A Further Extension of Marx’s Theory of World Money

Against the backdrop of the deepening evolution of economic games among major countries in recent years, competition among the world’s major currencies has become increasingly intense. The report of the 20th National Congress of the CPC [1]1 The 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, held in October 2022, set out the Party’s policy directions for the following five years. pointed out that it is necessary to “orderly advance the internationalization of the renminbi.” This is both a core element in shaping Chinese-path financial modernization and an inevitable path to enhancing China’s economic stability and competitiveness. However, the internationalization of the renminbi faces unique national and global conditions; it cannot blindly adhere to established Western theories but must follow Marx’s theory of world money and China’s independent economic knowledge system. Yet Marx primarily took metallic money as the object of study for his theory of world money, and subsequent Marxist economists also failed to construct a fully systematic theory of world money applicable to the era of sovereign credit money. This has long resulted in a scarcity of fruitful outcomes in examining this major issue through the lens of political economy principles. Nevertheless, Marx in fact offered many highly insightful views on monetary credit and the issues of social power and international relations it involves. We can and should, on this basis, further extend his theory in a manner consistent with the implications of the times, thereby constructing a more complete theory of world money for the era of sovereign credit money. This will provide fundamental methodological guidance for understanding the current landscape of global currency competition and exploring strategies related to the renminbi’s internationalization.

在近年来大国经济博弈深度演进的大背景下，世界各主要货币间的竞争日趋激烈。党的二十大报告指出，要“有序推进人民币国际化”。这既是塑造中国式金融现代化的核心内容，也是增进中国经济稳定性和竞争力的必由之路。而人民币的国际化面对着独特的国情世情，不能一味秉持西方的固有理论，而需要以马克思的世界货币理论和中国自主经济学知识体系为遵循。但马克思更多是将金属货币作为世界货币理论的研究对象，其后的马克思主义经济学家也并未建构起一套完全适用于主权信用货币时代的系统化的世界货币学说，这导致长期以来以政治经济学原理透视这一重大议题的成果并不丰硕。然而，事实上马克思对于货币信用及其涉及的社会权力和国际关系问题有着颇多极富洞察性的见解，我们完全可以并且应当在此基础上对其进行符合时代意蕴的再拓展，由此建构起主权信用货币时代更加完整的世界货币理论，从而为我们认识当前全球货币竞争的格局与探寻人民币国际化的相关战略作出根本的方法论指引。

I. Marx’s Theory of World Money and Its Development

一、马克思的世界货币理论及其发展

Compared with other economic theories, Marx did not provide a concentrated and detailed exposition of the issue of world money. However, as an examination of one of the five functions of money, Marx’s theory of world money is built upon the revelation of the essence of money and the laws of social production and circulation. Marx’s discussions on issues such as the commodity economy, the world market, international value, and the credit system all reflect his profound understanding of world money and related issues. These highly modern reflections also provided significant inspiration for later scholars exploring the development trends and circulation laws of world money.

相较于其他经济理论，马克思对世界货币问题并未作出集中详尽的论述。但作为对货币五大职能之一的考察，马克思的世界货币理论建立在对货币本质和社会生产、流通规律的揭示之上。马克思有关商品经济、世界市场、国际价值、信用体系等问题的论述，均体现出他对于世界货币及相关问题的深刻理解，这些极富现代性的思考也为后世学者探索世界货币的发展趋势与流通规律提供了较大启发。

(A) Marx’s Theory of World Money and Related Ideas

（一）马克思的世界货币理论及相关思想

Marx’s discussions on world money are distributed across multiple works, including the *London Notebooks*, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, and *Capital*, and he used different terms such as “world coinage,” “international money,” and “world money.” The content mainly involves the following aspects: First, regarding the reasons for the emergence of world money. Marx believed that the emergence of world money stemmed from the internationalization of the production process and the emergence of the world market, driven by the development of productive forces. He pointed out: “The development of the monetary system clearly presupposes other general developments.” [2]2 Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859). With the evolution of the international division of labor and international exchange, “everywhere it directs production toward exchange value, expands its scale, diversifies and globalizes it, and develops money into world money.” [3]3 Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I (1867). Second, regarding the connotation of world money. Marx believed that precious metals are the optimal form of world money. Because, although the form of world money is unimportant, once it crosses national borders, only precious metals such as gold and silver, possessing intrinsic value, can become the absolute representative of wealth everywhere. Therefore, money uniformly manifests as gold and silver in the world market: “Gold and silver become extraordinarily effective agents in opening up the world market and in making social material exchange transcend all local, religious, political, and racial distinctions,” [4]4 Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I. and they “create the true generality of exchange value in material and spatial terms.” [5]5 Marx, *Grundrisse* (1857–1858). Third, regarding the functions of world money. Marx believed that world money can extend the other four functions of money on a global scale, but the functions have primary and secondary roles. He pointed out: “World money functions as the universal means of payment, the universal means of purchase, and the absolute social incarnation of general wealth. Its most important function is as a means of payment to balance international trade balances.” [6]6 Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I. Because world money emerged to accommodate the occurrence and development of international trade, any country “also needs a reserve fund for the circulation of the world market.” [7]7 Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III (1894). Fourth, regarding the contradictions of world money. Although world money expands the space for monetary circulation, it cannot eliminate the inherent contradictions of money. Marx mainly mentioned three contradictions: first, the external contradiction between money and commodities; second, the contradiction between money’s own value and the value it represents, caused by the influence of monetary supply and demand; and third, the contradiction between monetary circulation and monetary hoarding during the operation of the world market.

