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Unofficial English translation by DeepSeek, a Chinese LLM · source marxism.cass.cn

How Mao Zedong Told the Long March Story

高晓波 巩乃鑫:毛泽东如何讲长征故事

· · Ideological & Political Education · "Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Theoretical Research" 2025, no. 1 · 42 min read

The report of the 20th National Congress of the CPC points out that it is necessary to “uphold the stance of Chinese culture, refine and display the spiritual symbols and cultural essence of Chinese civilization, accelerate the construction of Chinese discourse and Chinese narrative systems, tell China’s stories well, spread China’s voice well, and present a credible, lovable, and respectable image of China.” [1]1 The 20th National Congress of the CPC was held in October 2022. The quotation is from the congress report. This provides the fundamental guidance for telling China’s stories well in the New Era. Telling China’s stories well requires upholding fundamental principles and breaking new ground, refining the categories and concepts of Chinese discourse, spreading the Chinese spirit, and presenting Chinese civilization, so that the world can understand China. The Long March is a great epic of revolutionary heroism, and the “Long March story” is an important component of China’s stories. Xi Jinping points out: “The Red Army’s Long March was one of the most important events capable of influencing the world’s future in the 20th century; it is a human epic written with will and courage, full of ideals and the spirit of dedication.” [2]2 Xi Jinping’s remark on the Long March. Telling the Long March story can inspire revolutionary fighting spirit, transmit the revolutionary spirit, enhance national cohesion, and provide powerful spiritual momentum for socialist modernization to continuously advance from victory to victory.

党的二十大报告指出,要“坚守中华文化立场,提炼展示中华文明的精神标识和文化精髓,加快构建中国话语和中国叙事体系,讲好中国故事、传播好中国声音,展现可信、可爱、可敬的中国形象”。这为新时代讲好中国故事提供了根本遵循。讲好中国故事要守正创新,提炼中国话语的范畴、概念,传播中国精神,展现中华文明,让世界读懂中国。长征是一部伟大的革命英雄主义史诗,“长征故事”是中国故事的重要组成部分。习近平指出:“红军长征是20世纪最能影响世界前途的重要事件之一,是充满理想和献身精神、用意志和勇气谱写的人类史诗。”讲述长征故事,可激发革命斗志,传承革命精神,增强民族凝聚力,为社会主义现代化建设不断从胜利走向胜利提供强大精神动力。

Mao Zedong was a “three-person” (one who personally experienced, personally witnessed, and personally heard) of the Central Red Army’s Long March, as well as a teller of the Long March story and a disseminator and inheritor of the Long March spirit. Investigating how Mao Zedong told the Long March story is of great significance for constructing the Long March discourse system and innovating the narrative system of China’s stories. In recent years, academia has begun to focus on how Mao Zedong told China’s stories well, and on this basis, it is possible to conduct an in-depth investigation of the basic content of Mao Zedong’s telling of the Long March story. Existing research results emphasize verifying the historical facts of the Long March and exploring the inheritance and promotion of the Long March spirit, laying a good foundation for better constructing the discourse system of the Long March story and the theoretical methods of telling the Long March story. This, in turn, allows for a scholarly explanation of how Chinese Communists, mainly represented by Comrade Mao Zedong, Comrade Deng Xiaoping, and Comrade Xi Jinping, told the Long March story. The author believes that the study of Mao Zedong’s telling of the Long March story is based on existing Party documents, memoirs of important historical figures, local chronicles, and other historical materials. Following the logical thread of “why tell, what to tell, and how to tell,” it proposes the “three whats” of Mao Zedong’s telling of the Long March story: what was needed, what was written, and what was achieved, thereby comprehensively elucidating the historical context, core content, and main methods of Mao Zedong’s telling of the Long March story.

毛泽东是中央红军长征的“三亲者”(亲历者、亲见者、亲闻者),亦是长征故事的讲述者,长征精神的传播者、传承者。考述毛泽东如何讲长征故事,对于构建长征话语体系,创新中国故事叙事体系具有重要意义。近年来,学界开始关注毛泽东如何讲好中国故事,可在此基础上深入考察毛泽东讲长征故事的基本内容。现有研究成果注重考证长征史实、探讨传承弘扬长征精神,为更好构建长征故事话语体系、讲述长征故事的理论方法打下了良好基础,进而可以对以毛泽东同志、邓小平同志、习近平同志等为主要代表的中国共产党人讲长征故事加以学理阐释。笔者认为,毛泽东讲长征故事研究是以现有党的文献、重要历史人物回忆录、地方志等史料为基础,按“为什么讲、讲什么、如何讲”的逻辑思路,提出毛泽东讲长征故事的“三个何”:何以所需、何以成文、何以实现,进而全面阐明毛泽东讲长征故事的历史语境、核心内容和主要方法。

I. What Was Needed: The Historical Context of Mao Zedong’s Telling of the Long March Story

一、何以所需:毛泽东讲长征故事的历史语境

Mao Zedong’s telling of the Long March story had historical contexts with themes of revolution, governance, and construction, unfolding around specific issues in revolutionary struggle, Party building, and socialist construction.

毛泽东讲长征故事有革命、治理、建设主题的历史语境,围绕革命斗争、党的建设、社会主义建设过程中的具体问题展开。

(A) Telling the Long March Story in the Context of the New Democratic Revolution

(一)在新民主主义革命语境中讲长征故事

In the context of the New Democratic Revolution, Mao Zedong’s telling of the Long March story mainly focused on two major political issues: Was the Long March a victory or a defeat? How could the Long March spirit be used to unite all forces to establish an anti-Japanese national united front? The former was a theoretical issue, the latter a practical one.

在新民主主义革命语境中,毛泽东讲述长征故事主要集中于两个重大政治问题:长征胜利了还是失败了?如何用长征精神团结各方力量建立抗日民族统一战线?前者是一个理论问题,后者是一个实践问题。

After the Red Army’s Long March reached Yan’an, a negative argument emerged that the “Long March had failed.” Mao Zedong keenly perceived that whether the “Long March was a victory or a defeat” was not only about the military line but also concerned the future and destiny of the Party and the Red Army. Affirming the victory of the Long March meant affirming the Party’s ideological line of seeking truth from facts, while negating the Long March would prevent the Party from unifying its thinking and gaining a firm foothold in Yan’an. Facing the complex and volatile situation of revolutionary struggle, Mao Zedong comprehensively analyzed the Long March, made the major political judgment that the Long March had achieved victory, and criticized the erroneous argument of the “Long March’s defeat.”

红军长征到达延安后,出现了“长征失败”的消极论调,毛泽东敏锐发现,“长征胜利还是失败”不仅是讨论军事路线,还关系党和红军的前途与命运。肯定长征胜利即肯定党实事求是的思想路线,否定长征则使党无法统一思想,在延安站稳脚跟。面对复杂多变的革命斗争形势,毛泽东全面分析长征,作出长征取得胜利的重大政治判断,批判“长征失败”的错误论调。

On November 5, 1935, shortly after the Central Red Army had just arrived in northern Shaanxi, Mao Zedong revisited the Long March: “Counting from Ruijin, Jiangxi, we have walked for over a year. Each of us, using our own two feet, has walked 25,000 li. This is a Long March never seen before. The number of our Red Army soldiers is somewhat smaller than before, but those who remain are the essence of the revolution, all having undergone severe tempering and testing. The comrades who remain must not only be worth ten men each, but a hundred, a thousand.” [3]3 25,000 li is approximately 12,500 kilometers or about 7,800 miles. This was Mao Zedong’s first public affirmation of the Long March’s victory. In fact, when the Central Red Army set out from the Central Soviet Area in October 1934, it numbered 86,000 troops; by the time it entered northern Shaanxi in October 1935, only 6,000 troops remained. In late November 1935, after the Second and Sixth Army Groups left their base area, they only managed to break through the first Kuomintang military blockade line on the Yuan River. In mid-December of the same year, the Fourth Front Army retreated to the areas of Tianquan, Lushan, Baoxing, and Danba in Sichuan, confronting the enemy in a difficult situation. Meanwhile, the Kuomintang was mobilizing heavy forces to “encircle and suppress” the Shaanxi-Gansu base area. Facing the predicament of revolutionary struggle, pessimistic sentiments emerged within the revolutionary ranks, and Zhang Guotao [4]4 Zhang Guotao (1897–1979) was a founding member of the CPC who later broke with the Party and defected to the Kuomintang. went so far as to vigorously spread the argument that the “Central Red Army had failed, the Long March had failed.” To this end, on December 27, 1935, in a report titled “On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism,” Mao Zedong used the metaphor of a “frog at the bottom of a well” [5]5 “Frog at the bottom of a well” (井底之蛙) is a Chinese idiom for a person with a very narrow outlook. to criticize this argument, stating that the Red Army had only “suffered a temporary, partial defeat,” but in terms of completing the Long March plan, it was a victory. Mao Zedong affirmed: “The Long March ended with our victory and the enemy’s defeat.” When doubts about the Long March strategic decision and the harmful trend of the “Long March’s defeat” emerged within the Party, Mao Zedong promptly criticized them, nipping these erroneous arguments in the bud.

1935年11月5日,中央红军刚刚到达陕北,毛泽东重提长征:“从江西瑞金算起,我们走了一年多时间。我们每人开动两只脚,走了二万五千里。这是从来未有过的长征。我们红军的人数比以前是少了一些,但是留下来的是革命的精华,都是经过严峻锻炼与考验的。留下来的同志不仅要以一当十,而且要以一当百、当千。”这是毛泽东首次在公开场合肯定长征胜利。实际上,中央红军自1934年10月从中央苏区出发时8.6万人,到1935年10月进入陕北时部队只剩6000人。1935年11月下旬,红二六军团离开根据地后,仅突破沅江第一道国民党军事封锁线。同年12月中旬,红四方面军撤退至四川的天全、芦山、宝兴、丹巴地区与敌对峙,处境艰难。而国民党正调集重兵前来“围剿”陕甘根据地。面对革命斗争的窘境,革命队伍内部出现了悲观情绪,张国焘更是竭力散布“中央红军失败、长征失败”的论调。为此,1935年12月27日,毛泽东在题为《论反对日本帝国主义的策略》的报告中用“井底之蛙”寓意批判了这种论调,认为红军只是“遭遇了暂时的部分的失败”,但在完成长征计划方面来说是胜利了。毛泽东肯定地说:“长征是以我们胜利、敌人失败的结果而告结束。”在党内出现质疑长征战略决策和蔓延“长征失败”的不良思潮时,毛泽东及时进行批判,将这些错误论调扼杀在摇篮中。

Facing the accelerating pace of Japanese military aggression, Mao Zedong repeatedly told the Long March story on different occasions. During the Long March, the Chinese Communist Party held high the banner of resisting Japan and marching north. After the Long March victory, the Party consistently adhered to the proposition of a nationwide war of resistance. Facing national peril, Mao Zedong combined the Long March spirit with the resistance against Japan and national salvation, telling the Long March story to unite all forces in establishing a broad and solid anti-Japanese united front.

