Reinterpreting Heidegger's Practical Philosophy

In the 1960s, a movement of "rehabilitation of practical philosophy" (Rehabilitierung der praktischen Philosophie) arose in Western intellectual circles. According to Manfred Riedel's summary, the causes of this movement were, on the one hand, the urgency of resolving the internal contradictions of practical philosophy itself, and on the other hand, the revival of research on Aristotle and Hegel since 1945 and the reception of Anglo-Saxon metaethics. As far as the German situation is concerned, the movement began in 1961 with Joachim Ritter's philosophical-historical investigation in *On the Foundation of Aristotle's Practical Philosophy* (*Zur Grundlegung der praktischen Philosophie bei Aristoteles*). In 1969, Paul Lorenzen delivered a lecture titled "Scientism versus Dialectics" (*Szientismus versus Dialektik*) at the Düsseldorf Congress of Philosophers, which transformed and deepened the problem. (cf. Riedel, S.11-12) Within this movement, the existentialism led by Heidegger exerted a distinctive influence, which attracted the interest of the Italian philosopher Franco Volpi, who also won worldwide renown for his related research. As his student put it: "In the English-speaking world, Franco is best known for his account of Heidegger's 'ontologization' of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, and for his provocative reading of *Being and Time* as a translation of the 'ethics'." (Keane, p.327) It was precisely this research that later became one of the paradigms for exploring the question of Heidegger's practical philosophy. However, current domestic research on this topic is mainly of a general introductory nature, lacking systematic reflection. In view of this, the present study presents Volpi's work on the one hand, reveals its problems on the other, and on this basis attempts a more comprehensive interpretation of Heidegger's practical philosophy, with a view to offering a supplement to Volpi.

20世纪60年代，西方思想界兴起了一场“实践哲学复兴”（Rehabilitierung der praktischen Philosophie）的运动。这场运动的起因按曼弗雷德·里德尔（Manfred Riedel）的总结：一边是要解决实践哲学本身内在矛盾的急迫性；一边是1945年以来对亚里士多德和黑格尔研究的复兴及对盎格鲁-撒克逊元伦理学的接受。就德国的情形而言，这场运动始于1961年约阿希姆·里特（Joachim Ritter）在《论亚里士多德实践哲学的基础》（Zur Grundlegung der praktischen Philosophie bei Aristoteles）中所做的哲学史考查。1969年，保罗·洛伦岑（Paul Lorenzen）在杜塞尔多夫哲学家大会发表名为“科学主义与辩证法”（Szientismus versus Dialektik）的演讲，将问题转化并引向深入。（cf.Riedel,S.11-12）在此运动中，海德格尔引领的存在主义产生了独特影响，后者引起了意大利哲学家佛朗哥·沃尔皮（Franco Volpi）的兴趣，他也因相关研究赢得了世界性声誉。诚如其学生所言：“在英语世界，佛朗哥最出名的工作是他关于海德格尔对亚里士多德《尼各马可伦理学》的‘存在论化’（ontologization）的论述，以及对《存在与时间》是‘伦理学’的翻译的挑衅性解读。”（Keane,p.327）正是这项研究，后来成为探讨海德格尔实践哲学问题的范式之一。然而，目前国内对此研究主要是一般性介绍，缺乏系统反思。鉴于此，本研究一边呈现沃尔皮的工作，一边揭示其存在的问题，并在此基础上尝试更加全面地解读海德格尔实践哲学，以期给出一种对沃尔皮的补充。

I. Dasein as Practice: The Gains and Losses of Volpi's Research on the Relationship between Heidegger and Aristotle

一、此在作为实践：沃尔皮对海德格尔与亚里士多德关系研究的得失

In the late 1970s, Volpi took note of the trend of the rehabilitation of practical philosophy in Germany. In 1980, in his article "The Rehabilitation of Practical Philosophy in Germany," he presented two stages of the development and rehabilitation of practical philosophy: the first stage matured in the 1960s and bore a historical-linguistic character. This stage was characterized by a revival of Aristotle and Kant, both models of practical philosophy stemming from efforts to reconstruct the discipline. The second stage bore a theoretical-systematic character. This stage was characterized by the search, within the framework of the debates of mainstream contemporary German philosophy, for answers to the questions raised in the historical-linguistic field, especially in neo-Marxism, constructivism, hermeneutics, and critical rationalism. (cf. Volpi, 1980, p.17) The study of this movement not only displayed the face of the rehabilitation of practical philosophy in Germany, but also provided resources for Volpi; it was precisely this research that led him to Heidegger's practical philosophy—more precisely, to the study of the relationship between Heidegger and Aristotle. Before this, although he had also devoted himself to similar research and published *Heidegger and Brentano: Aristotelianism and the Problem of the Univocity of Being in the Philosophical Formation of the Young Martin Heidegger* (*Heidegger e Brentano. L'aristotelismo e il problema dell'univocità dell'essere nella formazione filosofica del giovane Martin Heidegger*) in 1976, the difference was that the later focus was no longer on the young Heidegger and the question of Being, but on a comprehensive presentation of his relationship with Aristotle; his research on the connection between the two on the question of practice began from this point. As he himself admitted: in the late 1970s, he had already attempted to seek similarities and even homogeneity between Heidegger's existential analytic (*existenziale Analytik*) and Aristotle's practical philosophy, and on this basis proposed the view that *Being and Time* is a modern reworking of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. (cf. Volpi, 2007, S.223)

上世纪70年代末，沃尔皮注意到了德国实践哲学复兴的趋势。1980年，在《德国实践哲学的复兴》一文中，他呈现了实践哲学发展及复兴的两个阶段：第一阶段于60年代走向成熟，富有历史-语言学特征。该阶段的特点是对亚里士多德和康德的复兴，此两种实践哲学的模型都源于重建这门学科的努力。第二阶段富有理论-系统特征。该阶段的特点是在当今德国主流哲学的辩论框架中，寻找历史-语言学领域所提问题的答案，尤其是新马克思主义、建构主义、诠释学及批判理性主义等。（cf.Volpi,1980,p.17）对该运动的研究不仅展示了德国实践哲学复兴的面貌，也为沃尔皮提供了资源，正是这项研究将他带向海德格尔实践哲学——更准确地说，带向对海德格尔与亚里士多德关系的研究。在此之前，他虽然也致力于类似研究，并于1976年出版了《海德格尔与布伦塔诺：青年马丁·海德格尔哲学形成中的亚里士多德主义与存在的单义性问题》（Heidegger e Brentano.L'aristotelismo e il problema dell'univocità dell'essere nella formazione filosofica del giovane Martin Heidegger），但不同的是，后来的聚焦点不再是青年海德格尔及存在问题，而是全面展现他与亚里士多德的关系，他对两者在实践问题上的关联的研究就始于此。正如他自己坦言：上个世纪70年代末，他已经尝试在海德格尔的生存论分析（existenziale Analytik）与亚里士多德的实践哲学之间寻找相似性乃至同质性，并据此提出《存在与时间》是《尼各马可伦理学》的现代翻版的观点。（cf.Volpi,2007,S.223）

The work that first gave expression to this view should be *Heidegger and Aristotle* (*Heidegger e Aristotele*), published in 1984. In the book, Volpi presents the influence of Aristotle on Heidegger in three stages, spanning not only his youth (1915-1923), but also the period of his teaching at the University of Marburg up to the publication of *Being and Time* (1923-1927), and even the period after the "turn" (after 1927). With respect to the theme of practical philosophy, his research focuses mainly on the second stage. Volpi proceeds from Heidegger's lecture course of the summer semester of 1924 to *Being and Time*, taking the three questions of truth, subject, and time as his guiding threads, showing one by one their relationship to Aristotle's thought, and revealing the inner connection among the three.

首次表露此观点的著作应该是出版于1984年的《海德格尔与亚里士多德》（Heidegger e Aristotele）。在书中，沃尔皮分三个阶段展示海德格尔受亚里士多德影响的情况，不仅贯穿其青年时代（1915-1923年），也包括任教于马堡大学到发表《存在与时间》（1923-1927年），乃至“转向”后的时期（1927年后）。就实践哲学这一主题而言，其研究主要聚焦在第二阶段。沃尔皮从海德格尔1924年夏季学期的课程开始到《存在与时间》，以真理、主体及时间三个问题为线索，逐一展示了它们与亚里士多德思想的关系，并揭示了三者的内在关联。

With respect to truth, Volpi holds that Heidegger, with the help of phenomenology, especially "categorial intuition," saw the originary understanding of truth in Aristotle and even in ancient Greece, namely, through the interpretation of Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* and *De Anima*, he found a foundation for the traditional truth of predication (*predicazione*). He holds that the ancient Greek conception of truth broke through beyond the category, grounding the truth of predication in an attitude of disclosure, which determines truth in the originary sense as disclosing and being-disclosed, that is, the relation between a subject and the state of Being of a disclosed object. This disclosure is grounded in the finding character of Dasein as subject and the findability of the object, that is, truth in the originary sense refers to the relation of the subject to an entity that is "in truth" (*wahrsein*, being-true). This is the inspiration Heidegger drew from the Greek word; it is also the achievement he obtained through Aristotle's definition of the soul—"the soul is the first actuality of a natural body potentially having life" (*Complete Works of Aristotle*, Vol. 3, p. 31). He not only interpreted the "natural body potentially having life" as Dasein, but also interpreted the "first actuality" as Dasein's being-present (*Anwesendsein*). (cf. Heidegger, 1992, S.18) The latter, in the sense of truth, is the "activity" of disclosure, the "unconcealment" that is primordially true; in the sense of time, it is the continuous presence from past through present to future, that is, "in order that truth in the sense of being-found, disclosure, can be determined as a characteristic of Being itself, Being must in some way be understood, namely, as presence (*Anwesenheit*). For only what is first determined as present can be understood as something found, something disclosed." (Volpi, 1984, p.87)

