Marx's *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* and Two Opposed Conceptions of Right

The *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* is a manuscript left unfinished and unpublished during Marx's lifetime, focusing on a critical analysis of the sections on the state in Hegel's *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. Published in 1821, the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* is an important work in which Hegel undertakes philosophical reflection on the question of right. Marx, who had long been perplexed by the question of right, stated his purpose in writing in the "Introduction" to the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, namely: "The German philosophy of state and of right is the only German philosophy which has been stated in a systematic, comprehensive, and final form in Hegel's works. The criticism of this philosophy of state and of right, which received through Hegel its most consistent, richest, and final formulation, is at once both a critical analysis of the modern state and of the reality connected with it, and the definitive negation of the whole manner of the German political and legal consciousness, whose most distinguished, most universal, and most elevated expression is precisely that philosophy." In the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Marx primarily directs his critique against Hegel's conception of right based on the state, touching on Hegel's ideas on sovereignty, executive power, and legislative power. At first glance, these critical contents seem to reflect Marx's focus on the question of right at the level of the state, but from the perspective of the process of creating his historical materialist conception of right, the direct purpose of Marx's critique is to establish a conception of right based on civil society. Viewed from the standpoint of the conception of right, it can be clearly seen that Marx's *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* unfolds around two opposed conceptions of right: one is the conception of right based on the state; the other is the conception of right based on civil society. Hegel's conception of right is the representative of the former; on the basis of a subversive critique of Hegel, Marx establishes the conception of right based on civil society. As an important achievement of Marx's critique of Hegel's conception of right, the establishment of the conception of right based on civil society laid an important cornerstone for the creation of Marx's historical materialist conception of right. Marx regarded the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* as "the first work I wrote," and its appearance marks the beginning of the construction of Marx's historical materialist conception of right.

《黑格尔法哲学批判》是在马克思生前未完成、未出版的手稿，重点分析批判了黑格尔的《法哲学原理》这一著作中有关国家的部分内容。出版于1821年的《法哲学原理》是黑格尔对权利问题展开哲学思考的重要著作。一直对权利问题备感困惑的马克思在《〈黑格尔法哲学批判〉导言》中表明了其写作目的，即：“德国的国家哲学和法哲学在黑格尔的著作中得到了最系统、最丰富和最终的表述；对这种哲学的批判既是对现代国家以及同它相联系的现实所作的批判性分析，又是对迄今为止的德国政治意识和法意识的整个形式的坚决否定。”马克思在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中主要针对黑格尔基于国家的权利观展开批判，涉及黑格尔的王权思想、行政权思想和立法权思想。初看起来，这些批判内容似乎反映出马克思的关注点在国家层面上的权利问题，但从马克思的历史唯物主义权利观的创建进程来看，马克思批判的直接目的是为了确立基于市民社会的权利观。从权利观的视角出发可以清楚地看到，马克思的《黑格尔法哲学批判》是围绕两种对立的权利观展开的：一种是基于国家的权利观；另一种是基于市民社会的权利观。黑格尔的权利观是前者的代表；马克思在对黑格尔进行颠覆性批判的基础上确立了基于市民社会的权利观。作为马克思对黑格尔的权利观进行批判的重要成果，基于市民社会的权利观的确立为马克思的历史唯物主义权利观的创建奠定了重要基石。马克思将《黑格尔法哲学批判》视为“我写的第一部著作”，它的问世标志着马克思的历史唯物主义权利观构建的开启。

I. Two Opposed Conceptions of Right: The Conception of Right Based on the State and the Conception of Right Based on Civil Society

一、两种对立的权利观：基于国家的权利观与基于市民社会的权利观

The Chinese translation of the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* renders the German "Recht" in four ways, namely, law, right, power, and legal statute. According to the original German meaning, the title of the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, "Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts," could also be translated as "Outlines of the Philosophy of Right," but the translator, considering that the focus of Hegel's discussion of the question of right falls on the level of the state, and that from customary understanding, right at the level of the state has the significance of "law," therefore adopted the rendering "Elements of the Philosophy of Right." Right at the level of the state has the significance of "law," or rather it is "law," but this does not mean that law is equivalent to right. Many rights in civil society are not expressed in the form of "law," for example, the socioeconomic rights of members of civil society. If one reduces Hegel's thinking on "right" to thinking on "law," this will directly affect a deep understanding of the content of Hegel's conception of right.

汉译本《法哲学原理》对德文“Recht”的翻译有四种，即法、权利、权和法律。根据德文原意，《法哲学原理》的书名“Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts”也可译为“权利哲学纲要”，但译者考虑到黑格尔对权利问题的论述重心是落在国家层面，而从习惯理解上看，国家层面的权利具有“法”的意义，因而采用“法哲学原理”这一译法。国家层面的权利具有“法”的意义，或者说它就是“法”，但这并不意味着法就等同于权利。市民社会中的许多权利不是以“法”的形式表现出来的，例如，市民社会成员的社会经济权利。如果将黑格尔对“权利”的思考简化为对“法”的思考，将直接影响对黑格尔权利观内涵的深入理解。

Law is not the universal of the concept of right, but the concept of right can encompass law. Returning from "law" to "right," and proceeding from the standpoint of right, one can see that the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* is a specialized work in which Marx critiques Hegel's conception of right. On the one hand, Marx exposes that the essence of Hegel's conception of right is a conception of right taking the state as its basis; on the other hand, Marx initiates the creation of a conception of right taking civil society as its basis. In the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, the conception of right based on the state and the conception of right based on civil society gradually emerge clearly in the course of Marx's critique. The opposition between these two conceptions of right also becomes a main thread in the course of the critique, a topic that Marx could not avoid in the process of critiquing Hegel's conception of right. In critiquing Hegel's conception of right, Marx emphasizes that in Hegel, "the Idea is made the subject, and the real relation of family and civil society to the state is conceived as its inner imaginary activity," but in reality, "family and civil society are both presuppositions of the state." The above view reflects that Marx discovered a certain opposition between Hegel's conception of right based on the state and the conception of right based on civil society.

