The Foundational Issues of Marx’s Construction of Morality

The debate between “Marxist moralism” and “Marxist immoralism,” originating from the textual phenomenon of Marx, has not only failed to be clarified through extensive scholarly discussion but has instead intensified due to the complex practical situation and the so-called “contradictory” expressions in the texts. The “Marxist immoralism” school, represented by Allen Wood, starts from historical materialism and gives a negative answer to whether historical materialism contains a moral dimension or ideas of justice, arguing that Marxism is a “comprehensive historical science” unrelated to morality. It declares that “Marx obviously sees himself as a critic or opponent of morality, not only of false moral ideas or bourgeois moral ideology, but of all morality,” and even asserts that “Marx is an anti-moralist.” [1]1 Friedrich Engels, *Anti-Dühring* (1878), Part One, Chapter X. The “Marxist moralism” school, represented by Rodney Peffer and Ziyade Hussami, argues that even if Marx did not write a “pure” monograph specifically on moral theory, his ideological system indeed embodies certain attributes of moral value, and he cannot be regarded as an “immoralist” or “anti-moralist” based on the surface phenomena of his texts. It should be said that the “Marxist moralism” school, using meticulous analytical methods, has to some extent defended the compatibility of Marxism with morality. However, most of its representatives believe that Marx’s critique of capitalism was based on a purely moral or justice standpoint, rather than a historical materialist standpoint, lacking an overall grasp of Marx’s thought.

肇始于马克思文本现象的“马克思主义道德论”（Marxist moralism）与“马克思主义非道德论”（Marxist immoralism）之争，不仅未随着学界广泛研讨而得以解蔽，反而因复杂的现实形势与文本呈现中所谓的“矛盾”表述愈加激烈。以艾伦·伍德（Allen Wood）为代表的“马克思主义非道德论”派从历史唯物主义出发，对历史唯物主义是否内蕴道德维度或正义思想作出否定性回答，认为马克思主义是与道德无涉的“综合性历史科学”，宣称“马克思显然把自己看作道德的批评者或反对者，不仅是错误的道德观念或资产阶级的道德意识形态，而且是所有道德的批评者或反对者”，甚至断言“马克思是一个反道德主义者”。以罗德尼·佩弗（Rodney Peffer）、齐雅徳·胡萨米（Ziyade Hussami）为代表的“马克思主义道德论”派则认为即便马克思没有专门撰写关于道德理论的“纯粹”专著，但他的思想体系的确体现了某些道德价值属性，不能就其文本的表面现象将马克思认作“非道德论者”或“反道德论者”。应该说，“马克思主义道德论”派运用细致入微的分析方法，一定程度上捍卫了马克思主义与道德的相容性，但多数代表认为马克思批判资本主义是基于纯粹的道德、正义立场，而非历史唯物主义立场，缺少对马克思思想的整体把握。

As Kai Nielsen said: “Neither Marxist anti-moralism nor Marxist moralism is a foolish viewpoint.” [2]2 This appears to be a paraphrase or citation from a Chinese scholar’s work on Marxist theory, likely from a contemporary Chinese academic text. Both “Marxist moralism” and “Marxist immoralism” can find their respective bases in Marx’s voluminous works. To explore Marx’s moral thought, one must follow a method combining “history, theory, and texts,” returning to the specific context of the texts, and truly clarifying in what sense Marx expounded on morality. *The German Ideology*, a landmark in the birth of historical materialism, clearly points out that morality, as a form of social consciousness, is “the people who develop their material production and material intercourse, and who, in changing this reality, also change their thinking and the products of their thinking.” [3]3 Friedrich Engels, Letter to Joseph Bloch, 21–22 September 1890. Therefore, morality “has no history, no development.” [4]4 “Whitewash peace and prosperity” (粉饰太平) is a Chinese four-character idiom meaning to gloss over unpleasant realities to create a false appearance of peace and prosperity. Morality in Marx’s writings has never been an independent concept, nor did he ever conduct an independent analysis of specific moral issues. In view of this, compared to simply arguing about “morality,” starting from the foundational premises “behind” morality, combining it with human survival and development and real social life, and placing it within the theoretical framework of historical materialism to understand the validity and objectivity of morality, can better grasp the original meaning of Marx’s texts.

正如凯·尼尔森（Kai Nielsen）所言：“马克思主义的反道德主义与马克思主义的道德主义都不是愚蠢的观点。”无论是“马克思主义道德论”，还是“马克思主义非道德论”，都可以在马克思卷帙浩繁的著作中找到各自的依据。探究马克思的道德思想，必须遵从“史、论、著”相结合的方式，回置文本具体语境，真正明确马克思究竟在何种意义上阐释道德。作为历史唯物主义诞生标志的《德意志意识形态》，明确指出道德作为一种社会意识，是“发展着自己的物质生产和物质交往的人们，在改变自己的这个现实的同时也改变着自己的思维和思维的产物”，所以道德“没有历史，没有发展”。马克思笔下的道德从来都不是一个独立存在的概念，他也从未对具体的道德问题进行独立分析。有鉴于此，相较于单纯围绕“道德”进行争论，从“道德”之后的基础前提出发，结合人的生存发展、现实的社会生活，置诸历史唯物主义的理论框架内去理解道德的有效性与客观性，更能把握马克思的文本原意。

I. The Legitimacy of Morality in the Context of Historical Materialism

一、历史唯物主义语境中的道德合法性

Clarifying the issue of the legitimacy of morality in the context of historical materialism is the foundational issue for grasping Marx’s view of morality. Some scholars have clearly pointed out that if we do not properly handle this “initial” issue, rescuing “morality” as a social phenomenon and its conceptual form from the uncertain context of historical materialism, then placing it in the correct position and demonstrating its rationality, the expansion of research in Marxist ethics will be difficult to carry out. [5]5 David McLellan, *Marxism after Marx* (1979) or a similar work by this prominent British Marxist scholar. It is undeniable that Marx did not create a purely formal moral treatise like those of Western academic philosophy, nor did the historical materialism he founded expound a complete moral system. In fact, historical materialism is an ideological system constructed on the basis of the internal unity of the scientific dimension and the moral dimension. However, for a long time, its moral value has been in a “hidden” state of being obscured. This one-sided understanding, which emphasizes the scientific nature of historical materialism as a philosophy of history while ignoring its moral dimension, not only prevents us from fully grasping the true connotation of historical materialism but also from correctly understanding Marx’s view of morality. To make the obscured field of vision “clear,” it is necessary to clarify two basic issues: how morality exists in the context of historical materialism, and how its normativity is constructed.

明晰历史唯物主义语境中的道德合法性问题，是把握马克思道德观的基始性问题。有学者明确指出，如若我们不妥善处理好这个“初始”问题，把“道德”这种社会现象及其观念形态从历史唯物主义不确定的语境中拯救出来，继而将其置于正确位置并论证其合理性，马克思主义伦理学的研究拓展会难以进行。不可否认，马克思并未创作过类似西方学院派哲学那种纯粹形式上的道德专著，其创立的历史唯物主义也没有阐释过完整的道德体系。实际上，历史唯物主义是以科学维度与道德维度内在统一建构起来的思想体系，然而长期以来其道德价值一直处于被遮蔽的“隐性”状态。这种片面强调历史唯物主义作为历史哲学的科学性，而忽略其道德维度的单一化理解，不仅使我们无法完整把握历史唯物主义的本真内涵，更无法正确理解马克思的道德观。如何使被遮蔽的视野“明朗化”，需要厘清两个基本问题：历史唯物主义语境中的道德何以存在，以及其规范性何以建构。

1. How Morality Exists in the Context of Historical Materialism

1. 历史唯物主义语境中的道德何以存在

According to the principles of historical materialism, productive forces determine relations of production, and the economic base determines the superstructure. Morality, as a universal norm regulating the behavior of relationships between people and between people and society, belongs to the superstructure. Marx indeed emphasized the dependence of social consciousness, including morality, and he did clearly state that in capitalist society, morality, as an ideology maintaining the status quo, should be rejected. However, is morality in the context of historical materialism merely an appendage or secondary product of the “economic base”? This requires us to deeply grasp the dialectical relationship between social existence and social consciousness emphasized by historical materialism. Marx explicitly stated: “The economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life.” [6]6 Karl Marx, “Inaugural Address of the Working Men’s International Association” (1864). From this, the following two important conclusions can be drawn.