马克思关于世界货币的论述分布于《伦敦笔记》《政治经济学批判》《资本论》等多部作品之中，并使用过“世界铸币”“国际货币”“世界货币”等不同的称谓，其内容主要涉及以下几个方面：第一，关于世界货币出现的原因。马克思认为，世界货币的出现源于生产力发展造成的生产过程国际化和世界市场的出现。他指出：“货币制度的发展，显然已经以其他的一般发展为前提。”随着国际分工和国际交换的演进，“到处都使生产朝着交换价值的方向发展，使生产的规模扩大，使它多样化和世界化，使货币发展成为世界货币”。第二，关于世界货币的内涵。马克思认为，贵金属是世界货币的最优形态。因为，虽然世界货币的形式无关紧要，但一旦越出国界，只有金银等贵金属因具有价值而在一切地方都可以成为财富的绝对代表。因此，货币在世界市场中统一表现为金银，“金银会在开辟世界市场方面，在使社会物质变换超越一切地方的、宗教的、政治的和种族的区别方面成为异常有力的作用物”，它们“在物质上和在空间上创造了交换价值的真正一般性”。第三，关于世界货币的职能。马克思认为，世界货币可以在世界范围内延伸货币的其他四种职能，但职能作用有主次。他指出：“世界货币作为一般支付手段、一般购买手段和一般财富的绝对社会化身执行职能。它的最主要的职能，是作为支付手段平衡国际贸易差额。”因为世界货币的产生就是为了适应国际贸易的发生和发展，所以任何国家“为了世界市场的流通，也需要有准备金”。第四，关于世界货币的矛盾。虽然世界货币拓展了货币流动的空间，但不能消除货币的固有矛盾。马克思主要提到了三种矛盾：一是货币与商品的外在矛盾；二是受货币供求影响而导致的货币自身价值与所代表价值间的矛盾；三是世界市场运行过程中货币流通和货币贮藏间的矛盾。

Although Marx took metallic money as the object of study for his theory of world money, it can be seen from his related monetary ideas that he did not deny the evolution of the form of world money. Marx once pointed out that changes in the form of money “will be an endless process,” [8]8 Marx, *Grundrisse*. and “relatively valueless things, such as paper, can function as symbols of gold money.” [9]9 Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. At the same time, he emphasized: “The entire history of modern industry shows that, if domestic production is already organized, metal is in fact only required to settle international trade when the balance of international trade is temporarily disrupted. There is no longer any need to use metallic money domestically.” [10]10 Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III. The form of money depends on the needs of social production in different periods; it “develops together with the relations of production in general, and the same applies to money in its determination as an international means of payment.” [11]11 Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III. And “credit money belongs to a higher stage of the social production process.” [12]12 Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III. As total social wealth and the connotation of transactions continue to expand, debt and credit relations also develop further. Although sovereign credit money acting as world money has inherent drawbacks compared to metallic money, the output of metallic money is ultimately limited and increasingly unable to meet the growing demand for the quantity of money brought about by the development of the commodity economy and credit relations. Sovereign credit money can replace metallic money in some major functions, so “its functional existence can be said to have swallowed up its material existence.” [13]13 Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I. Moreover, its issuance volume does not have to be as restricted as that of metallic money. As Marx said, “One form of money may eliminate the shortcomings that another form of money cannot overcome.” [14]14 Marx, *Grundrisse*. From the perspective of later generations, indeed, as Marx said, international means of payment have developed synchronously with the development of capitalist production relations, and the form of world money has evolved to the stage of sovereign credit money. This process undoubtedly demonstrates the profound foresight of Marx’s monetary theory.

马克思虽然将金属货币作为世界货币理论的研究对象，但从其相关货币思想中可以看到，他并未否认世界货币的形式演变。马克思曾指出，货币形式的变化“将会是一个永无止境的过程”，“相对没有价值的东西，如纸，可以作为金货币的象征来起作用”。同时他强调，“全部现代产业史都表明，如果国内的生产已经组织起来，事实上只有当国际贸易平衡暂时遭到破坏时，才要求用金属来结算国际贸易。国内现在已经不需要使用金属货币了”。货币的形式取决于不同时期社会生产的需要，它“是随同生产关系一般而一起发展的，同样，货币在作为国际支付手段这一规定上也是如此”。而“信用货币属于社会生产过程的较高阶段”，随着社会总财富和交易内涵的不断扩大，债务和信用关系也愈发拓展。尽管相较于金属货币，主权信用货币充当世界货币存在天然弊端，但金属货币的产量毕竟有限，也愈发不能满足商品经济和信用关系发展所带来的对货币数量持续增长的需求。而主权信用货币可以在一些主要职能上代替金属货币，故而它的“职能存在可以说吞掉了它的物质存在”。此外，它的发行量也不必像金属货币那样受限，正如马克思所说，“一种货币形式可能消除另一种货币形式无法克服的缺点”。从后来者的眼光看，确如马克思所言，国际支付手段伴随着资本主义生产关系的发展也获得了同步发展，世界货币的形式演进到主权信用货币阶段，这一过程无疑彰显着马克思货币理论深刻的预见性。

