Phenomenology and Marx’s Philosophy: Grounding and Critique

Juxtaposing phenomenology and Marx’s philosophy is clearly fraught with difficulties. First, there is a misalignment in their objects of study: it is generally held that phenomenology begins with the analysis of consciousness and therefore belongs to human inner experience; although Husserl’s successors have often criticized and revised the standpoint of philosophy of consciousness, they have basically not gone beyond human existential experience. Marx, by contrast, in his critique of capitalist large-scale production, revealed the laws of development of human history; his critique of political economy inclines him more toward socio-historical research. Second, the aims and conclusions of their research differ markedly: although both offer serious critiques of capitalism, Marx scientifically demonstrated from the dimension of the critique of political economy that capitalism must inevitably perish, whereas phenomenology, like traditional philosophy, focuses on grounding. Husserl determined that Western civilization must inevitably fall into crisis and therefore must reactivate the ideas of transcendental phenomenology in order to rebuild the foundation of Western civilization.

将现象学和马克思哲学并置，显然困难重重。首先，两者在研究对象上存在错位：一般认为，现象学始于意识分析，因而属于人的内在体验，胡塞尔的后学尽管对意识哲学的立场多有批评和修正，但他们基本上都未超出人的生存体验，而马克思则在对资本主义大生产的批判中揭示了人类历史的发展规律，他的政治经济学批判使其更偏向社会历史研究。其次，研究的目的和结论显著不同：尽管对资本主义都有严肃的批判，马克思从政治经济学批判维度科学地论证了资本主义最终必然走向消亡，而现象学与传统哲学一样聚焦建基，胡塞尔认定西方文明必然陷入危机，因而必须重新激活超越论现象学的观念，以此重建西方文明的基础。

On the other hand, however, it is easy to see that in the development of Western Marxism and the phenomenological movement, both sides have actively absorbed each other’s intellectual resources: Lukács’s so-called class consciousness and the problem of the producer’s production bear traces of phenomenology; Marcuse borrowed Heidegger’s existential analytic in an attempt to reconstruct materialism; and Adorno, through his sustained critique of phenomenology, developed his negative dialectics. The same is true of the phenomenological movement: Heidegger praised Marx for having grasped the essence of history; Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, through their respective elaborations of Marx’s philosophy, effectively compensated for phenomenology’s deficiency in the dimension of socio-historical critique. In the 1960s, phenomenology and Marx’s philosophy even showed a tendency toward high-level integration: Tran Duc Thao, Michel Henry, and the Milan School in Italy were no longer confined to a particular standpoint; how to integrate these two forms of philosophy in order to understand modern society and the actual existence of human beings more deeply even became the sole goal.

但另一方面，我们又很容易看到，在西方马克思主义和现象学运动的发展进程中，双方都在主动吸收对方的思想资源：卢卡奇所谓的阶级意识和生产者的生产问题就有现象学的痕迹，马尔库塞借用了海德格尔的生存论建构试图重建唯物主义，阿多诺更是借着对现象学的持续批判展开了他的否定辩证法。现象学运动同样如此：海德格尔曾称赞马克思洞悉了历史的本质，萨特、梅洛-庞蒂各自对马克思哲学的阐发使他们有效地弥补了现象学在社会历史批判维度的不足。20世纪60年代，现象学与马克思哲学甚至出现了高度融合的趋势：陈德草、米歇尔·亨利、意大利的米兰学派，他们已不再限于特定立场，如何融合这两种形态的哲学以更深入地理解现代社会以及人的现实存在甚至成了唯一的目标。

These two distinct postures require us to return to the following question: if philosophy is indeed the manifestation of the spirit of the times, then what spirit of the times does phenomenology, as the most important beginning of twentieth-century Western philosophy, manifest? What is the intrinsic relationship between the spirit of the times manifested by phenomenology and its critique of modernity, on the one hand, and Marx’s philosophy, on the other? In our view, as long as the aim of theoretical research is to confront existence itself and then critically reveal the possible forms of future existence, then these questions are undoubtedly the truly fundamental ones.

