An Analysis of the Materialist Foundation of Marxist Epistemology

The question of the subjectivity of cognition and the theory of reflection is an important domain of inquiry in Marxist philosophy. The core of this issue is how to uphold the materialist foundation of Marxist epistemology. Generally speaking, in the process of highlighting the subjectivity of cognition, the materialist foundation of cognition may be shaken; although the theory of reflection upholds the basic standpoint of materialism, it cannot essentially explain the objective validity of what is reflected in cognition. Therefore, to demonstrate more convincingly the correctness of the materialist position of Marxist epistemology, we must clearly explain the objective validity of reflection.

认识的主体性和反映论问题是马克思主义哲学研究的一个重要论域，该问题的核心是如何坚持马克思主义认识论的唯物主义基础。一般来说，在凸显认识的主体性的过程中，认识的唯物主义基础可能会被动摇；反映论虽然坚持了唯物主义的基本立场，但却无法从本质上说明反映在认识中的客观有效性。因此，为了更有说服力地表明马克思主义认识论的唯物主义立场的正确性，我们必须清楚地说明反映的客观有效性。

The objectivity of sensation and experience

感觉和经验的客观性

According to the basic principles of Marxist philosophy, cognition is the active reflection of the subject upon the object. In the process of cognition, the cognitive subject obtains perceptual material from the external world, processes and transforms this perceptual material, and thereby gains correct knowledge of the external world. This theory emphasizes the important role of sensation and experience. Yet we also see that, in the history of the development of epistemology, extreme empiricism also emphasized the role of sensory experience, but it ultimately led to skepticism: if cognition is built on the basis of experience, then humanity cannot obtain reliable knowledge. Those who doubt or even deny the theory of reflection often understand sensory experience from this standpoint of extreme empiricism, and those who uphold the theory of reflection also acknowledge that sensory experience is contingent and uncertain. From this perspective, both those who uphold the theory of reflection and those who doubt it share a common theoretical position: sensory experience is unreliable.

按照马克思主义哲学的基本原理，认识是主体对于客体的能动的反映。在认识的过程中，认识主体从外部世界中获得感性材料，并对这些感性材料进行加工和改造，从而获得对外部世界的正确认识。这个理论强调感觉和经验的重要作用。然而我们也看到，在认识论的发展历史中，极端的经验论也强调感觉经验的作用，但它们最终走向了怀疑主义：如果把认识建立在经验的基础上，那么人类无法获得可靠的知识。对反映论持怀疑甚至否定态度的人往往也是从这一极端经验论的立场上来理解感觉经验的，坚持反映论的人也承认感觉经验具有偶然性和不确定性。从这个角度来说，坚持反映论和怀疑反映论的人在理论上都有一个共同的立场：感觉经验是不可靠的。

Although sensory experience is unreliable, cognition nevertheless depends on it. If cognition were divorced from sensory experience, it would become mere speculation in pure thought, yielding no objective knowledge. Since cognition depends on sensory experience, this means that sensory experience must contain something objective. Only if it contains something objective can we obtain objective knowledge. The question here is: what exactly is there in sensory experience that allows us to be certain that it contains something reliable, or rather, something objectively content that cannot be doubted? Husserl used Descartes’ method of reflection to explain the objective elements in sensory experience. According to his line of thought, what exactly I sense in sensation is uncertain, but the fact that I have experience itself is indubitable. For him, sensory experience contains indubitable objective elements. Of course, this is a confirmation of the objective elements within sensation in the process of consciousness, a method of transcendental idealism. We can say that this is a subjectivized objectivity. Nevertheless, phenomenology’s acknowledgment of objectivity within sensation contains an element of truth. So, can we confirm the objectivity within sensation from a materialist standpoint?

虽然感觉经验是不可靠的，但是认识又要依赖于感觉经验。如果脱离了感觉经验，那么认识就变成了纯粹思想中的玄思，而不会有客观的知识。既然认识要依赖于感觉经验，那么就意味着感觉经验中一定包含了某种客观的东西。只有其中包含了客观的东西，我们才能获得客观知识，这里的问题就在于，感觉经验中究竟有什么东西让我们确信，这里包含了哪些可靠的东西，或者说，不可怀疑的客观内容。胡塞尔利用笛卡尔的反思方法来说明感觉经验中的客观要素。按照他的思路，在感觉中我究竟感觉到什么东西，这是不确定的，但是我有经验这个事实本身却是不可怀疑的。对于他来说，感觉经验中包含了不可怀疑的客观要素。当然，这是在意识过程中对于感觉中的客观要素的确认，是一种先验观念论的方法。我们可以说，这是一种主观化了的客观性。尽管如此，现象学对于感觉中的客观性承认却包含了真理的要素。那么，我们是不是可以从唯物主义的立场上来确认感觉中的客观性呢？