法并不是权利概念的一般，但权利概念却可以涵盖法。从“法”回归到“权利”，从权利的视角入手就能看出，《黑格尔法哲学批判》是马克思围绕黑格尔的权利观展开批判的专门著作。一方面，马克思揭露出黑格尔权利观的实质是一种以国家作为基础的权利观；另一方面，马克思开启了以市民社会作为基础的权利观的创建。在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中，基于国家的权利观与基于市民社会的权利观在马克思的批判进程中逐渐清晰地呈现出来。这两种权利观的对立关系也成为批判进程中的一条主线，是马克思在对黑格尔的权利观进行批判的过程中无法回避的话题。马克思在批判黑格尔的权利观时强调，在黑格尔那里，“观念变成了主体，而家庭和市民社会对国家的现实的关系被理解为观念的内在想像活动”，但实际上，“家庭和市民社会都是国家的前提”。上述观点反映出马克思发现了黑格尔基于国家的权利观与基于市民社会的权利观之间的某种对立。

The precondition for the emergence of these two conceptions of right, one based on the state and the other based on civil society, is the separation of civil society from the state. Marx points out: "Hegel's starting point is the separation of 'civil society' and 'political state' as two fixed opposites, two truly distinct spheres." This shows that Hegel's conception of right is precisely established on the basis of the separation of civil society from the state. Marx further points out: "Hegel regards the separation of civil society and political society as a contradiction, and this is the deeper part of his work." This depth lies in the fact that only by separating the concepts of civil society and the state can the opposition between the two be highlighted, and only from the opposition can the conception of right based on the state and the conception of right based on civil society be discovered. Marx holds that right encompasses content at both the level of the state and the level of civil society: what Hegel discusses is right at the level of the state, connected with sovereignty, executive power, and legislative power; the various rights enumerated in the French *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* of 1793 are mainly connected with right at the level of civil society. In his investigation of civil society, Marx focuses on private property, ownership, or private property in the narrow sense, and it is precisely through these that "the dependence of man on man" is formed. Here one already approaches the view of the self-organization of civil society. In short, with the separation of civil society from the state, right itself also separates into two independent parts: right at the level of the state (such as sovereignty, executive power, and legislative power) and right at the level of civil society (such as the material life rights and economic activity rights of members of civil society).

基于国家与基于市民社会这两种权利观的出现前提是市民社会与国家相分离。马克思指出：“黑格尔的出发点是作为两个固定的对立面、两个真正有区别的领域的‘市民社会’和‘政治国家’的分离。”这就表明，黑格尔的权利观正是建立在市民社会与国家相分离的基础之上的。马克思还进一步指出：“黑格尔觉得市民社会和政治社会的分离是一种矛盾，这是他的著作中比较深刻的地方。”这种深刻性就在于，只有将市民社会与国家的概念分离开，才能凸显双方的对立关系，才能从对立关系中发现基于国家的权利观与基于市民社会的权利观。马克思认为，权利包含国家与市民社会两个层面的内容：黑格尔所讨论的是国家层面的权利，与王权、行政权和立法权相联；法国1793年的《人权和公民权利宣言》所列举的各项权利，则主要与市民社会层面的权利相联。在对市民社会的考察中，马克思聚焦于私有制、所有权或私有财产，正是通过它们，形成“人对人的依赖”。这里已经接近市民社会自组织性的观点。简言之，随着市民社会与国家的分离，权利自身也分离为两大独立的部分：国家层面的权利（如王权、行政权和立法权）与市民社会层面的权利（如市民社会成员的物质生活权利和经济活动权利）。

"The relation of civil society and the state is the central problem of the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*." Going further, from the standpoint of right, one can see that Marx's discussion of this central problem is in fact built on the foundation of a conception of right. From another level, the relation between right at the level of civil society and right at the level of the state is also the central problem of the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*. The core content of the relation between the two is which kind of right is more fundamental. This forms two opposed views: one view holds that right at the level of the state is more fundamental; the other view holds that right at the level of civil society is more fundamental. The reason these two views are opposed mainly stems from: one view is the product of attention to the logic of the Idea (Hegel's conception of right); the other view is the achievement of attention to social reality (Marx's conception of right). In Hegel's understanding, "the true center of attention is not the philosophy of right, but logic," and "the entire philosophy of right is merely a supplement to logic." Marx clearly points out that Hegel does not abstract theoretical thought from objective objects, but rather uses his own presupposed abstract logical system to delimit objective objects, and thus unconsciously falls into the error of "logical, pantheistic mysticism." The evolutionary logic of Hegel's idealist Idea means that he can only understand the question of right from the level of the state. In his view, the state can accomplish the task of advancing right as ethical Idea, and therefore "the state is the actuality of the ethical Idea." Hegel holds that so-called right is necessarily at the level of the state, because the state is the holder, giver, and executor of right, that is, the state possesses sovereignty, executive power, and legislative power.