(B) Attempts by Later Scholars to Extend the Theory of World Money

（二）后世学者拓展世界货币理论的尝试

After the First World War, the problem of the limited supply of metallic money became increasingly prominent, the gold standard gradually declined, and Keynesianism, which advocated overissuing paper money to stimulate the economy, rose after the Great Depression. Sovereign credit money became more commonly used in the world market. Although Marxist scholars such as Rudolf Hilferding, Ernest Mandel, and Paul Mattick attempted to continue Marx’s analytical framework for money, their efforts did not significantly promote the development of the theory of world money. However, with the occurrence of the “stagflation” crisis and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the explanatory power of mainstream economics regarding international monetary and financial issues was undermined, and new characteristics emerged in the economic operation of capitalism. The neglected Marxist theory of world money once again attracted the attention of left-wing scholars, with related discussions continuing after the 2008 financial crisis. Overall, these scholars have achieved extensions of the theory of world money mainly from two perspectives.

第一次世界大战之后，金属货币供应量有限的问题愈发突出，金本位制逐渐衰落，倡导超发纸币以刺激经济的凯恩斯主义在“大萧条”之后崛起，主权信用货币在世界市场中被更加普遍地使用。虽有鲁道夫·希法亭、埃内斯特·曼德尔、保罗·马蒂克等马克思主义学者试图延续马克思的货币分析框架，但对世界货币理论的发展并未起到显著的推动作用。不过，随着“滞胀”危机的发生和布雷顿森林体系的解体，主流经济学对国际货币金融问题的解释力遭到冲击，资本主义的经济运行也出现了新的特点，遭遇冷落的马克思主义世界货币理论再次获得左翼学者的关注，相关讨论一直延续到2008年的金融危机之后。总的来看，这些学者主要从两个角度实现了对世界货币理论的拓展。

First, it affirmed the possibility of sovereign credit money serving as world money and discussed its functions. Scholars such as Costas Lapavitsas, Suzanne de Brunhoff, Duncan Foley, and Claus Germer all hold that, although Marx’s theory of money primarily analyzes metallic money, he did not negate the significance of credit money in the capitalist economy, and his theory is compatible with non-commodity forms of money. Sovereign credit money, as an expression of labor time, is regarded as a socially accepted universal equivalent, which does not conflict with Marx’s value-theory system. In fact, the dematerialization of money in the process of circulation has been ongoing all along; the form that world money takes depends on which of its functions is dominant, and the predominance of the payment function gave rise to the need to replace metallic money. However, some scholars have also pointed out the irrationality of sovereign credit money compared with precious metals serving as world money. They affirm the existence of the “Triffin dilemma,” [15]15 The Triffin dilemma refers to the conflict of economic interests that arises when a national currency serves as a global reserve currency, as identified by Belgian-American economist Robert Triffin in the 1960s. arguing that sovereign credit money serving as world money exacerbates the contradiction between the “quality” and “quantity” of money, making it difficult to simultaneously satisfy the two conditions of ensuring international liquidity and maintaining currency stability, thereby leading to imbalances in the world economic structure.

第一，肯定了主权信用货币充当世界货币的可能性，并讨论了其功能。考斯达斯·拉帕维查斯、苏姗·德·布朗霍夫、邓肯·弗利、克劳斯·杰默等学者均认为，尽管马克思的货币理论以对金属货币的分析为主，但他并未否定信用货币在资本主义经济中的意义，其理论与非商品形式的货币是相容的。主权信用货币作为劳动时间的表达式，被视为社会普遍接受的一般等价物，这与马克思的价值理论体系并不冲突。事实上，流通过程中货币的非物质化一直都在进行，世界货币采取怎样的形式取决于它的哪种职能占主流，而支付功能成为主要职能则催生了金属货币被替代的需求。但也有学者指出了主权信用货币相较于贵金属充当世界货币的不合理性，他们肯定了“特里芬难题”的存在，认为主权信用货币充当世界货币会加剧货币“质”与“量”间的矛盾，难以同时满足保证国际清偿能力与维持币值稳定两个条件，进而引发世界经济格局的失衡。

Second, it explored the new type of international exploitative relations engendered by power inequality in the world monetary system. Dequech, Vasudevan, Samir Amin, David Harvey, Michael Hudson, and some Chinese scholars all hold that the world monetary system is a means serving the accumulation of developed capitalist countries on a global scale, and that developed capitalist countries exercise monetary power by incorporating peripheral countries into the global financial system they dominate. For developed countries that possess world money, they can become specialized producers of world money rather than producers of commodities, obtaining commodities created by developing countries by printing money at virtually no cost. Even if developing countries acquire large amounts of foreign exchange reserves through trade, for the sake of preserving and increasing value, they often invest these foreign exchange reserves in the capital markets of developed countries, especially their government bond markets, thereby financing the debt of developed countries. This allows developed countries to establish a debt-based economy and thus reap without sowing. Developing countries not only contribute tangible commodities, resources, and labor to developed countries but also contribute substantial seigniorage revenue to them.