面对日本军事侵略步伐加快,毛泽东又在不同场合多次讲述长征故事。长征中,中国共产党高举北上抗日旗帜,长征胜利后,党始终坚持全民抗战的主张。面对民族危亡,毛泽东把长征精神与抗日救亡结合起来,讲述长征故事,团结各方力量建立广泛而牢固的抗日统一战线。

In the second half of 1935, Japan launched the “North China Autonomy Movement,” [6]6 The North China Autonomy Movement (1935) was a Japanese attempt to create a puppet regime in northern China. and the national crisis became increasingly severe. However, the Kuomintang adopted a policy of non-resistance, “making concessions to appease foreign aggression while stabilizing the domestic situation,” [7]7 “Making concessions to appease foreign aggression while stabilizing the domestic situation” (攘外必先安内) was Chiang Kai-shek’s policy of prioritizing the suppression of the Communists over resisting Japan. mobilizing heavy forces for “encirclement and suppression,” making it no easy task to establish a foothold in the northwestern base area. On November 5, 1935, Mao Zedong delivered a speech to the accompanying troops, pointing out: After the Long March, “the comrades who remain must not only be worth ten men each, but a hundred, a thousand. From now on, we must unite with the Red Army of northern Shaanxi and the people of northern Shaanxi, be models of unity, and jointly complete the great mission of the Chinese revolution, opening up a new phase of the Chinese revolution.” In 1937, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident [8]8 The Marco Polo Bridge Incident (July 7, 1937) is generally considered the start of the full-scale Second Sino-Japanese War. broke out. At the critical moment of survival for the Chinese nation, Mao Zedong and the CPC Central Committee issued a telegram to the whole country, calling on “all compatriots, the government, and the military of China to unite, build a solid Great Wall of the national united front, and resist the invasion of the Japanese aggressors!” He closely integrated the Long March spirit with the resistance against Japan and national salvation, calling on youth to join the war of resistance. In December 1939, he delivered a speech at a meeting in Yan’an commemorating the fourth anniversary of the December 9th Movement, [9]9 The December 9th Movement (1935) was a large student protest in Beiping (Beijing) against Japanese aggression and the Kuomintang’s policy of non-resistance. pointing out: “The Red Army comrades completed such a great Long March, and the student comrades in Beiping launched such a great national salvation movement. Both are struggles for the liberation of the nation and the liberation of the people, and their direct significance is to promote the War of Resistance Against Japan.”

1935年下半年,日本发动“华北自治运动”,民族危机日益严重,而国民党采取“攘外必先安内”的不抵抗政策,调集重兵前来“围剿”,立足于西北根据地并非易事。1935年11月5日,毛泽东向随行部队发表讲话,指出:长征后“留下来的同志不仅要以一当十,而且要以一当百、当千。今后,我们要和陕北红军、陕北人民团结一致,要做团结的模范,共同完成中国革命的伟大使命,开创中国革命新局面”。1937年,卢沟桥事变爆发。在中华民族处在生死存亡的关键时刻,毛泽东和中共中央通电全国,号召“全中国同胞,政府与军队,团结起来,筑成民族统一战线的坚固长城,抵抗日寇的侵掠!”他把长征精神与抗日救亡紧密结合起来,号召青年投身抗战。1939年12月,他在延安各界纪念一二·九运动四周年大会上发表演说,指出:“红军同志完成了这么伟大的长征,学生同志在北平发动了这样伟大的救亡运动,两者都是为解放民族和解放人民而斗争,其直接意义都是推动抗日战争。”

(B) Telling the Long March Story in the Context of Party Building

(二)在党的建设语境中讲长征故事

In the context of Party building, Mao Zedong mainly used the Long March story to warn and educate Party cadres to always maintain the fine style of modesty, prudence, freedom from arrogance and rashness, and hard struggle.

在党的建设语境中,毛泽东主要用长征故事警示教育党员干部要时刻保持谦虚谨慎、不骄不躁、艰苦奋斗的优良作风。

In 1949, when the War of Liberation led by the Chinese Communist Party was about to achieve nationwide victory, Mao Zedong discovered that within the Party, arrogance, complacency, and a craving for pleasure had arisen as a result of victory. He immediately reminded Party cadres and members not to forget the arduous spirit of the Long March. On March 5, 1949, at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Party, Mao Zedong put forward the important idea of the “Two Musts,”[10]10 The “Two Musts” refers to Mao Zedong’s call at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee in March 1949 that the whole Party must remain modest, prudent, and free from arrogance and rashness, and must preserve the style of arduous struggle. pointing out: “To win nationwide victory is only the first step in a long march of ten thousand li. Even if this step is worthy of pride, it is relatively petty; what is more worthy of pride still lies ahead… The Chinese revolution is great, but the road after the revolution will be longer, the work greater and more arduous.” On June 30 of the same year, in his article “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” Mao Zedong stated: “The work we have done in the past is only the first step in a long march of ten thousand li. The remnants of the enemy still await our elimination. The serious task of economic construction lies before us.” By telling the story of the Long March during the War of Liberation period, Mao Zedong timely reminded Party members to prevent the spread of arrogance and complacency, to avoid repeating the mistakes of history, and to ensure that the entire Party maintained a spirit of struggle and enterprise.

1949年,中国共产党领导的解放战争即将夺取全国胜利时,毛泽东发现党内因胜利而滋生了骄傲懈怠和贪图享乐情绪,随即提醒党员干部不要忘记艰苦卓绝的长征精神。1949年3月5日,毛泽东在党的七届二中全会上提出“两个务必”重要思想,指出:“夺取全国胜利,这只是万里长征走完了第一步。如果这一步也值得骄傲,那是比较渺小的,更值得骄傲的还在后头……中国的革命是伟大的,但革命以后的路程更长,工作更伟大,更艰苦。”同年6月30日,毛泽东在《论人民民主专政》一文中指出:“过去的工作只不过是像万里长征走完了第一步。残余的敌人尚待我们扫灭。严重的经济建设任务摆在我们面前。”毛泽东在解放战争时期讲述长征故事,及时提醒党员,防止骄傲和懈怠情绪滋生蔓延,避免重蹈历史覆辙,使全党继续保持奋斗进取的精神面貌。

After the founding of New China, Mao Zedong used the reasons for the Long March’s victory to constantly remind our Party to maintain its flesh-and-blood connection with the masses. On November 15, 1956, at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Party, he said: “On the Long March, crossing the grasslands, there were no houses at all, so we just slept… Sharing blessings and sharing hardships with the people—this is what we did in the past. Why can’t we do it now? As long as we do this, we will not become divorced from the masses.” He demanded that Party cadres and members not be wasteful, that they carry forward the spirit of hard work and plain living, and share hardships and joys with the masses. Mao Zedong also often reflected on the experiences and lessons of the Long March, believing that during the Long March period the Communist Party had committed serious “Left” dogmatist errors, deviating from the Marxist line of seeking truth from facts, and he warned Party cadres and members accordingly. In 1961, in a speech titled “Summing Up Experience and Educating Cadres,” Mao Zedong specifically mentioned that “the Long March of ten thousand li educated us,” and instructed Party cadres not to fear making mistakes, but to be good at summing up experience from both positive and negative aspects.

新中国成立后,毛泽东以长征取得胜利的原因时刻提醒我们党应该保持与人民群众的血肉联系。1956年11月15日,他在党的八届二中全会上说:“长征路上过草地,根本没有房子,就那么睡……同人民有福共享,有祸同当,这是我们过去干过的,为什么现在不能干呢?只要我们这样干了,就不会脱离群众。”他要求党员干部不能铺张浪费,要发扬艰苦朴素的精神,与人民群众同甘共苦。毛泽东还经常反思长征的经验教训,认为长征时期共产党犯了严重的“左”倾教条主义错误,背离实事求是马克思主义路线,并警示党员干部。1961年,毛泽东在题为《总结经验教育干部》的讲话中特别提及“万里长征教育了我们”,并指示党的干部不要怕犯错,要善于从正反两方面总结经验。

(III) Telling the Story of the Long March in the Context of Socialist Construction

(三)在社会主义建设语境中讲长征故事

Just after the founding of New China, it faced various difficulties and challenges, especially in military affairs where the gap with Western developed capitalist countries was very large. Many people lacked confidence in the cause of socialist construction and questioned the realization of national defense and military goals. Mao Zedong also regarded the arduous and lengthy cause of socialist construction as a great and firm new “Long March.” On June 26, 1966, Mao Zedong said to responsible comrades of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee and others: “Before, I led you on the Long March; now, I am going to lead you on another ‘Long March.’” Mao Zedong always maintained the clear-headed mind of a strategist and made precise judgments: socialist construction, like the Long March, is fraught with difficulties, but as long as the spirit of arduous struggle from the Long March is carried forward, success will be achieved. In October 1954, although national defense construction was struggling, Mao Zedong said with full confidence: “Looking at history, our goal of building the army can be achieved; our cause has hope.” He again used the analogy of the indomitable spirit of struggle in the Long March to show that difficulties could be overcome: “The 25,000-li Long March was no simple matter. Suppose we drill a hole through the earth right here and come out in the United States; that would be just over 12,500 kilometers.” During socialist construction, when some people felt helpless or fell into pessimism when encountering difficulties, Mao Zedong said: “The difficulties we face now are not very great. What’s so terrible about them! Compared to the Long March of ten thousand li, climbing snow mountains and crossing grasslands, it’s still a bit better… As long as we think of every possible way, difficulties can be resolved.” In 1962, when Deng Zihui reported to Mao Zedong on the difficulties in economic work at that time, he said: “Do you remember that the Red Army’s Long March started with 300,000 people and left only 28,000?”

新中国刚成立,面临各种困难与挑战,尤其在军事上与西方发达资本主义国家差距甚大,许多人对社会主义建设事业信心不足,并质疑国防军事目标的实现。毛泽东也认为艰难漫长的社会主义建设事业是伟大而坚定的新“长征”。1966年6月26日,毛泽东对湖南省委等负责人说:以前我带你们长征,现在,我又要带你们“长征”了。毛泽东时刻保持战略家清醒的头脑,作出精准判断:社会主义建设如长征一样困难重重,但只要发扬长征中艰苦奋斗精神,就会取得成功。1954年10月,尽管国家国防建设举步维艰,但毛泽东满怀信心地说:“从历史上看,我们的建军目标是能够达到的,我们的事业是有希望的。”他又用长征中锲而不舍的奋斗精神作类比,说明困难是可以战胜的,“二万五千里长征是不简单的,假定我们这里在地球上对钻一个洞,从美国钻出来,恰好是一万二千五百公里多一点”。在社会主义建设中,有些人遇到困难感觉束手无策或陷入悲观主义消极时,毛泽东讲:“我们现在遇到的困难不算很大,有什么了不起呀!比起万里长征,爬雪山过草地,总要好一点吧……只要想尽一切办法,困难是可以解决的。”1962年,当邓子恢向毛泽东反映当时经济工作中的困难时,他说:“你记得不记得,红军长征由原来的三十万人只留下二万八千人。”

The above themes outline the historical contexts in which Mao Zedong told the story of the Long March. In the context of the New Democratic Revolution, Mao Zedong skillfully used the Long March spirit to inspire fighting spirit, boost morale, and ignite hope for the revolutionary struggle. In the context of Party building, Mao Zedong summed up experiences and lessons to keep the Party always connected with the masses. In the context of socialist construction, Mao Zedong promoted the spirit of arduous struggle in the Long March, inspiring the people to fear no difficulties, to be enterprising, and to strive for the cause of socialist construction.

上述主题勾勒出毛泽东讲长征故事的历史语境。在新民主主义革命语境下,毛泽东善用长征精神,激发斗志、鼓足士气,为革命斗争点燃希望;在党的建设语境下,毛泽东总结经验教训,使党始终保持与人民群众的联系;在社会主义建设语境下,毛泽东宣扬长征中艰苦奋斗的精神,激励人民不畏困难,积极进取,为建设社会主义事业而奋斗。

II. How It Was Written: The Core Content of Mao Zedong’s Telling of the Long March Story

二、何以成文:毛泽东讲长征故事的核心内容

Taking the reasons for the Long March’s victory as his entry point, Mao Zedong drew many important historical conclusions in summing up historical experiences and lessons, which constitute the content of Mao Zedong’s telling of the Long March story. The author believes the core content mainly includes three aspects: first, upholding the Party’s leadership and the mass line—these are the basic experiences conveyed by the Long March story; second, the integration of the fundamental principles of Marxism with China’s specific realities—this is the theoretical framework expressed in the Long March story; third, the Long March spirit—this is the core value and soul of telling the Long March story. Mao Zedong wove a three-dimensional space for the Long March story with experience, theory, and spirit, forming the core content of the Long March story.

