Treating Reification in the Dialectical Relationship between Spirit and Body

Since Lukács proposed the theory of reification critique, there has been a major shift in the theory of capitalist critique. That is, when people criticize the capitalist system, they do not criticize the inherent contradictions within the capitalist system, but rather focus on the reification caused by the capitalist system. It can be said that in the history of Western Marxism, the critique of reification has always been the theme of capitalist critique. However, on how to treat reification, many people have not found a correct direction. Therefore, deeply considering this issue from the perspective of materialist dialectics has urgent theoretical significance and practical value.

自卢卡奇提出物化批判理论以来，资本主义批判理论发生了重大的转向。这就是，人们在批判资本主义制度的时候，不是批判资本主义制度存在的内在矛盾，而是关注资本主义制度造成的物化。可以说，在西方马克思主义的历史中，物化批判一直是资本主义批判的主题。但是，在如何对待物化方面，很多人并没有找到一个正确的方向。因此，从唯物主义辩证法的角度深入思考这一问题，具有迫切的理论意义和现实价值。

I. The Idealist Nature of Lukács's Theory of Reification Critique

一、卢卡奇物化批判理论的观念论性质

According to Marx's basic ideas in *Capital*, the main problem of capitalist society is the contradiction between capitalist socialized large-scale production and the private ownership of the means of production, a contradiction that inevitably leads to capitalist economic crises. The exploitation of workers by capitalist private enterprises exacerbates this contradiction. Here, Marx's thought also contains a critique of the logic of identity, namely, that the equal exchange of capitalism contains inequality. The bourgeoisie, from an idealist standpoint, places everything within the framework of identity, turning everything into something calculable. Marx, on the other hand, seeks to reveal and grasp what cannot be incorporated into the framework of identity, that is, to discover the non-identical within the identical. This non-identical thing is the use value that cannot be incorporated into the exchange system, the inequality hidden behind equal exchange, and so on. The revelation of the non-identical is a prominent manifestation of Marx's materialist thought.

按照马克思在《资本论》中的基本思想，资本主义社会的主要问题是资本主义社会化大生产与生产资料私人占有之间的矛盾，这个矛盾必然导致资本主义经济危机。资本主义私人企业对工人的剥削加剧了这种矛盾。在这里，马克思的思想中也包含着对于同一性逻辑的批判，即资本主义的平等交换中包含了不平等。资产阶级从一种观念论的立场出发，把一切东西都放在同一性的框架中，把它们都变成可以计算的东西。而马克思就是要揭示和把握不能被纳入同一性框架中的东西，即在同一性中发现非同一的东西。这种非同一的东西就是无法被纳入交换体系的使用价值，是平等交换背后所隐藏着的不平等，等等。对非同一的东西的揭示是马克思唯物主义思想的突出表现。

On the surface, Lukács's theory of reification critique is consistent with Marx's theory of surplus value. In Lukács's view, the main problem of capitalist society is reification, and the core of reification is rationalization, that is, capitalist society controls everything according to the model of rational calculation. Commodity exchange is a form of rationalized control. Through this rationalization, the economic system of capitalist society becomes an autonomous system, akin to a second nature. Marx also emphasized the second-nature characteristic of capitalist market exchange, but Lukács was not satisfied with this. In his view, this rationalized system of capitalist society has already penetrated all areas of social life. Therefore, his critique of reification is not limited to the economic sphere, but aims to critique the second-nature character of the entire capitalist society. When all social relations of capitalist society acquire the characteristics of a second nature, these social relations become "a priori" reasonable things. Marx understood this phenomenon as fetishism.

从表面上看，卢卡奇的物化批判理论与马克思的剩余价值理论是一致的。在卢卡奇看来，资本主义社会的主要问题是物化，而物化的核心是合理化，即资本主义社会把一切都按照合理化计算的模式来加以控制。商品交换就是一种合理化的控制，通过这种合理化，资本主义社会的经济系统变成一个自主的体系，类似于第二自然。马克思也强调资本主义市场交换所具有的第二自然的特征，但是卢卡奇不满足于这一点。在他看来，资本主义社会的这种合理化体系已经渗透到社会生活的一切领域。因此，他对物化的批判并不局限在经济领域，而是要批判整个资本主义社会的第二自然性质。当资本主义社会的一切社会关系获得了第二自然的特征时，这种社会关系就变成“先天”合理的东西。马克思把这种现象理解为拜物教。

If Marx's critique of capitalism concerns the problem of the economic base of capitalist society, pointing to the non-identical thing plundered by the capitalist (i.e., the different quantities of labor contained within the same labor time), then Lukács explicitly states that what he discusses is "the ideological problem of capitalism and its demise." That is to say, he shifts Marx's analysis of the demise of capitalism from the problem of the economic base to the "ideological problem." From the outset, this shift reveals the idealist tendency in his conception of history. In the essay "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat," Lukács clearly states the reified nature of capitalist society. He emphasizes that only in modern capitalist society does the phenomenon of reification cease to be limited to the economic sphere and penetrate all areas of social life. In capitalist society, the commodity has become the "universal category of the whole of society's being." According to this understanding, the entire capitalist society becomes a reified totality.

如果说马克思的资本主义批判涉及的是资本主义社会的经济基础问题，指向的是被资本家掠夺的非同一的东西（即相同的劳动时间中所包含的不同的劳动量），而卢卡奇则明确表示，他所讨论的是“资本主义及其灭亡的意识形态问题”。也就是说，他把马克思关于资本主义灭亡的分析从经济基础问题转向了“意识形态问题”。这个转向从一开始就显示出其历史观中的观念论倾向。在《物化与无产阶级意识》一文中，卢卡奇开宗明义说明了资本主义社会的物化性质。他强调，只有在现代资本主义社会，物化现象才不再局限于经济领域，而是渗透到社会生活的一切领域。在资本主义社会，商品已经变成“社会构造的普遍形式”。按照这样的理解，整个资本主义社会就变成了物化的总体。

However, the idea of capitalist society becoming a reified totality is precisely absorbed from Hegel. First, the concept of totality is the core of Hegel's idealist doctrine: spirit incorporates everything into its own system and constitutes a totality. According to this idealism, the whole of society is a totality controlled by rational spirit. Hegel expresses this totality controlled by spirit in the form of an idealist system, a totality that has a natural form. Hegel says: "The system of right is the realm of actualized freedom, the world of spirit brought forth from itself as a second nature." [1]1 Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, Preface to the New Edition (1967), trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), xxiii. What plays the decisive role here is the world spirit or absolute spirit. The process of the development of human civilization is the process of this spirit realizing itself. If the decisive role in Hegel is played by the world spirit, then in Lukács the decisive role is played by Max Weber's mechanism of rationalization. Lukács says: "Only capitalism has brought into being a unified economic structure for the whole of society, and thereby produced a — formal — unified consciousness structure for the whole of society." [2]2 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 62 (H. 38). In capitalist society, from the economic base to the superstructure, everything is incorporated into a unified "consciousness structure." Clearly, the reified totality is essentially a rephrasing of the idea that spirit controls the social system.