就真理而言，沃尔皮认为海德格尔在现象学，尤其是“范畴直观”的帮助下，看到了亚里士多德乃至古希腊对真理的源初理解，即通过对亚里士多德《解释篇》（De Interpretatione）和《论灵魂》（De Anima）的阐释，为传统的述谓（predicazione）真理找到了基础。他认为古希腊真理观突进到了范畴之外，将述谓真理的基础奠基于一种揭示（图片）态度，后者使源初意义上的真理被规定为揭示与被揭示，即一个主体与一个被揭示对象的存在情形之间的关系。这种揭示奠基于作为主体的此在（Dasein）的发现特征与对象的可发现特征，即源始意义的真理指主体与“在真理当中存在”（wahrsein，真在）的实体的关系。这是海德格尔从希腊词图片得到的启发；也是他借助亚里士多德对灵魂的界定——“灵魂是潜在具有生命的自然躯体的第一现实”（《亚里士多德全集》第3卷，第31页）——所取得的成果。他不仅将“具有生命的自然躯体”解读为此在，而且将“第一现实”解读为此在的在场存在（Anwesendsein）。（cf.Heidegger,1992,S.18）后者在真理意义上是揭示“活动”，是原始为真的“去蔽”（图片）；在时间意义上是由过去到现在再到将来的持续存在，即“为了使被发现-存在、揭示意义上的真理被限定为存在本身的特征，存在必须以某种方式被理解，即作为在场（Anwesenheit）。因为只有首先被确定为在场的东西，才能被理解为被发现、被揭示的东西”。（Volpi,1984,p.87）

The presence-at-hand of Dasein also establishes its relationship with time, namely, that the disclosive activity of truth continuously occurs between Dasein and what is disclosed. This issue gives rise to the divergence between Heidegger and Aristotle. Aristotle, and even the traditional understanding, regards time as a successive sequence of moments, that is, a chronological (cronologica) conception of time; whereas Heidegger, drawing on his interpretation of early Christianity, offers a kairological (kairologica) conception of time. (cf. ibid., p. 116) In the Pauline Epistles (Paulinischen Briefen), the latter signifies that the Christian understanding of time is directly linked to one's actual life of faith, namely, that "the Christian's religious experience lives (lebt) temporality." (Heidegger, 1995, S. 104) This time is not objective or cognitive, but is personally experienced together with actual life. By means of the concept of kairos, Heidegger advocates an experiential (Erlebnis) time that proceeds in step with actual life. This kairos concept does find expression in Aristotle: in the Metaphysics, he uses the term to refer to the Pythagorean school's theory linking numbers with life and other beings, where different numbers designate different things, especially important things or momentous moments in life, that is, kairos means the "decisive moment" (cf. Aristotle, 1924, p. 144); in the Rhetoric, kairos refers to the "opportunity" for uttering key phrases or suggestive remarks in order to focus the audience's attention (cf. Aristotle, 2009, p. 174; 2007, p. 234); in the Nicomachean Ethics, the term denotes the "specific moment" for choosing among different actions in concrete situations (cf. Aristotle, 2003, pp. 59-60). All of these reveal Aristotle's exploration of the practical significance of kairos. Although Heidegger takes note of the naturalistic (naturalistica) tendency in Aristotle's understanding of time (cf. Volpi, 1984, p. 118, 152), he is clearly more concerned with the discovery of practical time.

此在的在场也奠定了它与时间的关系，即作为真理的揭示活动持续发生于此在与被揭示者之间。该问题造成了海德格尔与亚里士多德的分歧。亚里士多德乃至传统领会都将时间看作前后相继的时间序列，即一种时序性（cronologica）时间观；而海德格尔借助对早期基督教的阐释，提供了一种时机性（kairologica）时间观。（cf.ibid.,p.116）后者在“保罗书信”（Paulinischen Briefen）里意味着基督徒对时间的领会与其实际信仰生活直接关联，即“基督徒的宗教性亲历（lebt）着时间性”。（Heidegger,1995,S.104）这种时间不是对象性、认知性的，而是与实际生活一道被亲身经历。凭借时机概念，海德格尔倡导一种与实际生活一道行进的体验（Erlebnis）时间。这种时机（图片）概念在亚里士多德那里确有体现：在《形而上学》中，他用该词指毕达哥拉斯学派将数字与生活乃至其他存在物相关联的理论，不同数字指代不同事物，尤指重要之物或人生重大时刻，即图片指“关键时刻”（cf.Aristotle,1924,p.144）；《修辞学》中，图片指为了集中听众注意力而说出关键字句或提示性话语的“时机”（opportunity）（cf.Aristotle,2009,p.174;2007,p.234）；《尼各马可伦理学》中，该词指在具体情境中对不同行为作出选择的“特定时刻”（图片）（参见亚里士多德，2003年，第59-60页）。这些都透露出亚里士多德对图片实践意义的探索。虽然海德格尔注意到亚里士多德时间理解中的自然主义（naturalistica）倾向（cf.Volpi,1984,p.118,152），但他显然更关注实践性时间的发现。

On the basis of the connections between Heidegger and Aristotle concerning truth, time, and the subject, Volpi selects a series of terms from Being and Time to elucidate their broader and deeper correspondences with Aristotelian thought. In Heidegger and Aristotle, these correspondences are only touched upon, for example: Gewissen (conscience) is a "translation" of phronesis (practical wisdom); Sorge (care) is a recovery of the concept of orexis (appetition); Entschlossenheit (resoluteness) corresponds to prohairesis (choice); Befindlichkeit (attunement) is an ontologization of the doctrine of pathos (passion); Verstehen (understanding) restores certain features of nous praktikos (practical reason), and so on. (ibid., pp. 28-29) The article that elaborates these correspondences in greater detail is "Dasein as Praxis: Heidegger's Assimilation and Radicalization of Aristotle's Practical Philosophy" (Dasein comme praxis. L'assimilation et la radicalisation heideggerienne de la philosophie pratique d'Aristote). That essay continues to proceed from the three aspects of truth, the ontological constitution of human life (the subject), and time, and focuses on the second aspect to reveal the correspondences between Aristotle's practical determinations and Heidegger's existential analysis. Among these, the most fundamental correspondences are threefold: Aristotle's praxis (practice), poiesis (production), and theoria (theory) correspond to Heidegger's Dasein, readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit), and presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit). In addition, Volpi adds new corresponding themes beyond Heidegger and Aristotle, such as being-toward (Zu-sein), mineness (Jemeinigkeit), and for-the-sake-of-which (Worumwillen). Ultimately, these correspondences converge on Heidegger's interpretation of the Nicomachean Ethics. On this basis, Volpi states: "Heidegger gradually came to believe that the questioned Aristotelian determinations, as they are presented in the Nicomachean Ethics, actually manifest three basic disclosive attitudes of human life (practice, production, theory) (parentheses and content added by the author—translator's note), in which three forms the soul is in truth, and thus they constitute the first complete phenomenological analysis of Dasein" (Volpi, 1992a, p. 106), that is, these three sets of correspondences mean, on the Aristotelian side, the forms in which the soul as the essence of the human being discloses truth, and on the Heideggerian side, the three modes of Dasein's existence. From this Volpi draws one conclusion: Dasein exists primarily in the sense of practice and production (rather than in the theoretical sense), establishing the correspondence between the analytic of Dasein and practical philosophy. A second conclusion: Aristotle's determination of the human being constitutes the basis for the phenomenological analysis of Dasein's existential structure, the latter being an ontologization of the former. In 1989 Volpi wrote a summary article, "Being and Time: Homologies with the Nicomachean Ethics" (Sein und Zeit: Homologien zur Nikomachischen Ethik), pointing out the homologous relationship between Dasein and praxis, and between Being and Time and the Nicomachean Ethics. Thereafter, almost all of Volpi's relevant research proceeds from the concept of "ontologization," for example, "Interpretation as Meaning, Saying, and Showing: The Ontologization of Language in the Early Heidegger from the Perspective of Aristotle" elucidates how Heidegger, drawing on Aristotle's understanding of logos, deals with the problem of language, holding that this is an ontologization of logos, thereby triggering a turn in the exploration of the relationship between language and being. (cf. Volpi, 1992b, S. 21-42)

