The Inner Logic of the Military and the Economy – A Study of Mao Zedong’s Military-Economic Thought
乔玉婷:军事与经济的内在逻辑——学习毛泽东军事经济思想
Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought is Mao Zedong’s scientific understanding of the relationship between war and the economy, and between national defense construction and economic construction, and it is also an important component of the scientific system of Mao Zedong Thought. Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought integrates the basic principles of Marxism with China’s specific realities, forming a Marxist military-economic theory with distinct Chinese characteristics through long-term practical exploration. Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought has a rigorous structure and is logically self-consistent; it is a relatively complete system with distinctive theoretical traits such as scientificity, subjectivity, and practicality, demonstrating the scientific nature and contemporary value of Marxist theory. At present, China is in a critical stage of comprehensively advancing the realization of Chinese-path modernization and moving toward the goal of basically realizing socialist modernization. The positions, viewpoints, and methods contained in Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought still have important enlightening significance for the New Era and the new journey in coordinating and handling major relationships such as development and security, enriching the country and strengthening the military, and independence and self-reliance versus learning from foreign experience, enhancing strategic resolve, improving the ability to respond to risks, and calmly coping with major tests of high winds and choppy waters, even raging waves.
毛泽东军事经济思想是毛泽东关于战争与经济、国防建设与经济建设关系的科学认识,也是毛泽东思想科学体系的重要组成部分。毛泽东军事经济思想把马克思主义基本原理同中国具体实际相结合,在长期实践探索中形成了具有鲜明中国特色的马克思主义军事经济理论。毛泽东军事经济思想结构严整、逻辑自洽,是一个相对完整的体系,具有科学性、主体性与实践性等鲜明理论特质,彰显了马克思主义理论的科学性与时代价值。当前,我国正处于全面推进实现中国式现代化、向基本实现社会主义现代化目标迈进的关键阶段。毛泽东军事经济思想蕴含的立场、观点与方法,对于在新时代新征程中统筹处理发展与安全、富国与强军、独立自主与借鉴外国经验等重大关系,增强战略定力、提高风险应对能力,从容应对风高浪急乃至惊涛骇浪的重大考验,仍具有重要启示意义。
I. The Overall Logic of Mao Zedong’s Military-Economic Thought
一、毛泽东军事经济思想的总体逻辑
Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought adheres to the basic positions, viewpoints, and methods of Marxism, and gradually formed a scientific understanding of the dialectical relationship between the military and the economy in the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution and construction. The overall logic of Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought is concentrated in the internal coherence and high degree of unity of three levels: the fundamental position, the logical main line, and the methodological principles.
毛泽东军事经济思想坚持马克思主义基本立场、观点与方法,在中国革命和建设的具体实践中逐步形成了关于军事与经济辩证关系的科学认识。毛泽东军事经济思想总体逻辑集中体现为根本立场、逻辑主线与方法论原则三个层面的内在贯通与高度统一。
(1) Fundamental Position: All Military-Economic Activities Must Be Rooted in the People, Rely on the People, and Serve the People
(一)根本立场:一切军事经济活动都必须立足人民、依靠人民、服务人民
Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought consistently follows historical materialism, making it clear that all military-economic activities must be rooted in the people, rely on the people, and serve the people. This fundamental position runs through multiple aspects, including the theory of people’s war, the building of the people’s army, and the strategy and tactics of the people’s army.
毛泽东军事经济思想始终遵循唯物史观,明确一切军事经济活动都必须立足人民、依靠人民、服务人民。这一根本立场贯穿人民战争理论、人民军队建设以及人民军队战略战术等多个方面。
First, the nature of people’s war determines that military-economic activities must be rooted in the people’s position. The masses of the people contain the profound strength for victory in war; only through the mass line can the support of the people be transformed into strategic resources for overcoming difficulties, and scattered economic and social forces be transformed into the overall material strength supporting the war. Mao Zedong pointed out: “The deepest source of the great power of war lies in the masses of the people.” [1]1 Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War” (1938). During the revolutionary war period, even under extremely difficult conditions, our Party always took improving the people’s livelihood as an important task. When planning the national development strategy, Mao Zedong placed the interests of the people first, proposing “first the common people, we cannot lose the people’s hearts; second, fighting; third, natural disasters,” [2]2 Mao Zedong, quoted from his remarks during the Yan’an period, reflecting his prioritization of the people’s livelihood. and in 1966 he proposed “prepare for war, prepare for natural disasters, for the people,” [3]3 Mao Zedong, directive issued in 1966, linking military preparedness, disaster relief, and service to the people. further clarifying that the ultimate purpose of military and economic work is to serve the people and benefit the people.
第一,人民战争的性质决定了军事经济活动必须立足人民立场。人民群众蕴藏着战争胜利的深厚力量,只有通过群众路线,才能把人民群众的支持转化为克服困难的战略资源,把分散的经济社会力量转化为支撑战争的整体物质力量。毛泽东指出:“战争的伟力之最深厚的根源,存在于民众之中。”革命战争时期,即便在极其艰苦的条件下,我们党始终把改善民众生活作为重要任务。毛泽东在谋划国家发展战略时将人民利益置于首位,提出“第一是老百姓,不能丧失民心;第二是打仗;第三是灾荒”,并在1966年提出“备战、备荒、为人民”,进一步明确军事与经济工作最终旨归在于服务人民、造福人民。
Second, the nature and purpose of the people’s army determine that its military-economic practice must adhere to the people’s position. The people’s army “is not united and does not fight for the private interests of a few or a narrow group, but for the interests of the broad masses of the people, for the interests of the entire nation.” [4]4 Mao Zedong, “On Coalition Government” (1945). This nature determines that the people’s army is not only a fighting force but also a production force and a work force. While carrying out military tasks, economic measures such as land reform, the Great Production Campaign, [5]5 The Great Production Campaign was a large-scale self-sufficiency movement launched by the Chinese Communist Party in the Yan’an base area during the 1940s to overcome economic difficulties. and streamlining administration and simplifying troops [6]6 Streamlining administration and simplifying troops was a policy implemented in the Yan’an period to reduce the burden on the people and increase efficiency in the base areas. consolidated the economic bonds and political foundation of sharing weal and woe between the military and the people, making the people’s army a new type of revolutionary armed force distinct from old-style armies.
第二,人民军队的性质宗旨决定了其军事经济实践必须坚持人民立场。人民军队“不是为着少数人的或狭隘集团的私利,而是为着广大人民群众的利益,为着全民族的利益,而结合、而战斗的”。这种性质决定了人民军队不仅是战斗队,同时是生产队和工作队。在执行军事任务的同时,土地改革、大生产运动、精兵简政等经济举措,巩固了军民休戚与共的经济纽带与政治基础,使人民军队成为区别于旧式军队的新型革命武装力量。
Third, the vitality of the people’s army’s strategy and tactics is rooted in the masses of the people. Tactical forms such as ambushes, sabotage operations, tunnel warfare, landmine warfare, and sparrow warfare [7]7 Sparrow warfare refers to small-scale, dispersed guerrilla attacks by small groups, named for their resemblance to sparrows pecking at food. were formed and developed precisely in the practice of relying on the wisdom and strength of the masses of the people. Mao Zedong profoundly pointed out: “Because our strategy and tactics are based on people’s war, no army that opposes the people can utilize our strategy and tactics.” [8]8 Mao Zedong, “Our Study and the Current Situation” (1944). The creation and application of military strategy and tactics cannot be separated from the deep social foundation of the masses of the people.
第三,人民军队战略战术的生命力根植于人民群众。伏击战、破袭战、地道战、地雷战、麻雀战等战术形式,正是在依托人民群众智慧与力量的实践中形成发展起来的。毛泽东深刻指出:“因为我们的战略战术是建立在人民战争这个基础上的,任何反人民的军队都不能利用我们的战略战术。”军事战略战术的创造与运用,离不开人民群众这一深厚社会基础。
(2) Logical Main Line: The Unity of Opposites between the Military and the Economy
(二)逻辑主线:军事与经济对立统一
The logical main line of Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought lies in the theoretical explanation and practical application of the dialectical unity of the basic contradictory categories of the military and the economy. Starting from the positions of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, Mao Zedong profoundly discussed the internal connection between the economic base and politics and the military: “The forces of politics and the military are for the purpose of overthrowing forces that hinder the development of productive forces; overthrowing forces that hinder the development of productive forces aims to liberate productive forces and develop the economy. The economy is the foundation of politics and the military; politics and the military are the superstructure. The foundation is the economy, and the fundamental purpose is also to develop the economy.” [9]9 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China” (1949). This assertion fundamentally reveals the historical mission of military struggle and the internal connection with economic development, making it clear that military activities ultimately point to the liberation and development of social productive forces. The formation and application of military force do not exist in isolation but are premised on certain relations of production and socioeconomic conditions and serve specific practical goals.