“市民社会和国家的关系是《黑格尔法哲学批判》的中心问题。”更进一步地，从权利的视角出发，就可以看出马克思有关这个中心问题的讨论其实是建立在权利观的基础上的。从另一个层面说，市民社会层面的权利与国家层面的权利之间的关系同时也是《黑格尔法哲学批判》的中心问题。二者关系的核心内容是哪一种权利更具有根本性。这就形成了两种对立的观点：一种观点认为国家层面的权利更根本；另一种观点认为市民社会层面的权利更根本。这两种观点之所以对立，主要源于：一种观点是关注理念逻辑的产物（黑格尔的权利观）；另一种观点是关注社会现实的成果（马克思的权利观）。在黑格尔的理解中，“真正注意的中心不是法哲学，而是逻辑学”，“整个法哲学只不过是逻辑学的补充”。马克思明确指出，黑格尔不是从客观对象中抽象出理论思想，而是用自己以及预设好的抽象的逻辑体系去限定客观对象，这便在不自觉中深陷于“逻辑的、泛神论的神秘主义”的迷途。黑格尔的唯心主义理念的演进逻辑使得他只能从国家层面理解权利问题。在他看来，国家可以完成将作为伦理理念的权利向前推进的任务，因此，“国家是伦理理念的现实”。黑格尔认为，所谓的权利必然是国家层面的，因为国家是权利的执掌者、赋予者和执行者，即国家拥有王权、行政权和立法权。

Marx’s concern with social reality runs through all of his theoretical creation and revolutionary activity. During his period at the *Rheinische Zeitung*, he paid close attention to the struggle against the law on theft of wood, pondering the practical question of “why the poor may not gather dead branches in the nobles’ estates,” and concluded that the poor have the right to gather dead branches, for this is their basic right to subsistence. Marx pointed out that the nobles’ representatives invoked medieval customary law to justify the law on theft of wood and to convict the poor who gathered dead branches; this was a “habit of the privileged,” a habit from the animal period of humanity, “the law of animals,” and “an expression of unfreedom,” whereas “the law of humanity is an expression of freedom.” In the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, he established a conception of rights based on civil society in order to complete his critique of Hegel’s state-based conception of rights; this was in fact an important continuation of his reflection on the question of rights during his *Rheinische Zeitung* period. In the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, Marx emphasized the naturalness and inalienability of rights at the level of civil society. He held that although the state is the holder, grantor, and enforcer of rights, because rights at the level of civil society are more foundational and fundamental, one cannot, in the name of the state, deprive citizens of their socioeconomic rights at the level of civil society. Before Marx, Hegel’s state-based conception of rights had received widespread attention; through Marx’s efforts, the civil-society-based conception of rights was established. At this point, the two different conceptions of rights, developed around the question of the relation between state and civil society, were presented in opposition to each other.

马克思对社会现实的关注贯穿于其全部的理论创建和革命活动。他在《莱茵报》时期就密切关注当时的反对林木盗窃法的斗争，思考“为什么穷人不能在贵族的庄园里捡拾枯树枝”这一现实问题，并得出结论：穷人有权捡拾枯树枝，这是他们的基本生存权利。马克思指出，贵族的代表用中世纪的习惯法来说明林木盗窃法的合理性，给捡拾枯树枝的穷人定罪，这是一种“特权者的习惯”，是人类的动物时期的习惯，是“动物的法”，是“不自由的体现”，“而人类的法是自由的体现”。他在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中建立起基于市民社会的权利观来完成对黑格尔基于国家的权利观的批判，这实际上是他在《莱茵报》时期思考权利问题的重要延续。在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中，马克思强调了市民社会层面权利的自然性以及不可剥夺性。他认为，虽然国家是权利的执掌者、赋予者和执行者，但由于市民社会层面的权利更为基础与根本，因此并不能假借国家之名去剥夺公民在市民社会层面上的社会经济权利。在马克思之前，黑格尔的基于国家的权利观受到广泛的关注；经过马克思的努力，基于市民社会的权利观得以确立。至此，围绕国家与市民社会关系问题而展开的两种不同的权利观以对立的方式呈现出来。

II. Marx’s Subversive Critique of Hegel’s State-Based Conception of Rights

二、马克思对黑格尔基于国家的权利观的颠覆性批判

In the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, Marx’s critique of Hegel’s state-based conception of rights displays a distinctly subversive character. This subversiveness is expressed in the fact that it undertakes a foundational understanding of the question of rights on the basis of civil society, no longer understanding the question of rights, as Hegel did, solely from the standpoint of the state. At the same time, this subversiveness also expresses the opposition between Marx’s civil-society-based conception of rights and Hegel’s state-based conception of rights, and the fact that the former is able to oppose the latter in an antagonistic manner and replace it. The root of Hegel’s state-based conception of rights lies in his idealist position. In his *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, he wrote: “In general, the basis of right is spirit, and its determinate place and point of departure is the will. The will is free, so that freedom constitutes both the substance of the will and its goal, and the system of right is the realm of actualized freedom.” In this way, Hegel understood the state as an absolute idea, and regarded civil society, the family, and state institutions as externalized forms of the state. For Hegel, both law and right must be understood from the level of the state; this is the intellectual bottom line of Hegel’s conception of rights. Unlike Hegel, who regarded the family and civil society as “the conceptual domain of the state,” Marx explicitly stated: “The family and civil society are both preconditions of the state; they are what is truly active; but in speculative thinking all this is inverted.” By grounding the basis of right in civil society, Marx expressed his clear opposition to Hegel’s thought on hierarchical legislation. In Marx’s view, legislative power is ultimately determined by civil society, not, as Hegel held, by the ruling classes such as the monarch and the aristocracy. Marx maintained that legislative power should be held by the people in civil society, for only the people are the real basis and true representative of universal interest. It should be noted that Marx’s position here is highly consistent with Rousseau’s theory of popular sovereignty in its resolute denial that right comes from the state. However, unlike Rousseau’s claim that right comes from the “social contract,” Marx not only pointed out that right comes from civil society, but further revealed that right comes from the “material relations of life” within civil society, which forms a fundamental difference from Rousseau’s position.

