On the Ontological Attribute of Marx’s Method of Critique of Political Economy — Taking the Category of Labor as an Example

If we regard the discussion of Marx’s method of studying political economy merely as a study of the methodology of Marx’s philosophy, then we clearly miss the most fundamental theoretical significance of researching this issue. This is because Marx’s discussion of the “method of political economy” in the *Grundrisse* (1857–1858) [1]1 Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1953), p. 24. (Citation from the original Chinese text.) is not intended to present a methodology for studying capitalist society, but rather to explore how the theoretical deduction of economic categories can touch upon the reality of capitalist society. The fundamental difference between the two is also the fundamental difference in the paths taken by classical political economists and Marx in their research on capitalist society: for classical political economists, using economic categories to describe and understand the process of the birth and evolution of capitalism constituted the main thrust of political economy research, whereas for Marx, exploring the real premises of existing economic categories and the real boundaries of their application was the fundamental purpose of his turn to the study of political economy. Therefore, Marx explicitly prefixed all his research on “political economy” with the term “critique,” where “critique” means the exploration of the “boundaries” of these categories. In other words, Marx replaced the national economists’ “cognition” of capitalist society with a critique of the reality of capitalist society. In this sense, Marx’s critique of political economy accomplishes an ontological deduction of economic categories, while the political economy research of the national economists only constructs an epistemology of capitalist society. Among them, the economic categories formed around the logic of capital construct a system resembling a theory of knowledge, assuming an objective, scientific form. It has a fundamentally different theoretical thrust from Marx’s related research. In this sense, if we construct a quasi-epistemological methodology of Marx’s philosophy based on the discussion of the “method of political economy” (rather than the method of critique of political economy) in the *Grundrisse*, we may instead run counter to the issues Marx was trying to discuss and stand on the same ground as the classical political economy and Hegel that he criticized.

如果我们将对马克思政治经济学研究方法的讨论仅仅视为是对马克思哲学之方法论的研究，那么我们显然错失了对这一问题进行研究最为根本的理论意义。因为马克思在《1857—1858年经济学哲学手稿》(简称《大纲》)中有关于“政治经济学方法”的探讨并非意在呈现某种关于资本主义社会研究的方法论，而是探索如何用经济范畴的理论演绎触及资本主义社会现实，两者之间的根本差异也是古典政治经济学家与马克思面向资本主义社会展开研究所采取的根本路径的不同：对于古典政治经济学家而言，运用经济范畴描述和理解资本主义诞生和演进的过程构成了政治经济学研究的主旨，而对于马克思而言，探寻既有经济范畴的现实前提以及其得以应用的现实界限才是其转向政治经济学研究的根本目的，因此马克思明确将其全部有关“政治经济学”的研究冠以“批判”之名，其中的“批判”即意味着对其范畴之“界限”的探寻。换言之，马克思用对资本主义社会现实的批判代替国民经济学家对资本主义社会的“认识”。这一意义上说，马克思的政治经济学批判所完成的是诸经济范畴的存在论演绎，而国民经济学家的政治经济学研究所构筑的只是一种关于资本主义社会的认识论。其中，围绕资本逻辑所形成的诸经济范畴构筑了某种类似知识论的体系，具有了某种客观的、科学的形态。它与马克思的相关研究有着根本不同的理论主旨。从这一意义上说，如果我们依据《大纲》的“政治经济学方法”(而非政治经济学批判方法)的相关论述构筑一种类认识论的马克思哲学的方法论，反而可能会与马克思试图谈论的问题背道而驰，与其所批判的古典政治经济学以及黑格尔站在同一立场之上。

I. Revisiting the Two Paths of Political Economy Research: From Hegel, Kant to Marx

一、再论政治经济学研究的两条道路：从黑格尔、康德到马克思

Academic discussions of Marx’s method of studying political economy always take Marx’s “method of political economy” in the Introduction to the *Grundrisse* as the core text, corroborated by relevant discussions in the Postface to the First Edition of Volume One of *Capital*. However, existing research has failed to emphasize the following two points. First, what Marx attempted to study in the Introduction to the *Grundrisse* (i.e., the notebook marked M) was how existing classical political economists, such as Smith, Ricardo, and others, actually conducted their political economy research. This determines that many of Marx’s discussions are carried out in the sense of describing existing research paths, such as discussions of production links including production, consumption, exchange, and distribution, and related issues such as property (Eigenthum) and appropriation (Aneignen). These economic categories became the theoretical elements used by classical political economists to structure their political economy research, and Marx almost entirely adopted them as the logical starting point for his own critique. For Marx, however, the categories of existing political economy are not concepts applicable to all historical epochs, like the objective, universal abstractions in the system of natural science. On the contrary, the entire system of economic categories of classical political economy is built upon the reality of capitalist society. In forming its own inherent abstractions, such as production in general (Die Production im Allgemeinen), it contains many real premises that require further clarification. Marx insisted that “production predominates not only over itself, in the antithetical definition of production, but over the other moments as well,” [2]2 Mercantilism: An economic theory and practice dominant in Europe from the 16th to the 18th century, which held that national wealth was measured by its stock of precious metals and advocated state regulation of trade to achieve a positive balance of trade. and rejected the political economists’ way of discussing production, exchange, consumption, and distribution in isolation from each other. The theoretical implication is precisely that the fact that production can determine all other elements and moments is only directly presented after the logic of capital has become universalized. Production, as the theoretical starting point for all existing classical political economists to discuss economics, they forgot that “when we speak of production, we always have in mind production at a definite stage of social development.” [3]3 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 25. In this sense, the abstraction of “production in general” proposed by Marx is an abstraction containing the full dimension of social historicity. It is precisely through this kind of abstraction that Marx accomplishes the transformation of classical political economy. This determines that Marx’s deduction of the research path of political economy in the Introduction to the *Grundrisse* always contains two parts: a summary of existing national economic research and a further advancement based on this research. This means that when interpreting his relevant discussions, we need to distinguish whether his expression describes the existing research of classical political economy or unfolds his own theoretical exploration.

学界有关于马克思的政治经济学研究方法的讨论，总是以马克思的《大纲》导言中的“政治经济学方法”为核心文本，佐证于马克思的《资本论》第一卷第一版跋的相关论述。但既有研究未能强调如下两点：其一，马克思在《大纲》导言(即被标注为笔记本M)中所试图研究的是既有的古典政治经济学家们，诸如斯密、李嘉图等人究竟以何种方式展开政治经济学研究，由此决定了马克思的很多讨论是在描述既有研究路径的意义上展开的，诸如对于包括生产、消费、交换与分配等生产环节以及与其相关诸如财产(Eigenthum)和占有(Aneignen)等问题的讨论。这些经济范畴成为古典政治经济学家用以架构政治经济学研究的诸理论要素，马克思几乎全部沿用下来，作为其自身展开批判的逻辑起点。只是对于马克思而言，既有的政治经济学的诸范畴并不是一个适用一切历史时代的概念，如同自然科学体系中那些客观的、普遍的抽象要素，相反，全部古典政治经济学的经济范畴体系都是建基于资本主义社会现实之上的，它在形成自身的固有的抽象，如生产一般(Die Production im Allgemeinen)的时候包含着诸多有待进一步阐明的现实前提。马克思坚持“生产既支配着与其他要素相对而言的生产自身，也支配着其他要素”,而否弃政治经济学家以彼此割裂的方式讨论生产、交换、消费与分配，其理论所指正是在于：生产可以决定一切其他要素和环节的事实正是只有在资本逻辑得以普泛化之后才得到直接的呈现。生产，作为所有既有的古典政治经济学家探讨经济学的理论起点，他们忘记的是“说到生产，总是指在一定社会发展阶段上的生产”。在这一意义上说，马克思所提出的“生产一般”的抽象，是一个包含全部社会历史性维度的抽象，马克思正是通过这样一种抽象方式来完成对古典政治经济学的改造。由此决定了马克思在《大纲》导言中有关于政治经济学研究路径的推演，总是包含着两部分：概括总结既有的国民经济学的研究以及在这一研究基础上的推进。由此意味着我们需要在解读其相关论述之际，辨析其表述究竟是描述既有古典政治经济学的相关研究，抑或是展开自身的理论探索。

