The "Lockean Factor" in the Construction of Marx's Thought

Marx called the philosophical system he constructed through arduous exploration "new materialism," "modern materialism," and "the new philosophy." It is both a product of the political-economic changes and social development of the modern world and a result of the transformation of the long-standing Western intellectual tradition. With regard to the latter, clarifying the complex relationship between Marx and his intellectual predecessors is undoubtedly of great significance for grasping and understanding the purport, connotation, and characteristics of Marx's philosophy. However, the Western intellectual tradition is itself a rather complex referent; macroscopic pronouncements and sweeping discussions often fall into abstraction and obscurity. Therefore, choosing an appropriate approach and a narrower perspective for in-depth excavation, then gradually broadening the horizon from there and generating and extending conclusions, is a more feasible research path.

马克思将其经过艰苦探索所建构的哲学体系称为“新唯物主义”“现代唯物主义”和“新哲学”。它既是近代以来世界政治经济变迁和社会发展的产物，也是源远流长的西方思想传统变革的结果。就后者来说，清理马克思与其思想先驱之间的复杂关系，对于把握和理解马克思哲学的意旨、内涵和特征无疑具有重要意义。然而，西方思想传统又是一个相当复杂的所指，宏观的言说和笼统的讨论往往会陷入抽象和玄虚，所以选择恰当的方式和较小的视角予以深度挖掘，再由此渐次拓宽视域，生发和延伸结论，是比较可行的研究路径。

In the Western intellectual tradition and its connection with modern society, John Locke (1632–1704) is by no means an insignificant figure. On the contrary, he made outstanding contributions in the fields of empiricist philosophy, the doctrine of labor ownership, and liberal political theory, and exerted an important influence on later generations. It is precisely for this reason that Marx, who had conducted in-depth research and possessed a precise grasp of the history of thought, attached great importance to Locke. Judging from the extant literature, as early as the humorous novel *Scorpion and Felix*, written during his student days at the University of Berlin, Marx mentioned Locke's name and the question of "primogeniture" discussed in detail in the first treatise of Locke's *Two Treatises of Government*. (See *Marx-Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 820) From then on, throughout the voluminous writings Marx produced in his lifetime, Locke and his works appear frequently, even including lengthy analyses and quite pertinent evaluations. As late as his later years, when he drafted Chapter 10 of Part II, "A Contribution to the Critique of Economic History," for Engels's *Anti-Dühring*, he summarized and "explained" the "position Locke should occupy in the genesis of classical political economy" (*Marx-Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 17) — it can be said that Locke to a large extent "participated" in Marx's intellectual process; in other words, the construction of Marx's thought contains many "Lockean factors." Unfortunately, although a few scholars both at home and abroad have touched upon this topic in their research, most of their discussions are macroscopic and abstract, lacking a systematic and meticulous examination based on specific texts.

在西方思想传统及其与近代社会的关联中，约翰·洛克（John Locke,1632-1704）不是一个无足轻重的人物。相反，他在经验论哲学、劳动所有权学说和自由主义政治理论诸领域都有卓越的建树，并对后世产生了重要影响。正因为如此，对思想史有深入研究和精准把握的马克思十分重视洛克。从留存下来的文献看，早在柏林大学求学期间写作的幽默小说《斯考尔皮昂和费利克斯》中，马克思就提及洛克的名字及其《政府论》上篇所详加论述的“长子继承权”问题。（参见《马克思恩格斯全集》第1卷，第820页）从此之后，在马克思一生撰写的卷帙浩繁的著述中，洛克及其著作更是频繁出现，甚至不乏大段的剖析和相当中肯的评价。直至晚年在为恩格斯的《反杜林论》一书执笔起草第二编第十章《〈批判史〉论述》时，他更总结、“说明”了洛克“在古典经济学产生过程中所应占的地位”（《马克思恩格斯文集》第9卷，第17页）——可以说，洛克很大程度上“参与”了马克思的思想进程；换言之，在马克思思想建构中包含着诸多“洛克因素”。可惜的是，国内外学界虽然有个别论者在研究中对这一专题有所涉猎，但多是宏观而抽象的言说，缺乏基于具体文本的系统而细致的清理。

In order to remedy the shortcomings in the aforementioned research, the author has recently sorted out the complex relationships between Locke and the doctrines Marx established in three areas: the "empiricist" philosophy and "modern materialism," the doctrine of "labor ownership" and the "labor theory of value," and liberal political theory and the idea of the "association of free individuals." Clearly this is a rather broad and cumbersome comparative study. In order to make the discussion concrete and in-depth, this essay addresses only the first of these issues. Following the "textological" research method, the author intends to rely on the intellectual content and argumentative logic of *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Locke's representative work of the "empiricist" system, and examine one by one their "traces" and influence in Marx's doctoral dissertation and its notebooks, the writings of the "Rheinische Zeitung–Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher period," *A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, *The Holy Family*, *The German Ideology*, and many other works. Moreover, in view of this study's aim to achieve a breakthrough in the discrimination of details, this essay takes only the critique of the "theory of innate ideas" in Book I of *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* as an example to distinguish the inheritance and transcendence between the two thinkers in terms of relevant lines of thought and viewpoints. As for the comparisons and discussions prompted by the content of the other three books of that work, the author will treat them in detail in a separate essay.

为了弥补上述研究中存在的缺憾，笔者最近梳理了洛克与马克思所创立的学说中有关“经验论”哲学与“现代唯物主义”、“劳动所有权”学说与“劳动价值论”、自由主义政治理论与“自由人联合体”思想三方面之间的复杂关系。显然这是一项较为宽泛而繁琐的比较研究。为了使得讨论具体、深入，这里只就第一方面的问题进行探讨。遵循“文本学”研究方法，笔者拟依据作为洛克“经验论”体系的代表作《人类理解论》中的思想内容及其论证逻辑，一一考辨它们在马克思“博士论文”及其笔记、“《莱茵报》—《德法年鉴》时期”的著述、《黑格尔法哲学批判》、《1844年经济学哲学手稿》、《神圣家族》、《德意志意识形态》等众多著述中的“踪迹”和影响；又鉴于本项研究力图在细节甄别方面有所突破，本文只以《人类理解论》第一卷中对“天赋观念论”的批判为例，辨析在相关思路和观点上二人之间的传承和超越关系；至于由该书其他三卷内容引发的比较和讨论，笔者将在另文中详加论述。

I. "Innate Principles" Are a "Fictitious" "Hypothesis"

一、“天赋原则”是一种“虚妄”的“假设”

The "theory of innate ideas," as a way of understanding and grasping the world, has a long tradition. Related doctrines had already appeared in ancient Greek philosophy, the most typical being Plato's theory of "recollection." He held that certain ideas exist in the human mind from birth; they are innate, but in worldly life they are temporarily buried and "forgotten" by people. When external things stimulate people's senses, they arouse their memory, enabling them to rediscover these forgotten things and thereby acquire knowledge. Plato called this process of thinking and acting "recollection" (see Plato, pp. 86–92). In the Middle Ages, the Scholastic philosophers held that the various creeds, ideas, knowledge, and truths that believers observe, learn, and comprehend all come from God, are mastered and provided by God, and are handed over to priests to explain and disseminate. For example, Augustine, the great synthesizer of "patristic philosophy," held that empirical reality is not real and therefore not worth mentioning; the certainty of knowledge originates in God's will and is transferred into the human heart. God governs and demands of people according to "truthful" knowledge and morality; all people need to do is believe in God and act according to His will.

“天赋观念论”作为人类理解和把握世界的一种思路和方式有悠久的传统。相关学说在古希腊哲学中业已出现，最典型的要数柏拉图的“回忆说”。他认为，人心中存在某些与生俱来的观念，它们是天赋的，但在尘世生活中被暂时埋没，被人们“遗忘”了。当外部事物刺激人们的感官时，唤起了他们的记忆，使其得以重新找回这些被忘记的东西，进而获取知识。柏拉图将这种思维和行动过程叫作“回忆”（参见柏拉图，第86-92页）。到中世纪，经院哲学家们认为，信徒遵守、学习和领悟的各种信条、观念、知识和真理等均来自上帝，是由上帝掌握、提供并交由神父来解释和传布的。比如，“教父哲学”的集大成者奥古斯丁就认为，现实经验不是实在的，因而不足道；知识的确定性起源于上帝的意旨，并转化到人心内部。上帝是依据“真理”性的知识和道德来管制、要求人的，人所要做的只是信仰上帝，并按其旨意行事。

Advancing to the early modern period, when old and new ways of thinking were in transition, with the "epistemological turn" in philosophical research, the "theory of innate ideas" became a conscious and rational position for some philosophers, who gave it a more systematic exposition. Descartes explicitly put forward the doctrine of "innate truths." He classified the ideas people acquire into three kinds: "some I think are born with me, some are foreign and come from outside, and some are made and fabricated by myself" (Descartes, p. 54). The latter two kinds of ideas, being obtained from the outside world or being products of the mind's arbitrary piecing together, cannot be trusted and are to be doubted. The first kind of ideas are axioms and principles possessing universality and necessity; before birth they are placed in the human heart by God, and they are self-evident, eternal, and unchanging truths. On this basis people can, through reasoning and deduction, come to know other complex things in the world, so they are the most real, reliable, and trustworthy. Descartes regarded these innate ideas as the principles of certainty in the world and the "first principles" of philosophy. After him, Spinoza, Malebranche, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, and even the later Kant all held similar views.

时序推进到新旧思维方式交替的近代早期，随着哲学研究的“认识论转向”，“天赋观念论”成为一些哲学家自觉而理智的主张，并作出更为系统的阐释。笛卡尔明确提出“天赋真理”说，他将人们所获得的观念归纳为三类：“有些我认为是与我俱生的，有些是外来的，来自外界的，有些是由我自己做成的和捏造的。”（笛卡尔，第54页）后两类观念由于是由外界获得或者由人的心灵随意拼凑的产物，所以是不能信任、让人怀疑的。第一类观念则是具有普遍性、必然性的公理和原则，它们在人出生前就由上帝将其置放于人的心里，是不证自明、永恒不变的真理，人们在此基础上可以通过推理、演绎来认识世界上其他复杂的事物，所以是最真实、可靠和可以信任的。笛卡尔将这些天赋的观念视为世界确定性的原则和哲学的“第一原理”。在他之后，斯宾诺莎、马勒伯朗士、莱布尼茨、贝克莱、休谟甚至后来的康德都持有类似的看法。

In the history of modern Western philosophy, Locke was the first to question the "theory of innate ideas." Proceeding from the intent of constructing an "empiricist" system, he was keenly aware that to expound in detail "the notion we have of our own knowledge, it must be established on a true foundation"; and in order to "lay the foundation," one must first "clear the way." The "theory of innate ideas" is the first obstacle on this path. It is precisely for this reason that Book I of *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* launches an all-round critique of the "theory of innate ideas"; in Locke's words, "I must explain the reasons why I doubt innate principles" (Locke, pp. 71–72).

在西方近代哲学史上，洛克率先质疑“天赋观念论”。从“经验论”体系建构的意旨出发，他强烈地意识到，要详尽地阐述“我们对于自己知识所有的意念，必须建立在真正的基础上”；而为了“打定基础”，又必须首先“扫除道路”。“天赋观念论”就是这条道路上的第一个障碍。正因为如此，《人类理解论》第一卷展开了对“天赋观念论”全方位的批评；用洛克的话说，“我必须把我所以怀疑天赋原则的道理，解释一番”。（洛克，第71-72页）

Locke re-examined the meaning of "innate principles." As mentioned above, those who insist on the "theory of innate ideas" firmly believe that before people carry out actual cognitive activities and acquire knowledge, there are certain original notions imprinted on their minds like marks; these are bestowed by heaven outside the human mind and brought into the world. But Locke held that, from the way human beings acquire knowledge, these presuppositional and foundational notions do not exist; even if they "exist," they have no significance. For "if people only exercise their innate faculties, they can obtain all the knowledge they have without the help of innate impressions." That is to say, since heaven has endowed human beings with the capacity to acquire knowledge, there is no need to endow them with a priori ideas as well; otherwise it would be a redundancy. And from the human side, as long as one exercises this capacity, one can naturally obtain the corresponding knowledge, so there is no need to resort to any innate ideas. (See ibid., pp. 6–7) Therefore, in Locke's view, so-called "innate principles" are nothing but a "fictitious" "hypothesis."

