The Construction and Transcendence of "Moral Politics": Rousseau, Hegel, and Marx

In recent years, when studying Marx's political philosophy and his critical theory of modernity, scholars have focused on the relationship between morality and politics. Some scholars have pointed out that "in the reflective and critical understanding of modernity, there is an essential connection between political questions and moral questions" (Zhang Dun, p. 52). "The tension and conflict between morality and politics is a fundamental problem that modern society has to face" (Shang Wenhua, p. 86). From the perspective of intellectual history, Hobbes and Locke demonstrated the rationality of individuals pursuing "private interests" in civil society, advocating the principle of particularity or the principle of the individual. Rousseau was the first to recognize that the development of modernity dominated by the principle of particularity caused the separation of morality and politics, as well as the many contradictions resulting from that separation, and further pointed out that the demoralization of politics would aggravate the state of human enslavement, thus advocating the reconstruction of "moral politics." However, Rousseau's project of reconstructing "moral politics" had internal conflicts, which left rich theoretical space for Marx to criticize and transcend the predicament of "moral politics." Between Rousseau and Marx, Hegel played an important bridging role. On the basis of his critique of Rousseau, Hegel distinguished "ethical life" [Sittlichkeit] from "morality" [Moralität], thereby perfecting the construction of the philosophy of right and restoring the moral essence of the political. (See Zhang Songlun, Zhang Dun, p. 103) This had a direct influence on the transformation of Marx's political stance and his view of democracy. Ultimately, by distinguishing the forms of property rights in the historical process, Marx thoroughly criticized bourgeois property rights, thereby transcending the path of reconstructing bourgeois "moral politics."

近年来，学界在研究马克思政治哲学及其现代性批判理论时，重点关注道德与政治的关系问题。有学者指出，“在对现代性的反思和批判性理解中，政治问题和道德问题之间存在一种本质联系”。（张盾，第52页）“道德和政治的张力与冲突是现代社会不得不面对的根本性问题”。（尚文华，第86页）从思想史看，霍布斯和洛克论证了公民社会中个体追逐“私人利益”的合理性，提倡特殊性原则或个人原则。卢梭首先认识到特殊性原则主导的现代性发展造成了道德与政治的分离，以及道德与政治分离导致的诸多矛盾，进而指出政治的非道德化会加重人的奴役状态，因而主张重建“道德政治”。但是，卢梭重建“道德政治”的方案有着内在冲突，这为马克思批判和超越“道德政治”困境留下了丰富的理论空间。在卢梭与马克思之间，黑格尔起到了重要的桥梁作用。黑格尔在对卢梭批判的基础上，区分了“伦理”与“道德”，从而完善了法哲学体系的构建，恢复了政治的道德本质要求。（参见张凇纶、张盾，第103页）这对马克思政治立场与民主观的转变产生了直接影响。最终，马克思通过区分历史进程中的财产权形式，彻底批判了资产阶级的财产权，从而超越了重建资产阶级“道德政治”的路径。

I. The Necessity of Constructing "Moral Politics": The Stance and Purpose of Rousseau's Political Philosophy

一、建构“道德政治”的必要性：卢梭政治哲学的立场与旨归

In the history of modern political philosophy, Rousseau's significance lies in his profound reflection on modernity. Strauss pointed out: "The second wave of modernity begins with Rousseau. He, like Machiavelli, profoundly changed the moral climate of the West" (Strauss, p. 186). In the first wave of modernity, Machiavelli was the first to advocate separating morality from politics and reducing politics to a technical problem, which led to "nature" becoming an artificial concept, severing the relationship between politics and natural right as well as morality, and changing people's understanding of nature and natural law. On this basis, Hobbes and Locke deepened the one-sided understanding of human nature, taking human self-preservation and the satisfaction of needs as important premises, and on the basis of the legitimacy of individuals pursuing private interests, constructed a modern political system that excluded classical virtue. Rousseau, in reflecting on the principles of modern politics, re-examined the relationship between moral principles and the political system, proposed the necessity of constructing "moral politics," and demonstrated its rationality.

在现代政治哲学思想史中，卢梭的重要意义体现在他对现代性的深刻反思上。施特劳斯指出：“现代性的第二次浪潮起始于卢梭。他与马基雅维利一样深刻地改变了西方的道德风气。”（施特劳斯，第186页）在现代性的第一次浪潮中，马基雅维利首倡分离道德和政治，并将政治还原为技术问题，这导致“自然”成为人造的概念，政治与自然权利以及道德之间的关系被切断，人们对自然以及自然法的理解也发生了变化。在此基础上，霍布斯和洛克加深了对人性的片面理解，将人的自我保存和需要的满足作为重要前提，并且在个体追求私利的合法性基础上构建了将古典美德排除在外的现代政治体系。卢梭则在反思现代政治原则中重新审视了道德原则与政治体系之间的关系，提出建构“道德政治”的必要性，并且论证其合理性。

(1) Hobbes's Hypothesis of Human Nature and His View of the State

（一）霍布斯的人性假设与国家观

In Hobbes's system of political philosophy, the assumption of the state of nature is an important premise for constructing his view of the state as "absolute monarchy." In Leviathan, Hobbes imagines human beings as independent individuals existing in the state of nature, describing the dangers that people constantly face from nature and from others, and thereby inferring that the primary and sole purpose of human beings is "self-preservation." For the sake of "self-preservation," Hobbes points out, everyone entrusts "all their power and strength to one man, or to an assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will" (Hobbes, p. 131). This transfer of power forces everyone to make a covenant, thereby establishing the legitimacy of the state. Moreover, in order to guarantee the validity of the covenant and the absoluteness of the collective power, Hobbes stipulates the content of the covenant as one-way execution, that is, the people transfer their power to the sovereign (a third party), and the sovereign may not execute the content of the covenant, while the people must execute it. At the same time, the sovereign possesses supreme power and may change legal provisions and the content of the covenant. Influenced by Machiavelli, Hobbes, when comparing democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy as forms of government, tended to favor monarchy. In his view, the different representatives of interests in a democratic polity would harm the public interest for the sake of private interests, whereas in a monarchy the purpose for which the people make the covenant is consistent with the benefits the sovereign can provide; hence only absolute monarchy can safeguard the interests of the people and the prosperity of the state. In reality, however, absolute monarchy not only cannot fully guarantee the fundamental interests of the people, but also causes tyranny resulting from the concentration of power, thereby oppressing the people. This also prompted later generations to reflect deeply on political-philosophical issues such as the state of nature and the social state, the individual and the community, and rights and justice.

在霍布斯的政治哲学体系中，自然状态的假定是其构建“君主专制”国家观的重要前提。在《利维坦》中，霍布斯设想作为独立个体的人存在于自然状态中，描述了人时刻面临着自然与他人造成的危险情况，从而推论出人的首要且唯一的目的就是“自我保存”。为了“自我保存”，霍布斯指出，大家把“所有的权力和力量托付给某一个人或一个能通过多数的意见把大家的意志化为一个意志的多人组成的集体”（霍布斯，第131页）。这种权力的让渡迫使每个人不得不订立契约，促使国家的合法性得到确立。不仅如此，为了保证契约的有效性和权力集体的绝对性，霍布斯将契约内容规定为单向执行，即人们将权力转让给君主（第三方），君主可以不执行契约的内容，而民众却必须执行。与此同时，君主具有至高无上的权力，可以改变法律条文和契约内容。受马基雅维利的影响，霍布斯在比较民主制、贵族制和君主制的政体时，更倾向于君主制。在他看来，民主政体中的不同利益代表会为了私利而损害公众利益，而君主制政体中民众订立契约的目的与君主所能提供的权益具有一致性，因而只有绝对的君主专制才能维护民众的利益和国家的繁荣。而实际上，君主专制不仅不能完全保障民众的根本利益，还会造成集权引发的暴政，从而对民众造成压迫。这也促使后人深入反思自然状态与社会状态、个体与共同体、权利与正义等政治哲学议题。

(2) Locke's Hypothesis of Equality and His View of the State

（二）洛克的平等假设与国家观

Locke was the first to recognize the defects of Hobbes's advocacy of absolute monarchy, so he re-assumed the state of nature and articulated the legitimacy of constitutional monarchy. In Locke's view, the state of nature is not an unstable state of the strong preying on the weak, but rather a "state of equality" (Locke, p. 3) in which everyone possesses property and personal freedom. Locke's "state of nature" is neither a "state of license" nor the state Hobbes identified in which everyone is in a "state of war" with everyone else. Locke points out: "Men being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community... to secure themselves from the invasion of others" (ibid., p. 59). In Locke's "state of nature," the changeability of human nature and the lack of a common judge often lead to the occurrence of criminal acts, for which reason a political entity needs to be established to protect the rights of the people. This political entity (the "government"), unlike the absolute authority Hobbes advocated, is always subject to the interests of the people and is therefore a limited authority. In Locke's view, people already possess property in the state of nature; property is the necessary means of preserving life, so property conforms both to natural law and to human nature. Therefore, he particularly emphasizes the government's protection of property rights. In "Of Property," Locke points out: "Thus labour, in the beginning, gave a right of property wherever any one was pleased to employ it upon what was common... it was his own, and thereby made it his property" (ibid., pp. 18-19). Locke holds that the people's self-ownership and private ownership take precedence over politics, and the government may not tax the people without their consent. Therefore, Locke opposes absolute monarchy with unlimited power and instead advocates a government in which supreme power is held by an elected parliament. Thus, in Locke's system of political philosophy, the status of the state or political society is lower than the people's property rights. However, Locke did not provide an answer to how to guarantee the rights of everyone or how to deal with the situation of inequality of property, but merely confined himself to defending bourgeois ownership.