This determines the second point: Marx’s discussion in the section on the “method of political economy” in the Introduction to the *Grundrisse* also contains two parts, namely, a description of the research path of classical political economy and Marx’s further exploration based on this. Because the discussions of the two parts are intertwined and confused, a more detailed re-analysis is particularly necessary. The “method of political economy” Marx attempts to discuss here is only the “method” of the classical political economists, not Marx’s systematic exposition of his own “method of critique of political economy.” More precisely, Marx did not form his own clear methodological expression in this part of the discussion. Instead, he adopted a certain method of “determination through negation” to expound the possible path of the deduction of economic categories, and, by means of the expository path of categories such as “appropriation” and “labor,” “presented” his unique analytical method. In other words, in Marx’s critique of political economy, his unique methodology is not “expounded” as an object of study, but is “done” in the manner of “application.” The reason Marx did not provide a systematic methodological exposition here is certainly related to the fact that the *Grundrisse*, as a “draft,” was written in a somewhat unsystematic manner. However, in my view, more importantly, Marx did not attempt to treat the capitalist society he was studying as an object to be “cognized” through some methodology, thereby reducing the reality of capitalist society to merely a theoretical object. Instead, he attempted to present the reality of capitalist society itself through the self-unfolding mode of social history with an ontological character. In this sense, there is no methodology in Marx’s philosophy that can be abstracted from a specific social reality, and therefore there is no need to understand Marx’s critique of political economy from an epistemological perspective.

由此决定了其二，马克思在《大纲》导言中“政治经济学方法”一节的讨论同样包含着两个部分，即对古典政治经济学研究路径的描述以及马克思在此基础上的进一步探索，由于两个部分的讨论相互交织和混淆，因此特别需要重新进行更为细致的辨析。这里马克思所试图讨论的“政治经济学方法”仅只是古典政治经济学家们的“方法”,而非马克思对自身“政治经济学批判”方法的系统阐发。更确切地说，马克思在这一部分的讨论中并没有形成自身清晰的方法论表述，而是采取了某种“否定即规定”的方式阐发了某种经济范畴演绎的可能性路径，并借助于对诸如“占有”和“劳动”等范畴的阐发路径“呈现”出其特有的分析方法，换言之，在马克思有关政治经济学的批判当中，其独特的方法论并不是被其作为研究对象而得以被“阐发”出来的，而是以“运用”的方式被“做”出来的。马克思在此之所以没有系统的方法论阐释，固然与《大纲》作为“草稿”,其写作还具有一定的非系统性有关，但在我看来，更为重要的是，马克思并不试图将其所要研究的资本主义社会当作有待通过某种方法论加以“认识”的对象，从而将资本主义社会现实仅仅转变一种理论对象，而是试图以带有存在论色彩的社会历史的自我展开方式来呈现资本主义社会现实本身。从这一意义上说，在马克思的哲学中并不存在一种可被抽离出特定的社会现实之外的方法论，因此也无需从认识论的视角来理解马克思的政治经济批判。

From this perspective, when we rethink the two paths proposed by Marx in the “Method of Political Economy,” we find that these two paths, in their spontaneous form, were the paths historically traversed by classical political economists in the course of history, while in their conscious form, they were understood and grasped by Marx through a quasi-Kantian epistemological theoretical path. Marx’s relevant expression is as follows: “The first path is the one that economics historically took in its genesis. For example, the economists of the seventeenth century always started from the living whole, from population, nation, state, several states, etc.; but they always ended by discovering through analysis a few decisive abstract, general relations, such as division of labor, money, value, etc. Once these individual moments had been more or less established and abstracted, economic systems began to emerge that ascended from the simple, such as labor, division of labor, need, exchange value, etc., to the state, international exchange, and the world market.” It must be pointed out that here, the process Marx describes as starting from the “living whole,” where classical political economy “discovers through analysis a few decisive abstract, general relations,” is precisely what Marx subsequently refers to as the “first path,” that is, “the complete presentation [Vorstellung] evaporates into abstract determinations”; and then, “once these individual moments had been more or less established and abstracted,” and subsequently “ascended to … various economic systems,” this becomes what Marx calls the second path, namely, “abstract determinations lead to the reproduction of the concrete in the course of thinking.” It is precisely by traversing these two paths in succession that classical political economy completed its “cognition” of the reality of capitalist society and constructed an economic system comprising various economic categories.

从这一视角出发，我们在重新思考马克思在“政治经济学方法”中所提出的两条道路时，会发现这两条道路在其自发形态上是古典政治经济学家们在历史上曾经走过的道路，而在其自觉形态上，则以一种类康德式的认识论式的理论路径被马克思所理解和把握，马克思的相关表述如下：“第一条道路是经济学在它产生时期在历史上走过的道路。例如，17世纪的经济学家总是从生动的整体，从人口、民族、国家、若干国家等等开始；但是他们最后总是从分析中找出一些有决定意义的抽象的一般的关系，如分工、货币、价值等等。这些个别要素一旦多少确定下来和抽象出来，从劳动、分工、需要、交换价值等等这些简单的东西上升到国家、国际交换和世界市场的各种经济学体系就开始出现了。”需要指出的是：在此，马克思所描述的“从生动的整体”出发，古典政治经济学“从分析中找出一些有决定意义的抽象的一般的关系”的过程即为马克思紧随其后所指出的“第一条道路”,也即 “完整的表象(Vorstellung)蒸发为抽象的规定”;而随后“这些个别要素一旦多少确定下来和抽象出来”,并随后被“上升到……各种经济学体系”则成为马克思所谓的第二条道路，即“抽象的规定在思维行程中导致具体的再现。”正是相继在这两条道路上走下来，古典政治经济学完成了他们对于资本主义社会现实的“认知”,构筑了包含诸经济范畴的经济体系。

In other words, we need to integrate the two paths into a complete methodology, and on this basis understand what Marx subsequently proposes as the “scientifically correct method [die wissenschaftlich richtige Methode].” It must be pointed out that the condition Marx uses to qualify this methodology as correct, namely “wissenschaftlich” (scientific), more precisely refers to the “doctrine of science” [Wissenschaftslehre] that Kant and Fichte sought to construct. This means that Marx highlights the epistemological legitimacy of integrating the two paths. Therefore, when Marx attempts to discuss this so-called “correct method” in a “descriptive” manner, he “consciously” elaborates it according to Kant’s deductive scheme of the “pure concepts of the understanding”: “The latter method is obviously the scientifically correct one. The concrete is concrete because it is the synthesis [Zusammenfassung] of many determinations, hence the unity of the manifold. It therefore appears in thinking as a process of synthesis, as a result, not as a starting point, although it is the real starting point, and hence also the starting point for intuition [Anschauung] and presentation [Vorstellung].”

换言之，我们需要将两条道路整合为一个完整的方法论，并在此基础上理解马克思紧随其后提出的“科学上正确的方法( die wissenschaftlich richtige Methode)”。需要指出的是，马克思用以限定这一方法论为正确的条件，即“wissenschaftlich”(科学上的),更为准确地说是康德和费希特所试图构筑的“知识学”。这意味着马克思凸显了两条道路的整合在“认识论”上的合法性。因此当马克思尝试以“描述”的方式来谈论这一所谓“正确的方法”的时候，“自觉地”将其按照康德的“纯粹知性概念”的演绎方案加以阐发：“后一种方法显然是科学上正确的方法。具体之所以具体，因为它是许多规定的综合(Zusammenfassung ),因而是多样性的统一。因此它在思维中表现为综合的过程，表现为结果，而不是表现为起点，虽然它是现实的起点，因而也是直观(Anschauung)和表象(Vorstellung)的起点。”