这两种截然不同的姿态要求我们回到如下问题：如果哲学确是时代精神的展示，那么现象学作为20世纪西方哲学最重要的开端，展示了何种时代精神？现象学所展示的时代精神及其对现代西方的批判与马克思哲学之间又有着何种内在关联？在我们看来，只要理论研究的目的在于直面存在本身，进而批判性地揭示未来存在的可能形态，那么这些问题无疑才是真正根本的。

Since the 1830s, the non-Euclidean geometry movement has driven the linkage and rapid development of the technological revolution, the industrial revolution, and the social revolution. This is in fact the common socio-historical background from which both Marx’s philosophy and phenomenology emerged. The difference is that Marx’s philosophy paid particular attention to the impact of these three revolutions on the capitalist mode of production and on the mode of existence of the proletariat within it, whereas phenomenology, born at the turn of the century, arose directly from a critical response to the non-Euclidean geometry movement at the level of intellectual structure. Consequently, at the underlying level of existence of their objects of study, phenomenology and Marx’s philosophy share a common origin. This determines that, although these two forms of philosophy have different tendencies and appear to deal with vastly different problems, there exists a broad space for correspondence and complementarity between them in ontology and methodology. This explains why phenomenology could become an important theoretical driving force for the birth of Western Marx’s philosophy, and also why, in the development of the phenomenological trend and the Western Marxist movement, these two forms of philosophy could continuously learn from each other through mutual criticism, and even ultimately attempt to move toward integration.

19世纪30年代以来，非欧几何运动推动了科技革命、工业革命和社会革命的联动和高速发展。这其实正是马克思哲学和现象学诞生的共同的社会历史背景。所不同的是，马克思哲学特别关注这三重革命对资本主义生产方式的影响，以及无产阶级在其中的生存方式，而诞生于世纪之交的现象学则直接产生于在理智结构上对非欧几何运动的批判性回应。因而，在研究对象的底层存在上，现象学与马克思哲学具有同源性，而这也就决定了这两种形态的哲学尽管倾向不同，处理的问题看似天差地别，但在存在论和方法论上却存在着广阔的对应和互补的空间，这也就解释了现象学何以能成为西方马克思哲学诞生的重要的理论推手，同时也解释了在现象学思潮和西方马克思主义运动的发展中，这两种形态的哲学何以能不断地在相互批评中相互借鉴，甚至最终尝试走向融合。

In ontology, Husserl determined that pure consciousness, as the primal region, is foundational; Heidegger confirmed the existential/ontological analytic of Dasein as fundamental ontology. If Marx’s philosophy also has a fundamental ontology, it can only be socio-historical existence. It is easy for people to focus on pure consciousness, the existence of Dasein, and socio-historical existence, and to judge that there is a gap between phenomenology and Marx’s philosophy, while neglecting the possible isomorphism among these three and the continuity of the spirit of the times between these two philosophies. Pure consciousness is not what is generally called a function of the brain; the latter belongs to what Heidegger identifies as a specific region. As a primal region, it is a multidimensional nexus of consciousness grounded in a temporal manifold. The temporal manifold originates from Husserl’s critical philosophical construction based on Riemann’s manifold theory, while the multidimensional intentional nexus provides us with an a priori field for understanding existence such as scientific objects, being-in-the-world, and socio-historical existence. As a philosophical reflection of the non-Euclidean geometry movement, Husserl’s phenomenology provides us with a reliable channel for understanding modern existence from the perspective of consciousness. The existential analytic of Dasein takes up the multidimensional nexus of pure consciousness and focuses on depicting the existential state of the “subject” thrown into ready-made existence. Interestingly, although Heidegger himself seems to deliberately avoid the capitalist mode of production, his description of the everyday average state of Dasein can be entirely regarded as a depiction of beings within capitalist large-scale production. As elements of capital production, the “they” and their being-in-the-world have long lost individuality and independence. Compared with phenomenology, Marx’s philosophy completed the ontological revolution in philosophy earlier: existence is neither an abstraction extracted from individuals nor a characteristic originating from a transcendent being; it is manifested as the absolute existence possessed by capitalist large-scale production. The various a priori elements of cognition and the various forms of existential analysis are, in the final analysis, ways in which this absolute existence manifests itself. On this basis, Marx not only revealed capitalist large-scale production as a new kind of self-constituting existence, but also revealed the fundamental driving force of this existence, namely the production of surplus value as the foundation of capital production, thereby determining the foundation of existence as social large-scale production.

