How Modernity Speaks of the Absolute: On Hegel's Interpretation of Spinoza

Since the rise of the nominalist current, although Western thought has seemingly weakened its reflection on the absolute, shifting its focus of attention to the laws of nature and human worldly achievements, the absolute has always remained a question that cannot be bypassed. Indeed, the speaking of the absolute has in fact become a hidden thread, continuously accompanying the development of modern philosophy. The reason behind this lies not in the fact that the absolute can be put to human use—that is, used to counter humanity's "sense of meaninglessness" in an age that appears both substantial and prone to nihilism—but rather in the fact that the Western mode of thought and way of life seem to predestine the absolute as a foundation from which there is no escape: if one does not know the absolute, one cannot speak of the relative. One of the most concise characterizations of the absolute in modern thought is Leibniz's question of "being": "Why is there something rather than nothing?" (Leibniz, S.428) What matters is not why there are these rather than those things, laws, or rules in the world, but rather the very fact that "there is something at all"—this itself constitutes the absolute precondition of our entire life. Such an "absolute" is no longer a traditional theological concept, but concerns a certain absoluteness at the deep level of the world, and is therefore unavoidable in all ages, ancient and modern, Chinese and foreign. This question later became a core problem animating Schelling, Hegel, Heidegger, French phenomenology, and several currently fashionable forms of "realism" (such as Markus Gabriel's new realism and Quentin Meillassoux's speculative realism).

自唯名论潮流兴起以来，虽然西方思想看似弱化了对绝对者的思考，将关注焦点转向了自然的规律与人间的事功，但绝对者始终是一个绕不过去的问题，对绝对者的言说事实上成为一条隐线，连绵不绝地伴随着现代哲学的发展。其背后的原因并不在于绝对者可以为人所用，即用来在一个貌似充实又极易产生虚无感的时代里对抗人的“无意义感”，而在于西方的思想方式与生活方式似乎注定了绝对者是某种逃无可逃的根基，人若不知绝对便无以言相对。现代思想对绝对者最简洁的刻画之一是莱布尼茨的“存在”之问：“为什么毕竟有什么，而不是无？”（Leibniz,S.428）重要的不是为什么世界上有这种而非那种事物、规律、法则，而是“毕竟有什么”这一点本身，它构成我们整个生活的绝对前提。这样的“绝对者”已不是传统神学概念，而是涉及世界深层次上的某种绝对性，因而是古今中外都无法回避的。这一追问后来成为牵动谢林、黑格尔、海德格尔、法国现象学与当下时兴的几种“实在论”（如马库斯·加布里埃尔［Markus Gabriel］的新实在论、甘丹·梅亚苏［Quentin Meillassoux］的思辨实在论）的一个核心问题。

Yet after Spinoza and Leibniz put forward their doctrine of substance and conception of the absolute monad concerning the absolute, the problem was far from "solved." German idealism discovered that the crux of the matter here lies in this: how can a mode of speaking of the absolute both acknowledge the various finite forms of the earthly world, without simply reducing them to the absolute, and instead, in a dialectical sense, see through the aforementioned various finite forms so as to convince modern reason wholeheartedly? Schelling and Hegel expanded and systematically answered this question at a sufficiently profound level. Unlike Schelling, who focused on the "origin" of worldly forms themselves (i.e., their transcendental genesis) and their "end" (i.e., their destination beyond reason), Hegel focused more on the internal contradictions and trajectories of worldly forms themselves. Through his interpretation of Spinoza, he explored the most core problem that any speaking of the absolute in the modern context must encounter, namely that, owing to the logical "inertia" of modern life itself, modern people consider it far from sufficient to directly transcend "determinations of finitude," posit an absolute, and conceive how it manifests itself as modes through two attributes. On this basis, one must at least pass through two further "passes" before reaching the absolute in the true sense: the pass of discerning absolute necessity from actual things, and the pass of understanding how absolute necessity presents itself freely. Hegel's interpretation of Spinoza happens to constitute a crucial link in this process; in Hegel's view, Spinoza's doctrine of substance is also an excellent example for displaying the crux of the modern mode of speaking of the absolute. Since this interpretation is obscured by his discussions of surface issues such as "determination is negation," "whether substance is active," and "whether the geometric method suffices to expound substance," this article must first briefly review Hegel's discussions of Spinoza in several core texts, excavating from them the true crux of Hegel's entire interpretation; then it will separately present in detail the aforementioned two "passes" and their "paths of passage"; and finally it will briefly discuss the enlightenment this interpretation brings to contemporary speaking of the absolute.

然而在斯宾诺莎、莱布尼茨提出事关绝对者的实体学说与绝对单子构想之后，问题远没有得到“解决”。德国唯心论发现，这里问题的关键在于，一种言说绝对者的模式，如何能够既承认尘世种种有限形式，又不将其径直归结于绝对者，而是在辩证的意义上洞穿上述种种有限形式从而令现代理性心悦诚服？谢林与黑格尔在足够深刻的层面拓展并系统回答了这个问题。与谢林专注于现世形式本身的“始”（即其先验的发生过程）与“终”（即其超出理性之外的归宿）不同，黑格尔更专注于现世形式内部的矛盾与走向。他凭借对斯宾诺莎的阐释，探讨了现代语境下言说绝对者必定遇到的一个最核心问题，即由于现代生活本身的逻辑“惯性”使然，现代人认为直接超出“有限性规定”之外，提出一个绝对者并构想它如何通过两种属性而表现为样式是远远不够的，在此基础上至少还必须经过两个“关口”才能到达真正意义上的绝对者，那就是从现实事物中洞察绝对必然性的一关和了解绝对必然性如何自由呈现的一关。而黑格尔的斯宾诺莎阐释恰好构成这个过程的关键一环，斯宾诺莎实体学说在黑格尔看来也是展示现代言说绝对者方式之症结的绝佳例证。由于这一阐释被他对“规定即否定”“实体是否能动”“几何学方法是否足以阐述实体”等表面问题的探讨所掩盖，因此本文首先需要简单回顾黑格尔在几个核心文本中对斯宾诺莎的讨论，从中抉发黑格尔整个阐释的真正要害，再分别详细展现前述两个“关口”及其“通关之路”，最后简说这一阐释给当代对绝对者的言说带来的启示。

I. A Review of Several Discussions in the Systematic Works

一、对体系著作中若干论述的梳理

Previous attention to Hegel's interpretation of Spinoza has mainly focused on clarifying several of Hegel's metaphorical formulations, and these clarifications are, from Spinoza's standpoint, reasonable. For example, regarding the most typical criticism that "the absolute is a static, empty abyss," it is easy to discover that Spinoza explicitly stated: "God is not only the efficient cause of the existence of all things, but also the efficient cause of their essence." (Spinoza, p. 26) Deleuze also pointed out that Spinoza's God is not only not a static God, but is "a God who is what he is and who produces." (Deleuze, p. 108) Domestic scholarship has also produced some quite solid corrective works vindicating Spinoza, such as refuting Hegel's claim that substance is not active as an exaggeration (see Wu Gongqing, pp. 118-126), or showing that Hegel's high praise of "determination is negation" overstates Spinoza's original meaning. (see Liu Chang'an, pp. 134-149) However, the focus of Hegel's interpretation of Spinoza is probably not here. If Hegel affirms Spinoza's breaking through finite determinations and returning to the absolute, then at the same time, he still holds that Spinoza, "though good, is not enough," and is dogmatic in its fundamental point. Yet this dogmatism lies not in whether Spinoza's definitions and uses of the concepts of substance, negation, and the geometric method within his own doctrinal system are comprehensive or sound, nor in whether, from a Cartesian or Kantian standpoint, the "I think" can attain substance through intellectual construction, but rather in the fact that this doctrine cannot pass the "test" of modern life: if his conception of substance cannot, after penetrating the various "rationalities" that modern life endorses, demonstrate its own necessity, it easily degenerates into the subjective arbitrary assertion of a philosopher. And the defect of dogmatism lies not in the truth or falsity of the content that is dogmatically asserted, but in the lack of the necessary path for reaching that content. Given that Hegel's discussions of Spinoza in his various works before the formation of his system (for example, in his youth and the Jena period) are rather scattered and unsystematic, we will take only the systematic discussions in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy and the two Sciences of Logic as examples, and briefly introduce their internal structure.