毛泽东军事经济思想的逻辑主线,在于对军事与经济这一基本矛盾范畴的辩证统一关系的理论阐释与实践运用。毛泽东从辩证唯物主义与历史唯物主义立场出发,深刻论述了经济基础与政治、军事之间的内在联系:“政治、军事的力量,是为着推翻妨碍生产力发展的力量;推翻妨碍生产力发展的力量,目的是为着解放生产力,发展经济。经济是政治、军事的基础,政治、军事是上层建筑。地基是经济,根本目的也是发展经济。”这一论断从根本上揭示了军事斗争的历史使命与经济发展的内在关联,明确了军事活动最终指向解放和发展社会生产力。军事力量的形成与运用不是孤立存在的,而是以一定的生产关系和社会经济条件为前提并服务于特定的实践目标。
First, following the basic law that the economic base determines the superstructure, it emphasizes that the economic base and economic-social relations determine class positions and political attitudes. In *Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society*, Mao Zedong pointed out that the primary issue of the revolution is to distinguish friends from enemies. [10]10 Mao Zedong, “Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society” (1926). During the New Democratic Revolution period, Mao Zedong profoundly analyzed the economic base of Chiang Kai-shek’s reactionary regime: “This monopoly capitalism, closely combined with foreign imperialism, the domestic landlord class, and the old-style rich peasants, became comprador, feudal, state monopoly capitalism. This is the economic base of Chiang Kai-shek’s reactionary regime.” [11]11 Mao Zedong, “The Present Situation and Our Tasks” (1947). Based on this analysis, he proposed that the revolutionary task of opposing imperialism and feudalism must first destroy the feudal land system, carry out land revolution, realize “land to the tillers,” and make the vast peasantry a solid relying force of the revolution. In the early stages of the War of Liberation, facing the apparent disparity in economic strength between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, Mao Zedong further pointed out that the Kuomintang regime, relying on bureaucratic monopoly capital and extremely reactionary fiscal and economic policies, would inevitably lead to economic collapse and social crisis. This profound grasp of the logic of the operation of the economic base enabled our Party to master historical initiative in strategic judgment. After the founding of New China, Mao Zedong applied this theoretical logic to the practice of socialist transformation, proposing the Party’s general line for the transition period, the core of which was to establish the dominant position of socialist public ownership in the national economy, making socialist ownership of the means of production the economic base of the state and society. [12]12 The general line for the transition period (1953–1956) aimed at the simultaneous socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts, and capitalist industry and commerce.
第一,遵循经济基础决定上层建筑这一基本规律,强调经济基础与经济社会关系决定阶级立场及政治态度。在《中国社会各阶级的分析》中,毛泽东指出革命的首要问题是分清敌友。新民主主义革命时期,毛泽东深刻剖析蒋介石反动政权的经济基础:“这个垄断资本主义,同外国帝国主义、本国地主阶级和旧式富农紧密地结合着,成为买办的封建的国家垄断资本主义。这就是蒋介石反动政权的经济基础。”基于这一分析,他提出反帝反封建的革命任务首先必须摧毁封建土地制度,进行土地革命,实现“耕者有其田”,使广大农民成为革命的坚实依靠力量。解放战争初期,面对国共双方经济实力的表面悬殊,毛泽东进一步指出,国民党政权依赖官僚垄断资本和极端反动的财政经济政策,必然导致经济崩溃和社会危机。这种对经济基础运行逻辑的深刻把握,使我们党在战略判断上掌握了历史主动。新中国成立后,毛泽东将这一理论逻辑运用于社会主义改造实践,提出党在过渡时期的总路线,核心在于确立社会主义公有制在国民经济中的主体地位,使生产资料的社会主义所有制成为国家和社会的经济基础。
Second, changes in the principal contradiction in society at different historical stages determine the primary and secondary patterns and practical emphases of the relationship between the military and the economy, thereby influencing specific strategic deployments and policy orientations, reflecting the organic unity of the two-point theory and the key-point theory. [13]13 The two-point theory and the key-point theory are dialectical methods: the former emphasizes seeing both sides of a contradiction, the latter stresses grasping the main aspect or central link. During the revolutionary war years, military struggle was the core way to resolve the principal contradiction in society, and economic construction had to revolve around the revolutionary war. Mao Zedong pointed out: “Revolutionary war is the central task at present, and economic construction is for it, revolves around it, and is subordinate to it.” [14]14 Mao Zedong, “Our Economic Policy” (1934). At the same time, he criticized the view that economic construction should not be carried out under war conditions: “The opinion that economic construction should not be carried out under the conditions of a revolutionary war environment is extremely erroneous.” [15]15 Mao Zedong, “Be Concerned with the Well-Being of the Masses, Pay Attention to Methods of Work” (1934). After the founding of New China, the principal contradiction in society changed, and national construction became the central task. Mao Zedong pointed out: “Only when economic construction develops more rapidly can national defense construction make greater progress. We must strengthen national defense, therefore we must first strengthen economic construction.” [16]16 Mao Zedong, “On the Ten Major Relationships” (1956). At the same time, Mao Zedong flexibly adjusted economic policies and class strategies according to changes in the principal contradiction in society at different historical stages. For example, during the War of Resistance Against Japan, the national contradiction rose to become the principal contradiction in society, and domestic class contradictions were relatively secondary. Therefore, in land policy, rent reduction and interest reduction were implemented rather than thorough land revolution; in labor-capital relations, on the one hand, workers were assisted so that they could have work and food, and on the other hand, a policy of developing industry was implemented so that national capital could obtain reasonable profits. This policy arrangement reflected the phased adjustment of economic relations under the conditions of the united front.
第二,不同历史阶段社会主要矛盾的变化,决定军事与经济关系的主次格局与实践侧重,进而影响具体战略部署与政策取向,体现了两点论与重点论的有机统一。在革命战争年代,军事斗争是解决社会主要矛盾的核心途径,经济建设必须围绕革命战争展开。毛泽东指出:“革命战争是当前的中心任务,经济建设是为着它的,是环绕着它的,是服从于它的。”同时,他批评那种认为在战争环境下不应进行经济建设的观点:“以为革命战争的环境下不应该进行经济建设的意见,是极端错误的。”新中国成立后,社会主要矛盾发生变化,国家建设成为中心任务。毛泽东指出:“只有经济建设发展得更快了,国防建设才能够有更大的进步。我们一定要加强国防,因此,一定要首先加强经济建设。”同时,毛泽东根据不同历史阶段社会主要矛盾的变化,灵活调整经济政策与阶级策略。例如,在抗日战争时期,民族矛盾上升为社会主要矛盾,国内阶级矛盾相对居于次要地位。因此,在土地政策上实行减租减息而非彻底的土地革命;在劳资关系上,一方面扶助工人,使其有工可做、有饭可吃,另一方面实行发展实业的政策,使民族资本获得合理利益,这种政策安排体现了在统一战线条件下对经济关系的阶段性调适。
(3) Methodological Principles: Seeking Truth from Facts, Independence and Self-Reliance, Overall Consideration and Proper Arrangement
(三)方法论原则:实事求是、独立自主、统筹兼顾
Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought constructs a scientific methodological system with seeking truth from facts as its theoretical foundation, independence and self-reliance as its principle of subjectivity, and overall consideration and balanced planning as its practical method. This methodological system not only provides a cognitive tool for accurately grasping the principal contradiction in society at different historical stages, but also serves as a “bridge” connecting theory and practice for the victory of China’s revolution and construction.
毛泽东军事经济思想构建了以实事求是为理论基石、以独立自主为主体性原则、以统筹兼顾为实践方法的科学方法论体系。这一方法论体系不仅为准确把握不同历史阶段社会主要矛盾提供了认识工具,而且为中国革命和建设事业的胜利提供了连接理论与实践的“桥梁”。
Seeking truth from facts is the practical character of Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought. Mao repeatedly emphasized that the victory of the Chinese revolutionary struggle must rely on the Chinese Communists’ profound grasp of China’s specific reality. China was a large semi-colonial and semi-feudal country with extremely uneven political and economic development. This fundamental national condition fundamentally determined the strategic direction and military strategy of the Chinese revolution, making it impossible to copy the model of urban-centered revolution and necessary to take the unique path of encircling the cities from the countryside and seizing political power by armed force. Mao pointed out: “Agriculture and handicrafts make up about 90 percent of the total… This is the economic expression of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal nature of old China, and it is also the basic starting point for all problems during the period of the Chinese revolution and for a fairly long period after the victory of the revolution.” [17]17 Mao Zedong, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People” (February 27, 1957). The quotation is from a discussion of China’s economic conditions. It was precisely from the reality of a backward economic base that the Chinese Communist Party began its independent exploration of the path of revolution and construction. First, it formed a path of military and economic development suited to China’s actual conditions. Second, it took in-depth investigation and research as the prerequisite for scientific decision-making. Mao emphasized: “No investigation, no right to speak” and “Without correct investigation, likewise no right to speak.” [18]18 Mao Zedong, “Oppose Book Worship” (May 1930) and “On the Question of Investigation and Research” (1941). These are two separate statements by Mao emphasizing the necessity of empirical investigation. Military and economic decisions must be based on a scientific analysis of class relations. Third, it adapted measures to local conditions and was flexible. During the New Democratic Revolution, Mao creatively proposed various wartime economic support methods based on the economic conditions and war environments of different regions. These measures were flexible decisions made in light of specific circumstances, embodying the practical wisdom of grasping conditions, transforming methods, and coordinating the military and the people in the midst of the complex movement of contradictions.