然而，资本主义社会变成物化总体的思想恰恰是从黑格尔那里吸收来的。首先，总体的观念是黑格尔观念论学说的核心：精神把一切纳入它自身的体系中，并构成一个总体。按照这种观念论，整个社会就是一个被理性精神控制的总体。黑格尔用一个观念论体系的形式来表达这个被精神控制的总体，这一总体具有自然的形式。黑格尔说：“至于法的体系是实现了的自由的王国，是从精神自身产生出来的，是作为第二自然的精神世界。”在这里发挥决定作用的是世界精神或者绝对精神。人类文明的发展过程就是这个精神实现自身的过程。如果说在黑格尔那里具有决定性作用的是世界精神，那么在卢卡奇这里发挥决定性作用的则是马克斯·韦伯所说的合理化机制。卢卡奇说：“只有资本主义才随同实现整个社会的统一经济结构，产生出一种——正式的——包括整个社会的统一的意识结构。”在资本主义社会，从经济基础到上层建筑，都被纳入统一的“意识结构”中。显然，物化总体其实就是精神控制社会系统这一说法的翻版。

So, how can the problems of capitalist society be solved? Lukács's view on this is clearly different from Marx's. Lukács believes: "It is not the primacy of economic motives in historical explanation that constitutes the decisive difference between Marxism and bourgeois science, but the point of view of totality." [3]3 Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,” in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3 (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 301. That is to say, he denies the primacy of the economic base. In his view, the difference between Marxist thought and bourgeois thought lies in the fact that Marx's thought contains dialectics, that is, it absorbed Hegel's dialectics, while the bourgeoisie adheres to the method of positive science. The core difference between Marxism and bourgeois thought is the difference between dialectics and positivism. Therefore, he believes that even if a new study completely refutes individual theses of Marx, as long as the new theory adheres to dialectics, it is still orthodox Marxism — the so-called orthodoxy of Marxism refers only to method. In fact, it can be seen that he Hegelianizes Marx's thought. Although Hegel's dialectics also seeks to grasp the non-identical, this non-identical thing has already been conceptualized by him; it is something within the realm of consciousness, not the materially non-identical thing that Marx discusses when analyzing commodity exchange.

那么，如何才能解决资本主义社会的问题？卢卡奇对此的看法明显不同于马克思。卢卡奇认为：“不是经济动机在历史解释中的首要地位，而是总体的观点，使马克思主义同资产阶级科学有决定性的区别。”也就是说，他否定了经济基础的首要地位。在他看来，马克思主义思想同资产阶级思想的区别在于，马克思的思想中有辩证法，即吸收了黑格尔的辩证法，而资产阶级所坚持的是实证科学方法。马克思主义与资产阶级思想之间的核心区别就是辩证法与实证主义的区别。因此，他认为，即使一项新的研究完全驳倒了马克思的个别论点，但是只要新的理论坚持辩证法，那么它依然是正统的马克思主义——所谓马克思主义的正统仅仅是指方法。其实可以看出，他把马克思的思想黑格尔主义化了。黑格尔的辩证法虽然也要把握非同一的东西，但是这个非同一的东西已经被他概念化，是意识领域中的东西，而不是马克思在分析商品交换时所讲的那种物质意义上的非同一的东西。

Lukács believes that as long as one adheres to dialectics, then it is Marxism. He even openly states: "Hegel unites — dialectically — thinking and being, and understands their unity as the unity of process and totality. This also constitutes the essence of historical materialism's philosophy of history." [4]4 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. xxiii. In his view, Hegel's unity of thinking and being becomes the essence of Marx's historical materialism, and of course, the essence of Marx's critique of political economy. Following this line of thought, the foundational position of the economic base in the historical process is shaken. Consequently, for changing capitalist society, the transformation of the economic base becomes unimportant. The economic base and the superstructure have already combined to form a totality. Therefore, the revolution in the ideological sphere and the revolution in the economic sphere are the same thing. Lukács proposes: "For the dialectical method, 'ideological' and 'economic' problems lose their mutual, fixed heterogeneity and flow into each other." [5]5 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 15. This means that thinking and being are completely unified. Here, he excludes the primacy of the economy, so when economic problems are combined with ideological problems, the ideological problem becomes primary. Therefore, for Lukács, to solve the problems of capitalist society, the primary task is to solve the ideological problem; indeed, the ideological problem is the only problem. He emphasizes: "The dominance of the category of totality is the bearer of the revolutionary principle in science." [6]6 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 28. Here, the "category of totality," i.e., the "category" with ideological characteristics, becomes the bearer of the revolutionary principle. The idealist essence of Lukács's revolutionary principle is thus clearly revealed.

卢卡奇认为，只要坚持了辩证法，那么就是马克思主义。他甚至公开说：“黑格尔使思维和存在——辩证地——统一起来，把它们的统一理解为过程的统一和总体。这也构成历史唯物主义的历史哲学的本质。”在他看来，黑格尔所说的思维与存在的统一成为马克思的历史唯物主义的本质，当然也是马克思的政治经济学批判的本质。按照这一思路，经济基础在历史过程中的基础地位被动摇了。如此一来，对于改变资本主义社会来说，经济基础的变革也就不重要了。经济基础与上层建筑已经结合在一起，构成了一个总体。因此，意识形态领域的革命和经济基础领域的革命就是同一回事。卢卡奇提出：“对辩证方法来说，‘意识形态的’和‘经济的’问题都失去了自己互有的、固定不变的异性，并相互汇合起来。”这就意味着，思维与存在完全统一在一起了。在这里，他排除了经济的首要地位，所以当经济问题与意识形态问题结合在一起时，意识形态问题就是首要的了。因此，对于卢卡奇来说，要解决资本主义社会的问题，首要的是解决意识形态的问题，甚至意识形态问题是唯一的问题。他强调：“总体范畴的统治地位，是科学中的革命原则的支柱。”在这里，“总体范畴”即具有思想特征的“范畴”成为革命原则的支柱。卢卡奇的革命原则的观念论本质也就昭然若揭。

II. Where Does the Root of Reification Lie?

二、物化的根源何在？

To determine whether Lukács’s line of thought is actually feasible, we need to clarify the root of reification. Contemporary capitalist society indeed exhibits the phenomenon of reification that Lukács described; how then does it occur? This requires us to trace back to the foundation of human civilization. According to the analysis carried out by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, in order to preserve themselves, humans must control external nature. In the process of controlling external nature, humans must also restrain their own inner nature. Adorno and Horkheimer use the story from the *Odyssey* of Odysseus conquering the Sirens to illustrate this phenomenon. According to their analysis, on his journey back to his homeland, Odysseus had to pass by the place where the Sirens lived. The song of these Sirens was exceptionally beautiful, and those who passed by were often lured by the beautiful song to their deaths at sea. Odysseus and his sailors adopted a “rationalized” method, what people today often call “instrumental reason,” to deal with the Sirens. He had himself tied to the mast and had his sailors plug their ears, thereby effectively conquering the Sirens. Here, the Sirens symbolize nature. This means that when conquering external nature, humans use a rationalized method to categorize and control natural objects. What Adorno emphasizes is that this method of instrumental reason is used not only to conquer external nature but also to conquer humans’ own inner nature. Originally, as humans, people always have emotions and will, and these emotions and will are all related to the needs of the body. However, in conquering external nature, humans also control their inner nature. In this way, the human spirit becomes opposed to will and emotion. The spirit, as a subjective force, becomes a rationalized spirit.

