The Critique of Hegel and Political Economy in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*

In Hegel’s grasp and understanding of political economy, political economy is “a science that starts from the standpoint of need and labor and then elucidates these relations and movements in accordance with the qualitative and quantitative determinations of mass relations and mass movements, as well as their complexity.” For Adam Smith, Ricardo, and others, this discipline sought to identify the “invisible hand,” whereas for Hegel, it aimed “to find the intelligence that operates in things and regulates them,” that is, to find reason. Precisely because political economy is a science that discovers intelligence or reveals reason, its object of study is what is necessary rather than what is contingent. Hegel’s philosophical critique and philosophical transformation of political economy had its reasons, the chief being to lay a political-economic foundation for his theory of the state. In Hegel’s philosophical critique and philosophical transformation of political economy, the logical thread that emerges is: “need – property – activity and labor – division of labor – wealth – estate – state.” In this logical thread, one can see both the logical starting point of Hegel’s critique of political economy and its theoretical destination. This logical thread differs from the logical line of Marx’s critique of national economy or political economy in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (hereinafter referred to as the *Manuscripts*). In the *Manuscripts*, the logical thread that unfolds is: “need – labor – division of labor – private property – class – state – communism.” For Marx, communism is the sublation of private property or civil society, not the state.

在黑格尔对政治经济学的把握与认识中，政治经济学就是从“需要和劳动的观点出发、然后按照群众关系和群众运动的质和量的规定性以及它们的复杂性来阐明这些关系和运动的一门科学”。这门学科，对于亚当·斯密、李嘉图等人而言就是要找出那只“看不见的手”，而对于黑格尔来说，就是要“找出在事物中发生作用并调节着事物的理智”，也即要找出理性。正是因为政治经济学是一门找出理智或发现理性的科学，因而对于政治经济学而言，其研究对象是必然性的东西而不是那些偶然性的东西。黑格尔对政治经济学进行哲学批判与哲学改造是有其原因的，最主要的原因就是为其国家学说奠定政治经济学基础。在黑格尔对政治经济学的哲学批判与哲学改造中，展现出来的逻辑主线是：“需要—所有权—活动和劳动—分工—财富—等级—国家。”在这条逻辑主线中，既可以看到黑格尔批判政治经济学的逻辑起点，也可以看到其批判政治经济学的理论归宿。这条逻辑主线与马克思在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》（以下简称《手稿》）中对国民经济学或政治经济学进行批判的逻辑线条是有所不同的。在《手稿》中展现的是“需要—劳动—分工—私有财产—阶级—国家—共产主义”这样一条逻辑主线。在马克思这里，共产主义是对私有财产或市民社会的扬弃，而不是国家。

Hegel’s Critique of Political Economy and Philosophical Construction Based on the Purpose of Freedom

黑格尔基于自由目的的政治经济学批判与哲学建构

Critiquing the main propositions and core categories of political economy from the height of philosophy is an important path that Hegel opened up in the history of political-economic research. Unlike Adam Smith, Ricardo, and others, who developed their political-economic research based on theoretical assumptions and abstract labor, Hegel’s philosophical critique and transformation of political economy proceeded from reality. In Hegel’s own logical reasoning and theoretical understanding, no scientific research can proceed from assumptions; it must proceed from reality.

从哲学的高度来批判政治经济学的主要命题与核心范畴，是黑格尔在政治经济学研究历史上开辟的一条重要路径。与亚当·斯密、李嘉图等人基于理论假设与抽象劳动来展开政治经济学研究不同，黑格尔对政治经济学的哲学批判与改造是从现实出发的。在黑格尔的自身逻辑理路与理论认知中，任何科学的研究，都不能从假设出发，而要从现实出发。

Of course, Hegel’s “reality” refers to what conforms to necessity. Therefore, for Hegel, proceeding from reality is in fact proceeding from necessity. For Hegel, “true actuality is necessity,” that is, freedom; hence, the exploration of actuality is the exploration of necessity, and therefore also the exploration of freedom. Consequently, to philosophically critique and transform the political economy of Adam Smith, Ricardo, and others, freedom necessarily had to be Hegel’s theoretical entry point and theoretical origin, and his powerful weapon was his dialectics. In civil society, individuals who exist as independent atoms of civil society or who take their own ends as their purpose are individuals possessing free will. Therefore, proceeding from the individual’s free will necessarily became a realistic starting point for Hegel’s reconstruction of political economy. In civil society, the individual’s free will often manifests as the individual’s need; man realizes his individual free will by satisfying his own needs. Hence, in this sense, the process of an individual satisfying his own needs can be seen as the process of realizing his individual free will. For the civil society on which individuals depend for their existence, it is constituted by three moments. Among the three moments of civil society, the system of needs is an important moment. This moment “mediates need through the labor of the individual and through the labor and satisfaction of needs of all other individuals, thereby providing for the individual’s satisfaction.” In other words, civil society develops and sublimates towards the state in the dialectical movement between need and the labor that satisfies need.