实事求是是毛泽东军事经济思想的实践品格。毛泽东反复强调,中国革命斗争的胜利必须依靠中国共产党人对中国具体实际的深刻把握。中国是一个政治经济发展极不平衡的半殖民地半封建大国,这一基本国情从根本上规定了中国革命的战略方向和军事方略,决定了中国革命不能照搬城市中心论模式,而必须走农村包围城市、武装夺取政权的独特道路。毛泽东指出:“农业和手工业占百分之九十左右……这是旧中国半殖民地半封建社会性质在经济上的表现,这也是在中国革命的时期内和在革命胜利以后一个相当长的时期内一切问题的基本出发点。”正是从落后的经济基础这一现实出发,中国共产党开启了对革命和建设道路的自主探索,一是形成了符合中国实际的军事与经济发展路径。二是以深入调查研究作为科学决策的前提。毛泽东强调:“没有调查,没有发言权”“不做正确的调查同样没有发言权。”军事与经济决策必须建立在对阶级关系的科学分析之上。三是因地制宜灵活变通。新民主主义革命时期,毛泽东根据不同地区的经济条件和战争环境,创造性提出多种战时经济保障方式。这些举措是基于具体环境作出的灵活决策,体现了在矛盾复杂运动中把握条件、转换方式、统筹军民的实践智慧。
Independence and self-reliance embodies the principle of subjectivity in Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought and is the core of establishing the initiative for development within its methodological system. Mao pointed out: “On what basis should our policy rest? It should rest on our own strength, which is called self-reliance.” [19]19 Mao Zedong, “We Must Learn to Do Economic Work” (January 10, 1945). Whether in the era of revolutionary war, when materials were extremely scarce and subject to severe blockade and encirclement, or in the period of socialist revolution and construction after the founding of New China, when the country was poor and blank and everything was waiting to be done, military and economic development must take one’s own strength as the strategic base point, without placing hopes on external forces, emphasizing that “revolution and construction must rely on ourselves.” At the same time, adhering to independence and self-reliance does not mean working behind closed doors or developing in isolation, but rather implementing the policy of “taking self-reliance as the mainstay and seeking external assistance as a supplement,” and critically learning from and drawing on all beneficial experience. “Our policy is to learn from the strong points of all nations and all countries… We must learn with an analytical and critical eye, not blindly, and we must not copy everything mechanically and apply it indiscriminately.” [20]20 Mao Zedong, “On the Ten Major Relationships” (April 25, 1956). “We must earnestly study the good experience of foreign countries, and we must also study their bad experience… This is the case on the economic front, and it should also be the case on the military front.” [21]21 Ibid.
独立自主体现了毛泽东军事经济思想的主体性原则,是其方法论体系中确立发展主动权的核心。毛泽东指出:“我们的方针要放在什么基点上?放在自己力量的基点上,叫做自力更生。”无论是在物资极端匮乏、遭受严密封锁和围剿的革命战争年代,还是在新中国成立后一穷二白、百废待兴的社会主义革命和建设时期,军事与经济发展都必须以自身力量为战略基点,不寄希望于外部力量,强调“革命和建设都要靠自己”。同时,坚持独立自主、自力更生,并不意味着闭门造车或孤立发展,而是实行“自力更生为主,争取外援为辅”的方针,批判地学习和借鉴一切有益经验。“我们的方针是,一切民族、一切国家的长处都要学……必须有分析有批判地学,不能盲目地学,不能一切照抄,机械搬用”“认真学习外国的好经验,也一定研究外国的坏经验……经济战线上如此,军事战线上也完全应当如此。”
Overall consideration and balanced planning is Mao’s specific method for handling relationships such as those between military affairs and economics, the present and the long term, key breakthroughs and overall balance. Its essence lies in, while grasping the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of the contradiction, reasonably attending to secondary aspects, so that various tasks form a pattern of coordinated advancement under the overall goal. Mao vividly likened the specific method of overall consideration and balanced planning to “playing the piano.” [22]22 Mao Zedong, “Methods of Work of Party Committees” (March 13, 1949). The metaphor “playing the piano” refers to coordinating multiple tasks simultaneously. This vivid metaphor profoundly reveals the rhythmic requirements for advancing work in a complex system: one must both highlight the “main melody” and coordinate multiple voices; one must both grasp the key links and not attend to one thing and lose sight of another.
统筹兼顾是毛泽东处理军事与经济、当前与长远、重点突破与整体平衡等关系问题的具体方法,精髓在于在把握主要矛盾和矛盾主要方面的同时,合理照顾次要方面,使各项工作在总体目标下形成协同推进的格局。对于统筹兼顾的具体方法,毛泽东形象地比喻为“弹钢琴”。这一生动比喻深刻揭示了在复杂系统中推进工作的节奏要求:既要突出“主旋律”,又要协调多声部;既要抓住关键环节,又不能顾此失彼。
II. The Main Content of Mao Zedong’s Military-Economic Thought
二、毛泽东军事经济思想的主要内容
Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought is based on the historical materialist view that the masses of the people are the creators of history, and uses the positions, viewpoints, and methods of dialectical materialism to analyze and solve major problems in the process of China’s revolution and construction. According to the historical stages of Mao’s leadership of China’s revolution and construction practice, it can be broadly divided into the thought on war economics during the New Democratic Revolution period and the thought on defense economics after the founding of New China.
毛泽东军事经济思想立足人民群众是历史创造者的唯物史观,运用辩证唯物主义的立场、观点和方法,分析和解决中国革命与建设进程中的重大问题。按照毛泽东领导中国革命和建设实践的历史阶段,可以大体划分为新民主主义革命时期的战争经济思想与新中国成立后的国防经济思想。
(I) The Theory of War Economics during the New Democratic Revolution Period
(一)新民主主义革命时期的战争经济论
During the New Democratic Revolution period, Mao mainly proceeded from the dialectical relationship between war and economics, systematically explored the material conditions and development path for the victory of the revolutionary war, and formed a system of thought with war economics as its core content.
新民主主义革命时期,毛泽东主要从战争与经济的辩证关系出发,系统探索革命战争胜利的物质条件与发展道路问题,形成了以战争经济为核心内容的思想体系。
First, scientifically grasping the dialectical relationship between war and economics. War is not only a military and political contest but also an economic contest. Economic power is the material foundation for waging war; without corresponding economic support, war is difficult to sustain and develop. Mao explicitly criticized the view that economic construction should not be carried out under the conditions of a revolutionary war environment, pointing out: “This opinion that economic construction should not be carried on under the conditions of a revolutionary war environment is extremely wrong… Only by carrying out work on the economic front and developing the economy of the Red areas can the revolutionary war obtain a fairly solid material foundation and can our military offensives be smoothly carried out.” [23]23 Mao Zedong, “Our Economic Policy” (August 20, 1933). Under the guidance of this thought, whether it was the victory in the “counter-encirclement and suppression” campaigns during the Agrarian Revolution, or the victories in the War of Resistance Against Japan and the War of Liberation, all were inseparable from the advancement of economic construction and financial support work in the base areas. Mao pointed out that the unevenness of political and economic development inevitably leads to the unevenness of revolutionary development: “Revolutionary victories always first begin, first develop, and first triumph in those places where the counter-revolutionary forces are relatively weak.” [24]24 Mao Zedong, “Why Is It That Red Political Power Can Exist in China?” (October 5, 1928). Therefore, the Chinese revolution could not copy the model of urban-centered revolution and had to take the path of encircling the cities from the countryside and seizing political power by armed force. This strategic choice was rooted in China’s specific economic structure and social conditions, not in subjective will.
第一,科学把握战争与经济的辩证关系。战争不但是军事的和政治的竞赛,还是经济的竞赛。经济力是进行战争的物质基础,没有相应经济支撑,战争难以持续和发展。毛泽东明确批判那种认为革命战争环境下不应进行经济建设的观点,指出:“这种以为革命战争的环境不应该进行经济建设的意见,是极端错误的……只有开展经济战线方面的工作,发展红色区域的经济,才能使革命战争得到相当的物质基础,才能顺利地开展我们军事上的进攻。”在这一思想指导下,无论土地革命时期取得“反围剿”胜利,还是抗日战争、解放战争胜利,都离不开根据地经济建设和财政保障工作的推进。毛泽东指出政治经济发展的不平衡必然带来革命发展的不平衡:“革命的胜利总是从那些反革命势力比较薄弱的地方首先开始,首先发展,首先胜利。”因此,中国革命不能照搬城市中心论,必须走农村包围城市、武装夺取政权的道路。这一战略选择,根源于中国特定的经济结构和社会条件,而不是主观意志。
Second, putting forward a series of policies and principles for base area construction centered on the agrarian revolution. Base area construction is an important part of Mao’s war economics thought. Mao pointed out that base areas are the most important factor in promoting the national revolutionary high tide and the strategic foundation for seizing national victory. The revolutionary war must be built on stable and sustainable economic development, and base area construction must be centered on the agrarian revolution. Only through the agrarian revolution, breaking the feudal land system and mobilizing the enthusiasm of the vast peasantry, could the base areas truly become reliable rear areas supporting the development of the revolutionary war. In 1936, Mao pointed out: “Whoever wins the peasants will win China, and whoever solves the land problem will win the peasants.” [25]25 Mao Zedong, in an interview with the American journalist Edgar Snow in 1936, recorded in Snow’s *Red Star Over China*. From “overthrowing the local tyrants and distributing the land” to “reducing rent and interest” during the War of Resistance Against Japan, and then to the extensive land reform movement in the liberated areas during the War of Liberation, the Chinese Communist Party gradually solved the peasant land problem that had persisted for thousands of years. The transformation of the land system not only changed the rural economic structure but also, under war conditions, was transformed into a powerful political mobilization capacity, providing an endless supply of manpower, material resources, and financial resources for the revolution. The agrarian revolution thus became the core link in the war economic system, realizing the inner unity of economic transformation and military struggle.
