The Construction of the Party’s Ideological Discourse System in the New Era

Ideology is an important cornerstone of modern political parties, and ideological discourse is a significant dimension of ideology. The Communist Party of China has always regarded ideological work as an “extremely important” task. At present, the construction of ideological discourse faces a complex context in which changes unseen in a century, the mission of rejuvenation, and Chinese-path modernization overlap. Constructing ideological discourse in a “one-dimensional” manner can no longer meet the needs of the times and development; it is necessary to systematically construct ideological discourse within the logical thread of “politics–narrative–power.” In this process, we should prudently explore the referents and connotations of ideological discourse in the three dimensions of politics, discourse, and power, grasp the internal mechanisms at work, and truly unleash the powerful efficacy of the CPC’s ideological discourse.

意识形态是现代政党的重要基石，意识形态话语是意识形态的一个重要向度。中国共产党始终把意识形态工作视为一个“极端重要”的工作。当前，意识形态话语建构面对着百年变局、复兴使命和中国式现代化相交叠的复杂语境，“单向度”地构建意识形态话语已无法满足时代和发展的需要，必须对意识形态话语在“政治－叙事－权力”逻辑脉络中进行体系化建构。在这个过程中，应当审慎地探究意识形态话语在政治、话语和权力三重维度中的所指和内涵，把握其中的内在机理，真正发挥出中国共产党意识形态话语的强大功效。

I. The Political Dimension: Effectively Strengthening Political Cohesion through “Speaking Politics”

一、政治维度：在“讲政治”中有效强化政治凝聚力

“Speaking politics with a clear stance” is a defining trait of a Marxist political party. Ideological discourse precisely needs to exert strong political cohesion in this process, turning “discourse” into “action” to the greatest extent and scope through “speaking politics.” Viewed from the century-long Party history, the established goals of each stage—revolution, construction, and reform—constitute the “biggest politics” of that stage, and the process of achieving these goals is the process of “speaking politics with a clear stance.” In the New Era, the CPC has embarked on a “new赶考之路” [1]1 赶考之路 (gǎn kǎo zhī lù): “Road of the imperial examination” – a metaphor used by the CPC to describe the ongoing test of governance, originating from Mao Zedong’s analogy of the Party’s entry into Beijing in 1949 as “going to the capital for an examination.”, and ideological discourse must both provide powerful explanatory support for the “historic achievements and historic transformations in the cause of the Party and the state” over the past decade of the New Era, and provide strong guidance and cohesion for “realizing the missions and tasks of the CPC in the New Era and the new journey.” This requires ideological discourse, in the process of “speaking politics,” to transform “political discourse” into “discursive politics,” thereby releasing strong cohesion and mobilization power.

“旗帜鲜明讲政治”是马克思主义政党的特质。意识形态话语恰需要在这个过程中发挥出强大政治凝聚力，通过“讲政治”最大程度、最大范围地使“话语”变为“行动”。从百年党史来看，革命、建设、改革各阶段的既定目标是每个阶段“最大的政治”，实现目标的过程就是“旗帜鲜明讲政治”的过程。新时代，中国共产党迎来“新的赶考之路”，意识形态话语既要为新时代十年“党和国家事业取得历史性成就、发生历史性变革”作出具有强大解释力的支撑，又要为实现“新时代新征程中国共产党的使命任务”提供强大引领力和凝聚力。这就需要意识形态话语在“讲政治”过程中把“政治的话语”转变为“话语的政治”，进而释放出强大凝聚力和动员力。

(1) Upholding the Political Mission through Value Discourse

（一）以价值话语高扬政治使命

The CPC is a Marxist political party with a lofty political mission. The loftiness of the mission is profoundly represented in ideological discourse, possessing extremely high visibility and resolution. Since the New Era, “original aspiration and founding mission” has become a signature discourse of the CPC. “Remain true to our original aspiration and keep our founding mission firmly in mind” and “seek happiness for the Chinese people and rejuvenation for the Chinese nation” are the “value ought” of the CPC in the New Era, responding both to the goals of struggle and clarifying “for whom” the struggle is waged. The value-form discourse represented by “original aspiration and founding mission,” on the one hand, emphasizes the inherent political genes of the CPC—that is, the CPC has never ceased its unremitting pursuit of realizing “the free and comprehensive development of the individual,” continuously fulfilling the values of a Marxist political party. On the other hand, it emphasizes the “future vision” of the CPC, profoundly embedding the internal connection between the “road to rejuvenation” and the “better life” within ideological discourse, providing the masses with “development expectations,” thereby shaping strong political cohesion.

中国共产党是具有崇高政治使命的马克思主义政党，使命的崇高性在意识形态话语中得到深刻表征，具有极高的能见度和分辨率。新时代以来，“初心使命”成为中国共产党人标识性话语，“不忘初心、牢记使命”“为中国人民谋幸福、为中华民族谋复兴”是中国共产党人在新时代的“价值应然”，既回应了奋斗的目标，又明确了“为了谁”而奋斗。以“初心使命”为代表的价值形态话语，一方面强调了中国共产党与生俱来的政治基因，即中国共产党人从未停止过对实现“人的自由全面发展”进行不懈追求，不断兑现马克思主义政党的价值观；另一方面强调了中国共产党的“未来愿景”，把“复兴之路”和“美好生活”内在联系深刻地展现在意识形态话语之中，为人民群众提供“发展预期”，进而凝塑强大政治凝聚力。

It must be emphasized that the value discourse of the CPC never “suspends” values; rather, in the process of releasing political cohesion, it continuously transforms the “ought” into the “is.” The report of the 20th National Congress of the CPC specifically emphasized “the missions and tasks of the CPC in the New Era and the new journey.” Here, “missions and tasks,” while emphasizing the CPC’s “mission” of rejuvenation, also clarifies how the “tasks” are to be realized—namely, comprehensively advancing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation through Chinese-path modernization. Similarly, while emphasizing “building a strong country,” the report of the 20th National Congress also emphasized the “two-step” strategic arrangement [2]2 两步走 (liǎng bù zǒu): “Two-step” strategic arrangement – refers to the plan to basically realize socialist modernization by 2035 and to build China into a great modern socialist country by the middle of the 21st century.; while expressing confidence in the ability to achieve the goal of rejuvenation, it also emphasized risks and challenges, clearly stating that “we must be prepared to make more arduous and strenuous efforts.” The clearer the political goal, the stronger the political cohesion. It is precisely in the process of the “mission” being continuously concretized into “tasks” that Party members, cadres, and the masses closely adhere to the “biggest politics,” forming a vivid practice of united struggle.