毛泽东以长征胜利的原因为切入点,在总结历史经验与教训中得出许多重要历史结论,构成毛泽东讲述长征故事的内容,笔者认为核心内容主要包括三方面:一是坚持党的领导、群众路线,这是长征故事传递的基本经验;二是马克思主义基本原理同中国具体实际相结合,这是长征故事表达的理论框架;三是长征精神,这是讲述长征故事的核心价值和灵魂。毛泽东用经验、理论、精神编织了长征故事的三维空间,构成了长征故事的核心内容。

(I) On Experience: Upholding the Party’s Leadership and the Mass Line

(一)讲经验:坚持党的领导和群众路线

When Mao Zedong discussed the basic experiences of the Long March, he mainly focused on two aspects: upholding the Party’s leadership and the mass line. Upholding the Party’s leadership during the Long March effectively ensured the scientificity and feasibility of decision-making, laid the foundation for maintaining the unity and cohesion of the revolutionary ranks, successfully completing the Long March, and opening a new phase for the Chinese revolution. At the same time, our Party adhered to the mass line, strictly observed discipline regarding the masses, protected the interests of the masses, formulated reasonable ethnic and religious policies, won the trust and support of the people, and consolidated the foothold for the strategic shift of the Long March.

毛泽东在讲述长征基本经验时,主要围绕坚持党的领导和群众路线两方面展开。长征中坚持党的领导,有效保证了决策的科学性与可行性,为维护革命队伍团结和统一,胜利完成长征,打开中国革命新局面奠定了基础。同时,我们党坚持群众路线,严守群众纪律,保护群众利益,制定合理的民族宗教政策,赢得民众信任与拥护,巩固了长征战略转移的落脚点。

First, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party must be upheld. When Mao Zedong told the story of the Long March, he was essentially telling the story of the Chinese Communist Party. Taking the reasons for the Long March’s victory as his entry point, he elucidated that the Chinese revolution cannot be separated from the correct leadership of the Party. After the Central Red Army arrived in northern Shaanxi, Mao Zedong pondered the reasons for the Long March’s victory and made a clear judgment. In December 1935, at a meeting of Party activists in Wayaobao, Mao Zedong explicitly pointed out: “Who made the Long March victorious? It was the Communist Party. Without the Communist Party, such a Long March would be inconceivable. The Chinese Communist Party, its leading organs, its cadres, and its members are not afraid of any hardship or difficulty.” In June 1936, when Edgar Snow arrived in northern Shaanxi to interview Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong again summarized the reasons for the Long March’s victory: “First, it was due to the correct leadership of the Communist Party; second, it was due to the great ability, courage, determination, and almost superhuman revolutionary enthusiasm of the basic cadres of the Soviet people.” When analyzing the various reasons for the Long March’s victory, Mao Zedong placed the Party’s leadership first. In 1936, after the three main forces of the Red Army successfully joined forces, Mao Zedong said: “When the Red Army crossed the grasslands during the Long March, they went fifty days without food, eating tree bark. Only the Communist Party could do this; others could not.” And what enabled the Communist Party to overcome all difficulties during the Long March was, most importantly, its adherence to the Marxist-Leninist faith. He once said: “The Chinese Communist Party has been, is, and will be loyal to Marxism-Leninism, and will continue to struggle against all opportunist tendencies. One of the reasons it is invincible and will surely achieve final victory lies in this determination.” By telling the story of the Party leading the Long March to victory, Mao Zedong arrived at the historical conclusion that the correct leadership of the Chinese Communist Party was an important reason for the Long March’s victory.

第一,要坚持中国共产党的领导。毛泽东讲述长征故事,实质上是在讲中国共产党的故事。他以长征胜利的原因为切入点,阐明中国革命离不开党的正确领导。中央红军到达陕北后,毛泽东就思考长征胜利的原因,做出明确判断。1935年12月,毛泽东在瓦窑堡党的活动分子会议上就明确指出:“谁使长征胜利的呢?是共产党。没有共产党,这样的长征是不可能设想的。中国共产党,它的领导机关,它的干部,它的党员,是不怕任何艰难困苦的。”1936年6月,埃德加·斯诺到达陕北采访毛泽东,毛泽东再次总结长征取得胜利的原因:“首先是由于共产党的正确领导,其次是由于苏维埃人民的基本干部的伟大的才能、勇气、决心以及几乎是超人的吃苦耐劳的革命热情。”毛泽东在分析长征胜利的各种原因时,把党的领导放在首位。1936年,红军三大主力胜利会师后,毛泽东说:“红军长征过草地的时候,有五十天没有饭吃,吃树皮,这只有共产党能做到,别人是做不到的。”而共产党能够在长征中战胜一切困难,最重要的是坚持马列主义信仰。他曾说:“中国共产党过去、现在、将来都忠于马列主义,并将继续进行斗争反对一切机会主义倾向。它之所以不可战胜,所以一定取得最后胜利,其原因之一就在于这种决心。”毛泽东通过讲述党领导长征取得胜利的故事,得出了中国共产党的正确领导是长征胜利重要原因的历史结论。

Second, we must adhere unswervingly to the mass line. Mao Zedong regarded the mass line of “for the people, unite the people, rely on the people” as an important experience of the Long March’s victory and repeatedly expounded on it in public settings. He believed that precisely because the Party earnestly implemented the mass line, sharing life and death, weal and woe with the people, it gained the broad support and assistance of the masses, and that in the future it must unite the people. In November 1935, Mao Zedong addressed the accompanying troops at Xiangbiziwan: “From now on, we must unite as one with the Shaanxi-Gansu Red Army and the people of Shaanxi and Gansu, be models of unity, and together fulfill the great mission of the Chinese revolution, opening up a new phase of the Chinese revolution.” [11]11 Xiangbiziwan: A location in present-day Shaanxi Province where Mao addressed troops after the Long March’s arrival in northern Shaanxi. After the founding of New China, in the course of building national defense and promoting the modernization of the military, Mao made the continuation of the close bond between the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army and the people—the “fish-and-water” relationship of fighting side by side—a focal point of army building, and mentioned that the army’s formation before the Long March was also for the people: “Our struggle represents the direction of the people. We were able to gather together guerrilla units, form corps and front armies, and later carry out the 25,000-li Long March.” [12]12 25,000-li Long March: The standard Chinese term for the Long March’s distance, approximately 12,500 kilometers. Using the relationship between the Party and the masses during the Long March, Mao Zedong warned Party cadres and members not to become detached from the masses. When many comrades within the Party proposed that factory directors and school principals could live in sheds, Mao affirmed this practice, pointing out: “When crossing the grasslands, we could live even without sheds; now that there are sheds, why can’t we live in them?” “Sharing blessings and sharing hardships with the people—this is something we did in the past; why can’t we do it now? As long as we act this way, we will not become detached from the masses.” Mao Zedong used the experience of the Long March’s victory to tell everyone: as long as we share weal and woe with the people, do not become detached from the masses, and rely on the masses, we can open up a new situation in the Chinese revolution and construction.

第二,要坚持群众路线不动摇。毛泽东把“为了人民、团结人民、依靠人民”的群众路线作为长征胜利的重要经验,在公开场合多次宣讲。他认为,正因为党认真贯彻落实群众路线,同人民群众生死相依、患难与共,才得到广大人民群众的支持和帮助,今后一定要团结人民。1935年11月,毛泽东在象鼻子湾对随行部队发表讲话:“今后,我们要和陕北红军、陕北人民团结一致,要作团结的模范,共同完成中国革命的伟大使命,开创中国革命新局面。”新中国成立后,毛泽东在建设国防推进军队现代化过程中,将延续工农红军与人民紧密相连、并肩战斗的军民鱼水情作为军队建设的重点,并提及长征前军队组建也是为了人民,“我们的斗争代表着人民的方向,我们能把游击队集合起来,成立了军团、方面军,以后又进行了二万五千里长征”。毛泽东以长征时期党和群众的关系,告诫党员干部不能脱离人民群众。党内许多同志提出厂长、校长可以住棚子,毛泽东肯定了这一做法,指出:“在过草地的时候,没有棚子都可以住,现在有棚子为什么不可以住?”“同人民有福共享,有祸同当,这是我们过去干过的,为什么现在不能干呢?只要我们这样干了,就不会脱离群众。”毛泽东以长征胜利的经验告诉大家:只要与人民同甘共苦,不脱离群众,依靠人民群众,就能开创中国革命和建设新局面。

(2) On theory: integrating the universal truth of Marxism with China’s concrete reality

(二)讲理论:把马克思主义普遍真理同中国具体实际结合起来

During the Long March period, our Party broke free from the shackles of “Left” dogmatism, corrected the subjectivist errors of separating the subjective from the objective and detaching knowledge from practice, promptly adjusted strategic direction, formulated revolutionary strategies suited to China’s concrete reality, independently resolved the existential crisis facing the revolution, and arrived at a universal truth: the need to integrate the basic principles of Marxism with China’s concrete reality. This includes the following three main aspects.

长征时期,我们党突破“左”倾教条主义束缚,纠正主观与客观相分离、认识与实践相脱节的主观主义错误,及时调整战略方向,制定适合中国具体实际的革命策略,独立自主解决革命面临的生存危机并得出一条普遍真理:要把马克思主义基本原理同中国具体实际结合起来,包括以下三方面主要内容。

First, the Zunyi Conference played a very important role in correcting “Left” opportunism and establishing the ideological line of seeking truth from facts, laying the foundation for explaining the principle of integrating the universal truth of Marxism with China’s concrete reality. [13]13 Zunyi Conference: A pivotal meeting of the CPC in January 1935 during the Long March, where Mao Zedong began to establish leadership and “Left” dogmatic errors were criticized. Mao Zedong believed that in the early stage of the Long March, the “Left” dogmatists turned from adventurism in attack to flightism in retreat, divorcing theory from reality, mechanically copying the Soviet experience, and violating the Marxist ideological line of seeking truth from facts, while the Zunyi Conference fundamentally corrected this erroneous thinking. In October 1938, Mao Zedong delivered a political report titled “On the New Stage” at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, pointing out: “The Zunyi Conference corrected the serious principled errors of a ‘Left’ opportunist nature committed in the struggle against the Fifth ‘Encirclement and Suppression,’ united the Party and the Red Army, and enabled the Party Central Committee and the main forces of the Red Army to successfully complete the Long March.” [14]14 Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee: A CPC Central Committee plenum held in September–November 1938 in Yan’an, which affirmed Mao’s leadership and the line of integrating Marxism with Chinese reality. In October 1939, Mao Zedong again pointed out in the “Foreword to *The Communist*”: “It was only after the Zunyi Conference that the Party thoroughly embarked on the path of Bolshevization.” [15]15 “Foreword to *The Communist*”: A 1939 article by Mao that summarized the Party’s historical experience, including the significance of the Zunyi Conference. By recounting the historical process of the Long March and elaborating on its important role in breaking through dogmatism within the Party, Mao Zedong laid the foundation for clarifying this principle.

第一,遵义会议在纠正“左”倾机会主义、确立实事求是思想路线方面起到非常重要的作用,为讲清马克思主义普遍真理同中国具体实际结合起来的原理奠定了基础。毛泽东认为,长征前期,“左”倾教条主义者从进攻中的冒险主义变成退却中的逃跑主义,理论脱离实际,照搬苏联经验,违背了马克思主义实事求是思想路线,而遵义会议从根本上纠正了这种错误思想。1938年10月,毛泽东在六届六中全会上发表题为《论新阶段》的政治报告,指出:“遵义会议纠正了在第五次反‘围剿’斗争中所犯的‘左’倾机会主义性质的严重的原则错误,团结了党和红军,使得党中央和红军主力胜利地完成了长征。”1939年10月,毛泽东在《〈共产党人〉发刊词》中再次指出:“只在到了遵义会议以后,党才彻底地走上了布尔什维克化的道路。”毛泽东讲述长征的历史过程,阐述长征在突破党内教条主义方面的重要作用,为讲清这条原理奠定了基础。

Second, the materialist view of matter is the philosophical basis for integrating Marxism with China’s concrete reality. Mao Zedong used the case of the Long March to interpret materialism: the Long March “these things are material things that exist objectively, independent of our consciousness; this is the basic viewpoint of all materialism, that is, the philosophical view of matter.” To better illustrate that matter is an objective existence independent of our consciousness, Mao Zedong also gave the following example: “Chinese people do not doubt the objective existence of the Japanese imperialism that is invading China and the Chinese people themselves; nor do the students of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University doubt the objective existence of this university and the students themselves.” [16]16 Anti-Japanese Military and Political University: A CPC military academy established in Yan’an in 1936 to train cadres for the war against Japan. By using the Long March to explain the philosophical view of matter, Mao Zedong further deepened the understanding of Party cadres and members regarding the principle of integrating Marxism with China’s concrete reality.

