Unity Is Preserved through Struggle

“Problems of Strategy in the Anti-Japanese United Front” is an outline for a report delivered by Mao Zedong on 11 March 1940 at a senior cadre meeting of the Chinese Communist Party in Yan’an, and is included in Volume 2 of the *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. This text puts forward the clear-cut thesis that “unity is preserved through struggle, and destroyed through concession,” providing the Chinese Communist Party with a methodology of struggle for responding to major risks and challenges and handling all kinds of complex relationships.

《目前抗日统一战线中的策略问题》是毛泽东于1940年3月11日在延安中国共产党的高级干部会议上的报告提纲，收入《毛泽东选集》第二卷。这篇文献提出“以斗争求团结则团结存，以退让求团结则团结亡”的鲜明论断，为中国共产党应对重大风险挑战和处理各类复杂关系提供了斗争方法论。

In December 1939, in the face of the Kuomintang’s ferocious military offensive and political pressure, how could the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation continue? How could the Anti-Japanese National United Front continue to be maintained? A series of questions confronted the Chinese Communist Party. Under these circumstances, Mao Zedong pointed out unequivocally that one must “use struggle as the means to achieve the unity of all anti-Japanese forces,” because in the Kuomintang-Communist relations of that time, “unity is preserved through struggle, and destroyed through concession.”

1939年12月，面对国民党来势汹汹的军事进攻与政治施压，国共合作如何继续？抗日民族统一战线如何继续维持？一系列问题摆在了中国共产党的面前。在此情况下，毛泽东旗帜鲜明地指出，要“以斗争为达到团结一切抗日势力的手段”，因为在此时的国共关系之中，“以斗争求团结则团结存，以退让求团结则团结亡”。

Waging Struggle That Is Just, Advantageous, and Measured

开展有理、有利、有节的斗争

Adopt the principle of self-defense. In a complex situation of struggle, one must emphasize the defensive character of war, stand on the correct side of history, enable the masses and all factions to see clearly what is right and wrong, and win people’s hearts in the course of struggle. The principle of self-defense in struggle contains dialectical and unified thinking: on the one hand, never take the initiative to attack, and at certain times even contract and concede, so that the diehards’[1]1 “Diehards” (顽固派) refers specifically to the most reactionary, anti-communist faction within the Kuomintang during the War of Resistance Against Japan, as distinct from the Kuomintang’s middle-of-the-road and progressive factions. unreasonableness and arrogance are fully exposed, and one’s own position of maintaining the overall situation, abiding by morality, and adhering to principles is fully demonstrated; on the other hand, never abandon defense, never engage in passive defense, but rather resolutely defend and actively defend. In response to the diehards’ military offensives, “they must be resolutely, thoroughly, wholly, and completely annihilated.” Do not take the initiative to attack in order to win moral support and demonstrate a stance of unity; resolutely counterattack and inflict pain on the invading enemy to make the diehards fearful and avoid larger-scale friction and conflict. This is what Mao Zedong summarized as: “We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack.”

采取自卫原则。在复杂的斗争局面中，要强调战争的防御性，站在历史正确的一边，让人民群众与各派势力看清楚是非对错，在斗争中赢得人心。斗争的自卫原则中包含着辩证统一思维：一方面绝不主动出击，甚至某些时候可以收缩退让，使顽固派的蛮横无理充分暴露，使我方维持大局、遵守道义、恪守原则的立场充分彰显；另一方面绝不放弃防御，绝不被动防御，而要坚决防御、主动防御。对于顽固派的军事进攻，“必须坚决、彻底、干净、全部地消灭之”。不主动出击以赢取道义支持、彰显团结立场，坚决还击打痛来犯之敌以令顽固派心生忌惮，避免更大范围的摩擦冲突。这就是毛泽东总结的“人不犯我，我不犯人，人若犯我，我必犯人”。

Adhere to the principle of victory. That is, “if we do not fight, so much the better; if we do fight, we must win.” Under conditions where the balance of forces between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party was relatively disparate, the key to achieving “if we do fight, we must win” lay in confining the struggle to a local scope and making thorough preparations. To achieve “if we do fight, we must win,” it was necessary to conduct detailed investigation and research on the diehards, fully grasp and exploit their internal contradictions, distinguish degrees of difference among them, and thus “select the most reactionary among them to strike first,” or choose the faction most likely to be defeated and concentrate forces to strike it. In this way, when struggling against one faction, relations with another faction could be eased; when engaged in intense struggle with another faction, partial cooperation could be reached with this faction. To achieve “if we do fight, we must win,” it was also necessary to make thorough and comprehensive preparations for struggle, and “never launch a struggle that is unplanned, unprepared, or uncertain of victory.” The struggle against the Kuomintang diehards required not only military counterattacks but also the ideological formulation of revolutionary theories that conformed to the tide of history, the political formulation of policies and strategies that met the requirements of the situation, the splitting of the diehards and the uniting of all factions at the level of the united front, and the shaping of the Party’s image as an anti-Japanese, democratic, and progressive force at the level of propaganda, forming an all-round plan to deal with the diehards’ offensives.