第二,提出以土地革命为中心的根据地建设的一系列方针政策。根据地建设是毛泽东战争经济思想的重要内容。毛泽东指出,根据地是促进全国革命高潮最重要的因素,是夺取全国胜利的战略基础。革命战争必须建立在稳定可持续的经济发展之上,而根据地建设必须以土地革命为中心。只有通过土地革命,打破封建土地制度,调动广大农民的积极性,根据地才能真正成为支持革命战争发展的可靠后方。1936年,毛泽东指出:“谁赢得了农民,谁就会赢得中国,谁解决土地问题,谁就会赢得农民。”从“打土豪分田地”到抗日战争时期的“减租减息”,再到解放战争时期解放区广泛开展的土地改革运动,中国共产党逐步解决了延续数千年的农民土地问题。土地制度的变革不仅改变了农村经济结构,而且在战争条件下转化为强大的政治动员能力,为革命提供了源源不断的人力、物力和财力。土地革命由此成为战争经济体系中的核心环节,实现了经济变革与军事斗争的内在统一。
Third, clarifying the economic tasks of the people’s army and establishing corresponding economic systems. The people’s army must undertake the three major tasks of fighting to destroy the enemy, raising funds by overthrowing the local tyrants, and doing mass work. [26]26 The three major tasks of the People’s Army were formally codified in the “Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention” and elaborated in Mao’s “On the Reissue of the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention” (October 10, 1947). In terms of institutional construction, Mao placed economic democracy alongside political democracy and military democracy, constituting the three major democratic systems within the army. “Regarding economic democracy, it is necessary to ensure that representatives elected by the soldiers have the right to assist (not supersede) the company commander in managing the company’s supplies and food.” [27]27 Mao Zedong, “On the Reissue of the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention” (October 10, 1947). Economic democracy within the army was mainly manifested in open economic accounts, equality between officers and men, democratic supervision, and participatory management. During the arduous years of the Jinggangshan struggle, the Red Army adhered to the system of open economic accounts. “The soldiers managed the food, and they could still save a little from the daily five cents for oil, salt, firewood, and vegetables for pocket money, called ‘food surplus,’ each person getting about sixty or seventy cash per day. The soldiers were very satisfied with these measures.” [28]28 Mao Zedong, “The Struggle in the Jinggang Mountains” (November 25, 1928). This institutional arrangement not only improved the economic management situation within the army but, more importantly, enhanced the soldiers’ sense of ownership and organizational identity.
第三,明确人民军队的经济任务,建立相应的经济制度。人民军队要担负起打仗消灭敌人、打土豪筹款子、做群众工作三大任务。在制度建设方面,毛泽东将经济民主与政治民主、军事民主并列,构成军队内部的三大民主制度。“关于经济民主,必须使士兵选出的代表有权协助(不是超过)连队首长管理连队的给养和伙食。”军队内部的经济民主主要体现为经济公开、官兵平等、民主监督和参与管理。在井冈山斗争的艰苦岁月里,红军坚持经济公开制度,“士兵管理伙食,仍能从每日五分的油盐柴菜钱中节余一点作零用,名曰‘伙食尾子’,每人每日约得六七十文。这些办法,士兵很满意”。这种制度安排不仅改善了军队内部的经济管理状况,更重要的是增强了士兵的主人翁意识和组织认同感。
Fourth, systematically exploring and forming multi-layered methods of wartime economic support. Mao Zedong proposed methods for economically supporting the people’s army in wartime, mainly including: raising funds through confiscating the property of local tyrants; developing the economy to ensure supply; the army’s self-reliance in production; and local supply and taking from the enemy. These methods showed a dynamic shift in emphasis under different historical conditions. During the Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area period, because the base area’s economic foundation was weak, war funds relied mainly on temporary fundraising. As the base area expanded and political power construction improved, the fiscal and taxation system gradually became an important source of wartime economic support, marking the progressive institutionalization of the revolutionary base area’s economic operations. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, the war entered a protracted stage, and the problem of economic support became more acute. Mao Zedong proposed that “developing the economy and ensuring supply is the general policy for wartime economic work and financial work.” He stressed that developing the economy does not mean unconditional expansion; rather, it must be based on concrete conditions, seeking truth from facts in developing both the public and private sectors of the economy, so as to ensure the stability and sustainability of financial supply. In this stage, the army’s self-sufficiency in production became an important supplementary method. During the War of Liberation, as the scale of war expanded and mobile operations became frequent, the method of economic support further shifted to supply from the front lines. In the famous “Ten Military Principles,” Mao Zedong pointed out that “the source of our army’s manpower and material resources lies mainly at the front lines.” [29]29 The “Ten Military Principles” were a set of operational guidelines formulated by Mao Zedong for the People’s Liberation Army during the Chinese Civil War, emphasizing principles such as concentrating superior forces to destroy the enemy and fighting a war of annihilation. This method of support was both an active response to the changing balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves and an economic underpinning for the strategic principle of mobile warfare.
第四,系统探索并形成多层次的战时经济保障方式。毛泽东提出在战时保障人民军队经济的方式,主要包括打土豪筹款子;发展经济,保障供给;军队自力更生搞生产;就地补给,取之于敌等。这些方式在不同历史条件下呈现出侧重点的动态转换。在井冈山革命根据地时期,由于根据地经济基础薄弱,战争经费主要依靠临时筹措。随着根据地扩大和政权建设完善,财政税收制度逐渐成为战时经济保障的重要来源,标志着革命根据地经济运行逐步走向制度化。抗日战争时期,战争进入持久阶段,经济保障问题更加突出,毛泽东提出“发展经济、保障供给是战时经济工作和财政工作的总方针”。他强调,发展经济不是无条件扩张,而必须立足具体条件,实事求是地发展公营经济与民营经济,以保障财政供给的稳定性和持续性。在这一阶段,军队生产自给成为重要补充方式。解放战争时期,随着战争规模扩大和机动作战频繁,经济保障方式进一步转向前线取给。在著名的“十大军事原则”中,毛泽东指出“我军人力物力的来源,主要在前线”。这种保障方式既是对敌我力量对比变化的主动应对,也是对运动战战略原则的经济支撑。
Fifth, systematically elaborating the theory of war economic mobilization. China’s semi-colonial and semi-feudal economic and social structure determined the protracted and complex nature of the Chinese revolutionary war. From the lessons of China’s revolutionary historical experience, Mao Zedong deeply recognized that mass mobilization is the fundamental guarantee for victory in revolutionary war, pointing out: “Because the revolutionary war is a war of the masses, it can be waged only by mobilizing the masses and only by relying on the masses.” [30]30 Mao Zedong, “Be Concerned with the Well-Being of the Masses, Pay Attention to Methods of Work” (January 27, 1934). In political strategy, Mao Zedong, by implementing the Anti-Japanese National United Front, united and mobilized all forces that could be united, giving war mobilization a broad social foundation. He pointed out: “Only by mobilizing the workers and peasants, who constitute 90 percent of the country’s population, can we defeat imperialism and feudalism.” [31]31 Mao Zedong, “The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan” (May 3, 1937). At the institutional level, Mao Zedong creatively proposed a “mobilization system” of military service. [32]32 The “mobilization system” refers to a system of military service based on mass mobilization, as opposed to a professional standing army, used by the Communist Party during the revolutionary wars. The practical effectiveness of war economic mobilization was concentratedly demonstrated during the War of Liberation, especially in the Huaihai Campaign. During the Huaihai Campaign, our army mobilized 410,000 handcarts, 3,070 large carts, 250 trucks, and 13,630 wooden boats, constructing an efficient transport system and achieving the support capability of “wherever the troops fight, supplies are delivered there.” [33]33 The Huaihai Campaign (November 1948 – January 1949) was a decisive campaign in the Chinese Civil War in which the People’s Liberation Army defeated the Nationalist forces in the region of Xuzhou, involving massive civilian support for logistics.
第五,系统阐发战争经济动员理论。中国半殖民地半封建的经济社会结构,决定了中国革命战争具有长期性和复杂性。毛泽东从中国革命历史经验教训中深刻认识到,群众动员是革命战争胜利的根本保证,指出:“因为革命战争是群众的战争,只有动员群众才能进行战争,只有依靠群众才能进行战争。”在政治策略上,毛泽东通过实行抗日民族统一战线,团结和动员一切可以团结的力量,使战争动员获得广泛社会基础,他指出:“只有动员占全国人口百分之九十的工农群众,才能战胜帝国主义,才能战胜封建主义。”在制度层面,毛泽东创造性提出“动员制”兵役制度。战争经济动员的实践成效,在解放战争特别是淮海战役中得到集中体现。淮海战役期间,我军动员手推车41万辆、大车3070辆、汽车250辆、木船13630条,构建起高效运输体系,实现了“部队打到哪里,物资送到哪里”的保障能力。
Sixth, systematically deploying strategic arrangements for the transition from a wartime economy to a peacetime economy. After the victory in the “Three Great Campaigns,” [34]34 The “Three Great Campaigns” refer to the Liaoshen, Huaihai, and Pingjin campaigns (1948–1949), the decisive military engagements that led to the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War. the main forces of the Kuomintang army were basically eliminated, and victory in the national revolution was a foregone conclusion. From a strategic height, Mao Zedong made systematic arrangements for this historic turning point. He clearly proposed that the Party’s work focus shift from the countryside to the cities, and from military struggle to economic construction. This shift marked the transformation from the logic of a war economy to the logic of a construction economy. In this regard, Mao Zedong pointed out: “The army is not only a fighting force; it is mainly a working force. Army cadres should all learn to take over and manage cities.” [35]35 Mao Zedong, “Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China” (March 5, 1949). At the same time, Mao Zedong put forward the idea of appropriately reducing military expenditure and adjusting the structure of resource allocation. This policy reflected the strategic consideration of investing more resources in economic recovery and construction after the war by optimizing the structure of fiscal expenditure.