需要强调的是，中国共产党人的价值话语绝非把价值“悬置”，而是在释放政治凝聚力过程中不断使“应然”变成“实然”。党的二十大报告专门强调了“新时代新征程中国共产党的使命任务”。这里，“使命任务”在强调中国共产党复兴“使命”基础上还阐明了“任务”如何实现，即以中国式现代化全面推进中华民族伟大复兴。同理，二十大报告在强调“强国建设”时，还强调了“两步走”的战略安排；在强调有信心和能力实现复兴目标时，还强调了风险挑战，明确指出“必须准备付出更为艰巨、更为艰苦的努力”。政治目标越清晰，政治凝聚力就越强，正是在“使命”不断具体化为“任务”的过程中，党员干部和人民群众紧扣“最大的政治”，形成团结奋斗的生动实践。

(2) Clarifying the Political Direction through Theoretical Discourse

（二）以理论话语明确政治方向

From the political dimension, the theoretical discourse of the CPC is the most direct expression of ideology, uniting people through clear direction and goals to form the most powerful united struggle. For example, the theory of New Democracy provided a clear direction for the Chinese revolution, guiding us to ultimately achieve revolutionary victory; the theory of the essence of socialism and the theory of the primary stage of socialism provided basic guidelines for China’s reform and opening up, writing the Chinese miracle. The CPC in the New Era places even greater emphasis on “theoretical clarity to achieve political firmness,” and regards “arming the entire Party and educating the people with the Party’s innovative theories” as the primary political task, in order to clarify what flag to hold and what path to take in the New Era and the new journey, providing Party members and the masses with a “sense of direction” for Chinese-path modernization. Taking the study and implementation of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era as an example, the process of thematic education is a process of “arming the entire Party with the Party’s basic theories,” achieving unified thinking, unified will, and unified action through thematic education, in order to “better fulfill the missions and tasks of the Party in the New Era and the new journey.” In this process, the “identification” of the CPC with the Party’s innovative theories is, in essence, “political identification.” Under the premise of political identification, theoretical consciousness and confidence in the theory are continuously enhanced, and in practice, they are transformed into political resolve on the path of development, becoming “the greatest certainty, the greatest confidence, and the greatest guarantee in dealing with all uncertainties” in the context of changes unseen in a century.

从政治维度来看，中国共产党的理论话语是意识形态最直接的表达，以明确的方向目标凝聚人心，形成最有力的团结奋斗。如新民主主义论为中国革命提供明确方向，指导我们最终取得革命胜利；社会主义本质论、社会主义初级阶段论等为中国改革开放提供基本遵循，书写了中国奇迹。新时代的中国共产党更加强调“理论上清醒，政治上才能坚定”，并把“用党的创新理论武装全党、教育人民”视为首要政治任务，为的是在新时代新征程中明确举什么旗、走什么路，为党员群众提供中国式现代化的“方向感”。以学习贯彻习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想主题教育为例，主题教育的过程是“用党的基本理论武装全党”的过程，做到通过主题教育统一思想、统一意志、统一行动，为的是“要更好肩负起新时代新征程党的使命任务”。在这个过程中，中国共产党人对党的创新理论的“认同”，本质上是“政治认同”，在政治认同前提下理论自觉和理论自信不断提升，并在实践中转化为发展道路中的政治定力，成为我们在百年变局中“应对一切不确定性的最大确定性、最大底气、最大保证。”

It is worth noting that at present, the trend of mutual agitation between Marxist ideology and diverse social trends of thought is becoming more pronounced, and the “silent struggle” in the ideological field has intensified, becoming a major cause of the difficulty in forging ideological consensus. Reflected in theoretical discourse, it is not difficult to see that the Western-centrism presupposed behind Western neoliberalism, “constitutional democracy,” and historical nihilism often leads people into “either-or” “theoretical traps,” such as opposing the two historical periods before and after reform and opening up, or forcing a choice between “the Party is greater than the law or the law is greater than the Party,” or severing the dialectical unity of the CPC as both a ruling party and a revolutionary party, etc. The ideological motive behind these is to attack and negate the Party’s leadership, political system, and development path. Therefore, the ideological nature of theoretical discourse also means that we must clarify vague understandings through theoretical arming, strengthening the guiding power of ideology in the process of purifying the theory from the turbid.