坚持胜利原则。所谓“不斗则已，斗则必胜”。在国共力量对比较为悬殊的局面下，要做到“斗则必胜”，关键在于将斗争控制在局部范围，并且做好充足准备。为实现“斗则必胜”，要对顽固派做细致的调查研究，充分掌握和利用顽固派的内部矛盾，在顽固派中分出程度差别，从而“择其最反动者首先打击之”，或是选择最具击败可能的派别集中力量打击之。这样，在与此派别斗争时，可以与彼派别缓和关系，在与彼派别激烈斗争时，可以与此派别达成部分合作。要实现“斗则必胜”，还需要做好充分全面的斗争准备，“绝不可举行无计划无准备无把握的斗争”。对国民党顽固派的斗争不仅要考虑军事上的反击，还需要在思想上提出符合历史潮流的革命理论，在政治上制定符合形势要求的政策策略，在统战层面分化顽固派、团结各派势力，在宣传层面塑造抗日、民主、进步的政党形象，形成应对顽固派进攻的全方位计划。

Adhere to the principle of truce. At that time, both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party belonged to the Anti-Japanese National United Front; the struggle could not be allowed to expand indefinitely but had to be restrained. Therefore, after beating back one round of offensives by the Kuomintang diehards, one should stop at the right moment, “bringing this period of struggle to an end.” At this point, one should take the initiative to make peace with the other side and sign a peace agreement, making the struggle appear temporary and phased. “We must on no account fight endlessly day after day, and on no account allow ourselves to become dizzy with success.” Making the struggle appear temporary and phased was in fact a way to grasp the initiative in the struggle and control its rhythm, intensity, and scope.

坚持休战原则。此时国共双方同属抗日民族统一战线，不能任由斗争持续扩大，而要有所节制。因此，在打退国民党顽固派的一轮进攻之后，要适可而止，“使这一斗争告一段落”。此时，要主动和对方讲和，签订和平协定，使斗争呈现出暂时性与阶段性。“决不可无止境地每日每时地斗下去，决不可被胜利冲昏自己的头脑。”使斗争呈现出暂时性与阶段性，实际上是要把握斗争的主动权，控制斗争的节奏、烈度和范围。

Winning Over the Majority and Opposing the Minority in the Course of Struggle

在斗争中争取多数、反对少数

To seek unity through struggle, one must not only strive to unite the target of struggle but, more importantly, unite the middle-of-the-roaders and onlookers in the course of struggle. Mao Zedong pointed out at the Wayaobu Conference[2]2 The Wayaobu Conference was an enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee held in Wayaobu, northern Shaanxi, in December 1935, which formulated the strategy of establishing an anti-Japanese national united front.: “To organize the millions upon millions of masses and mobilize the mighty revolutionary army is the need of today’s revolution to attack the counter-revolution.” To this end, one must win over the majority and oppose the minority, rallying the greatest number of forces around oneself. For the Chinese Communist Party, “winning over the majority” meant transforming the process of struggling against the Kuomintang diehards into a process of isolating the Kuomintang diehards and winning over more allies. To this end, Mao Zedong, based on his observation of the domestic and international situation, analyzed the various domestic strata and factions.

以斗争求团结，不仅要努力团结斗争对象，更重要的是在斗争过程中团结中间派与旁观者。毛泽东在瓦窑堡会议上指出：“组织千千万万的民众，调动浩浩荡荡的革命军，是今天的革命向反革命进攻的需要。”为此，要争取多数，反对少数，把大多数力量团结在自己周围。对于中国共产党来说，“争取多数”意味要将与国民党顽固派的斗争过程，转变为孤立国民党顽固派、争取更多同盟者的过程。为此，毛泽东基于对国内外形势的观察，对国内各个阶层和各派势力展开了分析。

Mao Zedong observed that at that time the domestic middle bourgeoisie, enlightened gentry, and regional power-holders expressed, in overt or covert ways, dissatisfaction with the Kuomintang diehards’ anti-communist actions. Mao Zedong classified these factions as middle-of-the-road forces and promptly put forward the overall strategy of developing the progressive forces, winning over the middle-of-the-road forces, and opposing the diehard forces. Mao Zedong believed: “These middle-of-the-road forces have considerable strength and can often be the decisive factor in the outcome of our struggle against the diehards; therefore, we must adopt a very cautious attitude toward them.”