Here, what is not so obvious is that the so-called “latter method,” following the above text, refers to the method by which economists begin their research from economic systems. These economic systems, as syntheses of many determinations, as results in thinking, like the synthesis of Kant’s synthetic judgments, constitute a “going beyond” the “given concept.” The legitimacy of their being the starting point of research lies in the fact that these economic categories, constituted by concepts such as “production,” are themselves the real starting point that can be “intuited [Anschauung] and presented [Vorstellung]” in capitalist society. Here, “intuition” is not the “intuitus,” “intuitiva,” or “intuitivie” of modern epistemology, but rather the “intuition [Anschauung]” used by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. “Anschauung,” in terms of its word formation, “an-” means “leaning on,” and “schauen” means “to see,” thereby expressing a kind of view or insight produced through “observation.” Since Kant’s synthetic judgment always emphasizes that “no matter how pure concepts are from anything empirical, no matter how certain they are, so that they are completely represented a priori in the mind, if they cannot be shown to have application to objects of experience, they still have no objective validity,” this determines that Kant’s “intuition [Anschauung],” as the starting point of knowledge, must from the very beginning be a kind of “going beyond” that relates to real objects: “In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and to which all thinking as a means is directed as an end, is intuition.” Therefore, Marx, by means of Kant’s “synthesis [Zusammenfassung]” and “intuition [Anschauung],” regards the research method constructed by economists who take as their starting point the “economic system” composed of ahistorical economic categories, such as “production,” “labor,” and “value,” as, and only as, “the method that is correct in the doctrine of science [die wissenschaftlich richtige Methode].” Its completed state is manifested in the second path, namely, abstract determinations (pure concepts of the understanding) in the course of thinking [im Weg des Denkens] (i.e., the process of synthesis) lead to the “reproduction [zur Reproduction des Concreten]” of the concrete. This “reproduction” of the concrete in the process of synthesis is precisely the task Kant assigns to the “imagination,” namely, that pure concepts must go beyond themselves and be applied to objects of experience. The entire theoretical legitimacy of this lies in the fact that these pure concepts of the understanding are represented a priori in the mind, “their representation is always a schema that relates solely to the reproductive imagination [reproductive Einbildungskraft], which calls forth objects of experience, without which space and time would have no meaning; this is the case for all concepts without distinction.” In other words, the “reproductive” capacity of the imagination is such that the “objects of experience” that can be applied to a priori forms, having been “reproduced” by the imagination, are themselves already products of thinking, thereby obtaining the legitimacy to be applied by pure concepts of the understanding.

在此，并不那么显而易见的是，所谓的“后一种方法”,承接上文，其所意指的是经济学家们从经济学体系开始研究的方法，这些经济体系作为许多规定的综合，作为思维中结果，如康德的综合判断之综合，构成对“被给予的概念”的“走出”,作为研究起点的合法性在于，这些诸如“生产”等概念所构筑的经济范畴，自身已经是在资本主义社会中可被“直观(Anschauung)和表象(Vorstellung)”的现实起点。在此“直观”并不是近代认识论中的“intuitus”“intuitiva”“intuitivie”。而是康德在“纯粹理性批判”中所使用的“直观(Anschauung)”“Anschauung”,就其构词来看，“an-”意为“依靠在……上面”,“shuaen”意为“看”,由此表达出的是一种通过“观察”而产生的某种观点、见解。由于康德的综合判断，总是强调无论概念“多么纯粹得没有任何经验性的东西，无论它们多么确定，以至于它们完全先天地在心灵中被表现，如果它们不能被指明在经验对象上的应用，它们就毕竟没有客观有效性”,因此，决定了康德作为知识之起点的“直观(Anschauung)”从一开始就是必须与现实对象相关联的某种“走出”:“一种知识不论以何种方式和通过什么手段与对象发生关系，它借以和对象发生直接关系，并且一切思维作为手段以之为目的的，还是直观。”因此，马克思借助于康德的“综合”(Zusammenfassung)与“直观(Anschauung)将经济学家以非历史性的诸经济范畴，例如“生产”“劳动”“价值”所组成的“经济体系”为其研究起点所构筑的研究方法视为，也仅仅视为是“在知识学上正确的方法”(die wissenschaftlich richtige Methode)。它的完成状态即表现在第二条道路上，即抽象的规定(纯粹知性的概念)在思维行程(im Weg des Denkens)(即综合过程)中导致具体的“再生产”(zur Reproduction des Concreten)。这一在综合过程中的具体的“再生产”正是康德赋予“想象力”的任务，即纯粹性的概念，要走出自身，应用于经验对象，其全部的理论合法性在于，这些纯粹知性的概念先天的在心灵中被表象，“它们的表象只是一个始终与再生的想象力(reproductive Einbildungskraft)相关的图形，这种想象力唤起经验的对象，没有这些对象，空间和实践就会没有任何意义；一切概念都没有区别地是这种情况”。换言之，想象力所具有的“再生产”的能力是将可以被先天形式所应用的“经验对象”,经过了想象力“再生产”,经验对象自身已经是思维的产物了，因此获得可被纯粹知性概念应用的合法性。

Therefore, when Marx regards the second path as the “reproduction of the concrete in the course of thinking,” he is merely using the Kantian doctrine of science’s scheme of the deduction of concepts of the understanding to articulate the method of political economy. Consequently, the path of research taken by classical political economy towards economics thus falls into the self-expression of idealism, and its method is correct only within the horizon of Kantian doctrine of science. Thus, following this line of thought, Marx also incorporates Hegel’s entire speculative philosophy into the scope that the second path can summarize, leading to Marx’s subsequent critique of Hegel: “Hegel, therefore, fell into the illusion of conceiving the real [das Reale] as the result of thinking that synthesizes itself, deepens itself, and moves itself; whereas the method of ascending from the abstract to the concrete is only the way in which thinking grasps the concrete and reproduces it as a spiritual [geistig] concrete. But it is by no means the process of the genesis of the concrete itself [Entstehungsprocess].”

因此，当马克思将第二条道路视为“思维进程中”“具体的再生产”的时候，他不过是用康德的知识学所展开的知性概念演绎的方案来言说政治经济学方法。于是古典政治经济学对经济学的研究路径也因此陷入了观念论的自我表达当中，其方法也仅是在康德知识学视域之内才是正确的。于是，延续这一思路，马克思将黑格尔全部思辨哲学也纳入了第二条道路所能概括的范围之内，引发了马克思紧随其后对于黑格尔的批判：“因此，黑格尔陷入幻觉，把实在(das Reale)理解为自我综合、自我深化和自我运动的思维的结果，其实，从抽象上升到具体的方法，只是思维用来掌握具体、把它当作一个精神上(geistig)的具体再现(Reproduction)出来的方式。但决不是具体本身的产生过程(Entstehungsprocess)。”

Here, on the one hand, Marx places Hegel within the post-Kantian philosophical tradition and criticizes the “illusion” into which Hegel has fallen, namely, that beginning with Fichte, a purely idealist system was gradually completed in order to dissolve Kant’s “thing-in-itself.” The illusion into which Hegel has fallen, that is, understanding the “real” merely as the result of the self-movement of thought, is nothing but the consequence of the radicalization of Kant by pure idealism. In Marx’s view, this even comes close to being a regression from Kant’s theory of knowledge. For the “epistemologically correct method” constructed by Kant, namely the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete, is merely the way in which thought (reproductive imagination) grasps the concrete, that is, the way in which the concrete is reproduced. But whether it is Hegel’s idealist system or Kant’s epistemological path, they both stand on the same ground as classical political economy: what they accomplish is a theoretical cognition of capitalist society, but they cannot achieve a real touch upon and critique of its reality. To use Marx’s own expression, this process of thought reproducing the concrete is “by no means the process of generation [Entstehungsprocess] of the concrete itself.” Here, “entstehen,” as the word formation for “process of generation,” does not mean “reproduction” in the sense of a mere repetition; rather, it means “origination,” encompassing a “coming-into-being” that has its own cause within itself, containing a demand to break free from the determinations of thought. And it is the discussion that encompasses the entire process of generation of the concrete itself that constitutes the main thread of the theoretical approach Marx attempts to unfold in his research on the critique of political economy.