以往对黑格尔的斯宾诺莎阐释的关注焦点主要放在对黑格尔的几种隐喻性说法的澄清上，而且这些澄清工作从斯宾诺莎的角度来看有其道理。比如，针对最典型的“绝对者是静止的、空虚的深渊”这一批评，我们很容易发现斯宾诺莎明确说过：“神不唯是万物的存在的致动因，而且是万物的本质的致动因。”（斯宾诺莎，第26页）德勒兹也指出，斯宾诺莎的神不仅不是一个静态的神，而且是“一个是其所是的、进行生产的上帝”。（德勒兹，第108页）国内学界也出现了一些相当坚实的为斯宾诺莎正名的纠偏之作，比如驳斥黑格尔关于实体非能动的说法实则言过其实（参见吴功青，第118-126页），或是表明黑格尔对“规定即否定”的高度赞扬夸大了斯宾诺莎的原意。（参见刘长安，第134-149页）但是，黑格尔对斯宾诺莎阐释的重点恐怕还不在此。如果说黑格尔肯定斯宾诺莎突破有限规定而回向绝对者的做法，那么与此同时，他仍认为斯宾诺莎“虽然很好，但还不够”，在根本之处是独断的。不过这独断之处还不在于斯宾诺莎在自身学说体系内对实体、否定、几何学方法这些概念的界定和运用是否周延，也不在于我们站在笛卡尔或康德立场上考察“我思”能否通过知性构造达到实体，而在于该学说不能通过现代生活的“考验”：他对实体的构想如若不能在穿透现代生活认同的各种“合理性”后表明自身的必要性，就容易沦为哲学家的主观臆断。而独断性的毛病不在于其所独断的内容的真假，而在于缺乏通达这内容的必要路径。鉴于黑格尔在体系成型前（比如青年时代、耶拿时代）的各部著作中对斯宾诺莎的论述比较零散且不系统，所以我们仅以《哲学史讲演录》和两种《逻辑学》中的系统论述为例，对其内部结构略作介绍。

From the standpoint of view, the "Spinoza" section of the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* already contains all the elements of Hegel's interpretation of Spinoza, but for the most part it is merely factual narration and the enumeration of viewpoints, without setting out the doctrinal basis of this interpretation as the *Science of Logic* does. The typical viewpoints in this section of text include: (1) Spinozism is the starting point of true philosophy. "Spinoza is the focal point of modern philosophy: either Spinozism or not philosophy at all." (Hegel, 1978, p. 100) Hegel also says: "Thought must be placed at the standpoint of Spinozism; this is the important beginning of all philosophizing. To begin philosophy, one must first be a Spinozist." The reason is that "the soul must bathe in this ether of the one substance, in which everything taken to be true is submerged. This negation of everything particular is something every philosopher must attain; it is the liberation of spirit and also its absolute foundation." (Ibid., pp. 101-102) (2) Spinozism is not atheism (*Atheismus*), but acosmism (*Akosmismus*). The reason is that in his system God is not too little but too much; conversely, "the world, finite essence, the universe, finitude are not something substantial—only God is." (Ibid., p. 99; see also p. 113) Acosmism is evidently something Hegel cannot endorse, but it is clearly only a consequence drawn from Spinoza's doctrine of substance, not the focal point of their dispute, so Hegel quickly turns his pen to the doctrine of substance. (3) As regards the doctrine of substance, Hegel holds that the idea of Spinozism is correct, only far from sufficient. In Spinoza, everything is simply cast into substance as this annihilating abyss, but the latter produces nothing (see Hegel, 1978, p. 102); in other words, Spinoza declares that all things return to God, but does not actually demonstrate how any one thing proceeds from God. (Ibid., p. 115) In Hegel's view, "the absolute substance is the true thing, but not yet the completely true thing; it must also be conceived as self-active, living, and precisely for that reason must determine itself as spirit." (Hegel, 1978, p. 102) Several phenomena closely related to this defect in the concept of substance are: Spinoza knows only one-sided negation, not the other side of negation, namely negation of negation (i.e., affirmation) (see Ibid., p. 100); Spinoza understands substance only through attributes, yet does not know how to pass over from substance to attributes (Ibid., p. 105); Spinoza knows only modes that descend stepwise from substance and are thereby progressively diminished, but the modes formed by such diminution are merely hollow things, showing that he does not understand genuine individuality and subjectivity. (Ibid., p. 106) In short, Spinoza merely starts from actual things to imagine a fine image of substance, and then conversely, on the strength of this abstract image, negates the individuality of actual things; hence, apart from his good intention being worthy of affirmation, he has no proper understanding either of substance, which ought to be the concrete universal, or of modes, which ought to be the particular things. (4) As regards method of demonstration, Hegel criticizes Spinoza's procedure of starting from definitions as dogmatic (Ibid., p. 108), and offers the corresponding doctrinal ground: Spinoza merely follows the geometrical model, listing some definitions and simply emphasizing how "concrete" the content of the definitions can be, but in this way never touches the question of "whether the content is true in and for itself"; what he fails to understand is that in fact, to prove this content, one must "go outward" (*herausgehen*), that is, actually show how substance becomes attributes and various determinations, and in the actual concrete situation "reduce all other content to this content," rather than arbitrarily declaring in words that all other content must be reduced to this content. (Ibid., pp. 108-109) Thus Hegel fully endorses Spinoza's elevation of substance, but holds that the manner of demonstrating substance cannot go unquestioned: if one cannot actually see the necessity of substance in concrete things and describe in detail the way this necessity is immanent in the world (which is precisely the task of the two chapters "Actuality" and "The Absolute Relation" in the *Greater Logic*, as discussed below), then however exquisite one's conception of substance may be, it is nothing but subjective fancy.

从观点上看，《哲学史讲演录》的“斯宾诺莎”部分已经包含了黑格尔的斯宾诺莎阐释的所有要素，但大抵只是事实叙述和观点罗列，没有像《逻辑学》那样陈明这一阐释的义理根据。这一部分文本的典型观点包括：（1）斯宾诺莎主义是真哲学的起点。“斯宾诺莎是现代哲学的重点：要么是斯宾诺莎主义，要么不是哲学”。（黑格尔，1978年，第100页）黑格尔还说：“必须把思维放在斯宾诺莎主义的观点上；这是一切哲学研究的重要开端。要开始研究哲学，就必须首先作一个斯宾诺莎主义者”。其原因在于，“灵魂必须在唯一实体的这种以太里洗个澡，一切被认为真实的东西都是沉没在这个实体之中的。这种对一切特殊物的否定，是每一个哲学家都必须达到的；这是精神的解放，也是它的绝对基础。”（同上，第101-102页）（2）斯宾诺莎主义不是无神论（Atheismus），而是无世界论（Akosmismus）。原因在于，他那里神不是太少了，而是太多了；反过来看，“世界、有限本质、宇宙、有限性并不是实体性的东西，——只有神才是。”（同上，第99页，另参见第113页）无世界论显然是黑格尔不敢苟同的，但它显然只是斯宾诺莎实体学说的推论结果，而不是二人争论的焦点，因此黑格尔很快就把笔锋转向了实体学说。（3）就实体学说而言，黑格尔认为斯宾诺莎主义的理念是正确的，只是还远远不够。在斯宾诺莎这里，一切都被简单投入实体这个毁灭性的深渊，但后者并不产生什么（参见黑格尔，1978年，第102页），换言之，斯宾诺莎宣告万物返回神，但并未切实演示任何一物如何出于神。（同上，第115页）照黑格尔看来，“绝对的实体是真的东西，但还不是完全真的东西；它还必须被设想成自身能动的、活生生的，正因此也必须将自身规定为精神”。（黑格尔，1978年，第102页）与实体概念的这一缺陷密切相关的几个现象是：斯宾诺莎只知道片面的否定，不知道否定的另一面是否定之否定（即肯定）（参见同上，第100页）；斯宾诺莎仅仅通过属性了解实体，却不知道如何从实体过渡到属性（同上，第105页）；斯宾诺莎只知道实体逐步下降因而也逐步减损的模式，但这样减损而成的样式不过是干瘪的东西，可见他并不了解真正的个体性和主体性。（同上，第106页）总之，斯宾诺莎仅仅从现实事物出发想象一副美好的实体形象，接着就反过来凭着这种抽象的形象去否定现实事物的个体性，因而除了他的良好意愿值得被肯定之外，他对本应作为具体的普遍东西的实体和本应作为个别东西的样式其实都没有适当的理解。（4）在论证方法上，黑格尔批评斯宾诺莎从定义出发的做法是独断的（同上，第108页），并提出相应的学理依据：斯宾诺莎只是按照几何学的模式，罗列一些定义并简单强调定义的内容可以多么“具体”，但这样根本没有触及“内容是不是自在自为地真实”这个问题；他所不了解的是，事实上要想证明这个内容，只有“往外走”（herausgehen），即切实表明实体如何化为属性及各种规定，在现实的具体情形中“把其他一切内容都归结到这个内容”，而不是武断地在口头上宣称其他内容都必须归结到这个内容。（同上，第108-109页）可见，黑格尔完全赞同斯宾诺莎标举实体的做法，但认为在实体的论证方式上不容不辩：如果不能切实地从具体事物中看出实体的必然性并具体而微地描述这种必然性内在于世间的方式（这恰恰分别是《大逻辑》的“现实性”和“绝对的对比关系”两章的任务，详后），对实体的构想无论多么精妙，都不过是主观断想。

Taken as a whole, the *Science of Logic* mentions Spinoza in no few places; as Pierre Macherey points out, Spinoza tends to appear at the crucial junctures of Hegel's system (especially the *Science of Logic*). (cf. Macherey, p. 24) The more typical instances are: in the *Greater Logic*, under the "Doctrine of Being," (1) the "Remark" to the chapter "Being"; (2) the "Remark" to the chapter "Quantum"; (3) the "Remark" to the chapter "The Becoming of Essence"; under the "Doctrine of Essence," (4) the "Remark" to the chapter "The Absolute"; under the "Doctrine of the Concept," (5) the "General Division of the Concept"; in the *Encyclopedia Logic*, (6) the "Remark" to §50, (7) the "Remark" to §62, (8) the "Zusatz" to §151, (9) the "Zusatz" to §158, (10) the "Remark" to §159. Although these places are situated at various key nodes on different levels of Hegel's system of logic, we cannot take it for granted that the dispute or choice of *Hegel or Spinoza* (the title of Macherey's book) should be played out on all these levels, because whenever Hegel mentions Spinoza in all the other places, he in fact points back to his doctrine of substance and the level of the "Absolute" in which it is rooted. The entire focus of Hegel's interpretation of Spinoza falls on the level of the "Absolute."