洛克重新审视了“天赋原则”（innate principle）的意涵。如前所述，坚持“天赋观念论”的人深信，人们在展开现实的认识活动、获取知识之前，就有一些原始的意念如同记号一样印在其心上，它们是在人的心灵之外由上天禀赋并带到尘世间来的。但洛克认为，从人类获取知识的方式看，这些前提性、基础性的意念是不存在的；即便“存在”，也没有什么意义。因为“人们只要运用自己的天赋能力，则不用天赋印象的帮助,就可以得到他们所有的一切知识”。也就是说，上天既然赋予人类获取知识的能力，就没有必要再赋予其先验的观念，否则就是一种重复了；而从人这方面来说，只要运用这种能力，就可以自然地获得相应的知识，也就不必借助什么天赋观念。（参见同上，第6-7页）所以，在洛克看来，所谓“天赋原则”不过是一种“虚妄”的“假设”。

In the era in which Locke lived and pursued theoretical inquiry, although the rise of the natural sciences, the outbreak of the Glorious Revolution, and the development of capitalism weakened the influence of religion in real life and greatly increased the degree of secularization in society, the idea of God and the tradition of “worship” remained deeply entrenched. Thus the religious sphere also became a “breeding ground” and “enclave” in which many proponents of the “theory of innate ideas” argued for and constructed their doctrines. It is precisely on this basis that Locke’s negation of “innate principles” also took religion as its primary object of analysis, seeking a breakthrough through this route.

在洛克生活和进行理论探索的时代，尽管自然科学的兴起、“光荣革命”的爆发和资本主义的发展减弱了现实生活中宗教的影响，社会的世俗化程度大大增强，但上帝观念和“礼拜”传统依然根深蒂固，于是宗教领域也成为诸多“天赋观念论”者论证、建构自己学说的“渊薮”和“飞地”。正是基于此，洛克对“天赋原则”的否定也多以宗教为剖析对象，由此来寻求突破。

In Locke’s view, religious ideas are neither innate nor eternal. Not to mention that ancient records attest to distant ages in which atheists who held no faith at all existed, even the many countries discovered by modern European navigators in the Middle East, the Americas, and the Pacific had no conception of God whatsoever. And among those countries that had already made great progress along the path of modern civilization, some saw religious ideas gradually fade, and religious belief even fell into ruin. As for the ancient great Eastern power—China—the rites and teachings to which the ruling class and the scholar-officials clung were, in their essence, a pure atheism. Moreover, among the vast multitudes who believed in religion and possessed the idea of God, even within the same territory, each person’s faith and understanding of God differed, being full of divergence and even mutual opposition. The complex circumstances described above show that the so-called “God” is nothing more than a “vague notion.” Since people believe in and worship a thousand deities, who can truly say what “God” is? Where is the “deity”? Furthermore, the proponents of the “theory of innate ideas” placed great weight on principles and rites such as “God ought to be worshipped,” even elevating them “to an equal standing with any great truth in the human mind” (Locke, p. 53), and asserted that these required no demonstration and admitted no doubt. Locke pointed out sharply that such ideas and principles are entirely absent in children, and even among adults they rarely hold force, because the connotation of the term “worship” is not clear and distinct. This being so, those who advocate and emphasize “worship” fall into a contradiction: on the one hand they say that “God ought to be worshipped” is an innate principle; on the other hand people do not know why this must be so or what their duty consists in. In Locke’s view, this “is the most ridiculous thing imaginable” (ibid., p. 54).

在洛克看来，宗教观念不是天赋的，也不是亘古就有的。姑且不论古书上记载的久远的时代就有不持任何信仰的无神论者，就是近代欧洲航海家在中东、美洲、太平洋等地发现的不少国家，也根本没有关于上帝的观念。而那些已经在现代文明之路上有巨大进步的国家，有的宗教观念逐渐淡漠，乃至宗教信仰惨遭废弃。至于古老的东方大国——中国，统治阶级和士大夫们所固守的礼教，就其实质而言属于纯粹的无神论。而在那些庞大的信教和拥有上帝观念的人群中，即便在同一国土上，各自信仰和理解的上帝也不相同，反而充满差异甚至彼此对立。上述复杂的情形表明，所谓“上帝”不过是一些“含糊的意念”。既然人们信奉、崇拜着的是千百个神明，那么，谁能真正说得清什么是“上帝”？“神明”何在？此外，“天赋观念论”者还很看重诸如“上帝是应当礼拜的”这样的原则和礼仪，甚至将其“同人心中任何伟大的真理立于相等的地位”（洛克，第53页），并认定这些是不需论证和不容质疑的。洛克对此尖刻地指出，这样的观念和原则在儿童那里根本就是缺失的，即便在成人那里亦很少有效，因为“礼拜”这个名词的内涵不是清楚、明白的。既然如此，主张和重视“礼拜”的人就陷入了矛盾：一方面他们说“上帝是应该礼拜的”，是天赋的原则；另一方面人们又不知道为什么必须如此和自己的责任何在。在洛克看来，这“乃是最可笑不过的一件事”。（同上，第54页）

This judgment of Locke’s concerning innate principles was inherited by Marx. Nearly two hundred years later, in the gradual transformation of his early thought through the mode of thinking constituted by “idealism—materialism—new materialism,” Marx not only consciously stripped away any possibility of the “innateness” of the formation of ideas, but also grounded the above judgment in the real soil of modern capitalist society and observed and examined it within its process of continuous generation and change, thereby greatly advancing Locke’s understanding in this regard.

洛克对于天赋原则的上述判定为马克思所继承。将近200年之后，马克思在其早期思想由“唯心主义—唯物主义—新唯物主义”构成的思维方式的渐次嬗变中，不仅自觉地剥夺了观念形成的任何“天赋”的可能性，更将上述判定奠基于现代资本社会的现实土壤之上及其不断生成、变化过程之中予以观照和透视，从而大大推进了洛克这方面的认识。

Even in the incipient period of Marx’s thought, when he was profoundly influenced by the ideas of the Young Hegelians, and in the “Dedication of the Doctoral Dissertation,” where through praise of his father-in-law he uttered that resounding cry from the heart—“idealism is not fantasy but truth” (Complete Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1, p. 9)—he nevertheless generated his thought on the basis of a profound analysis of “atomism,” a philosophical form that had taken shape and developed in ancient Greece and possessed a materialist tendency. His argument showed that freedom and self-consciousness, as the “highest divinity,” are rooted not in God but in the revelation of the philosophical connotation and significance of “the swerve of the atom from the straight line”: the “deviation from the straight line” breaks the “bondage of fate” represented by the necessity of “rectilinear downward motion,” and constitutes a confrontation and struggle against the external environment of freedom, namely “determinate being.” Thus any spirit or idea can be adequately grasped and objectively understood only when placed in its relation to the real world. It is precisely for this reason that Marx, in this work profoundly influenced by idealism, achieved a transcendence of idealism, “arriving at the conclusion that the philosophizing of the world is at the same time the worldizing of philosophy” (ibid., p. 76); and in the process of philosophy’s realization, man’s self-consciousness and ideas “always possess a double-edged demand: one edge is directed against the world, the other against philosophy itself” (Complete Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1, p. 76). This close connection with the real world makes the “theory of innate ideas” a pure “fabrication”; moreover, it can also be seen from this that, in the same mode of abstract theoretical argumentation, Marx’s logic is more refined and rigorous than Locke’s.

即便在马克思思想发轫期受到青年黑格尔派思想的深刻影响，在“‘博士论文’献词”中借助对岳父的赞美而喊出那句振聋发聩的心声——“唯心主义不是幻想，而是真理”（《马克思恩格斯全集》第1卷，第9页），他也是以对“原子论”这样一种古希腊时期形成并发展起来、具有唯物主义倾向的哲学形态深刻剖析的基础上生发出思想的。他的论证表明，自由和自我意识作为“最高的神性”，并不是根植于上帝，而是基于“原子脱离直线而偏斜”的哲学内涵和意义的揭示：“偏离直线”打破了“直线式的下落”运动的必然性所表征的“命运的束缚”，是对构成自由的外部环境即“定在”进行的对抗和斗争。这样说来，任何精神、观念只有放在同现实世界的关系中才能获得到位的把握和客观的理解。正因为如此，马克思在这部受到唯心主义深刻影响的著述中实现了对唯心主义的超越，“得出这样的结论：世界的哲学化同时也就是哲学的世界化”（同上，第76页）；而在哲学现实化过程中，人的自我意识和观念“始终具有一个双刃的要求：其中一面针对着世界，另一面针对着哲学本身”。（《马克思恩格斯全集》第1卷，第76页）与现实世界的这种紧密关联，更使“天赋观念论”成为一种纯粹的“虚妄”；而且从中也可以看出，同样是抽象的理论论证方式，马克思的逻辑要比洛克更加精致而严密。

The real events that had an even greater impact on the transformation of Marx’s thought occurred in the “Rheinische Zeitung period.” The controversies over the censorship decree and freedom of the press, the theft of wood and the divorce law, and the many complex problems of poverty along the Moselle River all led Marx to see the decisive role of “material interests” in people’s lives, prompting his “initial impetus to study economic questions” (Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 2, pp. 1–2). This also led him to grasp the origin of ideas more consciously from a real, practical angle, gradually eliminating the speculative elements that remained in his earlier negation of the “theory of innate ideas.” On this he offered an extremely brilliant exposition in “The Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung”: “Philosophers do not spring up like mushrooms out of the ground; they are the products of their time and of their people, whose finest, most precious, and most hidden essences have converged in philosophical ideas. It is the same spirit that builds railways with the hands of workers that builds philosophical systems in the minds of philosophers.” “Philosophy is not outside the world,” but rather “stands with both feet on the earth and plucks the fruits of the world with both hands,” and “every true philosophy is the intellectual quintessence of its own time, and therefore the time must come when philosophy, not only internally through its content but also externally through its manifestation, comes into contact and interaction with the real world of its own age” (Complete Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1, pp. 219–220). It should be noted that in his discussions during this period concerning the division of landed property, Marx also absorbed beneficial elements from Locke’s thought on property rights; as this falls outside the scope of the present article, I will treat it separately in another essay.

对马克思思想变革产生更大触动的现实事件发生在“《莱茵报》时期”。举凡关于书报检查令和新闻出版自由、林木盗窃和离婚法案、摩泽尔河沿岸贫困诸多复杂问题的争论，都让马克思看到“物质利益”在人们生活中举足轻重的作用，促使他去“研究经济问题的最初动因”。（《马克思恩格斯选集》第2卷，第1-2页）这也导致他更加自觉地从现实的角度来把握观念的来源，逐步清除此前否定“天赋观念论”时残留的思辨成分。对此，他在《〈科隆日报〉第179号的社论》中作了极为精彩的阐述：“哲学家并不像蘑菇那样是从地里冒出来的，他们是自己的时代、自己的人民的产物，人民的最美好、最珍贵、最隐蔽的精髓都汇集在哲学思想里。正是那种用工人的双手建筑铁路的精神，在哲学家的头脑中建立哲学体系。”“哲学不是在世界之外”，而是“用双脚扎根大地，并用双手采摘世界的果实”，“任何真正的哲学都是自己时代的精神上的精华，因此，必然会出现这样的时代：那时哲学不仅在内部通过自己的内容，而且在外部通过自己的表现，同自己时代的现实世界接触并相互作用。”（《马克思恩格斯全集》第1卷，第219-220页）需要指出的是，马克思在这一时期有关地产析分问题的讨论中，还吸收了洛克所有权思想中的有益因素，因超出本文讨论的范围，我将另外撰文专门梳理。

In order to resolve the "perplexing question" arising from the opposition between material interests and free reason, Marx sought to find explanations and avenues of inquiry in the "philosophy of the state and of law" which "received its most systematic, richest and final formulation in Hegel's works" (*Selected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 1, p. 9). At the same time, Marx also participated in the "discussion concerning the Jewish question" then underway in German intellectual circles. With regard to the entanglement with the "theory of innate ideas," one of the most important advances in Marx's thought during the "*Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* period" was the "reduction" of the religious question to a real question, thereby thoroughly closing off the possibility that God created the world, manipulated ideas, and dominated faith. Marx stated explicitly: "Man makes religion, religion does not make man. Religion is, indeed, the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet won through to himself, or has already lost himself again" (ibid., p. 1). Religion is "a reversed world-consciousness"; the "general theory of this world," its "encyclopaedic compendium," its "logic in popular form," its "spiritualistic point of honour [Point-d'honneur]," its "enthusiasm," its "moral sanction," its "solemn complement," and its "general basis of consolation and justification" all derive from the "inverted world" and can all be explained in terms of the real state and civil society. "Religious distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and also the protest against real distress. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of a spiritless situation. It is the opium of the people" (ibid., pp. 1-2). In this way, the "defence of the gods in heaven [oratio pro aris et focis]" by the proponents of the "theory of innate ideas" was thoroughly "refuted," its "fallacy" was exposed for all to see, and "its existence among men was discredited" (cf. ibid.).