基于海德格尔与亚里士多德在真理、时间、主体三方面的关联，沃尔皮从《存在与时间》中挑选出一系列术语，以阐明它们与亚里士多德思想更深广的对应关系。这些对应在《海德格尔与亚里士多德》中只是点到为止，比如：Gewissen（良知）是对图片（实践智慧）的“翻译”；Sorge（操心）是对图片（欲求）概念的复归；Entschlossenheit（决心）对应图片（选择）；Befindlichkeit（现身）是对图片（激情）学说的存在论化；Verstehen（理解）恢复了图片（实践理性）的某些特征，等等。（ibid.,pp.28-29）而更加细致阐明这些对应关系的文章是《此在作为实践：海德格尔对亚里士多德实践哲学的吸收和彻底化》（Dasein comme praxis.L'assimilation et la radicalisation heideggerienne de la philosophie pratique d'Aristote）。该文继续从真理、人类生活的存在论构造（主体）及时间三方面入手，并以第二方面为重点揭示亚里士多德实践规定与海德格尔生存分析的对应关系。其中，最基本的对应有三组：亚里士多德的图片（实践）、图片（制作）、图片（理论）对应海德格尔的此在、上手状态（Zuhandenheit）、在手状态（Vorhandenheit）。另外，沃尔皮还在《海德格尔与亚里士多德》的基础上增添了新的对应主题，比如去存在（Zu-sein）、向来我属性（Jemeinigkeit）、为何之故（Worumwillen）等。最终，这些对应汇集到海德格尔的《尼各马可伦理学》阐释中。据此，沃尔皮说：“海德格尔逐渐相信，所追问的亚里士多德的规定问题，正如它们在《尼各马可伦理学》中呈现的那样，实际上表明了人类生活的三种基本揭示态度（实践、制作、理论）（括号及内容为笔者所加——引者注）,在此三种形式中灵魂处于真理中，因此它们构成了对此在的第一个完整现象学分析”（Volpi,1992a,p.106），即这三组对应，在亚里士多德那里意味着作为人之本质的灵魂揭示真理的形式，在海德格尔那里意味着此在生存的三种状态。沃尔皮据此得出结论之一：此在首先在实践与制作的意义（而非理论意义）上存在，确立起此在分析与实践哲学的对应。结论之二：亚里士多德对人的规定构成了现象学分析此在生存结构的基础，后者是对前者的存在论化。1989年沃尔皮写了一篇总结性文章：《〈存在与时间〉：与〈尼各马可伦理学〉的同源性》（Sein und Zeit: Homologien zur Nikomachischen Ethik），点明此在与实践、《存在与时间》与《尼各马可伦理学》的同源关系。此后沃尔皮的相关研究几乎都从“存在论化”这一概念展开，比如《作为意指、言说、显示的解释：从亚里士多德看早期海德格尔的语言存在论化》阐明了海德格尔如何借助亚里士多德对逻各斯（图片）的理解来处理语言问题，认为这是对逻各斯的存在论化，从而引发了语言与存在关系探索的转向。（cf.Volpi,1992b,S.21-42）

It is worth noting that Volpi also explains the method and theme of his research in the above works. As for method, he rejects the philological and linguistic study of Aristotle and advocates a holistic grasp of the problems (cf. Volpi, 1989, S.225-226; 1992a, pp.122-123). This actually echoes Heidegger’s methodological choice in interpreting Aristotle, namely, to exclude the methods of Werner Jaeger and others (cf. Volpi, 1984, p.84, 177) and instead to appropriate intellectual resources through the method of “de-construction” (De-Konstruktion). Volpi also appropriates Heidegger and Aristotle in the same sense, viewing Heidegger’s fundamental ontology as an ontologization and radicalization (Radikalisierung) of Aristotle’s practical thought. This enabled him, in the 1970s and 1980s, when confronted with two major academic currents—the old existentialist interpretation and the reading of the relationship between Heidegger and metaphysics as a simple matter of overcoming and being overcome (cf. Volpi, 1989, S.240)—to identify the real problems and, through sustained effort, to develop this research into a classic paradigm in the relevant field. As for theme, Volpi insists on selecting truth, the subject, and time, and places the problem of the subject in a decisive position (ibid., S.227). This framework became his customary approach to dealing with the problems of Heidegger’s practical philosophy.

值得注意的是，沃尔皮在以上著作中也对其研究的方法和主题作了说明。就方法而言，他否定以训诂学、语言学研究亚里士多德，而提倡对问题的整体把握。（cf.Volpi,1989,S.225-226; 1992a,pp.122-123）这实际上呼应了海德格尔阐释亚里士多德时的方法论选择，即排除维尔纳·耶格尔（Werner Jaeger）等人的方法（cf.Volpi,1984,p.84,177），改以“解-构”（De-Konstruktion）法居有（appropriate）思想资源。沃尔皮也在相同意义上居有海德格尔和亚里士多德，将海德格尔的基础存在论看作对亚里士多德实践思想的存在论化和彻底化（Radikalisierung）。这使得他在上世纪七八十年代，面对两大学术潮流——旧的存在主义解释以及将海德格尔与形而上学之关系单纯解读为克服与被克服（cf.Volpi,1989,S.240）——的夹击，而能识别真问题，以持续不断的努力将此研究发展为相关领域的经典范式。就主题而言，沃尔皮坚持选定真理、主体和时间，并将主体问题置于决定地位。（ibid.,S.227）这种框架，成为他处理海德格尔实践哲学问题的惯例。

However, it must be said that Volpi’s research also suffers from problems of varying degrees. First, from the perspective of theme, Volpi directly refers to Dasein as the subject, which is a misunderstanding of Heidegger, since the latter clearly distinguishes between the two (cf. Heidegger, 2018, p. 60). Second, and more importantly, he places the focus of the comparison on the analysis of Dasein in *Being and Time*, causing the research to be unable to fully cover the goals he originally set for himself. In the “Introduction” to *Heidegger and Aristotle*, Volpi sets the starting point of his investigation at 1919 (cf. Volpi, 1984, p. 25), but ultimately places the emphasis on the period after Heidegger moved to the University of Marburg (1923). This can also be seen from the Heidegger works he references; for example, in discussing the problem of truth, he mainly references *Logic: The Question of Truth* (Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit); in discussing the problem of time, he mainly references *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*; in discussing the problem of the subject, both *Being and Time* and *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, which he references, were published during the Marburg period. Other referenced works include *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy* (Grundbegriffe der Aristotelischen Philosophie), *Aristotle: Metaphysics Theta 1-3* (Aristoteles: Metaphysik Θ 1-3), and so on, all of which were produced after the summer semester of 1923. Clearly, Volpi’s research is not comprehensive; even excluding the works before Heidegger returned to the lectern, it at least omits the thought of the period 1919-1923.

然而，不得不说沃尔皮的这项研究也存在不同程度的问题。首先，从主题看，沃尔皮直接以主体称呼此在，这是对海德格尔的误解，因为后者明确在两者之间作了区分。（参见海德格尔，2018年，第60页）其次，更重要的是，他将比较的重心落在《存在与时间》的此在分析，造成该研究无法全面覆盖当初为自己设定的目标。在《海德格尔与亚里士多德》的“引言”里，沃尔皮开门见山地将其考察的起点设定在1919年（cf.Volpi,1984,p.25），最终却将重心放在海德格尔移师马堡大学（1923年）后。这种情况从他参考的海德格尔著作也能看出，比如讨论真理问题，主要参考《逻辑学：真理的追问》（Logik.Die Frage nach der Wahrheit）；讨论时间问题，主要参考《现象学的基本问题》；讨论主体问题，无论所参考的《存在与时间》还是《时间概念史导论》，都发表于马堡时期。其他参考著作还包括《亚里士多德哲学的基本概念》（Grundebegriffe der Aristotelischen Philosophie）、《亚里士多德：形而上学第九卷1-3章》（Aristoteles: Metaphysik Θ 1-3）等，也都诞生于1923年夏季学期后。显然，沃尔皮的研究并不全面，即使排除海德格尔重返讲台前的作品，也至少遗漏了1919-1923年间的思想。

Of course, there is indeed an objective limitation here, namely, that when Volpi began this research, Heidegger’s early Freiburg works had not yet been published, a fact Volpi repeatedly lamented (cf. Volpi, 1984, p. 26; 1992a, p. 91). Among these works, the most important are *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Introduction to Phenomenological Research*, *Ontology (Hermeneutics of Facticity)*, and the “Natorp Report” (Natorp-Bericht). For in them Heidegger completed several key tasks: First, he derived from hermeneutics the reason why Aristotle could be appropriated by his interpretation, laying the foundation for the correspondence between practical philosophy and his own philosophy. Second, he used the essential characteristics of hermeneutics to correspond to practical wisdom (phronesis), raising this correspondence to a point prior to *Being and Time*. Third, he excavated the practical nature of philosophy, laying the foundation for the legitimacy of practical philosophy. That is to say, in Heidegger’s practical philosophy, the question of why Aristotle could exert influence and when he did so should not first seek an answer in the “analytic of Dasein,” but rather in the hermeneutics of facticity (Hermeneutik der Faktizität).