整体来看，《逻辑学》提及斯宾诺莎之处不少，正如皮埃尔·马舍雷（Pierre Macherey）指出的，斯宾诺莎往往会在黑格尔体系（尤其是《逻辑学》）的关键之处出现。（cf.Macherey，p.24）比较典型的有：《大逻辑》“存在论”之下（1）“存在”一章的“注释一”；（2）“定量”一章的“注释一”；（3）“本质的形成转变”一章的“注释”；“本质论”之下（4）“绝对者”一章的“注释”；“概念论”之下（5）“概念通论”；《小逻辑》（6）第50节“说明”、（7）第62节“说明”、（8）第151节“附释”、（9）第158节“附释”、（10）第159节“说明”。这些地方虽然处在黑格尔逻辑学体系的不同层面的一些关键节点，但我们不可理所当然地认为应当在所有这些层面展开《黑格尔抑或斯宾诺莎》（马舍雷书标题）的争执或抉择，因为当黑格尔在所有其他地方提及斯宾诺莎时，其实都指向了他的实体学说及其所扎根的“绝对者”层面。黑格尔的整个斯宾诺莎阐释的焦点都落在了“绝对者”层面。

However, before this section formally turns to the "Remark" in the chapter "The Absolute," it must first, through two pointers in the "Introduction" to the *Encyclopedia Logic*, clarify Hegel's logical positioning of Spinoza's doctrine of substance (the level of the "Absolute"), where this positioning is shown through the comparison of Spinoza with traditional metaphysics, empiricism, and critical philosophy. In the "Remark" to §50, Hegel, in explaining Spinoza's "acosmism," hints from the side that Spinoza's substance has already attained a height close to absolute spirit: "Spinoza's absolute substance is indeed not yet absolute spirit, and for that reason we are justified in requiring that God be determined as absolute spirit." (Hegel, 2023, p. 107) At the same time Hegel points out that this height of Spinoza's admits of no retreat: "But people imagine Spinoza's standpoint as if he confused God with nature or the finite world, taking the world for God, and this presupposes that the finite world has true actuality or positive reality." (Ibid.)

然而本节在正式转入“绝对者”一章“注释”之前，还需要通过《小逻辑》“绪论”中的两处提点，弄清黑格尔对斯宾诺莎实体学说的逻辑学定位（“绝对者”层面），那里是通过斯宾诺莎与传统形而上学、经验论与批判哲学的对勘显示出这一定位的。在第50节“说明”中，黑格尔在解释斯宾诺莎的“无世界论”时，从侧面暗示了斯宾诺莎的实体已达到近乎绝对精神的高度：“斯宾诺莎的绝对实体诚然还不是绝对精神，因此我们有理由要求上帝被规定为绝对精神。”（黑格尔，2023年，第107页）同时黑格尔指出，斯宾诺莎的这个高度不容退却：“但人们这样想象斯宾诺莎的观点，仿佛他把上帝和自然界或有限世界混淆起来，把世界当作上帝，而这就假定有限世界具有真正的现实性或肯定的实在性。”（同上）

In the "Remark" to section 60 below, Hegel likewise indicates this point indirectly: Jacobi, inspired by Spinoza, held that "cognition is merely cognition of the finite, that is, a progression in thought from the conditioned to the conditioned—through many conditioned conditions—advancing forward…. In this respect, so-called 'explanation' and 'conceptual grasping' consist in disclosing that something is mediated by an other; accordingly, all content is merely a particular, dependent, finite content; cognition is confined to such mechanical connections, whereas the infinite, the truth, God remain aloof and external." (Quoted from ibid., p. 120) Whether or not Jacobi fully understood Spinoza, it is undeniable that on the point that substance transcends the finite determinations of the conditioned, Jacobi did faithfully convey Spinoza's thought. And transcending finite determinations means not merely transcending the tangible objects before our eyes (the phenomenal world), but also transcending the various laws behind phenomena (the world of being-in-itself), and even transcending the essential contrastive relations of inner and outer such as "whole–part," "force–externalization of force," and "core–appearance" themselves—it means finally beginning to discern the absoluteness of the world itself, or rather the world's orderliness and lawfulness.

在后面的第60节“说明”里，黑格尔同样以间接的方式表明了这个意思：雅可比受斯宾诺莎的启发，认为“认识活动仅仅是对于有限者的认识活动，即在思维中通过有条件者到有条件者的一个序列，——通过诸多有条件的条件——，向前推进……。就此而言，所谓‘解释’和‘概念把握’，就是揭示出某东西以一个他者为中介；相应地，全部内容都仅仅是一种特殊的、有所依赖的、有限的内容；认识活动局限于这类机械的联系，反之无限者、真相、上帝却是逍遥在外”。（转引自同上，第120页）不论雅可比是否完全理解斯宾诺莎，不可否认的是，在实体超出有条件东西的有限性规定这一点上，雅可比的确忠实传达了斯宾诺莎的思想。而超出有限性规定之上不仅仅意味着超出我们眼下这些看得见摸得着的实物（现象世界），还意味着超出现象背后的各种规律（自在存在着的世界），甚至意味着超出“整体—部分”“力—力的外化”“内核—外观”这些内外二分的本质性对比关系本身，意味着终于开始洞悉世界本身的绝对性，或者说世界的有秩序性、有规律性。

This is confirmed in the chapter on "The Absolute" in the *Science of Logic*. After Hegel reworks and exploits Spinoza's model of "substance–attribute–mode" to exhibit the structure of the absolute in the abstract sense (divided into the three levels of "the exhibition of the absolute," "the absolute attribute," and "the mode of the absolute"), he immediately states at the opening of the sole "Remark" in the section on "Actuality": "As has already emerged here, what corresponds to the absolute and to the contrastive relation of reflection and the absolute is Spinoza's concept of 'substance.'" (Hegel, 2021, p. 155) This unmistakably indicates the logical location of Spinoza's doctrine of substance. Next, Hegel immediately states the fundamental defect of Spinozism at the outset: "Spinozism is a defective philosophy because reflection and its manifold determinations are an external thinking." (Ibid.) In other words, Spinoza only knows how to eliminate the independence of all finite things, at most granting them the appearance of "emerging and surfacing as independent" (ibid.), but in substance dissolving them into one and the same indivisible substance, totality, absolute, and concept of necessity. (Cf. ibid., pp. 155–156)

这一点在《大逻辑》“绝对者”一章得到了印证。黑格尔改造并利用斯宾诺莎的“实体—属性—样式”模式，展示了抽象意义上的绝对者结构（分为“绝对者的展示”“绝对的属性”和“绝对者的样式”三个层面）后，马上在“现实性”一篇中唯一的一个“注释”的开篇说道：“正如这里已经呈现出来的，与绝对者以及反映和绝对者的对比关系相吻合的是斯宾诺莎的‘实体’概念。”（黑格尔，2021年，第155页）这就明确无误地指出了斯宾诺莎实体学说的逻辑学定位。接下来，黑格尔马上开宗明义地指出了斯宾诺莎主义的根本缺陷：“斯宾诺莎主义之所以是一种有缺陷的哲学，在于反映及其杂多的规定是一个外在的思维。”（同上）换言之，斯宾诺莎只知道消除一切有限事物的独立性，顶多只赋予它们“作为独立者而显现和浮现”的样子（同上），实质上是将它们化解到同一个不可分的实体、总体性、绝对者、必然概念里。（参见同上，第155-156页）

Specifically, Hegel's assessment of Spinozism falls into two aspects. On the one hand, Spinoza sees that all particular determinations and specific things are, compared with the concept of substance, merely a state of being posited (ibid., p. 155), and he also valuably sees that the order of things and the order of thought are one and the same order (ibid., pp. 155–157), resolving to consider things under the form of eternity (*sub specie aeterni*). Thus it is evident that Spinoza's subjective intention in revering substance is good. On the other hand, once concretely constructed, his doctrine of substance dissolves into two poles that are quite disproportionate: substance is the unique, eternal, unchanging "cause of itself" that is directly asserted from the start, of which human beings can have no cognition, because it has no absolute form; while attributes are two "determinations of the absolute" or two "essences of the absolute" that the human understanding—itself merely a mode—abstracts and posits from experience, and the various modes are the concrete reflections of this unknowable substance under the two attributes thus erected (ibid., pp. 156–157), their value lying solely in embodying substance, or rather solely in being reducible to substance—they possess no genuine individuality or freedom. In other words, Spinoza did not succeed in achieving the "consideration under the form of eternity" he had promised himself. In Hegel's view, although substance is posited as unknowable, in being posited it is consistent with the attributes and modes established through empirical abstraction, and a positing not verified objectively amounts to subjective conjecture. Spinoza failed to satisfy a demand that modern life, which relies heavily on empirical objectivity, would naturally raise: namely, to discern absolute necessity from actual things. In other words, only by penetrating empirical objectivity and pointing out that behind this objectivity there stands an absoluteness of which modern life itself is unaware as its support, can the modern worldview be convinced. Of course, this is merely Hegel expressing his own meaning through his critique of Spinoza, not a rigorous textual examination of Spinoza. Spinoza, from his own perspective, in fact had reason to believe that he had accomplished the task of "considering things under the form of eternity."