毛泽东观察到，当时国内的中等资产阶级、开明绅士和地方实力派，以或明或暗的方式对国民党顽固派的反共行动表示了不满。毛泽东将这些派别归为中间势力，迅速提出发展进步势力、争取中间势力、反对顽固势力的整体策略。毛泽东认为：“这种中间势力有很大的力量，往往可以成为我们同顽固派斗争时决定胜负的因素，因此，必须对他们采取十分慎重的态度。”

Winning over the middle-of-the-road forces required three conditions. First, the Chinese Communist Party must have strong strength; second, the respective interests of the middle-of-the-road forces must be respected; third, they must be made to see that the Chinese Communist Party had the hope of gradually winning victories in its struggle against the Kuomintang diehards. Guided by this strategy, the Chinese Communist Party actively contacted various middle-of-the-road factions and took the initiative to establish long-term relations with them. By the time of victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Chinese Communist Party had successfully united a number of national bourgeoisie, enlightened gentry, and intellectuals, effectively winning over the middle-of-the-road forces.

争取中间势力需要具备三个条件。第一是中国共产党具有强大实力；第二是尊重中间势力各自的利益；第三是要让他们看到中国共产党在与国民党顽固派的斗争中有一步一步取得胜利的希望。在此策略指导下，中国共产党积极联络各派中间势力，主动与他们建立长期联系。抗战胜利时，中国共产党成功团结了一批民族资产阶级、开明士绅和知识分子，有效争取了中间势力。

As for the Kuomintang, Mao Zedong divided it into diehards, middle-of-the-roaders, and progressives. He emphasized that although the Kuomintang repeatedly created incidents to attack the Chinese Communist Party, this did not mean that the Kuomintang was equivalent to the diehards; indeed, “the majority of its members are not necessarily diehards.” Only by clearly recognizing that different factions existed within the Kuomintang and by conducting detailed analysis and research on the actual conditions and specific figures of these different factions could one effectively exploit the contradictions between them, achieve a cooperative relationship with the middle-of-the-roaders and progressives within the Kuomintang, and thus isolate the diehards within the Kuomintang to the greatest extent.

对于国民党，毛泽东将其划分为顽固派、中间派和进步派。他强调，尽管国民党屡造事端攻击中国共产党，但这不意味着国民党就等于顽固派，甚至“它的大多数党员并不一定是顽固派”。只有明确认识到国民党内存在不同派别，并对国民党不同派别的实际情况与具体人物做细致分析研究，才能有效利用不同派别之间的矛盾，取得与国民党中间派和进步派的合作关系，从而在最大程度上孤立国民党内的顽固派。

During the period of the full-scale War of Resistance Against Japan, in the face of the complex and ever-changing Kuomintang-Communist relations, the Chinese Communist Party, on the one hand, “concentrated its energy on running its own affairs well,” carried out the great project of Party building, built the anti-Japanese base areas into model zones, and became the mainstay of the War of Resistance Against Japan; on the other hand, it waged a resolute yet flexible struggle against the Kuomintang, effectively maintaining and consolidating the Anti-Japanese National United Front. After the victory of the War of Resistance, the Central Committee of the CPC specifically pointed out: “At all times, the principles of both unity and struggle, using struggle as the means to achieve the goal of unity; being just, advantageous, and measured; exploiting contradictions, winning over the majority, opposing the minority, and smashing them one by one—these must be adhered to and never forgotten.” This brief exposition was both a summation of the experience of the Kuomintang-Communist struggle during the full-scale War of Resistance and an important guiding principle for the Chinese Communist Party in carrying out new great struggles.

全面抗战时期，面对复杂多变的国共关系，中国共产党一方面“集中精力办好自己的事情”，开展党的建设伟大工程，将抗日根据地建设成为模范区，成为抗日战争的中流砥柱；另一方面对国民党展开坚决而灵活的斗争，有力维护和巩固抗日民族统一战线。抗战胜利后，中共中央特别指出：“不论何时，又团结，又斗争，以斗争之手段，达团结之目的；有理有利有节；利用矛盾，争取多数，反对少数，各个击破等原则，必须坚持，不可忘记。”这段简要论述，既是对全面抗战期间国共斗争的经验总结，又对中国共产党开展新的伟大斗争发挥着重要指导作用。

In recent years, the United States has pursued a policy of containing and suppressing China, provoking tariff wars, trade wars, and technological wars on various pretexts. In the face of the United States’ incessant provocations and bullying, concessions and compromises will not win respect; only by strengthening the will to struggle and mastering the art of struggle can it be truly possible to promote the stable and enduring development of Sino-American relations. Mao Zedong’s reflections on the methodology of struggle have important enlightening significance for handling the complex Sino-American relationship.

近些年来，美国推行对华遏制打压政策，以各种理由挑起关税战、贸易战、科技战。面对美国持续不断的挑衅与霸凌，退让和妥协换不来尊重，只有坚定斗争意志，掌握斗争艺术，才有可能真正推动中美关系行稳致远。毛泽东对斗争方法论的思考，对处理复杂的中美关系具有重要启示意义。

(The author is an associate professor at the School of Marxism, Northwestern Polytechnical University.)

（作者系西北工业大学马克思主义学院副教授）

Online editor: Huihui

网络编辑：慧慧