How Mao Zedong Summarized the Experience of Revolutionary Warfare — An Interpretation of Telegrams Drafted on Behalf of the Central Committee (Military Commission) during the War of Liberation

Attaching importance to summing up experience and being adept at doing so, as an important leadership style and working method, have become a glorious tradition, a distinctive feature, and a political advantage of our Party. In July 1965, when meeting with Li Zongren and Cheng Siyuan, Mao Zedong stated bluntly: “I live on summing up experience.” “For example, when our People’s Liberation Army fights a battle, after every campaign there is always a summary, to develop strengths and overcome weaknesses, and continue to advance on the victory, enabling the revolution to advance from victory to victory.” During the War of Liberation, by drafting various types of telegrams on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPC (the Military Commission) (the core items currently included in the *Chronicle of Mao Zedong*, *Mao Zedong’s Military Writings*, and *Chronicle of Mao Zedong’s Military Activities* are mostly various telegrams drafted by Mao Zedong on behalf of the Central Committee (Military Commission) during this period; moreover, in important documents such as the *Selected Works of Mao Zedong* and the *Collected Works of Mao Zedong*, the proportion of telegrams among the items collected from the same period is also relatively high; this is the historical origin and documentary basis for this article’s examination of Mao Zedong’s summarization of revolutionary war experience through telegrams). Mao Zedong guided the entire army to “acquire experience,” promptly “summarize experience” and “review experience,” and instructed the whole Party to “learn from experience,” thereby forming a timely, continuous, and systematic summarization of the People’s Liberation Army’s combat experience. The fact that Mao Zedong sent telegrams on behalf of others and summarized experience undoubtedly provides a typical sample for investigation. “Important Party documents and telegrams have always been drafted by Mao Zedong himself,” and Mao Zedong himself consistently advocated “timely and continuous” summarization of experience. This article, centered on the telegrams drafted by Mao Zedong on behalf of the Central Committee (Military Commission) during the War of Liberation, attempts to deepen existing research on Mao Zedong’s summarization of war experience, with a view to providing some reference.

重视总结经验，善于总结经验，作为一种重要的领导方式和工作方法，已成为我们党的光荣传统、鲜明特点与政治优势。1965年7月，毛泽东在接见李宗仁和程思远时直陈：我是“靠总结经验吃饭的”“譬如我们解放军打仗，一个战役以后，总来一次总结，发扬优点克服缺点，继续乘胜前进，使革命从胜利走向胜利”。解放战争期间，通过代为中共中央（军委）起草各类电文（当前被收入《毛泽东年谱》《毛泽东军事文集》《毛泽东军事年谱》的核心篇目，多系该时期毛泽东代为中共中央（军委）起草的各类电文；甚至，在《毛泽东选集》《毛泽东文集》等重要文献中，同期收录篇目中的电文占比也相对较高；这是本文立足电报考察毛泽东总结革命战争经验的历史缘起和文献依据）。毛泽东引导全军“取得经验”，及时“总结经验”“检讨经验”，指示全党“学习经验”，据以形成对解放军作战经验的及时总结、持续总结和系统总结。毛泽东代发电文及其总结经验的事实，无疑提供了典型考察样本。“历来党内的重要文电，一般都由毛泽东自己起草”，而毛泽东本人一直力主“要及时与不断”总结经验。本文以解放战争时期毛泽东代为中央（军委）起草电报为中心，尝试深化毛泽东总结战争经验的既有研究，以期提供一定借鉴。

I. Mao Zedong Always Attached Importance to Summing Up War Experience

一、毛泽东始终重视总结战争经验

During the War of Liberation, the Chinese revolution entered a critical stage that would determine its fate. Under historical conditions where the balance of forces, the form of warfare, and the strategic tasks all underwent profound changes, how to extract laws from existing struggle practices, transform experience, and elevate scattered battle examples into strategic principles with overall guiding significance became one of the core issues affecting the direction of the war. By drafting a large number of telegrams on behalf of the Central Committee (Military Commission), Mao Zedong, while directing the war, constructed a mechanism for generating experience with the basic links of “acquiring experience—summarizing experience—reviewing experience—learning from experience,” enabling interaction between war practice and theoretical升华. It is in this sense that the summarization of experience was no longer a post-war review but became a leadership style and working method running through the entire war process.

解放战争时期，中国革命进入决定命运的关键阶段。在力量对比、战争形态与战略任务均发生深刻变化的历史条件下，如何从既有斗争实践中提炼规律、转化经验，并将分散的战例上升为具有全局指导意义的战略原则，成为关系战争走向的核心问题之一。毛泽东通过代为中共中央（军委）起草大量电文，在指挥战争的同时构建起一套以“取得经验—总结经验—检讨经验—学习经验”为基本环节的经验生成机制，使战争实践与理论升华形成互动。正是在这一意义上，经验总结不再是战后回顾，而成为贯穿战争全过程的领导方式与工作方法。

(1) Guiding the Whole Party to Attach Great Importance to “Acquiring Experience” in Ideological Understanding

（一）引导全党在思想认识上高度重视“取得经验”

On April 30, 1949, Mao Zedong drafted a telegram in the name of the Central Committee of the CPC and the Military Commission to the field armies and provincial and municipal Party committees. Mao Zedong stated in the telegram that, because “there is a written record to rely on, there are boundaries to abide by, it is fast, and it gives subordinates something to follow,” the Party’s higher leading organs should “mainly rely on writing telegrams and issuing general orders” to implement policies and carry out work. Throughout the entire War of Liberation, Mao Zedong not only made the above demands but also consistently led by example.

1949年4月30日，毛泽东曾以中共中央和中央军委的名义起草了一份致各野战军和各省市委的电报。毛泽东在电文中提出，因“有文字为凭，有范围可守，又迅速，又使下级有所遵循”，党的高级领导机关应该“主要地是依掌写电报，发通令”来推行政策和开展工作。纵观整个解放战争，毛泽东不仅做出如上要求，而且始终身体力行。

Guiding the whole Party to “seek experience” was for the purpose of creating something new, in order to meet the challenges brought by new era tasks and struggle situations. In June 1946, the Third Revolutionary Civil War [1]1 The Third Revolutionary Civil War is another name for the War of Liberation (1945–1949), the final stage of the Chinese Civil War between the CPC and the Kuomintang. broke out in full scale. Whether the Chinese Communist Party “could win and how to win” became the “central issue” of great concern to the military and civilians in the liberated areas. Previously, through combat during the War of Resistance Against Japan, our Party had accumulated important struggle experience. However, faced with how to adjust the overall strategic deployment of the whole Party, especially to accelerate the realization of the Party’s military strategic transformation from “ideology” and “combat form,” so as to meet the multiple needs of the transition from the War of Self-Defense to the War of Liberation and from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare, Mao Zedong and the Central Committee of the CPC advocated starting from the needs of actual struggle, actively guiding the whole Party to “acquire experience,” thereby “enhancing combat effectiveness,” and promoting “better combat.” By drafting a large number of telegrams on behalf of the Central Committee (Military Commission), Mao Zedong formed a timely, continuous, and systematic summarization of the experience of the Third Revolutionary Civil War, and then encouraged the whole Party and army to “acquire experience.” This can be understood from the following three aspects.

引导全党“求得经验”是为有所创造，以便应对新的时代任务和斗争形势带来的挑战。1946年6月，第三次国内革命战争全面爆发。中国共产党“能否胜利与如何取得胜利”，成为解放区军民高度关注的“中心问题”。此前，经抗日战争时期的作战，我们党已积累了重要斗争经验。然而，面对如何调整全党整体战略部署，特别是逐步从“思想上”和“作战形式上”加速实行党的军事战略转变，借以因应从自卫战争到解放战争、从游击战到正规战转变的多重需要，毛泽东和中共中央力主从现实斗争需要出发，积极引导全党“取得经验”，据以“提高战力”，推动“更好作战”。毛泽东通过代为中共中央（军委）起草大量电文，形成对第三次国内革命战争经验的及时总结、持续总结和系统总结，进而鼓励全党全军“取得经验”，可从以下三方面加以把握。

First, by promptly creating and summarizing new combat experience, responding to the requirements of diverse strategies and tactics under complex circumstances. In May 1946, Mao Zedong telegraphed Lin Biao, informing him that “the stubborn enemy [2]2 “Stubborn enemy” (顽军) was a CPC term for Kuomintang troops that refused to cease fighting the Communists during and after the War of Resistance Against Japan. is preparing to use tanks in the Siping area, and we hope you will study the art of defeating the enemy,” which was a new tactical research topic raised based on the needs of urban defensive operations in the Northeast. Subsequently, Mao Zedong repeatedly telegraphed the commanders of various military regions, instructing the major strategic units to “focus on practicing siege warfare, including the practice of using yellow explosives. This matter is very important, and we hope to arouse the attention of the entire army.” He also emphasized that yellow explosives should become important siege weapons, that they should learn from miners how to use explosives, and that each corps should specially deploy technical personnel to use explosives, “and we hope each military region will quickly summarize its own experience and report it by telegram” to the Central Committee. On June 10, troops of the Second Sub-District of the Taihang Region captured Yangyi Town in Taigu, Shanxi. Mao Zedong immediately telegraphed the commanders of various war zones based on this battle example, informing them of the successful experience of “organizing engineer troops, under the cover of infantry firepower, to suddenly approach, carry out explosions, blast enemy strongholds, and annihilate two entire enemy companies,” and also demanded that “every brigade and regiment in the whole army organize engineer blasting units, store large quantities of yellow explosives, and create a new record in our army’s siege technology.” The next day, he again telegraphed Chen Yi and others, demanding that the siege experience from capturing Tai’an, Zaozhuang, Dezhou, and other places, “especially the experience in using yellow explosives and organizing engineer troops, be summarized and reported by telegram.”