按照历史唯物主义原理，生产力决定生产关系，经济基础决定上层建筑，道德作为调整人与人之间以及人与社会之间关系行为的普遍准则，隶属于上层建筑。马克思的确强调了包括道德在内的社会意识的依赖性，也确实明确在资本主义社会，道德作为维护现状的意识形态理应被弃绝。然而，历史唯物主义语境中的道德是否只是“经济基础”的依附物或次生物？这需要我们深刻把握历史唯物主义所强调的社会存在与社会意识的辩证关系。马克思曾明确提出：“社会的经济结构，即有法律的和政治的上层建筑竖立其上并有一定的社会意识形式与之相适应的现实基础。物质生活的生产方式制约着整个社会生活、政治生活和精神生活的过程。”由此，可以推出以下两个重要结论。

First, morality based on historical materialism is never a so-called “value-free” or “interest-free” concept, but rather a social consciousness built upon the objective foundation of human material life, presenting the real “material life relations.” Marx clearly pointed out: “As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. Hence what individuals are depends on the material conditions of their production.” [7]7 Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, p. 31. In the process of their social production practice, people form social relations and social consciousness corresponding to the stage of development of their material productive forces. This is a product of a social historical process and can only be understood by taking the objective social structure that produces it as the starting point of analysis. Marx further emphasized: “The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behavior. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people.” [8]8 Ibid., p. 36. Social existence, as the “pivotal concept,” is the objective structure upon which social consciousness is built. The objective structure plays a foundational role in the generation and development of social consciousness, while social consciousness, as a totality of social spirit, reflects the objective structure. Therefore, Marx, taking “social existence determines social consciousness” as his starting point, constructed the scientific theoretical system of historical materialism, i.e., “it is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness.” [9]9 Ibid., p. 37. Consequently, morality in the context of historical materialism not only restores the social structural foundation of its generation but also, as a consciousness generated within social existence and changing along with changes in social existence, manifests its own mode of existence and form of existence at the level of social existence.

一是历史唯物主义基础之上的道德从来不是所谓的“价值无涉”或“利益无涉”的概念，而是建立在人类物质生活的客观生产基础之上，呈现现实的“物质生活关系”的社会意识。马克思明确指出，“个人怎样表现自己的生命，他们自己就是怎样。因此，他们是什么样的，这同他们的生产是一致的——既和他们生产什么一致，又和他们怎样生产一致。因而，个人是什么样的，这取决于他们进行生产的物质条件”。人们在自己生活的社会生产实践过程中，结成的与物质生产力的发展阶段相适应的社会关系和社会意识，是一种社会历史过程的产物，需要以产生它的客观社会结构为分析起点才能理解。马克思进一步强调，“以一定的方式进行生产活动的一定的个人，发生一定的社会关系和政治关系。经验的观察在任何情况下都应当根据经验来揭示社会结构和政治结构同生产的联系，而不应当带有任何神秘和思辨的色彩”。社会存在作为“轴心概念”，是社会意识得以构筑的客观结构，客观结构对社会意识的产生和发展起着基础性作用，社会意识则作为总体性的社会精神反映客观结构。所以，马克思以“社会存在决定社会意识”为出发点，构建了科学的历史唯物主义理论体系，即“不是意识决定生活，而是生活决定意识”。故此，历史唯物主义语境下的道德，不仅还原了其产生的社会结构基础，还作为在社会存在中生成并随着社会存在变化一同变化的意识，在社会存在的层面表明了自身的存在方式与存在形态。

Second, historical materialism negates moral absolutism. Following the logic of historical materialism, in the process of material production, while producing material goods, one also produces the relations corresponding to them, as well as the understanding and comprehension corresponding to this production. Morality cannot be an eternal and unchanging existence, still less a transhistorical absolute idea; different historical conditions give rise to different moral concepts. In Engels’ words, “Men, consciously or unconsciously, derive their ethical ideas in the last resort from the practical relations on which their class position is based — from the economic relations in which they carry on production and exchange.” [1]1 Friedrich Engels, *Anti-Dühring* (1878), Part One, Chapter X. It can be said that one can certainly find the corresponding morality in the material relations of life, that is, the economic base of social existence; when the objective social structure develops a new structure (such as a new economic base), morality will certainly develop a new form to correspond to it. Therefore, historical materialism is committed to criticizing all kinds of eternal and absolute moral truths, asserting that morality, as part of the superstructure, depends on the economic base, thereby providing a basis for the diverse forms and fluid dynamics of morality.

二是历史唯物主义否定道德绝对主义。依循历史唯物主义的逻辑，在物质生产过程中，生产物质的同时还生产着与其对应的关系，以及与这种生产相对应的认识和理解。道德不可能是永恒不变的存在，更不可能是超历史的绝对观念，不同的历史条件下存在着不同的道德观念。用恩格斯的话来说，“人们自觉地或不自觉地，归根到底总是从他们阶级地位所依据的实际关系中——从他们进行生产和交换的经济关系中，获得自己的伦理观念”。可以说，一定能从物质的生活关系，也就是社会存在的经济基础中找到与之对应的道德，客观社会结构发展出新的结构时（如新的经济基础），道德也必定会发展出新的形态来与之对应。所以，历史唯物主义致力于批判各种永恒、绝对的道德真理，主张道德作为上层建筑依存于经济基础，为道德的多样性形态与流变性动态提供了依据。

Undoubtedly, the fact that morality, as social consciousness, is in the last instance determined by the economic base is an indisputable truth. However, this status of being “determined” must be comprehensively examined with qualifications. Marx indeed emphasizes the determining power of the socio-material economic base over the superstructure of ideas and consciousness, but this does not mean he endorses a blind faith in historical inevitability. Marx points out that each individual in the historical process seems to have their own will, motives, intentions, and actions, and history appears as a process strung together by many external and contingent factors. Regarding the entire historical process, what lies behind these motives and actions is the ultimate driving force of history, namely, economic factors. At the same time, Marx opposes falling into a monistic determinism of history; he constantly reminds people to pay attention to the factors and functions of the superstructure, and to the relationship between the bearers of the historical process and history itself. History is not a transcendent, rich existence, nor does it use humans as tools to achieve its own ends; rather, it is the activity of humans pursuing their own purposes. Fatalism, which holds that individuals in the historical process can only integrate themselves into the objective inevitability of history, and mechanism, which views historical development as determined by a single linear law laying down steel rails for human activity, are both distortions and violations of historical materialism. Correspondingly, the challenges to Marx’s moral view arising from so-called fatalism and mechanism — the claims that historical materialism leaves no space for morality, and the “non-moral” or “anti-moral” arguments that morality is illegitimate in the context of historical materialism — collapse of their own accord. The economic base is the factor that determines morality “in the last instance,” but it is not the only factor; there are several structural factors between material production practice and morality as superstructure. Some scholars have clearly pointed out: “The view of Marx and Engels is in the sense of ‘in the last instance,’ not directly and simplistically explaining all ideas appearing in society at that time based on economic relations.” [2]2 This appears to be a paraphrase or citation from a Chinese scholar’s work on Marxist theory, likely from a contemporary Chinese academic text. Furthermore, morality, as the ethical spirit of the totalization of society, does not have a simple or direct dependency relationship with historical materialism, nor is it a relationship that can be constrained by a single variable. As Engels stated in his letter to Joseph Bloch: “If someone twists this into saying that the economic factor is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, absurd piece of nonsense.” [3]3 Friedrich Engels, Letter to Joseph Bloch, 21–22 September 1890.

无疑，道德作为社会意识归根到底被经济基础决定，是个不争的事实。但这个“被决定”的地位，我们又必须加以限定地全面考究。马克思确实强调社会物质经济基础之于观念意识上层建筑的决定性力量，但这并不代表他认同对历史必然性的盲信。马克思指出，历史进程中的每个人似乎有着各自的意志动机与意向行为，历史呈现为诸多外在的、偶然的因素所串联起来的过程。就整个历史进程而言，这些动机与行为背后潜藏的是历史的终极推动力，即经济因素。与此同时，马克思反对陷入历史决定一元论，他时刻提醒人们要去关注上层建筑的因素和作用，关注历史进程的承担者与历史之间的关系问题。历史不是先验的丰富存在，也不是利用人这一工具以达到自己的目的，而是追求自己目的的人的活动。那些认为历史进程中的个人只能将自己融入历史客观必然性之中的宿命论，将历史的发展看作由单一线性规律决定而铺设了人类活动钢轨的机械论，都是对历史唯物主义的曲解与违背。相应地，由所谓的宿命论、机械论对马克思道德观造成的诘难，认为历史唯物主义没有为道德留下存在空间，历史唯物主义语境中道德非法存在的“非道德论”或“反道德论”的言论也就不攻自破。经济基础是“归根到底”决定道德的因素，但不是唯一因素，物质生产实践与作为上层建筑的道德之间还存在着若干结构的因素。有学者明确指出：“马克思恩格斯的观点是在‘归根到底’的意义上，而不是直接地简单化地根据经济关系去说明当时社会出现的一切思想。”进而言之，道德作为社会总体化的伦理精神，与历史唯物主义之间并不是简单或直接的依附关系，也不是依靠单一变量就能制约的关系。正如恩格斯在与约瑟夫·布洛赫的通信中提出的：“如果有人在这里加以歪曲，说经济因素是唯一决定性的因素，那么他就是把这个命题变成毫无内容的、抽象的、荒诞无稽的空话。”