马克思在此一方面将黑格尔放入后康德哲学传统之中批判黑格尔所陷入的“幻觉”,即为了消解康德的“物自体”,自费希特开始渐趋完成了一个纯粹的观念论体系的架构。黑格尔所陷入的幻觉，即将“实在”仅仅理解为思维的自我运动的结果，也不过是纯粹观念论对康德激进化的改造所致。它在马克思看来，甚至近乎成为对康德知识学的一种倒退。因为由康德所构筑的“知识学上正确的方式”,即从抽象上升到具体的方法，只是思维(再生产想象力)把握具体的方式，即具体被再生产(Reproduction)出来的方式。但无论是黑格尔的观念论体系抑或康德的知识学路径，他们都与古典政治经济学站在同一立场上，其所完成的是对资本主义社会的理论认知，并不能完成对其现实的触碰与批判，用马克思的语言来表述，即这个思维再生产具体的过程，“决不是具体本身的产生过程(Entstehungsprocess)”。在此，“entstehen”,作为“产生过程”的构词，其意义并不是“再生产”,而是“缘起”,包含以自身为原因的“发生”,包含着一种挣脱思维之规定的要求。而这一包含全部具体本身的产生过程的讨论，才是马克思试图在其政治经济学批判的研究中展开的理路主旨。

II. Marx’s Research Path and Plan for Transcending the “Epistemological” Method

二、马克思超越“认识论”方法的研究路径与方案

Strictly speaking, in his research on the critique of political economy, Marx never consciously gave an account of his own methodology. In other words, Marx did not attempt to place his research on “how to do research,” but was only concerned with “the object of research itself.” Consequently, all of Marx’s discussions on the method of political economy research are always theoretical responses forced upon him by the pressure of his polemical opponents. Even though Marx, in the preface to the French edition of Volume I of *Capital*, was already aware that “the method of analysis which I have employed, and which had not previously been applied to economic subjects, makes the reading of the first chapters rather difficult,” he still could not give a direct and systematic explanation of his distinctive analytical method. Marx’s reticence regarding methodology may, from the negative side, confirm his vigilance against, or even rejection of, a cognitive method based on epistemology. For Marx, research in the epistemological sense can only treat the various economic categories that dominate capitalist society as theoretical elements for “interpreting the world,” and cannot truly realize the theoretical demand of “changing the world” by “subverting” capitalism.

严格说来，马克思在其有关政治经济学批判的研究中，从未自觉地对自身的方法论给予说明，换言之，马克思并不试图将其研究放在“如何做研究”之上，而只关心“所做的研究对象”本身。以至于马克思全部关于政治经济学研究方法的讨论总是在其论敌的逼迫之下不得不进行的一种理论的回应。即便马克思在《资本论》第一卷的法语版序中也已经意识到“我所使用的分析方法至今还没有人在经济问题上运用过，这就使得前几章读起来相当困难”,他仍未能对其所特有的分析方法给出直接的、系统的说明。马克思对于方法论的惜墨如金，或许从反面印证了他对于一种基于知识论所展开的认识方法的警觉甚至否弃，对于马克思而言，认识论意义上的研究，只能将主导资本主义社会的诸经济范畴作为“解释世界”的理论要素，而无法真正实现以“颠覆”资本主义之改变世界的理论诉求。

However, the way Marx realizes his ideal of changing the world must nevertheless adopt a philosophical path and employ the mode of expression of concepts and categories. Therefore, what method must Marx adopt so that his deduction of economic categories does not itself fall into the self-movement of thought (Hegel) or the reproduction of thought (Kant), but instead becomes a weapon of thought that directly touches the reality of capitalist society? For an answer to this question, we cannot find it in the “power of abstraction” or the “mode of presentation” in the officially published Volume I of *Capital*. We must still return to the Introduction to the *Grundrisse*, and, through the determinations Marx gives in a “negative” way, outline the path and plan of the critique of political economy that Marx might have adopted.

然而马克思用以实现自身改变世界之理想的方式却又不得不采取一种哲学的路径，并采取概念与范畴的表达方式，因此，马克思究竟该采取何种方式，才能让其所进行的经济范畴的演绎自身不陷入思维的自我运动(黑格尔),抑或思维的再生产(康德),转而成为直接触碰到资本主义社会现实的思维武器?对于这一问题的回答，我们无法从马克思在正式出版的《资本论》第一卷中的“抽象力”抑或“叙述方式”当中找到答案。我们仍需回到《大纲》导言中，通过马克思以“否定”的方式所给出的规定，勾勒出马克思可能采取的政治经济学批判的路径和方案。

In summary, Marx summarizes the research path of classical political economy through the discussion of the cognitive method provided by Kant’s theory of knowledge, while Hegel’s speculative philosophy becomes the radicalized expression of this theory of knowledge within idealism. Thus, when Marx attempts to explore a research path that prioritizes objectivity and is non-idealist, Kant’s theory of knowledge obviously becomes his theoretical weapon for criticizing Hegel’s philosophy, and is therefore called by him the correct research method. In view of this, for Marx to discuss a theoretical advance unique to himself, he must once again start from Kant, and by sublating Kant’s theory of knowledge, transcend the epistemological research method, and complete his own philosophical demand of changing the world. The description of this process of thought is concentrated in the following expression in the Introduction to the *Grundrisse*: “The totality as a thought-entity, as a thought-concrete, is in fact a product of thinking, of conception; but it is by no means a product of the concept which thinks and generates itself outside or above intuition and representation, but a product of the working-up of intuition and representation into concepts. The whole, as it appears in the head as a thought-whole, is a product of the thinking head, which appropriates the world in the only way it can, a way different from the artistic, religious, practical-mental appropriation of this world. The real subject retains its autonomous existence outside the head just as long as the head’s activity is merely speculative, merely theoretical. Hence, in the theoretical method, too, the subject, society, must always be kept in mind as the presupposition.”

概而言之，马克思通过对康德的知识学所提供的认知方式的讨论对古典政治经济学的研究路径加以概括，黑格尔的思辨哲学成为这一知识学在观念论上的激进化的表达。由此，当马克思试图探寻一种客观性优先的非观念论的研究路径之际，康德的知识学显然成为他批判黑格尔哲学的理论武器，因此被其称为正确的研究方法，有鉴于此，马克思要谈论独属于自身的理论推进，则需要再度从康德出发，通过扬弃康德的知识学，超越认识论的研究方法，完成自身的改变世界之哲学诉求。对于这一思考过程的描述集中体现在《大纲》导言中的如下表述：“总体作为思想整体、作为思想具体，事实上是思维的、理解的产物；但是，决不是处于直观和表象之外或驾于其上而思维着的、自我产生着的概念的产物，而是把直观和表象加工成概念这一过程的产物。整体，当它在头脑中作为思想整体而出现时，是思维着的头脑的产物，这个头脑用它所专有的方式掌握世界，而这种方式是不同于对于世界的艺术精神的，宗教精神的，实践精神的掌握的。实在主体(Das reale Subject)仍然是在头脑之外保持着它的独立性(Selbstständigkeit);只要这个头脑还仅仅是思辨地、理论地活动着。因此，就是在理论方法上，主体，即社会，也必须始终作为前提浮现在表象面前。”

In this expression, the totality as a thought-whole, as a thought-concrete, is the philosophical mode of expression ultimately formed by theoretical research. Marx’s critique of political economy will also ultimately present itself as a thought-whole constructed by multiple categories including commodity, value, money, capital, and labor. Therefore, Marx does not deny that the thought-whole itself is a product of thinking and conception. But this does not mean that Marx can, like Hegel’s speculative philosophy, regard this thought-whole as “a product of the concept which thinks and generates itself outside or above intuition and representation”; rather, he must, like Kant, regard it as “a product of the working-up of intuition and representation into concepts.” However, on this basis, Marx needs to advance further: the whole is not a totality constituted by various different elements of thought, but becomes a product of the thinking head. Here, the head, with its corporeal sense, is emphasized as the condition for the generation of thought. This is the key point where Marx is absolutely different from both Hegel and Kant. For both Hegel and Kant, thought constitutes the root of the “genesis” of concepts and categories. But here, Marx pushes the origin of this thought back to the “head,” and particularly emphasizes that the uniqueness of the head’s appropriation of the world is different from any other spiritual (artistic, religious, practical-mental) mode of appropriating the world. For the thinking “head” determines the birth of thought, yet can be absolutely different from “thought.” In this way, Marx finds a theoretical path that breaks away from Hegel’s idealism and Kant’s theory of knowledge, namely, discovering an existence that is absolutely heterogeneous to thought, yet at the same time can become the condition for the generation of thought. This existence, in the sense of determining the “genesis” of thought, is the “head”; in the further inquiry into how the “head” can “generate” thought, it becomes the real subject. This real subject once again becomes a key element external to the head that may determine how the head thinks. Thus, through this continuously advancing critique of presuppositions (thought — head — real subject), Marx sets the principle for his unique “theoretical method.” This principle is expressed by him as follows: “the subject, society, must always be kept in mind as the presupposition.”