具体而言，黑格尔对斯宾诺莎主义的评判分为两个方面。一方面，斯宾诺莎看到一切特殊规定、特定事物与实体概念相比都不过是一种被设定的状态（同上，第155页），他也极为可贵地看到了事物的秩序和思想的秩序是同一个秩序（同上，第155-157页），立志要在永恒的形态下（sub specie aeterni）考察事物。由此可见，斯宾诺莎崇奉实体的主观意图是好的。然而另一方面，一旦具体建构起来，他的实体学说便分解为颇不相称的两极：实体是一上来就直接被断定的唯一的、永恒的、不变的“自因”，人对它无从认识，因为它并无绝对形式；而属性则是本身仅为样式的人类知性从经验中抽象并设定起来的两个“绝对者的规定”或两个“绝对者的本质”，各种样式则是这个无从知晓的实体在这样被树立起来的两个属性下的具体反映（同上，第156-157页），它们的价值仅仅在于体现实体，或者说仅仅在于能被归结于实体，它们并不具备真正的个体性和自由。换言之，斯宾诺莎并没有成功做到自己期许的“在永恒的形态下”考察事物。在黑格尔看来，实体虽然被设定为无从认识的，但在被设定这一点上，它与通过经验的抽象被建立起来的属性和样式是一致的，而未经客观验证的设定便意味着主观猜测。斯宾诺莎没能满足极端倚重经验客观性的现代生活自然会提出的一个要求，即从现实事物中看出绝对必然性，换言之，只有穿透经验客观性并指出这种客观性背后有现代生活本身都没有觉察到的一种绝对性作为支撑，才能令现代世界观心服口服。当然，这只是黑格尔借助对斯宾诺莎的批判在表达自己的意思，并不是对斯宾诺莎文本的严格考证。斯宾诺莎基于自身视角，其实是有理由认为自己完成了“在永恒的形态下”考察事物这一任务的。

We see that after completing this "Zusatz," Hegel immediately returns to his discussion of actuality. But this does not indicate that the critique of Spinozism is unimportant. In fact, the "great drama" of Hegel's interpretation of Spinoza has only just begun: after passing the test of discerning absolute necessity within actuality, the concept of substance in a new sense is established, and Hegel at that point still does not forget to compare it with the Spinozistic substance (cf. Hegel, 2023, pp. 254–256); and after passing the aforementioned second threshold, he likewise does not forget to praise Spinoza's "intellectual love of God" (ibid., p. 262), and to point out that Spinoza's absolute necessity ought to have excavated the connotation of freedom. (Ibid., pp. 263–264) The implication is that only the concept of the absolute that has passed through these two thresholds can truly attain Spinoza's expectation and genuinely possess the profound connotation he conceived for the concept of substance. If the two *Logics* are thus compared, one can discover that in the section on "Actuality" Hegel in fact operates a rigorously structured and coherent interpretation of Spinoza from beginning to end, and the dialogue between Spinoza's conception of the absolute and Hegel's own conception of the absolute becomes the dominant theme of this interpretation. In the next section, we focus our examination on the three chapters "The Absolute," "Actuality," and "The Absolute Contrastive Relation," because these three chapters are in fact Hegel's "rewriting" (the first chapter) and "completion" (the latter two chapters) of Spinoza's doctrine of substance. Only by examining these three chapters can we understand Hegel's complete view of how modernity can speak of the absolute.

我们看到，在这个“附释”完成后，黑格尔马上回到他对现实性的讨论中。但这并不表明对斯宾诺莎主义的批判不重要。其实黑格尔对斯宾诺莎阐释的“大戏”才开场不久：过了现实性中洞察绝对必然性的这一关之后，崭新意义上的实体概念建立起来了，黑格尔在彼时仍不忘与斯宾诺莎式的实体进行对比（参见黑格尔，2023年，第254-256页），而在通过前述第二个关口之后，也不忘赞赏斯宾诺莎的“对上帝的理智的爱”（同上，第262页），并指出斯宾诺莎的绝对必然性本应开掘出自由的内涵。（同上，第263-264页）言下之意，只有通过了这两个关口的绝对者概念才能真正达到斯宾诺莎的预期，并真正具备后者为实体概念设想的深刻内涵。如果这样对观两部《逻辑学》，那么可以发现黑格尔在“现实性”一篇中实际上有一套结构严谨、首尾连贯的斯宾诺莎阐释，而斯宾诺莎的绝对者构想与黑格尔本人的绝对者构想的对话则成为这套阐释的主调。在下一节中，我们把考察的重点放在“绝对者”“现实性”“绝对的对比关系”这三章，因为这三章实际上是黑格尔对斯宾诺莎实体学说的“改写”（第一章）与“补全”（后两章）。只有通过考察这三章，我们才能了解黑格尔本人对于现代如何言说绝对者的完整看法。

II. The Three Levels of the Conception of the Absolute and the Way Out

二、绝对者构想的三个层次与出路

At the level of the Doctrine of Essence as a whole, because human beings, in their pursuit of essence, necessarily carry with them a structure of dual positing (such as shining [Scheinen], reflection [Reflexion], essential relation [das wesentliche Verhältnis], absolute relation [das absolute Verhältnis], and positedness [das Gesetztsein, or "posited being"]), even when they intend to transcend the determinations of finitude and directly manifest the Absolute (in the chapter on "Actuality"), they can only obtain an abstract, subjective image of the Absolute, and cannot touch the absoluteness of the world itself. The reason is that when thinking inquires into the truth of things, it is accustomed to positing, behind the visible and tangible appearance, an eternal and unchanging essence, law, or "world that exists in itself" that governs that appearance, forming a dual structure of "core–exterior" with the appearance, using this dual structure in turn to consolidate people's trust in the world of appearance, while forgetting that the element behind the appearance and the entire dual structure are themselves only things posited by thinking (positedness). Most of the intelligible states involved in our everyday life, including the natural sciences in general, social norms, economic activities, the trade in artworks, and even a considerable portion of religious ritual, have already fallen into the dual positing structure without knowing it.

在整个本质论层面，由于人类在追求本质时必然带有的二元设定结构（如映现［Scheinen］、反映［Reflexion］、本质性对比关系［das wesentliche Verhältnis］、绝对的对比关系［das absolute Verhältnis］、被设定状态［das Gesetztsein，或译作“已设定的存在”］），人类即便在意图超出有限性规定之外而直接彰显绝对者时（“现实性”一篇），也只能得到绝对者的一副抽象的、主观的形象，无法触及世界的绝对性本身。原因在于，当思维探寻事物真相时，习惯于在看得见摸得着的现象背后设定永恒不变又支配该现象的本质、规律、“自在存在着的世界”等要素，使这些要素与现象形成一个“内核—外观”的二元结构，用这个二元结构反过来巩固人们对现象世界的信赖，同时却遗忘了现象背后的那个要素以及整个二元结构其实都只是思维设定起来的东西（被设定状态）。我们平时生活涉及的绝大部分可理解的状态，包括一般自然科学、社会规范、经济活动、艺术品交易，乃至相当大一部分宗教仪轨，都已落入二元设定结构而不自知。

The first chapter of the "Actuality" section (on "the Absolute") and its corresponding Spinozist doctrine of substance currently occupy a rather "awkward" position: although they see the limitations of finite determinations, they have no reflection whatsoever on the dual positing into which they themselves still fall when seeking the Absolute. The subsequent two chapters, "Actuality" and "the Absolute Relation," are the process of overcoming this difficulty. Below I briefly set out the thought of these three chapters in turn.

“现实性”一篇的第一章（“绝对者”）及其所对应的斯宾诺莎实体学说，目前便处在一个颇为“尴尬”的位置，即虽然看到了有限性规定的局限，但对自身在寻求绝对者时仍会陷入的二元设定却毫无反思。接下来的“现实性”与“绝对的对比关系”两章则是克服这一困境的过程。以下依次略述这三章的思想。

(I) The Abstract Absolute and Its Reflection

（一）抽象的绝对者及其反映

According to the subjective intention of thinking, the Absolute it conceives is neither mere being nor mere essence, but the absolute unity of being and essence, and the ground of the essential relation constituted by the two (i.e., the dual structure of "actual thing and its essence" itself), except that thinking has not previously recognized this. (Cf. Hegel, 2021, pp. 149–150) And when the so-called Absolute is taken as the ground of the dual structure itself, this means that thinking will by no means settle for "explaining" the appearance before it by means of an essence it has posited, but rather consciously realizes the absolute necessity of the fact that "appearance has an essence, and is not a chaos"—that is, it needs no further explanation to support this absolute necessity. I call this absoluteness "the absoluteness of the world."

按照思维的主观意图来说，它所构想的绝对者既不只是存在，也不只是本质，而是存在与本质的绝对统一体，以及二者构成的本质性对比关系（即“现实事物与其本质”这种二元结构本身）的根据所在，只不过此前思维没有认识到这一点。（参见黑格尔，2021年，第149-150页）而所谓绝对者被当作二元结构本身的根据，便意味着思维绝不会拿一种它设定起来的本质来“解释”眼前的现象了事，而是自觉意识到“现象有本质，而不是一片混乱”这一点的绝对必要性，即它无需更进一步的其他解释来支撑这种绝对必要性——笔者将这种绝对性称作“世界的绝对性”。

Since the intention is so admirable, why can thinking not grasp the Absolute in one stroke, and, like Spinoza, sketch out a total picture running from the Absolute down to individual things, thereby expressing "the intellectual love of God"? We can indirectly answer this question by borrowing a thought Hegel expresses at the crucial turning point from the Doctrine of Essence to the Doctrine of the Concept. "That truth which constitutes the beginning (namely, the Concept—translator's note) rests only on mere assertion, whereas truth itself in thinking must submit to the examination of thinking." (Hegel, 2023, p. 264) In this quotation Hegel is of course saying that the true Concept of the Absolute should appear at the opening of the Doctrine of the Concept, and not at the beginning of the entire *Science of Logic*; yet since the Doctrine of Being and the Doctrine of Essence are as a whole a process leading to the Doctrine of the Concept, this reasoning of Hegel's applies equally to the aforementioned question. This is why we characterize the chapter on "the Absolute" as "the abstract Absolute and its reflection." Hegel holds that actuality and the Absolute constitute a relation of reflection (Reflexion), which is inherent in all categories at the level of the Doctrine of Essence. Yet what is distinctive about the chapter on "the Absolute" is that this reflection is external reflection: "In comparison with this Absolute, reflection is external reflection; it merely contemplates the Absolute, not knowing that it is the Absolute's own movement." (Hegel, 2021, p. 148) This means that when we posit the Absolute and claim that actual things are its reflections, we are only artificially attaching actual things externally to the Absolute, without actually indicating in what way actual things embody the absoluteness of the world.