第六,系统部署战时经济向平时经济转型的战略安排。“三大战役”胜利后,国民党军队主力基本被消灭,全国革命胜利已成定局。毛泽东从战略高度出发,对这一历史性转折作出系统部署。他明确提出党的工作重心由乡村转移到城市,由军事斗争转向经济建设。这一转变标志着战争经济逻辑向建设经济逻辑的转换。对此,毛泽东指出:“军队不仅是一个战斗队,而且主要地是一个工作队,军队干部应当全体学会接收城市和管理城市。”与此同时,毛泽东提出适度压缩军费开支、调整资源配置结构的思想。这一政策体现了,战争结束后通过优化财政支出结构,将更多资源投入经济恢复与建设的战略考量。
(II) The Theory of the Defense Economy after the Founding of the People’s Republic of China
(二)新中国成立后的国防经济论
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the country’s development entered a period of relative peaceful construction. The focus of Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought shifted from wartime economic support to the coordinated development of economic construction and national defense construction. Under the new historical conditions, how to coordinate development and security, and achieve the simultaneous enhancement of economic strength and defense capability, became the core issue of the theory of the defense economy.
新中国成立后,国家发展进入相对和平建设时期,毛泽东军事经济思想的重心由战争经济保障转向经济建设与国防建设协调发展。在新的历史条件下,如何统筹发展与安全,实现经济实力与国防能力的同步提升,成为国防经济论的核心议题。
First, scientifically handling the relationship between economic construction and national defense construction. Mao Zedong clearly pointed out that national defense construction is indispensable and must be strengthened. He further elucidated the relationship between the two: “We must strengthen national defense, and therefore we must strengthen economic construction.” “Only when economic construction develops more rapidly can national defense construction make greater progress.” [36]36 Mao Zedong, “On the Ten Major Relationships” (April 25, 1956). At the institutional level, Mao Zedong proposed that national defense construction must be incorporated into the overall national construction plan, achieving unified balance and comprehensive arrangement. He stressed: “The military side should put forward long-term plans and annual plans for national defense construction and submit them to the State Planning Commission for unified balance and comprehensive arrangement.” [37]37 Ibid. In terms of fiscal structure, Mao Zedong advocated maintaining a reasonable proportion of military expenditure, avoiding excessive crowding out of resources for economic development. He pointed out that a reliable method is “to reduce military and administrative expenses to an appropriate proportion and increase expenditure on economic construction,” [38]38 Ibid. so as to promote faster economic development and create a solid foundation for national defense construction.
第一,科学处理经济建设与国防建设的关系。毛泽东明确指出,国防建设不可或缺,必须加强。他进一步阐明两者之间的关系:“我们一定要加强国防,因此,一定要加强经济建设”“只有经济建设发展得更快了,国防建设才能够有更大的进步。”在制度层面,毛泽东提出必须将国防建设纳入国家建设总体规划,实现统一平衡和全面安排。他强调:“军队方面要提出关于国防建设的长期规划和年度规划,交国家计划委员会统一平衡,全面安排。”在财政结构上,毛泽东主张保持军费开支合理比例,避免过度挤占经济发展资源。他指出,可靠的办法是“把军政费用降到一个适当的比例,增加经济建设费用”,以促进经济更快发展,为国防建设创造坚实基础。
Second, incorporating defense modernization into the overall layout of national modernization. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, while planning the national development strategy, Mao Zedong gradually established defense modernization as an important component of socialist modernization. In 1955, Mao Zedong pointed out: “We have entered a period in which what we are doing, thinking about, and studying is socialist industrialization, socialist transformation, modernized national defense, and beginning to study atomic energy – such a new historical period.” [39]39 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China” (March 21, 1955). Subsequently, Mao Zedong further proposed: “Building socialism originally required industrial modernization, agricultural modernization, and scientific and cultural modernization; now we must add defense modernization.” [40]40 Mao Zedong, “Reading Notes on the Soviet Textbook ‘Political Economy’” (1961–1962). Mao Zedong deeply recognized that the realization of defense modernization must be based on a solid industrial foundation. He pointed out: “Without modern industry, how can there be modern national defense?” [41]41 Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Military Affairs Commission” (June 1958). In 1964, Mao Zedong proposed the construction policy of “two fists, one buttocks,” [42]42 The “two fists, one buttocks” policy was a metaphor used by Mao Zedong to describe the relationship between agriculture and defense industry (the fists) and basic industry (the buttocks) in national economic planning. emphasizing that in the layout of the national economy, there are “two fists – agriculture and defense industry, and one buttocks – basic industry; they must be arranged well.” If the “buttocks” are seated firmly, the “fists” thrown will have strength. This vivid metaphor revealed the supporting role of basic industry in national modernization and defense modernization, stressing that strategic capability must be enhanced by consolidating the economic foundation.
第二,将国防现代化纳入国家现代化总体布局。新中国成立后,毛泽东在谋划国家发展战略时,逐步将国防现代化确立为社会主义现代化建设重要组成部分。1955年,毛泽东指出:“我们进入了这样一个时期,就是我们现在所从事的、所思考的、所钻研的,是钻社会主义工业化,钻社会主义改造,钻现代化的国防,并且开始钻原子能这样的历史的新时期。”此后,毛泽东进一步提出:“建设社会主义,原来要求是工业现代化,农业现代化,科学文化现代化,现在要加上国防现代化。”毛泽东深刻认识到,国防现代化的实现必须建立在坚实的工业基础之上。他指出:“没有现代化工业,哪有现代化国防?”1964年,毛泽东提出“两个拳头、一个屁股”的建设方针,强调国民经济布局中有“两个拳头——农业、国防工业,一个屁股——基础工业,要摆好”。“屁股”坐稳了,打出去的“拳头”就有力量。这一形象比喻揭示了基础工业在国家现代化与国防现代化中的支撑作用,强调必须通过夯实经济基础来增强战略能力。
Third, constructing a war-preparedness economic system oriented toward strategic defense. In the 1960s, the international situation became increasingly complex and severe. Against this backdrop, Mao Zedong clearly pointed out that the danger of imperialist launching war still existed, and it was necessary to “deploy work on the basis of the possibility of being attacked.” [43]43 Mao Zedong, “Instructions on the Question of War Preparedness” (1964). On August 12, 1964, Mao Zedong gave instructions, emphasizing the need to coordinate the economic layout from the height of national security. Subsequently, the Secretariat of the Central Committee [44]44 The Secretariat of the Central Committee was the executive body of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, responsible for day-to-day work. held a special meeting to discuss the issue of the Third Front Construction, [45]45 The Third Front Construction was a massive industrialization campaign (1964–1980) that relocated military and industrial facilities to China’s interior provinces to protect them from potential foreign invasion. deciding to concentrate forces on building the Third Front. The Third Front Construction relocated a number of important industrial projects to the strategic depth of the interior, gradually forming a strategic rear area of considerable scale. This layout was conducive both to responding to the threat of war and to promoting balanced regional industrial development; it was an important measure combining development and security. While the Third Front Construction was gradually unfolding, the state began to formulate the Third Five-Year Plan, [46]46 The Third Five-Year Plan (1966–1970) was a national economic plan that prioritized national defense and war preparedness. which took war preparedness as an important consideration. In 1965, Mao Zedong instructed: The plan must consider three factors: first, the common people, so as not to lose popular support; second, fighting a war; third, natural disasters. Subsequently, Zhou Enlai summarized this instruction as “prepare for war, prepare for natural disasters, and do everything for the people,” [47]47 “Prepare for war, prepare for natural disasters, and do everything for the people” (备战、备荒、为人民) was a slogan and policy guideline issued by Mao Zedong in the mid-1960s, emphasizing self-reliance and readiness for both military conflict and natural calamities. which was approved by Mao Zedong. Under the guidance of the thought “prepare for war, prepare for natural disasters, and do everything for the people,” the specific measures of “dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony” [48]48 “Dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony” (深挖洞,广积粮,不称霸) was a slogan from the late 1960s and early 1970s, reflecting Mao’s strategy of defensive preparation and non-aggression during the Sino-Soviet split. were proposed, and it was emphasized that “we must be prepared both mentally and materially, so that when sudden incidents occur, we will not be caught off guard.”