洛克首先意识到霍布斯君主专制主张的弊端，于是重新假定自然状态并阐明君主立宪制的合法性。在洛克看来，自然状态并非弱肉强食的不安定状态，而是一种人人拥有财产和人身自由的“平等的状态”（洛克，第3页）。洛克的“自然状态”既不是“放任的状态”，也不是霍布斯指认的人人都互相处于“战争的状态”。洛克指出：“人类天生都是自由、平等和独立的，如不得本人的同意，不能把任何人置于这种状态之外，使受制于另一个人的政治权力。任何人放弃其自然自由并受制于公民社会的种种限制的唯一的方法，是同其他人协议联合组成为一个共同体……防止共同体以外任何人的侵犯。”（同上，第59页）在洛克的“自然状态”下，人性的变化和公共裁判者的缺乏，往往会导致犯罪行为的发生，为此需要建立政治实体来维护民众的权利。这个政治实体（“政府”）与霍布斯主张的绝对权威不同，其始终受制于民众的利益，因而是有限的权威。在洛克看来，民众在自然状态下就拥有财产，财产是保持生命的必需物，所以财产既合乎自然法，也合乎人性。因此，他尤为强调政府对财产权的保护。在《论财产》中，洛克指出：“劳动使它们同公共的东西有所区别，劳动在万物之母的自然所已完成的作业上面加上一些东西，这样它们就成为他的私有的权利了。”（同上，第18-19页）洛克认为民众的自我所有权和私人所有权优先于政治而存在，政府未经允许不得向民众征税。所以，洛克反对无限权力的君主专制，而主张建立由民选议会掌握最高权力的政府。可见，国家或政治社会在洛克政治哲学体系中的地位低于民众的财产权。不过，洛克对于如何保障每个人的权益和如何应对财产不平等的情况并未作出解答，而只是囿于为资产阶级所有权辩护。

(3) Rousseau's Theory of the Social Contract and Its Critical Character

（三）卢梭的契约思想及其批判性

Rousseau’s contractual thought expresses his concern and critique of modern political theory. Although Hobbes and Locke envisioned the conditions and possibilities for the formation of a contract in the state of nature, Rousseau points out that neither of them resolved the problem of inequality existing in society. Rousseau holds that Hobbes’s and Locke’s understanding of the human being is overly negative and one-sided, whereas the human being he envisions possesses a nature of continuous development and self-perfection, a nature that impels the human being to move from the state of nature into “civil society.” However, once entering “civil society,” the relations among human beings become increasingly close; at the same time, human beings also develop vanity, and they compete with one another for gain, which causes the problem of inequality to become increasingly prominent. Rousseau points out that spiritual or political inequality “owes its establishment to a kind of custom, and is produced by the consent, or at least by the authorization, of men,” and “consists in the various privileges enjoyed by some to the detriment of others, such as being richer, more honored, more powerful, or at least making others obey them.” (Complete Works of Rousseau, Vol. 4, p. 229) Against Locke’s theoretical premise, Rousseau holds that the formulation of the social contract is not based on a natural state of equality, but is rather the product of the development of the state of nature into the state of civil society.

卢梭的契约思想表达了他对现代政治理论的忧虑与批判。虽然霍布斯和洛克设想了自然状态下契约形成的条件和可能，但是卢梭指出二者都没有解答社会中存在的不平等问题。卢梭认为霍布斯和洛克对于人的理解过于消极且片面，而他所设想的人有着不断发展和自我完善的本性，这种本性促使人从自然状态进入“文明社会”。然而，进入“文明社会”后，人与人之间的关系日益紧密，与此同时，人也产生了虚荣心，人与人之间会竞相逐利，这导致不平等问题日益凸显。卢梭指出：精神上的或政治上的不平等，“它的产生有赖于某种习俗，是经过人们的同意或至少是经过人们的认可而产生的”，“表现在某些人必须损害他人才能享受到的种种特权，例如比他人更富有、更尊荣、更有权势，或者至少能让他人服从自己”。（《卢梭全集》第4卷，第229页）针对洛克的理论前提，卢梭认为社会契约的制定不是基于自然的平等状态，而是自然状态发展到文明社会状态后的产物。

First, unlike Hobbes, Rousseau holds that individuals in the state of nature possess compassion and pity, as well as noble moral character. On the philosophical position of the “free subject,” Rousseau proposes that pity is a natural morality possessed by human beings. He is more in favor of Mandeville’s description of the human being as a sentient being, and opposes Hobbes’s theory of the evil of human nature. However, Rousseau does not accept Mandeville’s explanation that individual morality tends toward self-interest. Rousseau points out: “What Mandeville did not see is that all the social virtues of mankind (which Mandeville denies that mankind possesses) are all derived from this quality (pity—author’s note).” (Complete Works of Rousseau, Vol. 4, p. 259) Against Mandeville’s tendency to explain individual morality as self-interest, Rousseau recognizes the important role of pity in human morality. Rousseau strongly opposes the priority of individual interest, and advocates reconstructing the social contract with natural morality.

第一，与霍布斯不同，卢梭认为自然状态下的个体具有同情怜悯之心，同时有着高尚的道德品性。在“自由主体”的哲学立场上，卢梭提出怜悯心是人所具有的自然道德。他更加赞成曼德维尔对人类作为感性存在物的描述，而反对霍布斯的人性本恶论。不过，卢梭并不认可曼德维尔关于个体道德倾向于自利的解释。卢梭指出：“曼德维尔没有看到的是，人类的种种社会美德（曼德维尔否认人类有这种美德）全都是从这个品质（怜悯心——引者注）中派生出来的。”（《卢梭全集》第4卷，第259页）针对曼德维尔倾向于将个体道德解释为自利的观点，卢梭认识到怜悯心在人类道德中的重要作用。卢梭极力反对个体利益的优先性，主张用自然道德来重建社会契约。

Second, in comparing states of inequality, Rousseau opposes Hobbes’s and Locke’s attribution of the reason for the establishment of the contract to the state of nature, and emphasizes that the problem of inequality should be understood from the “social” dimension. This is also Rousseau’s important answer to the problem left by Locke. Rousseau points out that human beings in the state of nature do not exist in a condition of enslavement or being enslaved; the chain of enslavement is formed in the social state in which people are mutually dependent and mutually in need. (See ibid., p. 267) Because neither Hobbes’s theory of the state of nature nor Locke’s theory of property can explain the actual “relations of inequality” or “relations of enslavement,” Rousseau re-examines the difference between the state of nature and the social state, thereby locating the problem of inequality in society and institutions. Rousseau discovers that Hobbes and Locke, in order to reach the social contract, deliberately simplified political questions, excluded moral factors from politics, and selected only those parts of natural human nature suitable for their argumentation.

第二，在对不平等状态的比较中，卢梭反对霍布斯和洛克将契约订立的缘由归结到自然状态，强调应从“社会”维度来理解不平等问题。这也是卢梭对洛克遗留问题的重要解答。卢梭指出，自然状态中的人并不存在奴役或被奴役的状态，奴役的链条形成于人们互相依赖与互相需要的社会状态之中。（参见同上，第267页）由于霍布斯的自然状态论和洛克的财产论都无法解释现实中的“不平等关系”或“奴役关系”，所以卢梭重新审视自然状态与社会状态之间的差异，从而将不平等问题归置于社会与制度。卢梭发现，霍布斯和洛克为了达成社会契约而刻意简化了政治问题，将道德因素从政治中予以排除，只选取自然人性中适合论证的部分。

Third, Rousseau critiques the foundation of the legitimacy of modern politics on the basis of the actual condition of human enslavement. Rousseau holds that the meaning of the state’s existence lies in safeguarding human rights, but the state envisioned by Hobbes and Locke cannot truly protect the rights of the common people; the people and the state are always in a state of opposition. Against Hobbes, Rousseau strongly critiques his view that “the people willingly submit to being ruled by despotism,” and also critiques the authoritarian contract theory represented by Pufendorf. He holds that despotic power originates from inequality and intensifies the condition of inequality; therefore, the establishment of the state cannot take despotic power as its institutional form. Against Locke’s position of constitutional monarchy, Rousseau points out: “Even if he (the monarch—author’s note) becomes their master, in a certain sense he is also their slave: if he is rich, he needs their service; if he is poor, he needs their help; even if he is neither rich nor poor, he cannot do without them.” (Complete Works of Rousseau, Vol. 4, p. 282) In Rousseau’s view, private property gives rise to the problems of the polarization of rich and poor, greed, envy, and harming others for one’s own benefit. Therefore, Rousseau insists on taking the natural state of the “savage” as the ideal form of human civilization.

第三，卢梭以人被奴役的现实境遇批判现代政治的合法性基础。卢梭认为，国家存在的意义在于保障人的权利，但霍布斯和洛克设想的国家无法真正保护普遍民众的权利，民众与国家始终处于对立状态。针对霍布斯，卢梭强烈批判了其“人民甘愿被专制制度统治”的观点，而且批判了以普芬道夫为代表的政治权威式契约论。他认为专制强权源于不平等且加强了不平等的状况，因此国家的建立不能以专制强权为制度形式。针对洛克君主立宪制的立场，卢梭指出：“即使他（君主——引者注）成了他们的主人，但从某种意义上看，他也是他们的奴隶：如果他是富人，他就需要他们的服侍；如果他是穷人，他就需要他们的帮助；即使他不富也不穷，他也不能离开他们。”（《卢梭全集》第4卷，第282页）在卢梭看来，私有财产导致了贫富分化、贪婪、嫉妒、损人利己等问题的产生。所以，卢梭坚持将“野蛮人”的自然状态作为人类文明的理想形态。

Because of his radical critical attitude toward private property rights and the modern political state, Rousseau is often regarded as a precursor of Marx’s political philosophy. As Sabine points out: “Rousseau’s attack on private property rights in the Discourse on Inequality seems also to be classifiable within the camp of the aforementioned communist thought. But he did not seriously consider abolishing property rights, nor did he clearly consider the question of the place of property rights in society.” (Sabine, p. 272) Because Rousseau’s era had not yet formed the force of “the critique of weapons,” he could only proceed from the subjective rights of the people to construct a new government and state. In terms of philosophical premises, Rousseau re-examines the essence of the human being from the comprehensive perspective of material and spiritual development, opening the enlightening path of modern democratic politics. In terms of theoretical construction, through a historical investigation of inequality, Rousseau demonstrates that the despotic system is an important cause of the enslavement of the people. Therefore, his understanding of modern politics is no longer confined to the institutional premise of “the inviolability of property rights,” but transcends the discursive system of the dispute between “self-interest” and “morality,” providing intellectual nourishment for advancing the construction of the democratic state.