第二，探讨了世界货币体系中权力不平等所催生的新型国际剥削关系。德科、瓦苏德万、萨米尔·阿明、大卫·哈维、迈克尔·赫德森以及中国部分学者均认为，世界货币体系是服务于发达资本主义国家在世界范围内积累的一种手段，发达资本主义国家通过将外围国家纳入自身主导的全球金融体系以发挥货币权力。对于拥有世界货币的发达国家来说，其可以成为专门的世界货币生产国而非商品生产国，凭借几乎毫无成本地印刷货币来获得发展中国家创造的商品。而发展中国家即便通过贸易获得了大量的外汇储备，但出于保值增值的需要，常常会将这些外汇储备投资到发达国家的资本市场特别是国债市场，为发达国家的债务融资。这让发达国家可以建立起债务型经济，从而不劳而获。而发展中国家不仅为发达国家贡献了实实在在的商品、资源和劳务，还要为发达国家贡献大量的铸币税收益。

The development of Marx’s theory of world money by later scholars is undoubtedly meaningful, but overall, a complete theory of world money adapted to the era of sovereign credit money has not yet been constructed. First, the generative mechanism by which sovereign credit money becomes world money has not been deeply explored. Compared with metallic money, world money in the era of sovereign credit money has a completely different and more complex logic of generation. Under the broad pattern of global sovereign credit money competition, a more in-depth study of the underlying mechanisms is needed. Second, regarding the economic role of world money, scholars have mostly discussed the benefits to the issuing country of world money, while the costs to the issuing country and the economic impacts on the using countries have not been fully explored. This is not conducive to understanding the contradictory movement of the entire international production and financial system behind world money. Only by making further supplementary studies on these issues can we form an integrated understanding of the generation, functions, and inherent contradictions of world money, as Marx did, and truly develop a guiding theoretical framework and recommendations for the goals, methods, and pace of the current internationalization of the renminbi.

后世学者对马克思世界货币理论的发展无疑是富有意义的，但总体来看，尚未建构起适应主权信用货币时代的完整的世界货币理论。第一，主权信用货币成为世界货币的生成机制尚未得到深入探讨。相较于金属货币，主权信用货币时代的世界货币有着完全不同和更加复杂的生成逻辑，在全球主权信用货币竞争的大格局下，需要对其背后的机理机制进行更加深入的研讨。第二，对于世界货币的经济作用，学者们更多的是对世界货币发行国的收益进行了讨论，而对发行国的成本和使用国受到的经济影响探讨得还不充分，这不利于理解世界货币背后整个国际生产和金融体系的矛盾运动。只有对这些问题作出进一步补充研究，才能如马克思一样形成一个关于世界货币生成、功能及其所蕴含矛盾的一体化的理解脉络，也才能真正就当前人民币国际化的目标、方式、步伐等形成富有指导性的理论框架与建议。

II. The Generative Logic and Economic Role of World Money in the Era of Sovereign Credit Money

二、主权信用货币时代世界货币的生成逻辑与经济作用

Marx once pointed out that money itself is a social power; it originates from the social mode of production and grants its holders specific economic power, and the same is true of world money. As metallic money gradually withdraws from the world market, fiercely competing sovereign credit moneys have not only failed to change this essence of money but have made it even more pronounced. Therefore, understanding the generative logic and economic role of world money in the era of sovereign credit money likewise hinges on clarifying the power structure and mechanism of action behind current world money.

马克思曾指出，货币本身是一种社会权力，它们来源于社会生产方式，又给予持有者特定的经济权力，而世界货币亦是如此。随着金属货币逐渐退出世界市场，激烈竞争的主权信用货币不但没有改变货币的这一本质，反而使之更加凸显。因此，认识主权信用货币时代世界货币的生成逻辑与经济作用，关键同样在于厘清当前世界货币背后的权力结构和发生机制。

(I) The “Dual Power Structure” Determines the Competitive Landscape of World Money

（一）“二元权力结构”决定世界货币竞争格局

Unlike metallic money, sovereign credit money serving as world money does not originate from the endogenous value of money. Marx once noted: “The money symbol itself requires objective social recognition, and the paper symbol obtains this recognition through forced circulation.” [16]16 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, Chapter 3, Section 2(c). Although Marx did not specifically discuss the generative mechanism of world money in the era of sovereign credit money, it is not difficult to see from this statement that if a country’s paper money is to serve as world money internationally, it likewise needs to obtain recognition from various countries or possess coercive force in circulation. Research on the sources of this international recognition and coercive force indicates that economic power and political power are the two most core elements. This “dual power structure” dominates the generative logic of world money and the competitive landscape of world money in the era of sovereign credit money.

与金属货币不同，主权信用货币充当世界货币并非源于货币内生性的价值。马克思曾指出：“货币符号本身需要得到客观的社会公认，而纸做的象征是靠强制流通得到这种公认的。”尽管马克思并未专门论述过主权信用货币时代世界货币的生成机制，但通过这一论述不难看出，某一国家的纸币若要在国际范围内充当世界货币，同样需要得到各国公认或是拥有流通中的强制力量。诸多关于这种国际认可和强制力量的来源的研究表明，经济权力和政治权力是其中最为核心的两个要素，这一“二元权力结构”主导着世界货币的生成逻辑以及主权信用货币时代的世界货币竞争格局。