值得注意的是，当前，马克思主义意识形态与多样化社会思潮相互激荡的趋势更加明显，意识形态领域的“无声较量”加剧，已成为凝聚思想共识之难的一个主因。体现在理论话语上，不难发现西方新自由主义、“宪政民主”、历史虚无主义背后预设的西方中心主义，往往把人带入“非此即彼”的“理论陷阱”中，如把改革开放前后两个历史时期对立，或是让人在“党大还是法大”中选其一，又或是割裂中国共产党执政党和革命党的辩证统一性等等，其意识形态动机是攻击和否定党的领导和政治制度、发展道路。因此，理论话语的意识形态性还意味着我们必须通过理论武装澄清模糊认识，在对理论的激浊扬清中强化意识形态的引领力。

(3) Ensuring Political Execution through Institutional Discourse

（三）以制度话语确保政治执行力

The CPC has always emphasized regulating action through institutions. The “institutional discourse” within the ideological perspective of the CPC in the New Era includes not only the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics but also clearly points to the intra-Party regulations system composed of the Party Constitution, norms, regulations, rules, measures, methods, and detailed rules, etc. It is “the spillover of the CPC’s institutional concepts in the New Era,” ensuring the effective transformation of CPC members’ values into action. As is well known, after the 18th National Congress of the CPC, the Eight-Point Regulations were introduced. Although the specific provisions of the Eight-Point Regulations, as intra-Party regulations, mainly target the Politburo, the “spirit of the Eight-Point Regulations,” as a signature institutional discourse of the New Era, was rapidly implemented and enforced throughout the Party, effectively regulating and constraining the entire Party. The “spirit of the Eight-Point Regulations,” as an institutional discourse, ensures “speaking politics with a clear stance” through the emphasis on rigid institutions. Its effectiveness lies precisely in its expression of strict institutional requirements, highlighting the political attributes and disciplinary constraints of the CPC.

中国共产党向来注重以制度规范行动。新时代中国共产党意识形态视阈中的“制度话语”，不仅包括中国特色社会主义制度体系，还鲜明地指向党章、准则、条例、规定、办法、规则、细则等构成的党内法规制度，是“新时代中国共产党制度观念的外溢”，确保共产党人价值观向行动的有效转化。众所周知，党的十八大后“八项规定”出台，虽然“八项规定”作为党内法规，其具体条文针对的主要是中央政治局，但是“八项规定精神”作为新时代一个标识性的制度话语，在全党迅速贯彻落实，对全党进行有效规范和约束。“八项规定精神”作为制度话语，通过对刚性制度的强调来确保“旗帜鲜明讲政治”，其有效性恰因为其表达的是严格的制度要求，凸显中国共产党的政治属性和纪律约束。

It should be pointed out that behind the Chinese Communist Party’s “institutional discourse” lies the rapid advancement of institutional Party governance, and the formation of the institutional discourse system stems from the continuous improvement of the Chinese Communist Party’s intra-Party regulations system. Since the New Era, our Party has successively formulated the *Outline of the Five-Year Plan for the Formulation of Central Intra-Party Regulations (2013–2017)*, the *Second Five-Year Plan for the Formulation of Central Intra-Party Regulations (2018–2022)*, and the *Outline of the Plan for the Formulation of Central Intra-Party Regulations (2023–2027)*, continuously guiding the construction of the intra-Party regulations system. Taking the specific intra-Party regulation, the *Regulations of the Chinese Communist Party on Disciplinary Sanctions*, as an example, since the 18th National Congress, our Party has revised it three times, and in the Party discipline learning and education campaign carried out across the entire Party this year, it has corrected thinking and action through the study and implementation of the *Regulations of the Chinese Communist Party on Disciplinary Sanctions*.[3]3 The 18th National Congress of the CPC was held in 2012. The Party discipline learning and education campaign referred to here was launched across the Party in 2024.

需要指出的是，中国共产党“制度话语”的背后是制度治党的迅速推进，制度话语体系的形成来自于中国共产党党内法规体系的不断完善。新时代以来我们党连续制定《中央党内法规制定工作五年规划纲要（2013—2017年）》《中央党内法规制定工作第二个五年规划（2018—2022年）》《中央党内法规制定工作规划纲要（2023—2027年）》，不断引领党内法规制度建设。以《中国共产党纪律处分条例》这个具体党内法规为例，十八大以来，我们党三次对其进行修订，并在今年全党开展的党纪学习教育中，通过学习贯彻《中国共产党纪律处分条例》校正思想和行动。

II. Narrative Dimension: Continuously Releasing Value Appeal Through “Storytelling”

二、叙事维度：在“讲故事”中不断释放价值吸引力

“Accelerating the construction of Chinese discourse and Chinese narrative systems, telling China’s stories well, and spreading China’s voice well” is a clear requirement of the report to the 20th National Congress of the CPC.[4]4 The 20th National Congress of the CPC was held in October 2022. The narrative system is an important component of the Chinese Communist Party’s ideological discourse system; it “mainly uses declarative language to narrate, presenting it according to the process of the evolution of events, like telling a story in a leisurely and detailed manner.” In the New Era, to systematically present the overall picture and unfolding process of China’s stories, it is necessary to clearly explain, within the practical path of “Party leadership—China’s governance,” how the goal of rejuvenation can be achieved, how modernization development is possible, how community governance is formed, and other issues, and to strive to transform the values and significance in the stories into the internal driving force for united struggle.

“加快构建中国话语和中国叙事体系，讲好中国故事、传播好中国声音”是党的二十大报告的明确要求。叙事体系是中国共产党意识形态话语体系中的重要构成，“主要是使用陈述性的语言来叙事，按照事物演进的过程加以呈现，犹如讲故事一样娓娓道来”。新时代，系统地呈现出中国故事的整体图景和展开过程，要在“党的领导—中国之治”实践进路中讲清楚复兴目标何以实现、现代化发展何以可能、共同体治理如何形成等问题，并着力将故事中的价值与意义转化为团结奋斗的内驱力。