In the process of reflecting on and criticizing phenomenology, Adorno explained the objectivity in sensory experience from the element of the body. According to Adorno’s line of thought, in Husserl’s phenomenology, sensation is idealized, established in the process of spiritual reflection, and becomes something spiritual; but in reality, human sensation is the result of bodily activity. Of course, such a view can easily be understood from a naturalistic standpoint, namely, that cognition is the result of the interaction between the body and things in the external world. Although this naive naturalistic standpoint is mistaken, it tells us one basic thing: the objectivity in sensation is not, as Husserl claimed, obtained through reflection in consciousness, but has a material basis. The objectivity of sensory experience originates from this objective basis. This is an objective element within the cognitive process that can never be dissolved. Human sensation is, of course, not merely the interaction between two natural elements; it necessarily involves human consciousness. Under the influence of consciousness, hallucinations and illusions can occur in human sensation, yet even in hallucinations and illusions, the sensory objectivity emphasized by Husserl cannot be denied. However, this objectivity is not obtained through reflection, nor through the suspension of external reality, but through the interaction of objective things.

阿多诺在反思和批判现象学的过程中，从肉体的要素说明了感觉经验中的客观性。按照阿多诺的思路，在胡塞尔的现象学中，感觉是被观念化了，是在精神的反思过程中被确立起来的感觉，它变成了一种精神性的东西，而实际上人的感觉是肉体活动的结果。当然，这样一种观点很容易被人们从一种自然主义的立场上加以理解，即认识是肉体与外部世界中的东西相互作用的结果。这种朴素的自然主义立场虽然是错误的，但是它却告诉我们一个基本东西，即感觉中的客观性不像胡塞尔所说的那样是经意识中的反思而得到的，而是有物质基础的。感觉经验的客观性就是源于这个客观基础。这是认识过程中永远都无法消解的客观要素。人的感觉当然不是两种自然要素之间的相互作用，其中一定包含了人的意识。在意识的作用下，人在感觉中会出现幻觉、错觉，而即使在幻觉和错觉中，胡塞尔所强调的感性客观性也是不可否定的。不过，这种客观性不是通过反思得来的，不是通过悬置外部实在得来的，而是在客观的东西的相互作用中得来的。

Cognitive activity is, of course, an activity of consciousness. People process perceptual material in consciousness, and when they treat perceptual material as the matter of cognition, this perceptual material is detached from the body and becomes something purely contingent. Kant’s “manifold of sensibility” understands perceptual material in this sense. In the process of cognition, this spiritualized sensory material becomes a pure fact of consciousness. Only purely metaphysical thinking divorced from the cognitive process would hold that sensory experience is unreliable. People in the process of cognition do not simply doubt their sensory experience. No one in daily life constantly pulls at their own hair to interrogate whether they are dreaming. This is like saying that a stick half-inserted into water appears bent in the visual image—this is an indisputable fact. This fact is objectively necessary. Husserl established this fact within the process of consciousness. Once perceptual material is spiritualized, it can be interpreted in two extreme ways: sensation is either something purely contingent or something absolutely given. This is sensory experience discussed on the basis of being detached from the body. From this perspective, on the basis of being detached from the body, it is impossible to truly understand sensation and experience from a dialectical standpoint.

认识活动当然是一种意识活动，人们在意识中处理感性材料，而当人们把感性材料当作是认识中的质料时，这些感性材料就脱离了肉体，就变成了纯粹偶然的东西。康德提出的“感性的杂多”就是在这样一种意义上理解感性材料的。在认识的过程中，这种被精神化的感觉材料变成了一个纯粹的意识事实。只有脱离认识过程的纯粹形而上学的思考才会认为，感觉经验是不可靠的。认识过程中的人们不会简单地怀疑他的感觉经验。生活中没有人时时刻刻拉着自己的头发以便拷问，他是不是在做梦。这就好比说，半插入水的木棍在视觉映像中是弯曲的，这是一个无可争议的事实。这个事实是客观必然的。胡塞尔在意识过程中把这个事实确立起来。一旦感性材料被精神化，那么它就可以被人们在两种极端的状况下加以解释，感觉或者是纯粹偶然的东西，或者是绝对被给予的。这都是在脱离肉体的基础上被人们讨论的感觉经验。从这个角度来说，在脱离肉体的基础上，人们就不可能真正地从辩证法的角度理解感觉和经验。