当然，这里确实存在客观的限制，即沃尔皮着手该研究时，海德格尔早期弗莱堡著作尚未出版，对此沃尔皮曾多次表达惋惜。（cf.Volpi,1984,p.26;1992a,p.91）在这些著作中，以《对亚里士多德的现象学阐释：现象学研究导论》《存在论（实势性的诠释学）》和“纳托普报告”（Natorp-Bericht）为要。因为在其中海德格尔完成了几项关键任务：第一，从诠释学导出亚里士多德能被其阐释所居有的原因，奠定实践哲学与他的哲学相对应的基础。第二，以诠释学的本质特征对应实践智慧（phronesis），将对应关系提到《存在与时间》之前。第三，开掘出哲学的实践本性，为实践哲学的合法性奠基。这就是说，在海德格尔的实践哲学中亚里士多德之所以能发生影响及何时发生，都不该首先在“此在分析”中找答案，而是应在实势性诠释学（Hermeneutik der Faktizität）中寻找。

Throughout Volpi’s research, he never touches on the elucidation of the relationship between Heidegger and Aristotle from the perspective of the hermeneutics of facticity. Even when he later wrote *The Question of the Logos in the Articulation of Facticity in the Young Heidegger, Reader of Aristotle* (La question du logos dans l’articulation de la facticité chez le jeune Heidegger, lecteur d’Aristote), which involves the concept of facticity (facticité), it only discusses the status of language in the analytic of Dasein. In 2003, *Return to the Greeks in the 1920s* (Il ritorno ai Greci negli anni Venti), although it examines the relationship between Heidegger and ancient Greece from a hermeneutic perspective, its discussion of practical philosophy still follows the original framework; the hermeneutics therein is merely a methodological path, not an elucidation of the relationship between the hermeneutics of facticity and practical philosophy (cf. Volpi, 2003, pp. 25-35). Moreover, by that time, all of Heidegger’s early works except volume 62 had been published, a fact Volpi was well aware of. In his article *Is Ethics Still Possible? Heidegger and “Practical Philosophy”* (È ancora possibile un’etica? Heidegger e la “filosofia pratica”), he explicitly mentions these texts, yet in his interpretation he still chooses to skip over them. This sufficiently indicates that, rather than objectively attributing this to the limitation of sources, it is better to say that Volpi never had the subjective intention to focus on the hermeneutics of facticity from beginning to end. As a supplement to Volpi, I will attempt to elucidate the relationship between the hermeneutics of facticity and practical philosophy.

纵观沃尔皮的研究，他根本未涉及从实势性诠释学出发对海德格尔与亚里士多德关系的阐发，即便后来他写《亚里士多德读者、青年海德格尔实势性阐明中的逻各斯问题》（La question du图片dans l'articulation de la facticité chez le jeune Heidegger,lecteur d'Aristote）涉及了实势性（facticité）概念，但也只是论述语言在此在分析中的地位。2003年，《1920年代回归希腊》虽然以诠释学的视角观照海德格尔与古希腊的关系，但对实践哲学的论述依然按照原有框架，其中的诠释学只是方法论路径，而非对实势性诠释学与实践哲学关系的阐明。（cf.Volpi，2003，pp.25-35）况且，当时海德格尔的早期著作除第62卷外，已全数出版，沃尔皮对此心知肚明，在《伦理学还有可能吗？海德格尔与“实践哲学”》（È ancora possibile un'etica? Heidegger e la “filosofia pratica”）的文章中，他明确提到了这些文献，但在解读时依旧选择跳过它们。这足以表明，与其从客观上归咎于文献限制，不如说沃尔皮从始至终都没有关注实势性诠释学的主观意愿。作为对沃尔皮的一种补充，笔者将尝试阐明实势性诠释学与实践哲学的关系。

II. Why Aristotle: Elucidating the Hermeneutics of Facticity from the “Natorp Report”

二、为什么是亚里士多德：从“纳托普报告”阐明实势性诠释学

Because Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity lasted for a short time and produced few published works, research on it is relatively weak. Although scholars dedicated to hermeneutics can note the importance of the hermeneutics of facticity, this importance is soon diluted by statements such as the following: the hermeneutics of facticity completed the turn from methodological hermeneutics to ontological hermeneutics, laying the foundation for Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics—that is, the importance of the hermeneutics of facticity must be manifested through philosophical hermeneutics, and it itself loses its independence. Leaving aside the differences between the hermeneutics of facticity and philosophical hermeneutics, the rich connotations contained within the hermeneutics of facticity itself are worthy of deep excavation. This includes, in particular, the practical philosophical implications of the hermeneutics of facticity. This can not only supplement Volpi’s elucidation of Heidegger’s practical philosophy, but also serves as the foundation for the practical dimension of Gadamer’s hermeneutics.

海德格尔的实势性诠释学由于持续时间短，出版论著少，对它的研究就相对薄弱。致力于诠释学研究的人虽然能注意到实势性诠释学的重要性，但这种重要性也很快被诸如以下的说法所冲淡：实势性诠释学完成了方法论诠释学向存在论诠释学的转向，为伽达默尔的哲学诠释学奠定了基础，即实势性诠释学的重要性需借助哲学诠释学来体现，其本身失去了独立性。且不论实势性诠释学与哲学诠释学存在差异，单是实势性诠释学本身所蕴藏的丰富内涵，也值得深入挖掘。这其中尤其包括实势性诠释学的实践哲学意涵。这不但可以与沃尔皮对海德格尔实践哲学的阐发相补充，也是伽达默尔诠释学之实践维度的基础。

According to the *Gesamtausgabe* [Collected Works of Heidegger], from the first mention of hermeneutics to the appearance of a specialized course bearing the title “Hermeneutics of Facticity,” a total of four years elapsed. From Heidegger’s first methodological proposal of “hermeneutical intuition” (Hermeneutische Intuition) in the “War Emergency Semester” of 1919 (Heidegger, 2015, p. 130) to the course titled “Ontology (Hermeneutics of Facticity)” in the summer semester of 1923, the thought of the hermeneutics of facticity, though undergoing some changes, can basically serve as the core concept governing this period. Among the important texts are the “Natorp Report,” *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Introduction to Phenomenological Research*, and *Ontology (Hermeneutics of Facticity)*. Through a careful reading and interpretation of these texts, it can be discovered that if there indeed exists in Heidegger a practical philosophy established through an engagement with Aristotle’s thought, then its starting point should lie in the hermeneutics of facticity.

据《海德格尔全集》，从第一次提到诠释学到出现冠以“实势性诠释学”之名的专题课程，前后持续四年。从1919年海德格尔在“战时补救学期”第一次以方法论视角提出“诠释学直观”（Hermeneutische Intuition）（海德格尔，2015年，第130页）到1923年夏季学期以“存在论（实势性的诠释学）”为题开设课程，实势性诠释学思想虽经历一些变化，但基本上可以作为统领此间思想的核心概念。其中重要的文献包括“纳托普报告”、《对亚里士多德的现象学阐释：现象学研究导论》《存在论（实势性的诠释学）》。通过对这些文献的细致阅读及阐释可以发现，如果说在海德格尔那里确实存在一种通过与亚里士多德思想交锋而确立的实践哲学，那么其起点应该在实势性诠释学里。

Unlike the correspondence between Heidegger and Aristotle on certain important concepts, the “Natorp Report” explicitly incorporates Aristotle into the hermeneutics of facticity. In it, Heidegger not only presents his hermeneutical conception, but this conception internally contains Aristotle; the latter not only lays the foundation for Heidegger’s appropriation of practical philosophy, but his hermeneutics itself also shows an affinity with Aristotle’s “practical wisdom” in its core meaning. Specifically, the task to be accomplished by the “Natorp Report” is fully revealed in its title—“Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation”—and consists of no more than two points: first, to carry out a phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle; second, to indicate the hermeneutical situation. These two points have an internal relationship of mutual inclusion, namely, that the phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle is precisely the content that the hermeneutical situation is to indicate. The concept of indication (Anzeige) in Heidegger does not mean simple clarification (klären), but has a profound phenomenological significance, just as he stipulates in the “Natorp Report,” namely, a kind of “transparency” (Durchsichtigkeit). This transparency does not merely “make clear” the hermeneutics and its situation, but rather “appropriates” (aneignen) them. In Heidegger’s words: “As long as this situation—in which and for which an interpretation temporalizes itself (zeitigt)—is clarified in the above respects (namely, standpoint [Blickstand], direction of sight [Blickrichtung], and range of sight [Sichtweite]) (parentheses and content added by the author—note by the translator), then the carrying out of possible interpretation and understanding, as well as the appropriation of the object (Gegenstandsaneignung) arising from them, is transparent.” (Heidegger, 2005, S.347) In other words, Heidegger believes that the hermeneutical situation must be clarified from the three aspects of the interpretation’s standpoint, direction of sight, and range of sight in order to achieve transparency, and only then can it be appropriated as the situation in which hermeneutics unfolds; that is, the indication of the hermeneutical situation ultimately means transparently appropriating the situation, making it the beginning of a new situation. This is the first layer of meaning of the hermeneutics of facticity.