From the perspective of the composition of the economic power structure, the following factors are primary: First, the scale of economy and trade. Money fundamentally “represents a social relation of production”; [17]17 Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, Notebook II, “Chapter on Money.” a country’s advantages in production and trade are likewise transformed into advantages in its currency. A certain scale of economy and trade has a positive effect on supporting currency credit, building transaction networks, etc., and can enrich the application scenarios of a country’s currency and enhance the willingness of global users to hold it. Whether it was Britain in the 18th and 19th centuries or the United States in the 20th century, both had the world’s largest economic and trade volumes before their currencies became world money. Second, financial markets. The credit system has the important function of “accelerating the velocity of circulation of money.” [18]18 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 3, Chapter 33. With the continuous development of the global financial industry, the attractiveness of financial markets has become an increasingly important factor in the process of currency internationalization. Third, transaction costs. An increase in pure circulation costs causes a waste of social resources, and “society does not thereby appropriate any surplus product or value,” [19]19 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 2, Chapter 6. which forces holders to consider the transaction costs of a currency. Therefore, if a country has advantages in transaction scale, mature institutional design, and robust financial infrastructure, transaction efficiency will be greatly improved, and its currency will often be more favored. Fourth, currency credit. The circulation of sovereign credit money is a process in which, guaranteed by the state’s coercive power, the total value of social labor in the country is “recharged” into the value symbol. Therefore, the issuance of sovereign credit money must be compatible with the process of capital accumulation in the country; otherwise, it will cause frequent or large deviations between the labor value represented by the currency and the actual value, damaging currency credit and holder confidence. Fifth, settlement rights for scarce commodities. The binding of scarce commodities to a particular sovereign credit money leads to a monopoly phenomenon in the exchange process of specific commodities, thereby transferring the huge global demand for scarce commodities to that sovereign currency. Common scarce commodities include high-tech products, scarce resources, etc. For example, the rise of the German mark in the latter half of the 20th century relied heavily on its own strong industrial competitiveness, while the “petrodollar” system after the 1970s likewise demonstrated the important function of scarce commodities.

从经济权力结构的构成来看，以下几个因素是首要的：一是经贸规模。货币在根本上“代表一种社会生产关系”，一国在生产和贸易上的优势同样会转化为本国在货币上的优势。一定的经济与贸易规模对支撑货币信用、构建交易网络等存在正向作用，可以丰富一国货币的应用场景并增强全球用户的持有意愿。无论是18、19世纪的英国还是20世纪的美国，在其货币成为世界货币前，均已拥有全球规模最大的经济和贸易体量。二是金融市场。信用体系具有“加速货币流通的速度”的重要作用，随着全球金融行业的不断发展，金融市场的吸引力也成了货币国际化过程中日渐重要的因素。三是交易成本。纯粹流通费用的增加会造成社会资源的浪费，“社会并没有因此占有任何超额的产品或价值”，这令持有者不得不考虑货币的交易成本。因此，一国若拥有交易规模优势、成熟的制度设计和稳健的金融基础设施，交易效率将大大提高，其货币往往也更受青睐。四是货币信用。主权信用货币的流通是一个在国家强制力保证下、依赖本国社会劳动总价值量向价值符号“充值”的过程。因此，主权信用货币的发行量需与本国资本积累的进程相适应，否则就会造成货币所代表的劳动价值量与实际值频繁或大幅地背离，损害货币信用与持有者信心。五是稀珍商品结算权。稀珍商品与某种主权信用货币的绑定会招致对特定商品交换过程的垄断现象，进而将世界市场中对稀珍商品的巨大需求让渡给该主权货币。常见的稀珍商品有高技术产品、稀缺资源等，如20世纪后半期德国马克的崛起就在很大程度上依赖于其自身强大的工业竞争力，而20世纪70年代后的“石油—美元”体系同样彰显了稀珍商品的重要功能。

The political power structure that influences world money is equally impossible to ignore. Marx pointed out early on that sovereign currency “has a local and political character.” [20]20 Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, in *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, vol. 29 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1987), p. 367. [Translator’s note: The English translation of the quoted phrase is from the same source.] Among the most important constituent factors are: first, political stability. National credit is the foundation on which sovereign credit currency circulates in the world market; if a country’s political power is unstable over the long term, it will inevitably affect holders’ confidence in the currency. Conversely, a decline in a country’s political risk will produce a positive incentive for the inflow of overseas capital, thereby raising the level of openness of that country’s capital account and the development level of its financial market. Second, international institutions. Although there is no unified government within the international sphere that can provide coercive force for a given currency, international institutions can to a certain extent substitute for this function. The establishment of an international institution implies the unanimous recognition of its member states and generates a force of legitimacy; therefore, it can serve as a coercive force within the international sphere to guarantee the circulation of a particular sovereign credit currency. For example, both the Bretton Woods system after World War II and the Jamaican system after the 1970s produced a lock-in effect on the US dollar through relevant international institutional arrangements, while the five currencies currently with the highest degree of internationalization—the US dollar, the euro, the British pound, the Japanese yen, and the renminbi—all benefit from the composition of the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights (SDR). Third, strategic alliances. Marx once pointed out: “Money is itself the community, and it cannot tolerate any other community standing above it.” [21]21 Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin, 1973), p. 223. Partner allied states can help a country’s currency increase the scale of settlement and circulation, expand the foreign-exchange reserves based on it, and provide powerful counter-cyclical assistance in times of crisis; they are an important support for the currency of the core state. In the 18th century, the British pound formed a vast common currency area through the opening up of colonies, while the decolonization movement after World War II greatly accelerated the pound’s decline. Fourth, military strength. Military strength is the most direct form of coercive force within the international sphere; it determines that a great power can directly intervene in other countries’ currency choices through deterrence or conflict. For example, the reason West Germany after World War II held large amounts of dollar reserves contrary to economic rationality was largely out of consideration for maintaining US military protection, while the US dollar’s important influence in East Asia is also considered inseparable from the US’s powerful military strategic capabilities in that region.

