Marx’s Thesis on “Revolutionary Practice” as an Answer to the Relationship between Environment and Humanity

The “Theses on Feuerbach” (hereinafter referred to as the “Theses”) is the programmatic text that marks the birth of Marx’s new materialism. Among them, the third thesis, with its classic assertion that “the coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice,” contains Marx’s essential reflection on the relationship between environment and humanity. It is an important exposition that directly reaches the core of the “practice” of new materialism. Scholarly circles at home and abroad have engaged in extensive discussions on the theoretical connotations and textual content of the thesis on “revolutionary practice” and have achieved fruitful results, yet controversies remain over fundamental issues. What is worth further inquiry is: what exactly does the “circumstances” mentioned in this thesis refer to? How should we understand the internal connection between the “changing of human activity” and “self-change” in Marx’s original manuscript? Why can the relationship between environment and humanity “only” be regarded as “revolutionary practice”? It is necessary for us to return to the intellectual-historical background of the Theses and analyze it in conjunction with relevant textual content. Reconsidering the classic thesis on “revolutionary practice” and clarifying the logical rationale for why the relationship between environment and humanity can “only” be answered through “revolutionary practice” is conducive to revealing the fundamental transcendence of the “practice” of new materialism over “all previous materialism,” and to grasping the revolutionary implications of the thesis on “revolutionary practice” that lead to the communist movement.

《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》（以下简称《提纲》）是标志马克思新唯物主义诞生的纲领性文本，其中第三条关于“环境的改变和人的活动或自我改变的一致，只能被看做是并合理地理解为革命的实践”的经典论断，蕴含马克思对环境与人之间关系的本质反思，是直抵新唯物主义“实践”内核的重要论述。国内外学界围绕“革命的实践”论断的理论内涵和文本内容展开广泛讨论并取得丰硕成果，但在基础性问题上仍存在争议。值得进一步追问的是，这一论断提及的“环境”究竟指涉什么？如何理解马克思原稿中“人的活动”改变和“自我”改变之间的内在联系？环境与人的关系为何“只能”被视为“革命的实践”？我们有必要回到《提纲》的思想史背景并结合相关文本内容进行分析。重思“革命的实践”的经典论断，澄明“只能”以“革命的实践”回答环境与人关系问题的逻辑理路，有利于揭示“实践”的新唯物主义对“从前的一切唯物主义”的根本性超越，领悟“革命的实践”论断通向共产主义运动的革命意蕴。

I. What Exactly Does “Circumstances” Refer To?

一、“环境”具体指涉什么

Clarifying the connotation of “circumstances” in “the coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change” is the first theoretical premise for answering the question of the relationship between environment and humanity. Regarding the specific connotation of “circumstances,” existing research, based on an understanding of the object of critique of this thesis, namely “the materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing,” has formed two representative views. The first view holds that the third thesis of the Theses inherits the 18th-century French materialism represented by Helvétius, defining “circumstances” as the social environment. The second view holds that the “circumstances” in Marx’s thesis are not limited solely to the social environment, but are “the unity of the natural environment and the social environment.” The exploration by these two views of whether the “circumstances” Marx speaks of are the natural environment or the social environment has laid a theoretical foundation for understanding the connotation of “circumstances” and the relationship between environment and humanity. However, they overlook the distinction within Marx’s context between nature-in-itself and humanized nature. The author believes that the “circumstances” in Marx’s thesis on “revolutionary practice” refer neither simply to the social environment, nor to the entirety of both the natural and social environments, but rather to the “human environment,” which includes the social environment and the humanized natural environment.

明晰“环境的改变和人的活动或自我改变的一致”中“环境”的内涵是回答环境与人关系问题的第一个理论前提。对于“环境”的具体内涵问题，现有研究基于对这一论断的批判对象即“关于环境和教育起改变作用的唯物主义学说”的理解，形成了两种代表性观点。第一种观点认为，《提纲》第三条承继以爱尔维修为代表的18世纪法国唯物主义，将“环境”界定为社会环境。第二种观点认为，马克思这一论断中的“环境”并非仅仅局限于社会环境，而是“自然环境与社会环境的统一”。两种观点围绕马克思所言的“环境”究竟是自然环境还是社会环境展开的探讨，为理解“环境”的内涵以及环境与人的关系问题奠定了理论基础，但忽视了自然环境在马克思的语境中存在自在自然和人化自然的区分。笔者认为，马克思“革命的实践”论断中的“环境”既不是单纯指涉社会环境，也不是涵盖全部的自然环境和社会环境，而是包含社会环境和人化自然环境的“人的环境”。

The reason why scholarly debate over the specific connotation of “circumstances” focuses on whether “circumstances” includes the natural environment is primarily that existing research has yet to reach a consensus on what exactly Marx’s object of critique is. In the third thesis of the Theses, Marx states: “The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence, this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society.” From this exposition, “the materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing” is the object of critique of Marx’s thesis on “revolutionary practice.” Therefore, clarifying whether this object of critique specifically refers to 18th-century French materialism, or generally refers to past philosophical discussions of the overall environment including both the natural and social environments, directly affects the grasp of the connotation of “circumstances” in this thesis.

学界对“环境”具体内涵的争论之所以聚焦于“环境”是否包含自然环境，主要原因是现有研究对马克思的批判对象究竟是什么尚未达成共识。马克思在《提纲》第三条提出：“关于环境和教育起改变作用的唯物主义学说忘记了：环境是由人来改变的，而教育者本人一定是受教育的。因此，这种学说必然会把社会分成两部分，其中一部分凌驾于社会之上。”从这一论述而言，“关于环境和教育起改变作用的唯物主义学说”是马克思“革命的实践”论断的批判对象。那么，明晰这一批判对象究竟是特指18世纪的法国唯物主义，还是泛指以往哲学对整体环境包括自然环境和社会环境的论说，直接关系对这一论断中“环境”内涵的把握。

Returning to the specific context in which Marx put forward the thesis on “revolutionary practice,” that is, the specific context of critiquing “the materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing,” and understanding the specific referent of this “materialist doctrine,” is the basic prerequisite for grasping the connotation of “circumstances” in the thesis on “revolutionary practice.” In “the materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing,” Marx uses “concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing” as a qualifier to describe the “materialist doctrine,” implying that this “materialist doctrine” must first possess the theoretical connotation of emphasizing that “circumstances and upbringing bring about change.” Marx points out in *The Holy Family* that 18th-century French materialism “applied materialism to social life,” adhered to the basic position of social environmental determinism, emphasized “the influence of the external environment on man,” put forward the theory of “the omnipotence of education,” and held that circumstances and upbringing are the decisive forces for changing man. Marx’s discussion of 18th-century French materialism provides us with the answer to the specific referent of “the materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing.” The social environmental determinism and the theory of the omnipotence of education of 18th-century French materialism conform to the theoretical connotation of “concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing.” The direct object of critique in Marx’s thesis on “revolutionary practice” is not past philosophical discussions of the problem of “circumstances,” but specifically points to 18th-century French materialism.