From this it can be seen that the “theory of reflection” in Marxist epistemology represents a major transformation of traditional idealism. Traditionally, people have understood sensory experience as the material of cognition and cognition as a spiritualized process, neglecting the bodily element that serves as the basis of cognitive material. In criticizing idealism in epistemology, Adorno emphasizes: “The cognitive achievement of the knowing subject, according to its own meaning, is corporeal. This affects not only the basic relationship between subject and object but also the dignity of the body. It appears as the core of cognition at the end of the subject’s being-in-the-world. This abolishes the dominant conception of epistemology, which constructs the body as the law of the connection between sensation and action, that is, establishes it as something spiritual.” [1]1 Theodor W. Adorno, *Against Epistemology: A Metacritique*, trans. Willis Domingo (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983), p. 191. The claim that cognitive achievement is corporeal is meant to abolish a dominant conception in epistemology, which establishes cognition as something spiritual and understands the cognitive process as a purely spiritual process.

从这里可以看出，马克思主义认识论的“反映论”是对传统的观念论的一个重大变革。在传统上，人们都是把感觉经验作为认识的材料来理解，把认识理解为一种精神化的过程，而忽视了作为认识材料之基础的肉体要素。阿多诺在批判认识论上的观念论的时候强调：“认识主体的认知成就，按照其自身的意思，是躯体性的，这不仅影响主客体之间的基本关系，而且影响肉体的尊严。它作为认识的核心出现在主体认识的存在者状态的一端。这就废除了认识论的主导观念，这种认识论把肉体建构为感觉与行动之间关联的法则，也就是确立为精神性东西。”认识的成就是躯体性的，这个说法就是要废除认识论中的一个主导观念，这种主导观念把认识确立为精神性的东西，从纯粹的精神过程来理解认识过程。

The spiritualization of sensation and experience

感觉和经验的精神化

Marxist epistemology emphasizes that cognition is an active reflection. This fundamentally overturns a dominant conception in epistemology, namely, idealist epistemology. However, Marxist epistemology cannot be reduced to a naturalistic basis. The theory of active reflection merely emphasizes understanding the various elements of cognition on the basis of bodily activity.

马克思主义认识论强调，认识是一种能动的反映。这就从根本上颠覆了认识论中的一种主导观念，即观念论上的认识论。但是马克思主义认识论又不能被还原到自然主义的基础上。能动的反映论只是强调，在躯体性活动的基础上理解认识中的各种要素。

In the process of cognition, sensory elements are inevitably spiritualized. Only through spiritualization can sensory elements be processed. Cognition should be understood as a conscious process or a spiritual process. Reducing cognition to material interaction is crude reductionism. In the history of philosophy, cognition has mostly been understood within the spiritual process; the question is how we are to grasp what is objective within the spiritual process. As far as sensation is concerned, the sensation in cognition differs from the sensation in our daily life. Sensation in daily life includes pain and pleasure, whereas in cognitive activity human sensation is neutralized; it does not contain pain or pleasure. This neutralized sensation is the product of the regulation of ideas and will. Only by excluding the elements of pleasure and pain can sensation in cognition be objective. However, this objective sensation is precisely spiritualized, it is subjective. The objective element within the subjective process is determined by bodily elements. The objectivity in spiritualized sensation is the trace of bodily activity. In other words, this objective content is sedimented in the conscious process. This is an objective element that can never be eliminated from cognitive activity. Yet the objectivity sedimented in the conscious process is precisely concealed and ignored in the process of spiritualization. We know that in conscious activity, spiritualized sensation can be expressed in language. When people use words to say "pain," this pain is a spiritualized pain, a pain expressed in language. In other words, it is a pain detached from the body. In cognitive activity, the object of thought is mainly this spiritualized sensation, a communicable sensation. Sensation is always connected to the human body, and the sensation connected to the body cannot be communicated in language. These objective things that cannot be communicated in language yet exist in consciousness constitute the objective foundation of cognition. The communicable "pain" is built upon the foundation of incommunicable pain. This incommunicable pain is not accidental, not "irrational," not something that should be excluded from cognition. Without this unspeakable pain, the concept of "pain" would have no objective meaning. This is like telling a blind person "red"; they can never have a genuine concept of red, lacking the objective basis for sensing red. And it is precisely this foundational element that has long been treated as something outside cognition, ignored and excluded. Because what people grasp in cognition can only be sensation in consciousness and spiritualized sensation — these can be interpreted differently, while the objective sensation connected to the body is concealed and excluded — people simply assume that sensory experience is unreliable. In a certain sense, active reflection theory [2]2 Active reflection theory (能动反映论) is a key concept in Marxist epistemology as developed within Chinese Marxist philosophy, emphasizing that cognition is not a passive mirroring of reality but an active, practical process of reflection shaped by the subject's practical activity. is precisely about making people re-aware of this neglected foundation.