影响世界货币的政治权力结构同样不可忽视。马克思很早便指出，主权货币“有地方性和政治性”。其中最为主要的构成因素有：一是政治稳定性。国家信用是主权信用货币在世界市场得以流动的基础，若一国政权长期不稳，势必影响持有者对货币的信心。而国家政治风险的下降则会对海外资本的流入产生正向激励作用，进而提升一国资本账户的开放和金融市场发展水平。二是国际制度。虽然在国际范围内并不存在一个为某种货币提供强制力的统一政府，但国际制度可以在一定程度上替代这一功能。国际制度的建立意味着制度成员国的一致认可，并形成了合法性力量，因此，可以作为国际范围内的强制力量保证某一主权信用货币的流通。如二战后的布雷顿森林体系与20世纪70年代后的牙买加体系均通过相关的国际制度安排产生了对美元的锁定效应，而当前国际化程度最高的五类货币——美元、欧元、英镑、日元、人民币，也均受益于国际货币基金组织特别提款权（SDR）的构成安排。三是战略同盟。马克思曾指出：“货币本身就是共同体，它不能容忍任何其他共同体凌驾于它之上。”伙伴同盟国可以帮助一国货币提升结算和流通规模、扩大以其为基础的外汇储备，并在危急时刻提供强大的逆势帮扶作用，是中心国货币的重要助力。18世纪的英镑就通过殖民地的开辟形成了庞大的共同货币区，而二战后的非殖民化运动则在很大程度上加速了英镑的衰落。四是军事实力。军事实力是国际范围内强制力量最直接的体现形式，其决定了大国可以通过威慑或冲突的方式直接干预他国的货币选择。如二战后的联邦德国之所以违背经济理性持有大量美元储备，很大程度上是出于维系美国军事保护的考虑，而美元在东亚的重要影响力也被认为与美国在该地区强大的军事战略能力密不可分。

(2) The Two-Way Economic Effects of World Money on Countries

（二）世界货币对国家的双向经济作用

Marx pointed out: “The power that each individual exercises over the activity of others or over social wealth consists in his being the owner of exchange value, of money.” [22]22 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1976), p. 229. [Translator’s note: The English translation of the quoted phrase is adapted from this source.] When a country’s sovereign credit currency becomes world money, the economic power it possesses domestically begins to extend to the international sphere. Existing literature has already provided quite rich explanations of the power-imposing mechanisms of the currency-issuing country and the economic gains it can obtain, mainly including: (1) independence of monetary policy; (2) ability to monetize fiscal deficits; (3) low exchange-rate risk; (4) relatively high financing efficiency; (5) prosperity of trade and financial markets; (6) large seigniorage; (7) ability to influence international capital flows and shift crises; (8) commission and handling fees for financial institutions; (9) financial sanctions as a weapon. This means that the issuing country and the using countries of world money form a “core–periphery” structure that squeezes the periphery while exclusively benefiting the core; the using countries must bear the costs of currency dependence. For example, in the phenomenon often referred to in academic circles as the “dollar tide,” because there is a vast amount of capital denominated in US dollars worldwide, a simple interest-rate cut or hike by the Federal Reserve can affect the overall direction of international capital. When interest rates are cut, large amounts of capital flow out of the United States, seeking investment opportunities around the world and inflating the assets of developing countries; when interest rates are raised, large amounts of capital flow back to US banks, the assets of developing countries are dumped and sold off in a short time, and vast wealth is harvested by the United States.

马克思指出：“每个个人行使支配别人的活动或支配社会财富的权力，就在于他是交换价值的或货币的所有者。”而当一国的主权信用货币成为世界货币，其在国内拥有的经济权力便开始向国际范围延伸。针对货币发行国的权力施加机制及其可以获得的经济收益，现有文献已经作了相当丰富的阐释，主要包括：（1）货币政策的独立性；（2）财政赤字货币化能力；（3）低汇率风险；（4）较高的融资效率；（5）贸易和金融市场的繁荣；（6）庞大的铸币税；（7）影响国际资本流动和转嫁危机的能力；（8）金融机构的佣金费和手续费；（9）金融制裁武器。这意味着，世界货币的发行国和使用国形成了一个挤压外围而独厚中心的“中心—外围”结构，使用国必须承担货币依附的成本。如学界常提到的“美元潮汐”现象，由于世界范围内有着大量以美元计价的资本，美联储简单的降息加息行为就能影响国际资本的总体流向。降息时，大量资本流出美国，在世界范围内寻找投资场所，炒高发展中国家资产；加息时，大量资本回流美国银行，发展中国家资产在短时间内被砸盘变卖，海量财富被美国收割。