在这一表述中，作为思想整体(Gedankentotalität)、思维具体(Gedankenconcretum)的总体(Totalität)是理论研究最终形成的哲学表达方式。马克思的政治经济学批判最终也将以包括商品、价值、货币、资本、劳动等多个范畴所构筑的思想整体呈现出来，因此马克思并不否认思想整体本身是思维的和理解的产物，但这并不代表马克思可以如黑格尔的思辨哲学一样，将这一思维整体视为是“处于直观和表象之外或驾于其上而思维着的、自我产生着的概念的产物”,而是要如康德一样，将其视为“直观和表象加工成概念这一过程的产物”;但在此基础之上，马克思需要继续推进的是，整体(Das Ganze),并非由各个不同思维要素所构成的总体(Totalität),成为思维着的头脑(Kopf)的产物，在此带有着肉身感的头脑(Kopf)作为思维得以产生条件被强调出来，这是马克思绝然不同于黑格尔与康德的关键点。无论对于黑格尔还是康德来说，思维都构成了概念、范畴产生的“发生”之根源。但马克思在此却将这一思维的源发性推至“头脑”,并特别强调了“头脑”掌握世界的独特性是不同于其他任何精神(艺术的、宗教的、实践的)掌握世界的方式。因为思维着的“头脑”决定了思想的诞生，但却又能够绝然不同于“思想”。马克思以此找到了脱离黑格尔的观念论与康德知识学的理论路径，即发现了绝然异质于思想，同时却能够成为思想得以产生之条件的存在。这一存在，在决定思想之“发生”的意义上是“头脑”,在“头脑”如何能够“发生”思想的进一步追问中，则成了实在主体(Das reale Subject)。这一实在主体再一次成为外在于头脑却可能决定了头脑如何思想的关键要素。于是马克思借助于这一不断推进的前提性批判(思想—头脑—实在主体)为其独特的“理论方法”设定了原则。这一原则被其表述如下：“主体，即社会，也必须始终作为前提浮现在表象面前。”

In view of this, we can say that Marx’s way of transcending epistemology lies in fundamentally changing the core problem of theoretical research: whether it is classical political economists, Hegel, or Kant, as summarized by Marx in his “two paths,” they all merely attempt to ensure the “purity” of categorical deduction in some way, which is manifested in the fact that the starting point of thought is already the intuitions and representations processed and understood from a certain perspective. Therefore, the entire focus of research is nothing but the self-deduction of categories as products of thought. In this sense, the “illusion into which Hegel fell,” as summarized by Marx, is the most thorough and accurate presentation of the method of classical political economy.

有鉴于此，我们可以说，马克思用以超越认识论的方式在于从根本上改变了理论研究的核心问题：无论是古典政治经济学家、黑格尔抑或康德，正如马克思所给出的“两条道路”的概括，都不过试图以某种方式保证范畴演绎的“纯粹性”为己任，这表现在思维的起点即是已经被某一视角所加工和理解的直观和表象。因此全部研究的重心不过是作为思维产物的范畴的自我演绎，从这意义上说，马克思所概括出的“黑格尔所陷入的幻觉”是古典政治经济学方法最为彻底而准确的呈现。

Thus, Marx’s change to the problem domain lies in: setting for the movement of thought a real premise that is absolutely different from thought (rather than the logical premise given by Kant’s “thing-in-itself”). The deduction of the various categories within the theoretical system must always be influenced by the real premise from which they arise, a real premise that Marx regards as “society.” And “society” in Marx’s context always appears as “material life” opposed to the political state. Consequently, Marx could employ all the existing categories of classical political economy, not only to complete the “cognition” of capitalist society but also to directly strike at the reality of capitalist society itself. By discussing the inevitability of economic crises, he discovered the limits of the self-development of capital logic, which classical political economists considered eternal (the essence of the “critique” of political economy). The discovery of surplus value further provided a real force for transcending and changing the reality of capitalist society. Marx’s emphasis on the priority of “society” as the real subject over thought is key to prompting his discovery of the limits of capitalist society, because it is precisely in emphasizing the real priority of “material life” that the historical unfolding process of all economic categories themselves is introduced into the deduction of categories. Therefore, compared to the categorical deduction constructed by Kant’s system of epistemology, I tend to call Marx’s deduction, which endows all categories with their full historical connotations, the “ontological” deduction of economic categories. The path of this deduction is fundamentally different from the “two paths” based on epistemology. Its methodology cannot be systematically summarized or refined in essence; it can only be “presented” in a process of historical narration. But the ensuing question is: how can one actually achieve a historical narrative while ensuring that this historical narrative is not the self-completion of speculative logic, but always maintains the objective priority of the “real subject” outside the mind?

由是，马克思对于问题域的改变在于：为思维的运动设定了一个绝然不同于思维的现实前提(而非如康德的“物自体”所给出的逻辑前提),理论体系内在的诸范畴的演绎不得不总是遭遇作为其得以产生的现实前提的左右，这一现实前提被马克思视为“社会”。而“社会”在马克思的语境中总是作为与政治国家相对立的“物质生活”。由是，马克思能够运用全部古典政治经济学既有的诸范畴，不但完成了对资本主义社会的“认知”,而且直击资本主义社会现实本身，借助于对经济危机之必然性的讨论发现了被古典政治经济学家们认为永恒的资本逻辑自身发展的界限(政治经济学“批判”之要义),对剩余价值的发现更是为超越和改变资本主义社会现实提供了现实的力量。而马克思对作为实在主体的“社会”优先于思维的强调，是促使其发现资本主义社会之界限的关键，因为正是在对“物质生活”的现实优先性的强调中，所有经济范畴自身的历史展开过程就被引入范畴的演绎当中。因此相较于康德的知识学体系所构筑的范畴演绎，我倾向于将马克思让所有范畴都附带其全部历史性内涵的演绎称为经济范畴的“存在论”演绎。这一演绎的路径在根本上不同于基于认识论展开的“两条道路”,其方法论在本质上并不能被系统地概括、提炼，而只能在一种历史性的叙述过程中被“呈现”。但随之而来的问题在于，究竟怎样做才能真正做到既可以完成一个历史性的叙事，又能保障这一历史叙事不是思辨逻辑的自我完成，而是始终保持着头脑之外的“实在主体”的客观优先性?

Marx’s approach is to maintain a binary tension between economic categories and the socio-historical reality from which they arise, rather than the unity of history and logic. Under the effect of this tension, the connotation and meaning of economic categories do not originate from speculative conceptual dialectics, but from changes in the socio-historical reality opposed to them. The way economic categories manifest the priority of this “socio-historical reality” lies in their own disconnection from historical logic. In the section on “The Method of Political Economy,” Marx uses rich historical facts (such as Peru, which had cooperation and a developed division of labor but no money) to illustrate the particular complexity of economic categories when unfolding their own connotations. Marx’s enigmatic expression will also be clarified within the “binary tension”: “Therefore, to arrange economic categories in the order in which they were historically decisive is neither feasible nor correct. Their order is, rather, determined by their mutual relations in modern bourgeois society, and this order is the exact opposite of what appears to be their natural order or the order of their historical development. The point is not the historical position that economic relations occupy in the sequence of successive forms of society... but their internal structure within modern bourgeois society.”

马克思的做法是保持经济范畴与其得以产生的社会历史现实之间的二元张力，而非历史与逻辑的统一，在这一张力的作用下，经济范畴的内涵及其意义并非源自思辨的概念辩证法，而是源于与之对立的社会历史现实的变化，经济范畴表现这一“社会历史现实”之先在性的方式在于它自身与历史逻辑的脱节，马克思在其有关“政治经济学的方法”一节中用丰富的历史事实(比如拥有协作和发达分工，却没有货币的秘鲁)来说明诸经济范畴在其展开自身内涵的时候所特有的复杂性。马克思那谜一样的表述，也将在“二元张力”当中获得说明：“因此，把经济范畴按它们在历史上起决定作用的先后次序来排列是不行的，错误的。它们的次序倒是由它们在现代资产阶级社会中的相互关系决定的，这种关系同表现出来的它们的自然次序或者符合历史发展的次序恰好相反。问题不在于各种经济关系在不同社会形式的相继更替的序列中在历史上占有什么地位。……而在于它们在现代资产阶级社会内部的结构。”