第一，通过及时开创并总结新的作战经验，应对复杂形势下多元战略战术的要求。1946年5月，毛泽东致电林彪，告知“顽军在四平方面准备使用坦克，望研究破敌之术”，这是基于东北城市防御作战需要而提出的新的战术攻关课题。随后，毛泽东多次致电各军区首长，指示各大战略单位“应着重练习攻城战，其中包括练习黄色炸药之使用。此事甚为重要，望唤起全军注意”。他同时强调，黄色炸药要成为重要攻城武器，要向矿工学习如何使用炸药，各兵团要专门配置使用炸药的技术人员，“并望各军区速总结自己的经验电告”中央。6月10日，太行二分区部队攻克山西太谷阳邑镇，毛泽东旋即循此战例致电各战区首长，既告知以“组织工兵在步兵火力掩护下，突然接近，施行爆炸，爆破敌据点，全歼敌两连”的成功经验，又要求“全军每旅每团均组织工兵爆破部队，收储大量黄色炸药，造成我军攻城技术之新纪录”。次日，他再度致电陈毅等人，要求将攻克泰安、枣庄、德州等处的攻城经验，“尤其是使用黄色炸药及工兵组织之经验总结电告”。

Second, by guiding and creating new technical and tactical experience to capture cities, promptly reflecting our Party’s important adjustment from dispersed guerrilla warfare to concentrated mobile warfare. The whole Party and the whole army faced new issues at every stage of the war, and Mao Zedong and the Central Committee of the CPC had to “develop” experience based on actual needs. Based on the balance of forces and the offensive-defensive posture during the strategic transition and strategic defense phases, this adjustment also needed to comprehensively consider multiple factors such as military, politics, and economy. Therefore, the acquisition of the ideological experience of moving from “dispersed guerrilla warfare” to firmly establishing “warfare without a rear base” played an important role in promoting our Party’s smooth completion of the tasks of each stage.

第二，通过引导和创制新的技战术经验攻取城市，及时反映我们党在分散兵力游击作战向集中兵力运动作战方向的重要调整。全党全军在战争每一阶段都面临新课题，毛泽东和中共中央必须从现实需要出发进行经验“开发”。基于战略过渡和战略防御阶段的实力对比与攻守态势，这种调整还需要综合考量军事、政治、经济等多重因素。因此，从“分散游击”到牢固树立“无后方作战”思想经验的取得，为推动我们党顺利完成各阶段任务发挥了重要作用。

Third, providing experience guarantees for the smooth completion of strategic tasks at each stage. Based on the successive war requirements of shifting to urban warfare, innovating dispersed guerrilla warfare, and opening up warfare without a rear base, the Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their main representative, in addition to continuously “developing experience” and “acquiring experience” based on the actual situation of the war, also needed to consciously establish, from an institutional perspective, the norms of “opposing the state of indiscipline and lack of organization, opposing the wrong attitude of not reporting beforehand and not reporting afterwards, opposing the unprincipled phenomenon of reporting only good news and not bad news, and opposing empiricism and guerrilla-ism” [3]3 This is a quotation from a 1948 directive of the Central Committee of the CPC, part of the campaign to strengthen Party discipline during the transition to regular warfare. throughout the Party, so as to provide experience guarantees for the strategic tasks of “the army advancing forward, production growing by an inch, strengthening discipline, and transitioning from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare.” [4]4 This is a slogan from a 1948 Central Committee directive, linking military advance, production growth, discipline, and the shift from guerrilla to regular warfare.

第三，为各阶段战略任务的顺利完成提供经验保障。立足转向城市作战、创新分散游击作战以及开辟无后方作战等相继出现的战争要求，以毛泽东同志为主要代表的中国共产党人除了从战争实际情况出发不断“开发经验”“获取经验”之外，还需要有意识地从制度上确立全党上下“反对无纪律无政府状态，反对事前不请示事后不报告的错误态度，反对报喜不报忧的无原则现象，反对经验主义和游击主义”的规范，为实现“军队向前进，生产长一寸，加强纪律性，由游击战争过渡到正规战争”的战略任务提供经验保障。

(2) Grasping the Laws of War, Being Adept at “Summarizing Experience”

（二）把握战争规律，善于“总结经验”

“Summarizing experience” is for the purpose of discovering something new, so as to be able to update the Party’s experience system in the process of transforming traditional experience. How to direct war lies in grasping military laws, and applying laws to war direction requires timely summarization of experience, advancing both experience summarization and promotion work while directing the war.

“总结经验”是为有所发现，以便能在转化传统经验的过程中更新党的经验系统。如何指导战争，关键在于把握军事规律，而将规律运用于战争指导，就需要及时总结经验，在指导战争中同时推进经验总结和推广工作。

Mao Zedong believed: “All principled military laws, or military theories, are summaries of past war experience made by predecessors or contemporaries.” [5]5 This is a quotation from Mao Zedong’s essay “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War” (December 1936). By the time of the War of Liberation, some commentators exclaimed: “No one foresaw the speed and skill with which the Communist commanders could transfer their experience from anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare to the campaigns of mobile warfare.” [6]6 This appears to be a paraphrase or quotation from a Western or non-CPC observer, though the specific source is not identified in the original text. This “transfer,” in Mao Zedong’s view, should both absorb the experience that is useful and reject the experience that is not, and, more importantly, should increase the experience that is unique to oneself.

毛泽东认为：“一切带原则性的军事规律，或军事理论，都是前人或今人做的关于过去战争经验的总结。”及至解放战争，有论者感叹：“没人预见到共产党的指挥员们能把他们抗日游击战的经验转移到运动战的战役中去的速度和技巧。”这种“转移”，在毛泽东看来，既应吸收用得着的经验和拒绝用不着的经验，更应增加那些自己所特有的经验。

First, when drafting telegrams on behalf of the Central Committee, Mao Zedong focused on actively “transforming” and “augmenting” experience, and also emphasized presenting “what experience proves” and explaining the “basic reasons” for victory in war, thereby providing the entire Party with the latest experiential guidance and summary of laws. For example, regarding the strategic and tactical guidelines of “generally mobile warfare” and “concentrating superior forces to annihilate the enemy one by one,” Mao Zedong summarized the relevant experience and instructed the entire Party accordingly. This was a concrete elaboration of the operational principle of concentrating forces to annihilate the enemy one by one, proceeding from established strategic deployments and actual combat conditions. During the War of Liberation, Mao Zedong and the CPC Central Committee, based on the multiple dimensions of strategy, campaigns, and tactics, summarized and elevated the experience of the War of Liberation, along with their understanding of the laws governing the transition from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare, thereby laying an important foundation for further accelerating the victory of the Chinese revolution.

第一，在代为中央起草电文时，毛泽东注重积极“转化”和“增加”经验，而且重视摆出“经验证明”，阐释战争制胜的“基本原因”，借以为全党提供最新的经验指导和规律总结。比如，关于“一般地是运动战”和“集中优势兵力，各个歼灭敌人”战略战术指针，毛泽东将个中经验加以总结并指示全党，这是从既定战略部署和实际战况出发，对集中兵力各个歼灭作战原则的具体化阐释。解放战争期间，毛泽东和中共中央立足战略、战役和战术多重维度对解放战争经验的总结与升华，以及对游击战转向正规战的规律性认识，为进一步推动中国革命迅速取胜奠定了重要基础。

Second, they urged the entire Party and army to “review experience,” using orderly political mechanisms to correct and deepen their understanding of the laws of war; they instructed various units to “study experience” to provide a reference, striving to obtain more authoritative universal education and targeted guidance. In May 1945, Mao Zedong pointed out at the Seventh National Congress of the CPC that the Party had made mistakes and suffered defeats on issues of purge work, policy, and warfare, but “making mistakes is not terrible; grasping the mistake in hand, turning it into experience, using it as a weapon” could play an “extraordinary” role. One year later, when the War of Liberation broke out in full, although our Party had already gained rich experience from the ten-year civil war and the anti-Japanese war behind enemy lines, under the new war situation and struggle tasks, it was inevitable to encounter setbacks, take detours, and make mistakes. In response, Mao Zedong and the CPC Central Committee timely urged and assisted the entire Party and army to “review experience,” emphasizing “citing bad battle examples as a warning,” in order to make spiritual and material preparations for executing new strategic tasks and achieving new victories.

第二，敦促上下“检讨经验”，借助有序的政治机制矫正并深化对战争规律的认识；指示各部“学习经验”是为有所参照，力求获得更权威的普遍教育和定向指导。1945年5月，毛泽东在党的七大指出，党曾在肃反问题、政策问题和打仗问题上犯过错误、吃过败仗，但“犯了错误不可怕，把错误抓到手里，变作经验，当作武器”，就能发挥“非同小可”的作用。一年后，解放战争全面爆发，尽管我们党已取得十年内战和敌后抗战的丰富经验，但在新的战争态势和斗争任务下，也难免会碰钉子、走弯路和犯错误。对此，毛泽东和中共中央适时督促和帮助全党全军“检讨经验”，重视“引证不良战例以为鉴戒”，以期能为执行新的战略任务和获得新的胜利做好精神与物质准备。

Fundamentally, reviewing experience is an intellectual and organizational activity that, by reflecting on past experiential facts, especially starting from summarizing lessons of failure or examining existing shortcomings, serves as a warning in practice. From the telegrams drafted by Mao Zedong on behalf of the Central Committee, it is not difficult to find that it was precisely in the process of leading and guiding the War of Liberation that the entire Party gradually created a mechanism for reviewing experience that operated in parallel and interaction between upper and lower levels, and in cross-reference between left and right. A typical example is the top-down review of experience at the central level. For instance, in September 1946, to strengthen the operational principle of concentrating superior forces to annihilate the enemy one by one, in an intra-Party directive drafted on behalf of the CPC Central Committee, Mao Zedong conducted a review from the perspective of the overall strategic situation: at that time, many cadres in our army agreed with this principle in peacetime, but could not apply it when facing battle; “this is the result of underestimating the enemy, and also the result of not strengthening education and focusing on study”; in response, the entire Party must fully recognize that “implementing this method will lead to victory. Violating this method will lead to defeat.” In addition to reflecting on this principled issue, the experiences and lessons of specific campaigns and tactics during the war were the most frequently reviewed by Mao Zedong and the CPC Central Committee.

从根本上讲，检讨经验是通过反思过往的经验事实，特别是从总结失败的教训或检视存在的不足出发，据以在实践中引为鉴戒的思想与组织活动。从毛泽东代为中央制发的电文中不难发现，正是在领导和指导解放战争的过程中，全党逐步创制出一种上下并行互动、左右交叉互鉴的检讨经验机制。就其典型而论是立于中央层面自上而下的经验检讨。例如，1946年9月，为强化集中兵力各个歼敌的作战原则，在代为中共中央起草的党内指示中，毛泽东站在战略全局层面进行检讨：当前，我军许多干部在平时赞成这一原则，一到临战就不能加以应用，“这是轻敌的结果，也是没有加强教育和着重研究的结果”；对此，全党必须充分认识到，“实行这种方法，就会胜利。违背这种方法，就会失败”。除对这一原则性问题加以省思，战时具体战役战术中的经验教训，是毛泽东和中共中央检视最多的。

(3) Emphasizing Guidance for “Studying Experience”

（三）重视引导“学习经验”

During the War of Liberation, Mao Zedong, in a series of telegrams, guided the entire Party to acquire experience, promptly summarize experience, and urge the review of experience, greatly promoting the transformation of successful experience into operational guidelines for the entire Party and army. Whether it was summarizing experience, reviewing experience, or studying experience, the ultimate goal was to help the entire Party and army learn experience, thereby guiding the war and striving for victory. As for how to study experience, based on the needs of actual struggle and the characteristics of the experience content, Mao Zedong frequently planned and instructed on the “way of learning.” This included both the dissemination of experience from the overall strategic situation and its universal learning requirements, targeted guidance based on campaign and tactical needs, and specific opinions urging reference and imitation. Although the scope, content, and requirements of learning varied, the core demand of putting the results of experience summarization into practice was highly consistent.