在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中，马克思对黑格尔基于国家的权利观的批判显示出鲜明的颠覆性。这种颠覆性体现为它是基于市民社会对权利问题展开基础性理解，不再像黑格尔那样只是从国家出发理解权利问题。同时，这种颠覆性也体现了马克思的基于市民社会的权利观与黑格尔的基于国家的权利观之间的对立，以及前者是能够以对立的方式去对抗后者并取而代之的。黑格尔的权利观之所以从国家出发，根源在于他的唯心主义立场。他在《法哲学原理》中写道：“一般说，权利的基础是精神，它们的确定地位和出发点是意志。意志是自由的，所以意志既是权利的实质又是权利的目标，而权利体系则是已成现实的自由王国。”这样，黑格尔就将国家理解为一种绝对理念，而将市民社会、家庭、国家机构等视为国家的外化形式。在黑格尔那里，无论是法还是权利，都必须从国家层面加以理解，这是黑格尔在权利观上的思想底线。与黑格尔将家庭和市民社会视为“国家的概念领域”不同，马克思明确指出：“家庭和市民社会都是国家的前提，它们才是真正活动着的；而在思辨的思维中这一切却是颠倒的。”通过将权利的根据建立在市民社会的基础上，马克思对黑格尔的等级制立法思想表示了明确的反对态度。在马克思看来，立法权最终是由市民社会决定的，而并非如同黑格尔所认为的那样，是由君主和贵族等统治阶级决定的。马克思主张，立法权应该由市民社会中的人民掌握，只有人民才是普遍利益的现实基础和真正代表。需要指出的是，马克思的这种主张与卢梭的人民主权理论在坚决否定权利来自于国家这一点上，具有高度的一致性。但是，与卢梭关于权利来自于“社会契约”的主张不同，马克思不仅指出权利来自于市民社会，而且进一步揭示出权利来自于市民社会中的“物质的生活关系”，这就与卢梭的主张形成了根本性的区别。

Hegel’s theory of bureaucracy is the intellectual representative of one who clearly sees the separation of civil society from the state, yet hopes to reunite state and civil society under the dominance of the state. Marx proposed to “invert” this. He held that it is civil society that truly represents universal interest itself. Proceeding from civil society, Marx held that the mystery of the bureaucracy described by Hegel is in fact a manifestation of a state fabricated by Hegel in the world of ideas. In the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, Marx pointed out that “the development of history transformed political estates into social estates,” “the actual process of transformation from political estates to civil estates took place under absolute monarchy,” and “only the French Revolution completed the transformation from political estates to social estates, or rather, made the distinctions of rank in civil society entirely into social distinctions, that is, distinctions in private life that have no significance in political life. In this way the separation of political life from civil society was completed.” From this discussion it can be seen that the reason Marx believed the civil-society-based conception of rights could be used to achieve a subversive critique of Hegel’s state-based conception of rights is that there exists a relation of separation between state and civil society, and that this separation is historical.

黑格尔的官僚政治理论是明明看到市民社会与国家相分离，却又希望以国家为主导将国家与市民社会重新统一起来的思想代表。马克思提出要“颠倒过来”。他认为，真正代表着普遍利益本身的是市民社会。从市民社会出发，马克思认为，黑格尔所描述的官僚政治的神秘性其实是黑格尔在理念世界中所虚构的国家的一种体现。马克思在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中指出，“历史的发展使政治等级变成社会等级”，“从政治等级到市民等级的真正转变过程是在君主专制政体中发生的”，“只有法国大革命才完成了从政治等级到社会等级的转变过程，或者说，使市民社会的等级差别完全变成了社会差别，即在政治生活中没有意义的私人生活的差别。这样就完成了政治生活同市民社会的分离”。从这一论述中可看出，马克思之所以认为可以借助基于市民社会的权利观来实现对黑格尔基于国家的权利观的颠覆性批判，是因为国家与市民社会之间存在着分离关系，并且这种分离是历史性的。

The appearance of Hegel’s *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* was precisely intended to provide a theoretical explanation of the significance of the state for the question of rights; it is an expression at the level of cognition of the separation of the modern state from civil society. The reason Marx was able in the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* to achieve a critique of Hegel’s state-based conception of rights lies in the fact that he saw, from a realist perspective, the existence of civil society and the existence of a civil-society-based conception of rights. Through his critique, Marx told people that the ground of right must be sought in civil society, and that Hegel’s attempt to answer the question of rights in civil society by means of a state-based conception of rights was fundamentally mistaken in its direction.