要说明卢卡奇的这个思路究竟是否可行，我们需要弄清楚物化的根源。当代资本主义社会确实出现了卢卡奇所说的物化现象，那么它是如何发生的？这就需要追溯人类文明的基础。按照西奥多·阿多诺和马克斯·霍克海默在《启蒙辩证法》中进行的分析，人为了自我持存就必须控制外部自然。在控制外部自然的过程中，人还需要束缚人自身的自然。阿多诺和霍克海默借助《奥德赛》中奥德修斯征服海妖塞壬的故事来说明这种现象。按照他们的分析，奥德修斯在返回故乡的途中必须经过海妖塞壬居住的地方。这个海妖的歌声特别优美，经过这里的人常常受到优美歌声的诱惑而葬身大海。奥德修斯和他的水手们就采取了一种“合理化”的方法，也就是今天人们常说的“工具理性”的方法来对付海妖。他让人把自己捆在桅杆上，同时让水手堵住耳朵，由此有效地征服了海妖。在此，海妖就是自然的象征。这意味着，在征服外在自然的时候，人会用一种合理化的方法来对自然的对象进行归类和控制。阿多诺所要强调的是，这种工具理性的方法不仅被用来征服外在自然，而且被用来征服人自身的自然。本来人作为人总是有情感和意志的，这种情感和意志都与人的肉体上的需要有关。但是，人在征服外在自然的时候也控制了内在的自然。这样一来，人的精神就与意志、情感对立起来了。精神作为一种主体力量变成一种合理化的精神。

It should be said that Lukács saw this problem when analyzing the phenomenon of reification in developed capitalist society. In capitalist society, rationalization has penetrated every sphere of society, even the spiritual sphere of humans. Here, the human spirit itself is also reified. Axel Honneth understands this phenomenon of reification as the forgetting of “primordial” relations of recognition. [1]1 Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, Preface to the New Edition (1967), trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), xxiii. When relations between people are organized entirely according to the principle of rationalization, this society exhibits the characteristics of a second nature. But humans are not things; they cannot possibly act entirely according to natural laws, nor can they truly become a second nature. This is caused by the opposition between the body and the spirit within humans themselves. In the process of controlling nature, humans’ own nature (the body) no longer influences their spirit; the human spirit becomes a purely rational spirit. People will inevitably say that this statement is purely a theoretical fiction; the fact is that the body and spirit of all people are combined. Therefore, the notion that the human body and spirit are combined is naturally correct. In fact, the notion that the human body and spirit are combined is precisely what Marx called the characteristic of fetishism. From the perspective of fetishism, humans inevitably develop an inverted understanding of phenomena in the world. Originally, the commodity exchange relation is a social relation between people, but from the perspective of fetishism, it is a completely objective relation, a relation between things. In reality, the relation of things manifested here is false; the social relation hidden within it is true. However, in fetishism, what is true becomes false, and what is false becomes true. Reified consciousness (fetishism) merely adheres to the dogma of “seeing is believing.” Consequently, in capitalist society, if we tell people that their spirit and body are opposed, they will certainly not take it seriously. Yet, if the human body and spirit are combined, then why do they so often say one thing and mean another? Since spirit and body are combined, what the body does must necessarily be what the spirit thinks. However, inconsistency between words and deeds is a common human behavior; even children can lie. And the reason children lie is to get what they want. From this perspective, inconsistency between words and deeds is an inevitable result of humans conquering nature, an inevitable result of “civilization.”

应该说，卢卡奇在分析发达资本主义社会物化现象的时候看到了这个问题。在资本主义社会，合理化已经渗入社会的每个领域，甚至是人的精神领域。在这里，人的精神也物化了。阿克塞尔·霍耐特将这种物化现象理解为“源始”的承认关系的遗忘。当人与人之间的关系完全按照合理化原则组织起来时，这个社会就表现出第二自然的特点。但人不是物，不可能完全按照自然规律来活动，不可能真正变成第二自然。这是由人自身的肉体与精神的对立造成的。在控制自然的过程中，人自身的自然（肉体）不再影响人的精神了，人的精神变成了纯粹理性的精神。人们必然会说，这种说法纯粹是理论上的虚构，事实是，所有人的肉体与精神都是结合在一起的。因此，认为人的肉体与精神相结合的观念才是天然正确的。其实，认为人的肉体与精神相结合的观念恰恰就是马克思所说的拜物教的特点。在拜物教的视野中，人必然会对世界上的现象产生一种颠倒了的理解。本来商品交换关系是人与人之间的社会关系，但是在拜物教的视野中，这是一种完全客观的关系，是物的关系。而实际上，这里所表现出来的物的关系是假的，隐藏于其中的社会关系才是真的。但是，在拜物教中，真的东西变成了假的，而假的东西变成了真的。物化意识（拜物教）只是信奉“眼见为实”的教条。于是，在资本主义社会里，如果我们告诉人们，其精神与肉体是对立的，他们必定不以为然。可是，如果人的肉体与精神是结合在一起的，那么为什么他们常常会言不由衷？既然精神与肉体是结合在一起的，那么肉体所做的就必然是精神所想到的东西。但是，言行不一是人的常见行为，甚至连儿童都会撒谎。而儿童之所以撒谎，是为了得到他想要的东西。从这个角度来看，言行不一是人征服自然的必然结果，是“文明”的必然结果。