在认识过程中感觉要素必定会被精神化。只有通过精神化，感觉要素才能得到处理。认识应该被当作一种意识过程或者精神过程来理解。把认识还原到物质的相互作用上，是粗陋的还原论。在哲学史上，人们大多是在精神过程中来理解认识，而问题在于，我们究竟应该如何把握精神过程中客观的东西。就感觉来说，认识中的感觉和我们日常生活中的感觉是不同的。日常生活中的感觉包含了痛苦和快乐，而在认识活动中，人的感觉被中立化了，它不包含痛苦和快乐，这种中立化的感觉是观念和意志调节下的产物。只有排除了快乐和痛苦的要素，认识中的感觉才是客观的。但是，这个客观的感觉恰恰是精神化的，是主观的。主观过程中的客观东西又是由肉体要素所决定的。精神化的感觉中的客观性就是肉体活动的遗迹。或者说，这种客观内容是沉淀在意识过程中的。这是认识活动中永远都无法排除的客观要素。但是，沉淀在意识过程中的客观性恰恰在精神化的过程中被掩盖、被忽视。我们知道，在意识活动中，被精神化的感觉是可以用语言来表达的。当人们用字词说“痛苦”的时候，这个痛苦是被精神化的痛苦，是用语言表达出来的痛苦。或者说，这是脱离肉体的痛苦。在认识活动中，被思考的对象主要就是这种精神化的感觉，是可以交流的感觉，感觉又总是与人的肉体联系在一起的，而与肉体联系在一起的感觉是无法在语言中被交流的。这些无法在语言中被交流而又在意识中存在的客观的东西，是认识的客观基础。可交流的“痛苦”是建立在不可交流的痛苦的基础上的。这个不可交流的痛苦不是偶然的，不是“非理性的”，不是应该从认识中被排除的东西。如果没有这个不可言说的痛苦，那么“痛苦”的概念将毫无客观意义。这就好比说，我们可以告诉盲人“红色”，但是他却永远都不可能有真正的红色概念，他缺乏感觉红色的客观基础，而恰恰就是这个基础的东西长期以来被当作认识之外的东西被忽视和排除了。由于人们在认识中所把握到的只能是意识中的感觉和精神化的感觉。它们是可以被不同地解释的，而与肉体联系在一起的客观感觉却被掩盖、被排除了，于是人们就简单地以为，感觉经验是不可靠的。能动的反映论从一定意义上来说，就是让人们重新意识到这个被忽视的基础。

"Reason" is another core concept in epistemology. In the history of human civilization, people have conquered nature through the power of reason. Therefore, generally speaking, most people believe that reason and nature are completely opposed. However, from another perspective, reason is an extension of human natural power. As a natural organism, humans necessarily seek self-preservation. For self-preservation, people must constantly learn to classify things in nature in order to control nature, and classifying things in nature is precisely a capacity of reason. From this perspective, reason is an extension of human natural power. Therefore, we can say that reason both opposes nature and is an extension of nature. Reason itself is a self-contradictory concept. It both transcends nature and cannot leave nature behind. In other words, reason is both a capacity of the body and a capacity that opposes the body. In modern epistemology, when people emphasize the role of reason in cognition, they precisely neglect the natural foundation of reason.