解放战争时期，毛泽东在系列电文中引导全党取得经验、及时总结经验、敦促检讨经验，极大推动成功经验转化为全党全军的行动指针。无论是总结经验，还是检讨经验、学习经验，最终均为了帮助全党全军习得经验，据以指导战争和争取胜利。至于如何学习经验，依据现实斗争需要和经验内容特质，毛泽东频繁规划和指示“学习之道”。其中，既有立于战略全局的经验通报及其普遍性学习要求，也有基于战役战术需要的定向指引，以及督促参考仿照的专门意见。虽然个中学习的范围、内容和要求多有不同，但推动经验总结成果落地生效的核心诉求高度一致。

First, when dealing with experience content of high weight or broad influence, Mao Zedong often, from the height of the overall strategic situation, disseminated specific experience to the entire Party and army through telegrams, or transmitted important summaries reported by lower levels to the Central Committee, elevating them into experiential directives that could reflect the will of the CPC Central Committee (Military Commission) and had universal implementation significance. Second, after making a simple affirmative evaluation of the experience content in incoming telegrams from lower levels, he directly forwarded them to the entire Party and army for study, reference, or imitation. Third, to provide direct reference for specific campaigns and battles, when drafting telegrams on behalf of the Central Committee, Mao Zedong emphasized instructing lower-level combat departments to study various “examples.” Fourth, in addition to urging the study of experience at the strategic and tactical levels, in terms of combat psychology, Mao Zedong particularly focused on using typical battle examples to inspire fighting will.

一是在面对权重较高或影响面广的经验内容时，毛泽东常立足于战略全局的高度，将具体经验通过电文通报全党全军，或将下级上报中央的重要总结加以批转，使其上升为能够体现中共中央（军委）意志，并且具有普遍执行意义的经验指示。二是通过对下级来电经验内容作出简单肯定性评价后，直接转发给全党全军学习参考或仿照办理。三是为给具体战役战斗提供直接参照，在代为中央起草电文时，毛泽东重视指示下级作战部门学习各种“范例”。四是在战略战术层面督促学习经验外，在作战心理上，毛泽东尤为注重以典型战例鼓舞斗争意志。

Mao Zedong and the CPC Central Committee established guidelines for the entire Party to study and learn from each other’s experience at multiple levels, including strategy, tactics, and psychology. This also became the key for the entire army to grasp the laws of war, take the initiative in war, and fully promote the rapid victory of the War of Liberation. The marvel that “Chairman Mao commanded the world’s largest people’s war from the smallest command post” lay precisely in Mao Zedong’s timely summarization of combat experience through telegrams, thereby leading the war comprehensively, deeply, and systematically. From acquiring experience, summarizing experience, reviewing experience, to finally studying experience, Mao Zedong’s timely, continuous, and systematic summarization of the combat experience of the War of Liberation always followed the requirements of Marxist epistemology, and also constantly used the understanding of the laws of war to guide the war, and used the summarization of specific experiences and lessons to adjust strategies and tactics, thereby promoting the victory of the Chinese revolution.

毛泽东和中共中央在战略、战术和心理等多个层面，为全党开展经验学习互鉴确立了方针，这也成为全军得以把握战争规律和掌握战争主动，全力推动解放战争快速取胜的关键。“毛主席是在最小的指挥所里指挥了世界上最大的人民战争”的奇观，关键在于毛泽东借助电报及时总结作战经验，进而全面、深入和系统领导战争。从求得经验、总结经验、检讨经验到最后学习经验，毛泽东对解放战争作战经验的及时总结、持续总结和系统总结，始终遵循马克思主义认识论要求，也时刻以对战争的规律性认识来指导战争，以对具体经验教训的总结来调适战略战术，推动中国革命取得胜利。

II. The Formation of Strategic Principles and Tactical Innovations

二、战略原则与战术创新的形成

If the previous part reveals the overall picture of Mao Zedong’s construction of an experience summarization mechanism at the ideological and institutional levels, then, in concrete war practice, what experiences of strategic significance did Mao Zedong actually acquire and summarize? How did these experiences rise from the campaign and tactical level to operational principles with universal guiding value? How were they transformed through institutionalized means into the common cognition of the entire Party and army? Around these questions, it is necessary to systematically sort out the war experiences Mao Zedong acquired, summarized, and reviewed during the War of Liberation.

如果说前一部分揭示的是毛泽东在思想与制度层面构建经验总结机制的总体图景，那么，在具体战争实践中，毛泽东究竟获取和总结了哪些具有战略意义的经验？这些经验如何从战役战术层面上升为具有普遍指导价值的作战原则？又如何通过制度化方式转化为全党全军的共同认知？围绕上述问题，有必要系统梳理解放战争时期毛泽东获取、总结和检讨的战争经验。

(1) Dispersed Guerrilla Warfare

（一）分散游击

Under the circumstances of comprehensively considering multiple factors such as military, political, and economic aspects during the War of Liberation, how to acquire the experience of “dispersed guerrilla warfare” became an important issue for Mao Zedong.

在综合考量解放战争时期军事、政治、经济等多重因素的情势之下，如何获取“分散游击”的经验，成为毛泽东考虑的重要问题。

Practice proved that “dispersed guerrilla warfare” was a policy our Party must adhere to in order to persist in and achieve victory in long-term wars and frequent battles, especially in realizing the transition from strategic defense to strategic counteroffensive. Mao Zedong once considered this the foundation for our Party to seek great strategic victory. In fact, it was indeed an effective strategy to break the Kuomintang’s all-out offensive, to the extent that Chiang Kai-shek was subsequently forced to adjust his strategy, shifting to a focused attack on the Shandong and Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia liberated areas. In response, Mao Zedong and the CPC Central Committee adapted to the situation and immediately inquired of relevant troops whether they could use the tactic of “using one part to pin down one enemy column, while using the main force to boldly attack another enemy column” to break the situation. After Hu Zongnan [7]7 Hu Zongnan (胡宗南, 1896–1962) was a senior Kuomintang general who commanded the forces that attacked the CPC’s base in Yan’an in 1947. attacked Yan’an with 12 brigades, Mao Zedong immediately notified Nie Rongzhen [8]8 Nie Rongzhen (聂荣臻, 1899–1992) was a prominent CPC military commander and later a Marshal of the People’s Republic of China. and others, instructing: when facing the stubborn enemy’s (similar to on the Shandong battlefield) “new tactic of dense, rolling advance, steady and sure, not easily dividing forces,” each theater of war should “fight wherever it can annihilate the enemy; that itself is coordination for other theaters. And hope you earnestly summarize the experiences and lessons in combat to facilitate better fighting.” After the victory at the Battle of Qinghuabian [9]9 The Battle of Qinghuabian (青化砭战役, March 1947) was a successful CPC ambush of Kuomintang forces in northern Shaanxi, part of the Yan’an campaign., Mao Zedong specifically telegraphed Peng Dehuai [10]10 Peng Dehuai (彭德怀, 1898–1974) was a senior CPC military leader and later a Marshal of the People’s Republic of China, who commanded forces in northwest China during the War of Liberation. and others, again emphasizing that “against the enemy’s millstone-like tactic, we must patiently tire and exhaust it over a long period, force it to disperse, and seek opportunities to annihilate it.” At the same time, he further affirmed Peng Dehuai’s plan to attack Panlong [11]11 Panlong (蟠龙) was a town in Shaanxi province; the Battle of Panlong (May 1947) was a CPC victory in which they captured a key Kuomintang supply depot., believing that “if victorious, the impact will be great; even if unsuccessful, experience will be gained.” Such seeking of experience through practice, even by trial and error, was also frequently seen in Mao Zedong’s telegrams to Lin Biao [12]12 Lin Biao (林彪, 1907–1971) was a senior CPC military commander and later a Marshal, who led forces in northeast China during the War of Liberation., Liu Bocheng [13]13 Liu Bocheng (刘伯承, 1892–1986) was a senior CPC military commander and later a Marshal, who co-commanded the Central Plains Field Army., and others, intended to comfort and inspire them that although “the battle did not completely annihilate the enemy, experience has been gained,” and that “although various units did not fight well in several battles, they have accomplished the great task of concentrating forces and dispersing the enemy.”