与海德格尔和亚里士多德在某些重要概念上显示出来的对应关系不同，“纳托普报告”明确将亚里士多德纳入实势性诠释学当中。在其中海德格尔不仅提出了他的诠释学构想，而且这一构想内在地包含亚里士多德，后者不仅为海德格尔居有实践哲学奠定了基础，而且其诠释学本身也显示出与亚里士多德“实践智慧”在核心内涵上的接近。具体而言，“纳托普报告”所要完成的任务在其标题——“对亚里士多德的现象学阐释：诠释学处境的显示”——中就展露无遗，无非有二：第一，对亚里士多德进行现象学阐释；第二，显示诠释学的处境。此二者具有内在相互包含的关系，即对亚里士多德的现象学阐释正是诠释学之处境所要显示的内容。显示（Anzeige）概念在海德格尔那里并非指简单说明（klären），而是有深刻的现象学意义，正如他在“纳托普报告”中所规定的，乃是一种“透彻性”（Durchsichtigkeit）。这种透彻性并非单纯将诠释学及其处境“说明白”，而是将其“占有”（aneignen）。按海德格尔的话说：“只要这种处境——一种解释在其中并为了此处境而到其时机（zeitigt）——在上述方面（即视位［Blickstand］、视向［Blickrichtung］、视域［Sichtweite］）（括号及内容为笔者所加——引者注）得到澄清，那么可能的解释之践行和理解之践行以及产生于其中的对象占有（Gegenstandsaneignung）就是透彻的。”（Heidegger,2005,S.347）换言之，海德格尔认为诠释学的处境必须从解释之视位、视向和视域三方面得到澄清才能达到透彻性，才能将其占有为诠释学得以展开的处境，即诠释学的处境显示最终是透彻地占有处境，使之成为新处境的开端。这是实势性诠释学的第一层意思。

But the situation is, after all, a kind of existential condition that already exists, still exists, and will continue to exist. From the perspective of interpretation, Heidegger defines it as a state of having been interpreted (Ausgelegtheit), meaning that in the sense of the situation’s having been expressed and interpreted, it refers to a persistently existing state, an inescapable situation within which current interpretation can unfold. From a structural perspective, this inescapability is placed into the existential constitution of Dasein as a fore-having (Vorhabe); from a temporal perspective, this state of having been interpreted is the mode of being of history (Geschichte). Heidegger seeks to incorporate history into the present (Gegenwart), and his method is precisely interpretation (Auslegung), namely, through interpretation to pull the interpreted state of history into the present horizon, allowing the past and the present to mutually access each other in interpretation; the latter is what is called the appropriation of the situation. As Heidegger says: “The situation of interpretation, as an understanding appropriation of the past, is always a living present. History itself, as the past appropriated in understanding, has its intelligibility growing together with the primordiality of the decisive choice and constitution of the hermeneutical situation.” (Heidegger, 2005, S.347) Here, not only is the embryo of the definition of temporality (Zeitlichkeit) in *Being and Time* gestated, but Heidegger’s attitude toward the problem of history in hermeneutics is also made clear, namely, that history is intelligible only in the sense of being appropriated as the situation of the present. This is the second layer of meaning of the hermeneutics of facticity.

但处境毕竟是某种已然存在、依然存在且将继续存在的生存形势。从解释的角度看，海德格尔将其界定为一种被解释状态（Ausgelegtheit），即它在处境的被表达、被解释的意义上指一种持续存在着的状态，是当前解释得以开展的无法逃避的处境。从结构的角度看，这一无法逃避性作为先有（Vorhabe）被置入此在的生存建构中；从时间的角度看，这一被解释状态就是历史（Geschichte）的存在方式。海德格尔设法将历史纳入当前（Gegenwart），其方法正是解释（Auslegung），即通过解释将历史的被解释状态拉到当前视野，让过去与当前在解释中相互通达，后者就是所谓的对处境的占有。如海德格尔所言：“解释的处境，作为对过去的理解性占有，始终是一种活生生的当前。历史本身作为在理解中被占有的过去，其可理解性随着诠释学处境的决定性选择和构成的原始性一起生长。”（Heidegger，2005,S.347）在此，不但孕育着《存在与时间》对时间性（Zeitlichkeit）界定的胚胎，而且彰明了海德格尔对诠释学中历史问题的态度，即历史只有在被占有为当前处境的意义上才是可理解的。这是实势性诠释学的第二层意思。

The question is: what is the object of this hermeneutics, which integrates a distinctive temporality? What kind of object of interpretation can, in its interpretation, appropriate its own state of having been interpreted as the present? This is a problem on which Heidegger focuses; its problematic nature lies not only in determining the object of interpretation and the object being interpreted, but also in revealing the objecthood (Gegenständlichkeit) of that object. In this regard, Heidegger explicitly states that hermeneutics investigates the situation of human factual life (faktische Leben) (cf. ibid., S.351); that is, factual life is the object of hermeneutics, and its characteristic of being is designated as facticity (Faktizität). Unlike *Being and Time*, Heidegger does not give the structure of facticity in the “Natorp Report,” but rather enumerates the components constituting facticity; this enumeration directs the object of hermeneutics toward factual life. However, the thorny problem is that the subject of interpretation is also factual life itself, thus creating a circle (Zirkel) of self-interpretation, which must confront the question of objecthood. In this sense, Heidegger admires Husserl’s phenomenological method, namely, that phenomenology’s characterization of the structure of the object is entirely based on intentionality (Intentionalität), which makes it possible for factual life to be “counter-posed” (gegen) to itself. (ibid., S.345-346) Moreover, it is precisely on the basis of this mode of being of factual life—returning to itself through its own self-interpretation—that Heidegger defines it as existence (Existenz), i.e., “this being of factual life itself, accessible to factual life itself in factual life, is characterized as existence.” (Heidegger, 2005, S.361) The process by which existing factual life returns to itself by taking itself as an object is called the “detour” (Umwege) of factual life. From the perspective of objecthood, factual life goes out of itself (Ausser-sich) and is in the world; while taking the world (Welt) in as an object, it falls prey to it, and the detour is precisely the counter-movement against this falling, re-appropriating itself through interpretation. In this sense, Heidegger defines hermeneutics as a return to factual life, i.e., factual life, as the object being interpreted, becomes the motive (Motiv) for its own falling and its return to itself. This is the third layer of meaning of the hermeneutics of facticity.

问题在于，这种集合了独特时间性的诠释学，其对象是什么？何种解释的对象能在其解释中将自身的被解释状态占有为当前？这是海德格尔重点关注的问题，其问题性不仅在于确定解释与被解释的对象，还在于揭示该对象的对象性（Gegenständlichkeit）。对此，海德格尔明言诠释学是对人的实际生命（faktische Leben）的处境进行考察（cf.ibid.,S.351），即实际生命是诠释学的对象，其存在特征被标定为实势性（Faktizität）。和《存在与时间》不同，海德格尔在“纳托普报告”中并未给出实势性的结构，而是列举构成实势性的要件，这种列举将诠释学的对象对准实际生命。然而，棘手的问题在于解释的主体也是实际生命自身，于是造成自己解释自己的循环（Zirkel），这就要面临关于对象性的追问。在此意义上，海德格尔感佩于胡塞尔的现象学方法，即现象学刻画对象的结构是完全基于意向性（Intentionalität）的，这使得实际生命与自身“对置”（gegen）成为可能。（ibid.,S.345-346）而且正是基于实际生命如此这般通过自身解释而回到自身的存在状态，海德格尔才将其界定为生存（Existenz），即“这种在实际生命中对实际生命本身而言可通达的实际生命本身的存在，被刻画为生存”。（Heidegger，2005,S.361）生存着的实际生命通过将自身作为对象的方式回到自身，这一过程被称为实际生命的“绕道”（Umwege）。从对象性的角度看，实际生命出离自身（Ausser-sich）而在世，将世界（Welt）接纳为对象的同时沉沦于其中，而绕道正是对抗沉沦的反向运动，借助解释重新占有自身。在此意义上，海德格尔将诠释学界定为对实际生命的回归，即实际生命作为被解释的对象成为其自身沉沦又回归自身的动因（Motiv）。这是实势性诠释学的第三层意思。

Only by synthesizing these three levels of meaning can one understand why an interpretation initiated by facticity itself can include Aristotle. First, from a historical perspective, the unique temporality of the interpretive appropriation of the situation continuously re-enacts the historical Aristotle as the present. Second, from an object-oriented perspective, the interpretation of factical life must appropriate all interpretedness into the present. Because, according to Heidegger, whether these interpretations are Greek or Christian, they are all related to and derived from ancient Greece and Aristotle to varying degrees (cf. Heidegger, 2005, S.369-370); the latter thus becomes thematic in the sense of the object. Therefore, the appropriative interpretation that takes Aristotle as its object is an inevitable choice for our appropriation of the current situation; it accompanies everything with the priority of an interpretedness from which human life cannot escape. Similarly, in the winter semester of 1921-1922, Heidegger indicated Aristotle’s place in this interpretation through the originary relation between life and philosophy. In short, in these lecture courses, Heidegger not only defined hermeneutics of facticity but also directly applied it to the interpretation of Aristotle; the inner unity of these two is precisely the precondition for unifying the analytic of Dasein with historical elucidation; it is also the ground for equating hermeneutics of facticity with ontology; and it is furthermore the basis for what Volpi calls Heidegger’s ontologization of Aristotle. That is to say, Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle was already formed at the latest in the “Natorp Report,” [21]21 The “Natorp Report” refers to Heidegger’s 1922 essay “Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation,” written for the philosopher Paul Natorp. It outlines Heidegger’s early project of a hermeneutics of facticity through an interpretation of Aristotle. and the sense in which the latter opened up his appropriation of phronesis, thereby constructing hermeneutics as practical philosophy, still depends on a further reading of hermeneutics of facticity.