当然黑格尔的现实，是指合乎必然性的东西。因此，在黑格尔那里，从现实出发，事实上是从必然性出发。在黑格尔那里，“真实的现实性就是必然性”，也即自由，故而对现实性的探索，就是对必然性的探索，因而也是对自由的探索。因此，要对亚当·斯密、李嘉图等人的政治经济学进行哲学批判与改造，自由必然是黑格尔批判的理论切入点与理论原点，而有力武器就是其辩证法。在市民社会中，作为市民社会的独立原子而存在的个人或以自身的目的为目的的个人，是拥有自由意志的个人。因此，从个人的自由意志出发，就必然成为黑格尔重构政治经济学的一个现实起点。在市民社会中，个人的自由意志往往表现为个人的需要，人就是通过满足自身的需要来使个人自由意志现实化。故而从这个意义上讲，个人满足自身需要的过程，可以视为个人的自由意志得到实现的过程。对于个人所赖以生存的市民社会而言，其是由三个环节所构成的，在市民社会的三个环节中，需要的体系是其重要环节，这个环节，“通过个人的劳动以及通过其他一切人的劳动与需要的满足，使需要得到中介，个人得到满足”。换句话讲，市民社会就是在需要与满足需要的劳动之间的辩证运动中发展并向国家升华的。

In Hegel’s view, “for man to exist as the Idea, he must give his freedom an external sphere.” For man, the external manifestation of his inner free will and the inner free right (the right of personality) belonging to free will is the ownership of things. That is to say, in Hegel’s understanding and grasp of free will and free right, property exists as something external to man’s free will. As he himself believed, “man exists as reason only in property,” that is, man exists as a person with free will only in property.

在黑格尔看来，“人为了作为理念而存在，必须给它的自由以外部的领域”。对于人而言，其内在自由意志以及自由意志所具有的内在的自由权利（人格权）的外在表现就是对物的所有权。也就是说，在黑格尔对自由意志与自由权利的认识与把握中，所有权就是作为人的自由意志以外的东西而存在的。正如他自身所认为的那样，“人唯有在所有权中才是作为理性而存在的”，也即人唯有在所有权中才是作为具有自由意志的人而存在的。

For man, the right of personality is an inalienable right, but the ownership of things, which exists as the externalization and reification of the right of personality, is alienable. Man has the absolute right to appropriate all things for himself; this is the embodiment of his freedom. Therefore, understood from the perspective of freedom, property related to ownership appears on the surface as a means to satisfy needs, but from a substantive perspective, “property is the first determinate being of freedom; it is itself an essential end.” That is to say, property, as the reified form of ownership, is in fact the purpose of freedom, not the means to realize freedom; in other words, it is not the means to satisfy needs, but the satisfaction of needs itself. On the issue of property, ownership is its qualitative determination, while value, or money as the symbol of value, is its quantitative determination; its quantitative determination is determined by its qualitative determination and is also a reflection of its qualitative determination. It is precisely because of this that Hegel arrived at the understanding that “in property, the quantitative determination arising from the qualitative determination is value.” In civil society, value acquires the external form of money. In civil society, money is often regarded as a symbol of wealth, and thus can formally satisfy man’s needs, that is, formally embody man’s free will or reflect his free right. In Hegel’s view, the diversification of needs and the diversification of means or methods to satisfy needs will form various universal groups in civil society, that is, different estates. These estates constitute the second foundation of the state (the first foundation is the family). These estates include “the substantial or immediate estate, the reflective or formal estate, and the universal estate.” Without the existence of these estates, there would be no existence of the state; the state is established on the foundation of these estates. At this point, political economy no longer exists as national economy but exists as a part of his theory of the state.