第二,唯物主义物质观是马克思主义同中国具体实际相结合的哲学基础。毛泽东讲用长征案例释读唯物论:长征“这些东西都是客观地离开我们意识而独立存在的物质的东西,这是一切唯物论的基本观点,也就是哲学的物质观”。为更好地论述物质是独立于我们意识之外的客观存在,毛泽东还举了以下案例,“中国人不怀疑侵略中国的日本帝国主义同中国人自己的客观存在;抗日军政大学的学生也不怀疑这个大学和学生自己的客观存在”。毛泽东借用长征讲哲学的物质观,进一步加深了党员干部对马克思主义同中国具体实际相结合原理的理解。

Third, Marxism is not dogmatism or empiricism; it must be integrated with China’s concrete reality. When the Long March had just ended and they arrived in Yan’an, thinking within the Party was not unified. The dogmatism of Marxist texts and the Russian revolutionary experience still existed. Mao Zedong proposed: based on the experience and lessons of the Long March, the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin should not be regarded as dogmas, “but should be regarded as a guide to action.” “To talk about Marxism apart from China’s characteristics is merely abstract, empty Marxism.” Mao Zedong also emphasized: “Marx and Lenin both said that their theories are merely a guide to action, a direction indicator, and cannot be treated as dogmas. But some of our comrades simply did not understand this point; later they suffered losses and hardships before they understood.” [17]17 “Guide to action”: A standard Leninist formulation distinguishing Marxism from dogmatic interpretation, frequently cited by Mao. Among these, “suffered losses and hardships” refers to the revolutionary practice during the Long March. Mao Zedong again used the story of the Long March to clarify the historical necessity of integrating Marxism with China’s concrete reality.

第三,马克思主义不是教条主义、经验主义,要同中国具体实际结合起来。长征结束刚到延安时,党内思想并不统一。马克思主义的本本、俄国革命经验的教条主义仍然存在。毛泽东提出:基于长征的经验和教训,不应当把马克思、恩格斯、列宁、斯大林的理论当作教条看待,“而应当看作行动的指南”“离开中国特点来谈马克思主义,只是抽象的空洞的马克思主义”。毛泽东还强调:“马克思和列宁都曾说过,他们的理论仅仅是行动的指南,是指导方向的,不能当作教条。但我们有些同志就是不懂得这一点,后来受了损失,吃了苦头,才明白了。”其中“受了损失,吃了苦头”,是指长征过程的革命实践。毛泽东仍借用长征故事,讲清楚了马克思主义同中国具体实际结合的历史必然性。

Mao Zedong emphasized: “The universal truth of Marxism-Leninism should be believed, but it must be integrated with the actual conditions of the Chinese revolution. Later, once it was integrated, it worked, and we won battles.” Among these, “once it was integrated, it worked, and we won battles” refers to the fact that after the Zunyi Conference, strategic decisions suited to China’s actual conditions were formulated, and only then did the Long March achieve victory. In July 1941, the Yan’an Marxist-Leninist Institute was renamed the Marxist-Leninist Research Institute. Mao Zedong personally came to guide and delivered a report, pointing out: “The universal truth of Marxism-Leninism must be integrated with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution in order to advance the revolutionary cause.” [18]18 Yan’an Marxist-Leninist Institute: A CPC research and training institution established in 1938, later reorganized as the Marxist-Leninist Research Institute in 1941. Clarifying the principle is not the end; the real point lies in its application. While exploring a socialist construction path suited to China, Mao Zedong again emphasized the correctness of integrating the universal truth of Marxism with Chinese practice. In September 1963, when meeting with foreign guests, he said: “The dogmatists said that everything in the Soviet Union was correct and did not integrate the Soviet experience with China’s actual conditions. The slogan ‘integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of China’ was proposed during the Yan’an Rectification Movement. This slogan was written into the 1957 Moscow Declaration, which stated that the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism must be integrated with the concrete practice of each country. Foreign experience, no matter which country it comes from, can only serve as a reference.” [19]19 1957 Moscow Declaration: A joint statement issued by communist and workers’ parties at a Moscow conference in 1957, affirming the principle of integrating Marxism-Leninism with national conditions.

毛泽东强调:“马列主义的普遍真理是应该相信的,但是要同中国革命的实际情况相结合。后来一结合就灵了,就打胜仗了。”其中“后来一结合就灵了,就打胜仗了”,是指遵义会议后制定出适合中国实际的战略决策,长征才取得了胜利。1941年7月,延安的马列学院改为马列研究院,毛泽东亲临指导并发表报告,指出:“马克思列宁主义的普遍真理必须和中国革命的具体实践结合起来,才能将革命事业推向前进。”讲清原理不是目的,实际在于应用。在探索适合中国的社会主义建设道路时,毛泽东再次强调把马克思主义普遍真理同中国实践相结合的正确性。1963年9月,他在会见外宾时说:“教条主义者说苏联一切都对,不把苏联的经验同中国的实际相结合。马列主义普遍真理与中国具体实践相结合,这个口号就是在延安整风时提出的。这个口号写进了1957年莫斯科宣言,那里面说马列主义普遍真理要与各国的具体实践相结合。外国经验,不管是哪一个国家的,只能供参考。”

(3) On spirit: the revolutionary optimism of fearing neither hardship nor difficulty

(三)讲精神:不怕吃苦、不惧艰难的革命乐观主义精神

Mao Zedong was the creator, practitioner, and also the disseminator of the Long March spirit. Although he did not directly use the concept of “Long March spirit,” he provided historical material for refining and elevating it. On December 27, 1935, at the Wayaobu meeting of Party activists, Mao Zedong put forward the statement that “the Long March is a manifesto, the Long March is a propaganda team, the Long March is a seeding machine,” which is regarded as his earliest exposition of the Long March spirit. [20]20 Wayaobu meeting: A CPC meeting in December 1935 in Wayaobu, northern Shaanxi, which formulated the strategy of the anti-Japanese national united front. By interpreting Mao Zedong’s poems, reports, and essays on the Long March, it can be seen that his understanding of the Long March spirit was not limited to abstract expression but had concrete connotations, with revolutionary optimism being the soul of the Long March story as told by Mao Zedong.

毛泽东是长征精神的创造者、践行者,也是传播者。他虽然没有直接使用“长征精神”的概念,但为提炼和升华长征精神提供了历史素材。1935年12月27日,毛泽东在瓦窑堡党的活动分子会议上提出的“长征是宣言书,长征是宣传队,长征是播种机”,被认为是他对长征精神的最早阐释。通过解读毛泽东关于长征的诗词、报告、文论可以看出,他对长征精神的理解并非局限于抽象表达,而是有着具体内涵,革命乐观主义精神是毛泽东所讲长征故事的灵魂。

Mao Zedong’s telling of the Long March spirit ran through all major historical periods. On 19 October 1935, when the Central Red Army reached Wuqi Town in northern Shaanxi, Mao composed the poem “The Long March” (七律·长征), in which the lines “The Red Army fears not the trials of the distant march; / To them a thousand mountains, ten thousand rivers are nothing. / The Five Ridges wind like gentle ripples; / And the majestic Wumeng roll by like mud pellets” used poetry to narrate the Red Army’s revolutionary optimism in taking pleasure in hardship. In December 1935, when discussing the great significance of the Red Army’s Long March, Mao clearly stated: “The Red Army are heroes and good men.” This phrase became widely circulated and was a vivid, popular expression of the Red Army’s firm ideals and convictions, its willingness to die for life, and its spirit of being tempered into steel. In May 1939, at the Model Youth Awards Conference held by the Northwest Youth National Salvation Association, Mao said: “Only when Communist Party members have the style of arduous struggle can they endure hunger and cold to fight Japanese imperialism.”

毛泽东讲长征精神贯穿各个重要历史时期。1935年10月19日,中央红军到达陕北吴起镇,毛泽东作《七律·长征》,其中“红军不怕远征难,万水千山只等闲。五岭逶迤腾细浪,乌蒙磅礴走泥丸”,就用诗词讲述红军乐于吃苦的革命乐观主义精神。1935年12月,毛泽东在谈到红军长征伟大意义时,明确指出:“红军是英雄好汉。”这句话广为流传,是对红军坚定理想信念、向生而死、淬炼成钢精神通俗形象的表达。1939年5月,毛泽东在西北青年救国会举行的模范青年授奖大会上说:“共产党员有艰苦奋斗的作风,才能忍饥挨饿去打日本帝国主义。”

After the founding of New China, with a hundred things waiting to be done and facing severe tests in military, economic, and international relations, in order to consolidate the fruits of revolutionary victory, tide over difficulties, and meet challenges, Mao repeatedly narrated the revolutionary spirit of fearing no difficulties during the Long March. In October 1954, Mao set the goal of building a powerful revolutionary army. However, at that time China’s military equipment was backward, and catching up with world advanced levels inevitably lacked confidence. He used the Long March spirit of fearing no difficulties to inspire morale, affirming that the goal of building the army could certainly be achieved. When difficulties abounded in the process of socialist construction and people fell into negativity and pessimism, the Long March spirit of fearing no difficulties had to be carried forward. In November 1956, at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC, Mao admonished the entire Party to build the country through diligence and frugality, to be hardworking and plain-living, and not to be wasteful. Mao demanded that the revolutionary spirit of fearing no hardships and no sacrifice in the Long March be carried forward to overcome difficulties. He said: “On our Long March road crossing the grasslands, there were no houses at all, we just slept like that. Commander Zhu [De] walked for forty days on the grasslands, also sleeping like that, and we all got through. Our troops, when there was no grain, ate tree bark and leaves.” Mao believed that only by carrying forward the Long March spirit of fearing no hardship could we overcome the difficulties and obstacles on the road ahead. In January 1957, at a conference of secretaries of provincial, municipal, and autonomous region Party committees, Mao said: Compared to the ten-thousand-li Long March, climbing snow mountains and crossing grasslands, what are my difficulties?

新中国成立后,百废待兴,面临军事、经济、国际关系等方面严峻考验,为巩固革命胜利成果,渡过难关、应对挑战,毛泽东多次讲述长征中不怕困难的革命精神。1954年10月,毛泽东提出建设一支强大的革命军队的目标。然而,当时中国军队武器装备落后,要追赶世界先进水平,难免缺乏信心。他以不怕困难的长征精神鼓舞斗志,确定建军目标一定能够实现。社会主义建设过程中困难重重,陷入消极和悲观时,要发扬长征不怕困难的精神。1956年11月,在中国共产党八届二中全会上,毛泽东告诫全党要勤俭建国,艰苦朴素,不能铺张浪费。毛泽东要求发扬长征中的不畏艰险、不怕牺牲的革命精神,攻坚克难。他说:“我们长征路上过草地,根本没有房子,就那么睡,朱总司令走了四十天草地,也是那么睡,都过来了。我们的部队,没有粮食,就吃树皮、树叶。”毛泽东认为要弘扬长征不怕苦的精神,才能战胜前进中的艰难险阻。1957年1月,毛泽东在省市自治区党委书记会议上说比起万里长征,爬雪山过草地,我的困难又算什么?

In fact, the specific content of the Long March stories Mao told was very broad, but the core content mainly included three aspects: spirit, theory, and experience. From the perspective of the context in which the story content emerged, telling about spirit was to boost morale, telling about theory was to guide practice, and telling about experience was to warn the present.

