为我们终将是历史性的存在。因此,对于中华文化何为“优秀”的判定,将取决于我们对中华文化和我们自身的历史局限性的理解。如果说对“优秀”有一个终极性的唯一判定,那么这一判定绝不可能是当下所能先行给出的,而是要留待终极的未来去判定。如果说“优秀”不是终极性的唯一判定,那不同时代就有可能给出不同的对“优秀”的认定。即是说,昨天认为是“优秀”的,在今天就有可能被贬斥;同理,今天认为是“优秀”的,在未来的历史境域中就有可能成为未来难以再现的“过去”。
Just as history is the most impartial examiner, history is also the “screening device” for what is “fine” or not; it “degrades” many things that were once considered necessary and fine in specific historical contexts into things that are contingent or need to be bid farewell. Recognizing this, we will, on the one hand, strive to excavate and elucidate fine traditional Chinese culture, and on the other hand, maintain a historical and prudent reflective attitude in the process of excavation and elucidation, promoting the modern development of Chinese traditional culture with a more positive, open, and inclusive posture. Only in this way can fine traditional Chinese culture maintain its vitality and vigor forever, thereby contributing cultural power to advancing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
正如历史是最公正的检验者一样,历史也是“优秀”与否的“筛选器”,它将诸多在特定历史境域中曾被认为是必然的、优秀的东西,都“降解”为偶然性的或需要告别的东西。意识到这一点,我们就会一方面努力挖掘和阐发中华优秀传统文化,另一方面又在挖掘和阐发中坚持一种历史的、审慎的反思态度,用更加积极、开放、包容的姿态推动中华传统文化的现代发展。如是,方能使中华优秀传统文化永葆生机和活力,从而为推进中华民族伟大复兴贡献文化伟力。
Online editor: Paul
网络编辑:保罗
Notes
- This refers to the creative transformation and innovative development of fine traditional Chinese culture, a policy direction emphasized by the CPC to revitalize traditional culture in a modern context. ↩
- The term “modern Western scholars” here refers to thinkers like Hegel and Weber, who are critiqued for applying a rationalized, Eurocentric framework to non-Western cultures. ↩
- The author's argument here is that the Western perspective is flawed, and the following rhetorical questions elaborate this critique. ↩
- The term "本分" (benfen) refers to a traditional Chinese virtue of knowing one's place and fulfilling one's duties, often translated as "law-abiding" or "dutiful." ↩
- "穷则独善其身,达则兼善天下" is a classical allusion from *Mencius*; "修身、齐家、治国、平天下" is from *The Great Learning*, a core Confucian text. Both are four-character idioms summarizing Confucian self-cultivation and political philosophy. ↩
- "本于生命、尊崇生命的政治文化" refers to a political culture rooted in and revering life, a concept the author uses to characterize traditional Chinese political culture in contrast to Western rationalized modernity. ↩
- “The one who knows himself is wise” (自知者明) is a phrase from the *Dao De Jing* (Chapter 33), meaning that self-knowledge is a form of true wisdom. “Fasting of the mind” (心斋) is a concept from the *Zhuangzi* (Chapter 4, “The Human World”), referring to a meditative state of emptying the mind of preconceptions to achieve spiritual receptivity. ↩
- Joseph Needham (1900–1995) was a British biochemist and historian of Chinese science, author of the multi-volume *Science and Civilisation in China*. ↩
- The “homology of state and family” (家国同构) is a Confucian concept describing the structural and ethical isomorphism between the patriarchal family and the imperial state in traditional Chinese political thought. ↩
- “Entering the world” (入世) is a Confucian term contrasting with Daoist and Buddhist “world-transcendence,” denoting active engagement in social and political life. ↩
- Zhang Taiyan (1868–1936) and Liang Qichao (1873–1929) were late-Qing and early-Republican scholars and reformers who critiqued traditional Chinese political thought. ↩
- “Naturalistic contemplation” refers to a worldview that sees nature as the ultimate standard, often associated with Daoist thought. ↩
- “Family way” (家道) here denotes the principle of organizing political society on the model of the family, central to Confucian political ethics. ↩
- “Relatively distant from politics” means that rural society was less directly governed by the imperial state apparatus, allowing greater autonomy for local customs and kinship networks. ↩
- The author uses “普适性真理” (universal truth) in a critical sense, referring to the tendency in Western thought to treat its own concepts as universally valid regardless of context. ↩
- “魂脉” (soul vein) and “根脉” (root vein) are terms used in contemporary Chinese Marxist discourse to refer respectively to the guiding role of Marxism and the foundational role of traditional Chinese culture in the development of Chinese socialism. ↩
- “White-haired like strangers” (白发如新, bai fa ru xin) is a Chinese idiom meaning that two people have known each other for so long their hair has turned white, yet they remain as unfamiliar as strangers; it denotes a lack of genuine mutual understanding despite long acquaintance. ↩
- “Lord Ye’s love of dragons” (叶公好龙, Ye gong hao long) is a Chinese idiom from a fable about a man who professed to love dragons but was terrified when a real dragon appeared; it refers to professed fondness for something that one actually fears or does not truly understand. ↩
- *Zhenguan Essentials of Governance* (贞观政要, Zhenguan zhengyao) is a Tang-dynasty historical text compiled by Wu Jing, recording the political discussions and policies of Emperor Taizong (Li Shimin, r. 626–649) and his ministers during the Zhenguan reign, often cited as a model of effective governance. ↩
- The “Cave Dialogue” (窑洞对, yaodong dui) refers to a famous 1945 exchange in Yan’an between Mao Zedong and the democratic figure Huang Yanpei, in which Huang warned that historical cycles of dynastic rise and fall could only be broken if the Communist Party found a way for the people to supervise the government; Mao later cited this as a rationale for whole-process people’s democracy and self-revolution. ↩
- The quoted passage is from the *Zhenguan Essentials of Governance*, with the citation referring to a modern annotated edition by Pian Yuqian. ↩
- “Blooming alone, with no master” (寂寞开无主, ji mo kai wu zhu) is a line from Lu You’s (1125–1210) poem “Song of Divination: Ode to the Plum Blossom,” describing a plum blossom blooming in solitude without an owner, symbolizing unrecognized virtue. ↩
- The reference is to Xi Jinping’s speech on cultural heritage, likely from his address at a symposium on cultural inheritance and development, where he outlined the five characteristics of Chinese civilization. ↩
- “Rides on the correctness of heaven and earth” (乘天地之正, cheng tian di zhi zheng) is a phrase from the Zhuangzi, chapter “Free and Easy Wandering,” describing the ideal of acting in harmony with the natural order of the universe. ↩
- The citation is from Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology* (1845–1846), in the context of discussing how productive forces and forms of intercourse develop historically. ↩
- The quotation is from Xi Jinping’s speech at a forum on philosophy and social sciences, included in *Xi Jinping: The Governance of China*, Vol. 1, emphasizing the creative transformation of traditional culture. ↩
- The fable of Shu, Hu, and Hundun is from the *Zhuangzi*, chapter “Responding to Sovereigns” (应帝王, Ying diwang), illustrating the harm of imposing external order on a natural state of wholeness. ↩
- The phrase “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (中华民族伟大复兴) is a central political slogan of the CPC, referring to the goal of restoring China’s historical status as a prosperous and powerful nation, often associated with the “Chinese Dream” articulated by Xi Jinping.