回到马克思提出“革命的实践”论断的具体语境，即批判“关于环境和教育起改变作用的唯物主义学说”的具体语境，并理解这种“唯物主义学说”的具体指涉，是把握“革命的实践”论断中“环境”内涵的基本前提。在“关于环境和教育起改变作用的唯物主义学说”中，马克思用“环境和教育起改变作用的”作为限定词来描述“唯物主义学说”，其背后隐含这种“唯物主义学说”必须首先具备强调“环境和教育起改变作用”的理论内涵。马克思在《神圣家族》中指出，18世纪法国唯物主义将“唯物主义运用到社会生活方面”，坚持社会环境决定论的基本立场，强调“外部环境对人的影响”，提出“教育的万能”论，认为环境和教育是改变人的决定性力量。马克思对18世纪法国唯物主义的论述，为我们解开“关于环境和教育起改变作用的唯物主义学说”的具体指涉提供了答案。18世纪法国唯物主义的社会环境决定论、教育万能论符合“关于环境和教育起改变作用”的理论内涵，马克思在“革命的实践”论断中直接批判的对象并非以往哲学对“环境”问题的论述，而是具体指向18世纪法国唯物主义。

On the basis of clarifying the specific context of the thesis on “revolutionary practice,” it is also necessary to clarify the fundamental purpose of Marx’s putting forward this thesis. This is key to understanding the social environment as a component of “circumstances” in this thesis. As the object of critique of the thesis on “revolutionary practice,” 18th-century French materialism emphasizes the decisive role of the social environment. However, using only this as evidence, one cannot yet conclude that the “circumstances” in Marx’s thesis also emphasize the social environment. We must also clarify the fundamental purpose of Marx’s putting forward the thesis on “revolutionary practice,” and this purpose is hidden in the shift in Marx’s attitude toward 18th-century French materialism from *The Holy Family* to the *Theses*. In *The Holy Family*, Marx regarded 18th-century French materialism as an affirmative system capable of elevating life practice into theoretical thought. However, in the thesis on “revolutionary practice,” he made 18th-century French materialism the direct object of critique. The reason behind this is that, during the period of the *Theses*, Marx recognized that 18th-century French materialism, confined by the dichotomy of subject and object, had insurmountable limitations. They understood the social environment only as a pure object external to man, remaining at the level of an intuitive, dualistic relationship between the social environment and man, without discovering the mediating activity that causes interaction between the social environment and man. At the same time, in conjunction with expressions in the *Theses* concerning the relationship between the social environment and man, such as “all social life is essentially practical” and that “abstract individuals” “belong to a definite form of society,” we can infer that Marx’s purpose in putting forward the thesis on “revolutionary practice” was to use practice as a mediating activity to rethink the internal relationship between the social environment and man, and thereby to critique and transcend the intuitive understanding of the relationship between the social environment and man held by 18th-century French materialism. The social environment becomes an important component of “circumstances” in Marx’s thesis on “revolutionary practice,” and this constitutes the social theme of Marx’s answer to the question of the relationship between environment and humanity.

在明晰“革命的实践”论断具体语境的基础上，还必须明确马克思提出“革命的实践”论断的根本目的，这是理解社会环境作为这一论断中“环境”组成部分的关键。作为“革命的实践”论断的批判对象，18世纪法国唯物主义强调社会环境的决定性作用，但仅以此为论据还无法得出马克思这一论断中的“环境”也强调社会环境的结论，我们还需明晰马克思提出“革命的实践”论断的根本目的，而这一目的隐藏在他从《神圣家族》到《提纲》对18世纪法国唯物主义态度的转变中。马克思在《神圣家族》中认为，18世纪法国唯物主义是能够将生活实践升华为理论思想的肯定性体系，但在“革命的实践”论断中将18世纪法国唯物主义作为直接的批判对象，其背后原因就在于：《提纲》时期，马克思认识到18世纪法国唯物主义囿于主客二分思维导致无法克服的局限性，他们将社会环境仅理解为外在于人的纯粹客体，停留在社会环境与人之间二元对立的直观性关系层面，而没有发现引起社会环境与人之间相互作用的活动中介。同时，结合《提纲》中有关社会环境与人之间关系的表述，如“全部社会生活在本质上是实践的”，以及“抽象的个人”是“属于一定的社会形式的”等，我们可以推定，马克思提出“革命的实践”论断旨在以实践作为中介活动重新反思社会环境与人之间的内在关系，并以此实现对18世纪法国唯物主义将社会环境与人之间的关系加以直观性认识的批判和超越。社会环境成为马克思的“革命的实践”论断中“环境”的重要组成部分，这构成马克思回答环境与人关系问题的社会性主题。

Based on the specific context and fundamental purpose of Marx’s thesis on “revolutionary practice”, the social environment is an important component of the connotation of “environment” in this thesis. At the same time, viewed in light of the intellectual history of Marx’s materialism, the question of the relationship between nature and humanity has been embedded throughout the development of his thought, and the humanized natural environment is an indispensable part of the connotation of “environment” in the thesis on “revolutionary practice”. From the influence of the Romantic atmosphere of harmony between humanity and nature during his university years, to his doctoral dissertation’s focus on the fundamental differences between Epicurus and Democritus in natural philosophy, natural philosophy was a core element in the formation of Marx’s early materialism, although at that time he was not yet able to fully distinguish between nature-in-itself and humanized nature within the natural environment. In the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx for the first time creatively put forward the concept of “humanized nature”, i.e., the humanized natural environment, as an objective existence that condenses humanity’s essential forces, is a necessary objective intermediary for confirming “the essence of humanity”. “To what extent the essence of humanity has become nature for humanity, or to what extent nature has become the human essence of humanity.” [1]1 “Self-consciousness” (自为意识) — a term derived from Hegelian and Marxist philosophy, indicating consciousness that is aware of itself as an active, autonomous subject, as opposed to mere consciousness-in-itself (自在意识). Marx regarded nature as “the inorganic body of humanity”, [2]2 This is a quotation from Marx’s letter to Arnold Ruge (September 1843), published in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher. placing the question of “the essence of humanity” in the field of natural existence of “humanity as the nature of humanity”. The humanized natural environment, as the natural substrate of materialism, runs through the entire course of Marx’s intellectual development. In *The German Ideology*, Marx, by revealing the mutually constraining developmental process of natural history and human history, explains the intrinsic connection between humanized nature and humanity from a general historical dimension; in texts such as the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*, he demonstrates the special position of the humanized natural environment in productive labor in the context of a specific capitalist society, positioning labor first and foremost as a material metabolic process between humanized nature and humanity. Viewed from the intellectual-historical process of Marx’s materialism, the humanized natural environment, as the natural character of Marx’s materialism, always occupies an important position, among which the *Theses* [on Feuerbach] marks the birth of a new materialism of “practice”. Although Marx does not directly mention the concept of “humanized nature” in the thesis on “revolutionary practice”, the humanized natural environment is inherently included in the connotation of “environment” in the thesis on “revolutionary practice”, and this constitutes the natural theme of Marx’s answer to the question of the relationship between environment and humanity.