实际上,毛泽东讲述的长征故事具体内容十分广泛,但核心内容主要包括精神、理论、经验三方面。从故事内容出场语境来看,讲精神是鼓舞士气,讲理论在于指导实践,讲经验以警示当下。

III. How It Was Achieved: The Methodological Deduction of Mao Zedong’s Telling of the Long March Story

三、何以实现:毛泽东讲长征故事的方法演绎

Based on the basic historical facts of the Long March, Mao adopted different narrative methods, continuously innovated the subject, object, genre, and method of telling the story, integrated the story’s occurrence with the context of its telling, and used rich emotion to vividly narrate the figures and events of the Long March, spreading and promoting the Long March spirit. From the basic pattern of the methodological deduction of Mao’s telling of the Long March story, it unfolded according to the internal logic of “who tells” (subject), “told to whom” (object), and “how to tell” (genre or method).

毛泽东立足长征基本史实,采取不同叙事方法,不断创新故事主体、客体、文体及讲述方法,将故事发生与讲述背景融为一体,用丰富的情感生动讲述长征人物、事件,传播、弘扬长征精神。从毛泽东讲长征故事方法演绎的基本规律看,是按照“谁来讲”(主体)、“讲给谁”(客体)、“怎样讲”(文体或方法)的内在逻辑展开的。

(1) Subject: Combining “Self-Narration” and “Other-Narration”

(一)主体:“自述”与“他述”结合

Mao was a “three-proximity person” [21]21 “Three-proximity person” (三亲者) refers to someone who was personally present, personally involved, and personally witnessed an event. of the Long March and also its main leader. In order to tell the Long March story well, he did not confine the subject of storytelling to himself, but combined “telling oneself” with “others telling.” “Telling oneself” was the subject’s self-narration, preserving a sense of firsthand experience and authenticity, adding a three-dimensional feel to the Long March story. “Others telling” was the subject’s narration by others, further enriching the content of the Long March story through others and strengthening the dissemination of the Long March spirit.

毛泽东是长征的“三亲者”,又是长征的主要领导者,为能够讲好长征故事,他并未把讲故事的主体局限于自身,而是把“自己讲”与“别人讲”结合起来。“自己讲”是主体自述,保留亲历感和真实度,增加了长征故事立体感。“别人讲”是主体他述,通过他者进一步丰富长征故事的内容,加强长征精神的传播力。

First, “telling oneself” was mainly reflected in two aspects: one was on-site narration. At important occasions or meetings such as at Xiangbizi Bay in November 1935, at the Central Committee’s meeting of cadres at and above the regimental level in 1936, at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee in November 1956, at the conference of secretaries of provincial, municipal, and autonomous region Party committees in 1957, and when meeting the Palestinian Liberation Organization delegation in 1965, Mao narrated the Long March story on-site. The second was narration through writings. Many of Mao’s written works discussed the Long March. For example, in his “On Contradiction” (矛盾论), he wrote: “At certain times in revolutionary struggle, the conditions of difficulty outweigh those of smoothness. At such times, difficulty is the principal aspect of the contradiction, and smoothness is the secondary aspect. However, through the efforts of the revolutionary party, it is possible to gradually overcome difficulties and open up a new situation of smoothness, so that the situation of difficulty gives way to one of smoothness. This was the case after the failure of the Chinese revolution in 1927, and it was also the case during the Chinese Red Army’s Long March.” Mao used the Long March as a case to interpret abstruse philosophy, vividly illustrating the philosophical law of the unity of opposites. In fact, on-site narration and written narration were not separate; they often underwent a transformation of time and space. For instance, when teaching at the Military and Political University, Mao used his own “On Contradiction,” turning “written narration” into “on-site narration.” In December 1936, Mao delivered a report titled “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War” (中国革命战争的战略问题) at the Red Army University, mentioning the Long March six times; it was later included in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, achieving a transformation of time and space from “on-site narration” to “written narration.”

第一,“自己讲”主要体现在两方面:一是现场讲述。在1935年11月象鼻子湾、1936年中共中央召开的团以上干部会议上、1956年11月中国共产党八届二中全会上、1957年省市自治区党委书记会议上、1965年在会见巴勒斯坦解放组织代表团时等重要场合或会议上,毛泽东都现场讲述过长征故事。二是著述讲述。毛泽东撰写的许多著作都论及长征。如他在《矛盾论》中写道:“革命斗争中的某些时候,困难条件超过顺利条件,在这种时候,困难是矛盾的主要方面,顺利是其次要方面。然而由于革命党人的努力,能够逐步地克服困难,开展顺利的新局面,困难的局面让位于顺利的局面。一九二七年中国革命失败后的情形,中国红军在长征中的情形,都是如此。”毛泽东把长征作为解读晦涩哲学的案例,形象说明对立统一哲学规律。实际上,现场讲述与著述讲述并不割裂,经常会实现时空转化。如毛泽东在军政大学上课时用自己撰写的《矛盾论》,即把“著述讲”变成“现场讲”。1936年12月,毛泽东在红军大学作题为《中国革命战争的战略问题》的报告,其中6次提到长征,后来收录于《毛泽东选集》,实现了“现场讲”到“著述讲”的时空转化。

Second, “others telling” was mainly reflected in two aspects: one was through foreign writings reflecting how Mao told the Long March story. The most typical example here was Edgar Snow’s Red Star Over China (西行漫记), which recorded in detail Snow’s many conversations with Mao in 1936 about the Long March story. Also, Harrison Evans Salisbury’s The Long March: The Untold Story (长征——前所未闻的故事) recorded that during the Long March “the Chinese began to unite around Mao Zedong, forming a front against the German advisor sent by the Communist International.” Both used the written form to express how Mao told the Long March story. The second was writings by Long March Red Army soldiers reflecting how Mao told the Long March story. Xiao Feng’s Long March Diary (长征日记) recorded many of Mao’s oral accounts of his experiences accompanying the Long March. For example, Mao’s political report at Hadapu encouraged the Red Army soldiers: “Everyone need not be pessimistic; we are now more numerous than when the Fourth Red Army descended from Jinggangshan in early 1929! Victory belongs to us.” He also explained the policy orientation and disciplinary requirements under the current conditions: “Now that we are operating in White areas, we still mainly target local tyrants and eat from the landlords; we must not encroach on the interests of workers and peasants.” Chen Changfeng’s oral account Following Chairman Mao on the Long March (跟随毛主席长征) showed Mao’s story on the Long March road. Through others’ narration, Mao was integrated with the Long March story, and the image of Mao as a figure in the Long March became more three-dimensional and vivid. For instance, Following Chairman Mao on the Long March recorded: When Mao’s bedding, clothes, and other luggage were carried on a horse, and the soldier Old Yu led the horse across a bridge, the horse was startled, causing a traffic jam on the bridge. Mao promptly stopped this and let the Red Army soldiers cross the bridge first, earnestly teaching his guards: “Remember, no matter when, we must think of the troops, think of everyone! Just think, for the sake of one horse of ours, we delayed so many comrades in their march—how bad that is!”

第二,“别人讲”主要表现在两方面:一是通过国外著述反映毛泽东如何讲述长征故事。这方面最典型的是埃德加·斯诺的《西行漫记》,该书详尽记录了斯诺在1936年同毛泽东关于长征故事的许多谈话。还有哈里森·埃文斯·索尔兹伯里的《长征——前所未闻的故事》也记载:长征中“中国人开始团结在毛泽东的周围,形成反对共产国际派来的德国顾问的阵线”。两者都用著述方式表达了毛泽东是如何讲长征故事的。二是长征红军战士的著述反映毛泽东怎样讲长征故事。萧锋《长征日记》记述的长征随行见闻,有许多都是毛泽东的口述记录。如毛泽东在哈达铺作政治报告,激励红军战士们:“大家用不着悲观,我们现在比一九二九年初红四军下井冈山时的人数还多哩!胜利是属于我们的。”他还交代了当前条件下的政策导向和纪律要求:“现在到白区行动,仍然以打土豪为主,吃地主的,不能侵占工农的利益。”陈昌奉口述的《跟随毛主席长征》,展示了毛泽东在长征路上的故事。通过他人讲述,把毛泽东与长征故事融为一体,也使毛泽东的长征人物形象更加立体鲜活。如《跟随毛主席长征》记载:毛泽东的被褥衣服等行李驮在马背上,战士老余牵马过桥时马受惊吓导致桥拥堵,对此毛泽东及时阻止并让红军战士们先行过桥,并语重心长教导警卫员们:“要记住,无论什么时候,我们要想到部队,想到大家!你们想,为了我们一匹马,误了那么多同志行军,该多不好呀!”

(2) Object: Full Coverage of “Party, Government, Military, Civilians, and Students”

(二)客体:“党政军民学”全覆盖

The objects or targets of Mao’s telling of the Long March story were not only Party, government, and military cadres, but also ordinary soldiers, the masses, students, and other groups. The objects of narration, i.e., the targets, showed the pluralistic characteristic of full coverage of “Party, government, military, civilians, and students.” In addition, he adjusted the content and methods in a timely manner according to different targets, shifting the object from domestic to international.

毛泽东讲述长征故事的客体或对象,并不仅是党政军干部,还面向一般士兵、群众、学生等群体,讲述对象即客体呈现出“党政军民学”全覆盖的多元性特征。另外,他还针对不同讲述对象,及时调整内容与方法,将客体对象从国内转向国际。

First, targeting students. Here “students” specifically referred to those studying in schools; they might have multiple identities, such as students at the Military and Political University who were mostly senior commanders. When targeting students, using the Long March as an analogy helped narrate profound and abstruse materialism and dialectics. For example, during the Yan’an period, when Mao served as a teacher at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, he personally taught classes to students, during which he mentioned the Long March many times. When Mao was a teacher at the school, most of the content he taught to students was philosophy courses. For instance, when teaching the course on dialectical materialism to students, he said: “The Red Army, which has gone through the ten-thousand-li Long March, does not doubt the objective existence of the regions it passed through, including the great rivers, snow mountains, grasslands, and the enemy troops it fought, nor does it doubt its own objective existence.”

第一,面向学生。这里“学生”特指在校学习者,他们或许有多重身份,如军政大学学生大多为高级指战员。面向学生时,用长征作类比,有助于讲述深刻晦涩的唯物论和辩证法。如延安时期,毛泽东在抗日军政大学当教员时,面向学生亲自授课,其间就多次讲到长征。毛泽东在学校当教员时,面向学生所讲内容大多为哲学课程。如他给学生讲授辩证法唯物论课程时说:“经过了万里长征的红军,不怀疑经过地区连同长江大河、雪山草地以及和他作战的敌军等等的客观存在,也不怀疑红军自己的客观存在。”

Second, addressing the Party, the military, and the government. In October 1935, Mao Zedong delivered an important speech on the Long March at the threshing ground of the Guoshu Garden in Wuqi Town, addressing cadres at or above the regimental level of the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment. In November 1935, Mao’s “Snowy Ground Speech” analyzing the Central Red Army’s Long March was directed at the commanders and fighters of the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment’s Military Commission Directly Subordinate Unit. On December 27, 1935, Mao gave a report titled “On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism” at Wayaobao, discussing the Long March, addressing Party activists. The content addressed to the Party, military, and government included two aspects: first, strategy and tactics. Mao accumulated rich experience in strategy and tactics during revolutionary struggle. During the Long March, he once told Li Jukui: when attacked by the enemy, one should adapt to circumstances, avoid the enemy’s sharp edge, and “bring into play flexible and mobile combat methods.” [22]22 Li Jukui (1904–1995) was a senior general of the People’s Liberation Army of China. Shortly after the Central Red Army arrived in northern Shaanxi, Mao’s speeches to Party, military, and government cadres elaborated on the flexible and mobile strategy and tactics of the Long March: “fight when you can win, move on when you cannot.” Second, unity and mutual assistance. For example, on October 29, 1935, Mao attended a meeting of Party member representatives at or above the battalion level of the First Front Red Army held at Chenhong Field, analyzing and pointing out: “The meeting of the two southern and northern Red Armies and the convening of a meeting of Party member representatives at or above the battalion level is of great significance… The primary task at present is for the entire Party to unite around the Party Central Committee and break the Kuomintang’s third ‘encirclement and suppression.’ [23]23 The “third ‘encirclement and suppression’” refers to the Kuomintang’s third military campaign against the Chinese Communist Party’s base areas, which took place from July to September 1931. Each army corps has its own strengths; they should learn from each other and help each other. To smash the enemy’s third ‘encirclement and suppression’ and to open up a new situation in the northwest, we must unite all forces that can be united and deliver a crushing blow to Chiang Kai-shek.”