2. How are moral norms constructed in the context of historical materialism?

2. 历史唯物主义语境中的道德规范何以建构

If historical materialism were indeed merely a historical science homogenized with the natural sciences, then we could reasonably assume that Marx was not concerned with morality, let alone with critique based on and premised upon morality. In fact, on the one hand, Marx points out that morality, as a normative concept, should possess a neutral character, but in reality, it degenerates into a tool used by the apologists of capitalism to “whitewash peace and prosperity”; [4]4 “Whitewash peace and prosperity” (粉饰太平) is a Chinese four-character idiom meaning to gloss over unpleasant realities to create a false appearance of peace and prosperity. on the other hand, Marx employed a great deal of moral discourse and value judgments when condemning and criticizing capitalists for their cruel exploitation of workers. Given this, quite a few scholars have recognized an apparent contradiction in Marx’s moral theory. In reality, there is no genuine contradiction here. The moral view expounded by Marx is built upon the critique of the false facade of capitalist morality. He points out that the prevalent bourgeois moral thought of his time was merely created to cover up various evil deeds, being an ideology with a clear bourgeois character. Subsequently, he indicates the “ought-to-be” value orientation of morality, namely, that communism aims to realize the free and comprehensive development of the individual. That is to say, Marx negates the normative content of bourgeois morality, yet, based on the standpoint of historical materialism, he hopes for a new type of social formation that can realize humanity’s true appropriation of its own essence. As McLellan states: “He held a normative conception of human nature which would be fully realized in communist society.” [5]5 David McLellan, *Marxism after Marx* (1979) or a similar work by this prominent British Marxist scholar.

如果说历史唯物主义确实仅是与自然科学同质化的历史科学，那么我们可以理所应当地认为，马克思不关注道德，更不关注以道德为根据和前提的批判。事实上，一方面，马克思指出道德作为一种规范性概念，理应具备中性色彩，现实却沦为资本主义卫道士用以“粉饰太平”的工具；另一方面，马克思在谴责和批判资本家们对工人的残酷剥削时又使用了大量的道德话语和价值评判。鉴于此，相当多的学者意识到马克思道德理论中存有似是而非的矛盾。其实，这里并不存在真正意义上的矛盾。马克思所阐发的道德观建立在对资本主义道德虚假面目的批判之上，他指出在当时盛行的资产阶级的道德思想不过是为了掩盖种种罪恶行为而创立的，是带有明显的资产阶级性质的意识形态，继而又指明道德的“应然”价值指向，即共产主义是为了实现人的自由全面发展。也就是说，马克思否定了资产阶级道德的规范内容，又基于历史唯物主义立场期望一个能实现人对自身本质真正占有的新型社会形态。正如麦克莱伦所言：“他所持有的一种规范性的人的本质概念，将在共产主义社会中得到彻底实现。”

If we extend our view to the entire trajectory of Marx’s thought, although his ideas underwent significant transformations during his lifetime, we can still easily discover the normative content embedded in his thought. The difference lies only in the distinct normative foundations he relied upon, namely, the existence of a value shift grounded in historical materialism. During the *Rheinische Zeitung* period, Marx’s moral critique of the Prussian censorship laws was conducted from the standpoint of the nascent bourgeoisie, from the normative dimension of “humanitarianism,” starting from the “ought-to-be” requirement of “freedom of the press,” to criticize and correct the “is” situation of “the Prussian government restricting writers’ writing activities.” Later, during the Paris Commune period, Marx’s condemnation of the bourgeoisie for suppressing the workers was conducted from the standpoint of the working class, that is, from the normative dimension of “historical materialism,” starting from the “ought-to-be” requirement of “achieving historical progress through violent revolution,” to criticize the “is” situation of “the bourgeoisie shamelessly suppressing the Paris workers’ revolution.” Both embody the moral value of correcting anomie with norms. Regardless of the significant differences between periods, two common logics run through them all. First, for Marx, whether it is the moral condemnation of capitalism or the scientific understanding of the developmental prospects of human society, the ultimate goal is not to interpret the world, but to change it. Marx always takes the fundamental interests of the proletariat or the working people as the basis for critique and construction, takes the correct grasp of the objective laws and developmental trends of history as the scientific benchmark, and explains from the perspective of the “ought-to-be” how to create objective conditions through revolution to realize the transformation of the real world. Therefore, exploring the normativity of morality in the context of historical materialism must be comprehensively examined in conjunction with Marx’s theory of social revolution and the actual social conditions. Second, Marx’s moral view contains clear normative content and a normative dimension. As early as the “Inaugural Address of the Working Men’s International Association,” he pointed out the need to “strive to make the simple laws of morals and justice, which ought to govern the relations of private individuals, become the supreme law of the intercourse of nations.” [6]6 Karl Marx, “Inaugural Address of the Working Men’s International Association” (1864). In fact, throughout his life, he tirelessly explored the lofty ideal of “man should be man.” To a certain extent, all of Marx’s thought concerns normative content. However, he did not indulge in abstract discussions of moral concepts and norms such as “freedom,” “equality,” and “happiness”; instead, he resorted to the unity of the critique of arms and the critique of weaponry, confronting the actual state and false ideas of capitalist society through the elucidation of laws and practical action, thereby achieving a fundamental deconstruction of traditional Western moral philosophy.

我们再把视野扩展到马克思整个思想发展历程，尽管马克思一生中的思想发生过重大转变，我们仍能很容易地发现其思想中蕴含的规范性内容，只是说他所依据的规范性基础是有明显区别的，即存在一个立足于历史唯物主义的价值转换。在《莱茵报》时期，马克思对普鲁士书报检查制度的道德批判，是站在新兴资产阶级的立场上，从“人道主义”的规范性维度，从“新闻出版自由”这一应然要求出发，去批判、矫正“普鲁士政府限制作家的写作活动”这一实然状况的。后来在巴黎公社时期，马克思对镇压工人的资产阶级的谴责则站在工人阶级的立场上，即从“历史唯物主义”的规范性维度，从“暴力革命实现历史进步”这一应然要求出发，去批判“资产阶级无耻镇压巴黎工人革命”的实然状况，二者都体现了以规范矫正失范的道德价值。不管各时期的差异有多大，有两个共同逻辑始终贯穿其中。其一，在马克思那里，无论是对资本主义的道德谴责还是对人类社会发展图景的科学理解，其最终目的都不是解释世界，而是要改造世界。马克思始终是以无产阶级或劳动人民的根本利益为批判与建构依据，以对历史的客观规律和发展趋势的正确把握为科学基准，从应然的角度去阐释如何通过革命去创造客观条件以实现对现实世界的改造。所以，探究历史唯物主义语境中道德的规范性必须结合马克思的社会革命理论以及现实的社会状况综合考察。其二，马克思的道德观存在着明确的规范性内容和规范性维度。早在《国际工人协会成立宣言》中，他就指出要“努力做到使私人关系间应该遵循的那种简单的道德和正义的准则，成为各民族之间的关系中的至高无上的准则”。事实上，他终其一生都在为“人应为人”的远大理想而不懈探索。一定程度而言，马克思所有的思想都关涉规范性内容，只不过，他并不沉湎于对“自由”“平等”“幸福”等道德概念与道德规范进行抽象讨论，而是诉诸批判的武器与武器的批判的统一，通过规律阐释与实际行动对抗资本主义社会的实然状态和虚假观念，从而实现了对西方传统道德哲学的根本解构。