由于对私有财产权和现代政治国家采取了激进的批判态度，所以卢梭往往被看作是马克思政治哲学的先驱。正如萨拜因所指出的：“卢梭在《论不平等》一书中对私有财产权的抨击，似乎也可以被归入上述共产主义思想的阵营。但是他并没有认真考虑过要废除财产权，也没有明确考虑过财产权在社会中的地位问题。”（萨拜因，第272页）由于卢梭的时代尚未形成“武器的批判”力量，因而他只能从民众的主体权利着手建构新的政府和国家。在哲学前提方面，卢梭从物质与精神发展的全面视角重新审视人的本质，开启了现代民主政治的启蒙道路。在理论建构方面，卢梭通过对不平等的历史考察，论证了专制制度是造成民众被奴役的重要原因。因此，他对现代政治的认识不再囿于“财产权神圣不可侵犯”的制度前提，而是超越了“自利”与“道德”之争的话语体系，为推动民主国家的建构提供了思想养分。

II. The Construction of Rousseau’s “Moral Politics” Scheme and Hegel’s Judgment

二、卢梭“道德政治”方案的建构与黑格尔的评判

After profound reflection on modernity, Rousseau envisions reconstructing a modern political system centered on “moral politics” through the “general will.” Starting from the universality of safeguarding the common interest, Rousseau constructs the idea of “moral politics” on the assumption of the rational human being, providing a solid democratic principle for modern politics. Influenced by the French Revolution and Rousseau’s “moral politics” scheme, Hegel both affirms the principle of will proposed by Rousseau and critiques its philosophical premises, thereby putting forward an “ethical politics” that transcends “moral politics.”

在对现代性进行深刻反思之后，卢梭设想通过“公意”重建以“道德政治”为核心的现代政治体系。卢梭从维护共同利益的普遍性角度出发，以理性的人的假设建构了“道德政治”的理念，为现代政治提供了坚实的民主原则。受法国大革命和卢梭“道德政治”方案的影响，黑格尔既肯定了卢梭提出的意志原则，又批判了其哲学前提，从而提出了超越于“道德政治”的“伦理政治”。

(1) Rousseau’s Principle of the “General Will” and Its Universality

（一）卢梭的“公意”原则及其普遍性

Rousseau proposes establishing the “general will” as the democratic principle of the community and the foundation of “moral politics.” In Rousseau’s view, the state’s “entire purpose of governance is to ensure the protection of individual property” (Complete Works of Rousseau, Vol. 5, p. 208). To this end, Rousseau envisions that when human productive activities encounter obstacles, human beings should promote their development by changing the organizational form of the community. Under this vision, Rousseau points out: “To find a form of association that defends and protects with all the common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before.” (Complete Works of Rousseau, Vol. 4, p. 31) On this basis, Rousseau proposes the theory of the “general will” based on the public interest, namely, that the associated individuals transfer all their rights to the collective. The unreserved transfer of rights by individuals to the collective means that individuals are equal to one another; since the association is nearly perfect, individuals obtain the protection of greater collective force.

卢梭提出应设立“公意”作为共同体的民主原则和“道德政治”的基础。在卢梭看来，国家“全部施政的目的都是为了使个人的财产得到保障”（《卢梭全集》第5卷，第208页）。为此，卢梭设想当人类的生产活动受到阻碍时，人类应该通过改变共同体的组织形式来推动其发展。在这种设想下，卢梭指出：“创建一种能以全部共同的力量来维护和保障每个结合者的人身和财产的结合形式，使每一个在这种结合形式下与全体相联合的人所服从的只不过是他本人，而且同以往一样的自由。”（《卢梭全集》第4卷，第31页）依据于此，卢梭提出基于公共利益的“公意”理论，即结合的个体将其所有权利转让给集体。个体毫无保留地将权利转让于集体，意味着个体之间是平等的，由于联合体是近乎完美的，所以个体获得了更多集体力量的保护。

In Rousseau’s view, the “general will,” as the foundation of moral politics, possesses universality. Rousseau points out: “The general will is always upright and always aims at the public good, but it does not follow that the people’s deliberations are always equally upright” (ibid., p. 44). This is the core principle of Rousseau’s political philosophy. To clarify the nature of the “general will,” Rousseau distinguishes the essential difference between the “will of all” and the “general will,” emphasizing that the “general will” is the universalization of individual wills within the community, whereas the “will of all” is merely the sum of individual wills that have not attained universalization. Because the “general will” requires that individual volition coincide with the volition of all, it can be transformed into law. It is precisely the universalized will, or the universality of the will, that guarantees that it is necessarily moral or good; an apparently individual will can become the “general will” only if it is universal, otherwise it descends into the “will of all.” In short, Rousseau holds that the “general will” is a will of universal character formed by citizens as individuals; it differs from individual wills and does not represent personal interests, thereby severing the contradictory relationship between private interest and the public good that characterized modern Enlightenment thought. Rousseau steps outside human natural constitution, establishes moral and political ideals, and replaces the empirical natural-person assumption with human reason, providing modern politics with a developmental democratic principle.

在卢梭看来，作为道德政治基础的“公意”具有普遍性。卢梭指出：“公意始终是公正的，永远以公共的福祉为宗旨，但不能因此就得出结论说人民的意见也永远是公正的。”（同上，第44页）这是卢梭政治哲学中的核心原则。为了说明“公意”的性质，卢梭区分了“众意”与“公意”的本质差别，强调“公意”是共同体中个别意志的普遍化，而“众意”只是未能达到普遍化的个别意志的总和。由于“公意”要求的是个体意愿与所有人意愿相一致，所以其能够转化为法律。正是普遍化的意志或者意志的普遍性保证了其自身必然是道德的或善的，看似个体的意志唯有是普遍性的才能成为“公意”，否则将下降为“众意”。简言之，卢梭认为“公意”是作为公民个体形成的具有普遍性的意志，其不同于个别的意志，也不代表个人的利益，由此切断了近代启蒙思想中私利与公益二者之间充满矛盾的关系。卢梭跳出人的自然本性，确立了道德和政治理念，用人的理性取代了经验的自然人设定，为现代政治提供了具有发展性的民主原则。

(II) Rousseau’s “Moral Politics” Solution to Inequality and Its Significance

（二）卢梭应对不平等问题的“道德政治”方案及其意义

First, Rousseau proposes that government should maintain the “general will” by reconstructing moral politics and good customs and mores, thereby preventing the inequality and poverty that Locke failed to address. Facing the real gap between rich and poor and the problem of inequality, Rousseau states: “The thing government most needs to accomplish, and perhaps the most difficult thing, is to be strictly impartial toward all people, and especially to protect the poor from the bullying of the rich. As soon as there are poor people needing protection and rich people needing restraint, a great hidden danger has already taken shape; at that point, the force of law acts only on the middle stratum, and is powerless against both the wealth of the rich and the misery of the poor” (Complete Works of Rousseau, vol. 5, pp. 231-232). On the basis of the “general will” theory, Rousseau attempts to reshape the political system of the natural-rational tradition through the moral formation of politics.

首先，卢梭提出政府应该通过重建道德政治和良风美俗来维持“公意”，从而预防洛克未能应对的不平等与贫困等问题。面对现实的贫富差距与不平等问题，卢梭指出：“政府最需要做到的事情，或许也是最难做到的事情，是对所有的人都要一秉大公，尤其要保护穷人不受富人的欺凌。只要出现了需要保护的穷人和需要抑制的富人，则巨大的隐患便已经形成，这时候，法律的力量便只对中间阶层的人起作用了，而对富人的财富和穷人的疾苦都是无能为力的。”（《卢梭全集》第5卷，第231-232页）在“公意”理论的基础上，卢梭试图通过对政治的道德形塑来改变自然理性传统中的政治制度。

Second, Rousseau proposes that citizens of good quality should be cultivated through education. Unlike the British tradition of poor relief, Rousseau’s envisioned plan is a preventive route with positive significance, inseparable from his starting point of the “general will” and his position on the value of virtue. Rousseau perceives the “corruption of man” in modern commercial society; for this reason, he advocates using good moral politics to cultivate people’s understanding of and identification with the “general will.” At the concrete level, Rousseau envisions education as the means to cultivate people into moral citizens, thereby preventing the degeneration and corruption of “moral politics.” Rousseau states: “The method of prevention is not to strip the rich of their property, but to use various means to prevent them from accumulating property; not to build poorhouses to shelter the poor, but to ensure that citizens do not fall into poverty” (ibid., p. 232).