第二,面向党政军。1935年10月,毛泽东在吴起镇果树园打麦场召开发表关于长征的重要讲话,面向陕甘支队团以上干部。1935年11月,毛泽东分析中央军长征的“雪地讲话”,面向的是陕甘支队军委直属队的指战员们。1935年12月27日,毛泽东在瓦窑堡作题为《论反对日本帝国主义的策略》的报告论及长征,面向党的活动分子。面向党政军主要讲述的内容包括两方面:一是战略战术。毛泽东在革命斗争中,积累了丰富战略战术经验。在长征中,他曾和李聚奎谈道:被敌人袭击时,应随机应变,避开了敌人的锋芒,“要发挥机动灵活的作战方法”。中央红军刚到陕北后,毛泽东面向党政军干部的讲话,阐述长征中“打得赢就打,打不赢就走”的机动灵活战略战术;二是团结互助。如1935年10月29日,毛泽东出席了红一方面军在陈洪场召开的营以上党员代表会议,分析指出:“南北两支红军的会合,召开营以上党员代表会议,是有很大意义的……当前的首要任务是,全党要团结在党中央周围,冲破国民党的三次‘围剿’。各军团各有所长,要互相学习,互相帮助。为粉碎敌人的三次‘围剿’,为开辟西北新局面,要联合一切可以联合的力量,给蒋介石以粉碎性的打击。”

Third, addressing the masses and other groups. In addition to on-site storytelling to the masses, Mao also used forms such as poetry and essays to transform language into text, turning listeners into readers, breaking through the limitations of time and space, and expanding the audience. For instance, Chairman Mao’s poems “Nian Nu Jiao · Kunlun,” “Qing Ping Le · Liupan Mountain,” and “Seven-Character Regulated Verse · The Long March” were published in the inaugural issue of Poetry Magazine in January 1957. These poems about the Long March were directed at all members of society. The book Red Star Shines Over China, which centrally reflects the main content of Mao’s Long March stories, was translated into English and disseminated worldwide, shifting its target audience to an international one. On May 7, 1960, when Mao met with a delegation from Algeria, he discussed the Long March: “Our military strength before the Long March once reached 300,000 people; because of mistakes, later fewer than 30,000 remained.” On March 6, 1963, when Mao introduced revolutionary experience to a delegation of the Brazilian Communist Party (New Party) led by Central Committee Secretary-General Amasonas, he also spoke of the Long March: “The Red Army originally had 300,000 people; after the ten-thousand-li Long March, fewer than 30,000 remained, less than one-tenth,” and so on. Thus, the targets of Mao’s Long March stories were no longer limited to domestic masses but extended to the world public.

第三,面向群众和其他群体。除面向群众现场讲述之外,毛泽东还利用诗词、论文等形式将语言转化为文字,把听众变为读者,突破时空限制,扩大受众面。如毛主席撰写的《念奴娇昆仑》《清平乐六盘山》《七律长征》,于1957年1月在《诗刊》创刊号上发表。这些关于长征的诗词,面向社会所有群众。集中反映毛泽东讲长征故事主要内容的《红星照耀的中国》书籍被译成英文,在全世界传播,其面向群体已转向国外。1960年5月7日,毛泽东会见阿尔及利亚代表时,论及长征:“我们的军事力量在长征前曾经达到过三十万人,因为犯错误,后来剩下不到三万人。”1963年3月6日,毛泽东向中央总书记阿马索纳斯率领的巴西共产党(新党)代表团介绍革命经验时也讲到长征,“红军原来有三十万人,经过万里长征,剩下不到三万人,不足十分之一”等。可见,毛泽东讲述长征故事的对象不再局限于国内群众,而是面向世界大众。

Mao’s telling of the Long March story to the masses, besides inspiring morale with the Long March spirit, also had the political function of shaping the image of the Chinese Communist Party and the military. As recorded in the call for contributions to the book Records of the Long March: “Now, for the purpose of international propaganda… each person should, based on their own experiences in battles, marches, localities, and unit work, select interesting and vivid fragments and write them down. The writing need only be clear and fluent, not profound or abstruse. Writing one segment is to do fundraising propaganda for the Red Army and to expand the Red Army’s international influence.”

毛泽东面向大众讲述长征故事,除以长征精神鼓舞士气外,还有塑造中国共产党、军队形象的政治功能。正如《长征记》征稿函记述的那样,“现因进行国际宣传……各人就自己所经历的战斗、行军、地方及部队工作,择其精彩有趣地写上若干片段。文字只求清通达意,不求钻研深奥,写上一段即是为红军做了募捐宣传,为红军扩大了国际影响”。

In summary, when telling the Long March story, Mao Zedong adjusted the content and method of narration according to different audiences: he spoke philosophy to students, tactics to the military, unity to Party members, and reasoning to the masses. All this demonstrated his flexible narrative skills and deep insight into the actual needs of his listeners. Whether in political speeches or exchanges with the masses and soldiers, regardless of the audience, Mao fully utilized the charm of language or text to present the hardships and grandeur of the Long March, giving the Long March story powerful appeal and persuasiveness in different settings.

综上,毛泽东在讲述长征故事时,针对不同听众对象,调整讲述的内容与方法,面向学生讲哲理,面向军队讲战术、面向党员讲团结,面向群众讲道理,这些都展现出了他灵活的叙事技巧和对听众实际需求的深刻洞察。无论是政治演讲还是与群众、士兵的交流,无论面向的对象是谁,毛泽东都充分利用语言或文字魅力,将长征的艰辛与壮丽展现出来,使得长征故事在不同场合中都具有强大的感染力和说服力。

(3) Literary Form: “Poetry” and “Discourse” Complement Each Other

(三)文体:“诗”“论”益彰

From the perspective of literary form, Mao’s telling of the Long March story mainly took two forms: poetry and prose discourse. Poetry is sonorous and rhythmic, each word a gem, expressing emotions directly and moving people with feeling. Prose discourse is logically rigorous and philosophically profound, convincing people with reason. In terms of the story’s dissemination effect, the two complement each other.

从文体上看,毛泽东讲长征故事主要有诗词和文论两种形式。诗词音韵铿锵、字字珠玑,直抒胸臆、以情动人。文论逻辑缜密、哲理深奥,以理服人。从故事传播效果看,两者相得益彰。

First, using poetry to express aspirations. When telling the Long March story, Mao emphasized both the beauty of artistic expression in poetry and the depth of philosophical argument in prose discourse. The combination of “poetry” and “discourse” constituted the literary genre of Mao’s Long March storytelling, giving his stories both literary warmth and historical depth. At the same time, Mao, with his unique calligraphic art, used the charm of writing to enhance the appeal and dissemination power of the Long March story.

第一,以诗言志。毛泽东在讲述长征故事时,既注重艺术表达的诗词之美,又强调哲理思辨的文论之深。“诗”“论”结合构成毛泽东讲长征故事的文学体裁,也使他讲述的长征故事既有文学温度,又有历史厚度。同时,毛泽东又以其独特的书法艺术,以文字魅力增强了长征故事的感染力和传播力。

Mao skillfully employed metaphor and symbolism, using objects to express feelings and emotions, conveying emotions and thoughts through the rhythm, rhyme, and imagery of poetic language, presenting many moving scenes from the Long March. This was the most vivid artistic expression of Mao’s Long March storytelling. For example, in the opening work of the Long March, “Three Poems of Sixteen-Character Rhyme,” he wrote: “Mountains! / I whip my swift steed and never dismount. / I look back in surprise, / The sky is three feet three above my head! / Mountains! / Like surging billows that roll and tumble, / Like a thousand horses in full battle array. / Mountains! / Their peaks pierce the blue of heaven without blunting its edge. / The sky would fall / But for their pillars of support.” [24]24 These lines are from Mao Zedong’s “Three Poems of Sixteen-Character Rhyme,” written during the Long March. Using the towering, perilous, and majestic mountains, he depicted the Red Army’s indomitable and heroic spirit. In “Dream of a Maid of Honor · Loushan Pass,” “Idle boast the strong pass is a wall of iron, / With firm strides we are crossing its summit.” In “Pure Serene Music · Liupan Mountain,” “The sky is high, the clouds are pale, / We watch the wild geese vanish southward. / If we reach not the Great Wall we are not men, / We who have already measured twenty thousand li,” [25]25 These lines are from Mao Zedong’s poem “Pure Serene Music · Liupan Mountain,” written in October 1935. scene blends with emotion, emotion with scene. Amid the clear autumn scenery of the north, he reviewed the victory of the Long March, expressing the Red Army’s delicate feelings of longing for the people of the Soviet areas and their strong will to resist Japan and march north. “Seven-Character Regulated Verse · The Long March” is also a classic poem he created during the Long March, using phrases like “we treat them as nothing,” “like rippling streams,” and “like mud balls” to express the Red Army’s revolutionary optimism in facing difficulties and daring to win, presenting a magnificent historical picture.

毛泽东巧妙运用隐喻和象征手法,借物抒怀、托物抒情,通过诗歌语言的节奏、韵律和意象来表达情感和思想,展现了长征中许多感人画面。这是毛泽东讲长征故事最形象的艺术表达。如在长征途中开篇之作《十六字令三首》写道:“山,快马加鞭未下鞍,惊回首,离天三尺三。山,倒海翻江卷巨澜,奔腾急,万马战犹酣。山,刺破青天锷未残,天欲堕,赖以拄其间。”借山之高耸、奇险、威武写出了红军顶天立地、坚韧不拔的英雄气概。《忆秦娥·娄山关》“雄关漫道真如铁,而今迈步从头越”,《清平乐·六盘山》“天高云淡,望断南飞雁。不到长城非好汉,屈指行程二万”等,景中有情、情中有景,在北国清秋景色中回顾了长征的胜利,表达了红军长征中思念苏区百姓的细腻情感和北上抗日的坚强意志。《七律·长征》也是他在长征期间创作一首经典诗词,用“只等闲”“腾细浪”“走泥丸”表达了红军不畏困难勇于胜利的革命乐观主义精神,展现了一幅雄伟壮丽的历史画卷。

Mao’s poems about the Long March, written in the “Mao style” (Mao’s calligraphic script), undoubtedly enhanced the appeal and dissemination power of the Long March story. “Calligraphy is the painting of the heart.” Mao’s unique wild cursive script exudes the richness and strength of Chinese characters, with winding, twisting strokes full of force. His manuscript of “The Long March” could spread widely; besides the expressive effect of the poetic content, the artistic charm of the “Mao style” was also an important reason. The characters in this manuscript interweave with each other but are crisp and neat, with jagged undulations adding texture, easily penetrating the reader’s heart and evoking resonance. Mao’s written “Dream of a Maid of Honor · Loushan Pass” has rolling and surging brushstrokes, using the artistry of calligraphy to express the momentum of turning the tide during the Long March. His written “Pure Serene Music · Liupan Mountain” has leaping and flying characters, blending poetic feeling with brush intent, recreating the scene of the Central Red Army crossing Liupan Mountain with high spirits. The “Mao style” exudes the beauty of revolutionary heroism and romanticism, deeply engraving the meaning of the Long March into people’s hearts.