第三,构建以战略防御为导向的战备经济体系。20世纪60年代,国际形势日趋复杂严峻。在这一背景下,毛泽东明确指出,帝国主义发动战争的危险依然存在,必须“以可能挨打为出发点来部署工作”。1964年8月12日,毛泽东作出批示,强调要从国家安全高度统筹经济布局。随后,中央书记处专门召开会议讨论三线建设问题,决定集中力量建设三线。三线建设将一批重要工业项目布局于内地战略纵深地区,逐步形成具有相当规模的战略大后方。这一布局既有利于应对战争威胁,又促进了区域工业平衡发展,是发展与安全相结合的重要举措。在三线建设逐步展开的同时,国家开始编制以战备为重要考量的第三个五年计划。1965年,毛泽东指示:计划要考虑三个因素,第一是老百姓,不要丧失民心;第二是打仗;第三是灾荒。随后,周恩来将这一指示概括为“备战、备荒、为人民”,得到毛泽东认可。在“备战、备荒、为人民”思想指导下,提出“深挖洞,广积粮,不称霸”的具体措施,并强调“我们在精神上和物质上都要有所准备,当着突然事变发生的时候,才不至于措手不及”。
Fourth, constructing a national defense economic operating mechanism that combines military and civilian purposes and peacetime and wartime needs. In advancing the modernization of national defense, Mao Zedong put forward the idea of combining military and civilian purposes and integrating peacetime and wartime needs, emphasizing that through institutional and technical arrangements, the organic linkage between national defense construction and national economic construction should be realized, thereby enhancing the state’s capacity for conversion between peacetime and wartime conditions. In 1952, Mao Zedong pointed out that China’s defense industry must learn “two sets of skills” and achieve the ability to “serve both military and civilian needs, combining military and civilian purposes.” In 1956, at the Supreme State Conference, Mao Zedong further stressed that in the sphere of production, attention should be paid to dual-use military and civilian applications, mastering two sets of production technologies – one for military use and one for civilian use – and equipping two sets of production equipment, so that in peacetime they could be used for civilian production, and once war broke out, they could rapidly shift to military production. Under the guidance of this thinking, the Second Ministry of Machine Building formulated specific guidelines for developing the defense industry, summarized as “integrating peacetime and wartime needs, combining military and civilian purposes, prioritizing military needs while embedding military capacity within civilian society.” [49]49 The Second Ministry of Machine Building was established in 1958 to oversee China’s nuclear weapons and defense industry development. The phrase “以军为主,寓军于民” (prioritizing military needs while embedding military capacity within civilian society) is a specific policy formulation from that era. In addition, Mao Zedong attached great importance to the construction of the militia and reserve forces, putting forward the idea of “everyone a soldier,” emphasizing that by vigorously organizing militia divisions, a broad foundation for national defense mobilization could be formed.
第四,构建军民结合、平战结合的国防经济运行机制。在推进国防现代化进程中,毛泽东提出军民结合、平战结合的思想,强调通过体制和技术安排,实现国防建设与国民经济建设的有机衔接,增强国家在和平与战争状态下的转换能力。1952年,毛泽东指出,我国国防工业要学会“两套本领”,做到“能军能民,军民结合”。1956年,在最高国务会议上,毛泽东进一步强调,在生产领域要注意军民两用,掌握军用与民用两套生产技术,配备两套生产设备,使平时可以用于民用生产,一旦发生战争,能够迅速转入军用生产。在此思想指导下,第二机械部制定了发展国防工业的具体方针,概括为“平战结合、军民结合、以军为主,寓军于民”。此外,毛泽东高度重视民兵和后备力量建设,提出“全民皆兵”思想,强调通过大办民兵师,形成广泛的国防动员基础。
III. The Contemporary Value of Mao Zedong’s Military-Economic Thought
三、毛泽东军事经济思想的当代价值
Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought takes dialectical materialism and historical materialism as its theoretical foundation, applying such basic principles as the relationship between productive forces and relations of production, and between the economic base and the superstructure, to systematically analyze the internal connections between war and economics, and between national defense construction and economic construction. It played an important guiding role in the practice of China’s revolution and construction, driving the Party and the state to achieve historically significant accomplishments. This system of thought manifests a clear strategic foresight, holistic coordination, and practical creativity, demonstrating enduring theoretical vitality. The people’s standpoint, systemic perspective, dialectical thinking, and practical methods it contains not only played an important role during the revolutionary and construction periods but also retain significant revelatory significance for handling major relationships under the conditions of the New Era.
毛泽东军事经济思想以辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义为理论基础,运用生产力与生产关系、经济基础与上层建筑等基本原理,系统分析战争与经济、国防建设与经济建设之间的内在联系,在中国革命和建设实践中发挥了重要指导作用,推动党和国家取得了具有历史意义的成就。这一思想体系体现出鲜明的战略预见性、整体统筹性与实践创造性,展现出持久的理论生命力。其所蕴含的人民立场、系统观念、辩证思维和实践方法,不仅在革命和建设时期发挥了重要作用,而且对新时代条件下处理重大关系问题仍具有重要启示意义。
(I) Coordinating Development and Security, Scientifically Planning Major Issues in the Process of Chinese-Path Modernization
(一)统筹发展与安全,科学谋划中国式现代化进程中的重大问题
Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought takes the dialectical relationship between productive forces and relations of production, and between the economic base and the superstructure, as its theoretical main thread, emphasizing the grasp of the internal unity of development and security under different historical conditions. Chinese-path modernization is essentially a historic leap in productive forces, but the development of productive forces must be realized under the precondition of security guarantees. Therefore, Mao Zedong’s thinking on coordinating economic construction and national defense construction holds significant revelatory significance for advancing Chinese-path modernization in the New Era. On the one hand, it is necessary to maintain a high degree of vigilance against potential risks, strengthening security preparations through strategic foresight. Based on a sober judgment that the danger of imperialist aggression still existed, Mao Zedong proposed that “if we are well prepared, the enemy may not come; if we are not well prepared, the enemy may come,” and emphasized that work should be arranged “taking the possibility of being attacked as the starting point.” [50]50 This quotation reflects Mao’s strategic thinking during the Cold War, particularly in the context of the Korean War armistice and the Taiwan Strait crises, emphasizing proactive defense preparations. This thinking embodies a strategic mindset of presupposing risks and preparing for a rainy day within the process of development. At present, with the profound adjustment of the international landscape, adhering to bottom-line thinking and strategic resolve, strengthening dual preparations on the material and spiritual levels, improving crisis management mechanisms, and enhancing the capacity to prevent and respond to local conflicts are of great significance for ensuring the steady and sustained progress of Chinese-path modernization. On the other hand, it is necessary to coordinate development and security at the strategic level, scientifically handling the relationship between Chinese-path modernization and the modernization of national defense and the armed forces. The modernization of national defense and the armed forces is not only an important component of the national modernization system but also a crucial guarantee of national security. Chinese-path modernization adheres to the path of peaceful development, but peaceful development does not mean abandoning security preparations; rather, it takes strong comprehensive national power and national defense capability as its strategic support. The modernization of national defense and the armed forces must be integrated into the overall layout of national modernization and advanced in a coordinated manner, so that military capabilities match the stage of national development and strategic needs.
毛泽东军事经济思想以生产力与生产关系、经济基础与上层建筑的辩证关系为理论主线,强调在不同历史条件下把握发展与安全的内在统一。中国式现代化本质上是生产力的历史性跃升,但生产力发展必须在安全保障的前提下实现。因此,毛泽东关于统筹经济建设与国防建设的思想,对新时代推进中国式现代化具有重要启示意义。一方面,要高度警惕潜在风险,以战略预判强化安全准备。毛泽东基于对帝国主义侵略危险依然存在的清醒判断,提出“准备好了敌人可能不来,准备不好敌人就可能来”,并强调要以“可能挨打为出发点部署工作”。这一思想体现出在发展进程中预设风险、未雨绸缪的战略思维。当前,国际格局深刻调整,坚持底线思维和战略定力,强化物质与精神层面的双重准备,完善危机管控机制,增强防范和应对局部冲突的能力,对于确保中国式现代化行稳致远具有重要意义。另一方面,要在战略层面统筹发展与安全,科学处理中国式现代化与国防和军队现代化之间的关系。国防军队现代化既是国家现代化体系的重要组成部分,也是国家安全的重要保障。中国式现代化坚持走和平发展道路,但和平发展并非放弃安全准备,而是以强大的综合国力和国防能力为战略支撑。国防和军队现代化必须纳入国家现代化整体布局统筹推进,使军事能力与国家发展阶段和战略需求相匹配。
(II) Based on the Characteristics of Key Factors of Production, Perfecting the Relations of Production That Correspond to Them
(二)立足关键生产要素特性,完善与之相适应的生产关系
Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought closely integrates the historical materialist principle that the economic base determines the superstructure with the concrete practice of China’s revolution and construction, carrying out theoretical and practical exploration centered on the core issue of ownership of the means of production. The ideological connotations within Mao Zedong’s military-economic thought of grasping key factors of production, reshaping the structure of interests, rallying the people’s strength, and serving the strategic overall situation hold revelatory significance. In different historical stages, the form of key factors of production may change, but building reasonable relations of production around core factors of production and mobilizing the people’s initiative always remains significant. At present, against the backdrop of the rapid development of the digital economy, data has become an important factor of production driving economic and social development. Xi Jinping has pointed out: “The construction of a basic data system concerns the overall situation of national development and security… promoting the efficient circulation and use of data to empower the real economy, coordinating the advancement of data property rights, circulation and trading, income distribution, and security governance, and accelerating the construction of a basic data system.” [51]51 Xi Jinping, “Speech at the 20th Meeting of the Central Committee for Deepening Overall Reform,” June 22, 2022, as cited in official documents on data governance. Entering the New Era, adhering to the people-centered development thinking requires conforming to the laws of digital economy development, perfecting the property rights system, circulation and trading system, income distribution system, and security governance system that are compatible with the characteristics of the data factor, and constructing a data system that can both promote the efficient use of data and ensure national security and the people’s interests. Rationally allocating the income from data factors and optimizing the distribution mechanism, so that the fruits of the digital economy benefit all the people more and more fairly, will consolidate the mass base in the digital era.