既然意图如此美好，思维为什么不可以一步到位地抓住绝对者，并像斯宾诺莎那样构画出一套从绝对者纵贯到个体事物的整体图景，以此表明“对上帝的理智之爱”呢？我们可以借用黑格尔在从本质论到概念论的关键转折部位表达的一个思想，间接回答这个问题。“那种构成开端的真理（指概念——引者注）只是基于单纯的论断，反之思维中的真理本身却必须接受思维的检验”。（黑格尔，2023年，第264页）黑格尔在这句引文中说的固然是绝对者的真正概念应当出现于概念论的开篇，而不应出现在整部《逻辑学》的开端，然而鉴于存在论与本质论整个地都是走向概念论的一个过程，黑格尔的这番道理同样适用于前述疑问。这便是我们将“绝对者”一章刻画为“抽象的绝对者及其反映”的原因。黑格尔认为，现实与绝对者构成了反映（Reflexion）的关系，这本是本质论层面所有范畴的题中应有之义。然而“绝对者”一章的特殊之处在于，这种反映是外在的反映：“相比这个绝对者，反映是外在的反映，它仅仅考察着绝对者，殊不知它是绝对者自己的运动。”（黑格尔，2021年，第148页）这意味着我们设定绝对者并号称现实事物都是它的反映时，只是人为地将现实事物外在挂搭到绝对者头上了，根本没有切实指出现实事物何以体现世界的绝对性。

From this we can understand why the debate over whether "substance is at rest or in motion" is merely a superficial dispute. In the various texts in which Hegel discusses Spinozism mentioned above, whenever the discussion advances to the crucial juncture of the concept of substance, Hegel tends to say that Spinoza's Absolute is a motionless, indeterminate abyss, lacking activity, so that actual things also lack individuality and freedom. At this point, if we seize on the question of "motion" and "rest" and enter into debate with Hegel, we are likely to miss the crux of the matter, because motion and rest are both only metaphorical expressions; they are meant neither in a physical sense nor in some so-called "metaphysical" sense. The crux of the matter that Hegel emphasizes is that this dual positing of thinking is itself abstract. Without being conscious of this abstractness, Spinoza's substance, in order to show itself pure and undefiled, must instead continually demonstrate that it has stripped away all finite determinations in order to stand on its own—and the dynamic activities such as "expression" and "striving" that scholars emphasize in defending Spinoza presuppose precisely such self-standing.

由此，我们方可明白关于“实体是静还是动”的争论何以只是皮相之争。在黑格尔探讨斯宾诺莎主义的前述各种文本中，每当问题推进到实体概念这个关节部位时，黑格尔往往就会说斯宾诺莎的绝对者是静止的、无规定的深渊，缺乏能动性，从而使得现实事物也缺乏个体性和自由。此时，如果我们抓住“动”和“静”的问题与黑格尔展开争辩，就很可能错失了问题的关键，因为动和静其实都只是比喻的说法，它们既不是在物理学意义上，也不是在某种所谓的“形而上学”意义上说的。黑格尔强调的问题要害是，思维的这种二元设定本身是抽象的。在没有意识到这种抽象性的情况下，斯宾诺莎的实体为了显示自己清白无染，反而必须不断表明自己去除了一切有限性规定，方得自立——而学者们为斯宾诺莎辩护时强调的“表现”“努力”等动态活动则是以这般自立为前提的。

The Absolute is both absolute form and absolute content (cf. ibid., p. 150); hence its moments (the two attributes of thought and extension) are totalities, that is, each can cover all objects of the world; at the same time, the Absolute is not something external that wraps around the things of the world or intrudes into them; it itself reflects into the things of the world. Yet because the Absolute at this level is abstract, its "exhibition" (Auslegung) is only the continual exhibition of itself as the ground of all things in the world, namely, the exhibition that finite things are only expressions and images of the Absolute and should be absorbed into it (cf. Hegel, 2021, p. 151)—such exhibition is only the continual demonstration that the Absolute is "static," and by no means attains the "movement" that Hegel holds the Absolute ought to have. Therefore Hegel emphasizes that such an Absolute is lost in the modes (the changeability and contingency of being) and does not return to itself; the modes are merely the "being-outside-itself" of the Absolute. (Ibid., p. 154) Such an Absolute, though it may appear to be embodied in myriad phenomena, is in fact empty and contentless, because the attributes, as determinations of the Absolute, are only the reflecting movement (reflektierenden Bewegung) of the Absolute. The aim of this reflecting movement is merely to determine the Absolute again and again as original identity; in other words, the content of the Absolute is only the activity of positing, the activity of exhibiting itself. (Ibid., pp. 154–155) Here there is in effect only the Absolute repeated over and over; strictly speaking, there is no place for the world.

绝对者既是绝对的形式，也是绝对的内容（参见同上，第150页），因而它的环节（思维与广延两种属性）都是总体性，即都能覆盖全世界一切对象，与此同时绝对者也不是作为外来的东西包裹着世界万物或侵入世界万物之中，它本身就反映为世界万物。然而这一层面上的绝对者由于是抽象的，它的“展示”（Auslegung）便只是不断展示自身为世界万物的根据，即展示有限事物都只是绝对者的表现和肖像，应被绝对者吸收（参见黑格尔，2021年，第151页）——这样的展示不过是在不断表明绝对者是“静态”的，根本没有达到黑格尔心目中绝对者应有的“运动”。因此黑格尔强调，这样的绝对者是迷失在样式（存在的可变化性和偶然性）里了，没有回归到自身；样式不过是绝对者的“自身外存在”罢了。（同上，第154页）这样的绝对者看似可以体现为万千现象，实质上却是空洞无内容的，因为属性作为绝对者的规定性，只是绝对者的反映运动（reflektierenden Bewegung）。这个反映运动的宗旨不过是不断将绝对者规定为最初的同一性罢了，换句话说，绝对者的内容只是设定活动、展现自身的活动。（同上，第154-155页）这里实质上只有不断重复的绝对者，真正说来并没有世界的容身之地。

(II) Discerning the Absoluteness of the World in Actual Things: From Contingency to Absolute Necessity

（二）在现实事物中洞察世界的绝对性：从偶然性到绝对必然性

Modern life is extremely dependent on the laws, norms, and essences that are posited by thought behind actual things, expecting these elements to provide certainty for life and thereby creating many "comfort zones." Spinoza and Leibniz had already extended the boundaries of modern life to the acknowledgment of the absolute, yet the reason their conceptions of the absolute do not appear persuasive to modern people lies precisely in the fact that these were merely subjective conjectures, which did not guide people to discern the absoluteness of the world within actual things. What is called discerning the absoluteness of the world within actual things means that, in this world we take to be actual, we see that the existence of the absolute is not utterly incomprehensible (contingency), but rather, for contingent things, it is the genuine "thing itself" (relative necessity) (ibid., pp. 168-169); moreover, from the standpoint of the thing itself, even contingent things are shapes that absolute necessity determines itself into, which means that the absolute, in repelling itself, returns to itself, and in returning to itself, repels itself (absolute necessity). (ibid., p. 171) Seen in this way, contingency, relative necessity, and absolute necessity are respectively formal, real, and absolute actuality. (ibid., p. 161) And the protagonist of these three shapes remains a structure of dual positing, namely, the dual positing constituted by actuality and possibility.

现代生活极度依赖现实事物背后被思维设定的规律、规范、本质，指望这些要素为生活提供确定性，营造出诸多“舒适区”。斯宾诺莎、莱布尼茨已将现代生活的边界拓展至承认绝对者，然而他们的绝对者构想之所以在现代人看来没有说服力，关键在于那只是一些主观断想，没有引导人们在现实事物中洞察世界的绝对性。所谓在现实事物中洞察世界的绝对性，是指在我们认为现实的这个世界中，看出绝对者的存在并非彻底不可理解的（偶然性），而是对于偶然事物而言实实在在的“事情本身”（相对必然性）（同上，第168-169页）；不仅如此，从事情本身角度来看，甚至连偶然事物也是绝对必然性将自身规定而成的形态，这意味着绝对者在排斥自身的同时返回自身，在返回自身的同时排斥自身（绝对必然性）。（同上，第171页）这样看来，偶然性、相对必然性和绝对必然性分别是形式性的、实在的和绝对的现实性。（同上，第161页）而这三种形态的主角依然是一个二元设定结构，即由现实性和可能性构成的二元设定。

Contingency refers to the situation in which the actual state and other possible states (no matter how "fundamental" or "beautiful" those states may be) are all treated as equally "possible." In this case, the actual is also merely possible (ibid., p. 163), and what is possible, because it is "possible," also has a chance of being realized; but all possibilities also harbor contradiction, and hence are also an impossibility. (ibid.) In other words, what is contingent, because it is contingent, has neither a ground for actual existence nor, indeed, such a ground. (ibid., p. 164) Therefore, in contingency, actuality and possibility seem able to convert into each other (Umschlagen), except that actuality is usually posited as more real, yet if people attempt to transform actuality, they can conversely posit possibility as more conformable to truth. But once we understand that both become themselves only in this mutual contrast, we also understand that the common structure constituted by their mutual dependence (the absolute form) is what is truly necessary, because without this absolute form, contingency, actuality, and possibility would all be meaningless. Mediated by the absolute form, what is contingent also comes to possess a latent necessity, that is, it can be said to be necessary in substance, behind the scenes. (cf. Hegel, 2021, p. 165) This is how formal necessity is discerned within actual things.