只有综合以上三层意思，才能理解为何一项由实势性自身发起的解释能将亚里士多德包含在内。首先，从历史角度看，对处境的解释性占有的独特时间性将历史上的亚里士多德不断重演为当前。其次，从对象角度看，对实际生命的解释要将所有被解释状态占有为当前。因为，据海德格尔所言，这些解释无论是希腊式的还是基督教式的，都不同程度关联于、来源于古希腊和亚里士多德（cf.Heidegger，2005,S.369-370），后者在对象意义上成了主题。因此，以亚里士多德为对象的占有的解释是我们占有当前处境的必然选择，它以一种人之生命不可摆脱的被解释状态的先在性伴随始终。与之类似，1921-1922年冬季学期，海德格尔则通过生命与哲学之间的源始关系指明亚里士多德在该项解释中的地位。质言之，海德格尔在这些课程中不仅界定了实势性诠释学，而且直接将其运用在了对亚里士多德的阐释中，这二者的内在统一正是将此在分析与历史阐明相统一的前提；也是将实势性诠释学与存在论相等同的根据；更是沃尔皮所谓的海德格尔将亚里士多德存在论化的基础。这就是说，海德格尔的亚里士多德阐释最迟在“纳托普报告”就已成型，而后者在何种意义上开启了他对实践智慧的占有，从而建构起作为实践哲学的诠释学，还有赖于对实势性诠释学的进一步解读。

III. Hermeneutics of Facticity as Practical Philosophy: A New Interpretation

三、实势性诠释学作为实践哲学：一种新的解读

Among foreign studies on the relationship between Heidegger and Aristotle’s practical philosophy, besides Volpi, Jacques Taminiaux is also influential. The latter’s view is largely similar to Volpi’s, namely, acknowledging the influence of Aristotle’s concept of praxis on Heidegger. However, they also diverge: Taminiaux does not consider Aristotle’s influence on Heidegger to be positive; that is, he believes Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle loses the true meaning of phronesis, replacing it with a one-sided emphasis on the priority of theoria. In other words, Aristotle’s practical philosophy places phronesis first, but Heidegger replaces Aristotle’s public life based on phronesis with a contemplative life focused on Being; he replaces actual political action with individualized contemplation, thereby moving to the opposite of Aristotle’s practical philosophy. (See Zhu Qinghua, pp. 33-35) In the German-speaking world, the first to elaborate on this relationship is Gadamer. In 1964, in an article titled “Die Marburger Theologie,” he recalled how, in the 1920s, Heidegger, based on Aristotle’s distinction between techne and phronesis, exclaimed the latter as “conscience” (Gewissen). (cf. Gadamer, 1987, S.199-200)

国外关于海德格尔与亚里士多德实践哲学关系的研究，较有影响的除沃尔皮外还有雅克·塔米尼奥（Jacques Taminiaux），后者与沃尔皮观点大抵相似，即认可亚里士多德之实践（praxis）概念对海德格尔的影响。但他们也存在分歧：塔米尼奥并不认为亚里士多德对海德格尔的影响是正面的，即认为后者对前者的阐释丢失了实践智慧的真正内涵，取而代之的是片面强调理论（theoria）的优先性。换言之，亚里士多德的实践哲学是将实践智慧摆在第一位，但海德格尔用对存在的沉思生活取代了亚里士多德基于实践智慧的公共生活；以个人化的沉思取代现实的政治行动，从而走向了亚里士多德实践哲学的反面。（参见朱清华，第33-35页）而在德语世界，对此关系进行阐发的人首推伽达默尔。1964年，他在一篇名为“马堡神学”（Die Marburger Theologie）的文章中回忆了20年代海德格尔是如何基于亚里士多德对技艺（techne）与实践智慧的区分而将后者惊呼为“良知”（Gewissen）的情形。（cf.Gadamer,1987,S.199-200）

Although Gadamer was deeply influenced by Heidegger, his appropriation of phronesis within the horizon of hermeneutics differs. In Truth and Method, Gadamer discusses phronesis under the hermeneutical problem of “application” (Applikation). (See Gadamer, 2018a, pp. 434-459) Drawing on Aristotle’s distinction between praxis and techne, he summarizes its core point as: phronesis is the choice of correct action in a concrete situation, just as hermeneutical application also occurs in a concrete situation of understanding. From a methodological perspective, Gadamer does not reveal the inner connection between hermeneutics and practical philosophy; instead, he uses analogy (Analogie), analogizing the characteristics of practical philosophy to hermeneutics. This is also evident in the essay “Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy” (Hermeneutik als praktische Philosophie). There, Gadamer highlights the characteristics of praxis by contrasting it with techne: praxis not only has an inherent demand for the good but also depends on the concrete situation. He then directly transfers these characteristics to hermeneutics, stating that “now all of this also applies to (gilt...für) hermeneutics” (Gadamer, 1976, S.84); that is, he derives the characteristics of hermeneutics by analogy with the characteristics of praxis, rather than deriving praxis from hermeneutics itself. In fact, setting aside the problem of application, even the whole of Truth and Method does not provide a strong argument for the inner relationship between hermeneutics and praxis. The reason for this is that Gadamer believes this relationship has already been convincingly demonstrated by Heidegger through the analytic of Dasein, namely, that understanding itself is the mode of Being of Dasein. (See Gadamer, 2018b, p. 554) He is well aware of the relationship between this mode and the existential praxis of Dasein as “Being-towards”; in Heidegger, understanding existence and praxis are not separated but unified. Therefore, it becomes increasingly clear that, although drawing on Heidegger’s theoretical resources, like Volpi, Gadamer’s understanding of this issue also skips over Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity and goes directly to the analytic of Dasein in Being and Time. Regarding this, on the one hand, we consider Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity to have an independent status, which is especially evident in that its connection to practical philosophy can be determined from itself; the latter is the foundation upon which the analytic of Dasein is established. But on the other hand, although Gadamer and Volpi indeed overlook hermeneutics of facticity, their treatment of the problem of praxis does indicate a method for us to reinterpret Heidegger’s practical philosophy: analogy. Next, we will attempt to interpret this relationship using this method.

虽然，伽达默尔深受海德格尔影响，但他在诠释学视域中对实践智慧的挪用却有所不同。在《真理与方法》中，伽达默尔在诠释学的“应用”（Applikation）问题下展开对实践智慧的探讨。（参见伽达默尔，2018年a，第434-459页）他借助亚里士多德对实践与技艺的区分，将其核心观点总结为：实践智慧乃是在具体处境中对正确行为的选择，正如诠释学的应用也发生在具体的理解处境中。从方法程序看，伽达默尔并没有揭示诠释学与实践哲学的内在关联，而是采用类比（Analogie），将实践哲学的特征类比到诠释学。这一点在论文《作为实践哲学的诠释学》（Hermeneutik als praktische Philosophie）中也有体现。在其中，伽达默尔通过实践与技艺作对比的方式突出前者的特性，即实践不仅具有内在的善的要求，且取决于具体处境。随后他就直接将此特性引向诠释学，认为“现在所有这些也适用于（gilt...für）诠释学”（Gadamer,1976,S.84），即通过类比实践的特性而引出诠释学的特性，而非从诠释学本身导出实践。实际上，暂不论诠释学的应用问题，即便整部《真理与方法》也未对诠释学与实践的内在关系作强论证。之所以如此，是因为伽达默尔认为这一关系已被海德格尔通过此在分析的方式令人信服地表明了，即理解本身是此在的存在方式。（参见伽达默尔，2018年b，第554页）他深知此方式与作为“去存在”之此在的生存实践关系，在海德格尔那里理解着的生存与实践之间并无鸿沟，而是统一的。因此越发明显的是，虽然借助了海德格尔的理论资源，但与沃尔皮一样，伽达默尔对该问题的理解同样跳过了海德格尔的实势性诠释学，直接进入《存在与时间》中的此在分析。对此，一方面我们认为海德格尔的实势性诠释学具有独立地位，这尤其体现在从它自身就能确定其与实践哲学的关联，后者是此在分析得以成立的基础；但另一方面，虽然伽达默尔与沃尔皮确实忽略了实势性诠释学，但他们对实践问题的处理倒是为我们重新解读海德格尔实践哲学指示了一种方法：类比。接下来，我们将会尝试以此方法解读这对关系。

In the summer semester lecture course of 1923, Heidegger defines hermeneutics of facticity as the self-interpretation of facticity, and facticity itself is defined as: “our own Dasein in each case at the present time” (Heidegger, 1988, S.21). Therefore, hermeneutics of facticity is the self-interpretation of one’s own current Dasein. This definition connects forward to the definitions of factical life, facticity, and hermeneutics in the “Natorp Report”; and backward, because it begins to thematically use the concept of Dasein, it can also connect to the definition in Being and Time that “the self-interpretation of Dasein is a fundamental moment of its existential projection.” Since the latter aspect is precisely the path usually taken in interpreting Heidegger’s practical philosophy, for the sake of distinction, we focus on interpreting the former aspect. Here, we proceed in two dimensions: first, using the same analogical method as Gadamer and others to elucidate the similarity between practical philosophy and hermeneutics of facticity; we call this the external relation. Second, directly elucidating the practicality of hermeneutics of facticity itself; we call this the internal relation.