(I) Highlighting the Rejuvenation Discourse in Goal Narratives

（一）在目标叙事中彰显复兴话语

The Chinese Communist Party’s rejuvenation narrative unfolds within a grand historical perspective. In historical narratives, achieving great rejuvenation has always been a clear “historical theme,” and Chinese Communists have continuously united and struggled along the “path to rejuvenation.” “Over the past hundred years, all the struggles, sacrifices, and creations made by the Chinese Communist Party uniting and leading the Chinese people can be summed up in one theme: achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”[5]5 This is a quotation from Xi Jinping’s speech at the ceremony marking the centenary of the CPC on July 1, 2021. This means that within the goal orientation of achieving rejuvenation, the Party and the masses have made tremendous efforts at every stage, and the struggles of each stage accumulate conditions for the next, from “lagging behind and being beaten” to “catching up and surpassing,” from standing up, becoming prosperous, to becoming strong, making the historical mission of great rejuvenation increasingly clear and firm. In the hundred-year history of struggle of the Chinese Communist Party, “unremitting struggle” is not merely an adjective but the concrete actions taken by generations of Chinese Communists to achieve the goal, such as the growing aerospace industry relying on the continuous struggle of several generations of aerospace workers; “fearless sacrifice” is also not an empty reference but the ethics of life and death faced by Chinese Communists in times of crisis (especially evident in the revolutionary stage). Fang Zhimin, in prison, made a firm choice between the “small self” and the “greater self,” and the *Lovely China* he envisioned has clearly become a “historical reality” in the rejuvenation narrative.[6]6 Fang Zhimin (1899–1935) was a CCP revolutionary leader executed by the Kuomintang. *Lovely China* is an essay he wrote in prison expressing his vision for a future prosperous China.

中国共产党的复兴叙事在大历史观中展开。在历史性叙事中，实现伟大复兴始终是清晰的“历史主题”，中国共产党人沿着“复兴之路”不断团结奋斗。“一百年来，中国共产党团结带领中国人民进行的一切奋斗、一切牺牲、一切创造，归结起来就是一个主题：实现中华民族伟大复兴。”这意味着在实现复兴这个目标定向中，党和人民群众在每一个阶段都付出了巨大努力，且每一个阶段的奋斗都在为下一个阶段积累条件，从“落后挨打”到“实现赶超”，从站起来、富起来再到强起来，使伟大复兴这个历史使命变得愈加清晰和坚定。在中国共产党的百年奋斗史中，“不懈奋斗”并非是形容词，而是一代又一代中国共产党人为实现目标付诸的具体行动，如航天事业日益壮大离不开几代航天人的接续奋斗；“不怕牺牲”也并非是虚指，而是中国共产党人在危难之际（在革命阶段尤为明显）所面临的生死伦理，狱中的方志敏在“小我”与“大我”中做出了坚定抉择，他畅想的《可爱的中国》显然已成为复兴叙事中的“历史现实”。

On the other hand, amidst the severe challenges of “high winds and choppy waters” and “turbulent waves” on the new journey of the New Era, the Chinese Communist Party has always maintained a sense of urgency, continuously seeking new answers to break out of the “historical cycle,”[7]7 The “historical cycle” refers to the pattern of dynastic rise and fall in Chinese history, a concept famously discussed by Mao Zedong and the historian Huang Yanpei. and constantly overcoming internal and external risks and challenges, “insisting on basing the development of the country and the nation on our own strength, and firmly grasping the destiny of China’s development and progress in our own hands.”[8]8 This is a paraphrase of a statement from the report to the 20th National Congress of the CPC. Behind the rejuvenation narrative and rejuvenation discourse lies the practice of rejuvenation, concentratedly manifested in the historic achievements and historic transformations of the New Era. This is the continuous fulfillment of the original aspiration and founding mission of Chinese Communists, releasing value appeal through the mutual verification of discourse and practice, maintaining historical patience and accumulating historical confidence in the process of continuously approaching the great cause of national rejuvenation.

从另一方面看，在新时代新征程上“风高浪急”和“惊涛骇浪”的严峻挑战中，中国共产党始终怀有忧患意识，不断寻找跳出“历史周期率”的新答案，不断克服内外风险挑战，“坚持把国家和民族发展放在自己力量的基点上，坚持把中国发展进步的命运牢牢掌握在自己手中”。复兴叙事和复兴话语背后是复兴实践，集中体现在新时代的历史性成就和历史性变革之中，这是中国共产党人初心使命的不断兑现，在话语和实践相互证成中释放价值吸引力，在不断接近民族复兴伟业的进程中保持历史耐心、积累历史自信。

(II) Emphasizing the People’s Discourse in Development Narratives

（二）在发展叙事中强调人民话语

The value appeal of China’s stories is built on powerful developmental facts. The rapid economic development and long-term social stability since reform and opening up, as well as the continuously rising international influence, constitute the foundation of the “development narrative.” Currently, the international environment is exceptionally complex, and the tasks of reform, development, and stability are exceptionally arduous. Why is achieving high-quality development still the “unshakable principle” on the new journey? Why do the new development concepts and the new development pattern continue to solidify consensus and rally people’s hearts? The reason lies in the clear people’s logic behind them.

中国故事的价值吸引力建立在强大的发展事实之上，改革开放以来经济快速发展和社会长期稳定，以及不断提升的国际影响力构成了“发展叙事”的基础。当前，国际环境异常复杂，改革发展稳定任务异常艰巨，在新征程上实现高质量发展为何仍是“硬道理”？新发展理念、新发展格局何以持续凝塑共识、凝聚人心？原因在于背后清晰的人民逻辑。

Taking the Chinese-path modernization narrative as an example, the report to the 20th National Congress of the CPC provides a concrete explanation of the five characteristics of Chinese-path modernization. Among these five characteristics, the highly concerned issues—the enormous scale of the population, common prosperity for all the people, the comprehensive enrichment of material things and the comprehensive development of people, harmony between humanity and nature, and a community with a shared future for mankind—have the people as a prominent “intersection” of discourse, clearly signifying the Chinese Communist Party’s adherence to a people-centered development philosophy. This fully demonstrates that the report to the 20th National Congress of the CPC emphasizes “continuously realizing development for the people, development relying on the people, and development achievements shared by the people, allowing the achievements of modernization to benefit all the people more and more fairly.” Putting the people first is the basic logic of the Chinese-path modernization narrative. Within this people’s logic, we can more deeply understand the dialectical unity of “promoting Chinese-path modernization is the biggest politics” and “popular support is the biggest politics.” It is precisely in this process that the people’s aspiration for a better life continuously shifts from “whether it exists or not” to “whether it is sufficient or not” and then to “whether it is good or not.” Therefore, promoting Chinese-path modernization aims to safeguard the people’s fundamental interests and improve their well-being. Behind the development consensus lies the direction of popular sentiment.