Nevertheless, becoming the issuing country of world money is not all benefit and no harm. If a using country of world money wishes to challenge the status of the original issuing country and promote its own currency, it often needs to engage in careful consideration. On the one hand, the using country will lose part of the gains it enjoyed under the original world-money system. These gains mainly include the trade advantages brought to other countries by the long-term overvaluation of the original issuing country’s currency, the low transaction costs under the original world-money system, the rich financial assets provided by the original issuing country’s financial market, and so on. Taking the first point as an example: becoming a world money triggers exchange-rate changes, which for many industrial surplus countries will undoubtedly cause losses for their export enterprises. For instance, in Germany and Japan, which experienced rapid industrial growth after World War II, even though their currencies had already shown the strength to become strong currencies, in order to maintain the price competitiveness of their export goods, they did not show a positive attitude toward replacing the dollar or promoting the internationalization of their own currencies for a long time. Although these gains may be completely outweighed by their losses, they are still sufficient to make these countries consider the risks of rashly promoting currency internationalization.

尽管如此，成为世界货币的发行国也并非百利而无一害。世界货币使用国若想挑战原世界货币发行国的地位、推行本国货币，往往需要经过慎重的考量。一方面，使用国将丧失在原有世界货币体系下的部分收益。这些收益主要包括原发行国币值长期高估给他国带来的贸易优势、原有世界货币体系下的低交易成本、原发行国金融市场所提供的丰富金融资产，等等。以第一点为例，成为世界货币会引发汇率的变动，对于很多工业顺差国来说，这无疑将给其出口企业带来损失。譬如，在二战后工业快速崛起的德国和日本，即便其货币均已展现出成为强势货币的实力，但为了维持本国出口商品的价格竞争力，却也在很长一段时间内并未展现出替代美元和推行本币国际化的积极态度。尽管这些收益可能完全不及其损失，但也足以让这些国家考虑贸然推行本币国际化的风险。

On the other hand, becoming the issuing country of world money also faces many costs and challenges. Marx pointed out that the function of money as a means of payment “contains a direct contradiction” and implies the possibility of a monetary crisis. [23]23 Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, p. 235. The continuous issuance of sovereign credit currency as world money will undoubtedly accumulate this contradiction. The problems that the issuing country of world money must face include: first, a decline in trade and industrial competitiveness. After a country’s currency is held by multiple governments and investors, it will appreciate, thereby raising the prices of export goods and weakening its own trade competitiveness; this will inevitably create risks of damage to the real economy and industrial hollowing-out. Second, shocks to monetary credit and inflationary pressure. The “Triffin dilemma” [24]24 The “Triffin dilemma” refers to the conflict identified by economist Robert Triffin in the 1960s: a country whose currency serves as the global reserve currency must run persistent current-account deficits to supply the world with liquidity, but these deficits eventually undermine confidence in the currency’s value. is a problem that every country must face in the process of currency internationalization, because sovereign credit currency must ultimately rely on the total value of social labor as credit support; if a large amount of liquidity is released to the world (especially in the case of industrial hollowing-out or large-scale fiscal deficits), it will inevitably trigger depreciation pressure on the currency and damage to its credit. In this process, the country must effectively guide the outflow of monetary capital; otherwise, the macroeconomy will frequently suffer from the threat of high inflation. For example, the British pound suffered three large-scale devaluations in 1931, 1949, and 1967, causing large-scale withdrawal of foreign-held pound capital, which severely damaged the British economy and the pound’s status as an international reserve currency. The United States in the 1970s also triggered a dollar credit crisis due to long-term excessive currency issuance, which became an important cause of the later “stagflation” crisis. Third, greater financial risk. The status of world money will lead to the concentration of social capital in the financial industry and the entry of more international investors, forming a large offshore market, exacerbating the instability of exchange rates and interest rates, and at the same time increasing the difficulty of macroeconomic regulation. If a country’s domestic capital market and regulatory mechanisms are not yet mature, any major change in cross-border capital flows may trigger large fluctuations in its domestic asset prices, and it will very easily become a target for arbitrage and attack by international hot money.

另一方面，成为世界货币发行国，同样需面对诸多成本和挑战。马克思曾指出，货币作为支付手段的职能“包含着一个直接的矛盾”，并蕴含着货币危机的可能。而作为世界货币的主权信用货币的不断发行无疑将累加这一矛盾。世界货币发行国所必须面对的问题包括：一是贸易和工业竞争力下降。一国货币被多国政府和投资者持有后会出现升值，进而抬升出口商品价格，从而削弱自身的贸易竞争力，这势必将造成实体经济受损以及产业空心化的风险。二是对货币信用的冲击和通货膨胀压力。“特里芬难题”是各国货币国际化进程中都需要面对的问题，因为主权信用货币总归要以社会劳动价值总量为信用支撑，若向世界释放大量的流动性（尤其是在产业空心化或大规模财政赤字的情况下），必将引发货币的贬值压力和信用受损。在这一进程中，该国必须有效引导货币资本外流，否则便会令宏观经济频繁遭受高通胀威胁。如英镑便在1931年、1949年和1967年遭遇了三次大规模贬值，导致外国持有的英镑资本大规模撤出，重创了英国经济和英镑的国际储备货币地位。20世纪70年代的美国也由于长期的货币超发引发美元信用危机，这成为造成后来“滞胀”危机的一个重要原因。三是更强的金融风险。世界货币的地位会导致社会资本向金融行业的集中以及更多国际投资者的进驻，形成庞大的离岸市场，加剧汇率和利率的不稳定性，同时提高宏观调控的难度。若一国本土资本市场与监管机制尚不成熟，跨境资本流动的任何重大变动都可能引发其国内资产价格的大幅波动，且非常容易成为国际游资的套利和攻击目标。