在1923年夏季课程中，海德格尔将实势性诠释学界定为实势性对自身的解释，而实势性本身也被界定为：“当下我们本己的此在。”（Heidegger,1988,S.21）所以实势性诠释学就是当下的本己此在对自身的解释。这一界定向前可以连接“纳托普报告”关于实际生命、实势性及诠释学的界定；向后由于开始专题化使用此在概念，也可以连接《存在与时间》当中对“此在的自我解释是其生存筹划的根本环节”的界定。由于后一方面正是通常解读海德格尔实践哲学所遵循的路径，为了区别，我们重点解读前一方面。在此，我们分两个维度进行：一是采用与伽达默尔他们相同的类比法阐明实践哲学与实势性诠释学的相似，我们称之为外在关系。二是直接阐明实势性诠释学本身的实践性，我们称之为内在关系。

Viewed from the external relation. Whether in the “Natorp Report” or the hermeneutics course, the focus is consistently placed on the concept of facticity. Hermeneutics as the interpretation of facticity itself means, in the “Natorp Report,” the appropriation of the current situation, i.e., actual life, in fully understanding its interpreted state, appropriates this “history” as the situation in which it currently exists. This appropriation is not a return of current life to the past, but rather, in the sense of understanding, making the past “serve my purposes,” allowing the past to co-initiate the formation of a new situation within the current one. In the hermeneutics course, this “current” is defined as a state of “each-timeness” (Jeweiligkeit) (cf. ibid., S.7, 29), meaning that, from a temporal perspective, hermeneutics must be grounded in the present (Gegenwart). But this grounding is achieved through the appropriation of the past; i.e., factual hermeneutics refers to bringing the past into the present through interpretation and grounding oneself in the present. In this sense, this hermeneutics grounded in the current situation can be analogized to Aristotle’s practical wisdom, whose core meaning is taking correct action in different situations, manifested as deliberation about what is “good” for oneself (see Aristotle, p. 172). That is, from the perspective of situation, practical wisdom emphasizes “prudence” (prudentia) in concrete situations, achieving a comprehensive grasp of the current situation through careful deliberation, thereby making the correct choice. Similarly, factual hermeneutics emphasizes circumspection (Umsicht) within the situation, i.e., achieving a thorough grasp of the current situation through meticulous observation of the surroundings, which is oriented toward its consistent interpreted state and appropriates it through full understanding and interpretation. In short, both practical wisdom and factual hermeneutics focus on grasping the current situation, within which the present circumstances and conditions are grasped as a new situation belonging to oneself, enabling correct choices. It is in this sense that I propose translating Heidegger’s concept of Faktizität as “factical-situation” (实势性), where “situation” (势) refers to “circumstances” or “conditions” (Situation, situation), i.e., factical-situation refers to the “circumstances” and “conditions” in which actual life must currently exist, indicating the situatedness of Dasein. (See Liu Mingfeng) The commonly paired term faktische Leben can be translated as “factical life” (实势的生命) (this article retains the original translation), meaning that life itself is circumstantial and situated.

就外在关系看。无论是“纳托普报告”还是诠释学课程，始终将重点聚焦于实势性概念。诠释学作为实势性自身的解释，在“纳托普报告”中意味着对当前处境的占有，即实际生命在充分理解被解释状态的情况下将这一“历史”占有为当前自身得以存在的处境。这种占有并非当前生命回到过去，而是在理解的意义上让过去“为我所用”，让过去在当前的处境中一道发动形成新的处境。而在诠释学课程中，这一当前被界定为一种当下状态（Jeweiligkeit）（cf.ibid.，S.7,29），即从时间角度看，诠释学要立足当前（Gegenwart）。但这种立足是通过占有过去实现的，即实势性诠释学指的就是通过解释将过去带到当下并立足当下。从这层意义上说，此种立足当前处境的诠释学可以类比于亚里士多德的实践智慧，后者的核心意涵是在不同处境中采取正确行动，表现为对与自身为“善”的事情的考虑（图片）（参见亚里士多德，第172页），即从处境的角度看，实践智慧强调在具体处境中的“审时度势”（prudentia），通过谨慎考虑达到对当下处境的全面把握，从而作出正确选择。与之类似，实势性诠释学强调在处境当中的环顾（Umsicht），即通过对周遭的细致体察达到对当前处境的透彻把握，后者对准其一贯的被解释状态，并通过充分的理解和解释将其占有。质言之，实践智慧与实势性诠释学都聚焦于对当下处境的把握，在其中将当前的形势和时局把握为归自身所有的、作出正确选择的新处境。也正是在此意义上，笔者建议将海德格尔的Faktizität概念翻译为“实势性”，其中的“势”指“形势”“情势”（Situation，处境），即实势性指的是实际生命当下不得不存在于其中的“形势”“态势”，指示此在的境域性存在。（参见刘明峰）而通常搭配出现的faktische Leben可译为“实势（的）生命”（本文沿用原有译名），指的是生命本身就是形势的、处境性的。

Unlike Volpi’s method of corresponding concepts in *Being and Time* to those of Aristotle, we directly analogize the core meaning of factual hermeneutics—appropriating the current situation—to practical wisdom, which makes correct choices by deliberating on the situation. Similarly, this differs from Gadamer’s analogy of the application of hermeneutics in concrete situations to the situatedness of practical wisdom; we are not grounded in the application of hermeneutics, but rather reveal hermeneutics as the essence of appropriating concrete situations. Although Gadamer believes that application is not merely the use of understanding but its true core (see Gadamer, 2018b, p. 393), his definition of the situatedness of hermeneutics aims to emphasize the relationship between the universality of hermeneutics and the concreteness of the situation, as he says: “Understanding is the application of something universal to a particular individual concrete case.” (Gadamer, 2018a, p. 441) In contrast, the situatedness of Heidegger’s factual hermeneutics originates from the presentness of actual life, which can only be achieved by appropriating the prior interpreted state. Combining Heidegger’s discussion of the historical problem in the “Natorp Report” and his introduction of Aristotle, it can be seen that, compared to Gadamer, factual hermeneutics deals less with the relationship between the universal and the particular than with the relationship between the past and the present.

与沃尔皮将《存在与时间》当中的概念对应于亚里士多德的概念的方法不同，我们这里直接将实势性诠释学的核心意涵——占有当下处境——类比于通过考虑处境而作出正确选择的实践智慧。同样，这也有别于伽达默尔将诠释学在具体处境中的应用类比于实践智慧的处境性，我们并非立足于诠释学的应用，而是揭示诠释学作为占有具体处境的本质。虽然，伽达默尔认为应用不只是对理解的运用，而是其真正内核（参见伽达默尔，2018年b，第393页），但他对诠释学处境性的界定意在强调诠释学之普遍性与处境之具体性的关系，正如他所说：“理解乃是把某种普遍东西应用于某个个别具体情况的特殊事例。”（伽达默尔，2018年a，第441页）而海德格尔实势性诠释学的处境性源于实际生命的当下性，它只有通过占有先行的被解释状态才能达到。结合海德格尔在“纳托普报告”中对历史问题的探讨以及对亚里士多德的引入可以看出，与伽达默尔相比，与其说实势性诠释学处理的是普遍与特殊的关系，不如说是过去与现在的关系。

Viewed from the internal relation. During this period, Heidegger’s elucidation of the practical nature of philosophy laid the foundation for the practicality of hermeneutics, an elucidation mainly concentrated in the winter semester course of 1921-1922. Drawing on the results of his reflection on actual life from 1919-1921, Heidegger advanced in two directions: on the one hand, unifying hermeneutics and philosophy; on the other hand, excavating the practical nature of philosophy. Specifically, this course takes philosophy as the key object of inquiry, attempting a principled (Prinzip) definition of it. Heidegger formally grasps philosophy as “cognitive comportment” (erkennendes Verhalten) (Heidegger, 1985, S.53), whose object is actual life. The so-called “principled” definition means defining philosophy from its root, i.e., letting the object of philosophy—actual life—define itself, because Heidegger believes that only cognition that undergoes the cycle of self-knowledge is the most thorough. (See Heidegger, 2015, pp. 20-21) Thus, the object cognized by philosophy becomes the object that cognizes philosophy. In other words, principled cognitive comportment becomes the self-cognitive comportment of actual life. Furthermore, Heidegger holds that the enactment (Vollzug) of actual life and the way of naming this cognitive comportment are both categories (Kategorie), which in principle constitute the form of actual life’s interpretation of itself, i.e., cognition itself is a categorical interpretive comportment, which enacts actual life’s philosophical cognition of itself. In this sense, philosophy that cognizes itself and hermeneutics that interprets itself in the form of categories achieve unity in the enactment of actual life, i.e., actual life unifies philosophy and hermeneutics in the movement (Bewegung) of existence. This movement fundamentally exhibits a character of agitation (Bewegtheit), which renders invalid the way of grasping life in the sense of presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit). In other words, by revealing the agitation of actual life and achieving unity between philosophy and hermeneutics, Heidegger defines philosophy as philosophizing (Philosophieren) that unfolds along with actual life. The enactment of existence becomes the activity of philosophizing, directly transforming this “cognitive comportment” into living, practical life.