偶然性指的是将现实状态与可能的其他状态（无论那些状态多么“根本”、多么“美好”）都当作同等“可能”的情形。在这种情况下，现实的也仅仅是可能的（同上，第163页），可能的东西因其“可能”，所以也有实现的机会；但所有可能性也都蕴含着矛盾，因而也是一种不可能性。（同上）换句话说，偶然的东西因其偶然，所以既无现实存在的根据，又有那样的根据。（同上，第164页）因此在偶然性中，现实性与可能性似乎可以相互转化（Umschlagen），只不过现实性往往被设定为更实在的，但如果人们试图变革现实性时，也可以反过来将可能性设定为更合乎真理的。但我们明白了二者都只有在这种相互对照中才成为自身，也就明白了二者相互依赖所构成的这个共同结构（绝对形式）才是真正必然的，因为如果没有这个绝对形式，偶然性、现实性和可能性都没有意义。以绝对形式为中介，偶然的东西也便具有了隐性的必然性，即可以被说成在实质上、在背后是必然的。（参见黑格尔，2021年，第165页）这便是在现实事物中看出了形式上的必然性。

In real actuality, that is, in actual things possessing a manifold content, what needs to be discerned is real or relative necessity. Actuality (Wirklichkeit) differs from existence (Existenz): the former does not dissolve into appearance, but rather preserves its reflection-into-itself within the manifold existents, so that it neither passes over (into something else) nor shines into (some essence behind it), but rather, as that which acts (wirken) independently, preserves its reflection-into-itself in the other independent thing produced by its action. (ibid., p. 166) This is also manifest in Chinese usage: when we say that something is simply "reality" and demand that people "recognize reality," this means that it is neither illusion nor the surface presentation of some ground behind it; its center of gravity lies in itself, and by virtue of its present, concrete state it possesses a certain irresistible force, and we can only come to know it through the way it concretely acts. Real actuality means that we can discern, within concrete actual things, the aforementioned necessary mediating function of the absolute form; at this point, the two "ends" that are mediated are no longer abstract things, but real actuality and real possibility. Here real actuality and real possibility are understood in contrast to each other, and the latter, if taken not in the sense of "it could be this way, or it could be that way," but rather in the sense of its co-existence as one body with real actuality, is real necessity. Therefore, real possibility and real necessity are substantially identical, differing only "in appearance" (ibid., p. 169), or rather, real necessity is the negation of real possibility (ibid.), namely, the negation of the latter's abstract destructiveness. Yet this level ("relative necessity") is after all deficient, because real necessity proceeds from the standpoint of what is contingent, and hence it itself also appears to be contingent. (ibid., pp. 169-170) In other words, it does not truly take its stand on necessity, examining how necessity manifests itself in actuality and how it returns to itself, examining necessity's being-for-itself. (ibid.)

在实在的现实性中，即在具有杂多内容的实在事物中，需要看出实在的或相对的必然性。现实性（Wirklichkeit）与实存（Existenz）不同，前者并未瓦解为现象，而是在杂多实存中保留其自身内反映，因此它既不过渡（到他物），也不映现（到某种背后的本质上），而是作为独立起作用（wirken）者，在它的作用造就的另一个独立事物中保持其自身内反映。（同上，第166页）这一点在中文用法中也有所表现：当我们说某事情就是“现实”并要求人们“认清现实”时，这就意味着它既不是假象，也不是背后的某种根据的表面呈现方式，它的重心就在其自身，它凭着眼下这个实实在在的状态便具有某种不可抗拒的威力，我们只能通过它实实在在起作用的方式来了解它。实在的现实性意味着我们可以在具体的现实事物中洞察绝对形式的前述必然的中介作用，此时得到中介的“两端”不再是抽象的东西，而是实在的现实性和实在的可能性。此时实在的现实性与实在的可能性是对照而言的，而后者如果不就其“可能是这样，也可能是那样”而言，而就其与实在的现实性一体共在而言，便是实在的必然性。因此，实在的可能性与实在的必然性实质同一，只是“看起来”有区别而已（同上，第169页），或者说实在的必然性是实在的可能性的否定（同上），即对后者的抽象破坏性的否定。然而，目前这个层面（“相对的必然性”）毕竟有所不足，因为实在的必然性是从偶然的东西出发看问题，所以它本身也显得是偶然的。（同上，第169-170页）换言之，它没有真正立足于必然性，考察必然性如何体现于现实性中，又如何回归自身，考察必然性的自为存在。（同上）

Taking one's stand on necessity itself (that is, entering the level of "absolute necessity"), the absoluteness of this necessity is fully displayed. At this point, necessity is "so great that nothing lies outside it"; there is nothing else that contrasts with it or limits it. It is the truth into which all previous actualities, possibilities, and necessities return (ibid., p. 172), and only it can truly attain being as its essence (ibid.), that is, in essence it necessarily exists and cannot not exist, because without it, everything else would be unthinkable. At the level of absolute necessity, actuality and possibility both appear to possess within themselves a firm foothold. Because they must maintain this self-standing autonomy ("free actuality"), they do not reveal their relation to the other, that is, they do not reveal their dependence on shining into the other. But since both are rooted in absolute necessity, with absolute necessity as their "absolute identity," they undergo an "absolute inversion," namely, a complete conversion into each other. (ibid., pp. 172-173) This is a new type of substance, different from the Spinozist substance; it does not serve as one party in the structure of dual positing, but rather focuses intensely on the absoluteness and necessity of that structure itself. The substance that Hegel himself fashions is "being's self-identity attained in its negation," a "unity" that is "in negation or contingency" yet does not dissolve into that negation or contingency, and "substance as the relation of self-comparison." (Hegel, 2021, p. 174) Here we can clearly discern the contrast with Spinoza; one might say that Hegel here "does what Spinoza could not do," truly realizing the "original intention" of Spinoza's doctrine of substance.

立足于必然性本身来看（即进入“绝对的必然性”层面），这必然性的绝对性便尽显无遗。此时的必然性“其大无外”，没有任何别的东西与之形成对照或限定它了。它是先前的各种现实性、可能性和必然性都返回其中的那个真理（同上，第172页），只有它才能真正达到以存在为本质（同上），即在本质上必然存在，不可能不存在，因为如果没有它，其他一切都无法想象。在绝对必然性层面上，现实性与可能性都显得在自身内便具有坚固的立足点了。它们由于要维护这种自立自主性（“自由的现实性”），便不会透露出与对方的关系，即不会透露出自己对映现的依赖性。但既然二者都扎根于绝对必然性，以绝对必然性作为它们的“绝对同一性”，那么它们就会发生“绝对的颠转”，即完全颠转为对方。（同上，第172-173页）这是不同于斯宾诺莎式实体的一种新型实体，它不会充当二元设定结构中的某一方，而是高度聚焦于该结构本身的绝对性、必然性。黑格尔自己塑造而成的这个实体乃是“存在在它的否定中达到的自身同一性”，是“处于否定或偶然性中”又不涣散于该否定性或偶然性之中的“统一体”，是“作为自身对比关系的实体”。（黑格尔，2021年，第174页）这里我们明显可以看出与斯宾诺莎对比的意味，可以说黑格尔在这里才“为斯宾诺莎所不能为”，真正实现了斯宾诺莎实体学说的“初衷”。

(III) From Absolute Necessity to Freedom: The Contrastive Relations of the Three Absolutes

（三）从绝对必然性到自由：三种绝对的对比关系

A reader who glances at the chapter on "the absolute relation" may easily be puzzled: why should necessity "seek" freedom? In fact, this puzzlement is itself a misunderstanding. The necessity spoken of here is not the sense of being constrained in the ordinary meaning, nor is freedom willful caprice. From the standpoint of classical German philosophy, there is no such problem of necessity "seeking" freedom at all; there is only the question of whether the human being recognizes that necessity is freedom, because necessity and freedom in the genuine sense are originally co-generative, not diametrically opposed. As Schelling says: "Genuine freedom can only be a freedom grounded in absolute necessity, and the relation of this freedom to absolute necessity is itself identical to the relation of absolute knowledge to absolute action." (Schelling, p. 95) From this it is not difficult to understand the necessity of this chapter: seeing the absoluteness of the world in actual things is one thing, but how to properly position the relation of this absoluteness to actual things is another, because after the first step is completed, the necessity of the dual positing structure constituted by actuality and possibility has indeed already been made manifest, yet this necessity, as the absoluteness of the world, together with the actuality and possibility in which it manifests itself (i.e., the actual things in which it manifests itself), forms a new dual positing structure at the present level. Through the tempering of this new structure in its three levels from abstract to concrete (the relation of substantiality, the relation of causality, and reciprocity), we understand that only when a free relation of "the speculative unity of universality and particularity in individuality" is established between the absolute and actual things do we truly attain the concept of the absolute, and only then do we properly position the relation between the absolute and actual things.