黑格尔的《法哲学原理》一书的问世，正是为了对国家在权利问题上的重要意义作出理论上的说明，这是现代国家从市民社会中分离出来之后的一种认识上的表现。马克思在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中之所以能够实现对黑格尔基于国家的权利观的批判，在于他以现实主义的视角看到了市民社会的存在，以及基于市民社会的权利观的存在。马克思通过批判告诉人们，权利的根据必须到市民社会中去寻找，黑格尔试图用基于国家的权利观来解答市民社会中的权利问题这一方向是根本错误的。

III. The Creation of Marx’s Historical Materialist Conception of Rights: The Important Historical Value of the Critique of Hegel’s Conception of Rights

三、马克思的历史唯物主义权利观的创建：黑格尔权利观批判的重要历史价值

The significance of the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* in the process of creating Marx’s historical materialist conception of rights is clearly reflected in Marx’s later recollection of the circumstances in which he wrote this work: “The first work which I undertook to dispel the doubts assailing me was a critical review of the Hegelian philosophy of right, a work whose introduction appeared in 1844 in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* published in Paris. My investigation led to the result that legal relations as well as forms of state are to be grasped neither from themselves nor from the so-called general development of the human mind, but rather have their roots in the material conditions of life, the sum total of which Hegel, following the example of the English and French of the eighteenth century, combines under the name of ‘civil society.’” If one considers that Hegel, in the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, held only that the understanding of right should proceed from the state, then Marx’s view above is in fact the declaration of his historical materialist position in the conception of rights. The creation of Marx’s historical materialist conception of rights was inaugurated in the process of his subversive critique of Hegel’s conception of rights. The establishment in the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* of the important theory that “civil society determines the state” shows that this work is the starting point of the creation of Marx’s historical materialist conception of rights; from another angle, the important historical value of Marx’s critique of Hegel’s conception of rights is that it inaugurated the creation of Marx’s historical materialist conception of rights.

《黑格尔法哲学批判》在马克思的历史唯物主义权利观的创建过程中的重要意义清晰地反映在马克思后来对这部著作撰写经历的回忆中：“为了解决使我苦恼的疑问，我写的第一部著作是对黑格尔法哲学的批判性的分析，这部著作的导言曾发表在1844年巴黎出版的《德法年鉴》上。我的研究得出这样一个结果：法的关系正像国家的形式一样，既不能从它们本身来理解，也不能从所谓人类精神的一般发展来理解，相反，它们根源于物质的生活关系，这种物质的生活关系的总和，黑格尔按照18世纪的英国人和法国人的先例，概括为‘市民社会’。”如果从黑格尔在《法哲学原理》中只是认为理解权利应从国家出发这一点来看，马克思的上述观点实际上就是其历史唯物主义立场在权利观上的亮明。马克思的历史唯物主义权利观的创建是在对黑格尔的权利观进行颠覆性批判的过程中开启的。“市民社会决定国家”这一重要理论在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中的确立，表明了这部著作是马克思的历史唯物主义权利观创建的起点，从另一个角度来说，马克思对黑格尔权利观批判的重要历史价值就是开启了马克思的历史唯物主义权利观的创建。

Marx pointed out that the real foundation of law and right is "civil society" as the "totality of material relations of life," thereby revealing the real basis of the phenomenon of right. In his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, he wrote: "The real basis of private property, namely possession, is a fact, an inexplicable fact, not a right. It is only through society's conferring legal stipulation upon actual possession that actual possession acquires the character of lawful possession, the character of private property." In Marx's view, right is formed only after the social fact of "possession" is fixed in legal form; the emergence of right is grounded in social fact. This shows that no right is pre-given; it is merely another presentation of social fact, that is, of the "totality of material relations of life." On civil society, Marx offers a classic exposition in *The German Ideology*: "The term 'civil society' emerged in the eighteenth century, when property relations had already cast off the classical ancient and medieval community. Civil society as such only develops with the bourgeoisie; but the name civil society always marks the social organization that develops directly out of production and intercourse, and this social organization in all epochs forms the basis of the state and of any other ideal superstructure." Here the foundational position of civil society with respect to the state and law is clarified; the cognitive basis for any understanding of the state, law, and right is civil society.

马克思指出法与权利的真实基础就是作为“物质的生活关系的总和”的“市民社会”，从而揭示了权利现象的现实根基。他在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中写道：“私有财产的真正基础，即占有，是一个事实，是无可解释的事实，而不是权利。只是由于社会赋予实际占有以法律规定，实际占有才具有合法占有的性质，才具有私有财产的性质。”在马克思看来，“占有”这种社会事实被法律的形式确定以后才形成权利，权利的产生是建立在社会事实的基础之上的。这说明任何权利都不是既定的，它只是社会事实即“物质的生活关系的总和”的另一种呈现。关于市民社会，马克思在《德意志意识形态》中有一段经典论述：“‘市民社会’这一用语是在18世纪产生的，当时财产关系已经摆脱了古典古代的和中世纪的共同体。真正的市民社会只是随同资产阶级发展起来的；但是市民社会这一名称始终标志着直接从生产和交往中发展起来的社会组织，这种社会组织在一切时代都构成国家的基础以及任何其他的观念的上层建筑的基础。”在此，市民社会对于国家和法的基础地位得以阐明，有关国家、法以及权利的认识基础就是市民社会。