基于马克思提出“革命的实践”论断的具体语境和根本目的，社会环境是这一论断中“环境”内涵的重要组成部分。同时结合马克思唯物主义的思想史来看，对自然与人关系问题的思考一直内嵌于其思想发展的始终，人化自然环境是“革命的实践”论断中“环境”内涵不可或缺的部分。从大学时代受到浪漫主义中人与自然和谐相处氛围的熏陶，到博士论文中聚焦伊壁鸠鲁与德谟克利特在自然哲学上的根本差异，自然哲学是马克思早期唯物主义思想形成的核心要素，但当时他还未能完全区分自然环境中的自在自然和人化自然。在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》中，马克思首次创造性地提出“人化的自然界”概念，即人化自然环境作为凝聚人的本质性力量的对象性存在，是确证“人的本质”的必要对象性中介。“人的本质在何种程度上对人来说成为自然，或者自然在何种程度上成为人具有的人的本质。”马克思将自然界视为“人的无机的身体”，把“人的本质”问题置于“人是人的自然”的自然性存在场域，人化自然环境作为唯物主义的自然性底色贯穿于马克思思想进程的始终。在《德意志意识形态》中，马克思通过揭示自然史与人类史相互制约的发展进程，从一般性历史维度出发阐释人化自然与人之间的内在联系；在《1857—1858年经济学手稿》与《资本论》等文本中，结合特定资本主义社会论证人化自然环境在生产劳动中的特殊地位，将劳动首先定位为人化自然与人之间的物质变换过程。从马克思唯物主义的思想史进程来看，人化自然环境作为马克思唯物主义的自然性始终占据重要地位，其中《提纲》标志着“实践”的新唯物主义的诞生。马克思在“革命的实践”论断中虽然并未直接提及“人化自然”概念，但人化自然环境内在包含在“革命的实践”论断的“环境”内涵之中，这构成马克思回答环境与人关系问题的自然性主题。

The “environment” in the thesis on “revolutionary practice” includes the social environment and the humanized natural environment; the two together constitute the complete connotation of “environment”. We can collectively refer to the social environment and the humanized natural environment as “the human environment”. The dialectically unified relational practice between “the human environment” and humanity constitutes an important content of Marx’s new materialism in the *Theses*. First, the “environment” in the thesis on “revolutionary practice” is “the human environment” which contains the social environment and the humanized natural environment. The humanized natural environment and the social environment themselves have a close intrinsic connection: “What distinguishes Marx’s concept of nature from other views of nature from the very beginning is the social-historical character of Marx’s concept of nature.” [3]3 “Labor–formation” (劳动–陶冶) — a reference to Hegel’s concept of Bildung (formation or cultivation) through labor, as developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit, where the subject is shaped and transformed through its practical activity on the external world. The connection between the humanized natural environment and the social environment is specifically manifested as follows: the humanized natural environment is a necessary prerequisite for the generation and development of the social environment, and the development of the social environment further shapes the humanized natural environment. Second, the dialectically unified relational practice between “the human environment” and humanity constitutes an important content of Marx’s new materialism. In the *Theses*, Marx clearly distinguishes between the intuitive practice of the dichotomy of subject and object and the dialectically unified relational practice. On the one hand, he acknowledges the priority of the natural environment-in-itself, and thereby establishes the objective premise for the establishment of the new materialism. The natural environment-in-itself, as a purely objective world existing prior to humanity, possesses objective reality independent of human will, and presents an intuitive practical relationship of the dichotomy of subject and object with “humanity”. On the other hand, Marx transcends the intuitive practice of the subject-object dichotomy mode of thinking, takes the relationship between “the human environment” and humanity as the object of study of the new materialism, and, through “the coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change”, [4]4 This is a direct quotation from Marx’s “Theses on Feuerbach” (1845), Thesis III: “The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice.” reveals the dialectically unified relational practice between “the human environment” and humanity.

“革命的实践”论断中的“环境”包括社会环境和人化自然环境，二者共同组成“环境”的完整内涵，我们可将社会环境和人化自然环境统称为“人的环境”，“人的环境”与人之间辩证统一的关系性实践构成《提纲》中马克思新唯物主义的重要内容。首先，“革命的实践”论断中的“环境”是内含社会环境和人化自然环境的“人的环境”。人化自然环境与社会环境之间本身就具有紧密的内在联系，“把马克思的自然概念从一开始同其他种种自然观区别开来的东西，是马克思自然概念的社会—历史性质”。人化自然环境与社会环境之间的联系具体表征为：人化自然环境是社会环境生成发展的必要前提，社会环境的发展进一步塑造人化自然环境。其次，“人的环境”与人之间辩证统一的关系性实践，构成马克思新唯物主义的重要内容。在《提纲》中，马克思明确区分了主客二分的直观性实践和辩证统一的关系性实践，他一方面承认自在自然环境的先在性，并以此确立了新唯物主义成立的客观前提。自在自然环境作为先在于人类存在的纯粹客观世界，具有不以人的意志为转移的客观实在性，与“人”之间呈现为主客二分的直观性实践关系。另一方面，马克思又超越了主客二分式思维的直观性实践，将“人的环境”与人的关系作为新唯物主义的研究对象，以“环境的改变和人的活动或自我改变的一致”，揭示出“人的环境”与人之间辩证统一的关系性实践。

In terms of the specific context and fundamental purpose of the thesis on “revolutionary practice”, the social environment constitutes the social theme of Marx’s answer to the question of the relationship between environment and humanity; in terms of the intellectual-historical process of Marx’s materialism, the humanized natural environment contains the indispensable natural theme of his answer to the question of the relationship between environment and humanity. Marx’s “environment” does not merely refer to the social environment, but includes “the human environment” comprising the social environment and the humanized natural environment. The dialectically unified relational practice between “the human environment” and humanity is the first theoretical premise for answering the question of the relationship between environment and humanity.