为了解决因物质利益与自由理性对立而产生的“苦恼的疑问”，马克思试图从“在黑格尔的著作中得到了最系统、最丰富和最终的表述”的“国家哲学和法哲学”（《马克思恩格斯选集》第1卷，第9页）中寻求解释和探究出路。与此同时，马克思也参与了当时德国思想界正在进行的“有关犹太人的问题的讨论”。就与“天赋观念论”的纠葛来说，“《德法年鉴》时期”马克思思想最重要的进展之一，是将宗教问题“还原”为现实问题，从而彻底堵死了上帝创造世界、操控观念和主宰信仰的可能性。马克思明确指出：“人创造了宗教，而不是宗教创造人。就是说，宗教是还没有获得自身或已经再度丧失自身的人的自我意识和自我感觉。”（同上，第1页）宗教是“一种颠倒的世界意识”，宗教理论中“包罗万象的纲要”、“具有通俗形式的逻辑”、“唯灵论的荣誉问题［Point-d’honneur］，它的狂热，它的道德约束，它的庄严补充，它借以求得慰藉和辩护的总根据”都来源于“颠倒的世界”，都可以在现实的国家、社会中得到说明。“宗教里的苦难既是现实的苦难的表现，又是对这种现实的苦难的抗议。宗教是被压迫生灵的叹息，是无情世界的情感，正像它是无精神活力的制度的精神一样。宗教是人民的鸦片。”（同上，第1-2页）这样，“天赋观念论”者“在天国为神祇所作的雄辩［oratio pro aris et focis］”就被彻底“驳倒”，其“谬误”昭然若揭，“它在人间的存在就声誉扫地了。”（参见同上）

If, in Locke's critique of the "theory of innate ideas," the demonstration of the illusoriness of "innate principles" rested at first only on preliminary logical inference, then by comparison, in Marx's case, owing to the intervention of real and complex problems, the exposure of its crux was far more penetrating.

如果说，在洛克对“天赋观念论”的批判中，首先针对“天赋原则”虚妄性的指证还仅仅基于初步的逻辑推断，那么，相形之下，在马克思这里由于有现实复杂问题的介入，对其症结的揭示就更为入木三分了。

II. There Is No "Universal Consent" That Transcends Epoch, Region, or Class

二、不存在超越时代、地域、阶层的“普遍同意”

The "theory of innate ideas" was not merely a simple belief or assertion; it also contained rational reflection and argumentative demonstration, particularly among modern philosophers, who devoted even greater effort to the latter. But Locke, through systematic analysis, held that these reflections and demonstrations were all untenable.

“天赋观念论”不只是单纯的信念和主张，其中也包含了理性思考和思维论证，特别是在近代哲学家那里，在后一方面用力更甚。但洛克通过系统的辨析认为，这些思考和论证都是不成立的。

The first argument and reason adduced by the "theory of innate ideas" was the "doctrine of universal consent," namely, that certain "speculative and practical principles" are acknowledged by all mankind, are constant impressions in the human world, just as people are born with the capacity and talent to know the world and acquire knowledge. To this, Locke pointed out that this argument "has this misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain truths wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate" (Locke, p. 7). Take the "speculative principles" that the proponents of the "theory of innate ideas" regard as universally consented to by mankind, such as philosophical propositions as "whatsoever is, is" and "it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be"—these should be the most abstract and speculative of all; but precisely for this reason, they are not naturally imprinted on the minds of everyone. Children and idiots "have not the least apprehension or thought of them," because such people simply do not know what these "odd" propositions mean. "No proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of" (ibid., p. 9).

“天赋观念论”所持的第一个论据和理由是“普遍同意说”，即认为某些“思辨和实践的原则”是全人类一致承认的，是人世间的恒常印象，就如同人们天生具有认识世界、获取知识的能力和才具一样。对此，洛克指出，这种论据“有一层不幸，因为事实上纵然真有一切人类所公认的真理，那亦不足以证明它们是天赋的”（洛克，第7页）。就拿被“天赋观念论”者当作人类普遍同意的“思辨原则”来说，诸如“凡存在者存在”“一种东西不能同时存在又不存在”等哲学命题，应该说是最抽象、思辨的了，但也正因为如此，它们才不是自然印于每个人心中的，像儿童和白痴“分明一点也想不到它们”，因为对于这些人来说，根本就不知道这些“古怪”的命题说的是什么。“人心所不曾知道的命题，所不曾意识到的命题，根本就不能说是在人心中的。”（同上，第9页）

The crux of the illusoriness of religious ideas discussed above is also manifested here. Every religion believes in and worships its own sublime, great, and unattainable deity, but there is no "God" idea in the world that transcends all religions and is universally recognized by all mankind. Not only do atheists refuse to acknowledge its existence in their minds, but even among the believers of different religions, the idea of "God" differs from one to another, and they are even mutually opposed and hostile, difficult to reconcile or understand; there is simply no "universal consent." Theists of various stripes cannot form an "alliance" or "consensus"; the degree of difference among them even exceeds the relationship between atheism and theism. Hence Locke's conclusion: there are no principles and ideas universally consented to by all mankind and innate in them.

前述宗教观念虚妄性的症结也体现在这里。每一种宗教都信仰和崇拜着各自崇高而伟大、高不可攀的神灵，但世界上却没有超越所有宗教、全人类普遍认同的“上帝”观念，不仅无神论者心目中不认可它的存在，就是在不同的宗教信徒心目中，“神”的观念也各不相同，甚至相互对立、敌视，难以融通、理解，根本不存在“普遍同意”的情形。各种有神论者之间形不成“同盟”和“共识”，彼此之间的差异程度甚至超过无神论与有神论之间的关系。所以，洛克的结论是，没有什么全人类普遍同意的、与生俱来的原则和观念。

For the development of Marx's thought, depriving religious ideas of their "innate" and eternal character further led to a turn in the field of his early inquiry. As he pointed out in his "Introduction to a Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right": "The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness. The demand to give up the illusions about their condition is the demand to give up a condition which requires illusions. The critique of religion is therefore in embryo the critique of that vale of tears of which religion is the halo" (*Selected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 1, p. 2). Thus, the focus of Marx's attention shifted from religion to reality, specifically to the two important spheres constituting reality: politics and civil society. The critique of religion turned into the critique of politics and the critique of society; the former was a critique of the state, law, and moral philosophy that embodied the dominant ideas of the time and the will of the rulers; the latter was a critique of civil society, dominated by wealth and capital, and its system of property. Further, the question of freeing people from the shackles and bonds they suffered in these two spheres was raised, making "human emancipation" the aim of Marx's lifelong theoretical and practical exploration thereafter.

对于马克思思想的发展来说，剥夺了宗教观念的“天赋”性、永恒性，更导致其早期探究领域的转向。正如他在《〈黑格尔法哲学批判〉导言》中所指出的，宗教所代表的“真理的彼岸世界消逝以后，历史的任务就是确立此岸世界的真理。人的自我异化的神圣形象被揭穿以后，揭露具有非神圣形象的自我异化，就成了为历史服务的哲学的迫切任务。于是，对天国的批判变成对尘世的批判，对宗教的批判变成对法的批判，对神学的批判变成对政治的批判”。（《马克思恩格斯选集》第1卷，第2页）这样，马克思关注的重点就由宗教转向现实，具体说来，转向构成现实的两个重要领域：政治和市民社会。由宗教批判转向政治批判和社会批判，前者是对体现当时主流观念和统治者意志的国家、法和道德哲学的批判；后者是对受财富和资本操控的市民社会及其财产制度的批判。进一步，将人从这两个领域所遭受的桎梏和束缚中摆脱出来的问题提了出来，使“人的解放”成为其后马克思毕生理论和实践探索的旨趣。

But in truth, so-called "emancipation" is also an idea or ideal—how is it to be grasped? Is it "universally" recognized by people? If not, how did it arise? What specific content did it undergo in its evolution? Why did the pursuit of "emancipation" become an inspiring and broad social movement only in modern times? And how could such a movement avoid remaining merely a naive wish and an empty slogan and instead bear real fruits of victory? Reflection on these questions not only led Marx to inherit Locke's line of questioning the "doctrine of universal consent" in his critique of the "theory of innate ideas," but also to transcend the religious topic, extending and deepening it into real society, holding that there is likewise no "universal consent" that transcends epoch, region, or class.

但是，究其实，所谓“解放”也是一种观念或理想，究竟该如何把握？它是为人们所“普遍”认同的吗？如果不是，它又是怎么产生的？其具体内涵经历过怎样的演变？对“解放”的追求缘何到近代才成为一种鼓舞人心的、广泛的社会运动？而这种运动又如何避免仅限于一种朴素的愿望和空洞的口号而能结出实实在在的胜利之果？对这些问题的思考，不仅使马克思继承了洛克反对“天赋观念论”时质疑“普遍同意说”的思路，而且越超宗教议题，拓展和深化到现实社会之中，认为同样不存在超越时代、地域、阶层的“普遍同意”。

Marx was a thinker with a world-historical perspective; he indeed observed the conditions and development of Europe and even all countries from the general trend of the "transformation of history into 'world history.'" However, he was particularly aware that differences of epoch, region, and country made this trend manifest a complexity and tortuousness that was by no means a linear advance or upward development. Taking his fatherland, Germany, as an example, he held that if one proceeds "from the German status quo [status quo] itself," the "only appropriate way" to deal with it "is the negative way" (*Selected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 1, p. 3), because "the modern German regime is an anachronism" (ibid., p. 5), and "what is coming to an end in France and England is only now beginning in Germany" (ibid., p. 6). Even if the German despotic system of 1843 were negated, this would not elevate it to the level of the ideas established by the French Revolution of 1789, "still less to the focus of the present age" (ibid., p. 3).

马克思是具有世界眼光的思想家，他诚然是从“历史向‘世界历史’转换”的大趋势来观察欧洲乃至世界各国的状况及其发展的。然而，他特别意识到，时代、区域、国度的差异使这种趋势呈现出远非线性推进、向上发展的复杂性和曲折性。以他的祖国德意志为例，他认为，如果“从德国的现状［status quo］本身出发”，对此“采取的唯一适当的方式”，只能是“否定的方式”（《马克思恩格斯选集》第1卷，第3页），因为“现代德国制度是时代错乱”（同上，第5页），“在法国和英国行将完结的事物，在德国现在才刚刚开始。”（同上，第6页）即使否定了1843年的德国专制主义制度，也不会将其提升到1789年法国大革命所确立的理念的水准，“更不会是处在当代的焦点。”（同上，第3页）

Such being the actual situation, and since “society is endlessly … divided into all manner of sorts of people,”[n] the understandings, evaluations, and practical choices made by different people with regard to the condition of Germany at that time, based on their respective perspectives and standpoints, differed enormously. Marx enumerated these disputes one by one: “There is a school that seeks to justify the villainies of today by the villainies of yesterday, and a school that declares every cry of the serf against the whip … to be rebellion”;[n] while the “historical school of law,”[n] which ostensibly emphasized “the spirit of the nation and historical tradition,” “concocted a German history” and went “to the primeval Teutonic forests of our prehistory in search of our free history.” As for the “narrow-minded, ill-disposed, and coarsely mediocre” figures in real life, who “adopt an ambiguous and suspicious attitude” toward “states of mutual opposition,” “they must even acknowledge and affirm that their being dominated, ruled, and possessed is entirely heaven’s sanction!” (ibid., p. 4) In Germany, only philosophy “stands on a level with the official contemporary reality [al pari]” (ibid., p. 7), so the “practical political party”[n] was justified in demanding the critique and negation of philosophy, but that party believed that “the negation of philosophy is accomplished merely by turning one’s back on it and muttering a few stale and angry phrases at it over one’s shoulder” (ibid., p. 8); its “narrowness of outlook is shown in the fact that it does not include philosophy in the sphere of German reality, or even imagines that philosophy is inferior to German practice and to the theories that serve that practice.” The “theoretical political party,” which took a different approach, “committed the same error, only with the factors of the error reversed. That party regarded the present struggle as only a critical struggle of philosophy against the German world; it … adopted a critical attitude toward its adversary, but a non-critical attitude toward itself” (ibid.). From this it can be seen that the intellectual scene in Germany at the time was motley, variegated, and complex, and that there was no consensus whatsoever to be found.