It should be pointed out that although Marx here denies a corresponding, and therefore unified, relationship between economic categories and the social reality they seek to present, his formulation should not lead to a quasi-structuralist interpretation. Economic categories are relational in their very origin, which determines that their understanding can only be obtained within a specific structural relationship. Therefore, the “internal structure within modern bourgeois society” that Marx points to here serves, in the sense of a “real subject” outside concepts, as the decisive element for confirming the connotation of economic categories. For example, in Marx’s understanding of the concept of “population,” we find that, starting from the real premise, if economics takes “population” as the logical starting point of economic categories, it is correct in terms of the intuition and representation of the subject of social production. But Marx then clearly identifies: this is wrong. Because the rich determinations that make “population” an economic category require a different structure constructed by other specific economic categories existing in the reality of bourgeois society to be manifested: “If I were to set out, for example, from population, this would be a chaotic conception of the whole, and through closer determination I would arrive analytically at ever simpler concepts; from the concrete represented, I would arrive at ever thinner abstractions until I had arrived at the simplest determinations. From there the journey would have to be retraced until I finally arrived once more at population, but this time not as a chaotic conception of the whole, but as a rich totality of many determinations and relations.” This rich totality of many determinations and relations is not derived from a Hegelian speculative dialectical logical progression concerning the particular, the universal, and the general, but is obtained through the structural relationship of population with concepts such as wage labor and division of labor in the specific reality of capitalist society, thereby making it an economic category capable of influencing the valorization of capital. Its rich connotation will therefore change continuously with changes in the reality of capitalist society. Thus, within the binary tension, the real subject independent of the thinking mind, i.e., the specific reality of bourgeois society (as one “pole”), determines the basic connotation of economic categories (as the other “pole”). From this, we may gain a deeper understanding of Marx’s following expression: “In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general illumination which bathes all the other colors and modifies their particularity. It is a particular ether which determines the specific gravity of every being which has materialized within it.” The “general illumination” that Marx emphasizes here is precisely the specific reality of bourgeois society, which determines that all economic categories that have existed historically exhibit different theoretical connotations and specific structural relationships among themselves.

需要指出的是，马克思在此虽然否弃经济范畴与其所试图呈现的社会现实之间存在着对应的、因此也是统一的关系，但其所给出的表述也不能随之引发近结构主义的解读方案。经济范畴就其起源而言即为关系性的内涵，这决定了对它的理解也只能在某种特定的结构性的关系中来获得。因此马克思在此所指出的“现代资产阶级社会内部的结构”,是从一种在概念之外的“实在主体”的意义上用于确认经济范畴之内涵的决定性要素。例如在马克思有关“人口”概念的理解中，我们会发现，从现实的前提出发，经济学如果要以“人口”为经济范畴的逻辑起点，在其社会生产的主体的直观和表象上说，是正确的，但随之马克思又明确指认：这是错误的。因为决定“人口”作为一个经济范畴的丰富性规定需要以其他特定的、即资产阶级社会现实中存在的其他诸经济范畴构筑一个不同的结构来彰显：“如果我，例如，拋开构成人口的阶级，人口就是一个抽象。如果我不知道这些阶级所依据的因素，如雇佣劳动、资本等等，阶级又是一句空话。而这些因素是以交换、分工、价格等等为前提的。比如资本，如果没有雇佣劳动、价值、货币、价格等等，它就什么也不是。因此，如果我从人口着手，那么，这就是关于整体的一个混沌的表象，并且通过更切近的规定我就会在分析中达到越来越简单的概念；从表象中的具体达到越来越稀薄的抽象，直到我达到一些最简单的规定。于是行程又得从那里回过头来，直到我最后又回到人口，但是这回人口已不是关于整体的一个混沌的表象，而是一个具有许多规定和关系的丰富的总体了。” 这个拥有许多规定和关系的丰富的总体，并不因这一概念自身遵循黑格尔式的思辨辩证法所展开的有关特殊、普遍与一般的逻辑演进而得出的，而是通过人口在特定的资本社会现实中与诸如雇佣劳动、分工等概念之间的结构性关系，才成为可能对资本增值产生影响的经济范畴。它的丰富性内涵因此也将随着资本主义社会现实的变化而不断变化。由此，在二元张力中，独立于思维头脑之外的实在主体，即特定的资产阶级社会现实(作为其中的“一元”)左右了经济范畴(作为另外“一元”)的基本内涵。由此，我们或可对马克思如下表述有更为深入的理解：“在一切社会形式中都有一种一定的生产决定其他一切生产的地位和影响，因而它的关系也决定其他一切关系的地位和影响。这是一种普照的光，它掩盖了一切其他色彩，改变着它们的特点。这是一种特殊的以太，它决定着它里面显露出来的一切存在的比重。”马克思在此所强调的“普照的光”,正是作为特定的资产阶级社会现实，决定了所有在历史上曾经存在诸经济范畴展现出不一样的理论内涵以及其彼此之间的特定的结构性关系。

III. The Ontological Deduction of Economic Categories: Taking Labor as an Example

三、经济范畴的存在论演绎：以劳动为例

Strictly speaking, Marx did not directly propose a complete systematic method of critique of political economy. Marx only, in comparison with the discussion of the “method of political economy,” presented a deductive scheme of economic categories different from that of the national economists and Hegel. As early as the period of the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx explicitly identified that the two essentially stood on the same ground, especially when facing specific economic categories such as “labor.” The essence of its methodology lies in the unity of history and logic, and thus outlines a speculative logic that ascends from the abstract to the concrete: that is, simple categories and concrete categories seem to have a certain historical correspondence with social development. But in Marx’s view, the relationship between economic categories and specific social history is more complex: “The simplest category, although it can exist historically before the more concrete category, its full development in depth and breadth belongs precisely only to a complex social form, while the more concrete category has had a more full development in a less developed social form.” [4]4 The mercantile system or commercialism: Refers to the economic policies and theories of the mercantilist era, emphasizing trade and commercial activity as the primary source of national wealth. This gives rise to a unique mode of existence of economic categories: their most abstract, and therefore simplest, form can only exist in the most developed social-historical reality, while categories containing many concrete, rich connotations may appear in the least developed social-historical reality. This brings about a subversive transformation of Hegel’s dialectics: in Hegel’s view, the “universal” (die Allgemeinheit) of the concept is presented in the “particular” (Besonderheit) by the “individual” (Einzelne) (i.e., universal determinacy [Bestimmtheit]). Therefore, the “universal” is the most important; it manifests itself as the “individual” by means of the particular, i.e., “universal determinacy.” In contrast, for Marx, what is important is the “determinate” (Bestimmt), i.e., existence itself possessing specific determinations; it becomes a “real subject” absolutely external to the “universal.” The “universal” therefore does not, as in Hegel, acquire its rich, multi-determinate concrete of thought by being presented in the individual way within the particular possessing universal determinacy, but instead becomes an absolute abstraction that is always heterogeneous to the “determinate,” i.e., the determinate real subject. Thus, the original triadic structure of Hegel’s speculative dialectics — the dialectical unity of universal, particular, and individual — becomes a binary opposition between the “universal” and the “determinate.” It is in this opposition that the real subject independent of the mind, which Marx emphasizes — i.e., the social-historical reality rich in determinate determinations — gains its true independence.

严格说来，马克思并没有直接提出一整套系统的政治经济学批判方法。马克思只是在相比照于“政治经济学方法”的讨论中展现出了一个不同于国民经济学家和黑格尔的经济范畴的演绎方案。马克思曾在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》时期就明确指认了两者在本质上站在同一立场之上，特别是在面对诸如“劳动”这一特定的经济范畴来说，更是如此。其方法论的本质在于历史与逻辑的统一，并因此勾勒出一个从抽象上升为具体的思辨逻辑：即简单范畴与具体的范畴似乎与社会发展存在着某种历史性的对应关系。但在马克思看来，经济范畴与特定的社会历史之间的关系却更为复杂：“较简单的范畴，虽然在历史上可以在比较具体的范畴之前存在，但是，它在深度和广度上的充分发展恰恰只能属于一个复杂的社会形式，而比较具体的范畴在一个比较不发展的社会形式中有过比较充分的发展。”由此产生了一个有关经济范畴的独特的存在方式：其最抽象的，因此也是最简单的形式只有在最发达的社会历史现实中才得以存在，而其包含着诸多具体的、丰富内涵的范畴却可能出现在最不发达的社会历史现实之中。由此，带来了黑格尔的辩证法的一次颠覆性的改造：在黑格尔看来，概念的“一般”(die Allgemeinheit)是被“个别”(Einzelne)在“特殊”(Besonderheit)(也即普遍的规定性[Bestimmtheit])当中呈现出现。因此，“一般”是最为重要的，它借助于特殊，即“普遍的规定”表现为“个别”。相反，在马克思这里，重要的是“一定的”(Bestimmt),即拥有特定规定的存在自身，它成为决然外在于“一般”的“实在主体”,“一般”因此并没有如黑格尔一样，在拥有普遍规定性的特殊中，以个别的方式被呈现出来，从而获得了它丰富的、包含多种规定的思维具体，而是成为一种与“一定的”,即被规定的实在主体始终处于异质性的绝对抽象。于是，原初黑格尔思辨辩证法中的三元结构一般、特殊与个别的辩证统一体，变成“一般”与“一定的”的二元对峙。正是在这一对峙当中，马克思所强调的独立于头脑之外的实在主体，即富有一定的规定性的社会历史现实才获得了它真实的独立性。