就“革命的实践”论断的具体语境和根本目的而言，社会环境构成马克思回答环境与人关系问题的社会性主题；就马克思唯物主义的思想史进程而言，人化自然环境蕴含他回答环境与人关系问题不可或缺的自然性主题。马克思的“环境”并非仅仅指涉社会环境，而是包含社会环境和人化自然环境的“人的环境”，“人的环境”与人之间辩证统一的关系性实践，是回答环境与人的关系问题的第一个理论前提。

II. What is the Relationship between the Change of “Human Activity” and “Self-Change”

二、“人的活动”改变与“自我”改变之间有何关系

The intrinsic relationship between the change of “human activity” and “self-change” is the second theoretical premise for answering the question of the relationship between environment and humanity. The *Theses* [on Feuerbach], as a notebook draft “hastily jotted down” by Marx, [5]5 “Nature-in-itself” (自在自然环境) — a term distinguishing nature as it exists independently of human activity (nature-in-itself) from nature as it is transformed and mediated by human practice (the “human environment” or “humanized nature”). was not intended for publication. The first publicly published version of the *Theses* was not Marx’s original manuscript, but was published by Engels as an appendix to *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* after his revisions. There are many specific differences between Engels’s revised version and Marx’s original manuscript. Regarding the thesis on “revolutionary practice”, Marx’s original manuscript reads: “the coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change”, while in Engels’s revised version it becomes: “the coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity”. The main difference is that Engels deleted “self-change”. Regarding the difference between Marx and Engels in handling the change of “human activity” and “self-change”, some scholars believe that the change of “human activity” emphasizes the change in the attributes of humanity as a collective, while “self-change” emphasizes the change in the attributes of each individual; other scholars emphasize that the change of “human activity” and “self-change” manifest the dual characteristics of the external objectivity and internal directivity of the practical function of Marx’s philosophy. The academic community mainly explores the difference between “self-change” and the change of “human activity” from different dimensions such as the distinction between the individual and the species or the distinction between internal and external, but there is a relative lack of understanding of the intrinsic relationship between the two from the educational dimension. The author believes that it is necessary to explore the dynamic relationship between the change of “human activity” and “self-change” in the context of “practice-education”, and to explore the subjective educational significance of the thesis on “revolutionary practice” in guiding the proletariat in conscious action and awakening of consciousness.

“人的活动”改变与“自我”改变之间的内在关系，是回答环境与人关系问题的第二个理论前提。《提纲》作为马克思“匆匆写成”的笔记草稿，并没有付印的计划。首次公开发表的《提纲》并非马克思的原稿，而是经由恩格斯修订后作为《路德维希·费尔巴哈和德国古典哲学的终结》的附录出版。恩格斯的修订稿和马克思的原稿存在许多具体的差别，其中关于“革命的实践”论断，马克思的原稿是“环境的改变和人的活动或自我改变的一致”，而在恩格斯的修订版中则变为“环境的改变和人的活动的一致”，最主要的区别在于恩格斯删去了“自我改变”。对于马克思和恩格斯在处理“人的活动”改变和“自我”改变上的差异问题，有学者认为“人的活动”改变强调人类作为一个群体的属性的改变，“自我”改变则强调每一个个体的属性的改变；也有学者强调“人的活动”改变与“自我”改变彰显了马克思哲学实践功能的外在对象性和内在指向性的双重特征。学界主要从个体与类的差别或内在与外在的区别等不同维度切入，探讨“自我”改变和“人的活动”改变之间的差异，但相对缺乏从教育维度展开对二者关系的内在理解。笔者认为，有必要在“实践—教育”语境中探究“人的活动”改变和“自我”改变的动态关系，探索“革命的实践”论断在指引无产阶级在自觉行动和意识觉醒方面的主体性教育意义。

In the thesis on “revolutionary practice”, Marx launches a concrete critique of 18th-century French materialism, which extolled the omnipotence of education, and achieves a thorough transcendence of the omnipotence of education through the internal logic of “practice–education”. 18th-century French materialism liberated education from the study and, for the first time, understood education on a social dimension as “the sum total of all conditions of life”, thereby enriching the connotation of education while refuting the then-dominant educational thought that revered theology and innate ideas. Because environment and education were placed on the same theoretical plane, the social-environmental determinism necessarily deduced the omnipotence of education, leading to an excessive elevation of the role of education while neglecting the subjective initiative of human beings actively transforming the objective environment. For 18th-century French materialism, all human development is determined by the external social environment and education, and the most important link in the social environment is the system of political laws; but the political-legal system itself is the product of the “opinions” of legislators. Therefore, 18th-century French materialism had to answer the question of where the legislators’ “opinions” came from. Because it overlooked that “the educator himself must be educated”, 18th-century French materialism reduced the formation of legislators’ “opinions” to the self-creation of “geniuses”, ultimately leading to an appeal to a heroic view of history centered on genius-like figures for the progress of society and history, and thereby giving rise to the utopian “French and English socialism and communism”. Although Helvétius and others started from materialism, they ultimately could not escape the ideological shackles of idealism; the omnipotence of education they championed understood the source of education only as either the objective environment external to humanity or purely subjective genius-creation. In the thesis on “revolutionary practice”, Marx realized that the source of education is neither the objective environment external to humanity nor purely subjective genius-creation; the content of education itself originates from the relational practice between “the human environment” and humanity. Marx revealed the internal logic of “practice–education”, namely, that practice possesses the educational function of changing “human activity” and changing the “self”, taking the dialectically unified relational practice between “the human environment” and humanity as the fundamental source of education, thereby restoring the driving force of socio-historical development to the practical activity of the revolutionary subject, and achieving a fundamental transcendence of the omnipotence of education.

在“革命的实践”论断中，马克思对推崇教育万能论的18世纪法国唯物主义展开具体批判，并以“实践—教育”的内在逻辑提出实现对教育万能论的彻底超越。18世纪的法国唯物主义将教育从书斋中解放出来，首次在社会维度上将教育理解为“一切生活条件的总和”，在丰富教育内涵的同时反驳了当时崇尚神学和天赋观念的教育思想。由于将环境和教育置于同一理论高度，社会环境决定论必然推演出教育万能论，导致过分拔高教育的作用，而忽视人主动改造客观环境的主体能动性。对于18世纪法国唯物主义来说，人的全部发展都由外部社会环境和教育决定，而社会环境中最重要的环节是政治法律制度，但政治法律制度本身是立法者“意见”决定的产物。因此，18世纪法国唯物主义需要回答立法者的“意见”从哪里来的问题。由于忽视了“教育者本人也是要受教育的”，18世纪法国唯物主义将立法者“意见”的形成仅仅归结为“天才”的自我创造，最终导致将社会历史的进步诉诸以天才式人物为中心的英雄史观，进而引出空想乌托邦式的“法国和英国的社会主义和共产主义”。尽管爱尔维修等人以唯物主义为起点，但他们最终未能摆脱唯心主义的思想桎梏，其推崇的教育万能论仅仅将教育的来源理解为外在于人的客观环境或纯粹主观的天才创造。马克思在“革命的实践”论断中意识到，教育的来源既不是外在于人的客观环境，更不是纯粹主观的天才创造，教育的内容本身源自“人的环境”与人之间的关系性实践。马克思揭示了“实践—教育”的内在逻辑，即实践具有使“人的活动”改变及“自我”改变的教育功能，将“人的环境”与人之间辩证统一的关系性实践作为教育的根本来源，从而将社会历史发展的动力还原为革命主体的实践活动，实现了对教育万能论的根本超越。