When the human body and spirit are completely separated and even opposed to each other, human action will manifest a purely rationalized form. This indicates that the trend of reification is an inevitable trend in the development of human civilization, and capitalist society pushes this trend to its extreme. Originally, the human spirit must be autonomous, capable of functioning purely spontaneously. The activities stimulated by such a spirit must be arbitrary and contingent, impossible to occur entirely according to the principle of rationality. But why does the trend of reification appear in capitalist society? This is because, when spirit is opposed to body, there is no impulse of the body within the spirit. In this way, the spirit will not possess spontaneity and contingency. One view holds that human consciousness, besides its rational aspect, also has an irrational aspect. But these irrational things, such as will and emotion, are all connected to the body. If they are separated from the body, then these irrational things also become very rational. The situation where this irrational thing becomes rational is extremely clear in Kant’s concept of “will.” Because Kant excludes the role of the body, the will is understood as practical reason. Even the “respect” associated with practical reason is rational. In Kant, respect has nothing to do with feeling. This tells us a truth: when spirit is opposed to body, spirit suffers revenge from the body, becoming something like the body itself, and like nature, it follows certain laws. From a broader perspective, spirit cannot exclude nature; if spirit completely excludes nature, it will become something similar to nature itself. In other words, spirit will lose its autonomy. We can say that this is nature, after being excluded by spirit, stealthily entering spirit and taking revenge on it, causing the autonomous spirit to act according to the laws of nature. Conversely, matter cannot be separated from spirit; otherwise, for humans, it is nothing. Humans cannot form the most general consciousness of matter that does not appear in their spirit. If people insist on the existence of this matter separated from spirit, then this matter, like spirit, is a pure concept.

当人的肉体与精神彻底分离开来甚至对立起来的时候，人的行动就会表现出一种纯粹的合理化形式。这表明，物化趋势是人类文明发展中的一个必然趋势，而资本主义社会把这种趋势发展到极端。本来人的精神必然是自主的，可以纯粹自发地发挥作用。由这种精神激发起来的活动必然是随意的、偶然的，不可能完全按照合理性的原则发生。但是，为什么资本主义社会又会出现物化趋势呢？这是因为，当精神与肉体对立起来时，精神之中没有肉体的冲动了。如此一来，精神就不会具有自发性和偶然性。有一种观点认为，人的意识除了有理性的方面，还具有非理性的方面。但这些非理性的东西，比如意志和情感，都是与肉体联系在一起的。如果它们脱离了肉体，那么这些非理性的东西也变得非常理性了。这种非理性的东西变得理性的情况在康德的“意志”概念中表现得极其清楚。由于康德排除了肉体的作用，所以意志被理解为实践理性。甚至与实践理性联系在一起的那种“敬重”也是理性的。在康德那里，敬重与感情没有任何关系。这就告诉我们一个道理：当精神与肉体对立起来的时候，精神受到肉体的报复，变成了同肉体一样的东西，并像自然一样都遵循某种规律。从一个更广泛的角度来说，精神不能排斥自然，如果精神彻底排斥了自然，那么就会成为类似自然一样的东西。换言之，精神就会失去它的自主性。我们可以说，这是精神在排斥自然之后，自然偷偷摸摸地进入精神，并报复了精神，它让自主的精神按照自然的规律来活动。反过来，物质也不能脱离精神，否则对人来说，它就是无。人类对于不在自己精神中出现的物质不可能会形成最一般的意识。如果人们坚持这种脱离精神的物质的存在，那么这种物质就如同精神一样，是一个纯粹的概念。

When spirit and body are completely opposed to each other, the dualistic opposition of subject and object is also established. Descartes’ dualism is a typical representative of this idea of subject-object dualistic opposition. [2]2 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 62 (H. 38). The dualistic opposition of subject and object is the inevitable result of the development of this spiritual power. From this perspective, reification is merely a result of the dualistic opposition between subject and object, a concomitant phenomenon. Therefore, to solve the problem of reification, we must delve into the level of the dualistic opposition of subject and object to understand reification and seek a way to resolve it.

当精神与肉体彻底对立起来时，主客体的二元对立也就被确立起来了。笛卡儿的二元论是这种主客体二元对立思想的典型代表。主体与客体的二元对立就是这种精神力量发展的必然结果。从这个角度来说，物化只是主体与客体之间二元对立的结果，是其附带现象。因此，要解决物化问题，就必须深入主客体二元对立的层面去理解物化和探寻解决之道。

III. How Should We Treat Reification?

三、应该如何对待物化？

Since reification is the result of the subject-object binary opposition, then as long as this subject-object binary opposition is overcome, reification can be overcome. However, there are different approaches to the method of overcoming the subject-object binary opposition. Broadly speaking, among contemporary thinkers there exist three different approaches: the Hegelian idealist approach, the Heideggerian phenomenological approach, and the approach following Marx’s dialectical materialism. Lukács both criticizes Heidegger’s phenomenological approach and is dissatisfied with Marx’s “sticking to” the sphere of the economic base, thus moving toward a Hegelian idealist approach. The core of this approach is the subject conquering the object, ultimately achieving the unity of subject and object. From the perspective of the critique of reification, this means infusing a spiritual element into the object, spiritualizing the objective, thereby dissolving the power of the object. When engaging in self-reflection, Lukács also admits that this approach is “carried out in the pure Hegelian spirit,” and “especially, its ultimate philosophical foundation is the identical subject-object that realizes itself in the historical process. Of course, in Hegel, it is presented in a purely logical and philosophical way: through the sublation of externalization, self-consciousness returns to itself, and thereby realizes the identical subject-object; absolute spirit reaches its highest stage in philosophy.” [1]1 Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, Preface to the New Edition (1967), trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), xxiii. However, for Marx, criticizing the reified system means re-appropriating the surplus value (the non-identical thing that exceeds identity) that has been expropriated by the capitalist. For Lukács, the most serious problem in capitalist society is not the problem of exploitation in the economic sphere, but the problem of the reification of the capitalist social system and the problem of the individual being controlled within this reified system. If the working class becomes aware that this reified system is the result of their own social activity, then they can regain control of this system. In this way, they achieve the unity of subject and object. According to Lukács’s line of thought, this means reification has been overcome. However, even if the working class actually masters the reified system, if this system still operates according to the principle of rationalization, then it remains reified. Here, reification cannot truly be overcome.

既然物化是主客体二元对立的结果，那么只要克服了这种主客体二元对立，就可以克服物化。但是，关于克服主客体二元对立的方法却存在不同的思路。大致而言，在当代思想家中存在着三种不同的思路：黑格尔式的观念论思路、海德格尔的现象学思路和遵循马克思辩证唯物主义的思路。卢卡奇既批判海德格尔的现象学思路，又对马克思“拘泥”于经济基础领域的思路不满，而走向了一种黑格尔观念论式的思路。这种思路的核心就是主体征服客体，并最终达到主客体的统一。从物化批判的角度来说，这就是把一种精神要素灌注到客体中，把客观的东西精神化，从而消解客体的力量。卢卡奇在进行自我反思的时候也承认，这种做法是“用纯粹黑格尔的精神进行的”，“尤其是，它的最终哲学基础是历史过程中的自我实现的同一的主体—客体。当然，在黑格尔那里，它是以一种纯粹逻辑的和哲学的方式提出的：通过消除外化，自我意识向自身的返回，并由此实现同一的主体—客体，绝对精神在哲学中达到了它的最高阶段”。然而，对马克思来说，批判物化体系就是要重新获得被资本家剥夺的剩余价值（超出了同一性之外的非同一的东西）。而对于卢卡奇来说，资本主义社会存在的最严重的问题不是经济领域中的剥削问题，而是资本主义社会体系的物化以及个人在这种物化体系中被控制的问题。如果工人阶级意识到，这一物化体系是他们自己的社会活动的结果，那么他们就可以重新控制这个体系。如此一来，他们就达到了主客体的统一。按照卢卡奇的思路，这也就意味着物化被克服了。可是，即使工人阶级果真掌握了物化体系，但如果这一体系还是按照合理化原则来运行，那么它仍然是被物化的。在这里，物化并不能真正被克服。