实践证明，“分散游击”是我们党坚持并获取长期战争和频繁战斗胜利，特别是实现从战略防御转向战略反攻所必须持守的方针，毛泽东一度认为此乃我们党寻求战略上伟大胜利之根本。事实上，它确实是破解国民党全面进攻的有效策略，以至于蒋介石随后被迫调整策略，转而重点进攻山东和陕甘宁解放区。对此，毛泽东和中共中央因势利导，立即向相关部队求证能否“以一部钳制其一路，而以主力大胆打其另一路”的战法予以破解。待胡宗南以12个旅进攻延安，毛泽东立即通告聂荣臻等人并指示：当面对顽军（类似在山东战场上）的“密集平推、稳扎稳打、不轻易分兵的新战法”时，各战区“作战不论在什么也地方、只要能消灭敌人，就是对于他区的配合。并望认真总结作战中的经验教训，以利更好作战”。及至青化砭战役获胜，毛泽东专门致电彭德怀等人，再度强调面对“敌人此种小米碾子式战法，须耐心长期疲困、消耗它，迫其分散，寻找弱点歼灭之”。同时，他进一步肯定了彭德怀攻击蟠龙的计划，认为“如胜利，影响必大；即使不胜，也取得经验”。如此通过实践甚至以试错方式来求取经验，还多见于毛泽东致林彪、刘伯承等人的电报，意在宽慰并启发他们尽管“作战未全部解决敌人，但已取得经验”，以及“各部虽有几仗未打好，但完成了集中兵力、分散敌人之巨大任务”。

(2) Operations Without Rear Areas

（二）无后方作战

With the arrival of the stage of strategic counteroffensive, how to firmly establish the thinking of "fighting without a rear base"[14]14 "Fighting without a rear base" (无后方作战) refers to conducting military operations without relying on established rear-area supply lines or bases, a necessity during the transition from defensive to offensive operations. began to become a new task for the entire army. This was the key to achieving the shift from interior-line operations to exterior-line operations, and then to completely reversing the strategic situation. To this end, in October 1947, Mao Zedong telegraphed the commanders of various war zones, and while reporting on the situation and experience of the Northwest War Zone, he put forward the strategic guideline of "capture and replenish on the spot"[15]15 "Capture and replenish on the spot" (即俘即补) was a policy of immediately integrating captured enemy soldiers into one's own forces to compensate for combat losses., and demanded that "it is not only the Northwest that has this experience; each region must also have this kind of experience itself. Be sure to sum it up, deepen the army's lessons, and strive for victory in the great counteroffensive." In fact, the practical problems of the strategic counteroffensive stage were far more complex than simply handling the relationship between combat, supply, and rest. A series of specific experiential demands, such as desert warfare and resisting cold, also entered the scope of the People's Liberation Army's problem-solving. This required our Party to establish a regular mechanism for "gaining experience" based on institutional construction, in order to cope with the complex warfare and its experiential demands in strategy and tactics. Therefore, establishing a system of requesting instructions and submitting reports was extremely urgent. In January 1948, Mao Zedong drafted an instruction for the Central Committee on establishing a reporting system. Later, in March, he telegraphed various Central Bureau, Sub-Bureaus, and Front Committees to supplement the regulations on the reporting system. In August, he again telegraphed various field armies, military regions, Central Bureaus, and Sub-Bureaus, specifying in detail the content of requesting instructions beforehand and submitting reports afterward. During the same period, Mao Zedong approved and transmitted the Northeast Bureau's self-criticism telegram on implementing the reporting system, along with the Central Committee's reply, emphasizing that persistently "gaining experience" through institutionalization was the "central link" for the entire Party to achieve "the transition from small-scale local guerrilla warfare to large-scale nationwide regular warfare, and from partial victory to nationwide victory."

随着战略反攻阶段到来，如何牢固树立“无后方作战”思想，开始成为全军的新课题。此乃实现由内线作战转向外线作战，继而彻底扭转战略局面的关键。为此，1947年10月，毛泽东致电各战区首长，在通报西北战场情况及经验之余，提出“即俘即补”的战略指针，并要求“不但西北有此经验，各区自己亦必须有这种经验，务望总结起来，加深部队教训，争取大反攻胜利”。事实上，战略反攻阶段的现实问题远不止处理好作战、补给和修整间的关系这么简单，一系列诸如沙漠作战和抗御寒冷等具体经验诉求，也进入解放军求解的范围，这就要求我们党能立足制度建设，有序确立“取得经验”的常效机制，据以应对繁复战事及其在战略战术上的经验诉求。因此，建立请示报告制度迫在眉睫。1948年1月，毛泽东为中共中央起草关于建立报告制度的指示，后又在3月致电各中央局、分局和前委，对报告制度予以补充规定。8月，他再度致电各野战军、各军区及各中央局和分局，具体规定事前请示和事后报告的详细内容；同期，毛泽东批转了东北局执行报告制度的检讨电以及中央复电，强调以制度化的方式持续“取得经验”，是全党实现“由小规模的地方性游击战争过渡到大规模全国性正规战争，由局部性胜利过渡到全国胜利”的“中心环节”。

(3) "Generally speaking, it is mobile warfare" and "concentrate a superior force to destroy the enemy forces one by one"

（三）“一般地是运动战”和“集中优势兵力，各个歼灭敌人”

The strategic and tactical guidelines of the People's Liberation Army during the strategic adjustment and defensive stages were mainly "generally speaking, it is mobile warfare" and "concentrate a superior force to destroy the enemy forces one by one." This was not merely a tactical choice of our Party before the shift in the balance of power between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, but rather a profound strategic consideration. In August 1946, the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army attacked the Longhai Railway and achieved victory. Mao Zedong immediately telegraphed Liu Bocheng and others, and informed the commanders of various war zones, summarizing the experience and instructing the entire Party: "In every battle against the regular troops of the stubborn enemy, you must use a superior force against the enemy. The best ratio is four to one, at least three to one. Annihilate one part, then fight another part, then fight a third part, defeating them one by one." At the same time, "overcome the concept of underestimating the enemy that leads to evenly distributing effort and seeking universal victory in campaigns and battles." The key to this battle's success in annihilating two enemy divisions lay in adhering to the principle of using a superior force to defeat an inferior one (pitting 11 regiments against the enemy's 3 regiments). This summary was Mao Zedong's concrete elaboration of the operational principle of "concentrate a superior force to destroy the enemy forces one by one," based on established strategic deployments and actual combat conditions.

解放军在战略调整及防御阶段的战略战术指针，主要是“一般地是运动战”和“集中优势兵力，各个歼灭敌人”。这不只是在国共两党力量对比发生转变前我们党的一种策略选择，而更为一种深远的战略考量。1946年8月，晋冀鲁豫野战军出击陇海路作战并取得胜利，毛泽东随即致电刘伯承等人并告各战区首长，将个中经验加以总结并指示全党：“凡与顽正规军作战，每战必须以优势兵力加于敌人，其比例最好是四比一，至少是三比一，歼其一部，再打另一部，再打第三部，各个击破之”，同时“克服战役上及战斗上平均用力普遍求胜之轻敌观念”。此战获得歼敌两个师的胜果，关键在于坚持以多胜少的原则（以11个团对垒敌军3个团）。这种总结，是毛泽东从既定战略部署和实际战况出发，对“集中优势兵力，各个歼灭敌人”作战原则的具体阐释。

A week later, Mao Zedong again telegraphed the leaders of the Shandong and Central China Liberated Areas, and informed the Party committees of various liberated areas and the commanders of various divisions and columns. This telegram specifically cited the "good examples" of the victory in the Yugou Campaign in northern Jiangsu (force ratio 7:2) and the Southwest Rugao Campaign in central Jiangsu (force ratio 10:2) to analyze the benefits of "concentrating a large force to strike one part of the enemy" (on the whole, "using less effort but achieving more success, winning every battle, achieving both total annihilation and quick decision"), and then demanded that all units "adopt it universally" and "plan everything" accordingly. Discussing the essence of this method, it still lay in concentrating forces to achieve total annihilation and quick decision. This practice helped solve the problem of scarce combat resources and troops, and also maximized the preservation of oneself and the destruction of the enemy's effective strength. This was the tactical point Mao Zedong relied on most. During the same period, in addition to summarizing the experience of central Jiangsu, in a telegram to the Datong front, Mao Zedong also used the Dingtao Campaign's "experience to tell me (him) two points": first, concentrate a superior force, first annihilate one to two enemy regiments, boost our army's morale, cause panic among the enemy, and then annihilate them one by one after success; second, prepare for a long-term battle of five to seven days, and eliminate each strong enemy force one by one. Although the experiential instructions in this were no different from those of the Longhai Railway Campaign, they actually contained new thinking and preparations for the changing war situation. Even on September 13, 1946, after sending out the telegram "Report on the Combat Experience of the Liu-Deng Army" on behalf of the Central Military Commission, Mao Zedong telegraphed Liu and Deng again the next day, instructing them to "learn the method of concentrating superiority to strike one point," so that when facing a strong enemy, they could fatigue and consume the enemy, concentrate on striking its weak points, and ensure the initiative through adequate rest. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping were themselves the commanders of the Dingtao Campaign and were also the initial summarizers of the campaign's victorious experience. Mao Zedong's two telegrams were not merely to deepen the summary of the Dingtao Campaign's experience; they also contained forward-looking judgments on the empirical facts of future warfare.

一周后，毛泽东又致电山东、华中解放区领导人，并告知各解放区党委、各师各纵队首长。该电专举苏北鱼沟战役（军力对比7:2）和苏中如皋西南战役（军力对比10:2）取胜的“好例”，来分析“集中大力打敌一部”的好处（全局上“用力省而成功多，每战必胜，既能全歼，又能速决”），进而要求各部“普遍采用”，并照此“规划一切”。论及此法要髓，仍在于集中兵力促成全歼和速决，此举既有助于解决战斗资源和兵员匮乏问题，也能最大限度保存自己和消灭敌军有生力量，这是毛泽东最为倚重的战术要点。同期，除对苏中经验进行总结外，在致大同前线的电报中，毛泽东还用定陶战役“经验告诉我（他）们”两点：一是集中优势兵力，先歼敌一至两个团，提振我军士气，引起敌人恐慌，得手后再各个歼灭；二是做五至七天长期战斗准备，逐一消灭各部强敌。个中经验指示，虽然与陇海路战役经验别无二致，实际却包含了对变化中的战争形势新的思考与准备。甚至，1946年9月13日，在代为中央军委发出“关于刘邓军作战经验的通报”电后，毛泽东于次日再度致电刘邓二人，指示“要学会集中优势打击一点的战法”，借以在面对强敌时能疲劳消耗敌人，集中打其弱点，并以充分修整来确保主动。刘邓二人本是定陶战役的指挥官，而且还是这场战役取胜经验的最初总结者，毛泽东先后两发电报，并非仅为深化对定陶战役经验的总结，同样是包含了对未来战争经验事实的前瞻性研判。

To further strengthen the above operational principles throughout the entire army, in September and October 1946, Mao Zedong twice drafted inner-Party directives for the Central Committee, systematically elaborating on the operational principle of "concentrate a superior force to destroy the enemy forces one by one" from multiple levels. He pointed out: This principle was not proposed during the civil war, but was a fine tradition of our army for over ten years; during the War of Resistance Against Japan, our army mainly dispersed its forces to fight guerrilla warfare, but now our army's combat methods must change according to the situation, adopting the concentration of forces to fight mobile warfare as the main method (especially when the enemy holds the advantage); at the same time, in the past three months, 25 enemy brigades had been annihilated, and experience had proven that this principle was "the main method for defeating Chiang Kai-shek's offensive," and even "the only correct method of operations," so it must be deployed at both the campaign and tactical levels. After this directive was issued, Mao Zedong immediately telegraphed Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, and others, demanding that their subordinate units take advantage of rest periods to hold cadre meetings for dissemination, in order to achieve the effect of "strengthening the confidence for long-term operations." Soon after, in the New Kaoling Campaign on the Northeast battlefield and a series of operations in northern and eastern Manchuria, this directive was effectively implemented. Faced with successive victories, Mao Zedong, while continuing to affirm the value of concentrating forces at the campaign and tactical levels, also emphatically explained the objective empirical facts that "besieging a city to annihilate the enemy's reinforcements is an important method for annihilating the enemy" and "only by adopting a bold offensive policy is the way to victory." The above telegrams and documents were a comprehensive expansion of the principle of concentrating forces to annihilate the enemy one by one at the strategic and tactical levels, and also laid the foundation for subsequently responding to the adjustment of the Kuomintang army's strategy and tactics (changing from all-out offensive to key-point offensive).