With this methodological approach, Marx effectively highlights the non-unity of history and logic. Actual history, as a determinate, specific social-historical situation (“the light of all being”), determines the connotation of the universal concept (“the specific gravity of everything that emerges”) [5]5 Physiocracy: An 18th-century French school of economic thought that held that the wealth of nations derived solely from the value of “land agriculture” or “land development,” and that agricultural products should be highly priced., demonstrating the distinctive materialist attribute of his methodology. For the specific unfolding and implementation of this method, we might take the concept of “labor” in Marx’s *Grundrisse* (1857–1858) as an entry point, to glimpse the whole from a single spot and grasp its essentials.

马克思以这一方法论研究路径有效凸显了历史与逻辑非统一性，现实历史，作为被规定的一定的社会历史情境(“普照的光”),决定着一般概念的内涵(“显露出来的一切存在的比重”)(17),彰显了其方法论特有的唯物主义属性。对于这一方法具体的展开和实施，我们或可从马克思在《1857—1858年经济学哲学手稿》中的“劳动”概念为入手点，管中窥豹，领悟其要领所在。

Here, Marx first points out that labor “seems” to be a simple category. The simplicity of this category is manifested in its universality (Allgemeinheit) in appearance, i.e., “— that is, as labor as such (Arbeit überhaupt).” It should be noted here that the Chinese translation indiscriminately translates the two German words (Allgemein and überhaupt) mentioned by Marx here as “一般” (yiban, “general/universal”), thus failing to highlight the difference between Marx’s use of “labor in general” and the “universal” in Hegel’s dialectics. In terms of the difference between the two words, Allgemein can mean a universal with concrete thought, while überhaupt, in its sense of “generally speaking,” “always so,” etc., carries a “universal” that is more endowed with a certain, determinate character. In other words, in Marx’s discussion of labor in general, überhaupt is more concrete than Allgemein. To highlight this difference, I will render the überhaupt that also expresses “general,” “always,” as “as such.”

在此，马克思首先指出，劳动“似乎”是一个简单的范畴。这个范畴的简单性，表现在其在表象上的一般性(Allgemeinheit),即“——即作为如此这般的劳动(Arbeit überhaupt)”。在此，需要指出的是，在中文译本中不加区分的将马克思在此提到的两个德语词(Allgemein与überhaupt)翻译为“一般”,从而无法凸显马克思在使用“劳动一般”的时候与黑格尔的辩证法中的“一般”之间存在的差异。就两个词之间的差别看来，Allgemein可意指带有思维具体的一般，而überhaupt, 则在其作为“一般而言”,“总是如此”等等意义上带有着更富有一定的、规定性的“一般”,换言之，在马克思对于劳动一般的讨论中，überhaupt相较之于Allgemein, 更富有具体性。为了凸显这一差异，我将同样表达“一般”,“总是”的überhaupt表述为“如此这般”。

Thus, when Marx points out that the “generality” (Allgemein and überhaupt) of labor as a simple category is ancient, it means that the “generality” of labor in the process of spontaneous historical unfolding possesses both an absolute abstract quality and a specific richness. Immediately following this, Marx notes that if labor is grasped within economics, that is, as an economic category, then its “simplicity” and “the relations that produce this simple abstraction are modern categories.” [1]1 Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1953), p. 24. (Citation from the original Chinese text.) This determines that Marx’s grasp of the generality of labor as an economic category cannot, within the unity of history and logic, be understood as an ancient, simple concept that acquires increasingly richer determinations with the development of social history. On the contrary, it is in its developed form that the most abstract “generality” of the concept of labor receives its most direct expression. Here, a dislocation of history and logic is manifested. Marx expresses this dislocation in a historically unfolding manner: starting from mercantilism [2]2 Mercantilism: An economic theory and practice dominant in Europe from the 16th to the 18th century, which held that national wealth was measured by its stock of precious metals and advocated state regulation of trade to achieve a positive balance of trade. and extending to the most developed capitalist form of his era — the United States — Marx outlines the process of formation of the “generality” of labor. The formation of labor as an abstract generality not only allows for understanding a new phenomenon emerging in the most developed capitalist societies — namely, “the individual can easily shift from one kind of labor to another, and a specific kind of labor is for them contingent and therefore indifferent” [3]3 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 25. — but, more importantly, it grants legitimacy to the theories proposed by classical political economists represented by Adam Smith, such as labor creating wealth and the eventual formation of the labor theory of value. Consequently, in Marx’s deduction of the generality (Allgemein and überhaupt) of labor, he does not follow the triadic structure of Hegel’s speculative dialectic to expound how the “general” of labor obtains its universal determinations within the particular. Instead, he uses the real changes in forms of wealth existing in social-historical reality as the framework to understand changes in the form of labor. In summary, if mercantilism, which takes external money as its form of wealth, advocates a certain objectification of wealth, then the mercantile system or commercialism [4]4 The mercantile system or commercialism: Refers to the economic policies and theories of the mercantilist era, emphasizing trade and commercial activity as the primary source of national wealth. more prominently highlights the subjective activity of wealth, i.e., specific commercial and industrial labor. Their fundamental difference from physiocracy [5]5 Physiocracy: An 18th-century French school of economic thought that held that the wealth of nations derived solely from the value of “land agriculture” or “land development,” and that agricultural products should be highly priced. lies in confining activity to the activity of acquiring money, whereas physiocracy regards a specific form of labor, namely agricultural labor, as the only labor that creates wealth. Physiocracy also discovered “the generality of the object determined as wealth” (die Allgemeinheit des als Reichthum bestimmten Gegenstandes), seeing the product in general (Product überhaupt) as the general result of labor (allgemeines Resultat der Arbeit). In other words, starting from physiocracy, because it only regarded the activity of creating wealth as agricultural labor, it formed the most abstract generality of wealth (die Allgemeinheit), and thereby formed the most abstract general result of labor (allgemeines Resultat der Arbeit). The generality here carries the connotation of the most abstract general (Allgemeine) contained in Hegel’s speculative dialectic. Smith merely took a great step forward on the path of physiocracy: “He cast aside all determinations of the activity of creating wealth — it is simply labor, neither industrial labor, nor commercial labor, nor agricultural labor, but both this kind of labor and that kind. With the abstract generality of the activity of creating wealth, there is also the generality of the object determined as wealth, which is the product in general (Product überhaupt), or again labor in general (Arbeit überhaupt), but as past, objectified labor.” [6]6 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 25.