粗看“绝对的对比关系”一章的读者容易产生一个疑惑：为什么必然性要“寻求”自由？其实这种疑惑本身就是一个误解。这里说的必然性不是寻常意义上的受束缚感，自由也不是任性妄为。在德国古典哲学看来，本就没有所谓必然性“寻求”自由的问题，只有人是否认识到必然性就是自由的问题，因为真正意义上的必然性和自由本就是一体共生的，而不是截然对立的。正如谢林所说：“真正的自由只能是一种基于绝对必然性的自由，而这种自由和绝对必然性的关系本身又等同于绝对知识和绝对行动的关系。”（谢林，第95页）由此不难明白这一章的必要性：在现实事物中看出世界的绝对性是一回事，如何摆正这种绝对性与现实事物的关系又是另一回事，因为前一个步骤完成后，现实性与可能性构成的二元设定结构本身的必然性固然已经显明，但这种必然性作为世界的绝对性，与其表现出来的现实性与可能性（即与其表现出来的现实事物）之间又形成了目前层面上新的二元设定结构。经过这新结构由抽象到具体的三个层面（实体性对比关系、因果性对比关系、交互作用）的锤炼，我们明白，只有绝对者与现实事物之间建立起“普遍性与个别性在特殊性中达到思辨的合一”这种自由的关系，我们才算真正达到了绝对者的概念，才算摆正了绝对者与现实事物的关系。

What appears first is the relation of substantiality between substance and accidents (Akzidenzen), a relation already different from the Spinozistic relation between substance and attributes (Attribute) in the chapter on "the absolute": the latter is an external connection manufactured by thought ("external reflection"), because although thought everywhere emphasizes that attributes are the "essence" of substance, it fails to show why and how substance should have such an essence; the former is posited by thought when it already knows with certainty that accidents and substance must be mutually dependent in the activity of "semblance-manifestation" ("semblance posited as semblance"). (Cf. Hegel, 2021, p. 175) Relative to accidents, substance possesses a substantiality that appears to be "independent existence"; relative to substance, accidents exhibit an accidentally (Akzidentalität) of mere dependence on substance. Of course, this is only the surface appearance presented by both sides; thought is in fact fully aware that both sides (including substance) can only have meaning in the mutual activity of semblance-manifestation. In the chapter on "actuality," actuality and possibility, as the protagonists, now both fall into accidentally (ibid., p. 177), and each moment in this accidentally, when in motion, presents the alternating situation of the transition phenomenon common in the categories of being and the reflection phenomenon common in the determinations of reflection of essence. (ibid., p. 176) This means that although in the actual world some phenomena appear more "actual" than others, while others appear merely "possible," and although the "actual" and the "possible" wax and wane in the firmness of existence, often passing over into each other, at the same time both sides have their respective meaning only in mutual reflection, and neither side possesses an absolute firmness that can dispense with the other.

率先出现的是实体与偶性（Akzidenzen）之间的实体性对比关系，这种关系已不同于“绝对者”一章中斯宾诺莎式的实体与属性（Attribute）的关系：后者是思维制造的外在关联（“外在反映”），因为尽管思维处处强调属性就是实体的“本质”，但未能表明实体究竟为何以及如何会有这般的本质；而前者是思维已确知偶性与实体必须在“映现活动”中相互依赖的情况下设定下来的（“被设定为映象的映现”）。（参见黑格尔，2021年，第175页）相对于偶性而言，实体具有貌似“独立存在”的实体性；相对于实体而言，偶性则呈现出单纯依赖于实体的偶附性（Akzidentalität）。当然，这只是双方表面上呈现的面貌，思维实际上对双方（包括实体）必然只能在相互映现活动中才有意义这一点心知肚明。在“现实性”一章中，作为主角的现实性与可能性如今都落入偶附性之中（同上，第177页），而这种偶附性中的每一个环节在运动时都呈现出存在范畴中常见的过渡现象与本质的映现规定中常见的反映现象交替出现的局面。（同上，第176页）这就意味着，尽管现实世界中有些现象看似比另一些更加“现实”，而另一些看似不过是“可能”的罢了，尽管这“现实”的东西与这“可能”的东西在存在的坚固性方面此消彼长，经常过渡，然而与此同时双方又仅仅在相互反映中才有各自的意义，没有任何一方具备可以脱离另一方的绝对坚固性。

At bottom, whether actual or merely possible, things are nothing but accidents of the absolute substance. In Hegel's view, this "Oriental" situation of dependence evidently does not adequately realize the substantiality of substance; at this point substance is merely "absolute power" (cf. Hegel, 2021, p. 177), not having attained what a genuine substance should be, not being "substance as substance" (i.e., genuine substance) (ibid., p. 178). The reason is that if the relation of substantiality becomes the fixed lens through which we view the relation between the absolute and actual things (and, in a broader sense, the relations among actual things themselves), then everywhere we see only power and dependence on power, and we fail to see any real distinction between actual things and the absolute, or among actual things themselves. Such a lens is not only a crushing of the side of accidentally but also a disrespect to the absolute, because the absolute is purely embodied in its violence and does not possess the sublime and peculiar subsistence (eigentümliches Bestehen) that absoluteness ought to have. (ibid.)

追根究底说来，不论现实的还是可能的东西，都不过是绝对实体的偶性罢了。在黑格尔看来，这种“东方”式的依附性局面显然并不能充分实现实体的实体性，此时的实体也只不过是“绝对权力”罢了（参见黑格尔，2021年，第177页），没有达到真正的实体该有的样子，并非“作为实体的实体”（即真正的实体）（同上，第178页），原因在于，如果实体性对比关系成为我们看待绝对者与现实事物之间关系（乃至在更广泛的意义上看待现实事物之间关系）的固定眼光，我们到处看见的就只有权力与对权力的依附，看不见现实事物与绝对者之间，以及现实事物相互之间的任何实在的区别。这样的眼光就不仅是对偶附性一方的摧折，也是对绝对者的不敬，因为绝对者纯粹体现为它的暴力，并不具备绝对性该具备的那种崇高的特有持存（eigentümliches Bestehen）。（同上）

The relation of causality, although it grants the activity of substance greater depth and dynamism, is the absolute relation that is most distant from, and hence most forgetful of, the substantiality of substance. In causality, substance reflects back into itself as power. (ibid., p. 179) That is to say, substance no longer, as in the previous relation, encounters neither resistance nor any effect, but rather, as cause, brings about some effect, and in the shaping ("efficacy") of another substance at least formally equal to itself, comes to know its own power. (ibid., p. 180) However, Hegel then, in a manner that can only be called perfect, deconstructs the absolutized causality constructed by the understanding, showing that the "twin peaks of cause and effect" intended by understanding-causality is in fact suspect of self-deception, because it dresses up "both sides" of what is originally one and the same thing—the cause (Ursache) and the efficacy of the cause (Wirkung) (just as force and the externalization of force are one)—as respectively a "cause" and an "effect." (ibid., p. 181) Hegel then also mocks the practice of thinking one has grasped truth upon finding understanding-causality, saying that such a practice falls into the spurious infinity of endlessly tracing effects backward from the efficacy and endlessly tracing causes backward from the cause. (ibid., p. 186) Hegel further shows that if one can comprehend that understanding-causality is not worth much, and thereby reflect that efficacy must be accompanied within substance by reaction, that is a genuine advance, because it frees substance from the illusion of "pure activity," and in the observation of "being acted upon while acting" achieves the fusion of substance with itself, so that substance, while being internally determined, truly becomes originality (Ursprünglichkeit) (ibid., p. 190), i.e., reflects upon its own substantiality.

因果性对比关系虽然赋予实体的活动以更大的纵深与能动性，却是最远离因而也最遗忘实体之实体性的一种绝对对比关系。在因果性中，实体作为权力反映回自身内。（同上，第179页）这就是说，实体不再像在前一种对比关系中那样，既遇不到任何阻力，也看不到任何成效，而是作为原因引起了某种效果，在对另一个至少在形式上与自身平等的实体的塑造（“作用”）中，了解自身的力量。（同上，第180页）然而，黑格尔接下来堪称完美地解构了知性构造出的那种绝对化的因果性，表明知性因果性意指的“原因与结果双峰并立”其实有自欺的嫌疑，因为它将原因（Ursache）与原因的作用（Wirkung）这原本是一回事（正如力与力的外化一样）的“双方”分别装扮成一个“原因”和一个“结果”。（同上，第181页）黑格尔接下来还讥讽了那种找到知性因果性就以为抓住了真理的做法，说那种做法会陷入从作用往后无穷追踪作用和从原因往回无穷追溯原因的恶劣无限性。（同上，第186页）黑格尔还表明，如能领悟到知性因果性不足为道，由此反思到作用必然在实体内部伴之以反作用，那倒是一个真正的进展，因为那样就使实体摆脱了“纯粹主动”的幻象，在“施动的同时受动”这一观察中达到实体与自身的融合，从而使得实体在内在地受规定的同时真正成为原初性（Ursprünglichkeit）（同上，第190页），即反思到自己的实体性。

Reciprocity is not a simple reverse superposition of two causalities, but rather, on the basis of stepping out of causality's forgetfulness of the identity of its content and of the originality of substance, and of recovering the substantiality of substance, it fully brings to prominence the activity of both the absolute substance that supports this coordination and actual things, through the coordinated efficacy of many equal substances. Reciprocity not only acknowledges that the cause can act actively, but also sees the identity of cause and effect, and at the same time sublates originality itself. Next, Hegel says that causality in reciprocity returns to its absolute concept, and finally arrives at the concept itself (i.e., the concept of the absolute itself). (ibid., p. 192)—From this it can be seen that it is the level of "reciprocity" that truly eliminates the external rigid confrontation of substantiality and the narrow "one master, one servant" situation of causality; only then do the original protagonists of the chapter on "the absolute relation" (namely, the absoluteness of the world and actual things) shed the veil that covered them and appear in their true guise.