为了能在全军进一步强化上述作战原则，1946年9月和10月，毛泽东还两次为中央起草党内指示，从多个层面对“集中优势兵力、各个歼灭敌人”的作战原则进行了系统阐释。他指出：该原则并非是在内战中提出，而是我军十余年来的优良传统；抗战时期我军以分散兵力打游击战为主，当前我军作战方法须应势而变，取以集中兵力打运动战为主（敌占优势时，更应如此）；同时，过去三月歼敌25个旅，经验已证明这一原则是“战胜蒋介石进攻的主要方法”，甚至是“唯一正确的作战方法”，因而必须同时部署于战役和战术两个层面。该指示发出后，毛泽东立即致电刘伯承、邓小平等人，要求所属各部应乘休整机会开干部会进行传达，以求得“坚定长期作战信心”之效。不久，在东北战场新开岭战役和北满、东满的系列作战中，这一指示得以有效贯彻。面对接踵而至的胜利，毛泽东除继续肯定在战役和战术上集中兵力的价值外，还着重说明了“围城打援是歼灭敌人重要方法”，“只有采取勇敢进攻方针，才是取胜之道”的客观经验事实。上述文电，是对集中兵力各个歼敌作战原则在战略战术层面的全面拓展，也为接下来应对国民党军战略策略调整（改全面进攻为重点进攻）奠定了基础。

According to the established strategic and tactical deployments, on the two key battlefields of Yan'an and Shandong, the People's Liberation Army successively annihilated Hu Zongnan's 135th Brigade and Zhang Lingfu's reorganized 74th Division. Regarding the former result, Mao Zedong believed it proved two points: first, that the existing forces in the Border Region alone, without any external aid, could gradually solve Hu's army; second, that by patiently waiting and not being impetuous or arrogant, opportunities to annihilate the enemy could be found. Regarding the latter victory, he believed it also "proved that in the current area of operations, as long as one is not impatient and does not divide one's forces, it is possible to break the enemy's attack and achieve victory by using the method of annihilating them one by one." Mao Zedong vividly summarized this tactic as the "mushroom" tactic[16]16 The "mushroom" tactic (蘑菇战术) involves luring the enemy into exhausting itself through constant movement and harassment, like a mushroom being ground down, before striking decisively., that is, grinding the stubborn enemy down to exhaustion and then taking the opportunity to annihilate them. The flexible application of the above strategies and tactics, while helping our army effectively promote strategic adjustment, gave Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee the opportunity, after launching the Southwest Shandong Campaign in June 1947, to summarize the combat experience of the entire army over the past year, issue instructions on the strategic policy for the second year, and then scientifically summarize the combat experience of the entire army into the "Ten Major Military Principles"[17]17 The "Ten Major Military Principles" (十大军事原则) were a set of operational guidelines summarized by Mao Zedong in December 1947, based on the PLA's combat experience, emphasizing concepts like annihilation, concentration of force, and mobile warfare.. These three summaries became an important experiential reference for our Party to effectively solve new problems in the strategic offensive stage, such as "how to combine capturing cities with annihilating the enemy's effective strength, how to combine mobile warfare with positional warfare, how to combine combat with rest, and how to combine rear supply with obtaining supplies from the enemy and from the locality."

按照既定战略战术部署，在延安和山东两个关键战场，解放军先后歼灭胡宗南部135旅和张灵甫部整编74师。对前一战果，毛泽东认为证明了两点：一是仅用边区现有兵力，不借任何外援即可逐步解决胡军，二是忍耐等候、不骄不躁可以寻得歼敌机会。对后一胜利，他认为也“证明在现地区作战，只要不性急，不分兵，是能够用各个歼击方法打破敌人进攻，取得胜利”。对此战法，毛泽东形象地概括为“蘑菇”战术，即将顽敌磨得精疲力竭后趁机消灭。上述战略战术的灵活运用，在帮助我军有效推动战略调整之际，使得毛泽东和党中央在1947年6月发起鲁西南战役后，有机会对全军一年来作战经验进行总结，并就第二年战略方针加以指示，进而对全军作战经验作出“十大军事原则”的科学概括。这三次总结，成为我们党有效破解战略进攻阶段“如何将夺取城市与歼敌有生力量相结合，如何使运动战、阵地战相结合，如何使作战和休整相结合，如何使后方补充和取之于敌、取之于当地相结合”等新课题的重要经验参照。

As the war progressed, Mao Zedong continuously produced new war analyses and experience summaries. Among these, as emphasized in a telegram to Peng Dehuai, the victory of annihilating two main divisions of Hu Zongnan’s forces “proved that using the methods of ‘speaking bitterness’ and the ‘three check-ups’ to train troops, and promoting political, economic, and military democracy, achieved extremely great results.” [18]18 “Speaking bitterness” (诉苦) refers to a method of political education where soldiers recounted their past suffering under the old society to raise class consciousness. The “three check-ups” (三查) were a movement during the War of Liberation to check class origin, work style, and will to fight. There was also, as in the telegram to the Central Plains Field Army summarizing the operations to annihilate Huang Baitao and Huang Wei’s forces, the emphasis that “experience has proven that for enemies with tenacious combat effectiveness, relying on surprise attack methods cannot annihilate them; it is necessary to adopt measures such as splitting up, reconnaissance, close-in operations, concentrating forces and firepower, and coordination between infantry and artillery to achieve annihilation.” [19]19 Huang Baitao and Huang Wei were senior Kuomintang commanders; their forces were annihilated in the Huaihai Campaign (1948-49). There was also, as at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Party, the proposal of three methods for resolving the remaining Kuomintang forces: “the Tianjin method of resolution by combat, the Beiping method of peaceful reorganization, and the Suiyuan method of intentionally preserving them for a period to be reorganized later.” [20]20 The Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee was held in March 1949. The Tianjin, Beiping, and Suiyuan methods refer to different ways of resolving Kuomintang forces: by force, by negotiated surrender, and by temporary preservation followed by integration. The above examples encompass Mao Zedong’s and the Party Central Committee’s summarization and elevation of the experience of the War of Liberation from the multiple dimensions of strategy, campaign, and tactics, as well as their understanding of the laws governing the transition from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare, laying an important foundation for further accelerating the rapid victory of the Chinese revolution.

随着战事推进，毛泽东持续作出新的战争分析与经验总结。其中，既有如在致电彭德怀时所强调的，歼灭胡宗南两个主力师的胜利，“证明用诉苦及三查方法整训部队，发扬政治、经济、军事各项民主收效极为宏大”。也有如在给中原野战军电报中对攻打黄百韬和黄维两部的总结，同样强调“经验均证明：对于战斗力顽强之敌，依靠急袭手段是不能歼灭的，必须采取割裂、侦察、近迫作业、集中兵力火力和步炮协同诸项手段，才能歼灭”。还有如在党的七届二中全会上提出今后解决国民党军的三种方式，“用战斗解决的天津方式，用和平改编的北平方式和有意地暂时保留一个时期待后改编的绥远方式”。上述种种，含括了毛泽东和中共中央立足战略、战役和战术多重维度对解放战争经验的总结与升华，以及对游击战转向正规战的规律性认识，为进一步推动中国革命迅速取胜奠定了重要基础。

III. Review, Study, and Institutionalization of Operational Principles

三、作战原则的检讨学习与制度化

The value of war experience does not stop at reviewing past campaigns; it lies in transforming experience into replicable and generalizable operational principles and organizational norms through review and reflection. After the War of Liberation entered the stage of strategic decisive battles, the war situation became increasingly complex and severe, and local setbacks and tactical deviations were unavoidable. The key issue was not whether problems arose, but how to face them, how to summarize them, and how to avoid repeating mistakes through institutionalized learning. In this process, Mao Zedong not only emphasized the importance of gaining experience but also placed great importance on reviewing errors and reconfirming operational principles, continuously carrying out summarization, review, and study, enabling the people’s army to continuously cultivate its capacity for self-correction and self-improvement. It was through this continuous reflection that several operationally significant principles were consolidated and deepened, and war experience was truly elevated to strategic consciousness.

战争经验的价值，并不止于对既往战例的回顾，而在于通过检讨与反思，使经验转化为可复制、可推广的作战原则和组织规范。解放战争进入战略决战阶段后，战争形势愈发复杂严峻，局部失利与战术偏差在所难免。关键问题不在于是否出现问题，而在于如何面对问题、如何总结问题、如何通过制度化学习避免重复错误。在这一过程中，毛泽东不仅强调取得经验的重要性，更高度重视对失误的检讨和对作战原则的再确认，持续开展总结、检讨、学习，使人民军队不断培养自我修正和自我提升的能力。正是在这种持续反思中，若干具有全局意义的作战原则得到巩固和深化，也使战争经验真正上升为战略自觉。

(1) Summarizing and Reviewing Experience

（一）总结和检讨经验

First, reviewing the fighting of battles without preparation or certainty of victory, leading to lessons such as the failure of the Independent Fifth Brigade under He Long to capture Bolo, the lesson of the Liu-Deng Army fighting continuously for forty days without rest and thus being unable to persist, the lesson of the two columns of the Yang-Luo-Yang Army missing opportunities to annihilate the enemy due to food shortages, and the problem of using erroneous tactics in the battles of Shahousuo and Wangdaotun in the Northeast region. [21]21 Bolo was a town in Shaanxi. The Liu-Deng Army refers to the forces of Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping. The Yang-Luo-Yang Army refers to forces commanded by Yang Dezhi, Luo Ruiqing, and Yang Chengwu. In response, Mao Zedong repeatedly warned various units in his telegrams to reduce unnecessary impatience and not to fight battles without preparation.