毛泽东军事经济思想把经济基础决定上层建筑这一历史唯物主义原理同中国革命和建设的具体实践紧密结合,围绕生产资料所有制这一核心问题展开理论与实践探索。毛泽东军事经济思想中抓住关键生产要素、重塑利益结构、凝聚人民力量、服务战略全局的思想内涵,具有启示意义。不同历史阶段,关键生产要素的形态会发生变化,但围绕核心生产要素构建合理生产关系、调动人民积极性始终具有重要意义。当前,在数字经济快速发展的背景下,数据已成为驱动经济社会发展的重要生产要素。习近平指出:“数据基础制度建设事关国家发展和安全大局……促进数据高效流通使用、赋能实体经济,统筹推进数据产权、流通交易、收益分配、安全治理,加快构建数据基础制度体系。”进入新时代,坚持以人民为中心的发展思想,就必须顺应数字经济发展规律,完善与数据要素特征相适应的产权制度、流通和交易制度、收益分配制度以及安全治理制度,构建既能促进数据高效利用、又能保障国家安全和人民利益的数据制度体系。合理配置数据要素收益、优化分配机制,使数字经济成果更多更公平地惠及全体人民,筑牢数字时代群众基础。
(III) Adhering to the Overall Thinking of People’s War, Consolidating the Foundation for Strategic Initiative in International Competition
(三)坚持人民战争总体思维,夯实国际竞争中的战略主动基础
Mao Zedong always adhered to the historical materialist view that the masses of the people are the creators of history, emphasizing that all military-economic activities must be based on the people, rely on the people, and serve the people. At present, international competition has expanded from the traditional military and political domains to multiple fields including science and technology, trade, finance, industrial and supply chains, and cultural dissemination. The forms of competition have become more complex, but their essence remains a contest of comprehensive national strength and social cohesion, a comprehensive competition of institutional advantages, scientific and technological strength, and popular support. Therefore, transforming the overall thinking of people’s war into an overall mobilization and holistic coordination thinking under the conditions of the New Era has important practical significance for winning strategic initiative in international competition. Xi Jinping has established “putting the people first” as the fundamental value principle of governance, emphasizing the need to grasp the new characteristics and new requirements of people’s war under the conditions of the new era, pointing out: “No matter how the situation develops, the magic weapon of people’s war must never be discarded, but we must grasp the new characteristics and new requirements of people’s war under the conditions of the new era, innovate its content, methods, and means, and give full play to the overall power of people’s war.” [52]52 Xi Jinping, “Speech at a Meeting on National Defense and Military Construction,” 2017, emphasizing the enduring relevance of people’s war in the context of modern warfare and comprehensive national security. Entering the New Era, adhering to the overall thinking of people’s war means consolidating the foundation of military-government and military-civilian relations, raising the level of the national defense mobilization system and reserve force construction, and integrating the creativity and wisdom of the masses into key areas such as scientific and technological innovation, industrial upgrading, financial security, and public opinion guidance. By enhancing social cohesion and institutional execution capacity, and cultivating cross-domain, multi-level, and all-round comprehensive response capabilities, the state can maintain strategic resolve and developmental resilience in a complex and changing international environment.
毛泽东始终坚持人民群众是历史创造者的唯物史观,强调一切军事经济活动必须立足人民、依靠人民、服务人民。当前,国际竞争已从传统的军事与政治领域拓展至科技、贸易、金融、产业链供应链、文化传播等多个领域。竞争形态更加复杂,但其本质仍然是国家综合实力与社会凝聚力的较量,是制度优势、科技实力与民心向背的综合比拼。因此,将人民战争的总体思维转化为新时代条件下的总体动员与整体协同思维,对于赢得国际竞争中的战略主动具有重要现实意义。习近平将“坚持人民至上”确立为治国理政的根本价值遵循,强调在新的时代条件下把握人民战争的新特点、新要求,指出:“不论形势如何发展,人民战争这个法宝永远不能丢,但要把握新的时代条件下人民战争的新特点新要求,创新内容和方式方法,充分发挥人民战争的整体威力。”进入新时代,坚持人民战争总体思维,意味着要夯实军政军民关系基础,提升国防动员体系和后备力量建设水平,将人民群众的创造力和智慧融入科技创新、产业升级、金融安全、舆论引导等关键领域。通过增强社会凝聚力与制度执行力,培养跨领域、多层次、全方位的综合应对能力,使国家在复杂多变的国际环境中保持战略定力与发展韧性。
(IV) Deepening the Integration of Military and Civilian Purposes and the Combination of Peacetime and Wartime Needs, Consolidating the Foundation of National Strategic Capability
(四)深化军民一体与平战结合,夯实国家战略能力基础
Mao Zedong put forward the idea of combining military and civilian sectors and integrating peacetime and wartime, emphasizing the two-way conversion of military and civilian resources through institutional and technological arrangements. This idea has important practical implications for breaking the current dualistic separation of military and civilian sectors, integrating military and civilian resources, and building an integrated national strategic system and capability. Entering the New Era, Xi Jinping pointed out: “Integrated military-civilian development is a measure to rejuvenate the country and strengthen the military, forming a deep pattern of all-element, multi-domain, high-benefit military-civilian integration, and building an integrated national strategic system and capability.” [53]53 Xi Jinping’s remarks on military-civilian integration, as a key component of his broader strategy for national security and development in the New Era. First, promote the integrated fusion of emerging fields. Against the backdrop of a new round of technological revolution and industrial transformation, new quality productive forces and new combat capabilities have intrinsic connections such as shared technological origins, common industrial roots, and a joint talent pool. By strengthening the military-civilian collaborative layout of the scientific and technological innovation system and promoting the two-way transformation of scientific and technological achievements between economic construction and national defense construction, technological advantages can be converted into industrial and strategic advantages, providing sustained momentum for national modernization. Second, coordinate the construction of major national productive forces with the layout of the national defense science and technology industry. At present, the layout of major productive forces and the development of the national defense science and technology industry should be considered comprehensively in national strategic planning. In strategically deep areas, the layout of core nodes such as key industrial chains and supply chains, energy security, and logistics hubs should be optimized, enhancing the system’s resilience and risk-response capacity, achieving an organic combination of development layout and security needs. Third, strengthen the integrated peacetime-wartime coordination mechanism. During peacetime economic construction, necessary national defense functions should be pre-positioned, the mobilization system and emergency conversion mechanisms should be improved, so that the production system serves economic development in peacetime, can quickly shift to emergency support in emergency situations, and effectively supports national defense needs under wartime conditions.
毛泽东提出军民结合、平战结合思想,强调通过制度和技术安排实现军用与民用资源的双向转换。这一思想对于当前打破军民二元分割格局,整合军民资源,构建一体化国家战略体系和能力,具有重要现实启示意义。进入新时代,习近平指出:“军民融合发展是兴国之举、强军之策,形成全要素、多领域、高效益军民融合深度发展格局,构建一体化的国家战略体系和能力。”一是推动新兴领域一体融合。在新一轮科技革命和产业变革背景下,新质生产力与新质战斗力具有技术同源、产业同根、人才同池等内在联系。通过强化科技创新体系的军民协同布局,促进科技成果在经济建设和国防建设之间的双向转化,可以将技术优势转化为产业优势和战略优势,为国家现代化建设提供持续动能。二是统筹国家重大生产力能力建设与国防科技工业布局。当前,应在国家战略规划中统筹考虑重大生产力布局与国防科技工业发展,在战略纵深地区优化关键产业链供应链、能源保障和物流枢纽等核心节点布局,提升体系抗冲击能力和风险应对能力,实现发展布局与安全需求的有机结合。三是强化平时与战时的一体统合机制。在和平时期的经济建设中预置必要的国防功能,完善动员体系和应急转换机制,使生产体系在平时服务经济发展、在紧急状态下快速转入应急保障、在战争条件下有效支撑国防需求。
(5) Adhere to self-reliance as the mainstay with external assistance as a supplement, consolidating the foundation of autonomous and controllable development
(五)坚持自力更生为主、外援为辅,夯实自主可控发展基础
Mao Zedong put forward that “revolution and construction both depend on ourselves,” emphasizing that the victory of the Chinese revolution must be built on a profound grasp of China’s actual conditions. On the one hand, adhering to independence and self-reliance is the fundamental requirement for firmly grasping the initiative in revolution and construction amid various complex external environments. Entering the New Era, the pattern of international competition has undergone profound adjustments, and the field of science and technology has become the core battlefield of strategic competition among major powers. Xi Jinping emphasized that high-level scientific and technological self-reliance and self-strengthening are of extreme importance for taking the path of strengthening the military with Chinese characteristics and winning the initiative in strategic competition, pointing out that scientific and technological self-reliance and self-strengthening are the fundamental force supporting the overall development of the nation. “Key core technologies cannot be obtained, bought, or begged for.” [54]54 A widely cited phrase by Xi Jinping, emphasizing the necessity of indigenous innovation in core technologies to avoid external dependency. Therefore, in key areas and core technologies, independent innovation must be adhered to, firmly grasping the initiative in development in one’s own hands. On the other hand, adhering to self-reliance does not mean closed development, but rather actively seeking external resources while maintaining subjectivity. Mao Zedong emphasized critically learning from foreign experiences, absorbing their strengths while also being vigilant about their shortcomings. This principle has important implications for adhering to openness, inclusiveness, and cooperation in the New Era and promoting high-level opening up. By actively integrating into the global innovation network and learning from the world’s advanced technologies and management experiences, the nation’s overall innovation capacity and international competitiveness can be enhanced. External cooperation must be premised on safeguarding national sovereignty and development security, opposing simple “copycatism,” and not copying or imitating mechanically. Instead, it should adhere to taking oneself as the mainstay and using external resources for one’s own purposes, achieving deep integration of external resources and one’s own capabilities through the path of introduction, digestion, absorption, and re-innovation.