In the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, apart from citing Hegel's concept of "civil society," Marx mentions the concept of "civil society" 301 times. It is evident that for Marx, a thorough critique of Hegel's conception of right had to be grounded in civil society. It should be noted that Marx's study of civil society begins from civil society in the narrow sense, that is, from the bourgeois society in which he himself stood; like Hegel, he explicitly uses the term "bürgerliche Gesellschaft" to designate civil society. As his research deepened, Marx moved from civil society in the narrow sense to reveal, by focusing on material relations of production and life, the decisive role of these relations in social development. In this way, Marx's understanding of civil society expanded from the narrow sense to the broad sense, from "bourgeois society" to "all epochs" of human society. This is precisely the important reason why Marx, in his *Theses on Feuerbach*, proposed that "the standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the standpoint of the new materialism is human society, or social humanity." It reflects the fact that Marx completed the construction of historical materialism in the process of expanding from civil society in the narrow sense to civil society in the broad sense. For Marx, civil society in the broad sense is the civil society that serves as the "true source and stage of all history," referring to "the form of intercourse determined by the productive forces at all preceding historical stages and in turn determining the productive forces." From the perspective of intellectual development, the important basis on which Marx's critique of Hegel's conception of right in the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* rests is civil society in the narrow sense (that is, "bourgeois society"). For this very reason, by establishing a conception of right grounded in civil society, Marx enables people to see clearly that to truly understand the essence of the bourgeois conception of right, one must ground oneself in bourgeois society itself; Hegel's conception of right is grounded only in the state, so one cannot see from it the foundational significance of bourgeois society for the development of the bourgeois conception of right, and the hypocrisy of the bourgeois conception of right is thereby obscured by Hegel's conception of the state. Marx's understanding of the question of right did not stop there. In *The German Ideology*, he further profoundly reveals that civil society, as "the social organization that develops out of production and intercourse," "in all epochs forms the basis of the state and of any other ideal superstructure." At this point, the universal foundational significance of civil society for the state, law, and right is clearly elucidated. It is precisely because the conception of right grounded in civil society was established in the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* that Marx ultimately achieved a breakthrough "from the point to the whole" in his understanding of the question of right in *The German Ideology*. Marx's historical materialist conception of right was created on the basis of civil society; yet this conception of right is not limited to understanding the question of right merely by taking bourgeois society as its sample. On the basis of civil society in the broad sense, Marx established a conception of right of universal significance that transcends bourgeois society, and this is concentratedly embodied in his late exposition of the conception of right in communist society in the *Critique of the Gotha Programme*.

在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中，除引用黑格尔的“市民社会”概念外，马克思共提及“市民社会”概念301次。由此可见，对于马克思来说，要想彻底批判黑格尔的权利观，必须立足于市民社会。需要说明的是，马克思对市民社会的研究是从狭义的市民社会入手的，是从他当时所处的资产阶级社会开始的，他同黑格尔一样明确地使用“资产阶级社会”（bürgerliche Gesellschaft）一词来指待市民社会。随着研究的深入，马克思从狭义的市民社会中通过聚焦物质的生产生活关系，揭示出物质的生产生活关系在社会发展中的决定性作用。这样一来，马克思有关市民社会的理解便从狭义的市民社会拓展为广义的市民社会，从“资产阶级社会”拓展为人类社会的“一切时代”。这也正是马克思在《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》中提出“旧唯物主义的立脚点是市民社会，新唯物主义的立脚点则是人类社会或社会的人类”的重要原因。它反映出马克思是在从狭义的市民社会拓展到广义的市民社会的过程中完成了历史唯物主义的构建。在马克思那里，广义的市民社会就是作为“全部历史的真正发源地和舞台”的市民社会，它所意指的是“受到迄今为止一切历史阶段的生产力制约同时又反过来制约生产力的交往形式”。从思想发展的角度来看，马克思在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中对黑格尔权利观的批判所立足的重要基础是狭义的市民社会（即“资产阶级社会”）。正因如此，马克思通过建立基于市民社会的权利观让人们清晰地看到：要想真正理解资产阶级权利观的本质，就必须立足于资产阶级社会本身；黑格尔的权利观只是建立在国家的基础上，因此人们并不能从中看到资产阶级社会对资产阶级权利观发展的基础意义，资产阶级权利观的虚伪性也便受到了黑格尔国家观的遮蔽。马克思对权利问题的理解并没有止步于此。他在《德意志意识形态》中进一步深刻揭示出市民社会作为“从生产和交往中发展起来的社会组织”，“在一切时代都构成国家的基础以及任何其他的观念的上层建筑的基础”。至此，市民社会对于国家、法和权利的普遍性的基础意义得到了清晰的阐释。正是由于在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中确立了基于市民社会的权利观，马克思最终在《德意志意识形态》中对权利问题的理解取得了“以点带面”的突破。马克思的历史唯物主义权利观的创建是基于市民社会而展开的，然而这种权利观却并不局限于只是以资产阶级社会作为样本来理解权利问题。马克思在广义的市民社会的基础上建立了超越资产阶级社会的具有普遍意义的权利观，这一点集中体现于马克思晚年在《哥达纲领批判》中对共产主义社会权利观的阐述之中。

Unlike Hegel, who regarded right as a spiritual existence at the level of the state, Marx held that human rights are always historical and concrete, not innate and abstract; they are determined by the material and cultural structure of the given society. The *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* provided an important theoretical cornerstone for the creation of Marx's historical materialist conception of right. Marx once proposed: "Criticism is no longer an end in itself, but merely a means. Its essential emotion is indignation, its essential work is exposure." The important statement that the essential work of criticism is "exposure" is the intellectual guide by which we may more deeply understand the significance of the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*. It was precisely in the process of "exposing" the defects of Hegel's conception of right that Marx ultimately completed the construction of the historical materialist conception of right in *The German Ideology*.