对于人而言，人格权是其不可转让的权利，但作为人格权的外化与物化而存在的对物的所有权则是可以转让的。人拥有将一切物据为己有的绝对权利，这是人的自由的体现。因而，从自由的角度来理解的话，与所有权相关的财产，表面看是满足需要的手段，但从实质的角度讲，“财产是自由最初的定在，它本身是本质的目的”。也就是说，作为所有权的物化形式的财产，事实上是自由的目的而不是实现自由的手段，也即不是满足需要的手段，而是需要得到满足本身。在财产这个问题上，所有权是其质的规定性，而价值或作为价值的符号而存在的货币是其量的规定性，其量的规定性是由其质的规定性所决定的，也是其质的规定性的反映。也正是因为如此，黑格尔得出这样的一个认识，即“在财产方面，由质的规定性所产生的量的规定性，便是价值”。在市民社会中，价值取得了货币这个外在形式。在市民社会中，货币往往被视为财富的象征，因而也可以在形式上满足人的需要，即在形式上体现了人的自由意志或反映了人的自由权利。在黑格尔看来，需要的多样化、满足需要的手段或方式的多样化，会在市民社会中形成各种普遍的集团，也即不同的等级，这些等级构成了国家的第二个基础（第一个基础是家庭），这些等级包括“实体性的或直接的等级，反思的或形式的等级，以及普遍的等级”。没有这些等级的存在，也就没有国家的存在，国家就是建立在这些等级的基础之上的。至此，政治经济学不再是作为国民经济学而存在，而是作为其国家学说的一部分而存在。

The Human Turn and Shift of Purpose in the Critique of Political Economy in the *Manuscripts*

《手稿》对政治经济学批判的人间转向与目的转换

Clearly, Hegel’s understanding of property, of value or money, and of estates is fundamentally different from the political-economic thought of Adam Smith, Ricardo, and others. This analysis of the essence of ownership, property (relations of production), value, or money introduces political economy into the perspective of the species-essence of man and provides a new interpretation of them from the dimension of that species-essence. This interpretation is evidently something that the general theory of political economy of Adam Smith, Ricardo, and others cannot explain; it goes beyond the depth and breadth of their exploration of political economy, thereby also returning political economy to the research track of the science of man. From this perspective, it also provided Marx with a new dimension of understanding for criticizing national economy or political economy from the height of philosophy. This new dimension found a new path of explanation and a path of resolution for the difficult matter of expressing an opinion on material interests that Marx encountered in 1842–1843, and it also provided a new interpretive logic for how Marx could achieve an organic integration of economics and communism. From the perspective of Marx’s understanding of communism, “the establishment of communism essentially has an economic character.” [4]4 This quotation is from Marx’s *The German Ideology* (1845–1846), Part I, where he argues that communism is not a moral ideal but a real movement arising from the economic contradictions of capitalist society. Since the establishment of communism essentially has an economic character, it is by understanding and grasping communism from the economic dimension that one can truly and scientifically comprehend and recognize the essence of communism. Yet the existing economics, especially the political economy of Adam Smith, Ricardo, Mill, and others, clearly cannot provide a scientific method for scientifically interpreting and correctly understanding communism. Since the existing national economy or political economy cannot provide this, is it possible, as Hegel did, to criticize and reconstruct national economy or political economy from the philosophical dimension? On this question, Marx evidently made some attempts and put them into action. The *Manuscripts* are the manifestation of these attempts and also a theoretical action to resolve this problem.

显然，黑格尔对财产的认识、对价值或货币的认识、对于等级的认识，与亚当·斯密、李嘉图等人的政治经济学思想有着本质上的不同。这种对所有权、财产（生产关系）、价值或货币的本质分析，把政治经济学引入到了人的类本质的视野中，并从人的类本质的维度对它们做了新的注释。这种注释显然不是亚当·斯密、李嘉图等人的政治经济学的一般理论所能阐释的，超出了亚当·斯密、李嘉图等人的政治经济学探索深度与广度，从而也使得政治经济学回归了人学的研究轨道。从这个角度讲，它也为马克思从哲学的高度去批判国民经济学或政治经济学提供了新的认识维度。这个新的维度为马克思在1842—1843年所遇到的在物质利益上发表意见的难事找到了新的解释路径与解决路径，也为马克思如何实现经济学与共产主义的有机结合提供了新的阐释思维。从马克思对共产主义的认识来看，“建立共产主义实质上具有经济的性质”，既然建立共产主义实质上具有经济的性质，那么从经济学的维度来理解与把握共产主义才能真正科学地理解与认识共产主义的实质。但已有的经济学特别是亚当·斯密、李嘉图、穆勒等人的政治经济学，显然无法为科学解读与正确认识共产主义提供科学方法。既然已有的国民经济学或政治经济学无法提供，那么以黑格尔那样从哲学的维度去批判与重建国民经济学或政治经济学是否可能？对于这个问题，显然马克思是有所尝试的，也是付诸行动了的。《手稿》就是其尝试的表现，也是对解决这个问题在理论上的行动。