毛泽东用“毛体”(毛泽东的字体)撰写的关于长征的诗词无疑会增强长征故事的感染力和传播力。“书为心画”,毛泽东独特的狂草透着汉字的浑厚、雄强,婉转盘丝又颇具力感。他的手稿《长征》能够流传较广,除诗词内容体裁的表达效果,“毛体”的艺术魅力也是重要原因。这份手稿字迹相互穿插但干练利落,参差跌宕更具质感,易于穿透读者心灵,引起共鸣。毛泽东书写的《忆秦娥·娄山关》,笔锋翻滚激荡,借书法的艺术性表达了长征中力挽狂澜的气势,书写的《清平乐·六盘山》,字体跳荡飞动,把诗情笔意融合在一起,再现了中央红军精神抖擞踏过六盘山时的情景。“毛体”散发着革命英雄主义和浪漫主义之美,把长征的寓意深深镌刻于人们的心灵深处。

Second, conveying meaning through argumentation. Mao Zedong, relying on his rigorous logical thinking and profound theoretical foundation, narrated the story of the Long March, guiding readers to deeply ponder the profound truths behind historical events. His discussion of the Long March in “On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism” set the tone for the story of the Long March. He pointed out: “Marxists see problems not only in part but also in whole.” [26]26 Mao Zedong, “On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism” (December 27, 1935), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 1, p. 149. Using a familiar analogy, he said, “A frog sitting at the bottom of a well says, ‘The sky is the size of a well.’ This is incorrect,” [27]27 Mao Zedong, “On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism” (December 27, 1935), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 1, p. 149. explaining the significance and value of the Long March in simple and profound terms. As a strategist, Mao Zedong, in his famous work “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” accurately analyzed that the Long March was a continuation of the Red Army’s strategic defense, and that this strategic defense would persist in northern Shaanxi. [28]28 The Long March was a strategic retreat by the Chinese Red Army from 1934 to 1935 to escape encirclement by the Kuomintang forces, moving from southern China to northern Shaanxi. In his “On Contradiction,” he used the Long March to interpret the principal and secondary aspects of a contradiction: “At certain times in the revolutionary struggle, the difficult conditions outweigh the favorable ones. At such times, difficulty is the principal aspect of the contradiction and favorableness is the secondary aspect… This was the case with the Chinese Red Army during the Long March.” [29]29 Mao Zedong, “On Contradiction” (August 1937), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 1, p. 323. Thus, it can be seen that in his writings, Mao Zedong used the Long March as evidence to interpret obscure philosophical cases. Not only did he convey philosophical truths to the masses in a simple and profound style, but he also disseminated the story of the Long March in a style of seeking truth from facts. In 1945, in his political report “On Coalition Government,” Mao Zedong stated: The 25,000-li Long March had depleted the strength of the people’s army, yet it had now grown to 910,000 and become the main force in the War of Resistance Against Japan. [30]30 The 25,000-li Long March refers to the approximately 8,000-kilometer journey of the First Front Army of the Chinese Red Army. Using the inherent law of development from weakness to strength, he asserted that this army would ultimately defeat the Japanese invaders and achieve final victory in the War of Liberation that might break out.

第二,以论达意。毛泽东凭借其严谨的逻辑思维和深厚的理论功底讲述着长征故事,引导读者深入思考历史事件背后的深刻道理。他撰写的《论反对日本帝国主义的策略》关于长征的论述,奠定了长征故事基调。他指出:“马克思主义者看问题,不但要看到部分,而且要看到全体。”他用人们熟知的典故作比,“一个虾蟆坐在井里说:‘天有一个井大’这是不对的”,深入浅出地阐述长征的意义和价值。作为战略家,毛泽东在名篇《中国革命战争的战略问题》中准确分析了长征是红军战略防御的继续,这种战略防御在陕北要持续下去。他的《矛盾论》用长征释读矛盾的主要方面和次要方面:“革命斗争中的某些时候,困难条件超过顺利条件,在这种时候,困难是矛盾的主要方面,顺利是其次要方面……中国红军在长征中的情形,都是如此。”可见,毛泽东在著作中把长征作为解读晦涩哲学案例的论据,不但以深入浅出的文笔向人民群众传递了哲学真理,还以实事求是的文风传播了长征故事。1945年,毛泽东在《论联合政府》政治报告中谈道:万里长征消耗了人民军队的力量,现在却发展到91万,成为抗日战争的主力军。他用事物由弱到强的内在发展规律,断言这支军队将最终击败日军,在可能爆发的解放战争中取得最后胜利。

(4) Method: The integration of “emotion” and “scene,” and the harmony of “knowledge” and “action”

(四)方法:“情”“景”融合、“知”“行”和合

“Emotion” is internal, referring to emotional expression. “Scene” is external, referring to the reproduction of a setting. A scene can be real or virtual. Mao Zedong emphasized rendering and creating scenes for the story of the Long March, placing the “audience” within the situation, truly allowing the spirit of the Long March to be internalized in the heart. At the same time, he was adept at using “knowledge,” which is theory or experience, and “action,” which is practice. Mao Zedong deeply understood the dialectical relationship between “knowledge” and “action,” valuing both the guiding role of theory and the innovative significance of practice.

“情”是内在的,指情感表达。“景”是外在的,指场景再现。场景可以是现实的,也可以是虚拟的。毛泽东注重渲染、创设长征故事的场景,使“听众”置于情景之中,真正让长征精神内化于心。同时,他还善用,“知”是理论或经验,“行”是实践。毛泽东深谙“知”与“行”的辩证关系,既重视理论的指导作用,又强调实践的创新意义。

First, the integration of “emotion” and “scene.” Mao Zedong flexibly employed the method of blending “emotion” and “scene,” centering on real stories and figures from the Long March, integrating emotion into the scene, creating a realistic setting for the story of the Long March, and expressing his feelings. Mao Zedong was adept at using rhetorical devices such as metaphor, symbolism, and allegory to create scenes for the story of the Long March, making it more humorous and interesting, and easier for the audience to understand and accept. In November 1935, in Xiangbiziwan Village, Ganquan County, Yan’an, Mao Zedong delivered his famous “Snowfield Speech” to over 300 Red Army soldiers, elaborating on the victory of the Long March and its great significance. [31]31 The “Snowfield Speech” was delivered by Mao Zedong on November 6, 1935, in Xiangbiziwan Village, summarizing the significance of the Long March. He utilized the natural conditions of the cold snowfield to create a scene for telling the story of the Long March, enhancing the effectiveness of the narrative. Mao Zedong also created a virtual agricultural production scene, comparing the Long March to a “sowing machine,” saying: “It has scattered many seeds in eleven provinces, which will sprout, leaf, blossom, and bear fruit, and will yield a harvest in the future.” [32]32 Mao Zedong, “On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism” (December 27, 1935), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 1, p. 150. He vividly used the natural laws of crop growth to explain the greatness and far-reaching significance of the Long March, enabling the masses, especially peasants, to understand the prairie-fire-like momentum of the revolution after the Long March.

第一,“情”“景”融合。毛泽东灵活运用“情”“景”交融法,以长征中真实的故事和人物为中心,融情于景,创设长征故事实景,抒发感情。毛泽东善于运用比喻、象征和寓言等修辞手法,创设长征故事场景,使其更加诙谐有趣,容易被听众理解和接受。1935年11月,毛泽东在延安市甘泉县象鼻子湾村,面对300余名红军战士发表了著名的“雪地讲话”,阐述了长征胜利及其重大意义。他利用寒冷的雪地自然条件,创设了讲述长征故事场景,增强了故讲述事的实效性。毛泽东还创设虚拟的农业生产场景,将长征比作“播种机”,说道:“散布了许多种子在十一个省内,发芽、长叶、开花、结果,将来是会有收获的。”他生动形象地借农作物生长自然规律阐述了长征的伟大之处和深远意义,使群众尤其是农民了解当时长征后革命的星火燎原之势。

Mao Zedong transcended time and space, creating real historical scenes from the Long March and integrating emotion into the scene. On August 20, 1950, in a letter of condolence to Xu Haidong, Mao Zedong mentioned: “During the most difficult times in northern Shaanxi, Comrade Haidong lent me 5,000 silver dollars.” [33]33 Xu Haidong (1900-1970) was a senior Red Army commander who provided crucial financial support to Mao Zedong’s forces in northern Shaanxi. This actually brought people into the real scene of the Long March, expressing profound gratitude to a revolutionary comrade. In April 1945, when He Bingyan attended the Seventh National Congress of the CPC and saw Mao Zedong, he saluted with his left hand. [34]34 The Seventh National Congress of the CPC was held in Yan’an from April to June 1945, establishing Mao Zedong Thought as the Party’s guiding ideology. Mao Zedong took his hand and said: “Comrade He Bingyan, you are a one-armed general, so from now on you are exempt from this salute!” [35]35 He Bingyan (1913-1960) was a Red Army commander who lost his right arm during the Long March. This remark from Mao Zedong revealed his revolutionary friendship with He Bingyan and instantly transported people back to the historical scene of the Long March, where He Bingyan, “after being wounded, had his right arm sawed off with a lumberjack’s saw without anesthetic or painkillers.” [36]36 This refers to He Bingyan’s battlefield amputation in 1935 during the Long March, performed without anesthesia.

毛泽东跨越时空,创设长征中真实的历史场景,融情于景。1950年8月20日,毛泽东在致徐海东的慰问信中提及:“在陕北最困难的时候,海东同志借给我的5000块大洋。”这实际上是将人们带入长征的真实场景,表达了对革命同志深切的感激之情。1945年4月,贺炳炎在参加党的七大时见到了毛泽东,以左手行军礼。毛泽东握住他的手说:“贺炳炎同志,你是独臂将军嘛,今后你就免掉这份礼吧!”毛泽东的一句话流露出对贺炳炎的革命友情,也把人们顷刻间拉回贺炳炎“负伤后,在无麻药或和止痛药情况下,用伐木的锔子锯掉他的右臂”的长征历史场景。

Second, the harmony of “knowledge” and “action.” When telling the story of the Long March, Mao Zedong was adept at combining “knowledge” (experience and theory) with “action” (practice), discussing theory in practice and discussing practice in theory, exhibiting the characteristic of the harmony of “knowledge” and “action.”

第二,“知”“行”和合。毛泽东讲长征故事,善于把“知”(经验与理论)与“行”(实践)结合起来,在实践中讲理论,又在理论中讲实践,表现出“知”“行”和合的特征。

First, discussing theory in practice. After the Long March, in the practice of revolution and construction, Mao Zedong consistently emphasized how the methodology of dialectical materialism was adhered to during the Long March and how the universal truth of Marxism was integrated with China’s actual conditions. During the Yan’an period, faced with disunity in Party thinking and the prevalence of subjectivism and dogmatism, Mao Zedong revisited the practical process by which the Party had overcome dogmatism, book worship, and empiricism during the Long March, and propagated the truth derived from it: “Marxism-Leninism only provides the guiding direction; it must be integrated with China’s actual conditions.” In 1941, Mao Zedong launched and led the Rectification Movement in Yan’an and the revolutionary base areas, opposing subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party stereotypes, repeatedly mentioning adherence to the ideological line of seeking truth from facts established at the Zunyi Conference. [37]37 The Rectification Movement (1941-1945) was a Party-wide campaign to correct subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party stereotypes, emphasizing the integration of theory with practice. In the practice of the socialist construction period, Mao Zedong revisited the Long March, emphasizing the need to integrate the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with China’s specific realities.

