The U.S. "Summit for Democracy" and New Challenges to China's Ideological Security

Since Biden took office, the all-round strategic competition between China and the United States has increasingly shown a state of "intense confrontation." Within this, the United States has intensified its diplomatic offensive against China in the ideological domain. One notable trend is the global "Summit for Democracy" actively cultivated by the Biden administration in recent years. In March 2024, the third Summit for Democracy, themed "Democracy for Future Generations," was hosted by the Yoon Suk Yeol administration of South Korea. In his opening remarks at the summit, U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken stated bluntly, "Defending and accelerating our democratic renewal at home requires us to help shape a world where democracy thrives." [1]1 Antony J. Blinken, "Opening Remarks at the Third Summit for Democracy," U.S. Department of State, March 18, 2024. It is evident that a foreign policy line centered on Western "democratic values" is gradually dominating Biden's grand strategic concepts and practices. Against the backdrop of the relative decline of U.S. hegemony and the increasingly fierce all-round geostrategic competition between the U.S. and China in the Indo-Pacific region, the Biden administration's promotion of "democracy" and values-based diplomacy, along with the global rollout of the "Summit for Democracy," is intended to ignite an ideological war targeting countries such as China. Consequently, amid the uncertainties and destabilizing factors of changes unseen in a century, the U.S. "Summit for Democracy" has brought a series of entirely new challenges to China's ideological security.

自拜登上台以来，中美全方位战略竞争已经愈发显现出“白热化”的状态。这其中，美国在意识形态领域加大了对中国的外交攻势，一项值得关注的动向就是近年来拜登政府积极打造的全球“民主峰会”。2024年3月，以“未来一代的民主”（Democracy for Future Generations）为主题的第三届民主峰会由韩国尹锡悦政府负责主办，美国国务卿布林肯（Antony J. Blinken）在峰会开幕式的讲话中直言“在国内捍卫和加速我们的民主复兴需要我们帮助塑造一个民主繁荣发展的世界”。可以显见的是，一个以西方“民主价值”为内核的对外政策路线逐渐在拜登的大战略理念与实践中占据主导。在美国霸权相对衰落的背景下，在美国与中国印太全方位地缘战略博弈日趋激烈的当前，拜登政府推进“民主”和价值观外交并在全球范围内推行“民主峰会”，其意在掀起针对中国等国家的意识形态战争。由此，在世界百年未有之大变局的不确定和不稳定因素之下，美国“民主峰会”给我国的意识形态安全带来了一系列全新的挑战。

I. The Background of the U.S. "Summit for Democracy"

一、美国“民主峰会”出台的背景

Biden's revival of the "democracy card" in global politics after taking office is no accident. It stems from a strategic aim to consolidate the fragile foundation of the relatively declining U.S. hegemony through "democratic" ideology, and to uphold the U.S. "democratic" image and its ideological appeal amid increasingly severe political polarization. The Biden administration perceives the above two factors—originating from global and domestic levels—as major challenges to "American-style democracy," and thus has urgently crafted the "Summit for Democracy" as a remedy. Consequently, "democracy," as both an old and new instrument, has returned to the core of U.S. grand strategy. The "old" here refers to the fact that since the Cold War, "democracy" has always been a pillar for the U.S. to maintain the old international order and highlight the superiority of its political system. The "new" emphasizes that the Obama-era downplaying of overseas "democracy" promotion based on pragmatic principles, and Trump's anti-establishment and anti-traditional line, which damaged the U.S. "democratic" image, led Biden to choose the design of the "Summit for Democracy"—a new institutional model—to rebuild "American-style democracy" as a model.

拜登就任后在全球政治中重打“民主牌”并非偶然，是出于以“民主”意识形态巩固相对式微的美国霸权的脆弱性基础的战略目的，并在政治极化愈发严重背景下维护美国“民主”形象及其意识形态吸引力。源于全球和国内层面的上述两大因素被拜登政府视为对“美式民主”的重大挑战，因而急切打造出“民主峰会”作为拯救方案。由此，“民主”作为一种既旧又新的手段回归美国大战略核心地位。这里的“旧”是指“民主”自冷战以来始终是美国维系旧的国际秩序以及彰显其政治制度优势的支柱；而“新”则意在强调奥巴马时期基于务实原则对海外“民主”推广的淡化，以及特朗普的反建制和反传统路线对美国“民主”形象的破坏，使得拜登选择设计“民主峰会”这一全新制度模式来重造作为范本的“美式民主”。

(I) "Democracy" and Its Ideology Are Important Pillars for the Biden Administration to Sustain U.S. Leadership in the World

（一）“民主”及其意识形态是拜登政府维系美国领导世界的重要支柱

After entering the White House, Biden not only accelerated the recovery of the international institutions and alliance foundations needed to sustain the U.S. hegemonic order but also reshaped "democracy" and its ideology into an important means of shaping U.S. hegemonic leadership. In the preface to the 2022 National Security Strategy, Biden directly stated that the U.S. would continue to defend global "democracy," with the strategic aim of using "democracy" as a key pillar to sustain U.S. global leadership. In Biden's view, to sustain the U.S. "manifest destiny" of "leading the world," it is necessary "both to maintain the momentum of U.S. national power growth and to guide other countries to practice Western-style 'democratic politics.'" [2]2 This is a paraphrase of the strategic logic described in the text, not a direct quote from the 2022 National Security Strategy. Faced with the sustained rise of emerging economies represented by China, anxiety over the relative decline of U.S. hegemony has made the Biden administration particularly sensitive to whether it can continue to maintain U.S. global leadership. The U.S. under Biden urgently needs to ensure a "America First" position in hard power and material domains such as economy, trade, military, and technology, while also relying on the "Summit for Democracy" to spread the concepts and norms of "American-style democracy" globally. In short, U.S. global leadership, while supported by material power, must be supplemented by "democracy" and its ideology as a bond linking allies, partner countries, and other pro-U.S. regimes.

拜登入主白宫后除了加快找回维系美国霸权秩序所需的国际制度和联盟基础外，还将“民主”及其意识形态重整为塑造美国霸权领导的重要手段。在2022年的《国家安全战略》前言中拜登直接指明美国将继续捍卫全球“民主”，其战略目的在于以“民主”作为维系美国全球领导地位的关键支柱。在拜登看来，要维系美国“领导世界”这一“天定命运”，“既要维持美国国力增长的态势，也要引导其他国家践行西式“民主政治”。面对以中国为代表的新兴经济体的持续崛起，对美国霸权相对衰落的焦虑心理使得拜登政府对能否继续维持美国的全球领导地位格外敏感。拜登治下的美国亟须在经济、贸易、军事和科技等硬实力和物质基础领域确保“美国第一”的局面，同时，亦需要借助“民主峰会”在全球范围内扩散“美式民主”的理念和规范。简言之，美国的全球领导地位在以物质权势为支撑的同时必须辅之以“民主”及其意识形态作为联结盟友、伙伴国及其他亲美政权的纽带。

Against the backdrop of the current U.S. launch of a new Cold War against China, the Biden administration's creation of the "Summit for Democracy" aims to demonstrate U.S. strong leadership in the global ideological domain. Against the backdrop of four years of "America First" foreign policy and the January 6 Capitol riot in 2021, [3]3 The January 6 Capitol riot refers to the storming of the U.S. Capitol building by supporters of then-President Donald Trump on January 6, 2021, in an attempt to overturn the results of the 2020 presidential election. the "Summit for Democracy" is seen as a test of the U.S.'s sustained global appeal and leadership in "democracy" and human rights. To elaborate, Trump's belittling of NATO's functions, rejection of East Asian allies, and rebellion against some shared values of Western "democracy" have, to varying degrees, exacerbated the centrifugal forces of other Western-style "democratic" countries toward the U.S., artificially weakening U.S. leadership within the Western camp and among global allies. The "Summit for Democracy," relying on shared capitalist ideology and Western "democratic" norms, simultaneously creates topics about the threat posed by so-called "authoritarian" regimes like China and Russia to global "democracy," thereby achieving the strategic goal of dividing friend and foe camps by ideological affinity and diverting internal contradictions through a common enemy. The fact that major developed countries such as the G7 attended the "Summit for Democracy" is itself a symbol of the Western camp's recognition of U.S. leadership in the ideological domain. Moreover, the Biden administration's convening of the "Summit for Democracy" in video conference format, at a low cost, has reshaped the U.S.'s core leadership position while easing relations with the Western "democratic" camp.