就内在关系看。这一时期海德格尔对哲学实践本性的阐明为诠释学的实践性奠定了基础，此阐明主要集中在1921-1922年冬季学期课程。海德格尔借助1919-1921年思考实际生命取得的成果，从两方面推进：一方面，统一诠释学与哲学；另一方面，开掘哲学的实践本性。具体而言，该课程将哲学作为重点探究对象，尝试对其作原则性（Prinzip）界定。海德格尔将哲学形式化地把握为“认识行为”（erkennendes Verhalten）（Heidegger,1985,S.53），其对象是实际生命。所谓“原则性”界定，就是从根本处定义哲学，即让哲学对象——实际生命——自己界定自己，因为海德格尔认为只有经历自身认识之循环的认识才最彻底。（参见海德格尔，2015年，第20-21页）于是，被哲学认识的对象成了认识哲学的对象。换言之，原则性的认识行为成了实际生命的自身认识行为。另外，海德格尔认为实际生命践行（Vollzug）以及称呼该种认识行为的方式都是范畴（Kategorie），后者原则上构成了实际生命对自身的解释形态，即认识本身是一种范畴解释行为，该行为践行着实际生命对自身的哲学认识。在此意义上，认识自身的哲学与以范畴形式解释自身的诠释学就在实际生命的践行中达到统一，即实际生命将哲学与诠释学统一于生存运动（Bewegung）。该运动根本上表现出动荡性（Bewegtheit），后者使在现成（Vohandenheit）意义上把握生命的方式失效。换言之，海德格尔凭借对实际生命动荡性的揭示以及在哲学与诠释学之间取得的统一，将哲学界定为随着实际生命一道开展的哲学活动（Philosophieren）。生存活动践行为哲学活动，使这种“认识行为”直接变成活生生的生命实践。

In summary, on the one hand, through external analogy, we have elucidated the commonality between Aristotle’s practical philosophy and Heidegger’s factual hermeneutics; on the other hand, through internal analysis, we have clarified the unity of hermeneutics and philosophy and their practicality. Although Heidegger ultimately incorporates Aristotle’s thought as a hermeneutical situation inherently within the interpretive activity of philosophy and actual life, thereby downgrading our internal-external division to a strategy of interpretation, through this strategy we can confidently assert that factual hermeneutics is practical philosophy.

综上，一方面我们通过外在类比，阐发了亚里士多德实践哲学与海德格尔实势性诠释学的相通；另一方面，我们通过内在梳理阐明了诠释学与哲学的统一及它们的实践性。虽然，海德格尔最终将亚里士多德的思想作为诠释学处境内在地包含于哲学及实际生命的解释活动，使我们这里的内外划分方式降格为解读上的一种策略；但通过此策略，我们有信心宣称实势性诠学就是实践哲学。

IV. Conclusion

四、结 语

In 1946, Heidegger wrote in his *Letter on Humanism*: “We are still far from pondering the essence of action decisively enough.” [25]25 Heidegger, *Letter on Humanism* (1946). The Chinese edition cited is: Heidegger, *Collected Works* (Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2014), p. 369. Accordingly, the French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy holds that Heidegger’s philosophy from the very beginning was devoted to investigating the essence of action (*Handeln*) in its original, value-laden sense. This kind of action takes itself as its own end and produces no additional effects; it “seems to be a term suitable for translating the German word *Handeln* and the Greek word *praxis* (practice)” (Nancy, p. 67). That is, with respect to the essence of action, its immanence, which takes itself as its own end, corresponds to Aristotle’s definition of practice. Heidegger assigns this immanence to philosophy, excavating philosophy’s own practical character. In other words, at the principled level, Heidegger defines philosophy as the cognitive action of interpreting factual life; because this action is immanent in factual life, it is unified with hermeneutics as existential practice. It is precisely this relationship that, on the one hand, provides a unified basis for practice and philosophy, which stand at opposite ends; on the other hand, it wins for the hermeneutics of facticity, which appropriates the current situation, the meaning of authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*). In the current situation, because the interpreter attains a thorough understanding of life, a philosophy grasps its *kairos*; this action, because it authentically grasps its own life, possesses intrinsic value. However, precisely because of this inquiry into the original value of cognitive action, Heidegger’s practical philosophy, while possessing immanence, also falls into the defect of formalism. On the one hand, because philosophy, as the self-knowledge of factual life, is necessarily trapped in a self-referential hermeneutic circle and cannot provide external practical guidance; on the other hand, because the nature of cognitive action only formally indicates the possibility of practice without providing practical norms.

1946年，海德格尔在《关于人道主义的书信》里写道：“对于行动的本质，我们还远远没有充分明确地加以深思。”（海德格尔，2014年，第369页）据此，法国哲学家让-吕克·南希（Jean-Luc Nancy）认为海德格尔哲学一开始就致力于考察原始意义上具有价值性的行动（Handeln）的本质。这种行动以其自身为目的，不产生任何额外影响，它“似乎是一个适合用来翻译德语词Handeln和希腊词praxis（实践）的术语”（Nancy,p.67），即就行动的本质而言，其以自身为目的的内在性（Immanenz）契合于亚里士多德对实践的界定。海德格尔将这一内在性划归哲学，开掘哲学自身的实践性。也就是说，在原则层面海德格尔将哲学界定为实际生命解释着的认识行动，其本身由于内在于实际生命而与诠释学统一为生存实践。正是此关系，一方面使处于两端的实践与哲学有了统一基础；另一方面，为占有当下处境的实势性诠释学赢得了本真性（Eigentlichkeit）意涵。在当下处境中，由于解释者达到了对生命的透彻认识，就使得一种哲学把握到其时机，此行动就因其本真把握自身生命而具有内在价值。然而，也正因为对认识行动原始价值的探究，使海德格尔实践哲学具备内在性的同时落下了形式化的弊病。一方面，由于哲学作为实际生命的自我认识，必定困于自说自话的解释循环中而无法给出外在的实践指导；另一方面，由于认识行动的本性只是从形式上昭示实践可能而无法给出实践规范。

Even so, the hermeneutics of facticity as a practical philosophy has an irreplaceable significance: with the force of fundamental ontology, it establishes the fundamental status of the concrete practical situation within existence. This not only lays the foundation for ethical action but also directs this action toward the dimension of authenticity. Regarding the first aspect, the hermeneutics of facticity, because it is grounded in the concreteness of the current situation, possesses practicality; regarding the second aspect, although the concept of authenticity in Heidegger is never filled with specific guiding content—so much so that Adorno criticized it as a mere jargon—the real question is: does Heidegger’s practical philosophy intend to provide such guidance? Is such guidance even possible? The concept of authenticity neither refers to a certain ethical norm nor reveals what Charles Taylor calls the subject’s inner moral sense (see Taylor, p. 32); rather, it is a description of the existential state in which Dasein appropriates its situation, a state that enables Dasein to have a thorough grasp of itself. This latter does not directly produce moral behavior but rather grounds it: genuine practice must be based on a thorough grasp of one’s own situation. The latter indeed does not act upon actual society and empirical life but is confined to the ontological dimension of disclosing the meaning of Being. Yet this is not Heidegger’s oversight; it stems from his judgment: to talk about morality while the oblivion of Being has not yet been reversed is to put the cart before the horse (see Heidegger, 2014, pp. 419-420). Heidegger, who always kept his eyes fixed on the meaning of Being, may indeed be accused of narrowness, but he also bears some resemblance to his critic Adorno. The latter likewise acknowledges that it is nearly impossible to give a standard for “the good life” in a thoroughly evil capitalist society (cf. Freyenhagen, pp. 99-112); what is truly important is how to eliminate social evil—that is, rather than giving ethical guidance, it is more crucial to lay the foundation for ethics. In this regard, Heidegger, based on a critique of metaphysics, grounds ethical practice in the originary thinking that questions the meaning of Being; Adorno, based on a critique of ideology, directs ethical practice toward a critique of existing moral philosophy. Insofar as both refuse to provide ethical norms and both hold that there is something more urgent than this, the difference between them may not be so great after all.

即便如此，作为实践哲学的实势性诠释学也有不可替代的意义：以基础存在论的力道奠定了具体实践处境在生存当中的根本地位，这不仅为伦理行动奠定基础，而且将此行动导向本真之维。就第一方面看，实势性诠释学因立足于当下处境的具体性而具备实践性；就第二方面看，虽然本真概念在海德格尔那里从未填充具体指导内容，以致被阿多诺当作某种行话（Jargon）大加批判；但真正的问题在于，海德格尔的实践哲学意在给出这种指导吗？这种指导是可能的吗？本真概念既不指某种伦理规范也不揭示如查尔斯·泰勒（Charles Taylor）所谓的主体的内在道德感（moral sense）（参见泰勒,第32页），而是对此在占有处境之生存状态的描述，此状态使它对自身有透彻把握，后者并不直接导出道德行为，而是为其奠基，即真正的实践必定立足于对自身处境的透彻把握。后者确实未能作用于现实社会和经验生活，而是被限定于开显存在意义的本体维度。但这并非海德格尔的疏忽，而是源于他的判断：在尚未扭转存在被遗忘之局面的情况下谈论道德实属本末倒置。（参见海德格尔，2014年，第419-420页）始终紧盯存在意义的海德格尔确有偏狭之嫌，但也与其批判者阿多诺有几分相似。后者同样认可为一个完全罪恶的资本主义社会给出“好生活”的标准几无可能（cf.Freyenhagen,pp.99-112），真正重要的是如何消除社会罪恶，即与其给出伦理学指导，不如奠定伦理基础。就此而言，海德格尔基于形而上学批判而将伦理实践奠基于追问存在意义的本源之思；阿多诺基于对意识形态的批判而将伦理实践引向对现有道德哲学的批判。就二者都拒绝给出伦理规范并认为存在比此更紧要的事来看，他们之间的差异或许并不如此巨大。

(Author’s bio: Liu Mingfeng, Lecturer at the School of Marxism, Zhejiang Normal University; jointly trained Ph.D. in Philosophy from East China Normal University and Heidelberg University)

（作者简介：刘明峰，浙江师范大学马克思主义学院讲师，华东师范大学、海德堡大学联合培养哲学博士）

Online editor: Tongxin

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