In the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, Marx’s critique of Hegel’s philosophy of right in fact contains a critique of his political-economic thought. Although Hegel’s political-economic thought is built upon the political-economic thought of Adam Smith, Ricardo, and others, Hegel’s critique of them does not proceed from the earthly world to criticize political economy, but from the heavenly kingdom. In Marx’s view, this kind of topsy-turvy critique by Hegel cannot reveal the problems inherent in existing political economy itself, nor can it provide a scientific interpretation of what happens in civil society and its inner necessity, and still less can it provide any substantive help for the freedom and liberation of real human beings. Therefore, it is very necessary to directly criticize the political economy or national economy of Adam Smith, Ricardo, Mill, and others from the earthly dimension or based on “human society or social humanity.” As is well known, in the “Preface” to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx not only explained the initial motive for why he went to study economic problems, but also made a self-criticism of his own early mistaken understanding of and engagement with communism. The difficult matter of expressing an opinion on material interests in 1842–1843 and his mistaken understanding of communism can be said to be the main reasons Marx wrote the *Manuscripts*.

在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中，马克思对黑格尔法哲学思想的批判，事实上蕴含着对其政治经济学思想的批判。虽然黑格尔的政治经济学思想是建立在亚当·斯密、李嘉图等人的政治经济学思想之上的，但黑格尔对他们的批判不是从人间出发去批判政治经济学，而是从天国出发去批判政治经济学。在马克思看来，黑格尔这种头足倒置式的批判并不能揭示已有政治经济学本身存在的问题，也不能对市民社会发生的事情以及其内在的必然性给予科学解读，更不能为现实的人的自由与解放提供任何实质性的帮助，因此，从人间的维度或立足于“人类社会或社会化的人类”来对亚当·斯密、李嘉图、穆勒等人的政治经济学或国民经济学本身进行直接批判是非常必要的。众所周知，在《〈政治经济学批判〉序言》中，马克思不仅对自己为何要去研究经济问题的最初动因做了一个说明，同时还对自身早期接触与评判共产主义的错误认知做了自我批评。1842—1843年马克思对物质利益发表意见的难事以及其对共产主义的错误认知，可以说是马克思写作《手稿》的主要原因。

This can be explained by the two important themes of the *Manuscripts*, namely the critique of national economy or political economy and communism. If Hegel’s philosophical critique and construction of political economy served as the theoretical preparation and foundation for his theory of the state, then Marx’s philosophical critique and construction of political economy or national economy in the *Manuscripts* served as the theoretical preparation and foundation for his new worldview and communism.

这个可以从《手稿》的两个重要主题即国民经济学批判或政治经济学批判与共产主义得到说明。如果说黑格尔对政治经济学的哲学批判与建构是为其国家学说做理论铺垫与立论基础的话，那么马克思在《手稿》中对政治经济学或国民经济学的哲学批判与建构，则是为其新世界观与共产主义做理论铺垫与立论基础的。

The *Manuscripts*’ Critique of National Economy

《手稿》对国家经济学的批判

From the internal logic of the *Manuscripts*, Marx not only wanted to theoretically settle accounts with national economy from the height of materialism and dialectics, but also wanted, on the basis of the critique of Hegel’s philosophy of right, to continue to deepen the critique of the entire Hegelian philosophical system. In the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, Marx made a relatively systematic and in-depth critique of Hegel’s philosophy, but he did not make a systematic critique of the entire Hegelian philosophical system and classical German philosophy. Marx’s critique of Hegel’s philosophy of right with the aid of Feuerbach’s materialism was not thorough, nor did it fundamentally resolve the problems involving economic interests he encountered during his *Rheinische Zeitung* period. To resolve this problem, it was necessary to return to the critique of national economy itself. The philosophical critique of national economy itself is both a theoretical settling of accounts with national economy and involves a theoretical settling of accounts with Hegel’s philosophy of right. Since Hegel could, from the dimension of his own philosophy, carry out an idealist transformation of the theory of political economy, then carrying out a philosophical critique of national economy again dialectically from the materialist dimension had its urgency and necessity in theory. From this perspective, the *Manuscripts* are not only manuscripts for the critique of national economy, but also manuscripts for continuing to deepen the critique of Hegel’s philosophy and his entire philosophical system. It was precisely in the dual critique of national economy and Hegel’s philosophy that Marx’s new worldview and his new materialist thought were gestated. It is undeniable that Marx’s materialist critique of national economy in the *Manuscripts* is a further extension and deepening of Hegel’s critical logic regarding political economy, and is the concrete application and manifestation of the organic combination of materialism and dialectics in his works. The reason for thinking this is that Hegel’s philosophical critique and philosophical transformation of political economy served his theory of the state; therefore, in Hegel’s critical logic, the state is the realization in the sensible world of that intellect or reason that political economy seeks, it is actualized reason and freedom. But for Marx, the critique of national economy was to find the actual logic and historical necessity for the future society—communism.