与黑格尔将权利视为国家层面上的一种精神存在不同，马克思认为，人的权利从来都是历史的、具体的，而不是天赋的、抽象的，它是由这个社会的物质和文化结构决定的。《黑格尔法哲学批判》为马克思的历史唯物主义权利观的创建提供了重要的理论基石。马克思曾提出：“批判已经不再是目的本身，而只是一种手段。它的主要情感是愤怒，它的主要工作是揭露。”批判的主要工作是“揭露”这一重要论述是我们更加深入地理解《黑格尔法哲学批判》的重要意义的思想指南。马克思正是在“揭露”黑格尔权利观弊端的过程中，最终在《德意志意识形态》中完成了历史唯物主义权利观的构建。

On the whole, Marx's historical materialist conception of right is grounded in the theory that "civil society determines the state," which may be explained in the following three aspects. First, proceeding from the essence of the human being, Marx put forward the idea of the legitimacy of right grounded in civil society, highlighting the historical materialist character of Marx's conception of right. Marx opposed understanding human rights from the standpoint of abstract human rights divorced from social relations and the practical life of society, emphasized that the state and society cannot be treated as existences opposed to the individual, and held that to understand the legitimacy of right one cannot detach oneself from civil society as the basis of the existence of the individual. Marx pointed out: "The essence of the 'particular person' is not his beard, his blood, his abstract body, but his social quality." Civil society is precisely the embodiment of the human being's social quality; therefore, although right can be expressed through the form of the state, that is, as "law," fundamentally the establishment of right expressed as "law" has as its basis civil society and the rights of economic activity and economic intercourse operating within civil society. According to the theory that "civil society determines the state," the socioeconomic rights of members of civil society can play a decisive role with respect to "law" at the level of the state, that is, the rights of the monarchy, the executive, and the legislature in the juridical sense. Therefore, one must seek the legitimacy of right from civil society, not the reverse, not from the state. Hegel's error lies precisely in demonstrating the legitimacy of right only from the state, and hence his conception of right is an idealist one.

总体上说，马克思的历史唯物主义权利观建基于“市民社会决定国家”这一理论之上，对此可从以下三个方面作出展开说明。第一，马克思从人的本质出发，提出了建立在市民社会基础之上的权利正当性思想，凸显了马克思权利观的历史唯物主义特性。马克思反对从脱离社会关系和社会生活实践的抽象人权的角度来理解人的权利，强调不能把国家和社会作为与个人相对立的存在，认为要想理解权利的正当性就不能脱离作为个体的人的存在基础的市民社会。马克思指出：“‘特殊的人格’的本质不是它的胡子、它的血液、它的抽象的肉体，而是它的社会特质。”市民社会正是人的社会特质的体现，因此，虽然权利可以通过国家的形式表现出来，即体现为“法”，但从根本上说，这种体现为“法”的权利的建立，其基础却是市民社会以及在市民社会中运行的经济活动和经济交往的权利。依照“市民社会决定国家”这一理论，市民社会成员的社会经济权利能够对国家层面上的“法”，即法的意义上的王权、行政权和立法权等，发挥决定性作用。因此，需要从市民社会出发去寻找权利的正当性，而不是相反，从国家出发去寻找权利的正当性。黑格尔的错误就在于仅从国家出发去论证权利的正当性，因此其权利观是唯心主义的权利观。

Second, taking civil society as his point of departure, Marx theoretically revealed the dialectical relationship between rights one ought to have and rights one actually has, and further established the foundational significance of civil society for understanding the phenomenon of rights. The young Marx very early discovered the sharp opposition between "what is real" and "what ought to be," and at the time he explicitly maintained that this opposition between the "is" and the "ought" was "inherent in idealism, and the source of the subsequently produced, incurably erroneous division."[9]9 Marx, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, referring to the opposition between the "is" and the "ought" as inherent in idealism. In his later research, Marx always sought, by "carefully studying the object itself in its development," rather than by "arbitrarily dividing" it, to allow the reason inherent in the thing itself to unfold "as something internally contradictory." He held that, in order to resolve the opposition between the "is" and the "ought" on the question of rights, one must proceed from civil society. For Marx, so-called civil society is "the totality of material relations of life."[10]10 Marx, Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), where civil society is defined as the totality of material relations of life. Proceeding from civil society, Marx emphasized: "Rights can never be higher than the economic structure of society and its cultural development conditioned thereby."[11]11 Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (1875), on the limits of rights relative to the economic structure and cultural development of society. If, in the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Marx indicated that the ground for understanding rights must be sought in civil society, then in *The German Ideology* Marx indicated how to break through the idealist understanding of the phenomenon of rights. Marx explicitly pointed out that "the legal illusion that rights are reducible to pure will, under the further development of relations of ownership, necessarily gives rise to this phenomenon: that someone may legally have a right to a thing without actually possessing it," and that "this right is of no use to him whatsoever."[12]12 Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology* (1845–46), on the legal illusion that rights are reducible to pure will under developed relations of ownership. This view clearly shows that rights cannot be understood on the basis of a subjective "legal illusion," for otherwise a situation would arise in which, although some rights are stipulated in law, they cannot be realized in practice. Here Marx also placed particular emphasis on "relations of ownership," further indicating that different relations of ownership can give rise to different relations of rights. Therefore, if people are to strive for rights actually possessed, they must proceed from the actual conditions of the economic development of civil society; this is the reason why different relations of ownership are able to manifest themselves.