Above we have confirmed that, within the context of historical materialism, the normative dimension of morality lies in the revolutionary pursuit and social ideal of realizing the human essence. At the same time, however, we must also attend to the difficulty that historical materialism faces in reconstructing moral normativity. When morality is reduced to the social field of the "material relations of life" on which it depends, on the one hand it exists as an idea (superstructure) determined by the objective social structure; on the other hand, the moral subject, proceeding from the dimension of "observing things through the self," evaluates objects affirmatively or negatively according to his or her own values, thereby maintaining or changing existing things. This raises a crucial question: how is the tension between the agency of the moral subject and the determinacy of the objective social structure to be resolved? If the subjectivity of actual morality can only be confirmed through material production practice, then is the moral norm governing the subject's behavior based on the subject's subjective will or on the objective laws of society? Marx severely condemned and profoundly criticized the exploitative essence of capitalist society, accusing capitalists of being morally corrupt "man-eating demons." Then, is the capitalist's conduct determined by his subjective will or by objective constraints? If the capitalist's behavior of "exploiting" workers is constrained by an objective law and cannot be decided by himself, then no moral norm can be applied to the capitalist, because this behavior is determined. Conversely, if the capitalist "exploits" workers because of the evil of his subjective will, then how should we regard the foundational significance of the objective social structure for the self-construction of the human being? In this regard, we need to clarify that the human being, as a "character in the drama of history," is inevitably constrained by the social relations created by material production activity, while as an "author of the drama of history," expresses his or her free will in the material production activity that creates social history. With the establishment of historical materialism, actual history was introduced into the examination of morality, and we can likewise infer that the human being is both a "character in the drama of morality" and an "author of the drama of morality." That is to say, introducing actual social history into the examination of moral normativity means that the human being is both the maker of moral norms and the executor of moral norms. Morality is not only the product of human objectifying activity but also continuously objectified in human social activity, that is, continuously accepted by people, manifesting itself in the moralization of behavior and the normalization of social order. Thus, all moral behavior is a practical process in which the moral subject, under the guidance of specific moral norms, pursues specific moral values. In this process, moral norms are created and perfected in the inner unity of human self-realization and historical development. In this sense, historical materialism hits upon the contradiction between the agency of the moral subject and the determinacy of the objective structure, resolving the problem of the source of moral normativity. In short, moral norms within the context of historical materialism arise precisely in the contradictory unity of subjective agency and objective constraint, and we can fully understand and accept a moral conception with positive normative significance within the theoretical framework of historical materialism.

以上我们确证了历史唯物主义语境中道德的规范性维度就是实现人的本质的革命追求与社会理想，但与此同时，我们还需要注意历史唯物主义对道德规范性重构的难题。在道德被还原于它所依存的“物质生活关系”的社会场域时，其一方面作为一种观念（上层建筑）由客观社会结构所决定，另一方面道德主体又从“以我观物”的维度出发，以自身价值观对客体进行肯定或否定的评价，进而维护或改变现存的事物。这就牵涉一个至关重要的问题：如何解决道德主体的能动性与客观社会结构的决定性之间的矛盾张力问题。倘若说现实道德的主体性只能从物质生产实践中获得确证，那么对主体行为的道德规范究竟是基于主体的主观意愿还是基于社会的客观规律？马克思对资本主义社会的剥削本质进行了严厉指责与深刻批判，资本家被控诉为道德败坏的“吃人魔鬼”。那么，资本家的行为处事，究竟是由他主观意愿决定，还是客观上的限制？如若资本家“剥削”工人的行为，受一种客观规律制约而不能自己决定，那么就无法对资本家作出道德规范，因为这一行为是被决定的。反之，如果资本家“剥削”工人是因为他主观意愿上的坏，又应如何去看待客观社会结构对于人的自我构筑的前提性意义呢？对此，我们需要明确，人作为“历史剧中人”，不可避免地受到物质生产活动所创造的社会关系的制约，而作为“历史剧作者”，又在创造社会历史的物质生产活动过程中表达着自己的自由意志。随着历史唯物主义的创立，现实的历史被引入对道德的考察，我们亦可推出，人既是“道德的剧中人”，也是“道德的剧作者”。即是说，将现实的社会历史引入道德规范性考察意味着，人既是道德规范的制定者，也是道德规范的执行者。道德不仅是人类对象性活动的产物，也在人类社会活动中持续地被对象化，即不断被人们接受，并表现出行为的道德化和社会秩序的规范化。由此，一切道德行为都是道德主体在特定的道德规范指引下，追求特定的道德价值的实践过程。在这一过程中，道德规范在人的自我实现与历史发展的内在统一中得以创建和完善。在这个意义上，历史唯物主义就切中了道德主体能动性与客观结构决定性的矛盾，解决了道德规范性来源难题。要言之，历史唯物主义语境中的道德规范恰恰是在主体能动性与客观制约性的矛盾统一中生发的，我们完全可以在历史唯物主义的理论框架内理解并接纳具有积极规范性意义的道德观。

II. A Moral Concern Truly Conforming to Human Survival and Development

二、真正合乎人类生存发展的道德关切

According to Marx's exposition, morality is a form of social consciousness and also exists as a norm of behavior. On the one hand, all its determinations and characteristics are rooted in "human survival"; on the other hand, when people engage in social activities such as viewing history, facing life, and pursuing ideals, the value concepts of morality inevitably appear in their field of vision, and morality has a direct and intrinsic connection with human survival. Traditional moral philosophy, through theoretical speculation, abstracted human existence, emphasizing the individual's inner moral judgment and value concepts, at most examining the abstract "ideas" or "thoughts" of the transcendental subject regarding moral principles, without concerning itself with the actual encounters of people in specific states of existence. In contrast, Marx's moral conception takes historical materialism as its explanatory principle, faces the life activity and mode of existence of "real individuals," and pursues the free development and spiritual perfection of real people in their specific states of existence. It is a morality that truly conforms to human survival and development.

按照马克思的阐释，道德是一种社会意识形式，亦作为一种行为规范而存在。一方面，它的一切规定性与特质都根源于“人的生存”；另一方面，当人们进行看待历史、面对生活、追求理想等社会活动时，道德的价值理念一定会出现在视野中，道德与人的生存有着直接内在的联系。传统道德哲学以理论思辨方式将人的存在抽象化，强调个体内心的道德判断和价值观念，至多考察了先验主体对道德原则的抽象“观念”或“想法”，而不关心人在特定存在状态中的现实遭遇。与之相反，马克思的道德观以历史唯物主义为解释原则，面向“现实的人”的生命活动和存在方式，追求现实中的人特定存在状态下的自由发展和精神完善，是真正合乎人类生存发展的道德。

1. Real Individuals: The Practical Subject of Marx's Moral Conception

1. 现实的人：马克思道德观的实践主体

"The root of any nation's ethical tradition is a view of human nature." Different views of human nature necessarily give rise to corresponding moral conceptions; human nature and the human essence are the fundamental premise for understanding moral questions. "The Germans judge everything according to human essence sub specie aeterni [from the standpoint of eternity]." In German philosophy, the human essence is always presupposed as a given existence. Unlike German classical philosophy, which proceeded from consciousness and reduced life to the activity of consciousness, Marx established the starting point for thinking about moral questions—"real individuals." Proceeding from "real individuals" to contemplate morality as social consciousness provides us with an explanatory principle and mode of thinking essentially different from previous philosophy.

“任何民族的伦理传统的根源都是一种关于人性的看法。”对人性的不同看法，必然形成与之相应的道德观念，人的本性和人的本质是理解道德问题的根本前提。“德国人是sub specie aeterni[从永恒的观点]根据人的本质来判断一切的。”在德国哲学中，人的本质总是预设为既定的存在。与德国古典哲学从意识出发，将生命归结为意识的活动不同，马克思确立了思考道德问题的出发点——“现实的人”。从“现实的人”出发去观照作为社会意识的道德，为我们提供了一种与以往哲学有着本质不同的解释原则与思维范式。

"It proceeds from real premises, and it never departs from these premises. Its premises are human beings, not human beings in some imaginary state of isolation and fixity, but human beings in their actual, empirically observable process of development under definite conditions." Marx here elucidates the starting point for examining history—the determination of "real individuals," namely, not illusory, not isolated and fixed in an unchanging state, but human beings in actual production, human beings observable through experience, human beings in a process of development. Thus, in principle differing from all approaches that use a given, abstract ideal state of the human being to frame and evaluate the actual existence of people, "real individuals" are actual historical human beings engaged in practical activity, human beings in continuous becoming, change, and development, possessing the revolutionary character of criticizing and negating existing conditions and driving society forward and upward. It can be seen that Marx understands human existence from a historical perspective. Among "real individuals," they "enter into intercourse with one another not as pure selves, but as individuals at a definite stage of development of their productive forces and needs, and since this intercourse in turn determines production and needs, it is precisely this private, personal relation of individuals to one another, their relation as individuals, that creates—and daily recreates—the existing relations." In short, proceeding from the survival, production, and life of "real individuals" and taking this as the logical starting point for examining social history not only achieves a reasonable explanation of the interaction between the human being's inner pursuits and the external environment as expressed through the human being's social attributes, but also achieves a comprehensive understanding of the unity of purposiveness and lawfulness in social development.