在存在论上，胡塞尔认定纯粹意识作为原区域具有基础性，海德格尔将此在的生存论/存在论确认为基础存在，如果马克思哲学也有基础存在，那么它只能是社会历史存在。人们很容易着眼纯粹意识、此在的生存和社会历史，判定现象学与马克思哲学之间存在鸿沟，而忽略了这三者之间可能存在的同构性以及时代精神在这两种哲学之间的延续。纯粹意识不是一般所谓的大脑的功能，后者属于海德格尔指认的具体区域，作为原区域，它是一种建立在时间流形之上的多维的意识关联。时间流形源自胡塞尔对黎曼流形论的批判性的哲学建构，而多维的意向关联则为我们理解包括科学对象、在世生存和社会历史等存在提供了先天的场域。作为非欧几何运动的哲学反映，胡塞尔现象学让我们拥有了从意识角度理解现代存在的可靠通道。此在的生存论分析接续纯粹意识多维的关联域而起，着重刻画的是被抛入现成存在的“主体”的生存状态，有趣的是，尽管海德格尔本人似乎在刻意回避资本主义生产方式，但他对此在的日常平均状态的描述却完全可以被视为对资本主义大生产中的存在者的刻画，作为资本生产的要素，常人及其在世早已丧失了个性和独立性。相比现象学，马克思哲学更早地完成了哲学上的存在论革命：存在既不是从个体那里提取出的抽象物，也不是源自超越者的某种特性，它体现为资本主义大生产所具有的绝对存在。认识的诸先天要素以及生存论的诸形式归根到底都是此绝对存在展示自身的方式。在此基础上，马克思不仅揭示了资本主义大生产这种全新的自身具有构造性的存在，而且揭示了这种存在的根本动力，即作为资本生产之根基的剩余价值生产，从而将存在的基础规定为社会大生产。

Taken together, Husserl provided, from the perspective of phenomenological theory of science, a cognitive model for understanding the various existences in modern capitalist society; Heidegger depicted the existential mode of the subject surviving within capitalist large-scale production; and Marx not only revealed the origin of Husserl’s cognitive objects, but also determined the socio-historical foundation of Heidegger’s existential analytic. Through this three-dimensional prismatic structure, we can more deeply penetrate the structure, characteristics, and laws of development of capitalism.

综合看来，胡塞尔从现象学科学论上提供了理解现代资本主义社会中诸存在的认知模型，海德格尔刻画了在资本主义大生产中存活的主体的生存样式，而马克思不仅揭示了胡塞尔的认知对象的来源，而且规定了海德格尔的生存论分析的社会历史基础。通过此三维棱镜结构，我们可以更深刻地透视出资本主义的结构、特征和发展规律。

In methodology, phenomenology “took up” Marx’s completion of the major intellectual transformation of determining formal existence as true existence. Husserl distinguished generalization from formalization, establishing formalization, and the theory of manifolds as its best law, as the fundamental principle of transcendental phenomenology. On this basis, he clarified how pure consciousness constitutes the existence of specific regions, meaning that generalizations are not unrelated but are traversed by a new formal nexus and constituted within it. This is a completely new way of examining existence and the world. On the question of form, Heidegger almost entirely inherited Husserl; the sole difference also marks their fundamental divergence: for Heidegger, form is neither an expression of the intentional nexus of pure consciousness nor something to be subsumed under mathematical forms like the theory of manifolds; it can only be grounded in Dasein’s being-in-the-world, showing itself in Dasein’s existential activity. Formal indication is more originary than formalization; this is the key point on which Heidegger insists that his existential/ontological analysis can ground Husserl’s phenomenology and even the various positive sciences. Marx’s contribution on this issue is actually more fundamental, because through his analysis of the value-form he had already understood form as true existence; that is, Marx had already laid the intellectual foundation for modern Western philosophy, including phenomenology. In capitalist large-scale production, after the emergence of the universal equivalent and money, abstract labor and concrete labor, exchange value and use value, which could previously still be examined under the distinction between matter and form, are necessarily transformed under a new formal nexus into elements of existence within capitalist large-scale production. However, it must be pointed out that, although both regard formal existence as the most real, there is a fundamental difference between Marx’s philosophy and phenomenology on how to view this fundamental transformation.