以中国式现代化叙事为例，党的二十大报告对中国式现代化的五个特征做了具体阐释，五个特征中所高度关切的人口规模巨大、全体人民共同富裕、物的全面丰富和人的全面发展、人与自然和谐共生、人类命运共同体，人民是显著的话语“交集”，鲜明表征着中国共产党坚持以人民为中心的发展思想。这充分说明党的二十大报告所强调的“不断实现发展为了人民、发展依靠人民、发展成果由人民共享，让现代化建设成果更多更公平惠及全体人民”人民至上是中国式现代化叙事的基本逻辑，在这条人民逻辑中我们就能更深刻理解“推进中国式现代化是最大的政治”和“民心是最大的政治”的辩证统一，恰是在这个过程中，人民群众对美好生活的向往不断从“有没有”到“多不多”再到“好不好”。因此，推进中国式现代化为的是维护人民根本利益、增进民生福祉，发展共识背后是民心所向。

From another perspective, precisely because Chinese-path modernization is a profound practice for seeking happiness for the Chinese people, this also means that in the Chinese-path modernization narrative, there are no outsiders, no bystanders; it requires the joint writing by all the people, accomplished by relying on strong united struggle. This is an inherent requirement of the Chinese-path modernization narrative. Taking the “common prosperity” narrative as an example, it is not merely a conclusive statement but also a processual statement (such as winning the battle against poverty, promoting the development of the western region in the New Era, etc.), requiring everyone in all walks of life to stand together, think together, and work together within the value field of Chinese-path modernization, relying on united struggle to achieve it. Especially in the current context of intertwined and overlapping difficulties and challenges, it is necessary to gather the mighty force of millions united as one to overcome difficulties together.

从另一个角度来看，正因为中国式现代化是为中国人民谋幸福的深刻实践，这也意味着在中国式现代化叙事中没有局外人、没有旁观者，需要全体人民共同书写，依靠强有力的团结奋斗来完成，这是中国式现代叙事的内在要求。以“共同富裕”叙事为例，其不单单是一个结论性叙述，还是一个过程性叙述（如打赢脱贫攻坚战、新时代推动西部大开发等），需要各行各业中的每个人在中国式现代化这个价值磁场中站在一起、想在一起、干在一起，依靠团结奋斗来实现，尤其是在困难挑战交织叠加的当前，要集聚起万众一心、共克时艰的磅礴力量。

(III) Highlighting the Community Discourse in Governance Narratives

（三）在治理叙事中突出共同体话语

In the governance philosophy of the Chinese Communist Party in the New Era, the shift from “management” to “governance” is particularly evident. Taking social governance as an example, governance emphasizes the status and role of various social entities in national and social affairs. In the process of social governance, the “community” discourse is highlighted. For instance, when emphasizing social governance, “co-construction, co-governance, and sharing” is stressed, requiring “the realization of a positive interaction between government governance, social regulation, and resident autonomy,” with the goal of “building a social governance community where everyone has responsibility, everyone fulfills their duty, and everyone enjoys the benefits.”[9]9 This phrasing is drawn from official documents on social governance, such as the report to the 19th National Congress of the CPC (2017). Some Western scholars use “risk society” to refer to the characteristics of modern society where contradictions and risks are more frequent, diffuse, and complex. China’s practice since reform and opening up has also proven that “the problems after development are no fewer than those before development.”[10]10 This is a well-known remark attributed to Deng Xiaoping. The governance “community” effectively responds to the “problem domain” in the risk society, that is, breaking away from the atomized individual state, creating a “community” to achieve a deep integration of social vitality and social order, realize the organic unity of emotion and reason, and establish a close connection between the “small family” and the “big family.” This is also an effective way to actively respond to the profound changes currently taking place in social concepts, social psychology, and social behavior.

在新时代中国共产党治国理政的执政理念中，从“管理”到“治理”的转变尤其明显。以社会治理为例，治理强调社会各类主体在国家和社会事务中的地位和作用，在社会治理过程中“共同体”话语得到凸显。如，在强调社会治理时，突出“共建共治共享”，要求“实现政府治理同社会调节、居民自治良性互动”，目标是“建设人人有责、人人尽责、人人享有的社会治理共同体”。有西方学者用“风险社会”来指称现代社会矛盾和风险更具多发性、扩散性和复杂性等特征，中国改革开放以来的实践也证明“发展起来以后的问题不比不发展时少”。治理“共同体”有效回应了风险社会中的“问题域”，即摆脱原子式个人状态，以打造“共同体”实现社会活力和社会秩序的深度融合，实现情理和法理的有机统一，实现“小家”与“大家”的紧密联系。这也是积极应对当前社会观念、社会心理、社会行为发生深刻变化的有效方式。

It is not difficult to discover that, in the community discourse of governance narratives, “grassroots society” has become an important concern of state governance, and “grassroots social governance” has also become the key to building a community. In this regard, the “Fengqiao Experience” [11]11 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, 1883 German edition preface. is able to continuously develop in the New Era and constantly write vivid stories of grassroots governance precisely because it has created a community governance that suits grassroots characteristics, namely “relying on the masses to resolve conflicts on the spot.” In the process of resolving grassroots conflicts, the integration of self-governance, rule of law, and rule of virtue, combined with Party leadership and the mass line, releases a powerful “governance synergy,” continuously activating and empowering the “community.” Therefore, in the governance narrative of the New Era and the new journey, small matters concerning the masses can often highlight the governance community to a greater extent, such as installing elevators in old residential communities or activating the night-time economy. Community discourse, as a distinct expression of Chinese governance, is also a continuation of the people’s logic; the community in practice is a high degree of unity between Party spirit and people’s character, between the Party’s heart and the people’s heart.