在当前美国对华启动新冷战的背景下，拜登政府打造“民主峰会”意在展现美国在全球意识形态领域的强大领导力。在持续四年的“美国优先”对外政策以及2021年国会山骚乱事件的背景下，“民主峰会”被视为对美国在“民主”和人权领域持续的全球号召力以及领导地位的检验。展开来看，特朗普任内贬低北约功能、拒斥东亚盟友及对西方“民主”一些共有价值理念的反叛，或多或少加剧了其他西式“民主”国家对美国的离心力，美国在西方阵营及全球盟友内部的领导地位遭到人为削弱。而“民主峰会”以共有的资本主义意识形态和西方“民主”规范为内在依托，同时在外部制造中国和俄罗斯等所谓“威权主义”政体对全球“民主”威胁的话题，从而达到以意识形态亲疏划分敌我阵营、以共同敌人转移内部矛盾的战略目的。“G7”等主要发达国家出席“民主峰会”的事实本身就是西方阵营对美国在意识形态领域领导力认同的象征，而拜登政府以视频会议的形式召开“民主峰会”，更是以一种低成本的代价在缓和美国与西方“民主”阵营关系的基础上重塑了美国的核心领导地位。

(II) The U.S. Urgently Needs the Biden Administration to Rebuild the "Beacon of Democracy" Image Domestically

（二）美国国内亟需拜登政府重塑“民主灯塔”形象

In recent years, the most striking phenomenon in U.S. political processes is the intensifying political polarization—that is, the shrinking consensus and cohesion between the Democratic and Republican parties, and between establishment and anti-establishment factions, on many major socio-political issues and ideologies, while conflicts and centrifugal forces have gradually solidified. Examples include the impeachment of Trump initiated by Democrats and the judicial review of Trump; the infighting among different factions within the Republican Party; and the Capitol riot instigated by Trump supporters. These negative socio-political events under the backdrop of political polarization have severely impacted the effective functioning of the U.S. political system and the governance effectiveness of the government. As Francis Fukuyama noted when discussing the phenomenon of radical identity politics in the U.S. during the Trump era, "The current dysfunction and decline of American political institutions are closely related to the increasingly severe polarization of American politics." [4]4 Francis Fukuyama, "American Political Decay or Renewal? The Meaning of the 2016 Election," Foreign Affairs, July/August 2016. Negative events under political polarization have, to varying degrees, deconstructed the self-proclaimed "beacon" image of "American-style democracy" and the appeal of capitalist ideology. People have begun to question the practical effectiveness of emulating "American-style democracy" for nation-building and institutional design. Trump's electoral victory in 2016 was even seen as a carnival of the mob, with voters supporting Trump "knowing nothing about the informal rules and norms that make democratic institutions function well," [5]5 This is a paraphrase of a common critique of Trump's voter base, not a direct quote from a specific source. raising deep concerns about whether the U.S. might eventually evolve into a "democracy without democrats." All these indicate that, domestically, the development of "American-style democracy" faces the covert erosion of political polarization; overseas, the long-standing self-styled "model" image of "American-style democracy" is being widely questioned.

近年来，美国政治进程中最为引人注目的现象就是愈演愈烈的政治极化，即民主党与共和党之间、建制派与非建制派之间在诸多重大社会政治议题与意识形态上的共识和凝聚力不断萎缩而冲突和离心力却逐渐固化。如民主党人发起的对特朗普的弹劾以及对特朗普展开的司法审查；共和党内部不同派系的相互倾轧；特朗普支持者制造的国会山骚乱事件等。这些政治极化背景下的一系列负面社会政治事件严重冲击了美国政治体制的有效运转和政府的治理效力。正如福山（Francis Fukuyama）在谈论特朗普时代美国激进的身份政治现象时所指出的，“美国政治制度当前的功能失调和衰退，与美国政治愈演愈烈的严重极化有关”。政治极化下的消极事件或多或少解构了“美式民主”一贯自我标榜的“灯塔”形象以及资本主义意识形态的吸引力，人们开始质疑效仿“美式民主”进行国家建构和制度设计的现实有效性。2016年特朗普的竞选成功甚至被视为暴民的狂欢，支持特朗普的选民“对所有让民主制度良好运转的非正式规则和规范一无所知”，这就引发对美国最终是否会演变为“没有民主人士的民主国家”的深切担忧。凡此种种皆表明，在国内，“美式民主”的发展面临着政治极化的暗中侵蚀；在海外，长久以来以“榜样”自居的“美式民主”形象备受质疑。

The Biden administration’s prescription for saving the ills of U.S. “democracy” under the crisis of political polarization is the “Summit for Democracy.” In concrete operations, the Biden administration sets the themes of the “Summit for Democracy” within the scope of concerns common to participants or the globe, then emphasizes the obligation and responsibility of the United States to be present in leading the resolution of issues closely related to “democracy,” thereby continuing to project to the outside world the image of the United States as a defender of “democracy.” The themes of the 2021 summit focused on resisting “authoritarianism,” combating and curbing corruption, and promoting respect for human rights; the themes of the 2023 summit were further expanded to include new pathways for “democratic” transformation, the issue of peace in Ukraine, realizing the “democratic” dividend, defending the rule of law against hostile states, anti-corruption, “democratic” solidarity, the status of women in “democratic” countries, a business and “democracy” forum, and addressing hate-fueled violence. It can be seen that themes framed by the Biden administration for the “Summit for Democracy,” such as anti-corruption, safeguarding human rights, and improving the status of women, are easily endorsed by participants because they possess “universal values,” or themes like “authoritarianism” and the Russia-Ukraine conflict stimulate participants to seek U.S. security protection. The selection of these themes effectively masks the negative impact of various current “democratic” incidents within the United States; conversely, by relying on the “Summit for Democracy,” the Biden administration has re-crafted the image of the United States as the global savior of “democracy.”

拜登政府为拯救政治极化危机下美国“民主”弊病的药方即是“民主峰会”。在具体操作上，拜登政府将“民主峰会”的主题设定在参与方或者全球普遍关注的范畴之内，然后强调美国在牵头解决这些与“民主”息息相关问题上必须在场的义务和责任，以此继续向外界展示美国的“民主”捍卫者形象。2021年峰会的主题集中在反抗“威权主义”、应对和打击腐败以及促进对人权的尊重；2023年峰会的主题进一步扩展为“民主”变革的新路径、乌克兰和平问题、实现“民主”红利、捍卫法治对抗敌对国家、反腐败、“民主”团结、“民主”国家的妇女地位、商业与“民主”论坛以及应对仇恨引发的暴力。可以看出，拜登政府为“民主峰会”所框定的诸如反腐败、保障人权、提高妇女地位等主题因其具有“普世价值”而容易得到与会者的认同，或有如“威权主义”、俄乌冲突等主题以刺激与会者寻求美国的安全庇护。这些主题的选择很好地掩盖了美国国内当前存在的各种负面“民主”事件的消极影响，反之，依凭“民主峰会”拜登政府重新打造了美国作为全球“民主”救世主的形象。

It must be made clear that the Biden administration’s use of the “Summit for Democracy” to strenuously restore the image of the United States as a “beacon of democracy” and reshape global ideological dominance is, in the final analysis, to support the strategic conception of maintaining hegemony. The 2022 *National Security Strategy* unabashedly states, “We have not always lived up to our ideals, and in recent years our democracy has faced challenges from within,” and “the quality of our democracy at home affects the strength and credibility of our leadership abroad.” U.S. scholars Hal Brands and Charles Edel argue that “improving democracy at home should be a complement to, not a substitute for, leadership abroad.” It is evident that the internal task of the “Summit for Democracy” to mitigate the negative effects of political polarization serves the external goal of consolidating U.S. global leadership. By establishing the institutional platform of the “Summit for Democracy,” while downplaying domestic “democratic” contradictions, it continues to propagate “American-style democracy” values abroad. The deeper strategic motive is to inject soft power elements and an ideological foundation into the construction of a U.S.-led world order.