于是，当马克思指出作为简单范畴的劳动的“一般性”(Allgemein与überhaupt)是古老的，意味着在自发的历史展开过程中的劳动之“一般”,既具有绝对抽象的意味，同时也具有特定的丰富性。紧随其后，马克思指出，如果将劳动放入经济学之中来加以把握，即作为经济范畴的劳动，那么其“简单性”以及“产生这个简单抽象的那些关系一样，是现代的范畴”。由此，决定了马克思对于作为经济范畴的劳动之一般性的把握，不能在历史与逻辑的统一性中将其理解为古老的简单的概念，随着社会历史的发展而获得其越来越丰富的规定性，恰恰相反，在其发达的形态上，劳动概念最为抽象的“一般性”才得到了最直接的表达。在此，体现出了一种历史与逻辑的错位。马克思以一种历史性展开的方式表达了这一错位，即从货币主义开始，直至马克思生活的时代最发达的资本主义形态——美国，马克思勾勒出了劳动之“一般性”的形成过程。而劳动作为抽象的一般性的形成，不仅可以理解在最发达的资本主义社会中出现的新现象，即“个人很容易从一种劳动转变另一种劳动，一定种类的劳动对他们说来是偶然的，因而是无差别的”,同时更为重要的是，它给予以斯密为代表的古典政治经济学家所提出的劳动创造财富，以及最终形成劳动价值论等理论以合法性。于是马克思在对劳动的一般性(Allgemein与überhaupt)的演绎中，并不会遵循黑格尔思辨辩证法的三元结构阐发劳动“一般”如何在个别中获得其普遍性的规定，而是以社会历史现实中真实存在的财富形式的变迁为框架来理解劳动形式的变化。概而言之，如果说，以外在的货币为其财富形态的货币主义主张某种财富的客观化，那么重工主义或者重商主义则更为凸显了财富的主体的活动上，即具体的商业劳动和工业劳动，他们与重农主义的根本区别在于他们将活动局限在获取货币的活动，而重农主义则将劳动的一定形式，即农业劳动看作是唯一创造财富的劳动。并发现了“被规定为财富的对象的一般性”(die Allgemeinheit des als Reichthum bestimmten Gegenstandes),产品一般(Product überhaupt)看作劳动的一般成果(allgemeines Resultat der Arbeit.)。换言之，从重农主义开始，由于其将创造财富的活动仅仅看作为农业劳动，也就形成了对财富的最抽象的一般性(die Allgemeinheit),由此也就形成了最为抽象的劳动一般的成果(allgemeines Resultat der Arbeit)。此处的一般性，带有黑格尔思辨辩证法中所蕴含的最为抽象的一般(Allgemeine)的内涵。而斯密不过是在重农主义的道路上迈进了一大步：“他抛开了创造财富的活动的一切规定性，干脆就是劳动，既不是工业劳动，又不是商业劳动，也不是农业劳动，而既是这种劳动，又是那种劳动。有了创造财富的活动的抽象一般性，也就有了被规定为财富的对象的一般性，这就是产品一般(Product überhaupt),或者说又是劳动一般(Arbeit überhaupt),然而是作为过去的、对象化的劳动。”

Here we need to specifically point out that Marx uses “the general result of labor (allgemeines Resultat der Arbeit)” to express the abstraction, in physiocracy, of single agricultural labor into all forms of labor that create wealth. This abstraction is evidently simple, and therefore an absolute abstraction. He uses “labor in general (Arbeit überhaupt)” to express the abstraction achieved by Smith, which erases the formal differences between different kinds of labor. This abstraction, although not a simple abstraction from a single type of labor form, is an abstraction formed on top of multiple completely different forms of labor. If the abstraction in the sense of Allgemein carries a connotation of abstraction as a “universal” (Gemeinsames), then the abstraction of überhaupt carries an abstraction based on heterogeneity. If abstraction in the sense of the universal is an abstraction confined to the epistemological level, then abstraction based on heterogeneity is an abstraction with an ontological character. As Marx points out: “This equalization of all kinds of labor presupposes a highly developed totality of actual kinds of labor, in which none is any longer the dominant one. Thus, the most general abstractions arise only where the richest concrete development occurs, where one thing appears common to many, to all. Then it ceases to be thinkable only in a particular form. On the other hand, this abstraction of labor in general (diese Abstraktion der Arbeit überhaupt) is not merely the mental result (das geistige Resultat) of a concrete totality of labors.” [7]7 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 25. This means that its own abstract determination requires the existence of heterogeneity as its premise. These heterogeneous premises cannot, because of the existence of absolute abstraction, such as labor in general, lose the reality of their diverse, heterogeneous modes of existence, such as multiple completely different forms of labor. Here, Marx attempts to replace the generality of Allgemein with the generality of überhaupt, highlighting the abstractness of labor, which serves as the logical starting point of modern economics, an abstractness that contains multiple determinations within it. More importantly, Marx simultaneously points out that this unique form of labor in general is not only real in thought, i.e., in the mind, but also, because it is independent of the specific determinations of modern capitalist society in the mind, this abstraction of labor in general becomes “something practically true (praktisch wahr).” [8]8 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 25. In other words, the most abstract category of labor becomes the most real thing in modern capitalist society. Here, although Marx emphasizes the correspondence between abstract categories and social reality, he expounds it within a context of binary opposition: that is, the practical truth of labor in general does not arise because it conforms to the logic of concept movement in speculative dialectics, but because of the specific, determined reality of capitalist society itself.

在此我们需要特别指出的是，马克思用“劳动的一般成果(allgemeines Resultat der Arbeit)”表达了在重农主义那里将单一的农业劳动抽象为创造财富的全部劳动形式。这一抽象显然是简单的，因此也是绝对的抽象，而用“劳动一般(Arbeit überhaupt)”来表达斯密所实现的抹去了不同劳动的形式差别而实现的抽象，这一抽象，尽管并非对某一类劳动形式的简单抽象，而是将多种完全不同的劳动形式之上所形成的抽象，如果说Allgemein意义上的抽象带有一种“共相”意义上的抽象，那么überhaupt的抽象则带有一种异质性基础上的抽象。如果说共相意义上抽象是一种囿于认识论意义上的抽象，那么异质性的抽象则是一个带有存在论色彩的抽象。正如马克思所指出的那样：“对任何种类劳动的同样看待，以各种现实劳动组成的一个十分发达的总体为前提，在这些劳动中，任何一种劳动都不再是支配一切的劳动。所以，最一般的抽象总只是产生在最丰富的具体发展的场合，在那里，一种东西为许多东西所共有，为一切所共有。这样一来，它就不再只是在特殊形式上才能加以思考了。另外，劳动一般这个抽象(diese Abstraktion der Arbeit überhaupt )不仅仅是各种劳动组成的一个具体总体的精神结果(das geistige Resultat einer konkreten Totalität )”,这意味着，它的抽象性的规定自身就需要以异质性的存在为前提。这些异质性的前提不能因为绝对抽象的存在，例如劳动一般，而失去其多样化的、异质性的存在方式的真实性，例如多种完全不同形式的劳动形式。马克思在此试图用überhaupt的一般性来替代Allgemein的一般性，凸显作为现代经济学之逻辑起点的劳动所具有的包含着多种规定性在内的抽象性。并且更为重要的是，马克思同时指出，这一独特的劳动一般的形式不仅在思维中，即在头脑中具有其真实性，同时由于独立于头脑中现代资本主义社会特定的规定性，使得这一劳动一般的抽象，同时也成了“实际上真实的东西。(praktisch wahr )”(21)换言之，最为抽象的劳动范畴在现代资本主义社会中却成了最富有真实性的东西。在此，马克思虽然强调了抽象的范畴与社会现实之间的对应关系，但是在一个二元对峙的语境下对其加以阐发：换言之，劳动一般所具有的实际的真实性，并不因其符合思辨辩证法的概念运动逻辑，而是因为特定的、被规定的资本主义社会现实本身。

Thus far, by drawing on Marx’s discussion of the concept of labor as an economic category, we have tentatively set out an existentialist deductive path concerning Marx’s method of critique of political economy. This path differs from the one opened up by the national economists, Kant, and Hegel (as manifested in the first and second paths of political economy method discussed by Marx). Marx highlights the binary opposition between the social-historical reality of the real subject and the concept. By emphasizing this structure of opposition, Marx achieves a critical examination of the method of political economy. With its unique materialist attribute, it breaks through the methodology under the epistemological context constructed by the national economists, Kant, and Hegel on the same ground, providing a unique entry point for the starting point and framework of the subsequent study of the problem of “capital.”

至此，我们借助于马克思对作为经济范畴的劳动概念的讨论尝试性展开了有关于马克思政治经济学批判方法的存在论演绎路径。这一路径不同于国民经济学家、康德与黑格尔所敞开的道路(表现在马克思所探讨的政治经济学方法的第一条道路和第二条道路),马克思凸显了作为实在主体的社会历史现实与概念之间的二元对峙，依赖于对这一对峙性结构的强调，马克思实现了对政治经济学方法的批判性考察，以其独特的唯物主义属性突破了国民经济学家、康德与黑格尔哲学在同一立场上所构筑的认识论语境下的方法论，为其后展开有关“资本”问题的研究起点与框架提供了独特的切入点。

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