不难发现，在治理叙事的共同体话语中，“基层社会”成为治国理政的重要关切，“基层社会治理”也成为打造共同体的关键。就此而言，“枫桥经验”能够在新时代不断发展，并不断书写出基层治理的鲜活故事，恰在于其创造出了符合基层特点的共同体治理，即“依靠群众就地化解矛盾”。在化解基层矛盾过程中，自治法治德治相融，党的领导与群众路线相结合，释放出强大的“治理合力”，不断激活和赋能“共同体”。因此，新时代新征程的治理叙事中，群众小事往往能够更大程度凸显治理共同体，如老旧小区加装电梯、激活夜间经济等。共同体话语作为中国之治的鲜明表达，也是人民逻辑的延续，实践中的共同体是党性与人民性、党心与民心的高度统一。

III. The Dimension of Power: Achieving Ideological Guidance through the Deep Interaction of “Soft Power” and “Hard Power”

三、权力维度：在“软实力”和“硬实力”深层互动中实现思想引领

Firmly grasping the leadership, management, and discursive power over ideological work is an inherent requirement of constructing the ideological discourse system. Exploring the ideological discourse system from the dimension of power means stepping “outside discourse” to look at “discourse,” focusing on the era, strength, and practice, concerning itself with “ideological discursive power,” and discussing how to achieve ideological and value guidance through ideological discursive power. In this logic of power, soft power and hard power, along with their interactive relationship, become important factors in whether ideological power can be fully exerted.

牢牢掌握意识形态工作的领导权、管理权、话语权是意识形态话语体系建设的应有之义。在权力维度探讨意识形态话语体系，意味着跳出“话语”看“话语”，聚焦的是时代、实力与实践，关切的是“意识形态话语权”，探讨如何通过意识形态话语权实现思想和价值引领。在这条权力逻辑中，软实力与硬实力及其二者的互动关系就成为意识形态权力能否充分发挥的重要因素。

(1) Emphasizing the “Logic of Power” in Ideological Discourse

（一）重视意识形态话语的“权力逻辑”

The close relationship between discourse and power is no longer a new proposition. In Marx and Engels’ theory of ideology, the power of ideological discourse is more prominently manifested through ideological critique. The *Communist Manifesto* profoundly reveals the ideological hegemony of capitalism, that is, capitalism, through ideological expansion, makes itself the “universal light,” promotes “so-called civilization,” and turns “others” into “itself.” Moreover, Marx and Engels’ judgment of the “two inevitables” [12]12 Hou Huiqin, “The Ideological Attribute of Soft Power,” *Guangming Daily*, March 23, 2015. also illustrates the unavoidable tension between capitalist and socialist ideologies. If Marx and Engels explain ideological discursive power from the logic of “struggle” between two ideologies, then Lenin explains the importance of ideological discursive power more from the logic of “construction,” by elucidating the enormous role played by the ideology of the political party and the state.

话语与权力的密切关系已不是一个新命题，在马克思恩格斯的意识形态理论中，意识形态话语的权力通过意识形态批判而得到更大程度的彰显。《共产党宣言》深刻展现了资本主义的意识形态霸权，即资本主义通过意识形态扩张把自己作为“普照的光”，推行“所谓的文明”，把“别人”变成“自己”。不仅如此，马克思恩格斯“两个必然”的判断还说明了资本主义和社会主义意识形态之间不可避免的张力。如果说马克思恩格斯是从两种意识形态“斗争”的逻辑来说明意识形态话语权，那么列宁则更多是从“建设”的逻辑，通过阐释政党和国家意识形态所发挥出的巨大作用来说明意识形态话语权的重要性。

In the context of the Chinese Communist Party, both the logic of construction and the logic of struggle are clearly embodied in ideological discursive power. In the logic of construction, we adhere to Marxism’s guiding position in the ideological domain, which essentially requires that the Chinese Communist Party must realize Party management of ideology, Party management of media, and Party management of data; it must be able to disseminate the Party’s ideology well within the current complex media landscape, and continuously guide social thought with the Party’s ideology. In the logic of struggle, we must always maintain a clear and calm mind. On the one hand, we must strengthen cultural confidence and historical confidence, clearly seeing that Chinese-path modernization has broken the myth of “modernization = Westernization”; on the other hand, we must also be vigilant in times of peace, guard against subtle dangers, see the enormous risks and challenges facing the ideological domain, and prevent the weakening and hollowing out of ideological discursive power. In this regard, taking ideological discourse under Western-centrism as an example, whether it is using so-called “universal values” to quietly carry out ideological infiltration under the guise of “de-ideologization,” or using various versions such

在中国共产党语境下，无论是建设的逻辑，还是斗争的逻辑，都清晰地体现在意识形态话语权中。在建设逻辑中，我们坚持马克思主义在意识形态领域的指导地位，这就本质地要求中国共产党必须实现党管意识形态、党管媒体、党管数据，必须能够在当前复杂的媒体格局中传播好党的意识形态，不断用党的意识形态引导社会思潮。在斗争逻辑中，我们必须时刻保持头脑清醒冷静，一方面要坚定文化自信、历史自信，清醒地看到中国式现代化打破了“现代化=西方化”的迷思；一方面也要居安思危、防微杜渐，看到意识形态领域面临的巨大风险挑战，防止意识形态话语权的弱化和虚化。就此而言，以西方中心主义下的意识形态话语为例，无论是用所谓“普世价值”静悄悄地以“去意识形态”之名进行意识形态渗透，还是用“中国崩溃论”“中国威胁论”“定时炸弹论”等各种版本不断抹黑中国发展，其背后是意识形态之间权力的较量。故此，我们又经常将意识形态视为一种软实力。