在方法论上，现象学“接续”马克思完成了将形式存在确定为真实存在的重大思想变革。胡塞尔区分了总体化和形式化，将形式化以及作为其最好法则的流形论确立为超越论现象学的基本原则，并在此基础上阐明了纯粹意识如何构造出具体区域的存在，这意味着诸总体化不是无关的，而是被一种新的形式关联所贯穿并在其中得到构造。这是一种全新的考察存在和世界的方式。在形式问题上，海德格尔几乎完全继承了胡塞尔，唯一的差别也恰好标出了两者的根本差异：在海德格尔那里，形式既不是纯粹意识的意向关联的表达，也不应统合在流形论这样的数学形式之下，而只能建立在此在的在世生存之上，在此在的生存活动中自身显示。形式显示相比形式化更为本原，这是海德格尔坚持他的生存论/存在论能够为胡塞尔现象学乃至各门观念科学建基的关键点。马克思在此问题上的贡献其实更为根本，因为他借助价值形式分析早已将形式理解为真实存在，也就是说，马克思早已奠定了包括现象学在内的现代西方哲学的思维基础。在资本主义大生产中，一般等价物和货币诞生之后，原先仍可以在质料与形式这一区分下得到考察的抽象劳动与具体劳动、交换价值与使用价值，必然在新的形式关联下变形为资本主义大生产中的存在要素。但必须指出的是，尽管都将形式存在视为最真实的，但在如何看待此根本变形问题上，马克思哲学与现象学之间存在根本差异。

Marx held that in large-scale capitalist production, if one cannot recognize that the transformation into formal existence is ultimately grounded in the duplication of living labor, and especially in the production of surplus value, then various forms of fetishism are unavoidable. Phenomenology, by contrast, consistently insists on constructing the meaning of the world and of existence on the basis of formal existence. At this level of existence, beings are formal in character—whether they are purified into the pure ego in the phenomenological reduction, or are Dasein existing in the world. More essentially, phenomenology attempts to understand the existing world and endow it with meaning on the basis of the formal relations given by modern mathematical reason, whereas Marx’s philosophy critically focuses on the process of generation of these formal relations, ultimately inquiring into the possibility of constructing new relations of production at the very foundation that creates the formal existence of large-scale capitalist production.

马克思认为，在资本主义大生产中，如果不能认清向形式存在的变形最终建立在活的劳动的二重化之上，尤其是剩余价值的生产之上，那么各种形式的拜物教就无法避免。而现象学则始终坚持基于形式存在构建世界和存在的意义，在此存在层面，存在者就是形式性的，无论是在现象学还原中被纯化为纯粹自我，抑或在世生存的此在都是如此。更本质地说，现象学试图基于现代数学理性给出的形式关联理解现存世界并赋予其意义，而马克思哲学则批判性地聚焦此形式关联的生成过程，最终在创造资本主义大生产的形式存在的根基中追问构造新的生产关系的可能性。

There are certainly differences between phenomenology and Marx’s philosophy, but these differences do not constitute a chasm. The object of philosophical inquiry should be social history, present-day existence, and forms of thought—existence itself—and the purpose of inquiry is to explore possible future forms through the examination of socio-historical development. Yet because of the complexity of socio-historical existence, we need actively to construct multi-dimensional perspectives of investigation. In this sense, the so-called differences between phenomenology and Marx’s philosophy precisely constitute a multi-dimensional prism through which we can see through existence and move toward the future. In other words, by means of the intersecting perspectives of phenomenology and Marx’s philosophy, we can not only grasp more profoundly the scientific character and revolutionary character of Marx’s philosophy, but also discern more clearly the origin, characteristics, and future of modern existence.

现象学与马克思哲学之间当然存在差异，但这些差异并不构成鸿沟，因为哲学研究的对象应该是社会历史、当下生存和思维形式这些存在本身，研究目的在于通过对社会历史发展的考察，探索未来的可能形态。但由于社会历史存在的复杂性，我们需要主动构筑多维的考察视角，在此意义上，现象学与马克思哲学之间的所谓差异恰恰构成了我们透视存在、走向未来的多维棱镜。换句话说，借助现象学与马克思哲学的交叉视野，我们不仅能够更深刻地理解马克思哲学的科学性和革命性，而且能够更清晰地洞察现代存在的由来、特性和未来。

(The author is a tenured associate professor at the School of Philosophy, Zhejiang University.)

（作者系浙江大学哲学学院长聘副教授）

Online editor: Huihui

网络编辑：慧慧