其次，卢梭提出应该通过教育培育良好素质的公民。与英国传统的救济路线不同，卢梭设想的方案是一种具有积极意义的预防路线，这与其“公意”出发点和美德价值立场密不可分。卢梭看到现代商业社会中的“人的堕落”，为此，他提倡要以良好的道德政治来培养人们对“公意”的理解和认同。在具体层面上，卢梭设想通过教育将人培养成为具有道德的公民，从而预防“道德政治”的退化和堕落。卢梭指出：“防止的方法，不是剥夺富人手中的财产，而是用各种方法防止他们聚集财产；不是修建收容穷人的济贫院，而是保证公民不致沦为穷人。”（同上，第232页）

Finally, Rousseau proposes that government should protect individual property rights and abolish the poll tax system. Rousseau states: “Property rights are the most sacred of all citizens’ rights, and in certain respects even more important than liberty” (ibid., p. 238). In Rousseau’s view, individual property rights are the foundation of society and the social contract; they embody shared values and maintain the stability of social order. Furthermore, Rousseau proposes that government should employ an appropriate tax system to alleviate the poverty of the poor while preventing an increase in idlers. It can be seen that Rousseau does not seek to achieve equality through “leveling,” yet he still treats the political rights of modern people as an important precondition for political virtue and the construction of community, which runs counter to his own direction of criticizing private property. Nevertheless, Rousseau once again injects virtue and ideals into modern politics, guiding Kant and Hegel to take up the discussion of modernity and universality.

最后，卢梭提出政府应该保护个人财产权并且取消人头税制度。卢梭指出：“财产权是公民所有的权利中的最神圣的权利，在某些方面甚至比自由更为重要”。（同上，第238页）在卢梭看来，个人财产权是社会及其契约的基础，蕴含着共同的价值观并维护着社会秩序的稳定。进而，卢梭提出政府应该运用适当的税收制度来减轻穷人的贫困，同时防止懒汉的增加。可以看到，卢梭并非要通过“拉平”来实现平等，但他仍然将现代人的政治权利作为政治美德和共同体建构的重要前提，这与其对私有财产的批判方向背道而驰。尽管如此，卢梭为现代政治再次注入了德性和理想，指引着康德和黑格尔对现代性与普遍性问题展开讨论。

(III) Hegel’s Critique and Its Significance

（三）黑格尔的评判及其意义

Influenced by Rousseau’s political philosophy and the French Revolution, Kant and Hegel also attended to the question of the relationship between morality and politics. Some scholars point out that, taking the French Revolution as the dividing line, Kant’s views on politics and morality underwent two trajectories, one ascending and one descending (see Zhang Dun, p. 60). Kant initially, building on Rousseau, proposed the principle of autonomy as “self-legislation” and established “autonomy” as the moral principle, bringing the principle of universality in modern politics to a new height. However, the French Revolution led Kant to shift from holding a sublime moral-political ideal to attending to the reality of modern politics. In Toward Perpetual Peace, Kant states: “One cannot expect morality to produce a good state constitution; rather, one must expect a good state constitution to produce a nation’s good moral cultivation” (Kant’s Works, vol. 8, p. 372). It is evident that in his later years Kant paid greater attention to the influence of political institutions. He altered his earlier conception of freedom centered on the concept of autonomy, making the concept of right the core meaning of the idea of freedom. Further, Kant adjusted the weight of morality and politics, placing moral demands within the individual while making natural freedom the foundation of political power. However, Kant’s acknowledgment of the priority of nature causes his theory to “descend” to the standpoint of the principle of particularity, which once again provokes debate over social inequality and servitude, prompting Hegel to reflect on the question of the relationship between morality and politics left by Rousseau.

受卢梭政治哲学和法国大革命的影响，康德与黑格尔也关注到了道德与政治的关系问题。有学者指出，以法国大革命为分界点，康德对待政治与道德的观点出现过上升和下降两种思路。（参见张盾，第60页）康德起初在卢梭的基础上提出了“个人立法”的自律原则，以及确立“自律”作为道德原则，促使现代政治的普遍性原则达到了新高度。然而，法国大革命让康德从持有崇高的道德政治理想转为关注现代政治的现实。在《论永久和平》中，康德指出，“不能指望道德性来产生好的国家宪政，反倒是要指望好的国家宪政来产生一个民族的良好道德教养”（《康德著作全集》第8卷，第372页）。可见，康德在晚年更加关注政治制度的影响。他改变了原先以自律概念为核心的自由理念，而将权利概念作为自由理念的核心要义。进言之，康德调整了道德和政治的权重，将道德要求置于个体之中，而将自然自由作为政治权力的基础。然而，康德对自然优先性的承认使其理论“下降”到特殊性原则立场之上，这再次引发了关于社会不平等与奴役问题的争辩，促使黑格尔思考卢梭遗留下的道德与政治的关系问题。

First, Hegel criticizes Rousseau’s conception of freedom centered on will. Hegel questions the rationality of Rousseau’s grounding of law on individual will: “What becomes the substantive basis and primary thing is not the will that exists in and for itself and is rational, but the will of the single person in his particular caprice, nor spirit as true spirit, but spirit as a particular individual” (Hegel, 2011, p. 42), and he points out that this view attends only to external and formal freedom and cannot attain knowledge of the freedom of law or of the Idea, and is therefore a conception of freedom lacking in speculation. In fact, owing to the “reign of terror” of the French Jacobins, Hegel cautiously confronts the resonance between Rousseau’s political philosophy and the terror of absolute freedom. In the section “Absolute Freedom and Terror” of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel states: “Universal freedom can produce neither any positive work nor any positive deed; all it can do is the negative deed; it is merely the fury of destruction” (Hegel, 2013, p. 122). Just as formal conscience can turn into evil, so too the state constituted by universal freedom will ultimately fall into political terror through subjectivization. For this reason, Hegel opposes Rousseau’s principle of freedom by reconstructing reason, that is, by opposing the grounding of the validity of law on any external basis opposed to rational will.

首先，黑格尔批判了卢梭以意志为内核的自由观。黑格尔质疑卢梭将法建立在个人意志基础上的合理性，“（卢梭认为——引者注）成为实体性的基础和首要的东西的，不是自在自为地存在的、合乎理性的意志，而是单个人在他独特任性中的意志，也不是作为真实精神的精神，而是作为特殊个人的精神”（黑格尔，2011年，第42页），并且指出这种观点只关注到了外在和形式上的自由，而无法达到对法或者理念的自由的认识，因而是缺乏思辨性的自由观。事实上，由于法国雅各宾派的“恐怖政策”，黑格尔审慎地面对着卢梭政治哲学与绝对自由的恐怖之间的呼应。黑格尔在《精神现象学》的“绝对自由与恐怖”中指出：“普遍的自由，既不能产生任何肯定性事业，也不能作出任何肯定性行动；它所能做的只是否定性行动；它只是制造毁灭的狂暴。”（黑格尔，2013年，第122页）正如形式的良知会转变成恶，由普遍自由而组建的国家最终也会由于主观化而陷入政治恐怖之中。为此，黑格尔以重建理性的方式反对卢梭的自由原则，即反对将法的效力建立在任何与理性意志相对立的、外在的基础之上。

Secondly, Hegel, by distinguishing between “morality” and “ethical life,” put forward the ethical concept of freedom. Hegel believed that world history is the progress of the “consciousness of freedom,” and therefore it must constantly seek its rationality in the social politics of the era. Rousseau, on the other hand, held that modern society fails to create space for the development of the subject, and leads to the degradation of humanity and the failure of freedom, thereby advocating for the restoration of the subject’s position. Kant transcendentalized Rousseau’s political freedom, pointing out the transcendental nature of freedom and the inherent requirement of self-legislation. To this, Hegel raised a question: “What is the content of this moral law? Here what we see is again empty content. For the so-called moral law is nothing other than identity, self-consistency, universality—nothing else.” (Hegel, 2017, p. 322) Hegel saw that Kant’s self-legislation pursues only universality, while the highest universality excludes all particular content, leaving only pure form; thus self-legislation leaves only the empty demand of “ought.” Similarly, in Hegel’s view, Rousseau’s political philosophy is nothing more than an abstract theory that remains within the “ought” and contradicts social reality, and this abstract theory leads to an excessive elevation of the subject.

其次，黑格尔通过区分“道德”和“伦理”，提出了自由的伦理理念。黑格尔认为世界历史是“自由意识”的进步，因而要不断在时代的社会政治中寻找其合理性。卢梭则认为，现代社会未能给主体创造发展的空间，并且导致人的堕落和自由的落空，从而主张恢复主体的地位。康德将卢梭的政治自由先验化，指出自由的先验性及其自我立法的内在要求。对此，黑格尔提出质疑：“什么是这个道德律的内容呢？这里我们所看见的又是空无内容。因为所谓道德律除了只是同一性、自我一致性、普遍性之外不是任何别的东西。”（黑格尔，2017年，第322页）黑格尔看到，康德的自我立法追求的只是普遍性，而最高普遍性却排除一切特殊内容，留下的只是纯粹形式，因而自我立法只留下“应该”的空洞要求。同样，在黑格尔看来，卢梭的政治哲学也不过是停留在“应该”之中并与社会现实相悖的抽象理论，而且这种抽象理论会导致对主体的过度拔高。

In response to Rousseau’s concept of freedom based on moral law, Hegel believed it necessary to link universality and particularity in order to redefine the essence of freedom. To this end, Hegel proposed the sphere of “ethical life” to overcome the one-sidedness of the sphere of “morality.” Hegel pointed out: “The right of individuals to be subjectively destined to freedom is realized only when individuals belong to an ethical actuality, for only in this objectivity does the individual’s certainty of his own freedom possess truth, and only in ethical life does the individual actually possess his own essence and his inner universality.” (Hegel, 2011, p. 196) In Hegel’s view, “ethical life” is no longer merely the subjectivity of the moral sphere and its self-legislating goodness, but a substantive “system of institutions” unified with objective law. This combines the universal form of legislation with the concrete content of actual life, thereby providing freedom with a substantive basis beyond subjectivity. In other words, Hegel believed that freedom should be concrete, and the basis of ethical freedom should be speculative logic rather than an empty moral law. In the system of the philosophy of right, Hegel regarded the state as the representative of the universal will, and substantiated the universal will into a system of institutions and the power structures that act in accordance with it, pointing out that freedom is the unity of the individual will and the universal will. This causes the individual will to be constrained by the universal will and no longer “arbitrary.” Thus, Hegel supplemented and perfected Rousseau’s “half-understanding” of the concept of freedom, advancing freedom from the dimension of possibility and blindness to the dimension of substance.