Heidegger also saw the problem of reification in modern capitalist society. In his view, in the process of conquering nature, humans inevitably lead to the binary opposition of subject and object. To solve the problem of reification, humanity needs to overcome this opposition. Although this opposition is an unavoidable everyday condition of human existence, he believes that humans should not be mired in this everyday condition. People in everyday life should also see another, concealed world – “worldhood” (Weltlichkeit). This is a world that transcends the subject-object binary opposition. In this world, we can apprehend Being, that is, Being that directly transcends the subject-object binary opposition. Heidegger also declares: “Being is the transcendens pure and simple.” [2]2 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 62 (H. 38). However, when Heidegger turns Being into an “transcendens” that can be intuited, this Being becomes a being, that is, this thing that was originally opposed to reification instead becomes a reified thing. In Heidegger, the person who can apprehend Being in the life-world is called “Dasein.” The reason he understands humans as “Dasein” is precisely because he sees this contradiction within humans themselves. According to his understanding of “Dasein,” on the one hand, humans must become roles in life, which is necessary for human everyday existence, and this is what he understands as “falling” (Verfallen) without value or meaning; on the other hand, as “Dasein,” humans must simultaneously become “potentiality-for-Being” (Seinkönnen), and this so-called “potentiality-for-Being” is a kind of personhood; as an abstract personhood, humans have infinite possibilities. He combines personhood and role. A human combined in this way can be seen neither as a role nor as pure personhood. This contradictory identity can only be called “Dasein,” an “Dasein” that cannot be defined. Heidegger saw the fate of humans being reified in their roles, and attempted to use personhood to eliminate the state of forced reification in roles. As far as Heidegger’s line of thought is concerned, he reached the edge of dialectics, but ultimately brushed past it. The reason is that the phenomenological method hindered him, preventing him from reaching dialectics. When he used “Dasein” to name this contradictory unity, he actually dissolved the contradiction here, or rather, the authentic existence he conceived dissolved this contradiction. On the surface, this authentic existence eliminates reification, but the “Dasein” understood as authentic existence is actually a “Dasein” bound within personhood. This “Dasein,” from another perspective, remains reified.

海德格尔也看到了现代资本主义社会中的物化问题。在他看来，人在征服自然的过程中，必然会导致主体与客体的二元对立，人类要解决物化的问题，就需要克服这一对立。虽然这种对立是人的生存中不可避免的日常状况，但他认为，人不应该沉沦在这种日常状况中。日常生活中的人还应该看到被遮蔽了的另外一个世界——“世界之为世界”（Weltlichkeit）。这是一个超越了主客体二元对立的世界。我们在这个世界中可以领会存在，即直接超越主客体二元对立的存在。海德格尔也宣称：“存在地地道道是超越者。”可是，当海德格尔把存在变成了可以被直观的“超越者”的时候，这个存在就变成了存在者，即这个原本是反对物化的东西反而变成了物化的东西。在海德格尔那里，能够在生活世界中领会存在的人被称为“此在”。他之所以把人理解为“此在”，就是因为看到了人自身的这种矛盾。按他对于“此在”的理解，一方面，人要成为生活中的角色，这是人的日常生活所必需的，而这就是他所理解的没有价值和意义的“沉沦”；另一方面，作为“此在”的人同时又要成为“能在”，而所谓的“能在”就是一种人格性，人作为一种抽象的人格具有无限的可能性。他把人格性和角色结合在一起。如此结合在一起的人既不能被看作是角色，也不能被看作是纯粹的人格性。这种矛盾的身份只能被说成是“此在”，是无法被规定的“此在”。海德格尔看到了人在角色中被物化的命运，试图借助人格性来消除角色中被强制物化的状况。就海德格尔的思路而言，他达到了辩证法的边缘，但是最终还是与辩证法擦肩而过。究其原因，现象学的方法阻碍了他，使其无法达到辩证法。当他用“此在”来命名这个矛盾的结合体的时候，其实也就消解了这里的矛盾，或者说，他所构想的那个本真存在消解了这种矛盾。从表面上看，这一本真的存在消除了物化，但被理解为本真存在的“此在”其实是被束缚在人格性中的“此在”。这个“此在”从另一个意义上看仍然是被物化的。

An approach like Heidegger’s, which directly transcends the opposition of subject and object and thereby directly transcends reification, not only fails to overcome reification but also negates the rationality of the separation of subject and object. From the preceding analysis, it is clear that for humans to survive, the separation of subject and object is inevitable; this is a necessary result of the development of civilization. If this binary opposition is simply negated, and then directly transcended, then human civilization would be negated. Therefore, to overcome reification, one must both acknowledge the rationality of the subject-object binary opposition and simultaneously overcome this binary opposition. It should be said that Lukács’s line of thought unfolds in this direction. However, fundamentally, he overcomes the subject-object binary opposition according to Hegel’s concept of totality, thus falling into an idealist line of thought.

像海德格尔那样直接超越主客体的对立、从而直接超越物化的思路，不仅不能克服物化，而且会否定主客体分离的合理性。从前面的分析可以知道，人类要生存，必然就会导致主客体的分离，这是文明发展的必然结果。如果简单地否定这种二元对立，进而直接超越这种二元对立，那么就会否定人类文明。因此，要克服物化，就必须既承认主客体之间二元对立的合理性，同时又要克服这种二元对立。应该说，卢卡奇的思路就是按照这个方向来展开的。然而，从根本上来说，他是按照黑格尔的总体性观念来克服主客体的二元对立的，从而陷入了观念论的思路。

Marx is different. His understanding of the subject-object relationship was different from Hegel’s from the very beginning. In Hegel, the subject is absolute spirit, a spirit that excludes bodily elements. But in Marx, the subject is living, actual human beings, and living, actual human beings are self-contradictory. When Marx describes the “self-alienated” human in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, although he uses terms in the Hegelian idealist sense, he endows them with a completely new meaning: “This relationship reveals the extent to which the natural behavior of the human has become human, or the extent to which the human essence has become a natural essence for the human, the extent to which his human nature has become nature for him.” [3]3 Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,” in *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, vol. 3 (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 301. This means that within the human itself there is a conflict between the human element and the natural element. From this perspective, the human is a contradictory subject, a subject in which the human element and the natural element conflict with and reconcile with each other. If the subject is not a subject in the sense of abstract spirit, then the conflict between subject and object involves a complex relationship, not merely a simple binary opposition between subject and object. In the process of the subject thinking the object, the relationship between thinking and the object being thought is also a subject-object relationship. Here, thinking itself can be understood as the subject. Thinking must have an object, and the object of thinking must be different from thinking. Thus, thinking (the subject) necessarily contains the object. And the subject that engages in thinking can itself become the object of thinking. The reason this subject can be thought is precisely because the thinking subject contains the object. But pure thinking itself cannot be thought. From this, we can say that the subject can directly be the object, and the object also contains the subject, but the object necessarily contains something that exceeds the subject, and therefore the object cannot be simply reduced to the subject.