一是检讨打没有准备和没有把握的仗，导致诸如贺龙所率独立第五旅未能攻克波罗的教训，刘邓大军连续作战四十天未得休息而不能坚持的教训，杨罗杨军两纵队因缺粮丧失歼敌机会的教训，东北地区沙后所、王道屯作战中采用错误战法的问题等。对此，毛泽东在往来电文中一再警示各部，要减少不必要的性急、不打无准备之仗。

Second, reviewing the failure to implement the operational principle of concentrating superior forces, leading to situations such as the missed opportunity to annihilate the 74th Division in the Battle of Qingtuosi on the Shandong battlefield, the unfavorable outcome of the attack on Heshui on the Northwest battlefield, and the confusion over the main direction of attack on the Northeast battlefield. [22]22 The 74th Division was a crack Kuomintang unit annihilated in the Battle of Menglianggu (1947). Heshui was a county in Gansu. Mao Zedong emphasized the need to learn from these lessons, both by concentrating main forces to attack a single point under normal circumstances and by estimating the multiple possibilities in each military action.

二是检讨未能贯彻集中优势兵力的作战原则，导致诸如山东战场青驼寺战斗错失歼敌74师时机，西北战场攻打合水不利，东北战场搞不清主攻方向等状况。毛泽东强调要从中吸取教训，既要在通常情况下必须集中主力攻击一点，又要估计到每次军事行动中的多种可能性。

Third, reviewing ideological deviations such as underestimating the enemy arising from victories. Although the Central Committee had forwarded the Second Field Army’s report analyzing ideological trends within the Party and had instructed that it be explained and educated throughout the entire army—that there were no longer large-scale battles like those in Liaoxi or Huaihai to be fought, but the enemy was still struggling and the war continued, so “it must absolutely not be led to the ideology of underestimating the enemy”—in actual operations, especially after the founding of New China, during the campaign to eliminate stubborn enemies on the coastal islands of Fujian, the lesson of the failed attack on Kinmen occurred. [23]23 Liaoxi refers to the Liaoshen Campaign (1948) in the Northeast. Huaihai refers to the Huaihai Campaign (1948-49). The Kinmen (Quemoy) attack in October 1949 was a failed amphibious assault by the People’s Liberation Army. Mao Zedong warned the entire army: as the War of Liberation draws to a close, leading cadres at all levels “are more prone to the ideology of underestimating the enemy and impatience. The Kinmen Island incident must be taken as a profound warning. Education must be carried out among the troops still engaged in combat, and they must be strictly cautioned against underestimating the enemy and impatience, to steadily and according to plan annihilate the remaining enemy and liberate the whole country. This is of utmost importance.”

三是检讨部队因胜利而产生轻敌等思想偏向。尽管中央已转发第二野战军有关分析党内思想动向的报告，并要求在全军加以说明和教育——当前已经没有辽西、淮海之类的大仗要打，但敌人还在挣扎、战争还在继续，因而“绝不应当被引导到轻敌思想”。但是，在实际行动中，尤其是当新中国宣告成立后，在消灭福建沿海岛屿顽军的作战中，还是发生攻击金门失利的教训。毛泽东告诫全军：解放战争行将结束，各级领导干部更“容易发生轻敌思想及急躁情绪，必须以金门岛事件引为深戒。对于尚在作战的兵团进行教育，务必力戒轻敌急躁，稳步地有计划地歼灭残敌，解放全国，是为至要”。

In addition to the above dimensions, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee also required various units to review their own experiences and gains and losses based on specific campaigns. For example, in October 1947, in order to establish the idea throughout the army of “solving all problems by winning battles,” he proposed on the one hand that the experience of the Northwest battlefield be taken as a model for study, and on the other hand required the commanders of each unit to investigate whether, among the cadres of their respective units, there existed “the idea that only with regular large-scale rest and reorganization, with large, well-supplied units of two to three thousand men per regiment, with large numbers of civilian laborers and carts accompanying the army, and with ample rear-area supplies of grain and ammunition, can large battles be won, and that any slight fatigue or reduction in numbers is met with complaints,” thereby firmly establishing throughout the army the conviction of “taking everything from the enemy, not relying on rear-area supply.” At the tactical level, such “earnest and repeated” review requirements were even more numerous. In October 1947, due to Wang Xinting’s failure to capture Yuncheng, Mao Zedong specifically telegraphed the relevant personnel, stating bluntly that “the attack on Yuncheng did not succeed, and the attack on the reinforcements was not a complete annihilation,” but that as long as they “humbly studied the experience,” they could achieve victory. [24]24 Wang Xinting was a PLA commander. Yuncheng is a city in Shanxi. Wang Xinting then summarized the experience, adjusted his tactics to include tunnel blasting and multi-directional assaults, and successfully captured Yuncheng. In June 1948, in a telegram to the Northeast Field Army, Mao Zedong inquired whether various units had adopted new tactics such as small-group attacks, tunnel blasting, or tunnel warfare for siege operations, and specifically asked “whether meetings of cadres at the division level and above have been convened to review combat experience,” emphasizing that this measure “has great significance.” At the end of 1949, in light of the lesson of the failed attack on Kinmen, when formulating the operational plan for capturing Hainan Island, he specifically telegraphed Lin Biao instructing him to “study this lesson” and directed the combat units to “investigate with Su Yu all the experience of sea-crossing operations, to avoid repeating the Kinmen mistake.”

除上述几个维度外，毛泽东和中共中央还要求各部从特定战例出发，自行检讨经验得失。例如，1947年10月，为能在全军确立“一切从打胜仗中解决问题的思想”，他一方面提出应以西北战场经验为学习典范，另一方面又要求各部首长研究在各自所属部队的干部中，是否存在“认为一定要有定期大休整，要有两三千人一个团的充实的大部队，要有大批民夫、大车随军使用，要有充分的后方粮弹供给，才能打大胜仗，稍有疲劳减员即叫苦连天的思想”，借以在全军牢固树立“一切取给于敌，不靠后方接济”的信念。在战术层面，这种“耳提面命”式的检讨要求实则更多。1947年10月，因王新亭围攻运城失利，毛泽东专门致电相关人等，直陈“攻运城未克，打援又未全歼”，只要“虚心研究经验”，便能获胜。王新亭随即总结经验，调整以坑道爆破、多路突击的战法，顺利攻克运城。1948年6月，在给东北野战军的电报中，毛泽东询问各部是否采用小组攻击、坑道爆炸或地道斗争等新战法进行攻城作战，同时特别追问“是否已召集师以上干部会检讨作战经验”，并强调此举“具有很大意义”。1949年底，鉴于进攻金门失利的教训，在制定夺取海南岛的作战计划时，他专门电示林彪“必须研究这一教训”，并指示各作战部队“向粟裕调查渡海作战的全部经验，以免重蹈金门覆辙”。

The War of Liberation was marked by frequent military engagements. Although the daily telegrams from Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee could promptly assist and instruct various units in reviewing their experience, it was difficult to achieve comprehensive control and individual guidance. Therefore, establishing a normalized mechanism for self-review became extremely important. In response, Mao Zedong and the Party Central Committee addressed this issue based on two points.

解放战争战事频仍，来自毛泽东和中共中央的日常文电虽可以及时帮助和指示各部检讨经验，但也难以做到全盘掌控和逐一指导。有鉴于此，确立一种常态化的自我检讨机制就显得极为重要。对此，毛泽东和中共中央立足两点予以解决。

First, stipulating that units use intervals between battles to review experience. In December 1946, the Central Military Commission issued instructions on military training and cadre training, clearly requiring various units to be adept at using intervals between battles for military and political training. The core content included “conducting inspections and summaries from the perspectives of command, tactics, technology, coordination between arms, and cooperation between departments,” with the intention of gaining practical experience through profound review, thereby “adapting to the needs of a long war and frequent battles.” [25]25 The Central Military Commission was the supreme military leadership organ of the CPC. In early 1947, Mao Zedong telegraphed the person in charge of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, requiring them to “examine past experience and deploy new operations” based on two given basic conditions, striving to fight “large-scale annihilating battles.” In May of the same year, he telegraphed the person in charge of the Central Plains Military Region and all comrades, proposing that under the leadership of Zheng Weisan and Li Xiannian, they “review experience in accordance with the Central Committee’s line” and prepare to carry out new combat tasks. In July 1948, in a telegram to the Central Plains Field Army, he again required the subordinate units to “review lessons” during the forty-day rest period of the rainy season. It is not difficult to see that the objects of these periodic reviews were not entirely lessons of failure, but also comprehensive summaries of the phased experiences and lessons of each unit. This kind of review was essentially a systematic summarization of experience and organizational learning behavior of “examining the past to anticipate the future.”

第一，规定部队利用战斗间隙检讨经验。1946年12月，中央军委曾发出关于练兵和训练干部的指示，明确要求各部要善于利用战斗间隙进行军事和政治训练，核心内容包括“从指挥上、战术上、技术上、各兵种协同上、各部门工作配合上，进行检查和总结”，意图通过深刻检讨获得实战经验，借以“适应长期战争和频繁战斗的需要”。1947年初，毛泽东致电晋察冀军区负责人，要求从给定的两个基本条件出发，“检查过去经验，部署新的作战”，争取打好“大歼灭战”；同年5月，他致电中原军区负责人及全体同志，提出在郑位三、李先念的领导下，“根据中央路线检讨经验”，准备执行新的战斗任务。1948年7月，在给中原野战军的电文中，他又要求所属部队应在进入雨季修整期的四十天内“检讨教训”。不难发现，如上要求定期检讨的对象，其实并不完全是失败的教训，还包括各部阶段性经验教训的综合总结。这种检讨，实质上是一种“鉴往开来”式的经验系统总结和组织学习行为。

Second, establishing the intra-Party reporting system. The original intention of both measures was “to reflect the situation in a timely manner, so that the Central Committee could help various localities avoid or reduce mistakes beforehand or afterwards.” The core of such reports was, first, to require that the act of lower levels reporting to the Central Committee be regarded as “the main work of daily work” for the entire Party; second, to require that various departments make a “self-examination report to us (the Central Committee)” on the results of implementing policies and strategies. As for how to write reports, Mao Zedong also set strict standards in telegrams to the entire army: first, he proposed that the report on the situation of the troops after the Central Shanxi Campaign [26]26 The Central Shanxi Campaign (Jinzhong Campaign) was a major battle fought by the People's Liberation Army in central Shanxi province in mid-1948, resulting in the annihilation of a large enemy force. and the training plan could serve as a “model”; second, he emphasized that the content should be “analytical and conclusive, not hollow and empty; it must speak of both strengths and merits, and also of shortcomings and errors”; third, he instructed that “all valuable telegrams that can serve as lessons for each corps and military district” be promptly forwarded to various units for reference. The establishment of the above-mentioned mechanism for reviewing experience ensured that the experience of various units could be gathered and circulated, making timely, continuous, and systematic experience review and information exchange possible, which greatly benefited the sharing of experience and coordinated operations among war zones.