针对卢梭基于道德法则的自由观，黑格尔认为需要将普遍性与特殊性联系起来重新定位自由的本质。为此，黑格尔提出“伦理”环节，以克服“道德”环节的片面性。黑格尔指出：“个人主观地规定为自由的权利，只有在个人属于伦理性的现实时，才能得到实现，因为只有在这种客观性中，个人对自己自由的确信才具有真理性，也只有在伦理中个人才实际上占有他本身的实质和他内在的普遍性。”（黑格尔，2011年，第196页）在黑格尔看来，“伦理”不再只是道德层面的主观性及其自我立法的善良，而是与客观法律相统一的实体性“规章制度”，这就将立法的普遍形式与现实生活的具体内容相结合，从而为自由提供了除主观性之外的实体性依据。换言之，黑格尔认为自由应该是具体的，而伦理自由的依据应该是思辨逻辑而不是空洞的道德律。在法哲学体系中，黑格尔将国家看作普遍意志的代表，并且将普遍意志实体化为规章制度以及依此行事的权力机构，指出自由就是个体意志与普遍意志的统一，这就使得个体意志受到普遍意志的牵制而不再“任性”。由此，黑格尔补充完善了卢梭对自由理念的“半解”，将自由从可能性和盲目性维度推进到实体性维度。

Finally, Hegel evaluated the contributions and limitations of Rousseau’s concept of “will.” On the one hand, Hegel praised Rousseau’s contribution. He pointed out: “In seeking this concept, Rousseau made his contribution; the principle of the state he proposed is not only in form (like the gregarious instinct, divine authority), but also in content thought, and indeed thinking itself; that is to say, he proposed will as the principle of the state.” (Ibid., p. 290) Taking will as the basis for the validity of law is the core of the Enlightenment, and both Hegel and Rousseau adhered to this basis. Hegel pointed out: “The will is free only as thinking will. Now the principle of freedom [in Rousseau] appears, which gives this infinite power to the human being who understands himself as infinite.” (Hegel, 2017, p. 260) Hegel believed that the principle of freedom arose with Rousseau, and this principle provided an important foundation for the idea of the state. At the same time, Hegel opposed basing the validity of law on anything outside the rational will, which reflects his grasp of the rational content and thought-form of the state. On the other hand, Hegel criticized Rousseau’s contractarian view of the state and proposed the idea of the state. In Hegel’s view, “the will that Rousseau understood was merely the will of the individual in a particular form (as was later the case with Fichte); the universal will he understood was not the absolutely rational element in the will, but merely the common element… The combination of these individuals into a state thus becomes a contract, and a contract is based on the arbitrary will, opinion, and arbitrarily expressed consent of individuals” (Hegel, 2011, p. 290). Here, Hegel accused Rousseau not only of elevating contract to the level of the state, but also of using the abstract principle of the individual will to lead the French Revolution into the abyss.

最后，黑格尔评判了卢梭“意志”概念的贡献与局限。一方面，黑格尔称赞卢梭的贡献。他指出：“卢梭在探求这一概念中作出了他的贡献，他所提出的国家的原则，不仅在形式上（好比合群本能、神的权威），而且在内容上也是思想，而且是思维本身，这就是说，他提出意志作为国家的原则。”（同上，第290页）将意志作为法的效力依据是启蒙运动的内核，黑格尔和卢梭都坚持了这一依据。黑格尔指出：“意志只有作为思维的意志才是自由的。现在自由的原则〔在卢梭这里〕出现了，它把这种无限的力量给予了把自己理解为无限者的人。”（黑格尔，2017年，第260页）黑格尔认为自由的原则兴起于卢梭，这一原则为国家的理念提供了重要基础。同时，黑格尔反对把法的效力建立在理性意志之外，这体现了他对国家合理内容和思想形式的把握。另一方面，黑格尔批判了卢梭的契约国家观，提出国家的理念。在黑格尔看来，卢梭“所理解的意志，仅仅是特定形式的单个人意志（后来的费希特亦同），他所理解的普遍意志也不是意志中绝对合乎理性的东西，而只是共同的东西……这些单个人的结合成为国家就变成了一种契约，而契约乃是以单个人的任性、意见和随心表达的同意为其基础的”（黑格尔，2011年，第290页）。在此，黑格尔指责卢梭不仅将契约上升到国家层面，而且用抽象的个人意志原则引导法国革命走向深渊。

Thus, on the basis of the demand for “moral politics,” Hegel completed the construction of “ethical politics.” He pointed out: “The state in and for itself is the ethical whole, the actualization of freedom… The ground of the state is the power of reason that realizes itself as will.” (Ibid., p. 294) Hegel pushed Rousseau’s demand for “moral politics” to the level of “ethical politics.” The “rational state” he proposed is the institutional embodiment of the common good, an ethical actuality that transcends morality—highlighting the universality of the idea of the state, and this universality is also unified with the particularity of civil society. However, how the state as an ethical substance becomes actual was a question Hegel always left unresolved. In other words, when the state attains universality, whether the political rights of individuals are universally realized is a difficulty commonly encountered by actual particular states. If the political rights of individuals are not universally realized, it will result in the falsity of universality, and the state will be nothing but a formalistic facade. In fact, Hegel’s idea of the state formally uses universality to determine particularity, leading not only to the lack of protection for universal civil rights, but also to their suppression by the privileges of particular state estates. Hegel’s analysis of contract and morality demonstrates his profound understanding of social structure, but his obsession with constructing the idea of the state or ethical substance through dialectics leaves the essence of the actual state unclarified. Although Hegel’s “ethical politics” dealt a blow to the “moral politics” oriented toward the critique of modernity, the root causes of the predicament of the political state and “moral politics” remained insufficiently elucidated. To this, Marx gave a scientific answer.

由此，黑格尔在“道德政治”诉求的基础上完成了“伦理政治”的构建。他指出：“自在自为的国家就是伦理性的整体，是自由的现实化……国家的根据就是作为意志而实现自己的理性的力量。”（同上，第294页）黑格尔将卢梭“道德政治”的诉求推向“伦理政治”的层面，他提出的“理性国家”是公共善的制度化体现，是超乎于道德之上的伦理性现实——突出了国家理念的普遍性，而这种普遍性也与市民社会的特殊性相统一。但是，作为伦理性实体的国家如何成为现实，是黑格尔始终悬而未解的问题。换言之，在国家获得普遍性时，个体的政治权利是否得到普遍化实现，这是现实特殊国家普遍遇到的难题。如果个体的政治权利得不到普遍化实现，便会造成普遍性的虚假，国家只不过是形式主义的摆设。实际上，黑格尔的国家理念在形式上用普遍性规定特殊性，导致普遍的公民权利不仅得不到保障，反而会受到特殊国家等级特权的压制。黑格尔关于契约和道德的分析体现出他对社会结构的深刻认识，但是他对以辩证法来建构理念国家或伦理性实体的执着，导致现实国家的本质得不到澄清。尽管黑格尔的“伦理政治”给予以批判现代性为指向的“道德政治”以冲击，但是造成政治国家与“道德政治”困境的根源仍未得到充分阐明。对此，马克思给出了科学的解答。

III. Marx’s Resolution and Transcendence of the Problem of “Moral Politics”

三、马克思对“道德政治”难题的破解与超越

Although Hegel put forward the idea of the ethical state that transcends the demand for “moral politics,” he merely perfected Rousseau’s “moral politics” scheme on the basis of the principles of will and reason, and was still unable to overcome the predicament of “moral politics.” The reason for this is that both failed to deeply understand the economic base of modern politics. Facing modern society, which had developed to a certain mature stage, Marx recognized the limitations of “moral politics.” In his intertextual reading of Rousseau and Hegel, Marx discovered that the contradiction between private interest and the common good is not a problem of the identity of the individual will and the general will, but a more fundamental and core issue of property rights or ownership. In moving toward the depths of history, Marx not only absorbed the critical reflections on modernity from modern political philosophy, but also employed the viewpoints and methods of historical materialism to conduct an in-depth exploration of political issues, thereby extricating himself from the predicament of “moral politics,” achieving a transcendence of the political philosophies of Rousseau and Hegel, and pointing out the correct direction for human emancipation.

尽管黑格尔提出了高于“道德政治”诉求的伦理性国家理念，但他只是在意志原则和理性原则的基础上对卢梭的“道德政治”方案进行完善，依然无法逾越“道德政治”的困境。究其原因，二者都未能深刻认识现代政治的经济基础。面对发展到一定成熟阶段的现代社会，马克思认识到“道德政治”的局限性。在对卢梭和黑格尔的互文阅读中，马克思发现私利与公益的矛盾问题并非个体意志和公共意志的同一性问题，而是更为基础和核心的财产权或所有权问题。马克思在走向历史深处中，既吸取了近代政治哲学关于现代性的批判性思考，又运用唯物史观的观点和方法对政治问题展开了深入探索，从而摆脱了“道德政治”困境，实现了对卢梭和黑格尔政治哲学的超越，指明了人类解放的正确方向。

(I) The “Rousseau Notebooks” and Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right

（一）“卢梭笔记”与马克思对黑格尔法哲学的批判

In July–August 1843, Marx excerpted Rousseau’s *The Social Contract* in French at Kreuznach, forming the so-called “Rousseau Notes” (also referred to as the “Rousseau Excerpts”). This content primarily concerns Rousseau’s views on property rights and political institutions, especially democratic political institutions. Marx pointed out: “Rousseau holds that, as the main view of democracy, individual attention shifts from the universal viewpoint to particular objects, all of which are influenced by private interest in public affairs, and then in public affairs one is corrupted in the capacity of a legislator.” (MEGA2, IV/2, S.100-101) Thus, through Rousseau, Marx had already taken note of the intrinsic connection between the vexing problem of material interests and political law. It was no accident that Marx excerpted and formed the “Rousseau Notes.” Furet believed that Marx constantly studied works on the French Revolution and reflected on the relationship between “civil society and the state.” (See Furet, pp. 104–105) In the “Rousseau Notes,” Marx focused his excerpts on Rousseau’s concept of the “general will,” the main purpose being to understand how the “general will” constitutes the foundation of the social contract. (See Jiang Haibo, p. 66) This provided a useful reference for Marx’s reflection on and critique of Hegel’s philosophy of right.