“理性”是认识中又一个核心概念。在人类的文明史中，人都是通过理性的力量来征服自然。因此，一般来说，人们大多认为，理性和自然是完全对立的。但是，从另外一个角度来看，理性又是人的自然力量的延伸。人作为一种自然生物，必定要求自我持存。为了自我持存，人就要不断地学会对自然界的东西进行归类，从而控制自然，而对自然的东西进行归类恰恰就是一种理性的能力。从这个角度来说，理性又是人的自然力量的延伸。因此，我们可以说，理性既对抗自然又是自然的延伸。理性本身就是一个自我矛盾的概念。它既超越了自然，又无法离开自然。或者说，理性既是肉体的能力，又是对抗肉体的能力，而在现代认识论中，人们在强调理性在认识中的作用的时候恰恰忽视了理性的自然基础。

In epistemology, not only sensation can be analyzed in this way; analysis, synthesis, judgment, and inference in cognition can also be analyzed from this perspective. Analysis, synthesis, and judgment are all processes of thought, processes that can be communicated in language. But if there were no pre-linguistic sensory foundation within cognition, none of these activities could occur. That is, logic cannot be separated from its pre-logical foundation. Active reflection theory shows that even if cognition is a spiritualized process, this spiritualized process is always built upon the foundation of reflection.

在认识论中，不仅感觉可以被这样来分析，认识中的分析、综合、判断和推理等都可以从这个角度进行分析。分析、综合和判断都是思维过程，都是可以用语言来交流的过程，但是如果认识之中没有前语言的感性基础，那么所有这些活动都是不可能发生的。也就是说，逻辑不能脱离前逻辑的基础。能动的反映论表明，即使认识是一个精神化的过程，这个精神化的过程始终是建立在反映的基础上的。

The Non-Conceptual Factor in Concepts

概念中的非概念因素

In the process of cognition, people think through concepts, and concepts can be expressed through language. Here, people usually assume that concepts are purely ideational. In the cognitive process, people use concepts to make judgments and inferences, as if this process of judgment and inference has nothing to do with non-conceptual things. However, as we pointed out earlier, any concept must be combined with non-conceptual things. Without combination with non-conceptual things, concepts would be impossible. Although a blind person can also say "red," they are only using the word "red"; they cannot have a genuine concept of "red." The concept of "red" is combined with the red sensation "sedimented" in thought. This means that the red in thought is necessarily connected to the non-thinking red, the non-ideational red. From this perspective, concepts necessarily "contain" non-conceptual things. This is a "something" that no concept can avoid. This non-conceptual thing is the result of the effect of elements of sensory experience on the body. From this perspective, cognition is not a purely thinking process; this process is combined with the bodily elements of humans, combined with what Marxist epistemology calls "reflection."

在认识过程中，人都是通过概念进行思维的，而概念又可以通过语言被表达出来。在这里，人们通常认为，概念是纯粹观念性的。在认识的过程中人们就是通过概念进行判断推理的。好像这种判断推理的过程与非概念的东西无关。然而，正如我们前面所指出的那样，任何概念都必须与非概念的东西相结合。如果没有与非概念的东西相结合，那么概念就是不可能的。盲人虽然也可以说“红色”，但是他们只是使用了红色的词语，其实他们不可能有真正的“红色”概念。“红色”的概念是与“沉淀”在思维中的红色感觉结合在一起的。这就意味着思维中的红色一定是与非思维的红色、非观念的红色联系在一起的。从这个角度来说，概念之中一定“包含”了非概念的东西。这是任何一个概念都无法避免的“某物”。这个非概念的东西就是感觉经验的要素在身体中作用的结果。从这个角度来说，认识并不是一个纯粹思维的过程，这个过程是与人的肉体要素结合在一起的，与马克思主义认识论所说的“反映”结合在一起的。

In cognition, the thinking process is precisely about handling the relationship between concepts and non-conceptual things. Concepts contain non-conceptual factors, but in thinking the subject must both rely on non-conceptual things and exclude non-conceptual things. Without non-conceptual things, concepts have no content and become empty words. If concepts are bound to non-conceptual things, they lose their function of generalization and abstraction, and people cannot handle the non-conceptual content involved in concepts in their thinking. From this perspective, active reflection theory highlights this dialectical relationship.