马克思则不同，他对于主客体关系的理解从一开始就不同于黑格尔。在黑格尔那里，主体是绝对精神，是排除了肉体要素的精神。但在马克思那里，主体是活生生的人，而活生生的人是自我矛盾的。马克思在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》中描述“自我异化”的人时，虽然使用了黑格尔观念论意义上的术语，但是却赋予其全新的意义：“这种关系表明人的自然的行为在何种程度上是合乎人性的，或者，人的本质在何种程度上对人来说成为自然的本质，他的人的本性在何种程度上对他来说成为自然。”这就意味着，人自身之中包含着人性的东西与自然的东西的冲突。从这个角度来说，人是一个矛盾的主体，是人性的东西与自然的东西在其中相互冲突又相互和解的主体。如果主体不是抽象精神意义上的主体，那么主客体之间的冲突就存在着一种复杂的关系，而不只是指主客体之间存在简单的二元对立。在主体思考客体的过程中，思考与被思考的对象之间的关系也是一种主客体关系。在这里，思考本身可以被理解为主体。思考必须有对象，而思考的对象又必须不同于思考。于是，思考（主体）之中必定包含了客体。而进行思考的主体本身也可以变成被思考的对象。这个主体之所以能够被思考，就是因为思考的主体中包含了客体。而纯粹的思考本身无法被思考。由此，我们可以说，主体可以直接就是客体，而客体之中也包含了主体，但是客体之中一定包含了超出主体的东西，因而客体不能被简单地还原为主体。

We can connect the above ideas with Marx’s analysis of commodities in *Capital*. According to Marx, the use-value of a commodity is a value related to the physical needs of the human body, while its exchange-value is a value that can be incorporated into a system of exchange. Use-value cannot be calculated quantitatively, cannot be incorporated into the system of exchange-value; it is something non-identical. This non-identical thing that cannot be incorporated into the exchange system is the basis for resisting reification. If everything in economic activity could be incorporated into a system of identity and could be calculated, then the economic system would become a completely rationalized system, a reified thing. But this extremely rationalized system is precisely irrational, because people’s needs and the use-values of commodities cannot be calculated. From this perspective, commodity exchange is essentially a system of rationalized calculation, yet it calculates things that cannot be calculated. Here, rationalized calculation and blind production are inevitably combined. For this reason, no matter how much the capitalist rationalizes production, the blindness of production cannot be avoided. This is also one of the roots of economic crises in capitalist society. If we think about this problem from the perspective of overcoming the reified system, then reification is the result of extreme rationalization; it seeks to rationalize everything that cannot be rationalized and calculated, to incorporate everything into the rationalized system. The method of resisting reification is to see those things that cannot be rationalized. From the perspectives of subject and object, the subject is not a rationalized subject, not a purely spiritual subject; the subject itself contains something anti-subject, contains elements of the object. The subject only becomes a subject in the process of resisting the object within itself. Therefore, the subject itself also cannot be rationalized, cannot be understood as a purely spiritual subject. And the object also cannot be reduced to the subject, because it contains things that cannot be rationalized and quantified. From the perspective of the development of civilization, subject and object must both be rationalized to a certain extent, but subject and object both necessarily contain something anti-rationalization. Subject and object must both be rationalized and also resist this rationalization.

我们可以把上述思想与马克思在《资本论》中对商品的分析联系起来。根据马克思的观点，商品的使用价值是与人的肉体的需要有关的价值，而其交换价值是可以被纳入交换系统的价值。使用价值是无法从量上加以计算的，是无法被纳入交换价值体系的，它是非同一的东西。这个不能被纳入交换系统的非同一的东西就是抗拒物化的基础。如果经济活动中的一切东西都可以被纳入同一性系统，都能够被计算，那么经济系统就变成一个完全合理化的系统，变成一个物化的东西。但是，这个被极端合理化的系统恰恰是不合理的，因为人们的需要和商品的使用价值都是无法被计算的。从这个角度来看，商品交换本质上是一种合理化计算的体系，但是它却对不能被计算的东西进行计算。在这里，合理化的计算和盲目的生产不可避免地结合在一起。也正因为如此，无论资本家如何将生产合理化，都无法避免生产的盲目性。这也是资本主义社会产生经济危机的根源之一。如果从克服物化体系的角度来思考这个问题，那么物化是极端合理化的结果，它要把一切无法被合理化计算的东西都合理化，把一切都纳入合理化体系。而对抗物化的方法就是要看到那些无法被合理化的东西。从主体和客体两个角度来看，主体不是合理化的主体，不是纯粹精神的主体，主体自身中包含了反主体的东西，包含了客体的要素。主体就是在反抗自身中的客体的过程中，才成为主体的。因此，主体本身也无法被合理化，无法被理解为纯粹的精神主体。而客体也不能被还原为主体，因为它包含了无法被合理化和数量化的东西。从文明的发展过程来说，主体和客体都必须在一定程度上被合理化，但是主体和客体之中都一定包含了反合理化的东西。主体和客体既要被合理化，又要对抗这种合理化。

From this, we can see that to prevent reification, we must enhance our subjective power, but this subject is not a subject in the purely spiritual sense, but a subject combined with the needs of the body. However, we know that the power of the body can also obstruct the power of the spirit, can disrupt the rational planning that the spirit must undertake when conquering nature. For this reason, we also need to limit the power of the body. And if we limit the power of the body, spiritual power will expand excessively. Therefore, we need to correctly handle the relationship between body and spirit, not purely on the spiritual level but from a new dimension to enhance the power of the subject. In fact, the binary opposition between subject and object is a variant of the binary opposition between spirit and body. Thus, the question of how to treat reification also involves the question of how to treat the relationship between body and spirit. In the process of civilization’s development, the spirit must confront nature, even control its own body; this is a necessity of civilization’s development. But no matter how much humans use the spirit to control their bodies, bodily things will always function to varying degrees on the spirit. If body and spirit are combined, then humans cannot move like machines; they will inevitably have passion and will. The results of this kind of human activity cannot be reified. Otherwise, in modern capitalist society, humans would be completely without passion and will.