1843年7-8月，马克思在克罗伊茨纳赫用法文摘录卢梭的《社会契约论》，形成了所谓的“卢梭笔记”（亦被称作“卢梭摘要”）。这部分内容主要是关于卢梭财产权和政治制度尤其民主政治制度的观点。马克思指出：“卢梭认为，作为民主的主要观点，个人注意力从普遍的观点转移到个别的对象，都受到私人利益对公共事务的影响，然后在公共事务中以立法者的身份被腐化。”（MEGA2，IV/2，S.100-101）可见，马克思通过卢梭已经关注到苦恼的物质利益难题与政治法律之间的内在关联性。马克思摘录并形成“卢梭笔记”并非偶然。傅勒认为，马克思始终都在研读关于法国大革命的著作，并反思“市民社会与国家”的关系问题。（参见傅勒，第104-105页）在“卢梭笔记”中，马克思围绕卢梭的“公意”概念进行了重点摘录，其主旨在于理解“公意”构成社会契约的基础。（参见姜海波，第66页）这为马克思反思并批判黑格尔的法哲学提供了有益的借鉴。

On the one hand, Marx drew on Rousseau’s idea of popular sovereignty to critique Hegel’s concept of monarchy. Although Hegel, in his assessment of Rousseau, pointed out the merits and problems of the principle of “will,” Hegel seemed deliberately to ignore Rousseau’s distinction between the “general will” and the “will of all.” This led to controversy among later generations regarding Hegel’s assessment of Rousseau, and Marx was one of them. In his critique of “monarchy,” Marx stated: “Hegel proceeds from the state and turns man into a subjectified state. Democracy proceeds from man and turns the state into an objectified man. … In democracy, the formal principle is at the same time the material principle. Only democracy, therefore, is the true unity of the universal and the particular.” (Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 40) Marx believed that Hegel mistakenly understood the “general will” as “the crude conception of the people” (ibid., p. 38), thereby “uncritically taking a certain empirical existence as the actual truth of the idea” (ibid., p. 51). Marx pointed out that Hegel erroneously inverted the relationship between the people and the monarch, mystifying the origin of state sovereignty. At this point, Marx was also logically moving step by step toward philosophical communism.

一方面，马克思借鉴卢梭的人民主权思想批判了黑格尔的王权思想。尽管黑格尔在评判卢梭时指出其“意志”原则的功绩与问题，但黑格尔似乎刻意忽略了卢梭“公意”与“众意”的区分。这导致后人对黑格尔关于卢梭的评判存在争议，马克思就是其中一员。在批判“王权”时，马克思指出：“黑格尔从国家出发，把人变成主体化的国家。民主制从人出发，把国家变成客体化的人。……在民主制中，形式的原则同时也是物质的原则。因此只有民主制才是普遍和特殊的真正统一。”（《马克思恩格斯全集》第3卷，第40页）马克思认为黑格尔错误地将“公意”理解为“人民的粗陋观念”（同上，第38页），从而将“某种经验的存在非批判地当作观念的现实真理性”（同上，第51页）。马克思指出黑格尔错误地将人民与君主的关系颠倒，把国家主权产生的缘由神秘化。此时，马克思也在逻辑上逐步走向哲学共产主义。

On the other hand, on the basis of Rousseau’s view of democracy, Marx used the idea of “true democracy” to critique Hegel’s “state formalism.” Marx stated: “Hegel merely expounds state formalism. For Hegel, the true material principle is the idea, the abstract thought-form of the state regarded as subject, the absolute idea which contains in itself no negative element, no material element.” (ibid., p. 144) From the perspective of content and form, Marx believed that democracy should not be merely a formal element but rather an element formed from actual content. Consequently, Marx advocated abolishing the political state through “true democracy,” thereby resolving the conflict between the individual and the species—this continued Rousseau’s opposition to “the people willingly allowing themselves to be ruled by a despotic system.” In his critique of Hegel’s concept of the state, Marx emphasized the decisive role of civil society over the state (see Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 544), which was also a further development of Rousseau’s contractual thought. Moreover, in the distinction between “real individuals” and “citizens,” Marx was also influenced by Rousseau. In *On the Jewish Question*, Marx pointed out that Rousseau’s discussion of the abstract concept of the political person had positive significance, and he further proposed that the goal of “human emancipation” lies in restoring the “abstract citoyen [citizen]” to the “real individual.” (See Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 188)

另一方面，马克思在卢梭民主观的基础上，用“真正的民主制”思想批判了黑格尔的“国家形式主义”。马克思指出：“黑格尔只是阐发了国家形式主义。在黑格尔看来，真正的物质原则是观念，是被当作主体看待的国家的抽象思想形式，是本身不包含任何消极因素、任何物质因素的绝对观念。”（同上，第144页）从内容与形式的角度出发，马克思认为民主不应该只是形式要素，更应该是从现实内容中形成的要素。进而，马克思主张通过“真正的民主制”消灭政治国家，从而解决个人与类之间的冲突，这延续了卢梭反对“人民甘愿被专制制度统治”的观点。马克思在批判黑格尔的国家理念时，强调市民社会对国家的决定性作用（参见《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷，第544页），这也是对卢梭契约思想的进一步发挥。此外，在对“现实的个人”和“公民”的区分上，马克思也受卢梭的影响。马克思在《论犹太人问题》中指出，卢梭关于政治人这一抽象概念的论述有着积极意义，进而提出“人的解放”的目标在于将“抽象的citoyen〔公民〕”复归到“现实的个人”。（参见《马克思恩格斯全集》第3卷，第188页）

(II) The Philosophical Methodology by Which Marx Solved the Problem of “Moral Politics”

（二）马克思破解“道德政治”难题的哲学方法论

Marx transcended the philosophical presuppositions of “moral politics” with the methodology of historical materialism. Whether Rousseau or Hegel, their philosophical explorations of morality and politics were both based on the presupposition that man exists as will. Rousseau hoped to realize the union of morality and politics through the “general will,” while Hegel placed his hopes in the “rational state” (ethical life) to transcend “moral politics.” Both, on the basis of acknowledging the legitimacy of private property, explored the relationship between the individual and the community, falling either into individualism or into abstract ideas. Marx pointed out: “What individuals are depends on the material conditions of their production.” (Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 520) Proceeding from material production and the practice of intercourse, Marx believed that only by concretely analyzing the objects and conditions of human production could a scientific understanding of man and human society be formed. Marx opposed viewing man as an isolated individual, stating that “the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its actuality it is the ensemble of social relations.” (ibid., p. 505) In Marx’s view, man is neither an abstract rational being nor a sensuous being, nor merely a being of will, but a being in social relations.

马克思以唯物史观方法论超越了“道德政治”的哲学前提。不论是卢梭还是黑格尔，其关于道德和政治的哲学探讨都建立在人作为意志而存在的前提假设中。卢梭期望以“公意”来实现道德与政治的结合，而黑格尔寄希望于“理性国家”（伦理）来超越“道德政治”。二者都在承认私有财产合法性的基础上对个体和共同体关系展开探讨，或陷入了个人主义中，或陷入了抽象观念中。马克思指出：“个人是什么样的，这取决于他们进行生产的物质条件。”（《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷，第520页）从物质生产以及交往实践出发，马克思认为只有对人的生产对象和条件加以具体分析，才能形成对人以及人类社会的科学认识。马克思反对将人看作孤立的个体，指出“人的本质不是单个人所固有的抽象物，在其现实性上，它是一切社会关系的总和”（同上，第505页）。在马克思看来，人不是抽象的理性存在或感性存在，也不是单单作为意志的存在，而是社会关系中的存在。

Furthermore, Marx used the methodology of historical materialism to critique Rousseau’s concept of the natural man. In the 1857 *Introduction to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx pointed out: “Rousseau’s ‘social contract,’ which establishes relations and connections between naturally independent subjects through a contract, is also not based on this naturalism. This is an illusion, an aesthetic illusion produced by the various Robinson Crusoe stories.” (Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 5) Rousseau’s advocacy of “moral politics” is inseparable from the construction of the social contract; he placed his hopes in the self-perfecting individual will, but Marx believed that the social contract is not the result of subjective will but the result of objective material conditions. Regarding Rousseau’s postulation of the “natural man” and the “political man,” Marx pointed out that they were products of the dissolution of feudal social forms combined with new productive forces. Therefore, Marx insisted on understanding the individual and his history from the perspective of concrete material production; only in this way could one avoid falling into Rousseau-style utopianism and moral idealism.