Marx’s thesis on “revolutionary practice” achieves a critique and transcendence of the omnipotence of education through the internal logic of “practice–education”, and answers the question of the relationship between the change of “human activity” and the change of the “self”. To understand this question, we need to return to the theoretical source of Marx’s construction of the internal logic of “practice–education”, that is, to explore Marx’s critical inheritance and creative transcendence of Hegel’s thought on “labor–formation” [Bildung]. From the perspective of the “labor–formation” thought’s revelation of the “essence of labor”, Hegel, through the “master–servant relationship” of self-consciousness, elucidates that in the process where labor serves as a negating mediation, the master, who attains “independent consciousness”, and the servant, who is a “dependent consciousness”, undergo a transformation of independence and dependence. The servant directly confronts the independent thing and carries out the “formation of the thing” through labor on the thing. It is precisely because of labor that “the servant, through the process of rediscovering himself, becomes conscious of his own inherent disposition”, and ultimately attains “the truth of independent consciousness”. Unlike the servant as the “laborer”, the master, as the enjoyer, comes into contact with the non-independent thing that has been transformed by the servant; for the master, the thing is merely an object for the satisfaction of desire. Because he lacks the mediating link of self-confirmation through negating labor in the “laboring formation of the thing”, the master instead loses his own independence and becomes a non-independent existence dependent on the thing. Hegel’s thought on “labor–formation” reveals the positive significance of labor for humanity. Marx critically inherited Hegel’s philosophical thought on labor and dialectically applied the logic of “practice–education” to the relationship between the change of “human activity” and the change of the “self”.

马克思的“革命的实践”论断以“实践—教育”的内在逻辑实现了对教育万能论的批判和超越，回答了“人的活动”改变与“自我”改变关系的问题。我们对这一问题的理解，需要回到马克思建构“实践—教育”内在逻辑的理论源头，即回到马克思对黑格尔“劳动—陶冶”思想的批判性继承和创造性超越中进行探索。从“劳动—陶冶”思想对“劳动的本质”揭示来看，黑格尔通过自我意识的“主奴关系”阐明，在以劳动为否定性中介的过程中，获得“独立的意识”的主人和作为“依赖的意识”的奴隶发生独立性与依赖性的转换。奴隶直接面对具有独立性的物，并在对物的劳动中进行“事物的陶冶”。正是因为劳动，“奴隶通过自己再重新发现自己的过程，才意识到他自己固有的意向”，最终获得“独立的意识的真理”。与作为“劳动者”的奴隶不同，主人作为享受者，其接触到的是经由奴隶改造过的非独立性事物，物对于主人来说只是满足欲望的对象。由于缺失了在“劳动陶冶事物”中通过否定性劳动进行自我确证的中介环节，主人反而丧失自身的独立性，转变为依赖于物的非独立存在。黑格尔的“劳动—陶冶”思想揭示了劳动对人的积极意义，马克思批判性地继承了黑格尔关于劳动的哲学思想，将“实践—教育”逻辑辩证运用于“人的活动”改变与“自我”改变之间关系之中。

The internal logic of Marx’s “practice–education” is initially elaborated in the implicit “master–servant relationship” in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, and is further externally manifested in the thesis on “revolutionary practice” in the *Theses on Feuerbach* as a dynamic generative relationship between the change of “human activity” and the change of the “self”. In the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx, by elaborating the implicit “master–servant relationship” between the worker and the capitalist, critically absorbed Hegel’s thought on “labor–formation” in the “master–servant relationship”, and achieved a creative transcendence of Hegel within the real “master–servant relationship”. First, the worker, as the proletariat who does not possess the means of production, and the capitalist, as the bourgeoisie, together constitute an implicit “master–servant relationship” in real life. The proletariat possesses non-independence; its survival depends on the necessary means of subsistence provided by the bourgeoisie, and in logical form it contains the negating moment of Hegel’s “master–servant relationship”. Second, practical activity possesses the educational function of awakening the self-consciousness of the proletariat; the proletariat “achieves the critique and transformation of the world and of itself in practice, and attains independent consciousness”, and in its ideological core it contains the negating thinking of Hegel’s “labor–formation”. At the same time, Marx was not confined to the level of self-consciousness; his implicit “master–servant relationship” achieved a double sublation of Hegel’s speculative “master–servant relationship” in terms of the real subject and the revolutionary goal. On the dimension of the real subject, Marx returned the essence of labor of self-consciousness in Hegel’s master–servant dialectic to the concrete proletarian subject; on the dimension of the revolutionary goal, he did not confine himself to the self-consciousness’s spiritual awakening in and for itself, but directed the goal of the awakening of the proletariat’s self-consciousness toward real revolutionary action; the internal logic of his “practice–education” directly acts on the practical activity of the revolutionary subject “changing the world”. Based on the critical absorption of the essence of Hegel’s “labor”, Marx’s exposition of the implicit “master–servant relationship” contains the dialectical thinking of “practice–education”, and answers the question of the relationship between the change of “human activity” and the change of the “self” through the internal logic of “practice–education”: the practical activity of the subject possesses the educational function of awakening self-consciousness; the change of the “self” directly acts on the revolutionary action of the subject consciously initiating the change of “human activity”, and at the same time constitutes the precondition for the awakening of the subject’s self-consciousness at a new stage, promoting the change of the subject’s “self”, and further consciously initiating the movement process of new practical activity. Marx achieved a critical inheritance of Hegel’s thought on “labor–formation” through the logic of “practice–education”, and by creatively transforming the dialectical essence of “labor” at the level of self-consciousness in Hegel into the dialectical core of “practice” at the real level of the revolutionary subject, he realized the elucidation of the dialectical relationship of two-way generation between the change of “human activity” and the change of the “self”.