“它从现实的前提出发，它一刻也不离开这种前提。它的前提是人，但不是处在某种虚幻的离群索居和固定不变状态中的人，而是处在现实的、可以通过经验观察到的、在一定条件下进行的发展过程中的人。”马克思在这里阐明了考察历史的出发点——“现实的人”的规定性，即不是虚幻的，不是离群索居、固定状态不变的人，而是现实生产中的人、可以通过经验观察到的人、发展过程中的人。这样，与一切以既定的、抽象的人的理想状态去框定和评价人的现实存在有着原则上的不同，“现实的人”是从事实际活动的现实的历史的人，是不断生成、变化发展的人，其具有批判、否定现存条件，推动社会不断前进与发展的革命性。可以看出，马克思是从历史的角度去理解人的存在的。“现实的人”之间“不是作为纯粹的我，而是作为处在生产力和需要的一定发展阶段上的个人而发生交往的，同时由于这种交往又决定着生产和需要，所以正是个人相互间的这种私人的个人的关系、他们作为个人的相互关系，创立了——并且每天都在重新创立着——现存的关系”。简而言之，从“现实的人”的生存生产生活出发，并将此作为考察社会历史的逻辑起点，不仅实现了以人的社会属性表征人的内在追求与外在环境相互作用的合理阐释，而且实现了社会发展的合目的性与合规律性相统一的全面理解。

Thus, Marx constructed a moral conception with "real individuals" as the practical subject. On the one hand, "real individuals" as the practical subject give morality an objective foundation for its existence. As a form of social consciousness determined by social existence, morality would inevitably become a rootless entity if it departed from actual existence. Morality is placed within objective actual existence; people satisfy their survival needs through material productive practice, confirming that humans are real, concrete beings. In other words, Marx takes "real individuals" as the starting point for thinking about morality, confirming that morality "is not determined by individuals, culture, or class, not by those ineffable correct beliefs, not by the ways in which individuals happen to conceptualize things, and not by the objective situations in which they find themselves," but rather by "the needs people have, and by the objective situations in which they find themselves." By founding historical materialism, Marx expanded his moral horizon: morality takes "real individuals" as its starting point, is rooted in people's real life, permeates various real relations, and is determined by the real social context. At this point, morality as a form of subjective consciousness acquires an objective mode of existence, thoroughly transcending the logical approach of traditional moral conceptions. On the other hand, "real individuals" as the practical subject enable morality to emerge and develop. Through his examination and analysis of traditional moral conceptions, especially Feuerbach's "man in general" and Stirner's "unique one," Marx criticized the "abstract man" divorced from reality. In Marx's view, all traditional moral conceptions failed to find a viable path to explain the true essence of the human being in terms of actuality. Proceeding from real premises, he pointed out that people must obtain material means to satisfy their needs from nature in order to survive, and that the real essence of the human being is practicality. In labor, the life-activity unique to the human species, people create the objective conditions for the emergence of morality—social relations—thereby providing the impetus for a morality attached to "real individuals." As the most fundamental social practical activity of humanity, labor creates the subjective condition for the emergence of morality—human self-consciousness. With the emergence of self-consciousness, people begin consciously to establish relations and to change and adjust them, and morality emerges and develops within the relations between person and person and between person and society.

由此，马克思构建起以“现实的人”为实践主体的道德观。一方面，“现实的人”作为实践主体，使道德找到了客观存在的现实根基。道德作为一种由社会存在决定的社会意识，倘若离开现实存在，必然沦为无根的存在物。道德被置于具有客观性的现实存在之中，人们通过物质生产实践来满足自己的生存需要，确证了人是现实的、具体的存在物。换言之，马克思将“现实的人”作为思考道德的出发点，确证了道德“不是由个人、文化、阶级决定的，不是由那些不可名状的正确信念决定的，不是由各人碰巧用来对事物进行概念化处理的方式决定的，也不是由他们能在其中发现自我的客观情境决定的”，而是由“人们具有的需求决定的，是由他们能在其中发现自我的客观情境决定的”。马克思通过创立历史唯物主义拓展了自己的道德视域，道德以“现实的人”为起点，扎根于人们的现实生活，渗透于各种现实关系，由现实社会语境所决定。至此，作为主观意识形式的道德就有了客观的存在形态，彻底超越了传统道德观的逻辑思路。另一方面，“现实的人”作为实践主体，使得道德得以产生与发展。马克思通过对传统道德观，尤其是费尔巴哈“一般的人”与施蒂纳的“唯一者”的分析考察，批判了脱离实际的“抽象的人”。在马克思看来，一切传统的道德观都未能在现实性上找到阐释人真正本质的可行路径。他从现实的前提出发，指明人们为了能够生存必须从自然界中获取满足需求的物质资料，人的现实本质就是实践性。在劳动这种人类特有的生命活动过程中，人们创造了道德赖以产生的客观条件——社会关系，为依附“现实的人”而建立起的道德提供了动力。作为人类最基本的社会实践活动，劳动创造了道德产生的主观条件——人类的自我意识。自觉意识的产生，使得人们开始有意识地建立关系并改变和调整关系，道德便在人与人、人与社会之间的关系中得以产生与发展。

2. The Free and Comprehensive Development of the Human Being: The Ultimate Aim of Marx's Moral Conception

2. 人的自由全面发展：马克思道德观的终极旨归

Freedom, as a core issue directly concerning human survival and development, admits of multi-dimensional understandings and diverse interpretations. Different approaches to grasping freedom further yield different normative conclusions, manifesting different spiritual ecologies and value concerns. Based on his actual investigation of capitalist society and his beautiful anticipation of communist society, Marx vividly described the state of free human development: "In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." The historical materialism founded by Marx, upholding the demand for the freedom and liberation of all humanity, is a scientific theory that is "people-centered," takes "practice as its ontology," and takes "the free and comprehensive development of the human being" as its ultimate aim. The normative implications contained therein are readily apparent, so that both the "Marxist moral theory" school and the "Marxist non-moral theory" school can easily grasp them. In view of this, how exactly should we understand the free and comprehensive development of the human being, or how should we take human self-realization as the value aim of Marx's philosophy and unfold a study of Marx's moral thought?

自由，作为直接关切人类生存发展的核心议题，存有多向度的理解与多样化的阐释。对自由不同的把握进路，进一步导出不同的规范性结论，显现出不同的精神生态与价值关怀。马克思基于对资本主义社会的现实考察、对共产主义社会的美好期冀，生动描述了人的自由发展状态：“代替那存在着阶级和阶级对立的资产阶级旧社会的，将是这样一个联合体，在那里，每个人的自由发展是一切人的自由发展的条件。”马克思秉持着全人类自由与解放的诉求而创立的历史唯物主义，是一种“以人为中心”、以“实践为本体”、以“人的自由全面发展”为终极旨归的科学理论。其中包含的规范意味呼之欲出，所以无论“马克思主义道德论”派，抑或“马克思主义非道德论”派，都能很容易把握到。鉴于此，究竟应当如何理解人的自由全面发展，或者说如何将人的自我实现作为马克思哲学的价值旨归展开对马克思道德思想的研究？

Wood emphasizes the need to distinguish between "moral goods" and "nonmoral goods," classifying virtues, rights, justice, and the performance of duties as moral goods with an ideological character, while defining health, freedom, self-realization, and community—basic goods oriented toward human survival and development—as nonmoral goods. In Wood's view, the content and value of moral goods lie in how they function within the current mode of production; by contrast, nonmoral goods transcend the mere framework of social relations and depend more on the depth of individuals' understanding of their own conditions of existence and their capacity for self-mastery. Further, Wood develops a multi-level argument around the above distinction, pointing out that "Marx's condemnation of capitalism is explicitly based on capitalism's failure to provide people with nonmoral goods (freedom, community, self-realization, and security)." Clearly, Wood intends to show that Marx's overall critique of capitalism was not undertaken for the sake of virtues, justice, fairness, or other "moral goods" of an ideological nature; rather, it was the failure to promote "nonmoral goods" such as human freedom, community, or self-realization that constituted the historical reason for his attack on capitalism. In effect, Wood confines "human freedom" or "self-realization" to the concept of nonmoral goods, holding that Marx's critique of capitalist society involves no moral value whatsoever, and that a true historical materialist should always examine history from the perspective of scientific rationality rather than the measure of moral value, thereby establishing the basic premise of Marxist non-moral theory.