交互作用不是两个因果性简单的反向叠加，而是在走出因果性对其内容的同一性以及实体的原初性的遗忘，在重拾实体的实体性的基础上，以诸多平等实体协同作用充分凸显支撑这一协同作用的绝对实体与现实事物这双方的能动性。交互作用不仅承认原因可以能动地起作用，而且看到原因与作用的同一性，与此同时也扬弃了原初性本身。接下来，黑格尔说因果性在交互作用中返回到它的绝对概念，终于来到概念本身（即绝对者概念本身）。（同上，第192页）——由此可见，“交互作用”层面才真正消除了实体性的外在僵持局面与因果性的“一主一从”的狭隘局面，此时“绝对的对比关系”这一章原本的主角（即世界的绝对性与现实事物）才除去被遮盖的面纱，以真实面貌登场。

One final question remains: how this protagonist is able to act freely. The reason why there are entities of various kinds in the world, why these entities can act upon one another in the capacity of causes, and why the entities acted upon can harmonize with the entities acting, lies in the absoluteness of the world. Extensively speaking, the three forms in which the world’s absoluteness manifests itself—namely universality, particularity, and singularity—all encompass every actual thing in the world, and are therefore all totalities. But the offices and countenances of the three differ, and only when the three work together do the world’s absoluteness and actual things come to exist. From the perspective of the three themselves, since they encompass all actual things, none of them is constrained by any force external to them, and their movements are therefore all free. In this way, in the chapter on “Actuality,” what thought, grounded in actual things, saw as “absolute necessity” now presents itself, from the standpoint of the world’s absoluteness itself (or the matter itself, the absolute substance itself), in the guise of freedom. Of course, this freedom is not achieved at one stroke, but rather undergoes a development from the abstract to the concrete in the speculative sense, which is the task of the “realm of freedom” that is the Doctrine of the Concept. (Cf. Hegel, 2021, p. 193)

最后还剩下一个问题，即这位主角何以能自由活动的问题。世界上之所以有种种实体，这些实体之所以能相互以原因的身份起作用，被作用的实体之所以能与起作用的实体和谐一致，是由于世界的绝对性。从外延上看，世界的绝对性的三种体现形式，即普遍性、个别性以及特殊性，都涵盖了世界上所有现实事物，因而都是总体性。但三者的职分与面貌各不相同，只有三者共同起作用，世界的绝对性与现实事物才得以存在。从三者自身的角度来看，它们由于涵盖了全部现实事物，因而都不受其外部的任何力量制约，它们的运动便都是自由的。这样一来，在“现实性”一章，思维立足于现实事物所见的“绝对必然性”之后，如今在世界的绝对性本身（或事情本身、绝对实体本身）的角度来看便以自由的面貌呈现了。当然，这个自由也不是一蹴而就的，而是有一个在思辨的意义上从抽象到具体的发展过程，那便是概念论这一“自由王国”的任务了。（参见黑格尔，2021年，第193页）

III. Concluding Remarks: The Historical Significance of the Concept of the “Absolute” and the Contemporary Relevance of the Hegelian Path

三、余论：“绝对者”概念的历史意义与黑格尔路径的当代性

This article emphasizes that the modern conception of the “absolute” must demonstrate the necessity of the absolute within modern life itself, and cannot, as Spinoza does, leap directly back from actual life to the absolute (whether or not that absolute possesses movement or can make human beings free). On the whole, the way out that Hegel points to for the predicament into which Spinoza falls in speaking of the absolute is this: one must advance from the abstractly conceived architecture of substance to the insight into absolute necessity within actual things, and only then can one finally enter the free realm of speculative truth. It is evident that Hegel, like Spinoza, is on guard against all finite determinations, but he is also on guard against the sublime yet abstract fervor of abandoning finite determinations and directly embracing the absolute. Viewed from the structure of the Science of Logic itself, the aforementioned way out alone can bring the true concept of the absolute to light.

本文强调，现代的“绝对者”构想要在现代生活内部显示出绝对者的必要性，而不能像斯宾诺莎那样从现实生活直接跳回绝对者（无论这绝对者是否具备运动性，是否能使人自由）。总体来看，黑格尔为斯宾诺莎言说绝对者所陷入的困境指点的出路是：要从抽象意义上的实体架构，进展到在现实事物中洞察绝对必然性，最终才有可能进入思辨真理的自由王国。可见，黑格尔不仅像斯宾诺莎那样警惕一切有限规定，也警惕人抛弃有限规定而直接拥抱绝对者这种虽然崇高却也抽象的激昂做法。从《逻辑学》本身的结构来看，前述出路才能展现真正的绝对者概念。

As clarified above, Hegel’s “absolute” is an ultimate concept in the sense of Leibniz’s “question of being,” and such an ultimate concept is never out of date in any era. Spinoza, in a modernity deeply entangled in finite determinations, dared to raise anew the question of the absolute—for this he deserves great credit. And Hegel’s attitude of “correcting” rather than “overturning” Spinoza makes the concept of the absolute more adaptable to the modern intellectual situation, removing the dogmatic coloring of Spinoza’s doctrine of substance, and thereby providing modern people with an excellent intellectual model for confronting the question of the absolute in a modern way. The problems of the age to which contemporary speculative realism and new realism respond are far more complex and multifarious than anything the classical philosophical era could compare with, yet the deep-level mechanisms of these problems seem to be no fundamentally different from what Hegel saw. Whether these attempts to speak of the absolute can avoid Spinoza’s predicament and truly benefit intellectually from Hegel remains to be observed. Meillassoux’s doctrine of the “necessity of contingency,” for instance, though it attempts to bypass the entire “transcendentalist” tradition since Kant, objectively still constitutes an echo of Hegel’s thought of “discerning absolute necessity within actual things.” (Cf. Meillassoux)

正如前文澄清的，黑格尔的“绝对者”是莱布尼茨“存在之问”意义上的一个终极概念，这样的终极概念在任何时代都不过时。斯宾诺莎在深陷有限性规定的现代敢于重提绝对者问题，当然功莫大焉。而黑格尔对斯宾诺莎采取的“修正”而非“推翻”的态度，使得绝对者概念更能适应现代思想情境，去除了斯宾诺莎实体学说的独断色彩，这便为现代人更好地以现代方式面对绝对者问题提供了一个极好的思想样本。当代思辨实在论与新实在论应对的时代问题在繁杂程度上已远非古典哲学时代可比，但这些问题的深层机理与黑格尔所见的似乎并无根本区别。这些言说绝对者的尝试是否能避免斯宾诺莎的困境并在思想上真正受惠于黑格尔，则是值得观察的。比如梅亚苏的“偶然性的必然性”学说，虽然试图绕过康德以来的整个“先验主义”传统，但在客观上仍构成了黑格尔“从现实事物中看出绝对必然性”这一思想的一种回响。（参见梅亚苏）

Finally, it must be noted that Hegel’s conception of the “absolute” is by no means a strengthening of human subjective reason, nor an attempt to equip human beings with a “God’s-eye view”; on the contrary, it is a genuine restoration of the absolute to the absolute within the modern context. Hegel not only emphasizes that the transition from necessity to freedom, or from actual things to the concept, is extremely difficult to understand—because an actuality possesses its substantiality only in its identity with other actualities, and the concept is precisely that identity which breaks through the hard shell that actuality possesses in the eyes of common sense (cf. Hegel, 2023, pp. 263–264)—he also explicitly states that to preserve the hard-won spark of freedom, human beings require great self-restraint: “The freedom at this standpoint is at first only abstract freedom, which is rescued only by abandoning what one immediately is and has.” (Hegel, 2023, p. 262)

最后需要说明的是，黑格尔的“绝对者”构想绝不是对人的主观理性的强化，或者企图使人具备“上帝之眼”，反而是在现代语境下真正还绝对者于绝对者。黑格尔不仅仅强调从必然性到自由或从现实事物到概念的过渡极难理解，因为一个现实性在与其他现实性的同一性中才具有自己的实体性，而概念就是打破常识眼中现实性具备的这种坚固外壳的那个同一性。（参见黑格尔，2023年，第263-264页）他还明确指出，要保存来之不易的自由火种，人还需要极大的克己功夫：“这个立场上的自由起初也仅仅是抽象的自由，这种自由只有通过放弃人们直接所是和所拥有的东西才得以挽救”。（黑格尔，2023年，第262页）

(About the author: Zhuang Zhenhua, born 1981, is a professor and doctoral supervisor at the School of Marxism and the School of Philosophy of Shaanxi Normal University. His research focuses on classical German philosophy and modern Western philosophy. He has been selected for a national talent program and is the author of An Explication of the “Phenomenology of Spirit” and A Commentary on the “Encyclopedia Logic.” He has received the First Prize for Outstanding Achievements from the Shaanxi Provincial Department of Education.)

（作者简介：庄振华，1981年生，陕西师范大学马克思主义学部暨哲学学院教授、博士生导师，研究方向是德国古典哲学与近现代西方哲学，入选国家级人才计划，著有《〈精神现象学〉义解》《〈小逻辑〉评注》，获陕西省教育厅优秀成果奖一等奖）

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