在认识中，思维过程就是要处理概念和非概念之间的关系。概念中包含了非概念的因素，但是在思维中主体既要借助非概念的东西，又要排除非概念的东西。没有非概念的东西，概念就没有任何内容，就变成了空洞的词汇。如果概念被束缚在非概念的东西中，概念就失去了其概括和抽象的功能，人们就无法在思维中处理概念所涉及的非概念的内容。从这个角度来说，能动的反映论把这样一种辩证关系凸显出来。

Highlighting the non-conceptual factor in concepts is an important dimension for transcending the thinking of positive science, and also an important pathway for scientific knowledge to continuously expand itself. We know that in positive scientific research, scientists must obtain empirical materials through experiments and the like, and condense these empirical materials into abstract concepts. Scientists' thinking about general laws is conducted within abstract concepts; without abstract concepts, scientific thinking would be impossible. But if they are simultaneously aware that concepts are always connected to non-conceptual things, and that these non-conceptual things exceed concepts, that they are what concepts cannot generalize, then the basic concepts proposed by scientists will be shaken by the emergence of non-conceptual things. And every major innovation in science often occurs precisely through the breakthrough of concepts by non-conceptual things.

把概念中的非概念因素凸显出来，是超越实证科学思考的重要维度，也是科学知识不断扩展自身的重要途径。我们知道，在实证科学的研究中，科学家一定要通过实验等获得经验的材料，并把这些经验的材料凝练成抽象的概念。科学家对于一般规律的思考就是在抽象概念中进行的，没有抽象概念，科学思考就不可能。但是如果他们同时意识到，概念总是与非概念的东西联系在一起的，这些非概念的东西超出了概念，是概念所无法概括的，那么科学家所提出的那些基本概念就会由于非概念东西的出现而被动摇，而科学的每一次重大创新，常常就是借助于非概念东西对于概念的突破而发生的。

The non-conceptual element within the concept is the bridge linking spirit and the body. The materialist perspective in thought is manifested precisely in its attention to the non-conceptual element within the concept. For example, when we say “love,” “love” can be an empty concept; but when a mother speaks of her “love” for her child, this concept of “love” is entirely different from the empty concept of “love.” It contains rich content, that is, content combined with bodily elements. Only such “love” is truly love with abundant content. Marx frequently uses the concept of “the real” (现实) in his works, and Hegel also uses the concept of “the real.” However, Marx’s concept of “the real” is a materialist concept; it contains the element of the “body” and is connected to external reality, whereas Hegel’s “the real” is merely an abstraction of reality, a reference to reality in the vocabulary of language. The “containment” of reality within a concept is different from the “reference” to reality in a word. Yet in the abstract understanding of traditional epistemology, people cannot distinguish the difference between the “containment” of reality in a concept and the “reference” to reality in a word. To refer to reality in a word is merely to mention reality simply, while to “contain” reality in a concept is to connect the concept with reality concretely. This connection must be understood within the dialectical relationship between the body and spirit, and within the traditional framework of the dualism of subject and object, this dialectical relationship cannot be comprehended. Marxist epistemology is materialist dialectics; it both sees the objective foundation of cognition and emphasizes the interaction between body and spirit. Such an epistemology is truly a dialectical materialist epistemology, providing a key to solving the problems existing in the traditional dualism of subject and object.

概念中的非概念因素是精神和肉体联系的桥梁。思想中的唯物主义视角就表现在它对概念中的非概念因素的关注。比如，当我们说“爱”的时候，“爱”可以是一个空洞的概念，而当妈妈说出对孩子的“爱”的时候，这个“爱”的概念与空洞的“爱”的概念完全不同，它包含了丰富的内容，即一些与肉体的要素结合在一起的内容。只有这样的“爱”才是真正的内容丰富的爱。马克思在自己的作品中经常使用“现实”这个概念，而黑格尔也使用“现实”这个概念，但是马克思的“现实”概念是一个唯物主义的概念，这个概念包含了“肉体”的要素，它是与外部的现实相联系的，而黑格尔的“现实”不过是对于现实的抽象，是在语言的词汇上指称现实。概念中“包含”现实与词语中指称现实是不同的。但是在传统认识论的抽象理解中，人们无法区分概念中“包含”现实与词语中“指称”现实的差别。在词语中指称现实不过是简单地提及现实，而概念中“包含”现实是把概念与现实切实地联系起来。这种联系必须在肉体和精神的辩证关系中来理解，而在传统的主客体二元论的框架中，这种辩证关系是无法被理解的。马克思主义认识论是唯物辩证法，它既看到了认识的客观基础，又强调了肉体和精神的相互作用。这样的认识论才是真正的辩证唯物主义认识论，为解决传统的主客体的二元论所存在的问题提供了一把钥匙。

(Author: Wang Xiaosheng, Professor, School of Philosophy, Huazhong University of Science and Technology)

（作者：王晓升，系华中科技大学哲学学院教授）

Online Editor: Huihui

网络编辑：慧慧