需要明确的是，拜登政府借助“民主峰会”竭力恢复美国的“民主灯塔”形象、重塑全球意识形态主导权归根结底是为了配合维系霸权的战略构想。2022年《国家安全战略》毫不避讳地指出，“我们并未始终遵守我们的理念，近年来我们的民主遭到了源于国内的挑战”，而“我们国内民主的质量会影响我们海外领导地位的实力与可信性”。美国学者哈尔·布兰兹（Hal Brands）和查尔斯·埃德尔（Charles Edel）认为，“改善国内民主应当是对海外领导地位的补充而非替代”。可见，“民主峰会”消解政治极化负面影响的内部任务是服务于巩固美国全球领导地位的外在目标。搭建“民主峰会”这一制度平台，在淡化国内“民主”矛盾的同时继续向外宣扬“美式民主”价值观，在更深的战略动机上是为构建美国主导的世界秩序注入软实力要素和意识形态根基。

II. The Norms and Functions of the U.S. “Summit for Democracy”

二、美国“民主峰会”的规范与功能

The so-called “norms” refer to the strong ideological coloration and value-promotion pursuit of the U.S. “Summit for Democracy,” which is the summit’s symbolic purpose; “functions” refer to the summit’s latent strategic planning for addressing specific regional and global issues, which is the summit’s manifestation as a means. Among these two attributes, the normative goal with ideological competition as its purpose is the primary pursuit of the “Summit for Democracy,” and the functional goals ultimately serve and are subordinate to the normative goals.

所谓“规范”是指美国“民主峰会”带有强烈的意识形态色彩和价值推广追求，它是“民主峰会”作为目的的象征；“功能”则是指“民主峰会”带有解决特定区域性和全球性问题的潜在战略规划，它是“民主峰会”作为手段的表现。在这两种属性中，带有意识形态竞争目的的规范目标是“民主峰会”的首要追求，并且，功能目标归根结底也服务于、从属于规范目标。

On the one hand, in terms of functional attributes, the Biden administration, through the form of the “Summit for Democracy,” attempts to strengthen ties and coordination with what it defines as “democratic regimes,” linking ideology and “democracy” to specific issues, thereby addressing “global challenges” such as geopolitical threats, supply chain restructuring, cutting-edge technology controls, the climate crisis, and global economic recovery.

一方面，功能属性上，拜登政府以“民主峰会”的形式试图加强与其所界定的“民主政体”间的联系与协调，并将意识形态和“民主”与特定议题相挂钩，以此应对地缘政治威胁、供应链重组、尖端科技管制、气候危机、全球经济恢复等“全球性挑战”。

The “Summit for Democracy” is a manifestation of Biden’s revival of the Democratic Party’s use of international institutions and pseudo-multilateralism to advance U.S. hegemonic leadership. The White House official statement elaborating on the summit’s agenda explicitly emphasizes “the effectiveness of collective action in addressing the most pressing challenges of our time.” In a sense, the “Summit for Democracy” is essentially what Scott Lawless emphasizes as a “Concert of Democracies,” which assumes that this institution can collectively handle security affairs within the “democratic world” and promote burden-sharing among “democratic” states. Constructing a “Concert of Democracies” helps accumulate the power and collective will necessary to shape a new world order according to U.S. interests. It is not difficult to see that the Biden administration has adopted a method of “democratic universalization” on issues such as cutting-edge technology controls, supply chain restructuring, and responding to NATO and Indo-Pacific geopolitical “threats.” That is, it portrays issues originally belonging to non-ideological fields such as technology, economy, and military as major sources of threats to Western “democracy” and its ideology, thereby inducing other major global allies and partners to join a U.S.-led “democratic community,” thus constructing a collective response model with shared costs. More critically, “democratic” values involve issues of “political correctness”; using values as a rallying cry can cause U.S. allies to set aside considerations of some real economic interests. Thus, the “Summit for Democracy” has become a new tool for the Biden administration to address global challenges at a controllable cost in an era of overall strategic contraction for the United States.

“民主峰会”是拜登重拾民主党人以国际制度和伪多边主义推进美国霸权领导地位的一项表征。白宫官方在阐述“民主峰会”的会议事项时明确强调“集体行动在解决我们时代最紧迫的挑战上的有效性”。某种意义上，“民主峰会”本质上就是斯科特·劳利斯（Scott Lawless）强调的“民主国家协调”（Concert of Democracies），它假设这一制度能够在“民主世界”中集体处理安全事务，并促进“民主”国家间的责任分担。构建“民主国家协调”有助于按照美国的利益积聚塑造新世界秩序所必需的权力和集体意志。不难看出，拜登政府在尖端科技管制、供应链重组、应对北约和印太地缘“威胁”等议题上采取了一种“民主泛化”的手段，即将原本属于科技、经济、军事等非意识形态领域的问题渲染成西方“民主”及其意识形态威胁的重要来源，进而诱使其他全球主要盟友和伙伴加入美国主导下的“民主共同体”中，以此构建一种成本共担的集体应对模式。更关键的是，“民主”价值观涉及“政治正确”问题，以价值观为号召可以让美国的盟友放弃对部分现实经济利益的考量。由此，“民主峰会”成为在美国大战略总体转向收缩的时代，拜登政府以成本可控的代价应对全球性挑战的新工具。

Specifically, first, it unites “democratic regimes” to build a global high-tech blockade front, while actively using new technological means to respond to the trend of “global democratic backsliding.” At the first “Summit for Democracy,” the United States, together with Australia, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands, formally proposed the “Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative,” aimed at “countering the trend of authoritarian governments abusing technology and promoting a positive vision of technology underpinned by democratic values.” According to this initiative, signatory states link human rights standards to technology export licenses; when their domestic enterprises engage in technology trade and cooperation with other “authoritarian governments” or foreign companies included on the “Entity List,” they must obtain permission from the signatory government before proceeding. The third “Summit for Democracy” proposed countering activities by other countries that use commercial spyware to infringe on human rights, fundamental freedoms, and democratic values.

具体来看，一是联合“民主政体”构筑全球高精尖技术封锁阵线，同时积极利用新技术手段应对“全球民主退潮”趋势。在第一届“民主峰会”上，美国与澳大利亚、丹麦、挪威和荷兰等国正式提出“出口管制与人权倡议”（Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative），旨在“阻止威权主义政府滥用技术的趋势，推动形成一种以民主价值为支撑的技术的积极图景”。根据这一倡议，缔约方将人权标准与技术出口许可证挂钩，其内部企业在与其他“威权主义政府”或者被纳入“实体清单”中的外国公司进行技术贸易与合作时，必须得到缔约方政府准许之后方可进行。第三届“民主峰会”则提出反制他国利用商业间谍软件从事侵犯人权、基本自由和民主价值的活动。

Second, using the 2022 Ukraine crisis as a trigger, it intensifies efforts to build a global “democratic regime” alliance to counter the “geopolitical threats” from China and Russia. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken chaired a panel on the Ukraine crisis at the second “Summit for Democracy,” advocating for ending Russia’s war under the principles of the UN Charter and establishing a “just and lasting” peace in Ukraine. Additionally, the White House included the Taiwan region of China on the invitation list for both summits and strongly insinuated that if China were to unify Taiwan by force, it would be a “threat”

二是以2022年乌克兰危机为诱导，加紧构筑全球“民主政体”联盟应对中俄“地缘威胁”。美国国务卿布林肯在第二届“民主峰会”上主持召开了有关乌克兰危机的小组会议，主张在《联合国宪章》原则下终止俄罗斯的战争并在乌克兰建立“公正且持久”的和平。此外，白宫在两次峰会上都将中国台湾地区列入受邀名单，并极力渲染如若中国武力统一台湾将是“威权政府”对“民主政体”的“威胁”，以此诱导更多印太盟友和伙伴共同应对中国在亚太地区的“权势增长”，实现“民主峰会”以意识形态亲疏划分世界的潜在目的。

At the same time, the "Summit for Democracy" is a new institutional framework through which the Biden administration continues to shape a series of values, ideas, norms, and principles of "American-style democracy" into global "universal values," endowing "American-style democracy" with new vitality and appearance, thereby ensuring that "American-style democracy" remains invincible in the global ideological competition.