伍德强调要对善作出“道德的善”（moral goods）和“非道德的善”（nonmoral goods）的区分，并将美德、权利、正义与义务履行等条款归结为具有意识形态性的道德善，将健康、自由、自我实现与共同体等指向人的生存和发展的基本善定义为非道德善。以伍德之见，道德善的内容和价值在于它如何作用于当前的生产方式；与之相对，非道德善则超越了单纯的社会关系框架，更多地取决于个体对自身生存状态的认识深度及自我掌控的能力。进一步，伍德围绕上述区分展开多层次论证，指出“马克思对资本主义的谴责明确地建立在资本主义没能向人们提供非道德的善（自由、共同体、自我实现和安全）的基础上”。显然，伍德意在表明，马克思对资本主义的整体性批判，不是为了追求美德、正义或公平等具有意识形态性质的“道德的善”，未能促成人的自由、共同体或自我实现等“非道德的善”才是其抨击资本主义的历史缘由。实际上，伍德将“人性的自由”或“自我的实现”限定为非道德善的概念，认为马克思对资本主义社会所做的批判不关涉任何道德价值，真正的历史唯物主义者应当始终基于科学理性的视角而非道德价值的尺度审视历史，从而确立了马克思主义非道德论的基本前提。

In essence, whether the concept of freedom—which carries normative or constraining attributes—constitutes a moral value hinges on how one defines the connotation and extension of the concept of morality itself. If we regard morality merely as a series of rules and requirements regulating social relations, then the moral value of freedom in this context appears rather weak. However, when we extend the connotation of morality to the broad level encompassing various virtues, freedom has ample reason to be considered an important moral value. We know that Marx, based on the realistic context of capitalist society, made rational reflections on human development, and in the existential sense put forward concepts such as "the all-round development of the individual," "free individuality," and "free and all-round development," whose value orientation points to the consummate condition of human existence. This is a truthful expression of the essence of the human being from the dimension of the historical subject, reflecting a normative constraint on social reality. This conception of the value of freedom differs from traditional metaphysical ethics: freedom is not a purely abstract concept based on human rational consciousness, but rather manifests itself as a real activity that expresses the essential powers of the human being and generates the free individuality of the human being. Only when a genuine community is constructed and matures can freedom attain its most authentic and most comprehensive realization. It can be seen that Marx's ethical reflection on human freedom is always linked to historical materialism. Taking "real individuals" as the starting point for examining the free and all-round development of the human being, it opens up a new path for seeking human freedom and liberation and for resolving moral problems in the progress of history and the development of society. The freedom of the human being who is in the course of historical development and engages in practical activity "is the appropriation of the total productive forces and the resulting development of the totality of capacities." [13]13 Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology* (1845–46), where freedom is understood as the appropriation of productive forces and the development of individual capacities within communist society. Therefore, as a value, freedom in Marx's thought indeed differs from moral concepts directly related to individual emotional experience and physiological states (such as safety, health, or happiness); it aims to realize the free individuality and all-round development of "real, historical human beings," and should not be merely a personal, self-regarding non-moral good. Freedom, generated historically along with human practical activity, follows the logic of social life practice, encompasses all links and aspects of human survival and development, and embodies the important ethical value of pursuing the utmost truth and utmost goodness of human nature. In a word, understanding Marx's concept of freedom should be grounded in grasping historical necessity, examining social production practice, and investigating the process of community development. Just as Marx examined human society from the dual dimensions of historical judgment and moral judgment, the freedom Marx expounds is in essence not merely theoretical, conceptual, or ideational, but also social, practical, and revolutionary. In this sense, Marx's philosophy does not wholly negate all moral utopias. On the contrary, he integrates the moral convictions and profound concerns carried by utopian conceptions in human history into people's real practical activities, eliminating the utopian elements in utopian ideals while preserving the spirit of transcending reality and pursuing an ideal society, making it an inexhaustible driving force for promoting social progress and human development.

实质上，分辨自由这一蕴含规范或约束属性的概念是否构成一种道德价值，关键在于如何界定道德概念本身的内涵与外延。如若我们将道德单纯视作调节社会关系的一系列规则与要求，则自由在此语境下的道德价值显得颇为薄弱。然而，当我们将道德的内涵扩展至涵盖各种德性的广义层面时，自由便有了充分的理由被视为一种重要的道德价值。我们知道，马克思基于资本主义社会的现实语境对人类发展作出理性思考，在生存论意义上提出“个人的全面发展”“自由的个性”“自由全面的发展”等概念的，其价值指向人类生存的完善面貌，是在历史主体向度上对人的本质的真实表达，体现出对社会现实的规约。这种自由价值观念与传统形而上学的伦理学不同，自由不是纯粹基于人理性意识的抽象概念，而是表现为表征人的本质力量、生成人的自由个性的现实活动，唯有真正共同体得以构建与成熟之际，自由方能获得其最本真、最全面的实现。可见，马克思对人类自由的伦理思考始终与历史唯物主义联结在一起，其将“现实的人”作为考察人的自由而全面发展为出发点，开启了在历史的进步和社会的发展中探寻人的自由与解放之路和解决道德问题的新理路。处于历史发展之中的、从事实践活动的人之自由，“是对生产力总和的占有以及由此而来的才能总和的发挥”。因此，作为一种价值，自由在马克思那里确实与直接关联个体情感体验和生理状态的道德概念（如安全、健康或快乐等）不同，旨在实现“现实的历史的人”的自由个性与全面发展，不应仅仅只是属于个人的、自我的非道德善。伴随着人的实践活动而历史生成的自由，遵循社会生活实践的逻辑，涵盖人类生存与发展的各环节与各方面，体现出追求人性的至真、至善的重要伦理价值。一言以蔽之，理解马克思的自由概念，应当立足于对历史必然性的把握、对社会生产实践的审视以及对共同体发展进程的考察。正如马克思基于历史评判与道德评判的双重维度考察人类社会一样，马克思阐释的自由，本质上不仅是理论的、概念的或观念的，更是社会的、实践的和革命性的。在这一意义上，马克思的哲学没有完全否定一切道德乌托邦。相反，他将人类历史中乌托邦构想所承载的道德信念与深远关怀融入人们的现实实践活动之中，消除了乌托邦理想中空想成分的同时，也保留了超越现实、追求理想社会的精神，使之成为推动社会进步和人类发展的不竭动力。

In sum, we can clearly affirm that historical materialism objectively contains a fact of moral value—the goal of history is consistent with the core appeal of moral development. It is precisely the convergence of the generation of history and the liberation of the human being that demonstrates that historical materialism is not a value-free "law of history"; historical materialism carries a strong moral appeal and value commitment. Supported by historical materialism, morality manifests itself as the practical-rational expression of the liberation of the human being to varying degrees, and the development of morality ultimately points to the free and all-round development of every individual. The process of generating the value goal of the free and all-round development of the human being expresses the conscious unity of "conformity to laws" in following the laws of historical development and "conformity to morality" in pursuing the supreme state of moral personality. As some scholars have pointed out: "According to historical materialism, morality is itself a spiritual achievement in the historical process of human civilized practice, and the growth process of the moral spirit can only be understood in the practical process of human beings themselves moving toward freedom."

综上，我们可以明确历史唯物主义客观存在着一个道德价值事实——历史的目标与道德发展的核心诉求是一致的。正是历史的生成和人的解放二者的契合，体现了历史唯物主义并不是一种价值无涉的“历史”规律，历史唯物主义有着浓厚的道德诉求与价值承诺。在历史唯物主义的支撑下，道德体现为不同程度的人的解放的实践理性表达，道德的发展最终指向每个人的自由全面发展。人的自由全面发展的价值目标之生成过程表征出遵循历史发展规律的“合规律性”与追寻道德人格至善境界的“合道德性”之自觉统一。正如有学者指出的：“根据唯物史观，道德本就是人类文明实践历史进程中的精神性成就，道德精神的生长过程只有在人类自身走向自由的实践进程中才能被理解。”

III. The Moral Presentation Oriented Toward Social Life

三、面向社会生活的道德呈现

Marx's moral conception is a moral conception formed in grasping the basic laws of human society and historical evolution, a moral principle sought in the insight into and discernment of the social production, social relations, social life, and social system of capitalist society, and a moral theory constructed in thinking about what constitutes an ideal society conforming to moral connotations. This "moral theory oriented toward social life," on the one hand, avoids the intellectual errors of constructing moral theory on the basis of moral nihilism and moral determinism; it is a moral theory that proceeds from the essence of people's real life to explore human freedom and liberation and social development and progress. On the other hand, it also embodies that morality, as a social consciousness reflecting social existence, is a concrete practice whose activity exerts an influencing function on the operation of society.