(2) A profound recognition that hard power constitutes the “power foundation” of soft power

（二）深刻认识到硬实力是软实力的“权力基础”

From the perspective of power, stepping outside “discourse” to look at “discourse,” ideological discourse becomes a form of “soft power.” This then requires careful reflection and serious inquiry: if power is “soft,” how can it still form power and release power? Therefore, it must be recognized that the reason “soft power” forms “discourse power” is that it is in fact not soft; effective soft power is often supported by strong hard power behind it. In short, from the dimension of power, it can be seen more clearly that hard power constitutes the “power foundation” of soft power.

从权力视角跳出“话语”看“话语”，意识形态话语成为一种“软实力”。进而还需审慎思考和严肃追问的是，实力如果是“软”的，那么它还如何形成权力、释放权力？因此，必须看到“软实力”之所以形成“话语权”，是因为其事实上并不软，有效的软实力背后往往都有强大的硬实力做支撑。简而言之，在权力维度下能够更加清晰地看到硬实力构成了软实力的“权力基础”。

The 1883 German edition preface to the *Communist Manifesto* points out: “The economic production and the social structure necessarily resulting from it constitute the foundation of the political and intellectual history of each epoch.” [11]11 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, 1883 German edition preface. Therefore, if we acknowledge that ideological discourse as soft power contains politics, spirit, and history, we must see the hard power constituted by the economic and social development behind them. Hence we must clearly recognize that “soft power as superstructure cannot avoid being constrained by the economic base, political system, and national interests of a specific country, and cannot avoid possessing an ideological attribute.” [12]12 Hou Huiqin, “The Ideological Attribute of Soft Power,” *Guangming Daily*, March 23, 2015.

《共产党宣言》1883年德文版序言指出：“每一历史时代的经济生产以及必然由此产生的社会结构，是该时代政治的和精神的历史的基础。”因此，如果承认意识形态话语作为软实力蕴含着政治、精神和历史，那就必须看到它们背后的经济社会发展所构成的硬实力。因此我们必须清楚地看到“作为上层建筑的软实力，它不可能不受特定国家的经济基础、政治制度、国家利益制约，不可能不具有意识形态属性”。

Since the New Era, the report of the 18th National Congress of the CPC formally proposed the core socialist values, which have become the iconic expression of soft power, with their foundation of generation being the great achievements obtained in reform and opening up and socialist modernization. [13]13 The 18th National Congress of the CPC was held in 2012. The 19th National Congress Party Constitution formally wrote in confidence in the culture; from the “Three Confidences” to the “Four Confidences,” [14]14 The “Three Confidences” (confidence in the path, theory, and system) were expanded to the “Four Confidences” (adding confidence in the culture) at the 19th National Congress in 2017. one important “rationale” and “basis” is the all-round, pioneering achievements and deep-level, fundamental transformations obtained in the five years from the 18th to the 19th National Congress. The report of the 20th National Congress of the CPC clearly summarized the essential requirements of Chinese-path modernization, behind which it is inseparable from the historic achievements and historic transformations in the cause of the Party and the state in the ten years of the New Era. [15]15 The 20th National Congress of the CPC was held in 2022. This means that the cultural soft power formed since the New Era with the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation as its mission, and the powerful guiding force and cohesive force released by this soft power, are based on the solid developmental facts of China’s economy and society. Similarly, from the perspective of international discourse power, under the epochal proposition of telling the China story well, soft power is an effective combination of the narrative level, dissemination method, and value expression of the story, while hard power is the foundation for whether the “story” can be told well and whether it can be attractive. Taking the Three Global Initiatives as an example, [16]16 The Three Global Initiatives are the Global Development Initiative (2021), the Global Security Initiative (2022), and the Global Civilization Initiative (2023). one basis for understanding the Three Global Initiatives is that, compared with traditional Western governance models, Chinese-path modernization provides a more reasonable and effective new solution in addressing the current serious global governance deficit. Behind the Three Global Initiatives lies the effectiveness of China’s system and China’s governance, profoundly indicating: “China possesses the confidence to build economic strength based on Chinese-path modernization, the confidence to consolidate strong political will through the advantages of the social system, the confidence to deeply promote high-level institutional opening up, and the confidence to practice multilateralism and advance a new type of globalization.” [17]17 Wang Yi, “The Three Global Initiatives Are a Powerful Ideological Weapon for Responding to Changes Unseen in a Century,” *Qiushi*, 2024, no. 10. In short, hard power, through the “hard truth” of development, gives soft power value-based attractiveness; this is the basic logic by which “power” in soft power transforms into “authority,” and also the internal mechanism by which “discourse” becomes “discourse power.”