马克思“实践—教育”的内在逻辑初步阐发于《1844年经济学哲学手稿》的隐性“主奴关系”中，并进一步在《提纲》的“革命的实践”论断中外在表征为“人的活动”改变和“自我”改变之间的动态生成关系。在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》中，马克思通过阐述工人与资本家之间的隐性“主奴关系”，批判性地吸收了黑格尔“主奴关系”中的“劳动—陶冶”思想，并在现实的“主奴关系”中实现对黑格尔的创造性超越。首先，工人作为不占有生产资料的无产阶级与作为资产阶级的资本家共同构成现实生活中的隐性“主奴关系”。无产阶级具有非独立性，其生存依赖于资产阶级给予的必要生活资料，在逻辑形式上具备黑格尔“主奴关系”中的否定性环节。其次，实践活动具备唤醒无产阶级自我意识的教育功能，无产阶级“在实践中实现对世界和自身的批判与改造，获得独立的意识”，在思想内核上蕴含黑格尔“劳动—陶冶”的否定性思维。同时，马克思并未局限在自我意识层面，其隐性“主奴关系”在现实主体和革命目标上实现了对黑格尔思辨“主奴关系”的双重扬弃。在现实主体维度，马克思将黑格尔主奴辩证法中自我意识的劳动本质重新归还给具体的无产阶级主体；在革命目标维度，他并未囿于自我意识的自在自为精神觉醒，而是将无产阶级自我意识觉醒的目标指向现实的革命行动，其“实践—教育”的内在逻辑直接作用于革命主体“改变世界”的实践活动。基于对黑格尔“劳动”本质的批判性吸收，马克思对隐性“主奴关系”的论述蕴含“实践—教育”辩证思维，以“实践—教育”的内在逻辑回答“人的活动”改变与“自我”改变的关系问题：主体的实践活动具有唤醒自我意识的教育功能，“自我”改变直接作用于主体自觉发起“人的活动”改变的革命行动，同时也构成主体在新阶段自我意识唤醒的前提，推动主体的“自我”改变，并进一步自觉发起新的实践活动的运动过程。马克思以“实践—教育”逻辑实现对黑格尔“劳动—陶冶”思想的批判性继承，通过将黑格尔在自我意识层面的辩证“劳动”本质，创造性改造为革命主体在现实层面的辩证“实践”内核，实现了对“人的活动”改变和“自我”改变之间双向生成的辩证关系阐发。

The alteration of “human activity” and the alteration of the “self,” as external manifestations of the logic of “practice–education,” constitute the subjective dimension of Marx’s answer to the question of the relationship between environment and humanity. The two exhibit a dynamically generative relationship in “revolutionary practice”: the alteration of “human activity,” i.e., the occurrence of the subject’s action, is the practical theme that determines the establishment of the subject’s consciousness; the alteration of the “self,” i.e., the awakening of the subject’s consciousness, is the revolutionary motive that guides the subject’s conscious action. Examining the alteration of the “self” from the perspective of the alteration of “human activity,” the alteration of “human activity,” as the premise and purpose of the alteration of the “self,” constitutes the practical theme of the alteration of the “self.” The awakening of the proletariat’s self-consciousness can only be realized in the concrete practice of “human activity,” and the ultimate aim of the awakening of self-consciousness is to initiate revolutionary practical action. The proletariat forges its own revolutionary subject qualification in concrete practical activities; by facing practice and delving into social history, it then manifests its revolutionary subjectivity in the awakening of self-consciousness. Examining the alteration of “human activity” from the perspective of the alteration of the “self,” the awakening of the proletariat’s self-consciousness is the key to its revolutionary action possessing autonomy. The awakening of self-consciousness enables the proletariat to consciously obtain identification with the revolutionary subject and, in practical activities, awakens the proletariat’s self-consciousness [1]1 “Self-consciousness” (自为意识) — a term derived from Hegelian and Marxist philosophy, indicating consciousness that is aware of itself as an active, autonomous subject, as opposed to mere consciousness-in-itself (自在意识). daring to initiate struggle actions. Only by clarifying the “meaning of action” can the subject actively and consciously unfold revolutionary action; “the reform of consciousness consists only in enabling the world to recognize its own consciousness, in waking it from its dream of itself, in explaining its own actions to it.” [2]2 This is a quotation from Marx’s letter to Arnold Ruge (September 1843), published in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher. The awakening of the proletariat’s self-consciousness plays a crucial role in revolutionary action. If one neglects to understand the dynamically generative relationship between the alteration of “human activity” and the alteration of the “self” from the internal logic of “practice–education,” one cannot comprehend the educational significance of the thesis of “revolutionary practice” for the revolutionary subject in terms of action consciousness and consciousness awakening.

“人的活动”改变和“自我”改变作为“实践—教育”逻辑的外在表征，构成马克思回答环境与人关系问题的主体性向度，二者在“革命的实践”中表现出双向生成的动态关系：“人的活动”改变即主体行动的发生是决定主体意识确立的实践性主题，“自我”改变即主体意识的觉醒是引导主体行动自觉的革命性动因。从“人的活动”改变出发审视“自我”改变，“人的活动”改变作为“自我”改变的前提和目的，构成“自我”改变的实践性主题。无产阶级自我意识的觉醒只有在“人的活动”的具体实践中才能够实现，自我意识觉醒的最终目的在于发起革命性实践行动。无产阶级在具体的实践活动中锻造自身的革命主体资格，通过面向实践并深入社会历史，进而在自我意识的觉醒中开显其革命主体性。从“自我”改变出发看“人的活动”改变，无产阶级自我意识的觉醒是其革命行动具备自主性的关键。自我意识的觉醒能够使无产阶级自觉获得对革命主体的身份认同，并在实践活动中唤醒无产阶级敢于发起斗争行动的自为意识。只有明确“行动的意义”，主体才能主动自觉地展开革命行动，“意识的改革只在于使世界认清本身的意识，使它从对于自身的迷梦中惊醒过来，向它说明它自己的行动”。无产阶级的自我意识觉醒对于革命的行动具有关键作用。如果忽视从“实践—教育”的内在逻辑理解“人的活动”改变和“自我”改变之间的动态生成关系，就无法理解“革命的实践”论断对革命主体在行动自觉与意识觉醒层面的主体性教育意义。

The thesis of “revolutionary practice” contains the internal thread of “practice–education,” whose external manifestations are the alteration of “human activity” and the “self.” Marx’s exposition of the bidirectional dynamically generative relationship between the two dialectically absorbs, at the methodological level, Hegel’s thought of “labor–formation” (Bildung). [3]3 “Labor–formation” (劳动–陶冶) — a reference to Hegel’s concept of Bildung (formation or cultivation) through labor, as developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit, where the subject is shaped and transformed through its practical activity on the external world. The alteration of “human activity” is the practical theme of the alteration of the “self”; the alteration of the “self” is the revolutionary motive for the conscious alteration of “human activity.” On this basis, it lays the dual subjective foundation of action and consciousness for the proletariat. Exploring the dynamically generative relationship between the alteration of “human activity” and the alteration of the “self” based on the subjective dimension is the second theoretical premise for answering the question of the relationship between environment and humanity.

“革命的实践”论断蕴含“实践—教育”的内在线索，外在表征为“人的活动”和“自我”的改变。马克思对二者双向动态生成关系的论述在方法论层面辩证吸收了黑格尔的“劳动—陶冶”思想，“人的活动”改变是“自我”改变的实践性主题，“自我”改变是“人的活动”自觉改变的革命性动因，以此为无产阶级奠定行动和意识的双重主体性基础。基于主体性维度探索“人的活动”改变及“自我”改变之间的动态生成关系，是回答环境与人关系问题的第二个理论前提。

III. Why the Relationship between Environment and Humanity “Can Only” Be Regarded as “Revolutionary Practice”

三、环境与人的关系为何“只能”被视为“革命的实践”

In the thesis of “revolutionary practice,” why can the relationship between environment and humanity “only” be regarded as “revolutionary practice”? “Only” means that the relationship between environment and humanity can be correctly understood solely within the context of “revolutionary practice.” Based on the clarification of the premise context of the social main line, the natural background, and the subjective dimension in the relationship between environment and humanity, Marx transcends the intuitive practice of the subject–object dichotomy of old materialism through the dialectically unified relational practice, taking this as the “practice” core of new materialism. He clearly answers that the relationship between environment and humanity “can only be regarded as and rationally understood as revolutionary practice,” [4]4 This is a direct quotation from Marx’s “Theses on Feuerbach” (1845), Thesis III: “The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice.” embodying the historical, mediating, and revolutionary characteristics of new materialism.