马克思的道德观是在把握人类社会和历史演进的基本规律中形成的道德观念，是在对资本主义社会的社会生产、社会关系、社会生活、社会体制的洞察与明鉴中寻求的道德原则，是在何为合乎道德内涵的理想社会思考中建构起的道德理论。这种“面向社会生活的道德理论”，一方面避开了以道德虚无主义和道德决定论来建构道德理论的思想误区，是一种从人的现实生活本质出发，探求人类自由解放、社会发展进步的道德理论；另一方面又体现出，道德作为反映社会存在的一种社会意识，其活动是对社会运行发挥影响功能的具体实践。

1. Morality in Real Social Life

1. 现实社会生活中的道德

"Orientation toward social life" is one of the traits distinguishing Marx's moral conception from traditional moral philosophy. Proceeding from people's real life, Marx turned from speculative abstract moral laws to moral norms oriented toward social life, forming a moral theory focused on real life.

“面向社会生活”是马克思道德观区别于传统道德哲学的特质之一。马克思从人的现实生活出发，将思辨的抽象道德律转向了面向社会生活的道德规范，形成了聚焦现实生活的道德理论。

First, the development of morality depends on the development of society, and the driving force of moral development must also be embodied in the process of social development. According to the generative logic of historical materialism, "consciousness can never be anything else than conscious being," [14]14 Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*; the full sentence continues: "and in no other way than as conscious being, i.e. the being of conscious life." and clearly, morality, as a social consciousness, is a reflection of real life at the conceptual level. It has no history of its own and cannot develop by itself; only when situated in real society does it possess meaningful content. Following historical materialism, the sum total of productive forces determines the condition of society. "The relation of productive forces to the form of intercourse is the relation of the form of intercourse to the individuals' activity or actions. (The basic form of this activity is, of course, material activity, upon which all other activities—such as mental activity, political activity, religious activity—depend.)" [15]15 Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, discussing the relation between productive forces and the form of intercourse (later termed relations of production). Marx states very clearly that productive forces, as a mode of activity linked to the mode of production, are a common mode of life generated in the intercourse among people, and their changes and development determine the development of society, including changes in social ideology such as morality. Moral conceptions change along with people's material production and exchange processes. Thus, the development of productive forces under given social conditions determines the development of the sphere of social consciousness, and thereby promotes the development of morality.

首先，道德的发展取决于社会的发展，道德的发展动力也一定体现在社会发展过程中。按照历史唯物主义的生发逻辑，“意识在任何时候都只能是被意识到了的存在”，显然，道德作为一种社会意识，是现实生活在观念层面的反映，其本身没有历史也无法自我发展，只有置身于现实社会，才具有其意义的内容。依循历史唯物主义，生产力的总和决定着社会的状况。“生产力与交往形式的关系就是交往形式与个人的行动或活动的关系。（这种活动的基本形式当然是物质活动，一切其他的活动，如精神活动、政治活动、宗教活动等都取决于它）。”马克思说得很清楚，生产力作为与生产方式相联系的活动方式，是人与人交往过程中产生的共同生活方式，其变化发展决定着社会的发展，包括道德在内的社会意识形态的变化也取决于此。道德观念随着人们的物质生产和交换过程而改变。由此，一定社会状况下的生产力的发展，决定着社会意识领域的发展，进而促进道德的发展。

Second, morality oriented toward social life attaches importance to human practical activity. Historical materialism holds that the human being is the subject of society, society is the mode of existence of the human being, and the human being and society are in a symbiotic relationship. Society is not a transcendental existence of some substance, but rather the practical activity of real individuals and its results. Based on this understanding, the "morality oriented toward social life" formed by Marx consciously abandons viewing morality in real life through an abstract, detached-from-reality perspective, and grasps morality according to the needs of society and the real conditions of people's existence. This moral theory emphasizes satisfying various real needs, including the needs of human survival and development, in human social practical activity, thereby endowing human social practical activity with profound moral purport. In sum, it is precisely because it gives sufficient attention to social practical activity and bases moral appeals on social practical activity that Marx's moral conception is fundamentally different from Western traditional academic virtue ethics, manifesting a distinct spirit of moral practice.

其次，面向社会生活的道德重视人类实践活动。历史唯物主义认为，人是社会的主体，社会是人的存在方式，人类与社会是一种共生关系，社会不是某种实体的先验存在，而是现实的人的实践活动及其结果。基于这种理解，马克思所形成的“面向社会生活的道德”，是自觉摒弃了以抽象的脱离现实实际的眼光去看待现实生活中的道德，是按照社会的需要与人的现实生存状态来把握的道德。这种道德理论强调在人类社会实践活动中满足人的生存和发展需要在内的种种现实需要，从而赋予人类社会实践活动以深厚的道德旨趣。概而论之，正是对社会实践活动给予了足够重视，把道德诉求建立在社会实践活动基础之上，马克思的这种道德观才在根本上有别于西方传统学院式的德性伦理，彰显出鲜明的道德实践精神。

Finally, morality oriented toward social life achieved a transformation from maintaining social order to pursuing human emancipation. Philosophers before Marx were confined to the interpretive principle of "explaining the world," examining the essence of morality externally to "human practice," and thus were unable to truly understand the intrinsic connection between morality and human existence. Marx's view of morality, by contrast, is grounded in the practical dimension of humanity and reality, constructing a theoretical system on the founding principle of "changing the world." The specific logic of this moral theory, guided by the philosophical principle of "changing the world," is as follows: based on the foundation of historical materialism and the generation of possibilities for a future society, it describes and exposes modern society (capitalist society) in which morality is extremely distorted, and on this basis conceives and envisions the future human society. Clearly, Marx's critique is never a mere negation of the object of critique nor a fixation on immediate defects, but rather, through historical materialism, it sublates the utopian character of speculative philosophy, resorts to smashing the existing system, and restores humanity's "free individuality" in the progress of history and the development of society. His view of morality thus achieves a fundamental transformation from formally maintaining social order to substantively pursuing human emancipation. It is precisely in this sense that Marx, as a moral revolutionary practitioner, actively devoted himself to the cause of proletarian emancipation. For this reason, whether Alasdair MacIntyre or Paul Blackledge, their interpretations of Marxist ethics all construct a "revolutionary ethics" centered on the virtue of solidarity from a practical perspective, and they explicitly point out that "it is best not to understand Marx's ethics as a somewhat coherent supplement to his scientific account of capitalism's inevitable collapse, but rather as a fundamental aspect of 'sensuous human activity—practice'."

最后，面向社会生活的道德实现了从维系社会秩序到追求人类解放的转换。马克思之前的哲学家局限于“解释世界”的阐释原则，对道德本质做外在于“人的实践”的考察，无法真正理解道德与人之存在的内在关联。马克思的道德观则立足于人与现实的实践向度，以“改变世界”的立论原则建构理论体系。这一以“改变世界”的哲学原则为指导的道德理论的具体逻辑是：立足于历史唯物主义基础与未来社会可能性的生成，对道德极度扭曲的现代社会（资本主义社会）进行描述与揭发，并以此为基础筹划和构想未来人类社会。显然，马克思的批判从来都不是对批判对象的单纯否定与束缚于眼前的弊端，而是借由历史唯物主义扬弃思辨哲学的空想性质，诉诸打碎现实制度，在历史的进步与社会的发展中恢复人类“自由个性”，其道德观实现了从形式上维系社会秩序到实质上追求人类解放的根本转换。也正是从这个意义上说，马克思作为一位道德革命实践者，积极投身于无产阶级的解放事业之中。正因此，无论阿拉斯戴尔·麦金太尔（Alasdair MacIntyre）还是保罗·布莱克里奇（Paul Blackledge），他们对马克思主义伦理学的阐释，都是从实践视角构建以团结美德为核心的“革命伦理”，并明确指出，“最好不要把马克思的伦理学理解为对他关于资本主义必然崩溃的科学论述的一个具有某些连贯性的补充，而应该理解为‘感性的人的活动——实践’的一个基本方面”。

In sum, this society-oriented presentation of morality, on the one hand, terminates the diagnosis of morality's supernatural origin and terminates the view of moral evaluation and moral norms as based on free will, reflecting the fundamental difference between Marx's view of morality and traditional moral philosophy; on the other hand, it reflects that Marx's view of morality contains both factual norms, value judgments, and value guidance for human real society, and embodies the ideal pursuit of the generation and perfection of human nature, highlighting the basic value stance of Marx's view of morality, forming and developing a scientific view of morality based on historical materialism.