由此，我们可以看到，要阻止物化，就要提升我们的主体力量，但是这个主体不是纯粹精神意义上的主体，而是与肉体的需求结合在一起的主体。可是，我们知道，肉体的力量也会阻止精神的力量，会扰乱精神在征服自然时必须进行的合理规划。为此，我们又需要限制肉体的力量。而如果我们限制肉体的力量，精神力量又会过度膨胀。因此，我们需要正确地处理好肉体与精神的关系，不是纯粹在精神层面而是从一个新的维度来提升主体的力量。事实上，主体与客体的二元对立是精神与肉体的二元对立的变种。因此，如何对待物化的问题，其实也涉及如何对待肉体与精神之间关系的问题。在文明的发展过程中，精神必须对抗自然，甚至控制自己的肉体，这是文明发展的需要。但是，无论人如何用精神控制自己的肉体，肉体的东西都会在不同程度上对精神发挥作用。如果肉体与精神结合在一起，那么人就不可能像机器那样运动，就必定会有激情和意志。人的这种活动的结果无法被物化。否则，在现代资本主义社会中，人就会完全没有了激情和意志。

Therefore, the method of overcoming reification is to stimulate the passion that is negated and excluded in life. But this passion must also achieve reconciliation with the spirit. Although reconciliation between body and spirit within a certain scope is still possible in life, this reconciliation is suppressed. In Lukács’s words, they are seen as the source of error. At work, if a person does not act according to established rules but acts on emotion, then “errors” will inevitably occur. And we precisely need to save this thing that is regarded as the source of error. Yet, as long as humanity needs to conquer nature and control nature, it will inevitably lead to the opposition between body and spirit, and thus inevitably lead to reification. Therefore, we must acknowledge the rationality of reification within a certain scope; as long as humans must survive, there will inevitably be reification. If, like Lukács, we follow the idealist line of thought to “eliminate” reification, then this is in fact to dissolve everything “material” into the spiritual dimension, ultimately leading to complete reification. Conversely, if, like Heidegger, we return to the “primordial” condition, this would lead to a regression of civilization. This requires us to treat reification with dialectical materialism, both acknowledging the rationality of reification, acknowledging the rationality of the separation and opposition between subject and object, and also overcoming this separation and opposition.

因此，克服物化的方法就是要激发在生活中被否定、被排斥的激情。但是，这个激情又必须与精神实现和解。虽然在生活中肉体与精神在一定范围内实现和解还是有可能的，但是这种和解却受到了压制。用卢卡奇的话来说，它们被看作产生错误的根源。在工作中，如果一个人不按照既定的规则办事，而是凭感情做事，那么就必然会出现“错误”。而我们恰恰需要拯救这个被当作错误根源的东西。可是，只要人类需要征服自然、控制自然，那么就必然会导致肉体与精神的对立，从而必然会导致物化。于是，我们必须承认物化在一定范围内的合理性，只要人要生存，就必然有物化。如果像卢卡奇那样，按照观念论的思路来“消除”物化，那么其实就是把一切“物性”的东西都消解在精神维度中，最终导致彻底的物化。反过来，如果像海德格尔那样回到“源始”状况，则又会导致文明的倒退。这就要求我们用唯物辩证法来对待物化，既承认物化的合理性，承认主体与客体分离和对立的合理性，又要克服这种分离和对立。

IV. The Theoretical Significance and Social Significance of Examining Reification

四、透视物化的理论意义和社会意义

From the above, it can be seen that on the question of how to resist reification, we must both acknowledge reification and continuously struggle against reification; we must both acknowledge the rationality of reification and see the irrationality of reification. The problem of modern capitalist civilization is that reification has been unconditionally rationalized. People take reification for granted, wallow in the pleasure of reification, and lose the painful consciousness of reification.

由上可知，在如何对抗物化的问题上，我们既要承认物化，又要不断地与物化展开斗争，既要承认物化的合理性，也要看到物化的不合理性。现代资本主义文明的问题是，物化被无条件地合理化了。人们把物化当作理所当然的东西，沉沦在物化的快感之中，失去了对物化的痛苦意识。

The emergence of this phenomenon is linked to commodity fetishism. In Marx’s view, commodity fetishism in capitalist society replaces social relations between people with exchange relations between commodities. Here, man-made things acquire a special “magic,” as if they have become purely natural things. This is something that human power cannot change. Marx saw that there is an inverted relationship here, where man-made things become a second nature. In commodity fetishism, reified man-made things possess an innate rationality. If we analyze it in terms of “true” and “false,” we will find that this reification in capitalist society is false. Or rather, the “thing” manifested here, the “second nature” that appears, is false nature. But this false thing is also “true,” because it has an “innate” necessity, and is therefore rational. It is precisely because this false thing is “true” that people cannot see through it and take it as inevitable. Marx’s critique of commodity fetishism, his critique of the natural rationality of capitalist commodity exchange relations, is precisely to reveal the false phenomenon that exists here. The most typical characteristic of this false phenomenon is turning use-value, which cannot be calculated, into something that can be calculated; turning things that can never be equal into equal things; and turning this equality into something naturally rational.

这种现象的出现是与拜物教联系在一起的。在马克思看来，资本主义社会中的拜物教用商品之间的交换关系来取代人与人之间的社会关系。在这里，人为的东西获得了一种特殊的“魔力”，好像变成了纯粹自然的东西。这是人的力量所无法改变的。马克思看到，这里存在着一种颠倒的关系，即人为的东西变成了第二自然。在拜物教中，被物化了的人为的东西具有一种先天的合理性。如果我们用“真”和“假”来分析，就会发现，资本主义社会中的这种物化是虚假的。或者说，这里所表现出来的“物”、所出现的“第二自然”，是虚假的自然。但是，这个虚假的东西却又是“真”的，因为它具有“先天”的必然性，因而是合理的。正是由于这个虚假的东西是“真”的，人们才无法识破它，并把它当作不可避免的。马克思对于拜物教的批判，对于资本主义商品交换关系的天然合理性的批判，就是要揭示这里所存在的虚假现象。这一虚假现象的最典型特点，是把无法计算的使用价值变成可以计算的东西，把永远都不可能相等的东西变成了相等的东西，并把这种相等性变成是天然合理的。

There are three main reasons why people cannot recognize the falsity of this phenomenon. The first is an existential reason: in their own existence, humans must oppose body and spirit, must transform nature according to the logic of identity. Here, the method of identity has an innate rationality. The second is an epistemological reason. When the whole society has been reified, and even human consciousness has been reified, reified people cannot see the phenomenon of their own reification. The third reason is that true and false are so tightly interwoven that people actually cannot correctly distinguish “true” from “false.” That is, there is false in the true, and there is true in the false. The difficulty we face is that “reification” is particularly good at “performing” and “disguising.” “Reification” also seeks to satisfy human needs, that is, to “satisfy” people’s “needs” by regulating and even controlling people’s needs. Here, it is very difficult for people to distinguish true needs from false needs, true satisfaction from false satisfaction.