同时，“民主峰会”是拜登政府持续将“美式民主”的一系列价值理念和规范原则塑造为全球“普世价值”的全新制度架构，赋予“美式民主”新的活力和面貌，以此确保“美式民主”在全球意识形态竞争中立于不败之地。

First, using the “Summit for Democracy” as an opportunity to continue the American-style transformation of other countries’ political and social life, in coordination with the United States’ instigation of “color revolutions” overseas. The 2022 U.S. *National Security Strategy* states bluntly that “the American democratic experiment has always been a source of inspiration for people around the world,” and one of the implicit goals of the “Summit for Democracy” is to continue promoting “American-style democracy” to the participating developing countries, while providing substantive financial aid for their “democratic” transformation activities. One action plan formally proposed by the United States at the first “Summit for Democracy,” the “Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal,” includes “supporting democratic reformers,” explicitly backing “activists, labor, and reform-minded leaders.” In practice, the U.S. State Department provided $10 million to the “Lifeline: Embattled CSOs Assistance Fund” to support “threatened” human rights defenders and activists globally; the State Department also allocated $1 million to establish the “Bridging Understanding, Integrity, and Legitimacy for Democracy Initiative (BUILD),” providing technical and resource support to professionals in closed political spaces to guide them when opportunities for “democratic” opening arise; the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provided $15 million to launch the “Powered by the People” initiative to assist “nonviolent social movements”; and the U.S. Department of Labor, the State Department, and USAID jointly contributed approximately $1.2 billion to create the “Multilateral Partnership for Organizing, Worker Empowerment, and Rights (M-POWER),” which, by strengthening “democratic” and independent worker organizations and supporting labor law reform and enforcement, assists labor rights advocacy, wage increases, and improved working conditions. In fact, at the end of the Cold War, the United States, by supporting trade union leaders and labor organizations in Eastern European socialist countries, ultimately dismantled the communist regimes there; after the Cold War, the United States, through funding non-governmental organizations and social movements in some developing countries, achieved the goal of “color revolutions” to change those countries’ regimes. The “democratic reformers” that the U.S. “Summit for Democracy” seeks to engage are precisely these key targets—trade union leaders, labor groups, and non-governmental organizations in target countries—who are potential internal agents for “color revolutions.” Once a country accepts aid and support from the “Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal,” the United States gains the privilege of exercising long-arm jurisdiction over that country’s “democratic” political development process, thus providing a head start for the United States to foment “color revolutions” overseas.

其一，以“民主峰会”为契机继续对他国的政治和社会生活进行美式改造，配合美国在海外策动“颜色革命”。2022年美国的《国家安全战略》直言“美国的民主试验历来是鼓舞全世界人民的源泉”，而“民主峰会”暗含的一项目标就是向与会的广大发展中国家继续推销“美式民主”，并实质性地财政援助他国进行“民主”改造活动。在首届“民主峰会”上美国正式提出的“总统民主复兴倡议”（Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal）的其中一项行动计划就是“支持民主变革者”，明确表示支持“积极分子、劳工以及具有改革思维的领袖”。在实际运行中，美国国务院为“生命线：被困市民社会组织援助基金会”（Lifeline: Embattled CSOs Assistance Fund）提供1000万美元，用于支持全球范围内“被威胁”的人权捍卫者与积极分子；美国国务院还出资100万美元设立“为民主注入理解、完整性与合法性倡议”（Bridging Understanding, Integrity, and Legitimacy for Democracy Initiative，BUILD），为封闭政治空间中的专业人士提供技术和资源以在“民主”开放时机出现时进行引导；美国国际开发署提供1500万美元发起“人民赋权”倡议（Powered by the People）以协助“非暴力社会运动”；美国劳工部、美国国务院和美国国际开发署联合提供约12亿美元创建“组织、工人赋权与权利多边伙伴关系”（Multilateral Partnership for Organizing, Worker Empowerment, and Rights，M睵OWER），通过强化“民主”且独立的工人组织以及支持劳动法的改革与实施，协助劳工维权、提升工资水平、改善工作环境。事实上，在冷战行将结束之际，美国正是通过支持东欧社会主义国家的工会领袖和劳工组织，最终瓦解了这些国家的共产党政权；冷战后，美国依凭对一些发展中国家非政府组织及社会运动的资助,实现了更迭他国政权的“颜色革命”目标。而美国“民主峰会”所要接触的“民主改革者”就是目标国的工会领袖、劳工群体与非政府机构等重点对象，他们是“颜色革命”的潜在内部代理人。一旦他国接受“总统民主复兴倡议”的援助和支持，美国便获取了对该国“民主”政治发展进程进行长臂管辖的特权，这就为美国在海外制造“颜色革命”提供了先机。

Second, relying on the platform of the “Summit for Democracy” to provoke a new ideological war on a global scale, creating an atmosphere for the United States’ “new Cold War.” Currently, the United States’ strategic blockade against China in the three hard-power domains of economy, technology, and military is the material manifestation of the “new Cold War,” while the sense of superiority of “American-style democracy” promoted by the “Summit for Democracy” and the resulting new round of competition in socio-political systems, economic development models, and ideologies is the reflection of the “new Cold War” in the dimension of ideas and concepts. In a sense, the United States’ fear of heterogeneous ideologies is sometimes greater than the structural pressure exerted by hostile forces at the material level. Looking back at the history of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, the Soviet Union’s ideology was regarded by U.S. policymakers as a threat to national security, and ideology overriding economic interest considerations became the driving factor of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. The institutional superiority inherent in Chinese-path modernization is increasingly attracting global attention; in contrast, the Western world is currently facing a general crisis of “democratic” retreat. Against this backdrop, the United States’ establishment of the “Summit for Democracy” platform to promote values-based diplomacy and the concept of “American-style democracy” to the international community will inevitably exacerbate global ideological confrontation. The “Summit for Democracy” is a product of the United States’ Cold War mentality in examining its strategic competition with China; it is an indispensable and important link in the Biden administration’s launch of a comprehensive “new Cold War” against China in the ideological domain.

其二，依托“民主峰会”的平台在全球范围内挑起新的意识形态战争，为美国的“新冷战”烘托氛围。当前，美国在经济、科技、军事三大硬实力领域对华实施战略封锁是“新冷战”在物质基础上的体现，而“民主峰会”倡导的“美式民主”优越感及其造就的新一轮社会政治制度、经济发展模式和意识形态竞争则是“新冷战”在思想观念维度上的反映。在某种意义上，美国对异质化意识形态的恐惧有时要大于敌对力量在物质层面施加的结构性压力。回顾美苏冷战史，苏联的意识形态被美国决策者视为对国家安全的威胁，意识形态压倒经济利益考量成为冷战时期美国对外政策的驱动因素。中国式现代化所内蕴的制度优越性日益为全球所瞩目，相形之下，当前西方世界面临普遍性“民主”退潮的危机。在此背景下，美国搭建“民主峰会”平台向国际社会推广价值观外交和“美式民主”理念，不可避免地会加剧全球意识形态的对立。“民主峰会”是美国以冷战思维审视对华战略竞争的产物，它是拜登政府开启对华全领域“新冷战”在意识形态领域不可或缺的重要一环。

III. Understanding the Inherent Deficiencies of the U.S. “Summit for Democracy”

三、理解美国“民主峰会”的内在缺陷

Examining the “Summit for Democracy” created by the Biden administration from the three perspectives of development model, selection criteria, and narrative content, we can identify several inherent deficiencies contained within it. These internal deficiencies are precisely the counteracting forces that subtly erode the “Summit for Democracy” and its subsequent actions.

基于发展模式、选择标准和叙事内容这三大视角审视拜登政府打造的“民主峰会”，可以从中梳理出其内含的若干固有缺陷，这些内在缺陷正是暗中侵蚀“民主峰会”及其后续行动的反作用力。

(I) The Unification of the “Democracy” Model

（一）“民主”模式的一元化

The “democracy” and ideological connotations vigorously promoted by the “Summit for Democracy” are fundamentally still “American-style democracy.” It is not a universal model of “democracy,” let alone the only form of democratic politics in the world. The “Summit for Democracy,” which the Biden administration is fully promoting, is fundamentally aimed at strengthening the global marketing of “American-style democracy,” with the intention of continuing to package “American-style democracy” as the exclusive blueprint that other countries can draw upon for their democratic practices. The 2023 “Summit for Democracy Declaration” states that “democracy can take many forms,” but includes some “common features,” such as free and fair elections and the separation of powers. It can be seen that the diversity of “democracy” models recognized by the “Summit for Democracy” is based on a series of core elements of “American-style democracy”; the “democratic” pluralism it touts essentially does not escape the trap of the unified connotation of “American-style democracy.” That is to say, the “Summit for Democracy,” which the Biden administration has worked hard to create, is not a platform for the concentrated display of democratic concepts and practices from different countries and regions around the world; it cannot truly reflect the reality of the diversity of global democratic models. On the contrary, the “Summit for Democracy” has already become a pseudo-multilateralist camp where “American-style democracy” performs a solo act.