新时代以来，党的十八大报告正式提出社会主义核心价值观，社会主义核心价值观成为软实力的标识性表达，其生成基础是改革开放和社会主义现代化建设中取得的伟大成就。十九大党章正式写入文化自信，从“三个自信”到“四个自信”，一个重要“理”和“据”是十八大到十九大五年来取得的全方位、开创性的成就和深层次的、根本性的变革。党的二十大报告明确概括了中国式现代化的本质要求，背后离不开新时代十年党和国家事业取得历史性成就、发生历史性变革。这意味着，新时代以来所形成的以民族复兴为使命的文化软实力，以及软实力所释放出的强大引领力和凝聚力，其基础是中国经济社会坚实的发展事实。同样地，从国际话语权来看，在讲好中国故事这个时代命题下，软实力是故事的叙事水平、传播方式和价值表达的有效组合，硬实力则是“故事”能否讲好、能否具有吸引力的基础。以“三大全球倡议”为例，“三大全球倡议”的一个理解基础是，与西方传统治理模式相比，中国式现代化在解决当前严重的全球治理赤字问题中提供了更加合理有效的新方案。“三大全球倡议”背后是中国之制和中国之治的有效性，深刻表征出：“中国具有基于中国式现代化构筑经济实力的自信、以社会制度优势凝聚坚强政治意愿的自信、深入推进高水平制度型开放的自信，以及践行多边主义并推进新型全球化的自信。” 简而言之，硬实力通过发展这个“硬道理”使软实力具有价值上的吸引力，这是软实力中“实力”转变为“权力”的基本逻辑，亦是“话语”成为“话语权”的内在机理。

(3) Forging the ideological discourse system in the highly interactive relationship between soft power and hard power

（三）在软实力和硬实力的高度互动中打造意识形态话语体系

Since in the logic of power, ideological discourse uses “hard power” and “hard truths” as support to release “soft power,” then to effectively construct an ideological discourse system, it is necessary to consciously achieve the integration of hard power and soft power, enabling them to interact at a high level and empower each other in both directions. In fact, this is also an important aspect of the “systematization” of ideological discourse. Clearly, without the effective support of hard power, soft power loses its foundation, and the political logic and narrative logic within ideological discourse cannot be effectively unfolded. In this regard, the developmental fact that the Communist Party of China has led the Chinese people and the Chinese nation to “stand up, grow rich, and become strong” simultaneously constitutes the basis for “taking a clear-cut stand on politics” and “telling the China story well.” By the same token, if hard power lacks effective representation by soft power, it weakens the value-based cohesion of a political party and a state, and may even affect political security, just as the Soviet Union’s hard power did not save it from disintegration. To go further, “the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is not simply the growth of total economic output. The dignity of a country or a nation depends not only on its world GDP ranking. Today, the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation requires even more a reconstruction of the Chinese national spirit.” [18]18 The quotation is from an unspecified Chinese source, likely a scholar or official statement, emphasizing that national rejuvenation requires spiritual reconstruction beyond economic growth.

既然在权力逻辑中，意识形态话语以“硬实力”和“硬道理”做支撑释放“软实力”；那么，要想有效地建设意识形态话语体系，就必须有意识地实现硬实力和软实力的会通，使二者高度互动、双向赋能，事实上这也是意识形态话语“体系化”的一个重要方面。显然，没有硬实力的有效支撑，软实力就会失去底气，意识形态话语中的政治逻辑和叙事逻辑就无法有效展开，就此而言，中国共产党领导中国人民和中华民族实现“站起来、富起来、强起来”的发展事实，同时构成了“旗帜鲜明讲政治”和“讲好中国故事”的基础。同理，硬实力没有软实力的有效表征，则会削弱一个政党和国家价值上的凝聚力，甚至影响政治安全，正如苏联的硬实力并没有挽救苏联的解体。进而言之，“中华民族的复兴不是单纯经济总量的增长。国家或民族的尊严不仅取决于GDP的世界排名。今日中华民族的复兴，更需要的是一种中华民族精神的重建”。

Therefore, an inherent requirement for constructing the ideological discourse system is to attend simultaneously to the development of both hard power and soft power, and to strive to find “entry points” and “interfaces” in their effective interaction. Take the word “taikonaut,” which has been included in the Oxford Dictionary, as an example. “Taikonaut” is a blend formed from the Chinese pinyin for “space” (taikong) and the English word “astronaut,” meaning “Chinese astronaut.” Currently, more and more foreign media outlets are using “taikonauts” to refer to Chinese astronauts. As a new concept that bridges China and the international community, “taikonauts” enables us to tell the splendid story of China’s space program together with the world, and the support behind it is the fact of the vigorous and upward development of China’s space industry. Of course, it must be acknowledged that condensing discourse through the two-way interaction of soft power and hard power is no easy task. It requires precisely, scientifically, and reasonably grasping the rhythm of development and the timeliness, intensity, and effectiveness of publicity. It also requires attention to ideological risk prevention at important time nodes, so that the value endowment in soft power and the factual support in hard power achieve an organic coupling, enabling ideological discourse to exert its powerful efficacy through a combination of “hardness and softness.” [19]19 “Hardness and softness” (刚柔并济) is a Chinese idiom meaning a balanced combination of firmness and flexibility, often used in strategy or governance.

因此，意识形态话语体系的建设，一个内在要求是同时关照到硬实力和软实力的发展，并着力在二者的有效互动中找到“切口”和“接口”。以已被牛津词典收录的“taikonaut”一词为例，“taikonaut”是由中文“太空”的拼音和英语单词“astronaut”混成的拼缀词，意思是“Chinese astronaut”，当前越来越多的外媒开始使用“taikonauts”来称呼中国航天员。“taikonauts”作为一个融通中外的新概念，使得我们和国际社会一起讲出了精彩的中国航天故事，其背后的支撑则是中国航天事业蓬勃向上的发展事实。当然，必须承认的是，在软实力和硬实力的双向互动中凝塑话语并非易事，要精准、科学、合理地把握发展的节奏感和宣传的时度效，还要注重在重要时间节点上的意识形态风险防范，使软实力中的价值赋予和硬实力中的事实支撑实现有机耦合，在“刚柔并济”中发挥意识形态话语的强大功效。

Source: *Theoretical Perspectives*, September 6, 2024

文章来源：《理论视野》2024年9月6日

Online editor: Jing Mu

网络编辑：静穆