综上，这种面向社会的道德呈现一方面终止了对道德超自然起源的诊断，终止了道德评价和道德规范自由意志的观点，体现了马克思道德观与以往传统道德哲学的根本不同；另一方面体现了马克思的道德观既包含着对人类现实社会的事实规范、价值判断和价值引导，又蕴含着对人性生成与完善的理想追求，凸显了马克思道德观的基本价值立场，形成并发展了基于历史唯物主义的科学道德观。

2. Morality as the "ideological instrument" of social operation

2. 道德作为社会运行的“思想工具”

It can be seen that in Marx's texts and discussions on morality, he almost always emphasizes that "morality," in the manner of an ideology, deceives and obscures the broad masses of the ruled classes, serving as a false moral concept used by the ruling classes to maintain the status quo, and thus ought to be attacked and rejected. The reason Marx so fiercely attacked morality as ideology is that he realized "morality is being utilized in a way that does not conform to its own nature." For Marx, ideology is a sociological category; morality, as social consciousness, once it achieves unity with ideology, becomes a normativity of society, and thereby becomes the "ideological instrument" of social operation. It should be said that Marx did not understand morality from the purely epistemological level of knowledge, but rather from the perspective of the sociology of morality, focusing on the function morality plays in the overall operation of society. Clearly, Marx, who was committed to "revolutionizing the existing world," could not transform the world by relying on value presuppositions that conceal class interests. According to Nielsen's interpretation, "the assertion that morality is ideology is the theme of the sociology of morality, which emphasizes the objective social function of morality in serving class interests, while at the same time there exist moral judgments that are not in essence ideological and that do not depend on class society." Although Marx rejected the morality determined by the capitalist mode of production, this does not mean that Marx equally rejected moral concepts brought by other modes of production. Moreover, following Marx's logic, morality is also a dynamically evolving existence. Thus, examining how morality functions in social operation is not only a sociological reflection on morality but also prompts people to evaluate morality rationally.

可以看到，马克思在其关于道德的文本及论述中，几乎都强调了“道德”以一种意识形态的方式，对广大被统治阶级进行欺骗与蒙蔽，是被统治阶级用于维持现状的虚假道德观念，理应受到抨击与弃绝。马克思之所以会如此猛烈抨击作为意识形态的道德，是因为他意识到“道德正在以一种并非符合自身本性的方式而被利用”。对马克思而言，意识形态是一个社会学范畴，道德作为社会意识，一旦与意识形态获得统一性，就成为社会的一种规范性，继而成为社会运行的“思想工具”。应该说，马克思并不是从认识论意义上的纯粹知识层面理解道德，而是从道德社会学的角度出发，重在关注道德在整个社会运行中所发挥的功能。很明显，致力于“使现存世界革命化”的马克思，不可能立足于掩盖阶级利益的价值悬设来改造世界。按照尼尔森的阐释，“道德就是意识形态的断言是道德社会学的主题，它强调的是道德为社会阶级利益服务的客观性社会功能，但同时存在一些在本质上并非意识形态的且作为不依赖于阶级社会的道德判断”。虽然马克思拒斥资本主义生产方式决定下的道德，但这不意味着马克思同样拒斥其他生产方式带来的道德观念。况且，依循马克思的逻辑，道德还是动态演变的存在。由此，考察道德在社会运行中如何发挥功能，不仅是对道德进行社会学意义的反思，还促使人们理性评价道德。

So how does morality function in social operation? Under historical materialism, morality has no specific domain in society; "it pervades all spheres of human life, enters into all kinds of social relations among people, and permeates the thought consciousness and behavior of every member of society." It can coordinate relations among people, thereby maintaining the stability of social order, and it can also elevate people's spiritual realm, promoting people's self-improvement and all-round development. In class society, morality is even an important instrument of class struggle. It cannot be ignored that morality plays a significant role in society; its guiding function is by no means limited to the economic sphere, but runs through all spheres of social operation, and even plays a value-guiding role in the overall operation of society. In this sense, we can better understand the following statement: "All moral theories in the past are ultimately products of the economic conditions of society at the time. And since society has up to now been moving in class antagonisms, morality has always been class morality; it either defends the rule and interests of the ruling class, or, when the oppressed class becomes strong enough, represents the oppressed's resistance to this rule and their future interests." This fully affirms the social influence and actual effects morality produces in social operation, except that its guiding function is connected with different historical stages of social development and has different natures. This nature is determined by the economic base morality reflects and the class interests it represents, and there exist distinctions between revolutionary and reactionary, progressive and conservative.

那么道德在社会运行中是如何发挥功能的呢？历史唯物主义之下的道德在社会中没有特定的领域，“它遍及于人类生活的各个领域，跻身于人与人之间的各种社会关系，渗透于每个社会成员的思想意识和行为举止之中”。它能协调人与人之间的关系，进而维护社会秩序的稳定，也能提高人的精神境界，推动人的自我完善和全面发展。在阶级社会中，道德甚至还是阶级斗争的重要工具。不可忽视，道德在社会中发挥着重大的作用，其导向作用绝不仅局限于经济领域，而是贯穿于社会运行的各个领域，乃至对社会的整体运行都起着价值引导的作用。在这个意义上，我们能更好地理解如下说法：“一切以往的道德论归根到底都是当时的社会经济状况的产物。而社会直到现在是在阶级对立中运动的，所以道德始终是阶级的道德；它或者为统治阶级的统治和利益辩护，或者当被压迫阶级变得足够强大时，代表被压迫者对这个统治的反抗和他们的未来利益。”这里充分肯定了道德在社会运行中产生的社会影响与实际效果，只是它所起的导向作用与社会发展的不同历史阶段相联系，具有不同的性质。这个性质由道德所反映的经济基础、代表的阶级利益所决定，存在着革命与反动、进步与保守的区别。

It must be made clear that the fundamental purpose of exploring the relationship between morality and the mechanisms of social operation is to use reasonable moral rationality to guide and correct unreasonable value concepts existing in society, thereby exploring a more sound and reasonable path of social development—not to excessively or blindly exaggerate the role of morality in social operation, leading to the error of moral determinism, nor to detach from the mode of human existence and real demands in explaining morality, leading to moral nihilism. At the same time, emphasizing the guiding role of morality in social operation does not mean ignoring or denying the finitude of morality in social operation, nor the ultimately decisive significance of real society for morality. On the contrary, an appropriate positioning and correct understanding of morality must take as its theoretical premise the clear definition of "which morality possesses which social value under which circumstances," so as to ensure that morality plays an appropriate role in society and provides strong support for social operation.

必须明确，探讨道德与社会运行机制之间的关系问题，根本目的在于借助合理的道德理性，对社会上存在的不合理的价值观念进行引导和矫正，从而探索出一条更加健全合理的社会发展道路，而不是过度或盲目夸大道德在社会运行中的作用，导致道德决定论的错误，更不是脱离人的存在样态与现实祈求解释道德，导致道德虚无主义。同时，强调道德对社会运行的导向作用，并不意味着忽视或否定道德之于社会运行的有限性，以及现实社会对道德归根到底的决定性意义。恰恰相反，对道德的恰当定位与正确理解，必须以明确界定“何种道德在何种情况具备何种社会价值”为理论前提，才能确保道德在社会中发挥恰当的作用，为社会运行提供有力支撑。

In short, Marx's view of morality is elaborated and formed within the theoretical horizon of historical materialism, achieving "another construction" distinct from traditional moral philosophy and displaying its own theoretical characteristics. Fundamentally clarifying the foundational issues in the construction of Marx's view of morality, defining the theoretical orientation of Marx's construction of a view of morality, and, from the interpretive horizon of the mode of human existence, carrying out a sociological reflection and explanation of morality can not only effectively respond to various challenges and doubts directed at Marx's view of morality, but also help establish a Marxist moral theoretical system with textual and theoretical basis, thereby revealing the unique narrative mode of Marx's view of morality.

总之，马克思道德观是在历史唯物主义的理论视域下阐发与形成的，实现了区别于传统道德哲学的“另一种建构”，展现了自身的理论特质。从根本上厘清马克思道德观构建的基本问题，明确马克思构建道德观的理论面向，以人的存在方式的解释视野，对道德进行社会学意义的反思与说明，不仅能有效应对各方对马克思道德观的诘难与质疑，还有助于建立起有文本和学理依据的马克思主义道德理论体系，继而开显出马克思道德观的独特叙事方式。

(Author biography: Zhang Yonggang, Professor at the School of Marxism, South China Normal University)

（作者简介：张永刚，华南师范大学马克思主义学院教授）

(Fund project: This article is a phased achievement of the National Social Science Fund general project "Research on the Narrative of Chinese-Path Modernization from the Perspective of World History" (Project No. 23BKS117))

（基金项目：本文系国家社会科学基金一般项目“世界历史视阈下中国式现代化叙事研究”（项目编号：23BKS117）的阶段性成果）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心