“民主峰会”极力宣扬的“民主”和意识形态内涵根本上仍然是“美式民主”，它并非普世性“民主”模式，更不是全世界民主政治的唯一形态。拜登政府全力推行的“民主峰会”在根本上是为了在全球范围内加强营销“美式民主”，意图继续将“美式民主”包装为其他国家民主实践可资借鉴的独家方案。2023年的《“民主峰会”宣言》指出，“民主可以采取多种形式”，但却包括一些“共有特征”，诸如自由而公正的选举、三权分立等。可以看出，“民主峰会”所认可的“民主”模式的多样性是建立在“美式民主”一系列核心要素的基础之上，其所标榜的“民主”多元化本质上仍然没有跳出“美式民主”的一元化内涵陷阱。也就是说，拜登政府倾力打造的“民主峰会”并非为全球不同国家和地区的民主理念与民主实践提供集中展示的平台，它不能真实地映照出全球民主模式多样性的现实，反之，“民主峰会”已然成为“美式民主”一家独唱的伪多边主义阵营。

Looking back at history while considering the present, it is not difficult to find that the “American-style democracy” advocated by the “Summit for Democracy” is merely one form in the history of human democratic development. “American-style democracy” cannot be equated with global democracy, nor is it a template that other countries can directly copy and apply in the process of nation-building and achieving modernization. As early as the 1830s and 1840s, the French political scientist Tocqueville stated in *Democracy in America* that the American political structure is only one form of government that democratic countries can adopt, not the only and best form that democratic countries should establish. In response to the U.S. “Summit for Democracy,” the white paper *China: Democracy That Works* (2021) also points out that “democracy is diverse, and there is more than one path to achieving democracy. Different countries have different historical cultures and different actual national conditions, so the choice of democratic form must inevitably differ.” There is no doubt that the democratic model of any country is deeply rooted in its own historical and cultural traditions and actual political practices. “Democracy cannot be created according to an abstract principle, that is, it cannot ignore the consideration of historical circumstances and the need for decision-making criteria.” If the U.S. “Summit for Democracy” ignores the diversity of democratic development and ideological differences in different countries and regions, and insists on transforming other countries with “American-style democracy,” then the tension between the values of “American-style democracy” and other countries’ self-perception of democracy will bring disastrous consequences to the latter, such as the “Arab Spring,” which severely impacted the order of the Middle East region following the U.S. democratic transformation plan in the Middle East after the 9/11 attacks.

在回望历史的同时关照当下，不难发现，“民主峰会”倡导的“美式民主”只不过是人类民主发展史上的其中一种形式而已，“美式民主”不能等同于全球民主，更不是其他国家在进行国家建构和实现现代化进程中可以直接照搬照抄的样板。早在19世纪三四十年代，法国政治学家托克维尔就在《论美国的民主》中直言美国的政治结构只是民主国家可以采取的政府形式之一，而不是民主国家应当建立的唯一的和最好的形式。作为回应美国“民主峰会”的《中国的民主》白皮书（2021年）亦指出，“民主是多样的，实现民主的道路并非只有一条。各国的历史文化不同、现实国情不同，民主的形式选择必然不同”。毋庸置疑，任何国家的民主模式都是深深根植于本国历史文化传统和现实政治实践的产物，“民主不可能按照一种抽象的原则来创建，即不能无视对历史环境的考虑和对决策准绳的需要”。美国“民主峰会”如若忽视不同国家和地区民主发展的多元化和意识形态差异性，而执意以“美式民主”改造他国，那么“美式民主”的价值理念与他国对民主的自我认知之间的张力将给后者带来灾难性后果，如9·11事件后美国在中东的民主改造计划最终引发严重冲击中东地区秩序的“阿拉伯之春”。

(II) The Ambiguity of Western “Democracy” Standards

（二）西方“民主”标准的模糊性

The greatest internal controversy of the “Summit for Democracy” lies in the ambiguity of the criteria for defining “democracy.” The actual state of “democracy” among the participating parties varies enormously, and the Summit’s judgment of whether a country is “democratic” is directly tied to U.S. national interests. In his opening remarks at the first Summit for Democracy, Biden cited the Freedom House 2020 report, stating that global freedom had been in decline for 15 consecutive years. Here, even when measured against the so-called “freedom index” and “democracy” performance in the Freedom House report, the Summit’s approach to screening the participant list based on “democracy” criteria is extremely perplexing. For example, according to the Freedom House 2021 report, the Maldives, Nauru, Serbia, and Poland were listed as “the countries with the largest democratic倒退 [backsliding] over the past decade,” India and the Philippines were listed among the “countries with the largest democratic growth and backsliding in 2020” as backsliding countries, and the United States itself appeared on both negative “democracy” lists. Yet these “democracy”-backsliding countries were still permitted to participate in the Summit for Democracy. At the second Summit for Democracy, nearly one-third of the countries listed as “partly free” in the Freedom House 2023 report, as well as “not free” countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Iraq, were invited to attend. That is to say, although Biden used the Freedom House report to argue that global “democracy” is under siege and in decline, the Summit for Democracy selectively included some countries that the Freedom House annual report had classified as “democracy”-backsliding or having poor “democracy” records—precisely those countries the report identified as the root causes of the recent global “democracy” ebb. This fully demonstrates that the Summit’s determination of “democracy” criteria is extremely chaotic and uncertain.

“民主峰会”最大的内部争议就是“民主”标准界定上的模糊性，与会各方的“民主”现状相差巨大，“民主峰会”对“民主”与否的判断是与美国国家利益直接挂钩的。拜登在第一届“民主峰会”开幕式上的讲话中援引“自由之家”（Freedom House）2020年度报告指出，全球自由已经连续15年处于衰退之中。在这里，即便比照“自由之家”报告中的所谓“自由指数”和“民主”表现，“民主峰会”在以“民主”为标准筛选参会名单方面的做法也是极其令人困惑的。例如，根据“自由之家”2021年度报告，马尔代夫、瑙鲁、塞尔维亚和波兰被列为“10年来民主倒退最大国家”，印度、菲律宾被列为“2020年民主增长与倒退最大国家”中的倒退国家，美国则同时位列这两大“民主”负面名单。但是，这些“民主”倒退国家却仍然获准参加“民主峰会”。在第二届“民主峰会”中，有近1/3被“自由之家”2023年度报告列为“部分自由”国家以及刚果、伊拉克等“不自由”国家受邀出席。也就是说，尽管拜登以“自由之家”的报告来论证全球“民主”正在遭受围攻和衰退的现实，但“民主峰会”却仍然将被“自由之家”年度报告列为“民主”倒退或有“民主”不良记录的部分国家选择性地纳入进来，而它们恰是被该报告界定为导致近年来全球“民主”退潮的根源。这就充分说明，“民主峰会”对“民主”标准的认定是极其混乱而不确定的。

In fact, American scholars such as Hal Brands pointed out before the official convening of the Summit for Democracy that the Biden administration would face a thorny problem in defining “democracy.” Looking at the invitation lists for the two Summits for Democracy, the Biden administration did not resolve the entry criteria for “democracy”; “democracy” is not even the primary or sole indicator for participation in the Summit. The United States determines participants more from the perspective of its own grand strategic interests than from their actual “democracy” status. As these American scholars revealed, India—Pakistan’s primary rival—was invited, yet it was difficult to exclude Pakistan from the Summit for Democracy because, after withdrawing from Afghanistan, the Biden administration needed Pakistan’s cooperation in dealing with the Taliban. Hungary, meanwhile, was the only EU member state not invited to the 2021 Summit for Democracy, due to the Biden administration’s punishment of the Hungarian leadership for its close relationship with former President Trump. That is to say, beyond overseas geopolitical considerations, the partisan struggle between the Democratic and Republican parties is also an important factor influencing the Summit for Democracy’s judgment of “democracy” criteria. Furthermore, countries and regions that follow the U.S. lead unconditionally can also make it onto the Summit for Democracy list, while other countries pursuing independent foreign policies were not invited. In summary, when the criteria for “democracy” conflict with the Biden administration’s grand strategic needs, partisan interests, the closeness of bilateral relations, and other real-world factors, “democracy” must also give way. The ambiguity and even arbitrariness of the “democracy” criteria will inevitably undermine the authority and credibility of the Summit for Democracy, which also indirectly proves that the “democracy” in the Summit for Democracy is instrumental.