进而，马克思运用唯物史观方法论对卢梭的自然人概念进行批判。在1857年《〈政治经济学批判〉导言》中，马克思指出：“卢梭的通过契约建立天生独立的主体之间的关系和联系的‘社会契约’，也不是以这种自然主义为基础的。这是假象，只是大大小小的鲁滨逊一类故事所造成的美学上的假象。”（《马克思恩格斯文集》第8卷，第5页）卢梭关于“道德政治”的主张离不开对社会契约的建构，他寄希望于自我完善的个体意志，但马克思认为社会契约并非主观意志的结果，而是客观物质条件的结果。对于卢梭的“自然人”和“政治人”设定，马克思指出其是封建社会形式解体和新型生产力相结合的产物。因此，马克思坚持从具体的物质生产来理解个人及其历史，只有如此，才能避免走向卢梭式的乌托邦主义和道德唯心主义。

In Marx’s theory of community, the existing conditions of existence of individuals, together with the productive forces of each epoch and their forms of intercourse, are the roots of social forms (formations). With regard to Rousseau’s social contract theory and theory of community, Marx pointed out: “The association of the past was by no means arbitrary, as depicted in *The Social Contract*, but rather the necessary association under such conditions … These conditions of existence are, of course, only the productive forces and forms of intercourse of each epoch.” (Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, pp. 573–574) In Marx’s view, the common interest restricts the subordinate interest relations or class relations of individuals; individuals form communities as members of a class. The formation of this common relationship does not originate from the individual rights of freedom as Rousseau claimed; it is itself constrained by the actual material movement. In *The German Ideology* (hereafter referred to as *The German Ideology*), Marx, proceeding from relations of production and forms of intercourse, not only scientifically revealed the essence of the individual, society, and the state but also delved into the historical laws of human social development, breaking through the conceptual shackles of “moral politics” and the “ethical state,” gradually extricating himself from the real predicament of the divergence between morality and politics, and thus moving toward a more correct path of human emancipation.

在马克思的共同体理论中，个体既有的生存条件和各个时代的生产力及其交往形式是社会形式（形态）的根源。针对卢梭的社会契约论和共同体理论，马克思指出：“过去的联合决不像《社会契约论》中所描绘的那样是任意的，而只是关于这样一些条件的必然的联合……这些生存条件当然只是各个时代的生产力和交往形式。”（《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷，第573-574页）在马克思看来，共同利益制约着个人从属的利益关系或阶级关系，个体作为阶级成员组建共同体。这种共同关系的形成并非源自卢梭所言的个人自由权利，其本身受到现实物质运动的制约。在《德意志意识形态》（以下简称《形态》）中，马克思从生产关系和交往形式出发，不仅科学地揭示了个人、社会和国家的本质，而且深入人类社会发展的历史规律，突破“道德政治”以及“伦理国家”的观念束缚，逐渐摆脱道德与政治相背离的现实困境，从而走向了更为正确的人类解放道路。

(III) Transcending the Predicament of “Moral Politics”: Marx’s Critique of Political Economy

（三）超越“道德政治”的困境：马克思的政治经济学批判

First, Marx opposed reducing the problem of political inequality to a moral issue, insisting instead on understanding it as an economic problem, and thereby pointing to the crux of the matter in his critique of political economy. Although Rousseau, in *Discourse on Inequality*, attacked the right of private property, when constructing “moral politics” he nonetheless regarded property rights as “the most sacred of all the rights of citizens” and property as “the true foundation of political society.” (See *Complete Works of Rousseau*, Vol. 5, p. 238) Although Hegel, in *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, criticized Rousseau’s theory of “moral politics” with the concept of ethical life, he too acknowledged that “property is the first existence of freedom, and is itself an essential end” (Hegel, 2011, p. 61). By presupposing the maintenance of property rights, neither Rousseau nor Hegel could direct their critique toward the economic level, ultimately ending up either in “moral politics” or in “ethical politics.” For Marx, influenced by the principle of the rights of the poor established by the French Revolution, he focused on the question of the rights of the poor (workers or the proletariat) and the relationship between private property and alienated labor. In the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx pointed out: “From the relationship of alienated labor to private property it further follows that the emancipation of society from private property, etc., from servitude, is expressed in the political form of the emancipation of the workers; not that their emancipation alone is at stake, but because the emancipation of the workers contains universal human emancipation in it; and it contains this, because the whole of human servitude is involved in the relation of the worker to production, and every relation of servitude is but a modification and consequence of this relation.” (See *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 167) Marx saw in modern society that the wealth of the propertied is built upon the poverty of the propertyless, and that the diligence of the wage laborer becomes the source of poverty. (See *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 2, p. 580) Therefore, Marx replaced the right of the abstract individual will with the right of the worker, emphasizing the need to liberate people from private property and servitude. From this perspective, Marx did not confine himself to Rousseau’s “moral politics” solution to the problem of alienation, but clearly stated that only through the workers’ liberation movement could the contradictions of wealth and poverty and the problem of inequality caused by private property be eliminated.

首先，马克思反对将政治不平等问题归结为道德问题，坚持将其理解为经济问题，进而在政治经济学批判中指出问题的关键。尽管卢梭在《论不平等》中抨击了私有财产权，但他在建构“道德政治”时又认为财产权是“公民所有的权利中的最神圣的权利”，财产是“政治社会的真正基础”。（参见《卢梭全集》第5卷，第238页）尽管黑格尔在《法哲学原理》中用伦理的理念批判了卢梭的“道德政治”理论，但他也承认“财产是自由最初的定在，它本身是本质的目的”（黑格尔，2011年，第61页）。在维护财产权的前提下，卢梭和黑格尔都未能将批判的矛头指向经济层面，最终或走向了“道德政治”或走向了“伦理政治”。对马克思而言，他受到法国大革命确立起的贫困者的权利原则的影响，关注到贫困者（劳动者或无产者）的权利问题以及私有财产和异化劳动之间的关系问题。在《1844年经济学哲学手稿》中，马克思指出：“从异化劳动对私有财产的关系可以进一步得出这样的结论：社会从私有财产等等解放出来、从奴役制解放出来，是通过工人解放这种政治形式来表现的，这并不是因为这里涉及的仅仅是工人的解放，而是因为工人的解放还包含普遍的人的解放；其所以如此，是因为整个的人类奴役制就包含在工人对生产的关系中，而一切奴役关系只不过是这种关系的变形和后果罢了。”（《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷，第167页）马克思在现代社会中看到有产者的富有建立在无产者的贫困之上，雇佣劳动者的勤劳却变成了贫困的源泉。（参见《马克思恩格斯文集》第2卷，第580页）因此，马克思用劳动者的权利取代抽象的个体意志的权利，强调要把人从私有财产和奴役制中解放出来。以此来看，马克思并没有囿于卢梭解决异化问题的“道德政治”方案中，明确指出只有通过工人的解放运动，才能消除私有制导致的贫富矛盾和不平等问题。

Second, by delving into the investigation of relations of ownership, Marx revealed the limitations of the “moral politics” and “ethical politics” solutions. In *The German Ideology*, Marx pointed out: “Since private property emancipated itself from the community, the state has acquired an independent existence alongside and outside civil society; in reality, the state is nothing more than the form of organization which the bourgeois necessarily adopt both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interests.” (See *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 584) The political goals of both Rousseau and Hegel lay in resolving the conflict between the individual and the community by changing the institutions of the state. Unlike Rousseau and Hegel, Marx identified the essence of the modern state as lying in its economic base of private property. In Marx’s view, under conditions of natural division of labor, the state is an instrument for safeguarding the interests of a particular class; therefore, whether a democratic state or a monarchical state, it is a false community, and “moral politics” and “ethical politics” are merely demands for improvement put forward on the premise of acknowledging the state. The solution Marx proposed was to promote the progress of productive forces; only in this way could private property rights and their state form be abolished, and what would replace the state would be the “true community.” This is precisely the communist movement that Marx elaborated in *The German Ideology*. The communist movement differs from previous revolutionary movements in that “it overturns the basis of all earlier relations of production and intercourse, and for the first time consciously treats all naturally evolved premises as the creations of earlier men, strips these premises of their natural character, and subjugates them to the power of the united individuals” (ibid., p. 574). The core requirement and characteristic of communism lies in the abolition of bourgeois private property.

其次，马克思深入所有制关系的考察中，揭示了“道德政治”和“伦理政治”方案的局限性。在《形态》中，马克思指出：“由于私有制摆脱了共同体，国家获得了和市民社会并列并且在市民社会之外的独立存在；实际上国家不外是资产者为了在国内外相互保障各自的财产和利益所必然要采取的一种组织形式。”（《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷，第584页）卢梭、黑格尔的政治目标都在于通过改变国家的制度来解决个体与共同体之间的冲突矛盾，与卢梭、黑格尔不同，马克思指明了现代国家的本质在于其私有制的经济基础。在马克思看来，在自然分工条件下，国家是维护特殊阶级利益的工具，因而不论是民主制国家还是君主制国家都是虚假共同体，“道德政治”和“伦理政治”也只是在承认国家的基础上提出的改善要求。马克思提出的解决方案是推动生产力的进步，唯有如此才能消灭私有财产权及其国家形式，取代国家的则是“真正的共同体”。这也就是马克思在《形态》中所阐述的共产主义运动。共产主义运动不同于以往的革命运动，“它推翻一切旧的生产关系和交往关系的基础，并且第一次自觉地把一切自发形成的前提看做是前人的创造，消除这些前提的自发性，使这些前提受联合起来的个人的支配”（同上，第574页）。共产主义的核心要求及其特征就在于废除资产阶级私有制。

Third, by distinguishing between two types of private property, Marx scientifically resolved the inherent dilemma of the “moral politics” solution. In *Capital* and its manuscripts, Marx profoundly revealed the history of the separation of labor and ownership, elucidating the theoretical difficulty of presupposing property rights. Particularly in his analysis of “so-called primitive accumulation” and “modern colonial theory,” Marx distinguished between two types of private property: “one based on the producer’s own labor” and “the other based on the exploitation of the labor of others,” reasonably explaining that the dilemma of “moral politics” lies in the confusion over private property rights by Rousseau and others. As mentioned earlier, in *Discourse on Inequality*, Rousseau criticized the moral decay caused by capitalist private property and its modern development. However, in *Political Economy*, Rousseau could not deny the rationality of the self-sufficient mode of production under feudal private property based on small-scale peasant farming, revealing a clear physiocratic tendency. [12]12 Physiocratic tendency: A reference to the 18th-century French school of economic thought (the Physiocrats) that held agriculture to be the sole source of wealth, reflecting Rousseau’s sympathy for small-scale peasant property. In response, Marx clearly stated: “Political economy confuses, in principle, two very different kinds of private property, one of which is based on the producer’s own labor, the other on the exploitation of the labor of others. It forgets that the latter not only is the direct opposite of the former, but grows only on the former’s grave.” (See *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 876) In Marx’s view, Rousseau and others confused the understanding of private property and private property rights, thereby taking a path that indirectly upheld capitalist private property. From the perspective of intellectual history, Locke’s idea of labor-based property rights confronted the first type of private property, while Rousseau confronted both types coexisting and in a period of transition; thus, it is not difficult to understand why he fell into a dilemma when constructing “moral politics.”