一是在实践中讲理论。长征后,在革命与建设实践中,毛泽东一直强调长征中是如何坚持唯物辩证法的方法论,如何把马克思主义普遍真理同中国的实际结合起来的。延安时期,面对党内思想不统一,主观主义、教条主义盛行,毛泽东重提长征时期党如何在克服教条主义、本本主义、经验主义思想的实践过程,并对得出的“马列主义只是指导方向的,一定要和中国实际相结合”的真理进行宣讲。1941年,毛泽东在延安及革命根据地领导发动整风运动,反对主观主义、宗派主义、党八股,多次提到坚持遵义会议确立的实事求是的思想路线。在社会主义建设时期的实践中,毛泽东重提长征,强调要把马克思主义普遍真理同中国具体实际相结合。

Second, discussing practice in theory. To clarify theory, one must return to practice. Mao Zedong used the practice of the Long March to further explain the principle of how to move from defeat to victory. Mao Zedong continuously summarized the experiences and lessons of the Long March, refining a series of theoretical principles that conformed to the specific realities of China’s revolution. However, he never rigidly adhered to the classical tenets of Marxism-Leninism; instead, he placed great emphasis on practical exploration and theoretical innovation. During the Yan’an period, Mao Zedong wrote Section 11, Chapter 2, “On Practice,” of “Dialectical Materialism (Lecture Outline),” precisely with the aim of “exposing the subjectivism of those who belittle practice, namely dogmatism.” [38]38 Mao Zedong, “On Practice” (July 1937), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 1, p. 295. As an instructor at the Chinese People’s Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, he specifically taught students the philosophical principles of “On Practice.” [39]39 The Chinese People’s Anti-Japanese Military and Political University (Kangda) was a military academy established in Yan’an in 1936 to train cadres for the war effort. “On Practice,” as the philosophical foundation of Mao Zedong Thought, comprehensively elucidated that practice is the source, motive force, and criterion of knowledge. He proposed: “After experiencing failure, people draw lessons from it, correct their thinking to conform to the laws of the external world, and can then turn failure into victory.” [40]40 Mao Zedong, “On Practice” (July 1937), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 1, p. 297. As discussed earlier, in “On Contradiction,” Mao Zedong also used the practice of the Long March to clarify the law of the mutual transformation of contradictions.

二是在理论中讲实践。讲清理论必须重回实践,毛泽东用长征实践进一步阐释如何从失败中走向胜利的原理。毛泽东不断总结长征经验教训,提炼出一系列符合中国革命具体实际的理论原则,但他从不固守马克思列宁主义经典条文,而是十分注重实践探索与理论创新。延安时期,毛泽东写出《辩证法唯物论(讲授提纲)》第二章第十一节“实践论”,目的正是“揭露看轻实践的教条主义这种主观主义”。作为抗日军政大学的教员,他专门为学生讲授“实践论”的哲学原理。《实践论》作为毛泽东思想的哲学基础,全面阐明了实践是认识的来源、动力、标准。他提出:“人们经过失败之后,也就从失败取得教训,改正自己的思想使之适合于外界的规律性,人们就能变失败为胜利。”兹前所论,毛泽东在《矛盾论》中,也借用长征实践讲清矛盾相互转化的规律。

Mao Zedong’s discourse on the unity of “knowledge” and “action” not only reflected his profound understanding of the relationship between theory and practice but also demonstrated his foresight and outstanding wisdom as a great leader. Mao Zedong applied the experience and theoretical innovations of the Long March to the actual practice of revolution and construction. After the founding of New China, in the process of realizing social system transformation, the spirit of the Long March and theoretical innovation consistently played an important guiding role, promoting social progress and development in China.

毛泽东关于“知”“行”统一的论述,不仅体现了他对理论与实践关系的深刻理解,而且展示了他作为伟大领袖的高瞻远瞩和卓越智慧。毛泽东将长征经验和理论创新应用于实际的革命与建设实践,新中国成立,在实现社会制度变革的过程中,长征精神和理论创新始终发挥重要的指导作用,推动中国社会进步和发展。

The interweaving of different themes constitutes the historical context in which Mao Zedong told the story of the Long March, with experience, theory, and spirit jointly forming the core content of his narrative. The innovation in subject, object, and literary form made the story of the Long March as told by Mao Zedong vivid in content and significantly enhanced in its power of dissemination. From a historical perspective, Mao Zedong’s major contributions in telling the story of the Long March are reflected in three aspects: first, he made the major political judgment of the victory of the Long March, pointing out the direction forward for the entire Party and the entire army; second, he summarized the experiences and lessons of the Long March, unified thinking, and established the ideological line of seeking truth from facts; third, he highlighted the correct leadership of the Party and the great power of the masses. At the same time, Mao Zedong used the practice of the Long March to clearly explain the universal theory that the basic principles of Marxism must be integrated with China’s specific realities, providing important historical inspiration for the Party and the state in exploring revolution, construction, and reform.

不同主题相互交织,是毛泽东讲长征故事的历史语境,经验、理论、精神共同构成他讲长征故事的核心内容。主体、客体、文体的创新使毛泽东所讲的长征故事内容形象生动,传播力明显增强。从历史意义看,毛泽东讲长征故事的重大贡献体现在三方面:一是作出了长征胜利的重大政治判断,为全党全军指明了前进方向;二是总结了长征的经验与教训,统一了思想,确立了实事求是的思想路线;三是彰显了党的正确领导和人民群众的伟大力量。同时,毛泽东用长征实践讲清楚了马克思主义基本原理要同中国具体实际相结合的普遍理论,为党和国家探索革命、建设、改革提供了重要历史启示。

The story of the Long March as told by Mao Zedong was always closely linked to the future and destiny of the nation and the people. It was his reflection on the democratic revolution [41]41 The "democratic revolution" (民主革命) refers to the New Democratic Revolution (1919–1949) led by the Communist Party of China, which aimed to overthrow imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism as a stage preceding socialist revolution. to pursue national independence and people's liberation, and also his profound consideration of how an Eastern country with overall economic backwardness could carry out socialist revolution and construction. Reviewing history is meant to continue advancing; only by not forgetting the original aspiration can great achievements be created. On the journey toward the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, the story of the Long March increasingly demonstrates its necessity for the times. In the New Era and the new stage of development, everyone is a teller of the Long March story. All should uphold the stance of Chinese culture, explore the resources of the Long March story, innovate modes of dissemination, optimize communication strategies, and promote the Long March spirit, so as to provide powerful spiritual strength for comprehensively building a modern socialist country.

毛泽东所讲的长征故事始终与国家、民族的前途和命运紧密联系在一起,是他对追求民族独立、人民解放民主革命问题的思考,也是他对经济全面落后的东方大国如何进行社会主义革命和建设的深刻考量。重温历史是为了继续前进,不忘初心才能创造伟业。在实现中华民族伟大复兴的征程上,长征故事愈发彰显为时代所需。新时代新发展阶段,每个人都是长征故事的讲述者,都应坚守中华文化立场,发掘长征故事资源,创新传播方式,优化传播策略,弘扬长征精神,为全面建设社会主义现代化国家提供强大的精神力量。

(Author bios: Gao Xiaobo, professor and doctoral supervisor at the School of Marxism, Shanghai University of Electric Power; Gong Naixin, doctoral student at the School of Marxism, Guizhou Normal University)

(作者简介:高晓波,上海电力大学马克思主义学院教授,博士生导师;巩乃鑫,贵州师范大学马克思主义学院博士研究生)

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑:同心

Notes

  1. The 20th National Congress of the CPC was held in October 2022. The quotation is from the congress report. ↩
  2. Xi Jinping’s remark on the Long March. ↩
  3. 25,000 li is approximately 12,500 kilometers or about 7,800 miles. ↩
  4. Zhang Guotao (1897–1979) was a founding member of the CPC who later broke with the Party and defected to the Kuomintang. ↩
  5. “Frog at the bottom of a well” (井底之蛙) is a Chinese idiom for a person with a very narrow outlook. ↩
  6. The North China Autonomy Movement (1935) was a Japanese attempt to create a puppet regime in northern China. ↩
  7. “Making concessions to appease foreign aggression while stabilizing the domestic situation” (攘外必先安内) was Chiang Kai-shek’s policy of prioritizing the suppression of the Communists over resisting Japan. ↩
  8. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident (July 7, 1937) is generally considered the start of the full-scale Second Sino-Japanese War. ↩
  9. The December 9th Movement (1935) was a large student protest in Beiping (Beijing) against Japanese aggression and the Kuomintang’s policy of non-resistance. ↩
  10. The “Two Musts” refers to Mao Zedong’s call at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee in March 1949 that the whole Party must remain modest, prudent, and free from arrogance and rashness, and must preserve the style of arduous struggle. ↩
  11. Xiangbiziwan: A location in present-day Shaanxi Province where Mao addressed troops after the Long March’s arrival in northern Shaanxi. ↩
  12. 25,000-li Long March: The standard Chinese term for the Long March’s distance, approximately 12,500 kilometers. ↩
  13. Zunyi Conference: A pivotal meeting of the CPC in January 1935 during the Long March, where Mao Zedong began to establish leadership and “Left” dogmatic errors were criticized. ↩
  14. Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee: A CPC Central Committee plenum held in September–November 1938 in Yan’an, which affirmed Mao’s leadership and the line of integrating Marxism with Chinese reality. ↩
  15. “Foreword to *The Communist*”: A 1939 article by Mao that summarized the Party’s historical experience, including the significance of the Zunyi Conference. ↩
  16. Anti-Japanese Military and Political University: A CPC military academy established in Yan’an in 1936 to train cadres for the war against Japan. ↩
  17. “Guide to action”: A standard Leninist formulation distinguishing Marxism from dogmatic interpretation, frequently cited by Mao. ↩
  18. Yan’an Marxist-Leninist Institute: A CPC research and training institution established in 1938, later reorganized as the Marxist-Leninist Research Institute in 1941. ↩
  19. 1957 Moscow Declaration: A joint statement issued by communist and workers’ parties at a Moscow conference in 1957, affirming the principle of integrating Marxism-Leninism with national conditions. ↩
  20. Wayaobu meeting: A CPC meeting in December 1935 in Wayaobu, northern Shaanxi, which formulated the strategy of the anti-Japanese national united front. ↩
  21. “Three-proximity person” (三亲者) refers to someone who was personally present, personally involved, and personally witnessed an event. ↩
  22. Li Jukui (1904–1995) was a senior general of the People’s Liberation Army of China. ↩
  23. The “third ‘encirclement and suppression’” refers to the Kuomintang’s third military campaign against the Chinese Communist Party’s base areas, which took place from July to September 1931. ↩
  24. These lines are from Mao Zedong’s “Three Poems of Sixteen-Character Rhyme,” written during the Long March. ↩
  25. These lines are from Mao Zedong’s poem “Pure Serene Music · Liupan Mountain,” written in October 1935. ↩
  26. Mao Zedong, “On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism” (December 27, 1935), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 1, p. 149. ↩
  27. Mao Zedong, “On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism” (December 27, 1935), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 1, p. 149. ↩
  28. The Long March was a strategic retreat by the Chinese Red Army from 1934 to 1935 to escape encirclement by the Kuomintang forces, moving from southern China to northern Shaanxi. ↩
  29. Mao Zedong, “On Contradiction” (August 1937), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 1, p. 323. ↩
  30. The 25,000-li Long March refers to the approximately 8,000-kilometer journey of the First Front Army of the Chinese Red Army. ↩
  31. The “Snowfield Speech” was delivered by Mao Zedong on November 6, 1935, in Xiangbiziwan Village, summarizing the significance of the Long March. ↩
  32. Mao Zedong, “On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism” (December 27, 1935), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 1, p. 150. ↩
  33. Xu Haidong (1900-1970) was a senior Red Army commander who provided crucial financial support to Mao Zedong’s forces in northern Shaanxi. ↩
  34. The Seventh National Congress of the CPC was held in Yan’an from April to June 1945, establishing Mao Zedong Thought as the Party’s guiding ideology. ↩
  35. He Bingyan (1913-1960) was a Red Army commander who lost his right arm during the Long March. ↩
  36. This refers to He Bingyan’s battlefield amputation in 1935 during the Long March, performed without anesthesia. ↩
  37. The Rectification Movement (1941-1945) was a Party-wide campaign to correct subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party stereotypes, emphasizing the integration of theory with practice. ↩
  38. Mao Zedong, “On Practice” (July 1937), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 1, p. 295. ↩
  39. The Chinese People’s Anti-Japanese Military and Political University (Kangda) was a military academy established in Yan’an in 1936 to train cadres for the war effort. ↩
  40. Mao Zedong, “On Practice” (July 1937), *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 1, p. 297. ↩
  41. The "democratic revolution" (民主革命) refers to the New Democratic Revolution (1919–1949) led by the Communist Party of China, which aimed to overthrow imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism as a stage preceding socialist revolution. ↩