实际上，哈尔·布兰兹(Hal Brands)等美国学者在“民主峰会”正式召开之前就指出拜登政府将面临棘手的“民主”定义问题。纵览两届“民主峰会”受邀名单，拜登政府并未解决好“民主”的入选标准，“民主”甚至不是参与“民主峰会”首要的、唯一的指标，美国更多的是从自身大战略利益角度出发来确定参会者，而不是根据它们真实的“民主”现状。正如这些美国学者所揭示的，印度这一巴基斯坦的头号对手参会却很难将巴基斯坦排除在“民主峰会”之外，因为在撤出阿富汗之后，拜登政府在应对塔利班问题上需要巴基斯坦的合作。而匈牙利则是欧盟成员国中唯一没有受邀参加2021年“民主峰会”的国家，源于拜登政府对匈牙利领导人与前总统特朗普之间亲密关系的惩罚。也就是说，除海外地缘政治考量之外，民主党与共和党之间的党争亦是影响“民主峰会”评判“民主”标准的重要因素。此外，那些唯美国马首是瞻的国家和地区亦能入列“民主峰会”名单，而其他奉行独立对外政策的国家并未受邀出席。概而言之，当“民主”的标准与拜登政府的国家大战略需求、党派利益、双边关系亲疏等现实因素相冲突时，“民主”也是要让位的。“民主”标准上的模糊性甚至随意性势必会反噬“民主峰会”的权威性与可信度，这也从侧面证明“民主峰会”中的“民主”是工具性的。

(3) The Unreality of the “Democracy” Narrative

（三）“民主”叙事的非现实性

The Summit for Democracy uses the false binary narrative of “democracy versus authoritarianism” to shape a paradigm for understanding world politics, thereby concealing the internal contradictions of “American-style democracy” and the predicament of its global retreat. When explaining the reasons for designing the Summit for Democracy, Biden stated that “in the face of persistent and urgent challenges to democracy, universal human rights, and even the world, democracy needs defenders.” Since Biden took office, China’s development model, which differs from Western modernization, together with Russia’s strategic culture in the context of the Russia-Ukraine military conflict, have been viewed by the United States as the forced exit of “democracy” and the oppressive advance of “authoritarianism.” Even the Russia-Ukraine conflict has been described as an invasion of “democratic regimes” by “authoritarianism.” Biden’s national security strategic thinking is essentially a binary opposition paradigm of “democracy” versus authoritarianism, reflected in the Summit for Democracy as a binary struggle between the participating “democratic regimes” and the excluded “authoritarian” states. But this ideological dichotomy is not a scientific paradigm for fully understanding current global politics. Robert A. Manning, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, pointed out that the division between “democracy” and authoritarianism in the Summit for Democracy is a flawed assumption, and the concept of “autocracy” is intellectual laziness—an oversimplified dichotomy of a complex world. The Summit for Democracy uses this minimalist binary narrative of “democracy” versus authoritarianism to maximize the concealment of the dire state of “democracy” within the United States and the declining appeal of “American-style democracy” globally.

“民主峰会”以“民主对抗威权”的虚假二元叙事塑造理解世界政治的范式，以此掩盖“美式民主”的内部矛盾及其全球退潮的困境。拜登在谈及设计“民主峰会”的原因时指出，“面对民主、普世人权乃至全世界遭受的持续且危急的挑战，民主需要捍卫者”。拜登执政以来，中国迥异于西方现代化的发展模式，连同俄乌军事冲突背景下俄罗斯战略文化，都被美国视为“民主”的被迫退场与“威权”的压迫性进逼，甚至俄乌冲突亦被描述为“威权主义”对“民主政体”的入侵。拜登的国家安全战略思维本质上就是“民主”与威权的二元对立范式，体现在“民主峰会”上就是与会的“民主政体”与排除在外的“威权主义”国家之间的二元抗争，但这种意识形态上的二分论并不是充分理解当前全球政治的科学范式。美国大西洋委员会（Atlantic Council）高级研究员罗伯特·曼宁（Robert A. Manning）指出，“民主峰会”划分的“民主”与威权是有缺陷的假设，威权（autocracy）的提出是智识上的懒惰，它是对复杂世界的一种过分简单化的二分法。“民主峰会”正是利用“民主”对抗威权的极简二元叙事寻求最大化遮蔽美国国内的“民主”糟糕现状，以及“美式民主”在全球范围内吸引力下降的处境。

The “democracy versus authoritarianism” promoted by the Summit for Democracy is in fact a false narrative. Its unreality lies in characterizing “authoritarianism” as the key independent variable causing the global retreat and decline of “democracy.” In reality, “democratization is usually a process that occurs within states… many of the most serious threats to democracy are endogenous: distrust, polarization, voter suppression, and partisan systems.” The global “democracy” retreat emphasized by the Summit for Democracy is fundamentally a phenomenon of global “democracy” decline based on “American-style democracy.” Faced with this predicament, the Biden administration has not reflected on the embarrassing “democracy” practices in the United States in recent years or the inherent shortcomings of the “American-style democracy” concept itself, but instead blames the so-called large-scale rise of “authoritarianism.” “The assumption that the sharp rise of authoritarian regimes is a threat or a key factor in the weakening of democratic regimes seems to confuse cause and effect.” The “democracy” backsliding in countries such as India, Brazil, the Philippines, and Poland originated from within. One challenge facing the Summit for Democracy lies in its primary narrative, which holds that the crisis of “democracy” originates from the struggle between global democratic regimes and “authoritarian states,” rather than from internal conflicts within democratic regimes. Clearly, this false narrative of “democracy” versus authoritarianism, which ignores internal causes, is difficult to resonate with global audiences. The metaphysical narrative of the Summit for Democracy, detached from the true state of “American-style democracy” and the practice of global “democracy” development, cannot obscure the basic fact of the diverse forms of human democracy and ideology.

“民主峰会”宣扬的“民主对抗威权”实为一种虚假叙事，其非现实性在于将“威权主义”定性为全球“民主”倒退和衰微的关键自变量。事实上，“民主化通常是发生在国家内部的过程……对民主的诸多最严重威胁都是内生的：不信任、极化、压制选民以及党派制度”。“民主峰会”强调的全球“民主”退潮根本上是“美式民主”基础上的全球“民主”式微现象，面对这一困境，拜登政府没有反思近年来美国国内难堪的“民主”实践以及“美式民主”理念自身存在的不足，而是怪咎所谓“威权主义”的大规模兴起。“有关威权政体的急剧兴起是威胁或者说是民主政体削弱的要因的假设似乎混淆了因果”，印度、巴西、菲律宾和波兰等国家的“民主”倒退是从其内部产生的。“民主峰会”面临的一项挑战就在于其首要叙事，即认为“民主”危机起源于全球民主政体与“威权国家”之间的争夺，而非民主政体的内部冲突。显然，这种忽视内因的“民主”对抗威权的虚假叙事是难以引起全球受众共鸣的，“民主峰会”脱离“美式民主”真实现状与全球“民主”发展实践的形而上叙事是无法遮蔽人类民主及其意识形态多样化形态的基本事实的。

IV. New Exogenous Challenges to China’s Ideological Security

四、中国意识形态安全面临新的外源性挑战

There is no doubt that the Summit for Democracy, painstakingly crafted by the Biden administration, will spark a new round of ideological competition targeting China on a global scale. Currently, ideology has become an important weapon in the U.S. strategy to contain China. “The United States, by shaping the ideological differences between China and the United States into an irreconcilable real-world conflict, intends to comprehensively contain China’s development.” The Summit for Democracy is precisely a new tool for the Biden administration to launch an ideological war against China. This is certainly because Chinese-path modernization, rooted in the great practice of socialism with Chinese characteristics, shines brightly in world politics, together with the superiority demonstrated by China’s social and political governance model in the New Era when compared with Western experience. In recent years, the “democracy” practices of the United States and major developed capitalist countries in Europe have shown increasingly negative trends such as political polarization, violent riots, and the rise of populist parties. “American-style democracy,” the Western model, and capitalist ideology are no longer templates for global “democracy” and state-building. China’s steady progress on the path of modernization, governance model, and social-political system has prompted the Biden administration to hastily launch the Summit for Democracy, and the introduction of the Summit has greatly increased the challenges to China’s ideological security.

毫无疑问，拜登政府倾力打造的“民主峰会”将在全球范围内掀起针对中国的新一轮意识形态竞争。当前，意识形态已然成为美国遏华战略的重要武器，“美国通过将中美意识形态差异塑造为不可调和的现实冲突，意图全面遏制中国发展”。而“民主峰会”正是拜登政府发动对华意识形态战的全新工具。这固然是因为根植于中国特色社会主义伟大实践的中国式现代化在世界政治中大放异彩，连同新时代中国的社会政治治理模式在与西方经验对比中展现出的优越性，而近年来美国和欧洲主要发达资本主义国家的“民主”实践却呈现出愈演愈烈的政治极化、暴力骚乱事件和民粹主义政党崛起等消极趋势，“美式民主”、西方模式和资本主义意识形态不再是全球“民主”和国家建构的模本。中国在现代化道路、治理模式和社会政治制度上的稳步前行使得拜登政府急切推出“民主峰会”，而“民主峰会”的出台则大大增加了中国的意识形态安全挑战。

(I) The “Summit for Democracy” Exerts Pressure on China’s Ideological Security

（一）“民主峰会”施压我国意识形态安全

China’s socialist ideology is a complete system of concepts guided by Marxism and taking the core socialist values as its core value appeal. The U.S. “Summit for Democracy” attempts to erode the foundation of China’s socialist ideology by vigorously promoting the so-called “universal values” of Western “democracy” and capitalist ideology. At present, the pressure exerted by the “Summit for Democracy” on China’s ideological security is concentrated in two dimensions: core values at the conceptual level and development models at the practical level.