现实情形如此，而“社会无止境地……分成各色人等”，所以导致对于当时德国的状况，不同的人基于各自的视角、立场作出的理解、评价和实际选择又差异极大。马克思一一清点了这些争议：“有个学派以昨天的卑鄙行为来说明今天的卑鄙行为是合法的，有个学派把农奴反抗鞭子……的每一声呐喊都宣布为叛乱”；而本来强调“民族精神和历史传统”的“历史法学派”却“杜撰了德国历史”，“到我们史前的条顿原始森林去寻找我们的自由历史。”至于现实生活中“心胸狭窄、心地不良、粗鲁平庸之辈”对“处于互相对立的状态……采取暧昧的猜疑的态度”，“甚至他们还必须承认和首肯自己之被支配、被统治、被占有全是上天的恩准！”（同上，第4页）在德国唯有哲学“与正式的当代现实保持在同等水平上［al pari］”（同上，第7页），所以“实践政治派”要求对哲学进行批判和否定具有正当性，但该派以为，“只要背对着哲学，并且扭过头去对哲学嘟囔几句陈腐的气话，对哲学的否定就实现了”（同上，第8页），其“眼界的狭隘性就表现在没有把哲学归入德国的现实范围，或者甚至以为哲学低于德国的实践和为实践服务的理论。”与此思路不同的“理论政治派犯了同样的错误，只不过错误的因素是相反的。该派认为目前的斗争只是哲学同德国世界的批判性斗争，它……对敌手采取批判的态度，对自己本身却采取非批判的态度”。（同上）由此可以看出，当时德国思想界的光怪陆离、斑驳繁杂，根本无共识可言。

In the absence of the idea of “universal consent,” and with action lacking any consensus, only a return to a detailed analysis of the actual situation could yield an accurate and adequate grasp, and thereby a path to resolution. Take, for example, the “emancipation” that the Jews within Germany at that time yearned for: it was necessary to clarify, “what kind of emancipation do they desire?” Bruno Bauer had conflated the “emancipation” of Jews, Christians, and different groups and strata in civil society, holding that the “special oppression and humiliation they suffer in reality should not be regarded as exceptions to the general rule, but rather as confirmations of the general rule.” (Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1, p. 21) The so-called “general rule” here is precisely the norm and requirement based on “universal consent” and used to constrain different people. In Marx’s view, Bauer’s understanding was “one-sided,” and his viewpoint overly “abstract.” In order to break through this doctrine of “universal consent,” Marx traced the changes from the emergence of Judaism to the differentiation of Christianity out of it and then to their opposition, attended to the transformation of Judaism itself from its origins through the “rabbinic period” to the Middle Ages and then to its modern form, and saw in this the process of the waning influence of the Talmud as the basis of its doctrine, thereby probing more deeply into the actual living conditions of real Jews, holding that one could not, like Bauer, focus only on “the Jew on the Sabbath,” but must “examine the everyday Jew.” In this way, the picture that emerged was completely different — “What is the secular basis of Judaism? Practical need, self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly god? Money.” (ibid., p. 49) On this basis, Marx reduced the emancipation of the Jews to: “the emancipation of mankind from Jewish chauvinism” (ibid., p. 50). The meaning of the Jews’ self-emancipation therein is emancipation from their huckstering and money, and hence from actual, worldly Judaism; and the political emancipation of the Jews is, through a kind of social organization, the elimination of the precondition of their huckstering, and thereby the elimination of the possibility of their huckstering. And with this social transformation, the religious consciousness of the Jews would, like a wisp of smoke, dissipate of itself in the air of society, that real, life-sustaining element.

缺少“普遍同意”的观念，又无共识可言的行动，只有再回到现实状况的细致分析中才能获得准确而到位的把握，进而寻找到解决之径。就以当时德国境内犹太人渴望的“解放”诉求来说，必须弄清楚，“他们渴望什么样的解放？”布鲁诺·鲍威尔曾将犹太人、基督徒和市民社会中不同群体、阶层的“解放”混为一谈，认为他们在现实中“所受的特种压迫和耻辱，不应该看成是通则的例外，相反，应该看成是通则的证实”。（《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷，第21页）这里的所谓“通则”就是基于“普遍同意”并用来约束不同人的规范和要求。在马克思看来，鲍威尔的这种理解是“片面”的，其观点则过于“抽象”了。为了破除这种“普遍同意”之论，马克思追溯了从犹太教产生到从中分化出基督教再到二者对立的变迁，关注到犹太教本身从起源到“拉比时期”再到中世纪直至现代形态的转换中，看到了作为其教义依据的《塔木德》影响力式微的过程，从而更深入探究了现实的犹太人的生存境况，认为不能像鲍威尔那样只关注“安息日的犹太人”，而是必须“考察日常的犹太人”。这样一来，呈现出来的情形就完全不同了——“犹太教的世俗基础是什么呢？实际需要，自私自利。犹太人的世俗礼拜是什么呢？经商牟利。他们的世俗的神是什么呢？金钱。”（同上，第49页）据此，马克思将犹太人的解放归结为：“人类从犹太精神中解放出来”（同上，第50页）。其中犹太人的自我解放的意涵是从其经商牟利和金钱中解放出来，从而是从实际的、世俗的犹太教中解放出来；而犹太人的政治解放就是通过一种社会组织，消除其经商牟利的前提，从而消除其经商牟利的可能性。而随着这种社会变革，犹太人的宗教意识也会像淡淡的烟雾一样在社会这一现实的、生命所需的空气中自行消失。

Going further, Marx not only replaced Bauer’s religious conviction with secular relations as the perspective and approach for observing the Jewish question, and resolved the “abstractness” of the way out that Bauer proposed — solving the Jewish question by means of religious emancipation — through political emancipation and social emancipation; he also noted more profoundly: so-called political emancipation and social emancipation are only a “mediation”; compared with genuine “human emancipation,” they too are abstract and inadequate. In this way, through the examination of the Jewish question, Marx mapped out a ladder of “emancipation” that unfolds step by step and rises progressively: “political emancipation” — “social emancipation” — “human emancipation.” And these understandings and conceptions can only be adequately grasped and understood when placed within the developmental stages of modern capitalist society, its real predicaments, and the sustained efforts to change those predicaments.

更进一步，马克思不仅用世俗关系替代鲍威尔的宗教信念作为观察犹太人问题的视角和思路，用政治解放、社会解放化解鲍威尔所提出的借助宗教解放以解决犹太人问题的出路的“抽象性”，而且更深刻地注意到：所谓政治解放、社会解放也只是一个“中介”，较之真正的“人的解放”，它们也是抽象的、不合格的。这样借助对犹太人问题的探讨，马克思规划了一条次第展开、逐步提升的“解放”阶梯：“政治解放”—“社会解放”—“人的解放”。而这些认识和观念只有放在近代资本社会的发展阶段、现实困境及其改变这种困境的持续努力中才能获得到位的把握和理解。

Clearly, compared with Locke’s abstract refutation of the “doctrine of universal consent,” Marx’s analysis, situated in time, region, and class, is far more forceful and far more profound.

显然，较之于洛克对“普遍同意说”的抽象驳斥，马克思置于时代、地域、阶层中的分析要有力得多、深刻得多。

III. The “Reason” Principle and Its Effects Are Manifested Only When Connected with Reality

三、“理性”原则及其效应只有与现实关联起来才得到彰显

The second ground and justification held by the “theory of innate ideas” is “the discovery of reason,” namely, the view that when people begin to use reason to grasp the world, they can discover and intuit those a priori principles; “knowing these propositions, assenting to these propositions, is sufficient proof that they are innate.” Locke held that this inference “treats a meaningless and ambiguous formulation as if it were a clear reason” (Locke, p. 10), and that it in fact contains a great paradox and contradiction: on the one hand, it holds that for reason to function, it needs as its basis and guide what is naturally imprinted on the mind (i.e., innate ideas); but on the other hand, it says that whether these things exist, and if they exist what they are, is not known at the outset, and that to discover and grasp them, one must again exercise and exert the power of reason. This in effect amounts to saying that with regard to these innate ideas, “people know and do not know them at the same time.” Reason needs to rely on them, and they in turn must rely on reason. In this way, what “ideas” and “reason” actually are both become “ambiguous formulations.” If so, where is there any room for “understanding” them? And what meaning would such “understanding” have?

“天赋观念论”所持的第二个依据和理由是“理性发现”，即认为当人们开始运用理性把握世界的时候，可以发现、感悟到那些先验的原则，“知道这些命题、同意这些命题，这就足以证明它们是天赋的。”洛克认为，这种推论是“把毫无意义的含糊的说法当做清晰的理由”（洛克，第10页）了，而实际上它蕴含着巨大的悖论和矛盾性：一方面，认为理性要发挥作用，需要以自然印入人心的东西（即天赋观念）为基础和指导；但另一方面，又说这些东西是否存在、如果存在究竟是什么，起初并不知道，要发现和把握它们,又必须运用和发挥理性的力量。这实际上等于说，对于这些天赋观念，“人们同时知道而又不知道它们”。理性需要借助它们，同时它们也必须借助理性。这样，“观念”和“理性”究竟是什么，都成为“含糊的说法”了。既然如此，哪里还谈得上对它们的“理解”？这种“理解”又有什么意义？

Apart from the speculative principles involved in the “doctrine of universal consent,” the “theory of innate ideas” also finds no support in practice; that is, “practical principles likewise cannot obtain universal assent” (ibid., p. 28). For example, in moral practice, “faith” and “justice,” although in a certain sense they may be said to be the public bonds that sustain the normal functioning of society and the order of people’s lives, yet such people as desperadoes and arch-criminals do not regard them as the norms of their conduct. There is also the saying that “even thieves have their code,”[n] but even if, as in a den of thieves, confederates can deal peacefully with one another on this basis, when they encounter others, they rob and kill. In the minds of those who live by deception and robbery, what innate moral principles could there be!

在“普遍同意说”所涉及的思辨原则之外，“天赋观念论”在实践上也得不到支持，就是说，“实践的原则(Practical Principles)亦一样是不能得到普遍的认可的”（同上，第28页）。比如，道德实践中的“信义”（faith)和“公道”（justice)，虽然它们某种意义上可以说是维系正常的社会运转和人们的生活秩序的公共纽带，但像那些亡命之徒、元恶大憝等就不会将其视为其行为的准则。也有所谓“盗亦有道”之说，但是，就算像在贼窝之中同党之间可以据此和平处事，可遇到别人，他们就会抢劫杀戮。在那些以欺骗和抢劫度日的人心目中，哪有什么天赋的道德原则！

Furthermore, Locke also held that “moral rules,” belonging as they do to the sphere of reason, “need a proof,” and that “if they are proposed, one may reasonably ask for a reason why” (ibid., pp. 30-31). Only when the proof is forceful and the answer pertinent can one achieve “convincing people by virtue.” Moreover, such evidence and reasons should possess universality, that is, they should be consistent across different eras and among different people. But anyone “slightly acquainted with the history of mankind” knows that the actual situation is not so. For example, regarding the moral principle of “keeping contracts,” Christians cite as their reason “God requires us to do so,” followers of Hobbes maintain that “it is what the public needs,” while humanist philosophers would say it “accords with human dignity” and is the demand of “virtue” as “the highest excellence of human nature.” This shows that people assent to such “great and undeniable moral rules” “not because they are innate, but because they are useful”! (ibid., p. 32) The consequence is that in actual practice, even concerning the same moral principle, opinions diverge and intermingle in various ways, and the effects of practice are even more multifarious, sometimes diametrically opposed. Given that “the practical principles of different people differ greatly, I think it is impossible to confirm innate moral principles by the mark of universal consent” (ibid., p. 40); even the presence of powerful reason is of no avail.

此外，洛克还认为，属于理性范畴的“道德的规则需要一个证明”，“在一提出来以后，人们都可以合理地请问一个所以然的理由”（同上，第30-31页）。只有证明有力、回答中肯，才能达致“以德服人”。而且这样的证据和理由应该具有普适性，即在不同的时代、不同的人那里都是一致的。但是，“稍微明白人类的历史”的人都知道，实际情况并不是如此。比如，对于“遵守契约”这条道德原则，基督徒所持的理由是“上帝需要我们那样做”，霍布斯的信徒则认为“那是公众需要”，而人文主义哲学家会说这“合于人的尊严”，是作为“人性中的最高优点”的“德性”的要求。这表明，人们之所以赞同此类“伟大而不能否认的道德规则”，“不是因为它是天赋的，乃是因为它是有利的”！（同上，第32页）这样的后果是，在现实实践中，即便有关同一个道德原则，也会各种意见分歧错杂，践行效果更是五花八门，甚至截然相反。鉴于“各人的实践原则是有很大差异的，因此，我想，要以普遍同意的标记，来证实天赋的道德原则，那是不可能的”（同上，第40页）；即便有强大的理性力量同样无济于事。

Through the above analysis, Locke concludes: whether speculative principles or practical principles, “various ideas, especially those belonging to principles, are not innate.” (ibid., p. 51)

通过以上辨析，洛克得出结论：无论是思辨原则还是实践原则，“各种观念，尤其是属于原则的那些观念，都不是与生俱来。”（同上，第51页）

According to traditional understanding, Locke belongs to the empiricists, and empiricism is opposed to rationalism. However, this is merely a simple demarcation made by philosophy textbooks for the convenience of exposition; the actual situation is not so, but rather more complex. As for Locke, his philosophical thought is precisely elaborated through rationalist thinking and relatively rigorous logical inference. The argumentation of *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* is so meticulous and detailed that it gives one a sense of extreme triviality and complexity. But Locke’s intention is to consider all aspects of a given problem comprehensively and explain them thoroughly. In this sense, his empiricist position and rationalist method are not so much opposed as complementary and mutually reconcilable.