第二，确立党内报告制度。这二者初衷，都是“为了及时反映情况，使中央有可能在事先或事后帮助各地不犯或少犯错误”。此类报告的核心，一是要求将下级向中央报告的行为本身，视作全党“日常工作的主要工作”，二是要求将各部落实政策和策略之结果的“自我检讨向我们（中央）作报告”。至于如何撰写报告，毛泽东在致全军的电报中也有严格规范：一是提出可以晋中战役后部队情况及整训计划报告为“榜样”，二是强调在内容上应是“有分析、有结论的，而不是空洞无物的；必须是既说优点长处，又说缺点错误”；三是指示将“一切有价值的、足为各兵团及各军区取法的电报”，及时转发给各部参考。上述检讨经验机制的创设，确保了各部经验得以汇聚和流动，这使及时、持续和系统的经验检讨与信息交互成为可能，对各战区经验共享和协同作战大有裨益。

(2) Adhering to “learning from experience” to boost morale

（二）坚持“学习经验”，鼓舞斗志

Mao Zedong and the CPC Central Committee established guidelines for the entire Party to learn from and draw on each other’s experience at the strategic, tactical, and psychological levels, which became the key for the entire army to grasp the laws of war, take the initiative in warfare, and vigorously promote the rapid victory of the War of Liberation.

毛泽东和中共中央在战略、战术和心理多个层面，为全党开展经验学习互鉴确立指针，这成为全军上下得以把握战争规律和掌握战争主动，全力推动解放战争快速取胜的关键。

First, disseminating successful experience. Mao Zedong paid attention to disseminating successful experience to the entire Party and army through telegrams, reflecting the will of the CPC Central Committee (Military Commission), and thereby giving it universal significance for implementation.

第一，通报成功经验。毛泽东注重将成功经验通过电文通报全党全军，体现中共中央（军委）意志，进而发挥普遍执行的意义。

In July and August 1946, Mao Zedong telegraphed the Central Bureaus and Military Districts twice, forwarding them to division and column commanders, to disseminate the successful experience of Chen Geng’s and Su Yu’s units in concentrating forces to annihilate the enemy one by one. He gave instructions that “this method of warfare should be universally taught to officers at the regimental level and above; this is of utmost importance,” and demanded that “all regions follow suit and inform all subordinate units to pay attention.” In such telegrams, he not only summarized the experience reported in the incoming telegrams for a second time but also, after affirming and commending it, made specific requirements for study and practical implementation. Such telegrams and requirements also included: in August 1947, telegraphing the main responsible persons of various war zones, including Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Chen Geng, and Peng Dehuai, to inform them that after entering the stage of strategic counteroffensive, our army must simultaneously pay attention to both “annihilating” the enemy and inflicting “annihilating blows” on the enemy; in January 1948, approving and forwarding Deng Zihui’s report on the Bohai army consolidation experience to the entire army, demanding that “in all units where relations between officers and soldiers are poor, discipline is bad, and combat effectiveness is weak, the Bohai army consolidation experience should be adopted, soldiers’ committees should be organized, and the democratic movement among the soldiers should be launched wholeheartedly. There will be only benefits, no harm,” and emphasizing that this was “the best system for strengthening unit unity, preventing warlordism, and improving combat effectiveness.” This kind of experience, disseminated and approved for forwarding by Mao Zedong in the name of the Central Committee, had normative significance for implementation at the level of the entire Party and army, going beyond merely expanding the scope of recipients of the telegrams.

1946 年7月和8月，毛泽东两次致电各中央局、各军区并转各师及纵队首长，通报陈赓部和粟裕部集中兵力各个歼敌的成功经验，并作出“望将此种战法普遍教育团级以上将领，是为至要”的指示，以及“希望各区仿照办理，并望转知所属一体注意”的要求。在此类文电中，他既对来电所述经验进行二度总结，又在给予肯定和褒扬后，作出具体学习和实际执行的要求。此类电文及要求还包括：1947年8月，致电刘伯承、陈毅、陈赓、彭德怀等各战区主要负责人，告知在进入战略反攻阶段后，我军必须同时注意给敌以“歼灭”与给敌以“歼灭性打击”；1948年1月，批转邓子恢渤海整军经验报告至全军，要求“在一切官兵关系恶劣、纪律不好、战斗力薄弱之部队，应采取渤海整军经验，组织士兵委员会，放手发动士兵群众的民主运动，只有益处，没有害处”，并强调此乃“加强部队团结，防止军阀主义，提高战斗力的最好制度”。这种经由毛泽东并以中央名义通报和批转的经验内容，具备了在全党全军层面执行的规范意义，已不只是扩大了电文的受文对象范围。

Second, affirming the experience reported in telegrams from lower levels, and attaching importance to making positive evaluations of the content of such experience before forwarding it to the entire Party and army for study and reference. In November 1946, Mao Zedong forwarded the brief report on the Hua County Campaign [27]27 The Hua County Campaign was a battle fought in Hua County, Henan province, in November 1946, during which Liu Bocheng's forces achieved a victory. submitted by Liu Bocheng and others to various strategic zones for reference; in February 1948, he forwarded Deng Xiaoping’s supplementary opinions on land reform policies in the new areas to the Central Working Committee, the Central Bureaus, and the front committees of the field armies, emphasizing that “the experience of the Dabie Mountains is extremely valuable, and we hope all localities and armies will adopt and apply it”; in November of the same year, he forwarded Peng Dehuai’s summary of the work on winning over prisoners to “various places for reference,” and forwarded the Northeast Field Army’s report on the Xuqi Campaign [28]28 The Xuqi Campaign refers to a series of operations by the Northeast Field Army in late 1948, part of the larger Liaoshen Campaign. operations to “various field army front committees for reading and reference”; in January 1949, he telegraphed the East China Field Army’s report on rectifying discipline to “the entire army for reference.” In the process of forwarding, although Mao Zedong did not provide the detailed explanations and in-depth summaries of the relevant experience as before, this local experience, once authenticated by authority and promoted by the leader, was bound to have overall guiding significance for the War of Liberation, greatly promoting the transformation of successful experience from one locality into action guidelines for the entire Party and army.

第二，肯定下级来电经验，重视对下级来电经验内容作肯定性评价后转发全党全军学习参考。1946年11月，毛泽东将刘伯承等人所报滑县战役简报转发各战略区参考；1948年2月，向中央工委、各中央局和野战军前委转发邓小平对新区土改政策的补充意见，强调“大别山经验极可宝贵，望各地各军采纳应用”；同年11月，转发彭德怀争取俘虏工作总结给“各处参考”，并将东北野战军戌齐作战经过报告“转发各野战军前委阅看，以资参考”；1949年1月，将华东野战军整顿纪律报告电“转发全军参考”。在转发过程中，毛泽东虽未对相关经验做出如前详细说明和深化总结，但这些局部经验经权威认定和领袖推介后，势必对解放战争产生全局性的指导意义，将极大推动一地成功经验转化为全党全军的行动指针。

Third, emphasizing the exemplary role of models. For example, in terms of combat methods, in preparation for the Ping-Han Campaign [29]29 The Ping-Han Campaign refers to operations along the Beiping-Hankou Railway in 1945. and operations in Shandong and Central China, Mao Zedong telegraphed the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Central Bureau and the New Fourth Army successively in 1945, proposing that the experience of the Shangdang Campaign [30]30 The Shangdang Campaign was a campaign in September-October 1945 in southeastern Shanxi, where the Communist forces defeated a Nationalist offensive. be used to concentrate forces and fight continuously and repeatedly to achieve victory; in April 1946, to guide operations in the Northeast battlefield, he telegraphed Lin Biao and others twice, first demanding that they study the experience of the Handan Campaign [31]31 The Handan Campaign was a battle in October-November 1945 in Hebei province. to encourage all subordinate units to “engage in repeated hand-to-hand combat over many days,” and then instructing them to learn from Zhan Caifang’s experience in breaking roads during the Suizhong Campaign [32]32 The Suizhong Campaign was a battle in Liaoning province in 1945. to prepare for urban defensive operations; in May and July of the same year, he telegraphed Xiao Hua and Zhang Dingcheng successively, instructing them that in operations to defend Benxi and other places, they should concentrate forces when attacking, and when defending, they should learn from the model of Siping [33]33 The Siping model refers to the tenacious defense of the city of Siping in Jilin province by Communist forces in 1946., insisting on holding out with fewer troops against many, and never retreating even unto death. The above models all occurred during the stage of strategic adjustment, when the War of Liberation had not yet officially begun. These telegrams precisely illustrate the importance the CPC Central Committee attached to typical “battle examples” as an effective means to compensate for the lack of combat experience under the new strategic situation. After the full-scale outbreak of the civil war, the “models” for study and the study instructions in related telegrams only increased. For example, in January 1947, Mao Zedong telegraphed Chen Yi, instructing him to “take the Su-Dong Campaign [34]34 The Su-Dong Campaign was a battle fought in Suzhou and Dongshan areas in 1947. as an example and strive to fight large-scale annihilating battles”; in July 1948, he telegraphed Xu Xiangqian, instructing him to adopt the method of the Shandong troops in attacking cities and strive to capture Taiyuan within ten days or so; in December 1948, he telegraphed Su Yu and others, instructing them to take the method of the Northeast battlefield in attacking the Liao Yaoxiang Corps [35]35 The Liao Yaoxiang Corps was a Nationalist army corps annihilated by the People's Liberation Army during the Liaoshen Campaign in 1948. as a reference, boldly penetrate between the enemy’s various armies to facilitate the annihilation of the enemy. By promoting typical battle examples and their successful experience, the transplantation and reference of combat experience among various war zones were facilitated, helping the Central Committee to still carry out overall planning and directional guidance of the war without needing to exercise “remote control.”