我国社会主义意识形态是以马克思主义为指导，以社会主义核心价值观为核心价值诉求的一整套观念体系。美国“民主峰会”试图通过竭力推广西方“民主”和资本主义意识形态的所谓“普世价值”侵蚀我国社会主义意识形态的根基。当前，“民主峰会”施压我国意识形态安全集中体现在观念层面的核心价值与实践层面的发展模式两大维度。

The first is the contest over core values. Core values are an important representation of a specific ideology, and the struggle over core values is the center of gravity in the contest for ideological dominance. The Biden administration continues to package core values such as freedom, “democracy,” and human rights under the Western capitalist system as “universal values,” and at the “Summit for Democracy” formulated the “Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal,” supported by financial resources, to promote “Western-style values” globally, especially in third-world countries. It is not difficult to see that the “Western-style values” expansion plan with a clear agenda of the “Summit for Democracy” will form a new competitive situation with the common values of all mankind, whose core is peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy, and freedom, that China has advocated in the international community in recent years. The common values of all mankind “do not impose one’s own values and model on others, and do not engage in ideological confrontation,” whereas the “Summit for Democracy” intends to sell “Western-style values” to all countries and regions of the world. Furthermore, the common values of all mankind advocate achieving harmonious coexistence among different civilizations by building a community with a shared future for mankind on the basis of jointly responding to global challenges, whereas the “Summit for Democracy” examines different values around the world with a black-and-white “democracy–non-democracy” mindset, and even seeks to forcibly transmit “Western-style values” by engaging so-called “democratic reformers” within developing countries, attempting to achieve the “universalization” of “American-style democracy” through value penetration. In summary, the “Western-style values” vigorously promoted by the “Summit for Democracy” exert significant pressure on China’s ideological security in terms of both goal pursuit and practical pathways.

一是核心价值之争。核心价值是特定意识形态的重要表征，核心价值观上的博弈是争夺意识形态主导权的重心。拜登政府继续将西方资本主义制度下的自由、“民主”和人权等核心价值包装为“普世价值”，并在“民主峰会”上为在全球范围内、特别是第三世界国家推广“西式价值”制定了以财政为支持的“总统民主复兴倡议”。不难看出，“民主峰会”带有明确议事议程的“西式价值”扩展计划与近年来中国在国际社会倡导的以和平、发展、公平、正义、民主、自由为内核的全人类共同价值将形成全新竞争局面。全人类共同价值“不将自己的价值观和模式强加于人，不搞意识形态对抗”，而“民主峰会”则意在将“西式价值”推销至全世界所有国家和地区。此外，全人类共同价值主张通过在协同应对全球性挑战的基础上构建人类命运共同体来实现不同文明间的和谐共处，而“民主峰会”则以“民主—非民主”的非黑即白思维审视全球不同价值观，甚至谋求通过接触广大发展中国家内部的所谓“民主改革者”来强制性传输“西式价值”，试图通过价值渗透来实现“美式民主”的“普世化”。概而言之，“民主峰会”竭力推崇的“西式价值”在目标追求和实践路径上对我国的意识形态安全造成重大压力。

The second is the contest over development models. The competition between development models is, in the final analysis, a competition over the superiority of political systems; it is the real-world contest of ideological competition in terms of the advantages of governance. For a long time, Western countries, relying on their economic achievements and social prosperity, have given the statement “modernization = Westernization” high international discursive power, and Western-style modernization once became the “benchmark” for late-developing countries moving toward modernization. However, the success of Chinese-path modernization “has shown a new picture different from the Western modernization model” and “has broken the myth of ‘modernization = Westernization’.” The Chinese approach and Chinese experience on the path of national modernization have triggered a sense of crisis in the West. Consequently, the Biden administration has used the “Summit for Democracy” to intensify its offensive against Chinese-path modernization, prominently manifested in describing the leaders of Chinese-path modernization and the ideology inherent in it as the rise of so-called “authoritarianism,” while simultaneously regarding Chinese-path modernization, which is committed to shaping a new form of human civilization, as a challenge to Western civilization. The “Summit for Democracy” links issues such as anti-corruption, defending human rights, business prosperity, and social equity with “American-style democracy” in its themes and agenda settings, aiming to demonstrate the still-existing vitality of Western-style modernization within them. However, “its essence is to ‘use democracy as a pretext to suppress and contain countries with different social systems and development models’,” attempting to use the false narrative of so-called “authoritarianism versus democracy” to smear the achievements of the New Era in modernizing China’s national governance system and governance capacity. The continuous pressure exerted by the U.S. “Summit for Democracy” on “democracy,” values, and governance models has significantly increased the external risks to maintaining national ideological security in the process of Chinese-path modernization development.

二是发展模式之争。发展模式的竞争归根结底是政治制度优越性的竞争，它是意识形态竞争在治国理政优势上的现实较量。长久以来，西方国家依凭其经济成就和社会繁荣使得“现代化=西方化”的说法有着很高的国际话语权，西式现代化一度成为后发国家走向现代化的“标杆”。然而，中国式现代化的成功，“展现了不同于西方现代化模式的新图景”，“打破了‘现代化=西方化’的迷思”，国家现代化道路上的中国方案与中国经验引发了西方的危机感。由此，拜登政府借助“民主峰会”加大了对中国式现代化的攻势，突出表现为以所谓的“威权主义”崛起描述中国式现代化的领导者及其内蕴的意识形态，同时，将致力于塑造人类文明新形态的中国式现代化视为对西方文明的挑战。“民主峰会”在会议主题和议程设置上将反腐败、捍卫人权、商业繁荣、社会公平等议题与“美式民主”挂钩，意在彰显西式现代化在其中仍存的生命力，但“其实质是‘以民主为幌子，对与其社会制度不同、发展模式不同的国家进行打压遏制’”，企图以所谓“威权对抗民主”的虚假叙事抹黑新时代中国在国家治理能力和治理体系现代化方面的成就。美国“民主峰会”在“民主”、价值观和治理模式上的不断压迫显著增加了中国式现代化发展过程中维护国家意识形态安全的外部风险。

(II) China’s Practical Measures to Address the New Ideological Challenges Brought by the “Summit for Democracy”

（二）我国应对“民主峰会”带来全新意识形态挑战的现实举措

The current U.S. “Summit for Democracy” has brought severe challenges to China’s ideological work. “Ideological work is the work of establishing the heart for the nation and establishing the soul for the people.” Whether ideological work can be done well under the new situation to better respond to the new challenges and pressures brought by the U.S. “Summit for Democracy” is directly related to the security of political power, the system, and ideology in the process of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

当前美国“民主峰会”给我国的意识形态工作带来了严峻的挑战。“意识形态工作是为国家立心，为民族立魂的工作”，能否在新形势下做好意识形态工作以更好地应对美国“民主峰会”带来的新挑战与压力，直接关乎中华民族伟大复兴过程中的政权、制度与意识形态安全。

First, at the macro level, ideological security work must be coordinated from the perspective of a holistic approach to national security, and a holistic view of ideological security should be constructed with a grand security concept, thereby more effectively responding to the multidimensional challenges brought by the “Summit for Democracy.” In the current construction of a new security pattern that coordinates security in various fields, political security is the primary task, and maintaining ideological security is one of the constituent elements of political security. In traditional understanding, ideological security plays a guiding role in thought for the stability of the state’s political power and system; therefore, maintaining ideological security in a general sense focuses more on these two areas. However, the impact of the U.S. “Summit for Democracy” on China’s ideological security involves dimensions such as political path, economic model, cultural values, and social governance. Therefore, in the face of the multiple ideological threats from the “Summit for Democracy,” it is necessary to coordinate work on political security, economic security, cultural security, social security, and cybersecurity on the basis of adhering to a holistic approach to national security, and then to collaboratively construct a holistic view of ideological security with the fundamental system of upholding the guiding role of Marxism in the ideological field, the Four Confidences of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the core socialist values, and resolutely winning the struggle for online ideology as its main core. This grand concept of ideological security can more comprehensively, efficiently, and targetedly resist the ideological attacks of the U.S. “Summit for Democracy” on China from multiple fields such as politics, economy, society, culture, and the internet.