按照传统的理解，洛克属于经验论者，而经验论与唯理论又是对立的。然而，这只是哲学史教科书为了叙述的方便而作出的简单划界，实际情形并非如此，而是更为复杂。就洛克来说，他的哲学思想恰恰是通过理性主义（Rationalism）的思考和较为严密的逻辑推论来阐发的，《人类理解论》的论证非常细致和详尽，以至于给人极其琐屑和繁杂之感。但洛克的意图在于，将关于某一个问题的各个方面都考虑全、解说透。这样说来，他的经验论主张与唯理论方法与其说是对立的，还不如说是可以互补和融通的。

Marx’s “modern materialism” also inherited this characteristic and advanced it in depth. In the evolution of modern Western philosophy after Locke, “reason” increasingly became a very complex concept and category; in reality, it also meant an indispensable idea, attitude, capacity, and competence for understanding society and history. Hegel provided a fairly systematic and profound exposition of it within his philosophical system. Marx grasped this with considerable precision and, within the framework of “modern materialism,” emphasized, reflected upon, and reconstructed it. Thus, we see that after twice “taking leave” of Hegel—in the “doctoral dissertation” and in the “*Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* period”—Marx, having “turned” to the study of political economy, unexpectedly undertook an examination of “Hegel’s dialectics as a whole, especially the exposition of dialectics in the *Phenomenology* and the *Science of Logic*, and finally the relation of the modern critical movement to Hegel” (*Marx-Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 197). In the “seven observations” on communism in the third notebook of the “Paris Manuscripts,” he inserted at length a discussion of Hegel’s philosophy—this is the most concentrated exposition and argumentation directly related to “reason” in the process of the construction of Marx’s thought.

马克思的“现代唯物主义”也继承了这一特色，并向纵深做了推进。在洛克之后西方近代哲学的演进中，“理性”愈益成为一个非常复杂的概念、范畴；而在现实中，它又意味着一种理解社会历史不可或缺的理念、态度、能力和素养。黑格尔在其哲学体系内对其做过较为系统而深入的阐释，马克思对此有相当精准的把握，并且在“现代唯物主义”的框架下予以强调、反思和重构。所以，我们看到，在“博士论文”和“《德法年鉴》时期”两度“告别”黑格尔之后，“转向”政治经济学研究的马克思又出人意料地“对黑格尔的整个辩证法，特别是《现象学》和《逻辑学》中有关辩证法的叙述，以及最后对现代批判运动同黑格尔的关系”（《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷，第197页）进行了辨析。在“巴黎手稿”第三笔记本关于共产主义的“七条说明”中他大段插入的有关黑格尔哲学的讨论，这是马克思思想建构过程中最为集中的与“理性”直接相关的阐发和论证。

Marx sketched in outline the systematic structure of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as “the true birthplace and secret of Hegel’s philosophy,” in which the excerpts concerning the chapter on “Reason” are particularly detailed. Beyond the chapter heading “The Certainty and Truth of Reason,” he also highlighted the contents of sections such as “Observing Reason,” “Legislative Reason,” and “Reason as Testing Laws” (ibid., p. 202). This principle of “reason” was subsequently summarized by him as “Hegel’s *Phenomenology* and its final achievement—the dialectic, as the negative principle of movement and creation,” whose “greatness” lies in “conceiving the self-creation of man as a process, objectification as de-objectification, as externalization and the sublation of this externalization” (ibid., p. 205), and in that “thoroughgoing naturalism or humanism is distinct from both idealism and materialism, and at the same time is the truth uniting both” (ibid., p. 209). This kind of “rational” thinking not only exposed the absurdity and impossibility of the explanatory approach that treats ideas, spirit, self-consciousness, and even human existence as “innate,” “prior,” “logical,” and “speculative,” but also grasped and explained the structure of society, historical change, and human development—including, of course, the origin and renewal of ideas—through the contradictions and struggles “between man and nature, and between man and man,” and “between existence and essence, objectification and self-confirmation, freedom and necessity, individual and species” (ibid., p. 185).

马克思概略地勾勒了作为“黑格尔哲学的真正诞生地和秘密”的《精神现象学》的体系结构，其中有关“理性”章节的摘录尤显详尽，在“理性的确定性和真理性”这一章的标题外，还突出了“观察的理性”“立法的理性”“审核法律的理性”（同上，第202页）等节的内容。这种“理性”原则随后更被他概括为“黑格尔的《现象学》及其最后成果——辩证法，作为推动原则和创造原则的否定性”，认为其“伟大之处”在于“把人的自我产生看做一个过程，把对象化看做非对象化，看做外化和这种外化的扬弃”（同上，第205页），而“彻底的自然主义或人道主义，既不同于唯心主义，也不同于唯物主义，同时又是把这二者结合起来的真理。”（同上，第209页）这种“理性”思考不仅揭露了观念、精神、自我意识包括人的存在的“天赋”“先在”“逻辑”“思辨”特征解释思路上的荒谬性和不可能性，更在“人和自然界之间、人和人之间”“存在和本质、对象化和自我确证、自由和必然、个体和类之间”（同上，第185页）矛盾和斗争中把握和解释了社会的结构、历史的变迁和人的发展，当然也包括观念的起源和更新。

Compared with Locke’s use of the principle of “reason” to refute the “theory of innate ideas,” Marx’s application of it to the investigation of the different conditions of human existence in capitalist society achieved even more conspicuous results. This is prominently manifested in the first notebook of the “Paris Manuscripts,” where the principle of “reason” is displayed as a grasp of the social structure and class composition from the perspective of “totality.”

较之于洛克用“理性”原则来驳斥“天赋观念论”，马克思将其运用于对资本社会人们不同的生存状态的探究中，所达致的效果更为明显。这突出表现在“巴黎手稿”第一笔记本将“理性”原则展示为从“总体性”上对社会结构和阶级构成的把握。

As we know, the most authoritative “historical-critical edition” of Marx’s writings (MEGA²) provides two versions of this part of the “Paris Manuscripts”: the “logical arrangement edition” and the “original order edition” (MEGA², I/2, pp. 187-322, 323-444). The “logical arrangement edition” begins with the sequential arrangement of “Wages,” “Profit of Capital,” and “Rent of Land,” which reads as if these were merely the different forms of income of three classes at the time; their actual conditions and manifestations differ greatly, and their historical origins and future destinies show no great connection with one another, making it difficult to grasp the overall condition of society as a whole. But if one returns to Marx’s original manuscript and carefully reads the “original order edition,” which presents the process of Marx’s writing, one learns that Marx divided each page of manuscript into three columns or two columns, respectively labeled “Wages,” “Profit of Capital,” and “Rent of Land,” and wrote the exposition of their respective contents in correspondence with one another. Why did he do this? Was there any particular intention? In my understanding, this manner of writing precisely indicates that at this point Marx had already realized that these three are governed by an overall social structure—namely, the distinctive function of “capital.” Whether in the sections on “Wages” and “Rent of Land” or in “Profit of Capital” itself, we can see that “capital” plays an irreplaceable role throughout, participating in, shaping, permeating, and generating social phenomena, influencing the living conditions and future destinies of people in different classes, and thereby closely binding these different classes together; in other words, apart from capital, many social phenomena could not be accurately described or adequately explained.

我们知道，马克思著述最权威的“历史考证版”（MEGA²）提供了有关“巴黎手稿”这一部分的两个版本：“逻辑编排版”和“原始顺序版”（MEGA2,I/2,S.187-322，323-444）。“逻辑编排版”的开头是按照“工资”“资本的利润”和“地租”依次编排的，读起来让人觉得这只是当时三个阶层的不同的收入形式，它们之间现实境况和表现差异很大，历史渊源和未来命运也看不出彼此之间有多么大的关联，据此很难把握得到整个社会的总体状况。但如果回到马克思的原始手稿，认真阅读能够呈现马克思写作过程的“原始顺序版”，就会知道，马克思是将一页稿纸分成三栏或者两栏、分别标上“工资”“资本的利润”“地租”来写作的，而在阐述其各自的内容时则是一一对应着写的。为什么会这样呢？有什么样特别的用意吗？按照我的理解，这种写法恰恰表明，这时的马克思已经意识到这三者之间是受到一个社会总结构的控制的，这就是“资本”的独特功能。无论在“工资”“地租”部分抑或“资本的利润”本身中，我们都可以看到“资本”如影随形地发挥着不可替代的作用，参与、塑造、渗透和创生着社会现象，影响着不同阶层的人的生活境遇和未来命运，而这些不同阶层的人之间又因此而密切联系在一起了；换句话说，离开资本，诸多社会现象就得不到准确的描述和到位的说明。

Although the above mode of thinking and writing did not come directly from Locke, it fused the influence of the mode of research and interpretation of modern philosophy, particularly German classical philosophy. Yet it was not only extremely closely related in its line of argument to the analysis of the various dimensions of the critique of the "theory of innate ideas" in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, but it also greatly advanced that critique under the new framework of thought of "modern materialism." This was a new philosophical way of understanding the world, but Marx gradually constructed it through his investigation of political economy. The "Paris Notebooks" and the "Paris Manuscripts" were the fruits of the initial stage of Marx's forty years of political economy research and the writing of *Capital*; he "proceeded almost entirely from the original words of the national economists," yet the profundity of the thought thereby formed "surpassed the level of national economy" (*Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 1, p. 124). The reason is that the essence of the economic phenomena of the age of capital provided by the economists was revealed by Marx through rationalist reflection and structural, totalizing exposition.

上述思考和写作方式虽然并不是直接来自洛克，而是熔铸了近代哲学特别是德国古典哲学研究和阐释方式的影响。但它不仅与《人类理解论》中对“天赋观念论”批判各个维度的分析在论证思路上有极大的关联性，而且在“现代唯物主义”这种新的思维框架下将其大大推进了。这是一种新的理解世界的哲学方式，但马克思却是通过政治经济学的探究来逐步建构起来的。“巴黎笔记”和“巴黎手稿”是马克思40年政治经济学研究和《资本论》写作起步阶段的成果，他“几乎是用国民经济学家的原话所作的论述出发”的，但借此形成的思想的深刻性却“超出国民经济学的水平”（《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷，第124页）。原因在于，经济学家提供的资本时代经济现象的实质被马克思通过理性主义思考和结构性、总体性的阐发揭示出来了。

IV. Examining the Truth of the Content of Ideas by Placing Them in the Vicissitudes of Social History

四、置于社会历史的变迁之中检视观念内容的真实性

After exposing the loopholes and absurdities in the "principles of speculation and practice" of the proponents of the "theory of innate ideas," Locke also carefully examined other types of ideas and the various complex situations to which they pertained, and, after earnest discrimination, showed that they too did not possess the character of being "innate" and could not provide any corroboration for the "theory of innate ideas," thereby completing the "encirclement" of that theory. Not coincidentally, Marx also investigated these ideas one by one in different writings, thereby embodying the level that "modern materialism" was able to attain.

在揭穿“天赋观念论”者在“思辨和实践的原则”上存在的漏洞和荒谬之后，洛克还悉心考察了其他类型的观念及其所关涉到的多种复杂状况，并且在进行认真辨析之后，说明它们也不具有“天赋”性特征和不能为“天赋观念论”提供任何佐证，进而完成了对“天赋观念论”的“合围”。无独有偶，马克思在不同著述中对这些观念也一一进行过探究，借此体现了“现代唯物主义”所能达到的水准。

1. "Identity" in Logical Thought

1.逻辑思维中的“同一性”

Locke held that if there were so-called "innate ideas," they ought to be very clear and distinct, capable of being widely known and naturally assented to by people, that is, possessing universal and evident truth components and characteristics; otherwise they would inevitably arouse people's constant doubt and perplexity. And the so-called "identity" is precisely problematic in this respect. It is always "not very certain, not very clear"; for example, the idea of "identity" as understood by those outside the Pythagorean school is certainly not the same as that of Pythagoras and his followers. Then how can one determine which school's idea is true and "innate," and which is not? Are all the differing ideas of "identity" "innate"? If so, does this not violate the very purport and principle of "identity" itself? The existence of these problems fully shows that "identity" is not an "innate idea."