第二，马克思将市民社会作为出发点，在理论上揭示了应有权利与实有权利之间的辩证关系，更进一步地确立了市民社会对理解权利现象的基础意义。青年马克思很早便发现“现实的东西”与“应有的东西”之间的尖锐对立，他当时明确地主张，这种“实然”与“应然”之间的对立是“理想主义所固有的，是随后产生的无可救药的错误的划分的根源”。在后来的研究中，马克思总是力图通过“从对象的发展上细心研究对象本身”，而不是对其“任意划分”，从而让事物本身的理性“作为一种自身矛盾的东西”得以展开。他认为，要想解决权利问题上“实然”与“应然”的对立，必须从市民社会出发。在马克思那里，所谓的市民社会就是“物质的生活关系的总和”。从市民社会出发，马克思强调：“权利决不能超出社会的经济结构以及由经济结构制约的社会的文化发展。”如果说，在《黑格尔法哲学批判》中，马克思指明了理解权利的根据必须到市民社会中寻找，那么在《德意志意识形态》中，马克思则指明了如何破除对权利现象的唯心主义理解。马克思明确指出，“把权利归结为纯粹意志的法律上的错觉，在所有制关系进一步发展的情况下，必然会造成这样的现象：某人在法律上可以对某物享有权利，但实际上并不拥有某物”，“这种权利对他毫无用处”。这一观点清楚地表明，不能基于主观的“法律上的错觉”来理解权利，否则就会出现这样的情形，即虽然有些权利在法律上得到了规定，但在实际中却无法实现。马克思在此还特别强调了“所有制关系”，进一步表明不同的所有制关系可以派生出不同的权利关系。因此，人们要想争取实有权利，就必须从市民社会的经济发展的实际情况出发，这是不同的所有制关系得以呈现出来的原因所在。

Third, taking his stand on the process of economic development in civil society, Marx analyzed the historical developmental logic of relations of rights, giving people a clearer understanding of the historical-materialist foundation of relations of rights. In recalling the process of composing the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Marx explicitly put forward an important conclusion: "The anatomy of civil society is to be sought in political economy."[13]13 Marx, Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), stating that the anatomy of civil society is to be sought in political economy. That is to say, in order to understand relations of right and the forms of the state, one must proceed from the economy. "The various stages of development in the division of labor are just so many different forms of ownership."[14]14 Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, on the stages of the division of labor as forms of ownership. In *The German Ideology*, through his analysis of the internal relation between the division of labor and the forms of ownership, Marx put forward three forms of ownership connected with the social division of labor, namely "tribal ownership," "ancient communal and state ownership," and "feudal or estate ownership."[15]15 Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, listing the three forms of ownership: tribal, ancient communal and state, and feudal or estate ownership. All three forms of ownership are connected with relations of rights. What Marx elucidated is in fact the historical development of the social division of labor, forms of ownership, and relations of rights, which helps people further recognize the decisive influence of civil society, as the economic base, on the historical development of relations of rights.

第三，马克思立足于市民社会的经济发展进程，分析了权利关系的历史发展逻辑，使人们对权利关系的历史唯物主义基础有了更清晰的认识。在回忆《黑格尔法哲学批判》的创作历程时，马克思明确提出了一个重要结论：“对市民社会的解剖应该到政治经济学中去寻求。”这就是说，要想理解法的关系以及国家的形式，必须从经济出发。“分工的各个不同发展阶段，同时也就是所有制的各种不同形式。”马克思在《德意志意识形态》中通过对分工与所有制形式之间的内在关系的分析，提出了与社会分工相联系的三种所有制形式，即“部落所有制”、“古典古代的公社所有制和国家所有制”，以及“封建的或等级的所有制”。这三种所有制形式都与权利关系相联。马克思所阐明的实际上是社会分工、所有制形式以及权利关系的历史发展，这有助于人们进一步认识作为经济基础的市民社会对权利关系历史发展的决定性影响。

IV. Conclusion

四、结语

In sum, viewed from the perspective of rights, it can be clearly seen that Marx's *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* is an analysis tightly organized around two opposed conceptions of rights. Taking Hegel's *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* as his object of critique, he indicated his wish to theoretically re-examine Hegel's state-based conception of rights. On the basis of his critique of Hegel's conception of rights, he established a conception of rights based on civil society. Marx's interpretation shows that the ground for understanding rights should be sought directly in civil society. The establishment of the conception of rights based on civil society is the theoretical precondition for the construction of Marx's historical-materialist conception of rights. It is precisely in this sense that one can say the historical significance of the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* is very great: it is an important cornerstone of the construction and development of Marx's historical-materialist conception of rights.

综上所述，从权利的视角出发可以清楚地看到，马克思的《黑格尔法哲学批判》是紧紧围绕两种对立的权利观展开分析的。他将黑格尔的《法哲学原理》作为批判对象，表明他希望对黑格尔的基于国家的权利观作出理论上的重新梳理。他在对黑格尔的权利观进行批判的基础上确立了基于市民社会的权利观。马克思的诠释表明，应当直接到市民社会中去寻找理解权利的根据。基于市民社会的权利观的确立是马克思的历史唯物主义权利观得以构建的理论前提。正是在这个意义可以说，《黑格尔法哲学批判》的历史意义十分重大，它是马克思的历史唯物主义权利观构建与发展的重要基石。

(Author's biography: Wang Xueqiao: Renmin University of China Law School)

（作者简介：王雪乔：中国人民大学法学院）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心