毛泽东提出“革命和建设都要靠自己”,强调中国革命的胜利必须建立在对中国实际情况的深刻把握之上。一方面,坚持独立自主、自力更生,是在各种纷繁复杂的外部环境中牢牢把握革命和建设主动权的根本要求。进入新时代,国际竞争格局深刻调整,科技领域成为大国战略博弈的核心战场。习近平强调,高水平科技自立自强对于走好中国特色强军之路、赢得战略竞争主动权具有极端重要性,指出科技自立自强是支撑国家发展全局的根本力量。“关键核心技术是要不来、买不来、讨不来的”,因此,在关键领域和核心技术上必须坚持自主创新,把发展的主动权牢牢掌握在自己手中。另一方面,坚持自力更生并不意味着封闭发展,而是在保持主体性前提下积极争取外部资源。毛泽东强调要批判地学习外国经验,既吸收其长处,也警惕其不足。这一原则对新时代坚持开放、包容、合作,推动高水平对外开放具有重要启示意义。通过主动融入全球创新网络,学习借鉴世界先进技术和管理经验,国家整体创新能力和国际竞争力可以得到提升。对外合作必须以维护国家主权和发展安全为前提,反对简单“拿来主义”,不能照抄照搬,而应坚持以我为主、为我所用,通过引进、消化、吸收、再创新的路径,实现外部资源与自身能力深度融合。
Author’s bio: Qiao Yuting, Associate Professor and Master’s Supervisor at the School of Basic Education for Military and Political Affairs, National University of Defense Technology.
作者简介:乔玉婷,国防科技大学军政基础教育学院副教授,硕士生导师。
Notes
- Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War” (1938). ↩
- Mao Zedong, quoted from his remarks during the Yan’an period, reflecting his prioritization of the people’s livelihood. ↩
- Mao Zedong, directive issued in 1966, linking military preparedness, disaster relief, and service to the people. ↩
- Mao Zedong, “On Coalition Government” (1945). ↩
- The Great Production Campaign was a large-scale self-sufficiency movement launched by the Chinese Communist Party in the Yan’an base area during the 1940s to overcome economic difficulties. ↩
- Streamlining administration and simplifying troops was a policy implemented in the Yan’an period to reduce the burden on the people and increase efficiency in the base areas. ↩
- Sparrow warfare refers to small-scale, dispersed guerrilla attacks by small groups, named for their resemblance to sparrows pecking at food. ↩
- Mao Zedong, “Our Study and the Current Situation” (1944). ↩
- Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China” (1949). ↩
- Mao Zedong, “Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society” (1926). ↩
- Mao Zedong, “The Present Situation and Our Tasks” (1947). ↩
- The general line for the transition period (1953–1956) aimed at the simultaneous socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts, and capitalist industry and commerce. ↩
- The two-point theory and the key-point theory are dialectical methods: the former emphasizes seeing both sides of a contradiction, the latter stresses grasping the main aspect or central link. ↩
- Mao Zedong, “Our Economic Policy” (1934). ↩
- Mao Zedong, “Be Concerned with the Well-Being of the Masses, Pay Attention to Methods of Work” (1934). ↩
- Mao Zedong, “On the Ten Major Relationships” (1956). ↩
- Mao Zedong, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People” (February 27, 1957). The quotation is from a discussion of China’s economic conditions. ↩
- Mao Zedong, “Oppose Book Worship” (May 1930) and “On the Question of Investigation and Research” (1941). These are two separate statements by Mao emphasizing the necessity of empirical investigation. ↩
- Mao Zedong, “We Must Learn to Do Economic Work” (January 10, 1945). ↩
- Mao Zedong, “On the Ten Major Relationships” (April 25, 1956). ↩
- Ibid. ↩
- Mao Zedong, “Methods of Work of Party Committees” (March 13, 1949). The metaphor “playing the piano” refers to coordinating multiple tasks simultaneously. ↩
- Mao Zedong, “Our Economic Policy” (August 20, 1933). ↩
- Mao Zedong, “Why Is It That Red Political Power Can Exist in China?” (October 5, 1928). ↩
- Mao Zedong, in an interview with the American journalist Edgar Snow in 1936, recorded in Snow’s *Red Star Over China*. ↩
- The three major tasks of the People’s Army were formally codified in the “Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention” and elaborated in Mao’s “On the Reissue of the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention” (October 10, 1947). ↩
- Mao Zedong, “On the Reissue of the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention” (October 10, 1947). ↩
- Mao Zedong, “The Struggle in the Jinggang Mountains” (November 25, 1928). ↩
- The “Ten Military Principles” were a set of operational guidelines formulated by Mao Zedong for the People’s Liberation Army during the Chinese Civil War, emphasizing principles such as concentrating superior forces to destroy the enemy and fighting a war of annihilation. ↩
- Mao Zedong, “Be Concerned with the Well-Being of the Masses, Pay Attention to Methods of Work” (January 27, 1934). ↩
- Mao Zedong, “The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan” (May 3, 1937). ↩
- The “mobilization system” refers to a system of military service based on mass mobilization, as opposed to a professional standing army, used by the Communist Party during the revolutionary wars. ↩
- The Huaihai Campaign (November 1948 – January 1949) was a decisive campaign in the Chinese Civil War in which the People’s Liberation Army defeated the Nationalist forces in the region of Xuzhou, involving massive civilian support for logistics. ↩
- The “Three Great Campaigns” refer to the Liaoshen, Huaihai, and Pingjin campaigns (1948–1949), the decisive military engagements that led to the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War. ↩
- Mao Zedong, “Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China” (March 5, 1949). ↩
- Mao Zedong, “On the Ten Major Relationships” (April 25, 1956). ↩
- Ibid. ↩
- Ibid. ↩
- Mao Zedong, “Speech at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China” (March 21, 1955). ↩
- Mao Zedong, “Reading Notes on the Soviet Textbook ‘Political Economy’” (1961–1962). ↩
- Mao Zedong, “Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Military Affairs Commission” (June 1958). ↩
- The “two fists, one buttocks” policy was a metaphor used by Mao Zedong to describe the relationship between agriculture and defense industry (the fists) and basic industry (the buttocks) in national economic planning. ↩
- Mao Zedong, “Instructions on the Question of War Preparedness” (1964). ↩
- The Secretariat of the Central Committee was the executive body of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, responsible for day-to-day work. ↩
- The Third Front Construction was a massive industrialization campaign (1964–1980) that relocated military and industrial facilities to China’s interior provinces to protect them from potential foreign invasion. ↩
- The Third Five-Year Plan (1966–1970) was a national economic plan that prioritized national defense and war preparedness. ↩
- “Prepare for war, prepare for natural disasters, and do everything for the people” (备战、备荒、为人民) was a slogan and policy guideline issued by Mao Zedong in the mid-1960s, emphasizing self-reliance and readiness for both military conflict and natural calamities. ↩
- “Dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony” (深挖洞,广积粮,不称霸) was a slogan from the late 1960s and early 1970s, reflecting Mao’s strategy of defensive preparation and non-aggression during the Sino-Soviet split. ↩
- The Second Ministry of Machine Building was established in 1958 to oversee China’s nuclear weapons and defense industry development. The phrase “以军为主,寓军于民” (prioritizing military needs while embedding military capacity within civilian society) is a specific policy formulation from that era. ↩
- This quotation reflects Mao’s strategic thinking during the Cold War, particularly in the context of the Korean War armistice and the Taiwan Strait crises, emphasizing proactive defense preparations. ↩
- Xi Jinping, “Speech at the 20th Meeting of the Central Committee for Deepening Overall Reform,” June 22, 2022, as cited in official documents on data governance. ↩
- Xi Jinping, “Speech at a Meeting on National Defense and Military Construction,” 2017, emphasizing the enduring relevance of people’s war in the context of modern warfare and comprehensive national security. ↩
- Xi Jinping’s remarks on military-civilian integration, as a key component of his broader strategy for national security and development in the New Era. ↩
- A widely cited phrase by Xi Jinping, emphasizing the necessity of indigenous innovation in core technologies to avoid external dependency. ↩