洛克认为，假如有所谓“天赋观念”，那它应该是十分清楚明白的，能够广泛地被人知道、自然地被人认同，即具有普遍而分明的真理成分和特性，否则必然会引起人们不断地怀疑和困惑。而所谓“同一性”恰恰在这方面是成问题的。它始终是“不很确定、不很清晰”的，比如，非毕达哥拉斯学派的人所理解的“同一性”观念同毕达哥拉斯及其信徒之间肯定是不一样的。那么，如何确定哪一派别的观念是真的、是“天赋”的，而别的派别不是呢？难道具有差异性的“同一性”观念都是“天赋”的吗？如果是这样，不是违背了“同一性”本身的意旨和原则吗？这些问题的存在充分表明，“同一性”不是“天赋观念”。

Having rationally denied the "innate" character of identity, Locke subsequently investigated in Chapter 27 of Book II of *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* "what constitutes identity." In his view, this needed to be determined by "comparing the existence of things themselves." He particularly restricted "things" to "one kind," pointing out: "If we compare a thing's existence at a certain time and place with its existence at another time and place, we form the ideas of identity and diversity. If we see any thing existing at a certain time and place, we are sure (whatever it is) that it is what it is, and not something else" (Locke, p. 325). That is to say, in Locke's view, so-called "identity" is merely "a thing's identity with itself," for which reason he admonished: "But to say that two or more things can become one is a contradiction" (ibid., p. 327).

从理性上否定了同一性的“天赋”性质，洛克之后在《人类理解论》第二卷第27章探究了“同一性是由何成立的？”在他看来，这需要“比较事物的存在本身”来确定。他特别将“事物”局限于“一种”，指出：“我们如果把一种事物在某个时间和地点存在的情形，同其在另一种时间和地点时的情形加以比较，则我们便形成同一性（identity）和差异性（diversity）的观念。我们如果看到任何事物在某地某时存在，则我们一定会相信（不论它是什么），它就是它，不是别的”。（洛克，第325页）就是说，在洛克看来，所谓“同一性”只是“一个事物与其自身同一”，为此他告诫说：“不过要说两个以上的东西可以成为一个,那只是一种矛盾。”（同上，第327页）

Marx agreed with determining "identity" by "comparing the existence of things themselves," but his grasp of this question differed from Locke's: first, he regarded "one kind of thing" as a system composed of different factors of contradiction or opposing sides; in this sense, "identity" refers less to the consistency of this total thing across different times and places than to the inseparable internal connection and fusion of the contradictory sides within the unity, that is, the tendency of these factors to interconnect, attract, permeate, and renew one another; second, by comparing two things or multiple things, clarifying the state and composition in which they can coexist, he regarded the common nature they possess as "identity." This is Marx's breakthrough and transcendence of Locke's thought within the framework of "modern materialism"; the paradigmatic analyses of this are Marx's and Engels' expositions of "the identity of thinking and being" and "the general relation of production to distribution, exchange, and consumption."

马克思认同通过“比较事物的存在本身”来确定“同一性”，但对这一问题的把握与洛克不同：一是将“一种事物”看作是由矛盾或对立双方不同因素构成的系统，这个意义上的“同一性”与其说指的是这个总体性事物在不同时空中的一致性，不如说指统一体内部矛盾双方不可分割的内在关联和融合，即这些因素之间相互联结、吸引、渗透、更新的倾向；二是对两种事物或多种事物进行比较，厘清它们能够共同存在的状态和构成，将它们所具有的共同的性质视为“同一性”。这是马克思在“现代唯物主义”框架内对洛克思想的突破性和超越性；对此具有典范意义的分析是马克思、恩格斯有关“思维与存在的同一性”和“生产与分配、交换、消费的一般关系”的阐释。

In his later years, Engels, in summing up and clearing up the relation between Marxist philosophy and German classical philosophy, once asked: "Is the world created by God, or has it always existed?" Clearly, the "theory of innate ideas" gives a doubly affirmative answer to this question. Fundamentally different from this, Engels regarded the "world" here as a combination of "spirit" and "nature," "thinking and being"; the condition of the world and its movement is the concrete presentation of the relation between the two. He held that this is "the great basic question of all philosophy, and especially of modern philosophy," "the highest question of all philosophy," and that it "was only clearly posed, and only acquired its full significance, after the Europeans awoke from the long winter of the Christian Middle Ages" (*Selected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 4, p. 230). He particularly pointed out that, according to the answer to the relation between the two, the philosophies of history can be divided into the "two great camps" of materialism and idealism; but at the same time it must be understood that "apart from this, the two terms idealism and materialism originally have no other meaning, and they are not used here in any other sense"; on the contrary, "what confusion would be caused if one gave them any other meaning" (ibid., p. 231). That is to say, Marx and Engels grasped the world and understood philosophy in the sense of the mutual relation of "spirit" and "nature," "thinking and being," and further "idealism and materialism"; these paired "elements" and "units" differ from one another, even being heterogeneous, but they are "relational terms" within the same system, mutually related, indispensable, and not to be favored one over the other; the latter is their "identity." As Engels said: "What is the relation of our thoughts about the world surrounding us to the world itself? Can our thinking know the real world? Can we correctly reflect reality in our representations and concepts of the real world? In philosophical language, this question is called the question of the identity of thinking and being" (*Selected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 4, p. 231). In short, "identity" is established on the basis of "difference"; and "difference" is not the negation of "identity," but its derivation, development, and deepening. This is the "modern" level and "new" realm that Marxist materialism attained in the question of "identity" in transcending old philosophy (including idealism and ordinary materialism).

恩格斯在晚年中总结性地清理马克思主义哲学与德国古典哲学的关系时曾经追问：“世界是神创造的呢，还是从来就有的？”显然，“天赋观念论”对这个问题持双重肯定性回答。与此根本不同，恩格斯将这里的“世界”视为“精神”与“自然界”、“思维和存在”的组合，所谓世界的状况及其运动就是二者之间关系的具体呈现。认为这既是“全部哲学，特别是近代哲学的重大的基本问题”、“全部哲学的最高问题”，也是“在欧洲人从基督教中世纪的长期冬眠中觉醒以后，才被十分清楚地提了出来，才获得了它的完全的意义”。（《马克思恩格斯选集》第4卷，第230页）他特别指出，可以依照对二者关系的回答将历史上的哲学分成唯物主义和唯心主义“两大阵营”；但同时也需要明白，“除此之外，唯心主义和唯物主义这两个用语本来没有任何别的意思，它们在这里也不是在别的意义上使用的”，相反，“如果给它们加上别的意义，就会造成怎样的混乱。”（同上，第231页）这就是说，马克思、恩格斯是在“精神”与“自然界”、“思维和存在”进而“唯心主义和唯物主义”相互关联的意义上来把握世界、理解哲学的；这些成对出现的“元素”“单元”彼此是存在差异，甚至是异质的，但它们又是同一体系中的“关系项”，彼此相互关联、不可或缺和偏废，后者就是它们之间的“同一性”。诚如恩格斯所说：“我们关于我们周围世界的思想对这个世界本身的关系是怎样的？我们的思维能不能认识现实世界？我们能不能在我们关于现实世界的表象和概念中正确地反映现实？用哲学的语言来说，这个问题叫作思维和存在的同一性问题”。（《马克思恩格斯选集》第4卷，第231页）质言之，“同一性”是建立在“差异性”基础上的；而“差异性”不是“同一性”的否定，而是其衍生、发展和深化。这就是马克思主义的唯物主义在“同一性”问题上超越旧哲学（包括唯心主义和一般唯物主义）所达到的“现代”水准和“新”境界。

Marx went further to extend this transformation in his philosophical outlook to a profound analysis of capitalist society. His discussion of the “general relation of production to distribution, exchange, consumption” within the economic structure of capitalist society is a vivid embodiment of his idea of “identity.” Regarding “these items alongside production,” the understanding obtained according to “superficial appearance” is: “production appears as the starting point, consumption as the end point, and distribution and exchange as the middle links,” or among them “a regular syllogism is formed: production is the universal, distribution and exchange the particular, consumption the individual, and the whole is united thereby.” In Marx’s view, “this is of course a connection, but a superficial one,” and therefore not genuine “identity.” Genuine “identity” means that “they constitute moments of one totality, differences within a unity. Production predominates not only over itself, in the antithetical definition of production, but over the other moments as well. The process always starts afresh with production. Exchange and consumption cannot be predominant... distribution, as the distribution of products, is likewise so. And as the distribution of the factors of production, it is itself a moment of production. Hence a definite production determines a definite consumption, distribution, exchange, and definite relations of these different moments to one another. Of course, production, in its one-sided form, is in turn determined by the other moments... with changes in distribution, e.g., with the concentration of capital, with different distributions of the population between town and country, etc., production also changes. Finally, the needs of consumption determine production” (Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 30, pp. 30-42).

马克思更进一步把哲学观上的这种变革延展至对资本社会的深刻剖析中。他有关资本主义社会经济结构中“生产与分配、交换、消费的一般关系”的讨论就是其“同一性”思想的鲜明体现。对于“与生产并列的这几个项目”，根据“肤浅的表象”所获得的理解是：“生产表现为起点，消费表现为终点，分配和交换表现为中间环节”，或者它们之间“形成一个正规的三段论法：生产是一般，分配和交换是特殊，消费是个别，全体由此结合在一起”。在马克思看来，“这当然是一种联系，然而是一种肤浅的联系”，因此并不是真正的“同一性”。真正的“同一性”是说，“它们构成一个总体的各个环节，一个统一体内部的差别。生产既支配着与其他要素相对而言的生产自身，也支配着其他要素。过程总是从生产重新开始。交换和消费不能是起支配作用的东西，……分配，作为产品的分配，也是这样。而作为生产要素的分配，它本身就是生产的一个要素。因此，一定的生产决定一定的消费、分配、交换和这些不同要素相互间的一定关系。当然，生产就其单方面形式来说也决定于其他要素。……随着分配的变动，例如，随着资本的积聚，随着城乡人口的不同的分配等等,生产也就发生变动。最后，消费的需要决定着生产。”（《马克思恩格斯全集》第30卷，第30-42页）

This grasp of the complexity of the “identity” problem in the structure of capitalist society means that for Marx, so-called social revolution is not the isolated change of one or some “moments,” but the overall transformation of society, because “there is an interaction among the different moments. This is the case with every organic whole” (ibid., p. 41).

对资本社会结构中“同一性”问题的复杂性的这种把握，意味着在马克思那里所谓社会革命不是某个或者某些“要素”的单独变化，而是社会的整体转型，因为“不同要素之间存在着相互作用。每一个有机整体都是这样”。（同上，第41页）

2. The Mathematical Principle of “the Whole Is Greater than the Part”

2.“全体大于部分”式的数学原则

In Locke’s view, the “whole” and the “part” contained in this proposition are entirely relative concepts; what can appropriately and directly embody and support these two concepts is “nothing but extension and number,” that is, area and quantity. This means that the nature of the relation between “whole” and “part” should be determined by the relation between the things in which they are lodged and on which they depend. If “whole” and “part” are “innate” ideas, then extension and number must also be so; but everyone knows that “extension and number,” i.e., area and quantity, are in real life actual, “positive existences,” and are by no means “innate.”

在洛克看来，这个命题所包含的“全体”和“部分”完全是相对的概念，能恰当而直接地体现和支持这两个概念的“不外广袤和数目”，亦即面积和数量。这就意味着，“全体”和“部分”之间关系的性质应该由它们所寄寓的、所依赖的东西之间的关系来确定。如果说“全体”和“部分”是“天赋”观念，那么广袤和数目一定亦是；但谁都知道，“广袤和数目”即面积和数量是现实生活中实实在在的、“积极的存在”，根本不是“天赋”的。

How do abstract mathematical ideas, principles, and axioms originate and become established? In a letter to a relative, Marx addressed this question, returning to everyday life and its socio-historical changes to observe: “Not very large calculations, e.g., in household expenses and commerce, were never made with [numerals] but only with stones and other similar markers on the abacus... As for larger mathematical calculations, the Romans already had the multiplication table or the Pythagorean table before such a need arose... In making very large calculations, the old method created insurmountable obstacles, as can be seen from the tricks performed by the distinguished mathematician Archimedes” (Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 30, p. 650).

抽象的数学观念、原则和公理是怎么起源和确立起来的？马克思在一封写给亲属的信中谈及这一问题，他回归到日常生活及其社会历史变迁中来观照，指出：“不太大的计算，例［如］在家庭开支和商业中，从来不用［数字］而只用石子和其他类似的标记在算盘上进行。……至于更大一些的数学计算，则在有这种需要之前古罗马人就已经有了乘法表或毕达哥拉斯表，……在作很大的计算时，旧方法造成不可克服的障碍，这一点从杰出的数学家阿基米得所变的戏法中就可以看出来。”（《马克思恩格斯全集》第30卷，第650页）

Scholars generally hold that Marx’s study of mathematics was merely an “amateur pastime” outside his research on political economy. However, if we carefully study Marx’s economic and mathematical manuscripts and letters as published in the “historical-critical edition” of the Collected Works of Marx and Engels, we will find that from the 1860s onward Marx devoted himself to the intrinsic integration of economics and mathematics. On the one hand, he saw that economic phenomena and movements contain extremely important and complex quantitative relations, which are the fertile soil and garden from which mathematical methods, principles, axioms, and ideas arise, advance, and break through; on the other hand, he felt that a complete economic system and universally applicable economic laws (including value, surplus value, profit, and average profit, etc.) could only be abstracted, outlined, deduced, revealed, and expounded through mathematical methods. Therefore, Marx studied mathematics for economic purposes and from an economic perspective. As he pointed out in a letter to Engels: “(I) in formulating the principles of political economy... quickly reviewed algebra” (Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 29, p. 247). His economic manuscripts created between 1857 and 1881 convey this information: he “intended to apply mathematics to economics, though not simple algebraic operations (Marx would not engage in simple operations), but rather to find universally applicable laws among these economic values, and if possible also to use it for the precise calculation of dynamic economic values, as well as for the logical derivation (transformation) of economic concepts (value—surplus value—profit—average profit)—this was also quite important for Marx” (Vollgraf, pp. 81-82).