在“革命的实践”论断中，环境与人的关系为何“只能”被视为“革命的实践”？“只能”意味着有且仅有在“革命的实践”语境中才能正确理解环境与人的关系。基于对环境与人关系中社会性主线、自然性底色和主体性向度的前提语境澄明，马克思以辩证统一的关系性实践超越旧唯物主义主客二分的直观性实践，以此作为新唯物主义的“实践”内核，明确回答环境与人的关系“只能被看做是并合理地理解为革命的实践”，体现了新唯物主义的历史性、中介性和革命性特征。

That the relationship between environment and humanity “can only” be regarded as “revolutionary practice” helps to unravel the riddle of the development of human history and manifests the historical character of new materialism. First, pure nature-in-itself [5]5 “Nature-in-itself” (自在自然环境) — a term distinguishing nature as it exists independently of human activity (nature-in-itself) from nature as it is transformed and mediated by human practice (the “human environment” or “humanized nature”). sets limits for human practical activity; acknowledging the priority of nature-in-itself constitutes the objective historical premise for the establishment of new materialism. Human practical activity possesses a finite dynamic “boundary.” The finitude of the so-called “boundary” does not mean that human practical activity has a predetermined absolute end point of development, but rather that human practical activity within the “human environment” will continuously encounter objective limitations from nature-in-itself. The dynamic nature of the “boundary” means that, as the scope of human practical activity gradually expands, nature-in-itself will also be continuously incorporated into the “human environment.” Along with the expansion of the scope of the “human environment,” the “boundary” of practice itself will also change dynamically. However, it must be acknowledged that beyond the current scope of human practical activity, there still exists much nature-in-itself that has not yet been incorporated into the “human environment.” When facing pure nature-in-itself, humanity should “maintain a vigilance and self-awareness,” and “recognizing humanity’s dependence on the natural environment is crucial for a rational understanding of the historical process.” [6]6 The internal quotation appears to be the author’s paraphrase or a reference to a secondary source; no specific source is provided in the original text. Second, exploring the objective historical laws of human development is the theoretical content of Marx’s new materialism. “The standpoint of the new materialism is human society or social humanity.” [7]7 This is a direct quotation from Marx’s “Theses on Feuerbach” (1845), Thesis X. The fundamental purpose of Marx’s construction of new materialism is to reveal the objective historical laws of human development and thereby endow new materialism with the real possibility of leading to human liberation. Although nature-in-itself serves as the prior premise for the establishment of new materialism, it does not itself constitute the object of study of new materialism. Marx takes the “human environment” as his object of study, dedicating himself to revealing the dynamic laws of human historical development through the relational practice between the “human environment” and humanity, thereby unraveling the riddle of human historical development.

环境与人的关系“只能”被视为“革命的实践”，有助于解答人类历史发展之谜，彰显新唯物主义的历史性特征。首先，纯粹的自在自然环境为人类的实践活动设定界限，承认自在自然环境的先在性构成新唯物主义成立的客观历史性前提。人类的实践活动存在有限的动态“边界”。所谓“边界”的有限性，并非指人类的实践活动具有一个既定的绝对发展终点，而是指人类在“人的环境”中的实践活动会不断受到自在自然环境的客观限制。“边界”的动态性意味着，随着人类实践活动范围的逐渐扩大，自在自然环境也会不断被纳入“人的环境”。伴随“人的环境”范围扩大，实践本身的“边界”也会随之动态变化。但必须承认的是，在人类当前的实践活动之外，仍然存在很多尚未被纳入“人的环境”的自在自然环境范畴，人类在面对纯粹的自在自然环境时理应“保持一种警醒与自觉”，“承认人类对自然环境的依赖对于合理理解历史进程是至关重要的”。其次，探索人的发展的客观历史性规律是马克思新唯物主义的理论内容。“新唯物主义的立脚点则是人类社会或社会的人类”，马克思建构新唯物主义的根本目的在于揭示人的发展的客观历史性规律，并以此使新唯物主义具备通向人类解放的现实可能。自在自然环境虽作为新唯物主义成立的先在性前提，但其本身并不构成新唯物主义的研究对象。马克思以“人的环境”为研究对象，致力于在“人的环境”与人之间的关系性实践中揭示人类历史发展的动态规律，解开人类历史发展之谜。

That the relationship between environment and humanity “can only” be regarded as “revolutionary practice,” as a manifesto of new materialism transcending old materialism, manifests the mediating character of new materialism. In the development of materialism, the relationship between environment and humanity has always been an important question for materialists. The mechanical materialism of the 17th century, influenced by the geographical determinism of the time, emphasized the unidirectional determination of the natural environment over humanity, but did not distinguish between nature-in-itself and humanized nature. It directly applied the intuitive practice of the subject–object dichotomy to the relationship between humanity and nature as a whole, neglecting the dialectically unified relational practice between humanized nature and humanity. The French materialism of the 18th century understood the relationship between environment and humanity through social environmental determinism, still handling the relationship between social environment and humanity with the intuitive practice of the subject–object dichotomy. Marx’s new materialism, through the dialectically unified relational practice between the “human environment” and humanity, overcomes the predicament of intuitive practice caused by the subject–object dichotomy mode of thinking of old materialism. Regarding the concept of “practice” in Marx’s new materialism, there exist two tendencies in academic circles that interpret it from different levels of subject and object: one emphasizes Marx’s concept of “practice” as the “practical viewpoint” from the subjective level of the mode of thinking, and the other understands it as the “existential ontology” of practice from the objective level of social being. Starting from the thesis of “revolutionary practice,” “practice” serves as the dialectically unified mediation between environment and humanity; interpretations that are overly subjectivized or overly objectivized do not quite conform to the mediating character of Marx’s own concept of “practice.” The proposal of relational practice re-establishes the non-ontological foundation of “practice,” marking Marx’s thorough negation of the “essentialist” mode of thinking of old metaphysics. Only by understanding the concept of “practice” in “revolutionary practice” from the mediating dimension does it conform to the “practice” core of Marx’s new materialism.