人们认识不到这种现象的虚假性主要有三个原因。一是生存论上的原因，即人在其自身的生存中必须要把肉体与精神对立起来，必须要按照同一性逻辑来改造自然。在这里，同一性的方法具有先天的合理性。二是认识论上的原因。当整个社会都被物化了，甚至人的意识都被物化了的时候，被物化了的人无法看到自身被物化的现象。第三个原因是，真与假是如此紧密地结合在一起，以至于人们其实无法正确地辨识“真”与“假”。也就是说，真的东西中有假的，而假的东西中有真的。我们所面对的难题是，“物化”特别能“表演”和“伪装”。“物化”也是要满足人的需要的，即通过调节乃至控制人的需要来“满足”人的“需要”。在这里，人们很难将真需要与假需要、真满足与假满足区分开来。

When truth and falsehood are inseparably combined, how can ordinary people see through the relationship between truth and falsehood here? Moreover, reification is an inevitable trend of human existence. The situation of "hyperreality" that Jean Baudrillard revealed in his critique of advanced capitalist society typically embodies this state where truth and falsehood are indistinguishable. For example, in daily life, people often purchase fashionable goods, but we cannot determine whether the purchase of fashionable goods is due to their use-value or exchange-value (sign-value). If obtaining use-value is the essence of the purchasing activity, then we can say that fashion consumers are not clear whether their purchasing activity is real or illusory. Even if they purchase fashion goods more for their sign-value, this sign-value is always combined with the use-value of the commodity; therefore, their purchasing behavior gains natural rationality through use-value. Since reification cannot be eliminated in capitalist society, the practice of naturalizing reification as rational is also difficult to eliminate. From this perspective, falsehood is unavoidable in the life of capitalist society; it is a necessary "illusion" in life. It is precisely for this reason that this necessary illusion is rationalized and accepted by people as a matter of course. This has a tremendous impact not only on individual life but on the entirety of human civilization. Here, we only analyze this impact from the foundation of capitalist civilization. As mentioned above, the basis of the phenomenon of reification is the opposition between body and spirit. When this opposition is developed to an extreme, genuine emotional relationships cannot form between people, and people do not know what they truly need in life. What appears at the foundation of capitalist civilization is that people guarantee their self-preservation through a form of self-negation. The ultimate goal of competition between nations should be to make the common people live more happily. However, if competition itself becomes the goal, competing for the sake of competition, even competing by harming oneself, then it deviates from the track of the development of human civilization. Competition between nations turns into mutual harm, which will inevitably bring disaster to civilization. Similarly, individuals compete with each other for self-preservation. This competition is reasonable within a certain scope. Without this competition, civilization could not progress. But if we rationalize this competition without limit, even pushing it to extremes, then it will ultimately cause mutual harm between people. This in turn hinders the development of civilization. People living in "illusions" often fail to recognize this; they easily rationalize the mode of self-negation and find the rationality of this harm in any form of self-harm. Therefore, we must constantly exert the role of the subject, recognize the "illusions" in life, and not be deceived by them.

在真与假不可分离地结合在一起的时候，常人如何能够看透这里的真假关系呢？更何况，物化还是人类生存的必然趋势。让·鲍德里亚在批判发达资本主义社会时所揭示的那种“超级真实”的状况，就典型地体现了这种真假不分的状况。比如，在日常生活中，人们常常购买时尚用品，但我们无法辨明购买时尚用品究竟是因为它的使用价值还是交换价值（符号价值）。如果获得使用价值是购买活动的本质，那么我们可以说，时尚消费者并不清楚其购买活动是真实的还是虚假的。即使他购买时尚品更多是由于其符号价值，但是这种符号价值总是与该商品的使用价值结合在一起，因此，他的购买行为通过使用价值而获得了天然的合理性。既然在资本主义社会物化是无法消除的，那么把物化天然地合理化的做法也是难以消除的。从这个角度来说，虚假的东西是资本主义社会生活中无法避免的，是生活中必要的“幻相”。也正因为如此，这个必要的幻相被合理化了，被人们理所当然地接受了。这不仅对个人生活，而且对整个人类文明产生了巨大的影响。在这里，我们只是从资本主义文明的根基处来分析这种影响。前已述及，物化现象的基础是肉体与精神的对立。而当这种对立被极端地发展起来的时候，人与人之间就不可能形成真正的情感关系，并且人们在生活中也不知道自己真正需要什么。在资本主义文明的根基处所出现的情况是，人以一种自我否定的方式来保证自我持存。国家间竞争的最终目的应该是使老百姓生活得更加幸福。但是，如果把竞争本身变成了目的，为了竞争而竞争，甚至用伤害自身的方式来进行竞争，那么它就偏离了人类文明发展的轨道。国家之间的竞争变成了相互伤害，这必定会带来文明的灾难。同样，个人为了自我持存，相互之间也会竞争。这种竞争在一定的范围内是合理的。没有这种竞争，文明就不可能进步。但是，如果我们把这种竞争无限地合理化，甚至将其推向极端，那么它最终会造成人与人之间的相互伤害。这反过来又阻碍了文明的发展。而生活在“幻相”中的人们往往认识不到这一点，很容易把自我否定的方式合理化，会在任何一种自我伤害中找到这种伤害的合理性。因此，我们必须时刻发挥主体的作用，认清生活中的“幻相”，不被其迷惑。

Therefore, how to treat reification is a question that requires our serious consideration. Reflecting on reification and curbing reification in the process of reification is an inevitable requirement for the development of civilization. Curbing reification must rely on the power of the subject. However, on the one hand, we cannot, like Lukács, move towards idealism and overemphasize the power of the subject; on the other hand, we cannot, like Heidegger, abandon the power of the subject and be content with intuiting "Being" itself. We need to adhere to Marx's materialist dialectics and approach the phenomenon of reification we face from the perspective of the dialectics between body and spirit, subject and object.

因此，如何对待物化是一个需要我们严肃思考的问题。在物化过程中反思物化、遏制物化是文明发展的必然要求。遏制物化必须要借助主体的力量，但是，一方面，我们不能像卢卡奇那样走向观念论，过度突出主体的力量；另一方面，我们也不能像海德格尔那样放弃主体的力量而满足于直观“存在”本身。我们需要坚持马克思的唯物主义辩证法，从肉体与精神、主体与客体之间的辩证法的角度来对待我们所面对的物化现象。

Online editor: Paul

网络编辑：保罗