从《手稿》的内在逻辑来看，马克思不仅要从唯物主义与辩证法的高度对国民经济学进行理论清算，也想在对黑格尔法哲学思想的批判基础之上继续深化对整个黑格尔哲学体系的批判。马克思在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中对黑格尔哲学做了比较系统而深入的批判，但没有对整个黑格尔哲学体系以及德国古典哲学做系统性批判。马克思借助费尔巴哈的唯物主义对黑格尔的法哲学思想进行批判并不是彻底的，也没有从根本上解决他在《莱茵报》时期所遇到的涉及经济利益的问题。要解决这个问题，还需回到对国民经济学本身的批判当中去。对国民经济学本身的哲学批判，既是对国民经济学的理论清算，也涉及对黑格尔法哲学思想的理论清算。既然黑格尔能从其自身哲学的维度对政治经济学的理论进行唯心主义改造，那么从唯物主义的维度再次辩证地对国民经济学进行哲学批判在理论上就有其紧迫性与必要性。从这个角度讲，《手稿》不仅是对国民经济学进行批判的手稿，也是对黑格尔哲学及其整个哲学体系继续深化批判的手稿。正是在对国民经济学与黑格尔哲学的双重批判中，孕育了马克思的新世界观和他的新唯物主义思想。不可否认，马克思在《手稿》中对国民经济学的唯物主义批判，是在黑格尔对政治经济学的批判逻辑上的进一步延伸与深化，是唯物主义与辩证法的有机结合在其著作中的具体运用与展现。之所以如此认为，究其原因就在于，黑格尔对政治经济学的哲学批判与哲学改造是服务于其国家理论的，因而在黑格尔的批判逻辑中，国家是政治经济学要寻找的那个理智或理性在感性世界中的实现，是现实化的理性与自由。但对于马克思而言，批判国民经济学则是为未来的社会——共产主义找到现实的逻辑与历史的必然性。

In Notebooks I and II of the *Manuscripts*, although Marx’s philosophical critique of national economy broke away from Hegel in terms of its theoretical destination, it still used the terminology and categories of Hegel’s philosophy in the critique. This also indicates to a certain extent that Marx at this time had not yet completely jumped out of Hegel’s philosophical framework and conceptual categories; in a certain sense, he was still a young Marx who had not yet left the Young Hegelians. In Notebook III of the *Manuscripts*, the critique of Hegel’s dialectics and philosophy as a whole indicates to a certain extent that Marx at this time had already begun to undertake a systematic and comprehensive critique of Hegel’s philosophy and his entire philosophical system. Marx’s philosophical critique of national economy and his economic (materialist) critique of Hegel’s philosophy and his entire philosophical system ultimately forged Marx’s new worldview and new materialism in *The German Ideology*.

在《手稿》的笔记本I和笔记本II中，马克思对国民经济学的哲学批判，虽然在批判的理论归宿上摆脱了黑格尔，但仍在批判中使用了黑格尔哲学的术语与范畴。这也在一定程度上表明，此时的马克思并没有从黑格尔的哲学框架与概念范畴中完全跳出来，从某种意义上讲，仍是一个没有走出青年黑格尔的青年马克思。在《手稿》的笔记本III中，对黑格尔的辩证法和整个哲学的批判，则又在一定意义上表明此时的马克思已经在着手对黑格尔哲学及其整个哲学体系进行系统而全面的批判了。马克思对国民经济学的哲学批判与对黑格尔哲学及其整个哲学体系的经济学（唯物主义）批判，最终在《德意志意识形态》中铸就了马克思的新世界观和新唯物主义。

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