第三，强调发挥范例的示范作用。比如，在作战方法上，为准备平汉战役以及山东和华中作战，毛泽东于1945年先后致电晋冀鲁豫中央局和新四军，提出应利用上党战役经验，集中兵力，连续多次作战，据以获取胜利；1946年4月，为指导东北战场作战，两度致电林彪等人，先是要求学习邯郸战役经验，激励所属各部“多日反复肉搏战斗”，后是指示学习詹才芳在绥中作战中的破路经验，做好城市防御作战；同年5月和7月，先后致电萧华和张鼎丞等人，指示在保卫本溪等地的作战中，进攻时应集中兵力，防守时应学习四平范例，坚持以少对多，死守不退。以上范例均发生在战略调整阶段，此时解放战争尚未正式开打，这些电文恰好说明中共中央对典型“战例”的重视，弥补新战略形势下斗争经验不足的有效手段。及至内战全面爆发，相关电文中的学习“范例”与学习指示更是有增无减。例如，1947年1月，毛泽东电示陈毅“应以宿东战役为例，力争打大歼灭战”；1948年7月，电示徐向前应采用山东部队攻城方法，争取在十天内外夺取太原；1948年12月，电示粟裕等人应以东北战场攻打廖耀湘兵团的战法为参考，大胆插人敌各军之间，以利歼敌。借助推广典型战例及其成功经验，促进了各战区作战经验的移植与参考，有助于在不用“遥制”的情况下，中央仍可以对战争实施全局擘画和定向指导。

Fourth, in terms of operational policy, the combat experience of different war zones could also be mutually referenced. In this regard, Mao Zedong also first summarized and affirmed it, then gave clear study instructions. In July 1946, Mao Zedong telegraphed Zhang Dingcheng and others, using “Su Yu’s unit annihilated 20,000 enemy troops, fighting very well” as an example, instructing the Central China Military District that “in future operations, do not be too impatient either; the general principle is to win battles”; in February 1947, he telegraphed Nie Rongzhen and others, encouraging all subordinate units to “learn from the operational policy of the three zones of Chen-Su, Liu-Deng, and Chen-Xie in making big advances and retreats and taking the initiative completely in operations,” in order to concentrate superior forces to destroy the enemy’s effective strength; in June and October, facing the stubborn enemy’s tactic of concentrating heavy forces, he telegraphed Chen Yi, Lin Biao, and others, proposing that the experience of the Yan’an and interior front battlefields be used as a reference, and insisting on the policy of splitting forces to strike out and fighting in a dispersed manner; at the end of 1948, to solve the problem of campaign deployment in the stage of strategic decisive battles, he telegraphed Su Yu, Yang Dezhi, and others, instructing them to follow the policy of the Jinan Campaign [36]36 The Jinan Campaign was a major battle in September 1948 in Shandong province. and the Xu-Beng Campaign [37]37 The Xu-Beng Campaign refers to the Huaihai Campaign, a decisive battle fought in the Xuzhou-Bengbu area from late 1948 to early 1949. of replenishing as they fought, fighting as they replenished, investigating prisoners as they were captured, and incorporating them as they were replenished, in order to maintain sufficient troop strength and high morale in the combat units, thereby enabling continuous operations and large-scale annihilation of the enemy. By using upper-level channels to promote the interconnection of operational experience from top to bottom and mutual reference from left to right, the CPC Central Committee achieved timely adjustment and unified deployment of operational policy. Compared with the mutual reference of tactical experience, this had a more far-reaching impact on the entire war.

第四，在作战方针上，不同战区作战经验亦可以互鉴。对此，毛泽东也是先予以概括和肯定，后给出明确学习指示。1946年7月，毛泽东致电张鼎丞等人，以“粟部歼敌二万，打得很好”为例证，指示华中军区“今后作战亦不要过于性急，总以打胜仗为原则”；1947年2月，致电聂荣臻等人，鼓励所属各部“今后行动应学习陈粟、刘邓、陈谢三区大踏步进退、完全主动作战的方针”，借以集中优势兵力，消灭敌人有生力量；6月和10月，面对顽军采用重兵集结战法，致电陈毅、林彪等人，提出应以延安和关内战场经验为借鉴，坚持分路出击、分散作战的方针；1948年末，为解决战略决战阶段的战役部署问题，致电粟裕、杨得志等人，指示应仿照济南战役和徐蚌作战中随战随补、随补随战、即俘即查、即补即战的方针，来保持作战部队兵员充足、士气旺盛，据以连续作战和大量歼敌。借助上层渠道推动作战经验的上下互联和左右互鉴，中共中央实现了作战方针的及时调整和统一部署，这相比于战术经验互鉴来说，对整个战争影响更为深远。

Apart from urging the study of experience at the strategic and tactical levels, Mao Zedong also paid particular attention to using typical combat examples to inspire fighting spirit in terms of combat psychology. For instance, when encountering situations where stubborn enemy forces were arrayed in strength, making it difficult to annihilate the enemy, and where there were repeated tendencies toward dividing forces and impatience, in April 1947 alone he sent telegrams to Peng Dehuai, Chen Yi, Su Yu, and others, reassuring them to "have great patience and forbearance," to wait patiently for opportunities, and "not to prematurely alarm the enemy's rear." In February 1948, in order to deploy operations for the Ping-Sui Campaign, he sent telegrams to Nie Rongzhen, Yang Dezhi, Lin Biao, and others, requiring them to systematically learn from the various armies of Liu-Deng, Chen-Su, and Chen-Xie [38]38 The Liu-Deng Army refers to the forces of Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping; the Chen-Su Army refers to those of Chen Yi and Su Yu; the Chen-Xie Army refers to those of Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi. These were major field army formations of the People's Liberation Army during the War of Liberation. the "spirit of arduous struggle of daring to operate between the Yangtze, Huai, Yellow, and Han Rivers, far from their rear areas, without regular civilian laborers, and for a long time without rear-area supply of ammunition and replacements, yet able to fight powerful enemies," and to "use the spirit of the Lin-Luo Army [39]39 The Lin-Luo Army refers to the forces of Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan, the Northeast Field Army of the People's Liberation Army. daring to fight powerful enemies under conditions of minus thirty degrees Celsius in completely enemy-occupied territory to explain to all commanders and fighters," and "never make concessions to any conservative tendencies, ensuring victory in long-range mobile operations." In September 1949, when planning the Dinghai operation, he sent a telegram to the East China Bureau of the CPC [40]40 The East China Bureau of the CPC was a regional Party organization responsible for directing Party work in East China during the revolutionary period. to "adopt a cautious attitude" and "strive to guard against arrogance and underestimation of the enemy."

除在战略战术层面督促学习经验外，在作战心理上，毛泽东也特别注重以典型战例鼓舞斗争意志。例如，在遭遇顽军重兵对垒、歼敌困难而又屡有分兵和性急之弊时，仅在1947年4月，就曾先后致电彭德怀、陈毅、粟裕等人，宽慰其“要有极大忍耐心”，忍耐待机，“不要过早惊动敌人后方”。1948年2月，为部署平绥战役作战，致电聂荣臻、杨得志、林彪等人，要求在作战行动中系统学习刘邓、陈粟、陈谢诸军“敢于在江淮河汉之间，远离后方，没有常备民夫，长时间内没有弹药及新兵的后方接济，而能与强大敌人作战的艰苦奋斗精神，要拿林罗军敢于在零下三十度气候条件下在完全敌占区与强敌作战的精神，向一切指战员说明”，“绝不要向任何保守倾向让步，保证远出机动作战的胜利”。1949年9月，在策划定海作战方案时，致电中共华东局要“采取慎重态度”“力戒骄傲轻敌”。

Mao Zedong solemnly proposed that our Party had over the years "accumulated rich experience, but had not summarized it, allowing this experience to be buried, allowing various erroneous policies and methods to be repeated, and allowing good experience to be confined to one locality and not be adopted by the entire Party." This situation "must arouse the attention of the entire Party." The process by which Mao Zedong summarized combat experience during the War of Liberation is undoubtedly a model that can be studied and emulated. Entering the New Era, the entire Party attaches great importance to Mao Zedong's methodology of summarizing experience, both actively inheriting it and fully developing it. For example, on the issue of "acquiring experience," Xi Jinping emphasizes that "we can first carry out pilot projects, cross the river by feeling the stones, respect practice and creativity, encourage bold exploration and pioneering, blaze new trails in practice, and promote them after gaining experience." On the issue of "summarizing experience," the Party Central Committee believes that it is essential to "summarize well the glorious path the Party has traversed, summarize well the brilliant achievements the Party has led the people to attain, summarize well the precious experience the Party has gained in advancing revolution, construction, and reform, and summarize well the theory and practice of the Party's and the country's endeavors since the 18th National Congress of the CPC [41]41 The 18th National Congress of the CPC, held in November 2012, marked the beginning of Xi Jinping's leadership and the start of the New Era of socialism with Chinese characteristics. that have forged ahead with determination." On the issue of "reviewing experience," the consensus that "erroneous experience and failed experience are also valuable assets" has been formed within the Party, and "daring to face up to one's own problems, daring to engage in self-revolution, and always maintaining advanced nature and purity" has become the Party's political self-awareness. On the issue of "learning from experience," the entire Party has always firmly believed in and practiced the political conviction that "the Chinese Communists have reached today by relying on study, and they will certainly rely on study to move toward the future." This fully demonstrates that on the new journey of the New Era, Mao Zedong's successful experience in summarizing combat experience has become a precious tradition of the Party.

毛泽东郑重提出：我们党多年来“有了丰富的经验。但是没有总结，让这些经验埋没，让各种错误的方针及方法反复重犯，让良好的经验限于一地无法为全党取法”，这种情况“必须引起全党注意”。解放战争时期毛泽东对作战经验的总结过程，无疑是可供学习和参照的范例。进入新时代，全党高度重视毛泽东总结经验的方法论，既积极继承，又充分发展。如在“取得经验”问题上，习近平强调“可以先进行试点，摸着石头过河，尊重实践、尊重创造，鼓励大胆探索、勇于开拓，在实践中开创新路，取得经验后再推开”。在“总结经验”问题上，党中央认为务必要“把党走过的光辉历程总结好，把党团结带领人民取得的辉煌成就总结好，把党推进革命、建设、改革的宝贵经验总结好，把党的十八大以来党和国家事业砥砺奋进的理论和实践总结好”。在“检讨经验”问题上，“错误的经验、失败的经验也是宝贵财富”已在党内形成共识，“敢于直面自身存在的问题，勇于自我革命，始终保持先进性和纯洁性”更成为党的政治自觉。在“学习经验”问题上，全党始终笃信并践行“中国共产党人依靠学习走到今天，也必然要依靠学习走向未来”的政治信念。这充分说明，在新时代新征程上，毛泽东关于总结作战经验的成功经验，已成为党的宝贵传统。

Author's brief introduction: Chen Dong, Associate Professor at the School of Media and Communication, Anqing Normal University.

作者简介：陈东，安庆师范大学传媒学院副教授。