学界通常认为，马克思对数学的研究只是他在政治经济学研究之外的“业余消遣”。然而，如果我们对《马克思恩格斯全集》“历史考证版”所刊布的马克思经济学、数学手稿和书信进行认真研究，就会发现，马克思自19世纪60年代以来就致力于经济学与数学的内在结合。一方面他看出经济现象和运动中蕴含着极为重要而复杂的数量关系，是数学方法、原则、公理和观念由以产生、推进和突破的丰沛土壤和园地；另一方面他感到，完整的经济学体系及普遍适用的经济学规律（包括价值、剩余价值、利润和平均利润等等），只有通过数学方法才能被抽象、勾勒、推导、揭示和阐发出来。所以，马克思是出于经济学目的、又从经济学视角出发研究数学的。诚如他给恩格斯的信中所指出的：“（我）在制定政治经济学原理时……把代数迅速地温习一遍。”（《马克思恩格斯全集》第29卷，第247页）1857-1881年间他创作的经济学手稿传达出这样的信息：他“打算将数学运用于经济学，不过不是简单的代数运算（马克思不会从事简单的运算），而是要在这些经济学数值之间找出普遍适用的规律，如果可能的话还打算用来精确计算动态的经济学数值，以及对经济学概念（价值—剩余价值—利润—平均利润）进行逻辑推导（转化）——这对于马克思来说也相当重要”。（福尔格拉夫，第81-82页）

It should be said that it was Engels who provided a clearer and more complete theoretical exposition of the above questions. In the “Philosophy” section of Anti-Dühring, he devotes a chapter to criticizing “apriorism,” asking: “Whence does thought obtain these principles? From itself?” To this, Dühring’s view is that “without any empirical admixture, all pure mathematics can be deduced from those mathematical axioms which ‘neither can nor need be demonstrated from the purely logical point of view,’ and then applied to the world” (Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 3, p. 414). Moreover, Engels, as if responding to Locke’s critical line of thought, points out that in Dühring’s case, “the mathematical axioms are the expression of the extremely impoverished thought-content which mathematics has to borrow from logic. They can be reduced to the following two: 1. The whole is greater than the part... 2. If two quantities are equal to a third quantity, then they are equal to each other” (ibid., pp. 414-415). This is typical “apriorism” and “the theory of innate ideas.” The crux of this idealist view is that “it turns everything completely upside down” (ibid., p. 410), “whether in mathematics or in any other field, such impoverished propositions are of no avail. To proceed further, we must introduce real relations, relations and spatial forms derived from real objects. The ideas of line, plane, angle, polygon, cube, sphere, etc., are all derived from reality... derived from ascertained reality” (Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 3, p. 415). That is to say, mathematical principles and axioms appear abstract, but over the long span of social history, these principles too come from reality, experience, and practice—that is, they possess real content.

应该说，对上述问题作出更明确而完满的理论阐述的是恩格斯。在《反杜林论》的“哲学编”中，他专设一章批判“先验主义”，追问：“思维从什么地方获得这些原则呢？从自身中吗？”对此，杜林的看法是，“不需要任何经验的填加料，就可以从那些‘按照纯粹逻辑的观点既不可能也不需要论证’的数学公理中推导出全部纯数学，然后把它应用于世界”（《马克思恩格斯选集》第3卷，第414页）。不仅如此，恩格斯还仿佛回应洛克的批判思路似地指出，在杜林那里，“数学公理是数学不得不从逻辑学那里借用的极其贫乏的思想内容的表现。它们可以归结为以下两条：１.整体大于部分。……２.如果两个数量等于第三个数量，那么它们彼此相等。”（同上，第414-415页）这是典型的“先验主义”和“天赋观念论”。这种唯心主义观点的症结在于，“它把事物完全头足倒置了”（同上，第410页），“不论在数学中或者在别的领域中，这样贫乏的命题都是无济于事的。为了继续前进，我们必须引入真实的关系，来自现实物体的关系和空间形式。线、面、角、多角形、立方体、球体等等观念都是从现实中得来的……是从确凿的现实中得来的”（《马克思恩格斯选集》第3卷，第415页）。这就是说，数学原则和公理貌似抽象，但从社会历史的长时间段来看，这些原理等也是来自现实、经验和实践，即具有实在的内容。

3. “Substance” as an Idea

3.作为观念的“实体”

The idea of “substance” is an important question to which Locke devotes two chapters in Book II of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. In Book I he only points out that the “substance” spoken of by the proponents of the “theory of innate ideas” is also not a clearly defined referent—that is, it is not a special, clear, or “positive” idea; they merely vaguely assume something they do not know, and regard it as the foundation and support of those ideas we do know. Moreover, “substance” has no other meaning; it is merely what we obtain through sensation or reflection. Since “substance” is so intricately entangled with the aspect of reality, and only thereby can it confirm its own existence and value, how can it be said to be “innate” or “a priori”?

“实体”观念是洛克在《人类理解论》第二卷要专设两章论述的重要问题。在第一卷中他只指出，“天赋观念论”者谈及的“实体”也不是一个含义明确的所指，即并不是一个特殊的、清楚的、“积极的”观念，他们只是含糊地假定了一个自己所不知道的东西，并将其视为我们所知道的那些观念的基础和支柱。此外，“实体”并没有别的意义，它只是我们借感觉或反省得来的。“实体”与现实方面有如此复杂的纠葛，且由此才能确证自己的存在及其价值，缘何谈得上是“天赋”的、“先在”的呢？

Marx, for his part, did not regard the meaning of "substance" as obscure, but rather examined it in the context of the transformation of modes of thinking brought about by social development. In modern times, with the development of capitalism, the progress of science and technology, and the "struggle against abstract subjectivity" in modes of thinking, "the philosophy of the eighteenth century was driven into mutually opposed one-sidedness." Engels summarized this as "objectivity opposed to subjectivity, nature opposed to spirit, materialism opposed to spiritualism, abstract universality and substance opposed to abstract singularity." (Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1, p. 88) In short, in terms of the connotation of "substance," it is the opposition between material substance and ideal substance. In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, by clarifying the difference between Feuerbach's and Hegel's thought, Marx explained the essentials of these two views of substance: the former "proceeds from the positive, from what is sensibly certain," "sublates the infinite, and posits the real, the sensuous, the actual, the finite, the particular"; while the latter "proceeds from alienation (logically, from the infinite, the abstractly universal), proceeds from substance, from the absolute and immutable abstraction—that is, put more plainly, he proceeds from religion and theology." (Ibid., p. 200) More importantly, the development of the times "caused the two opposing sides to develop fully in their head-on confrontation, thereby making the elimination of this opposition inevitable." (Ibid., p. 89) This is precisely the work that Marx's "new materialism" undertook.

马克思倒是不认为“实体”的含义不明所以，而是将其放在社会发展导致的思维方式的变迁中予以观照。近代以来，随着资本主义的发展、科学技术的进步以及思维方式上“反对抽象主体性的斗争”，促使“18世纪的哲学走向相互对立的片面性”。恩格斯将其概括为“客体性同主体性相对立，自然同精神相对立，唯物主义同唯灵论相对立，抽象普遍、实体同抽象单一相对立”。（《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷，第88页）质言之，以“实体”内涵而论，就是物质实体与观念实体的对立。在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》中，马克思借助对费尔巴哈与黑格尔思想差异的厘清，对这两种实体观的要义作出了阐释，即前者“从肯定的东西即从感觉确定的东西出发”，“扬弃了无限的东西，设定了现实的、感性的、实在的、有限的、特殊的东西”；而后者“从异化出发（在逻辑上就是从无限的东西、抽象的普遍的东西出发），从实体出发，从绝对的和不变的抽象出发，就是说，说得更通俗些，他从宗教和神学出发”。（同上，第200页）更重要的是，时代的发展“使对立的双方在针锋相对中得到充分发展，从而使消灭这种对立成为必不可免的事”。（同上，第89页）这就是马克思“新唯物主义”所作的工作。

In The Holy Family, Marx analyzed and explained this problem through two methods and approaches.

在《神圣家族》中，马克思通过两种方式和途径来分析和阐释了这一问题。

The first is the discrimination between the two types of "views of substance." According to plain life experience and everyday thinking, we derive the general concept of "fruit" from real apples, pears, strawberries, and almonds; yet the Young Hegelians subjected this to "further imagination" and "transcendental" interpretation, holding that "fruit" (die Frucht), this abstract concept, is a essence existing outside the human being, and is the true essence of real pears, apples, and so on. Thus they "declare (to express it in speculative language) that 'fruit' is the 'substance' of pears, apples, almonds, etc." (Ibid., p. 276) That is to say, for real pears, apples, and so on, as themselves, they are inessential and indifferent; they are merely the pure forms of existence or modes of the concept "fruit." "The essential thing about these things is not their sensuously perceptible actual existence, but the essence that I have abstracted from them and imposed upon them—my conceptual essence, 'fruit.'" Speculative reason, like the "innate-idea theorists," "discerns in apples and pears something common, and in pears and almonds something common—this is 'fruit.' The various particular real fruits henceforth are merely illusory fruits, and their true essence is 'fruit' as 'substance'" (Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1, p. 277). Marx held that "by this method one obtains no particularly content-rich determinations." Unlike "speculation, which derives from various real fruits an abstract 'fruit'—'fruit,'" he held that one must "abandon abstraction" or "turn from abstraction to its opposite." That is, "in order to attain the appearance of some real content, it must by some means return from 'fruit,' from substance, to the real, multifarious, ordinary fruits, to pears, apples, almonds, and so on." (Ibid.)

一是两类“实体观”的辨析。按照朴素的生活经验和日常思维，我们是从现实的苹果、梨、草莓、扁桃中得出“果品”这个一般的观念，然而青年黑格尔派却对此作了“进一步想象”和“先验”的解释，认为“果品”（die Frucht）这个抽象观念是存在于人之外的一种本质，是现实的梨、苹果等等的真正的本质，于是就“宣布（用思辨的语言来表达）‘果品’是梨、苹果、扁桃等等的‘实体’”。（同上，第276页）就是说，对于现实的梨、苹果等来说，它们作为其自身，是非本质的、无关紧要的，只是“果品”这个观念的单纯的存在形式或样态。“这些物的本质的东西并不是它们的可以用感官感触到的现实的定在，而是我从它们中抽象出来并强加于它们的本质，即我的观念的本质——‘果品’”。思辨的理性如同“天赋观念论”者一样，“在苹果和梨中看出了共同的东西，在梨和扁桃中看出了共同的东西，这就是‘果品’。各种特殊的现实的果实从此就只是虚幻的果实，而它们的真正的本质则是‘果品’这个‘实体’”（《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷，第277页）。马克思认为，“用这种方法是得不到内容特别丰富的规定的。”与“思辨从各种不同的现实的果实中得出一个抽象的‘果实’——‘果品’”不同，他认为必须“抛弃抽象”或者“从抽象转到抽象的对立面。”也就是说，“为了要达到某种现实内容的外观，它就不得不用某种方法从‘果品’、从实体返回到现实的千差万别的平常的果实，返回到梨、苹果、扁桃等等。”（同上）

The second is the constructive path of materialist substance theory. The transition between the two views of substance is not easy: "It is easy to derive from real fruits the abstract concept 'fruit,' but it is difficult to derive from the abstract concept 'fruit' the various real fruits." (Ibid.) Therefore, although "empiricism" found it relatively easy to reject "innate-idea theory," constructing a genuinely and thoroughly transcendent "modern materialist" mode of thinking required traversing an arduous constructive path. The materialist view of substance did not begin from scratch, nor did it start with the explorations of Marx and Engels; for this reason, Marx surveyed the entire evolution of materialism, focusing on "the French Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, and especially French materialism." (Ibid., p. 327) In this process, Locke became an extremely important figure because of his sustained and widespread influence on the development of French materialism. "Materialism is the native-born son of Great Britain." When the philosophers of the European continent "needed to undertake a negating critique of theology and seventeenth-century metaphysics," "they needed an affirmative, anti-metaphysical system... a book that would reduce the life-practice of the time to a system and provide it with theoretical justification." (Ibid., p. 330) At this point, Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding appeared, and "this work was welcomed as warmly as a long-awaited guest" (Ibid.). Condillac translated it directly into French and elaborated Locke's thought in his Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, using Locke's sensationalism to oppose seventeenth-century metaphysics. Helvétius likewise took Locke's doctrine as his point of departure, applying materialism to the analysis of all aspects of social life in his book On the Intellectual Faculties and Education of Man, treating "sensuous characteristics and self-esteem, pleasure, and correctly understood personal interest" as "the foundation of all morality," while "the natural equality of human intelligence, the unity of the progress of reason and the progress of industry, the natural goodness of man, and the omnipotence of education" constituted the principal elements of his system. This led to the result that "in him materialism acquired a truly French character." (Ibid., p. 333)