再次，马克思通过区分两种私有制，科学解答了“道德政治”方案的内在困境。在《资本论》及其手稿中，马克思深刻揭示了劳动与所有权分离的历史，阐明了将财产权设定为前提的理论困境。尤其在关于“所谓原始积累”和“现代殖民理论”的分析中，马克思区分了“以生产者自己的劳动为基础”和“以剥削他人的劳动为基础”的两种私有制，合理说明“道德政治”的困境在于卢梭等人对私有财产权的混淆。如前所述，在《论不平等》中，卢梭批判的是资本主义私有制及其现代性发展造成的道德沦丧问题。但在《政治经济学》中，卢梭却无法否认以小农经济为主的封建私有制中自给自足方式的合理性，表露出明显的重农主义倾向。对此，马克思明确指出：“政治经济学在原则上把两种极不相同的私有制混同起来了。其中一种以生产者自己的劳动为基础，另一种以剥削他人的劳动为基础。它忘记了，后者不仅与前者直接对立，而且只是在前者的坟墓上成长起来的。”（《马克思恩格斯文集》第5卷，第876页）在马克思看来，卢梭等人混淆了关于私有制以及私有财产权问题的理解，走向了间接维护资本主义私有制的道路。从思想史来看，洛克的劳动所有权思想面对的是第一种私有制，而卢梭面对的是共存并处于转变时期的两种私有制，因而也就不难理解他在建构“道德政治”时会陷入困境。

Finally, Marx proposed taking the proletariat as the revolutionary subject to rebuild new economic forms and social systems. Rousseau’s theory of the “general will” touched on the demand for reconstructing society, but it was insufficiently thorough due to the lack of a universal revolutionary subject. Hegel, in turn, vested the universal force for reconstructing society in the state. Marx, however, clarified that only the proletariat possesses thorough revolutionary character and genuine universality. In Marx’s view, the proletariat “has a universal character by its universal suffering” (Marx & Engels Collected Works, Vol. 1, p. 17), and the emancipation of the proletariat also encompasses “the universal emancipation of man” (ibid., p. 167). Therefore, Marx pointed out that the proletariat “has nothing of its own to protect; it must destroy everything that has hitherto protected and guaranteed private property” (Marx & Engels Collected Works, Vol. 2, p. 42). On the basis of Rousseau’s “moral politics” and Hegel’s “ethical politics” schemes, Marx found the real force of universality, thereby elevating this issue to an unprecedented height. At the same time, Marx revealed that bourgeois property rights, as a precondition for freedom, in fact only produce inequality, which is also the reason why the development of modern society inevitably generates predicaments. Furthermore, Marx opposed capitalist private property, which causes exploitation, and advocated rebuilding “individual property.” In Marx’s view, since capitalist private property replaced private property “based on the labor of the producer himself,” the expropriating character of private property “based on the exploitation of the labor of others” would ultimately lead to its own negation, and “with the appropriation of all productive forces by the united individuals, private property comes to an end” (Marx & Engels Collected Works, Vol. 1, p. 582). As Marx said, “This negation does not re-establish private property, but re-establishes individual property on the basis of the achievements of the capitalist era, that is, on the basis of cooperation and the common possession of the land and of the means of production produced by labor itself” (Marx & Engels Collected Works, Vol. 5, p. 874). “Individual property” is the form of expression of the negation of capitalist private property; the essence of this negation is the establishment of a new public ownership under conditions of advanced material productive forces. Marx also pointed out in *The Civil War in France*: “The Commune … the political form of the economic emancipation of labor … to make the means of production, i.e., land and capital, which are now primarily the means of enslavement and exploitation of labor, into the instruments of free and associated labor, thereby making individual property a reality” (Marx & Engels Collected Works, Vol. 3, p. 158). As Marx said, the emancipation of the laborer cannot be separated from economic emancipation. In reality, relying solely on “moral politics,” it is difficult for laborers to achieve genuine emancipation, and they often fall into the constraints of “moral politics.” Therefore, Marx’s critique and transcendence of “moral politics” has important enlightening significance for promoting social progress and realizing the free emancipation of humanity.

最后，马克思提出以无产阶级为革命主体，重建新的经济形式与社会制度。卢梭的“公意”理论触及了重建社会的要求，但由于缺乏具有普遍性的革命主体而不够彻底。黑格尔则把重建社会的普遍性力量赋予国家。马克思则阐明只有无产阶级才具有彻底的革命性和真实的普遍性。在马克思看来，无产阶级“由于自己遭受普遍苦难而具有普遍性质”（《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷，第17页），并且无产阶级的解放还包含“普遍的人的解放”（同上，第167页）。因此，马克思指出，无产阶级“没有什么自己的东西必须加以保护，他们必须摧毁至今保护和保障私有财产的一切”（《马克思恩格斯文集》第2卷，第42页）。在卢梭“道德政治”和黑格尔“伦理政治”方案的基础上，马克思找到了普遍性的现实力量，因而将此议题提升到了前所未有的高度。同时，马克思揭示了作为自由前提的资产阶级财产权实质上只会造成不平等，这也是现代社会发展必然产生困境的缘由。此外，马克思反对造成剥削的资本主义私有制，主张重建“个人所有制”。在马克思看来，由于资本主义私有制取代了“以生产者自己的劳动为基础”的私有制，“以剥削他人的劳动为基础”的私有制的剥夺性最终会造成对自身的否定，而“随着联合起来的个人对全部生产力的占有，私有制也就终结了”（《马克思恩格斯文集》第1卷，第582页）。正如马克思所说，“这种否定不是重新建立私有制，而是在资本主义时代的成就的基础上，也就是说，在协作和对土地及靠劳动本身生产的生产资料的共同占有的基础上，重新建立个人所有制”。（《马克思恩格斯文集》第5卷，第874页）“个人所有制”是对资本主义私有制否定的表现形式，这种否定的实质是在先进的物质生产方式条件下建立新的公有制。马克思在《法兰西内战》中也指出：“公社……使劳动在经济上获得解放的政治形式……要把现在主要用做奴役和剥削劳动的手段的生产资料，即土地和资本完全变成自由的和联合的劳动的工具，从而使个人所有制成为现实。”（《马克思恩格斯文集》第3卷，第158页）正如马克思所说，劳动者的解放离不开经济上的解放。实际上，仅仅依靠“道德政治”，劳动者难以获得真正的解放，并且往往会陷入“道德政治”的束缚之中。因此，马克思对“道德政治”的批判与超越，对促进社会进步和实现人的自由解放具有重要的启示意义。

The construction and reflection on “moral politics” embodies the predicament of modern political philosophy in the face of the changes of the times. Although Rousseau’s “moral politics” and Hegel’s “ethical politics” touched on the problem of human existence, they both failed to penetrate to the essential level of the problem of the development of human society, ultimately heading toward romanticism and statism. From a theoretical lineage perspective, on the basis of Rousseau’s view of democracy, Marx used the idea of “true democracy” to critique Hegel’s “state formalism,” while at the same time understanding individuals and their history from concrete material production, thus avoiding a slide into Rousseau-style utopianism and moral idealism. Starting from the analysis of relations of production and forms of intercourse, Marx put forward a new social principle that transcends the principle of particularity, profoundly unraveling the root of the predicament of “moral politics,” and, in a scientific differentiation of the problem of private property rights, proposed a practical path to transcend “moral politics”: namely, taking the proletariat as the revolutionary subject to rebuild new economic forms and social systems, thereby realizing emancipation with universal significance. In this regard, Marx eliminated the antagonistic relationship between modern morality and politics, opened up a new path of modern development, provided a scientific practical guide for gradually eliminating the gap between rich and poor and realizing genuine democracy and equality, and also pointed the way for overcoming the existential predicament of modern people.

关于“道德政治”的建构与反思体现了近代政治哲学面对时代之变的困境。尽管卢梭的“道德政治”与黑格尔的“伦理政治”触及人的生存问题，但都未能深入人类社会发展问题的本质层面，最终走向浪漫主义和国家主义。从理论谱系来看，马克思在卢梭民主观的基础上，用“真正的民主制”思想批判了黑格尔的“国家形式主义”，同时从具体的物质生产来理解个人及其历史，避免走向卢梭式的乌托邦主义和道德唯心主义。从分析生产关系和交往形式出发，马克思提出了超越特殊性原则的新社会性原则，深刻破解了“道德政治”困境产生的根源，并且在对私有财产权问题的科学区分中提出了超越“道德政治”的实践路径，即以无产阶级为革命主体重建新的经济形式与社会制度，从而实现具有普遍意义的解放。就此而言，马克思消除了现代道德与政治之间的背离关系，开辟出新的现代性发展道路，为逐步消除贫富差距并实现真正的民主与平等提供了科学的实践指南，也为克服现代人的生存困境指明了方向。

(Author’s brief biography: Zhang Dang, Lecturer and Master’s Supervisor, School of Marxism Studies, Renmin University of China)

（作者简介：张当，中国人民大学马克思主义学院讲师、硕士研究生导师）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心