首先，宏观层面上，要从总体国家安全观的角度统摄意识形态安全工作，以大安全理念构建总体意识形态安全观，从而更有效地应对“民主峰会”带来的多维挑战。在当前构建统筹各领域安全的新安全格局中，政治安全是首要任务，维护意识形态安全是政治安全的构成要素之一。在传统认知中，意识形态安全对国家的政权和制度稳定起着思想指引作用，因而一般意义上维系意识形态安全更多着眼于这两大领域。然而，美国“民主峰会”对中国意识形态安全的冲击涉及政治道路、经济模式、文化价值和社会治理等维度。因此，面对“民主峰会”在意识形态上的多重威胁，必须在坚持总体国家安全观的基础上统筹政治安全、经济安全、文化安全、社会安全和网络安全等方面的工作，进而以坚持马克思主义在意识形态领域指导地位的根本制度、中国特色社会主义“四个自信”、社会主义核心价值观，以及坚决打赢网络意识形态斗争为主要内核，协同构建总体意识形态安全观，这种意识形态大安全理念能够更加全面、高效、有针对性地抵制美国“民主峰会”从政治、经济、社会、文化、网络等多个领域对我国进行的意识形态攻击。

Second, at the meso level, strategically strengthen China’s international discursive communication capacity regarding ideology, and more targetedly resolve the stigmatization of China’s ideology by the “Summit for Democracy” at the global level. The Biden administration chose to build a “Summit for Democracy” encompassing more than 100 different subjects, intending to use the scale advantage of this pseudo-multilateralism to spread the international influence of “American-style democracy” while simultaneously suppressing China’s growing global ideological influence in a wider scope. Fortunately, we have already begun to build a propaganda model combining government and non-governmental forces to enhance China’s ideological narrative capacity. On the one hand, various Chinese official and non-official media have produced foreign-language (e.g., English) promotional videos reflecting the achievements of Chinese-path modernization and the Chinese people’s pursuit of a better life, and, using Western mainstream social media such as TikTok and YouTube, have told overseas audiences down-to-earth Chinese stories that resonate with people abroad, such as the Communist Party of China leading the people in pursuing a better life and achieving common prosperity, in forms with high public acceptance such as animation, micro-films, and documentaries. This kind of narrative, which actively demonstrates the superiority of China’s governance in the New Era from a non-governmental perspective using Western media, can effectively offset the negative impact of the “Summit for Democracy’s” attempts to smear China’s ideology globally. On the other hand, non-governmental think tanks and academic groups have organized international academic conferences and high-end forums on the themes of socialist democratic politics with Chinese characteristics and Chinese-path modernization, forming public opinion countermeasures against the “Summit for Democracy” through agenda-setting and discourse shaping on “democracy” and its ideological topics, partially resolving the passive situation imposed on China by the “Summit for Democracy” in seizing global “democracy” discourse. By strategically enhancing China’s international discursive communication level regarding ideology through the “official + non-governmental” joint propaganda, the pattern of the United States using the “Summit for Democracy” to manipulate global ideological discursive hegemony can be gradually broken.

其次，中观层面上，战略性强化我国的意识形态国际话语传播能力，更有针对性地化解“民主峰会”在全球层面上对我国意识形态的污名化。拜登政府选择打造囊括100多个不同主体的“民主峰会”，意在通过这一伪多边主义的规模优势扩散“美式民主”国际影响力的同时，在更大范围内打压中国意识形态日渐增加的全球影响力。所幸我们早已开始打造政府加民间联动的宣传模式以提升中国意识形态叙事能力。一方面，中国各类官方、非官方媒体等已经以英语等外语制作反映中国式现代化成就以及中国人民追求美好生活的对外宣传片，并借助海外抖音（TikTok）、油管（YouTube）等西方主流社交媒体，以动漫、微电影、纪录片等大众接受度高的形式，向海外受众讲述中国共产党带领人民追求美好生活、实现共同富裕等接地气的、能够引发海外人民共鸣的中国故事。这种借助西方媒介从民间视角主动展现新时代中国治国理政优越性的叙事可以有效对冲“民主峰会”企图抹黑我国意识形态在全球的消极影响。另一方面，民间智库和学术团体围绕中国特色社会主义民主政治和中国式现代化的主题举办国际学术会议和高端论坛，通过“民主”及其意识形态话题上的议程设置和话语塑造形成对“民主峰会”的舆论反制，部分化解了“民主峰会”在抢占全球“民主”话语上施与中国的被动处境。通过“官方+民间”的联动宣传来战略性增强我国意识形态国际话语传播水平，逐步破除美国借助“民主峰会”操控全球意识形态话语霸权的格局。

Finally, at the micro level, we must take online ideological security as an important lever and strictly prevent the “Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal” formulated by the “Summit for Democracy” from using overseas non-governmental organizations as a base and employing online tools to intensify ideological infiltration from within China during its implementation. “Without cybersecurity there is no national security; if we cannot get past the hurdle of the internet, we cannot get past the hurdle of long-term governance.” [11] Online platforms, filled with various uncertainties, together with non-governmental organizations that are usually cloaked in the guise of “civil society, peace, and cooperation,” are covert overseas ideological infiltration tools that cannot be ignored. As mentioned earlier, one ultimate goal of the “Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal” vigorously promoted by the U.S. “Summit for Democracy” is to engage with so-called “democratic reformers” such as labor, trade unions, and activists in other countries, thereby achieving the hidden aim of dismantling other countries’ ideologies and political systems from within. In response to this situation, national security and cyberspace authorities must further strengthen anti-infiltration supervision over popular domestic social and communication software such as WeChat, Weibo, Douyin, and Xiaohongshu, curbing the use of these software by U.S. intelligence agencies to spread various political rumors and other smear information that easily exacerbates social contradictions from within. In this process, it is even more necessary to prevent overseas non-governmental organizations from engaging in ideological sabotage activities within China.

最后，微观层面上，以网络意识形态安全为重要抓手，严防“民主峰会”制定的“总统民主复兴倡议”在实施过程中以境外非政府组织为依托、借助网络工具加大从我内部进行意识形态渗透。“没有网络安全就没有国家安全；过不了互联网这一关，就过不了长期执政这一关”，充满各种不确定性的网络平台，加之通常披着“民间、和平与合作”外衣的非政府组织是不容忽视的隐蔽的境外意识形态渗透工具。如前所述，美国“民主峰会”极力推进“总统民主复兴倡议”的一项终极目标就是与他国的劳工、工会和积极分子等所谓“民主变革者”进行接触，从而达到从内部瓦解他国意识形态和政治制度的隐秘目的。针对此一态势，国家安全和网络主管部门要进一步加强对微信、微博、抖音、小红书等国内热门社交和通信类软件的反渗透监管工作，遏止美国情报机构利用这些软件从内部散播各类政治谣言以及其他容易激化社会矛盾的抹黑信息。在此过程中，更要防止境外非政府组织在我国内部从事意识形态破坏行动。

It is evident that the three “Summits for Democracy” convened by the Biden administration are not the end point of the U.S. ideological war against China. This means that in the coming period, China’s ideological security will always face sustained pressure and challenges from the U.S. “Summit for Democracy.” Xi Jinping emphasizes

显见的是，拜登政府打造的三届“民主峰会”并不是美国对华意识形态战的终点，这也就意味着未来一段时期我国的意识形态安全将始终面临来自美国“民主峰会”的持续性压力与挑战。习近平强调，“意识形态关乎旗帜、关乎道路、关乎国家政治安全”。对于正处在民族伟大复兴进程中的中国来说，我们要在把握美国“民主峰会”本质及其内在缺陷的基础上，以中国特色社会主义民主政治自信有力回击“美式民主”的攻势，以新时代中国国家治理能力和治理体系现代化的长远进展回应“民主峰会”抹黑中国的社会政治制度和发展模式的做法，坚定捍卫我国的意识形态安全。当然，与此同时，我们更要警惕美国借“民主峰会”之机在贸易、关税、科技、军事、人文等领域之外将中国纳入意识形态全面竞争的轨道，从而达到如同冷战时期全方位拖垮苏联的战略目的。力避被拖入全面意识形态竞争陷阱是我们审视美国“民主峰会”的应有之义。

Online editor: Huihui

网络编辑：慧慧