环境与人的关系“只能”被视为“革命的实践”，作为超越旧唯物主义的新唯物主义宣言，彰显新唯物主义的中介性特征。在唯物主义的发展历程中，环境与人的关系始终是唯物主义者思考的重要问题。17世纪的机械唯物主义受到当时地理环境决定论的影响，强调自然环境对人的单向决定作用，但并未区分自在自然环境和人化自然环境，将主客二分的直观性实践直接运用于人与整体性自然的关系，忽视了人化自然环境与人之间辩证统一的关系性实践。18世纪的法国唯物主义以社会环境决定论理解环境与人的关系，仍是以主客二分的直观性实践处理社会环境与人之间的关系。马克思的新唯物主义通过“人的环境”与人之间辩证统一的关系性实践，克服旧唯物主义主客二分式思维方式导致的直观性实践困境。关于马克思新唯物主义中的“实践”概念，学界存在从主体和客体不同层面展开解读的两种倾向，即从思维方式的主体层面强调马克思的“实践”概念作为“实践观点”，以及从社会存在的客体层面将其理解为“生存论的本体论”的实践。从“革命的实践”论断出发，“实践”作为环境与人之间辩证统一的中介，过于主体化或客体化的解读方式均不太符合马克思“实践”概念本身的中介性特征。关系性实践的提出重新奠定“实践”的非本体论基础，标志着马克思对旧形而上学“本质式”思维方式的彻底否定。只有从中介性维度理解“革命的实践”中的“实践”概念，才符合马克思新唯物主义的“实践”内核。

The relationship between environment and humanity “can only” be understood as “revolutionary practice”; only in this sense can the new materialism open onto the communist movement and manifest the revolutionary character of Marx’s new materialism. In *The Holy Family*, Marx reveals that eighteenth-century French materialism “is necessarily connected with communism and socialism,” but because eighteenth-century French materialism understands the relationship between environment and humanity as a relationship of intuitive practice, “the human environment” always remains a pure object external to humanity, and the “educator” and the “educated” stand opposed to each other, ultimately ending, within an elitist conception of history, in the utopia of utopian socialism. In the *Theses* [on Feuerbach], Marx takes up the internal thread that leads from materialism to communism and, within the relational practice between “the human environment” and humanity, demonstrates the historical necessity by which the new materialism of “practice” opens onto revolutionary communism. First, the new materialism takes “human society” as its standpoint, establishes the objective context of revolution within “the human environment,” and, by revealing the dynamic laws of human historical development, points to the blueprint of scientific socialism that leads to human emancipation. Second, following the internal thread of “practice–education,” the new materialism works to make the proletariat a true class-for-itself, reveals its historical responsibility as the revolutionary subject of the communist movement, and thereby, within the dynamic generative relationship between the transformation of “human activity” and the transformation of the “self,” lays the dual subjective foundation for the proletariat’s consciousness of action and consciousness of awakening. Only by understanding the relationship between “the human environment” and humanity as “revolutionary practice” can we transcend the utopian trap that all previous “materialisms” inevitably encountered and, within Marx’s new materialism, open up the revolutionary possibility of the communist movement. As the logical starting point that internally leads to communist theory, the new materialism provides the scientific theory and fundamental method for realizing human emancipation. Compared with the historical materialism of *The German Ideology* and of *Capital* and its manuscripts, the new materialism of “practice” in the *Theses* only provides a philosophical sketch from the height of principle, grasping the main points; it has not yet grasped the objective essence of historical materialism within the concrete forms of capitalist relations of production. Yet one should not overlook the transcendent implications of the new materialism of “practice” in the *Theses* itself. Following the step-by-step inquiry into the thesis of “revolutionary practice,” the social main line, the natural substrate, and the subjective dimension of the new materialism in the *Theses* contain a historical thinking that unifies social history, natural history, and human history, constituting the theoretical foundation on which Marx established historical materialism. Clarifying the authentic connotation of the thesis of “revolutionary practice” is conducive to grasping the internal evolutionary logic of Marx’s early materialist thought and to revealing the revolutionary ideal of the new materialism of “practice” that strives to “change the world.”

环境与人的关系“只能”被视为“革命的实践”，只有在这一意义上新唯物主义才能够通向共产主义运动，彰显马克思新唯物主义的革命性特征。在《神圣家族》中，马克思揭示了18世纪法国唯物主义“同共产主义和社会主义有着必然的联系”，但由于18世纪法国唯物主义将环境与人的关系理解为直观性实践关系，“人的环境”始终是外在于人的纯粹客体，“教育者”和“被教育者”互相对立，最终只能在精英史观中走向空想社会主义的乌托邦。在《提纲》中，马克思承续唯物主义通往共产主义的内在线索，在“人的环境”与人之间的关系性实践中，论证“实践”的新唯物主义通向革命的共产主义的历史必然性。首先，新唯物主义以“人类社会”为立脚点，在“人的环境”中确立革命的客观语境，通过揭示人类历史发展的动态规律，指明通往人类解放的科学社会主义蓝图。其次，从“实践—教育”的内在线索看，新唯物主义致力于使无产阶级成为真正的自在自为阶级，揭示其作为共产主义运动革命主体的历史责任，进而在“人的活动”改变和“自我”改变之间的动态生成关系中，为无产阶级奠定行动自觉和意识觉醒的双重主体性基础。只有以“革命的实践”理解“人的环境”与人的关系，才能够超越以往“一切唯物主义”必然遭遇的乌托邦陷阱，在马克思的新唯物主义中开启共产主义运动的革命性可能。新唯物主义思想作为内在通往共产主义理论的逻辑起点，提供了实现人类解放的科学理论与根本方法。与《德意志意识形态》和《资本论》及其手稿中的历史唯物主义相比，《提纲》中“实践”的新唯物主义只是从原则高度进行提纲挈领的哲学式刻画，尚未在资本主义生产关系的具体形态中把握历史唯物主义的客观性本质，但也不应忽视《提纲》中“实践”的新唯物主义自身的超越性意蕴。依循对“革命的实践”论断的层层追问，《提纲》中新唯物主义的社会性主线、自然性底色和主体性向度，内蕴社会史、自然史和人类史相统一的历史性思维，构成马克思确立历史唯物主义的理论基点。廓清“革命的实践”论断的本真内涵，有利于领会马克思早期唯物主义思想的内在演进逻辑，揭示“实践”的新唯物主义力求“改变世界”的革命理想。

Author of this article: Liu Tongfang (born 1966– ), Distinguished Professor of the Ministry of Education’s “Changjiang Scholars” Program, Dean and Professor of the School of Marxism at Zhejiang University, Chief Expert of the Center for Theoretical Innovation and Communication of Marxism at Zhejiang University

本文作者：刘同舫（1966- ），教育部“长江学者”特聘教授，浙江大学马克思主义学院院长、教授，浙江大学马克思主义理论创新与传播研究中心首席专家

Online editor: Jin Qiu

网络编辑：金秋

Source: *Studies on Marxism*, Issue 6, 2024

文章来源：《马克思主义研究》2024年第6期