二是物质实体论的建构之路。两种实体观的转换是不容易的，“从现实的果实得出‘果品’这个抽象的观念很容易，而从‘果品’这个抽象的观念得出各种现实的果实就困难了。”（同上）所以，“经验论”摒弃“天赋观念论”比较容易，但要建构起真正、彻底超越这种思想的“现代唯物主义”思维方式还必须走过一个艰苦的建构之路。“唯物主义”实体观不是从头开始，不是自马克思、恩格斯的探索起步的，为此，马克思清理了整个唯物主义的嬗变历程，重点是“18世纪的法国启蒙运动，特别是法国唯物主义”。（同上，第327页）在这一过程中，洛克因其对法国唯物主义的发展所产生的持续而广泛的影响成为一个极其重要的角色。“唯物主义是大不列颠本土的产儿”，当欧洲大陆的哲学家们“要对神学和17世纪形而上学进行否定性的批驳”的时候，“需要有一个肯定性的、反形而上学的体系……需要一部把当时的生活实践归纳为一个体系并从理论上加以论证的书”。（同上，第330页）这时，洛克《人类理解论》出现了，“这部著作就像人们翘首以待的客人一样受到了热烈的欢迎”（同上）。孔狄亚克直接将其翻译成法文，并在《人类知识起源论》中详细阐述了洛克的思想，借助洛克的感觉论去反对17世纪的形而上学。爱尔维修同样也是以洛克的学说为出发点的，在《论人的理智能力和教育》一书中将唯物主义运用到社会生活各个方面的分析，将“感性的特性和自尊、享乐和正确理解的个人利益”视为“全部道德的基础”，而“人的智力的天然平等、理性的进步和工业的进步的一致、人的天然的善良和教育的万能”构成其体系中的主要因素。这导致“在他那里唯物主义获得了真正法国的性质”。（同上，第333页）

Besides this school, deeply influenced by Locke and "originating from Locke's" thought, the other school of French materialism "originated from Descartes." Descartes was a dualist: "he separated his physics completely from his metaphysics," and "within the scope of his physics, matter is the sole substance, the sole ground of being and of knowledge." (Ibid., p. 328) But this matter is not a passive existence; rather, it "possesses an autonomous creative force, and regards mechanical motion as the life-activity of matter." Body, existence, and substance are one and the same idea of reality. Thus Marx emphasized: "Thought cannot be separated from thinking matter. Matter is the subject of all change. If the word 'infinite' does not express our mind's capacity for infinite addition and supplementation, then the word is meaningless. For only material things can be perceived and known, so one knows nothing of the existence of God. Only my own existence is certain and credible. All human passions are mechanical motions with a beginning and an end. The object of desire is the good. Man and nature are subject to the same laws. Force and freedom are identical." (Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1, p. 332) This analysis exposed very clearly the crux of idealist philosophy, including that of Bruno Bauer, namely, its refusal "to recognize any existence distinct from thought, any natural force distinct from the spontaneity of spirit, any human essential power distinct from intellect, any passivity distinct from activity, any influence of others distinct from one's own action, any feeling and desire distinct from knowledge, any heart distinct from head, any object distinct from subject, any practice distinct from theory, any man distinct from the critic, any real commonality distinct from abstract universality, any you distinct from me." (Ibid., p. 345)

除了深受洛克影响、“起源于洛克”思想的这一派别，法国唯物主义的另一派“起源于笛卡儿”。笛卡尔是一个二元论者，“他把他的物理学和他的形而上学完全分开”，而“在他的物理学的范围内，物质是唯一的实体，是存在和认识的唯一根据”。（同上，第328页）但这个物质不是被动性的存在，而是“具有自主创造的力量，并把机械运动看做是物质的生命活动。”形体、存在、实体是同一种实在的观念。所以，马克思强调，“不能把思想同思维着的物质分开。物质是一切变化的主体。如果‘无限的’这个词不表示我们的精神具有无限增添补充的能力，这个词就毫无意义。因为只有物质的东西才是可以被感知、被认识的，所以人们对神的存在就一无所知了。只有我自己的存在才是确实可信的。人的一切激情都是有始有终的机械运动。欲求的对象是善。人和自然都服从于同样的规律。强力和自由是同一的。”（《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷，第332页）这种分析把包括布鲁诺·鲍威尔在内的唯心主义哲学的症结展示得非常明显了，即“不承认任何有别于思维的存在、任何有别于精神自发性的自然力、任何有别于理智的人的本质力量、任何有别于能动的受动、任何有别于自身作用的别人的影响、任何有别于知识的感觉和愿望、任何有别于头脑的心灵、任何有别于主体的客体、任何有别于理论的实践、任何有别于批判家的人、任何有别于抽象的普遍性的现实的共同性、任何有别于我的你”。（同上，第345页）

This brings to the fore the essential purport of "modern materialism." That is, the process of the construction of Marx's thought is not merely, as traditional interpretations have sketched it, a successive replacement of philosophical forms—"idealism–materialism–new materialism"—but rather a gradual inquiry unfolded within the framework of "subject–object," "spirit–matter," and "idea–reality" relations.

这也就使“现代唯物主义”的要旨凸显出来了。即在马克思思想的建构过程并不仅仅是传统解释所勾勒的“唯心主义—唯物主义—新唯物主义”的哲学形态的次第更替不同，更是在“主体—客体”“精神—物质”“观念—现实”相关的框架内展开的渐进探寻。

Moreover, in the first book of *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Locke goes on to examine the nature and function of "language" as well as the content of "recollection" and "memory," again stressing that these are by no means innate ideas. And in Marx's writings we can likewise find discussions of related questions, in which the views expressed are connected to Locke's line of denying their "innate" character, and are even more incisively revealed and analyzed within the framework of "modern materialism." Owing to limitations of space, I will not undertake a detailed sorting-out of these matters here.

此外，在《人类理解论》第一卷中，洛克还紧接着辨析了“语言”的本质和功能以及“回想”和“记忆”中的内容，再次强调了它们绝非天赋观念。而我们从马克思的著述中同样可以找到对相关问题的论述，其中所表达的看法既与洛克否定其“天赋”性的思路相关联，更在“现代唯物主义”的框架内有鞭辟入里的揭示和剖析。限于篇幅，这里就不再进行细致的清理了。

Thus, through a circuitous and even meticulous argument, Locke in the first book of *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* accomplished the mission of "clearing the way" by criticizing the "doctrine of innate ideas," which made him all the more convinced that ideas, principles, and propositions are not "innate," "because they have neither utility nor certainty" (Locke, p. 67). The so-called "doctrine of innate ideas" is nothing but a trick of the "lazy" and the "skeptic"; to grasp ideas in this way, "the lazy man is spared the toil of inquiry, and the skeptic ceases the pain of search" (ibid., p. 71). The inevitable conclusion, then, is that people's differing "discoveries" of ideas result only from their exercise of their own faculties and abilities—either perceived through sensation and reflection, or understood by composing ideas into propositions in the mind and making appropriate comparisons and careful deductions of the relations among different ideas. Only thus can ideas be known and assented to. In short, "man must think and understand for himself" (ibid., p. 69). Having criticized and negated the "doctrine of innate ideas," Locke resolved to build, with the aid of experience and observation, a complete and systematic edifice of knowledge—this is his "empiricist" philosophy. It "stands on a firm foundation, resting on no props or buttresses, and borrowing no borrowed or begged basis"; while logically, "empiricism" is rationalist—in Locke's words, even if it be "a castle in the air, I will make it coherent and systematic throughout" (ibid., p. 72).

这样，经过曲折甚至琐屑的论证，洛克在《人类理解论》第一卷中通过对“天赋观念论”的批判完成了“扫清道路”的使命，这使他更加确信，观念、原则、命题都不是“天赋”的，“因为它们既没有功用，亦没有确定性。”（洛克，第67页）所谓“天赋观念论”，不过是“懒惰者”“怀疑者”的把戏，以这样的方式把握观念，“懒惰者便省了探求之劳，怀疑者便停了搜索之苦。”（同上，第71页）那么，必然的结论是，人们所以对观念有不同的“发现”，只由于他们运用了自己的才具和能力的结果，或者靠人们的感觉和内省来感知，或者通过在人心中将观念组成命题、对不同观念间的关系进行适当的比较和细致的演绎来理解。这样，观念才能被人知道、被人认同。质言之，“人必须自己来思想，自己来理解。”（同上，第69页）在批判和否定了“天赋观念论”之后，洛克立志要借助经验和观察建立一个体系完整的关于知识的大厦，这就是他的“经验论”哲学。它“立在稳固的基础上，而不依靠任何支柱和倚墙，而不凭借任何借得的、丐得的基础”；而在逻辑上，“经验论”则是理性主义的，用洛克的话说，即便“是空中楼阁，我亦要使它首尾完整、体系一贯”。（同上，第72页）

We see that, with nearly two hundred years of social development, the world has presented a more complex condition, and the kingdom of ideas constructed by humanity has become more resplendent and more tangled, all of which adds greater difficulty to people's grasp and understanding. At the origin of his thought, Marx was also nurtured and profoundly influenced by German classical philosophy, especially Hegel and his successors, the Young Hegelians' "idealism," holding that freedom and "self-consciousness is the highest divinity" (*Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, vol. 1, p. 12). But through the meditation on the "perplexing questions" provoked by real social problems during the "Rheinische Zeitung period," and through the writing of such works as *On the Jewish Question*, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, the "Paris Manuscripts," *The Holy Family*, *Theses on Feuerbach*, and *The German Ideology*, he settled his intellectual accounts with these predecessors and embarked on the road of independently founding a "new philosophy." He turned from the critique of the "copy" of society to the critique of the "original," from the inquiry into a state philosophy and philosophy of right that exalted free reason to the political-economic study of the conditions of existence of civil society, reduced religious questions to worldly questions, and along the path of "political emancipation"—"social emancipation"—"human emancipation" gradually explored the road of modern social development. He not only replaced the "innate principle" of ideas with the "principle of reality," eliminating the idealist explanation of the origin of ideas, but also found the practical path for the generation, elevation, and development of ideas.

我们看到，伴随着将近200年的社会发展，世界呈现出更为复杂的状况，人类建构的观念王国也更加斑斓、庞杂，这些都为人们的把握和理解增添了更大的难度。马克思在其思想起源时也受到德国古典哲学特别是黑格尔及其后继者青年黑格尔派“观念论”的哺育和深刻影响，认为自由和“自我意识是最高神性”（《马克思恩格斯全集》第1卷，第12页）。但通过“《莱茵报》时期”遭逢现实社会问题所引发的“苦恼的疑问”的沉思，借助《论犹太人问题》、《黑格尔法哲学批判》“巴黎手稿”、《神圣家族》、《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》和《德意志意识形态》等著述的写作，他了断了与这些先驱的思想因缘，走上了独立创立“新哲学”的道路。他由对社会的“副本”批判转向“原本”批判，由彰显自由理性的国家哲学、法哲学的探讨转向了对市民社会生存境况的政治经济学研究，把宗教问题还原为世界问题，沿着“政治解放”—“社会解放”—“人的解放”的路径渐次探究现代社会发展之路，不仅将观念的“天赋原则”置换为“现实原则”，消除了观念来源问题上的唯心主义解释，而且找到观念产生、提升和发展的实践途径。

Discerning the "Lockean factor" in the construction of Marx's thought and the transcendence he achieved not only reflects, from the perspective of a "case" in the history of thought, the inseparable internal connection between Marxism and the Western intellectual tradition, but also reveals the trajectory, content, and significance of his intellectual transformation accomplished through the changes of social history and the shift of the questions of the times.

辨析马克思思想建构中的“洛克因素”及其所实现的超越，既从一个思想史“个案”的视角反映了马克思主义与西方思想传统之间不可分割的内在关联，也昭示出他借助社会历史的变迁和时代问题的转换所完成的思想变革的轨迹、内涵及其意义。

(Author's bio: Nie Jinfang, Professor and Doctoral Supervisor, Department of Philosophy, Peking University; Director, Peking University Center for Marxist Document Studies)

（作者简介：聂锦芳，北京大学哲学系教授、博士生导师，北京大学马克思主义文献研究中心主任）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心