It can be seen that, whether for the issuing country or the using countries, the economic effects created by world money are two-way. Therefore, when discussing the issue of a country’s currency internationalization, two points need to be recognized: first, the world-money system in the era of sovereign credit currency does not create a power mechanism in which the issuing country unilaterally benefits; other countries, when promoting currency internationalization, often also take their own existing power gains into consideration. Second, apart from depending on the relevant economic and political power, the formation of world money also requires attention to the choice of window of opportunity, pace, and strategy. If a country wants to become the issuing country of world money, it must have the ability to bear the corresponding costs; otherwise, it will face extremely high economic and financial risks due to containment by the original issuing country of world money or the immaturity of its own internal conditions.

可见，无论对于发行国还是使用国而言，世界货币所造成的经济作用都是双向的。因此，在探讨一国货币国际化的问题时，有两点是需要认清的：第一，主权信用货币时代的世界货币体系并非创造了一个发行国完全单方面受益的权力机制，他国在推行货币国际化时往往也会将自身现行的权力收益纳入考虑。第二，世界货币的形成除取决于相关经济与政治权力外，对窗口期、步伐和策略的选择同样需要重视。一国若要成为世界货币的发行国，必须拥有承受相应成本的能力，否则便会因为世界货币原发行国的遏制或自身内部条件的不成熟而面对极高的经济和金融风险。

III. The Current Situation and Strategic Choices for Renminbi Internationalization

三、当前人民币国际化的形势与战略选择

Marx’s thought on world money and its development still have important guiding significance for our understanding of the current issue of RMB internationalization. Although the internationalization of the renminbi has achieved notable results in recent years, it still does not match the status of China as the world’s second-largest economy. From the perspective of the “dual power structure,” China’s economic and political status has risen significantly in recent years, yet the internationalization of the renminbi remains constrained by certain factors. However, considering that for the issuer of a world currency, benefits and risks coexist, the internationalization of the renminbi should not be rushed; rather, it should be a gradual process that keeps pace with the growth of its own economic fundamentals.

马克思的世界货币思想及其发展对于我们理解当前人民币国际化的问题仍然具有重要的指导意义。尽管人民币的国际化已经在近年来取得显著成就，但与我国世界第二大经济体的地位仍不相匹配。立足“二元权力结构”来看，中国的经济和政治地位近年来虽已显著提升，但人民币国际化仍受到一些因素的掣肘。不过，考虑到对于世界货币发行国而言收益与风险并存这一特点，人民币的国际化也不应操之过急，而应是一个渐进的、与自身经济基本面成长相匹配的过程。

(I) Realistic Challenges to RMB Internationalization from the Perspective of the “Dual Power Structure”

（一）“二元权力结构”视角下人民币国际化的现实挑战

The process of RMB internationalization began in 2009, at a time when China’s economy was rapidly rising while the major capitalist countries were in a period of relative decline after the crisis. This critical window of opportunity helped China achieve a series of important accomplishments. Currently, the renminbi is the world’s fourth-largest payment currency and fifth-largest foreign exchange reserve currency, with a comprehensive internationalization index (6.40) that has surpassed the Japanese yen (4.59) and the British pound (4.38), but it still lags significantly behind mature currencies such as the US dollar (50.50) and the euro (25.16). Under the new circumstances, further promoting RMB internationalization still faces a series of complex problems for China.

人民币国际化的历程始于2009年，其时中国经济快速崛起，而主要资本主义国家则处于危机后的相对衰弱期，这一关键的窗口期帮助中国取得了一系列重要的成就。当前人民币已是全球第四大支付货币和第五大外汇储备货币，综合国际化指数（6.40）已超越日元（4.59）和英镑（4.38），但距美元（50.50）和欧元（25.16）这样的成熟货币还有着显著差距。在新形势下进一步推动人民币国际化，中国仍然面临一系列的复杂问题。

From the perspective of economic power, the main issues arise from the following aspects: First, trade quality. China is the world’s largest trading nation and has maintained a long-term current account surplus since 1994. However, for currency internationalization, the quality of trade is more important than its scale. This is because, under the hegemony of the US dollar, surplus countries not only stabilize the currency value of deficit countries by supplying goods, but the large amount of foreign exchange reserves they generate is also used to accumulate US financial assets, objectively strengthening the dollar and making their own currencies weaker. In addition, although China’s trade structure has been continuously optimized in recent years, the proportion of high-tech products is still not high. In 2023, China’s export volume was 3.38 trillion US dollars, of which high-tech products accounted for 842.542 billion US dollars, roughly one-quarter. This means that while China has a clear quantitative advantage in trade, it has not been fully transformed into an advantage in pricing and settlement in renminbi. Only by improving trade quality to form a more abundant settlement right for scarce and high-value goods can stronger support be provided for RMB internationalization. Second, the financial market. Convertibility and the ability to repatriate currency are necessary conditions for currency internationalization, but the opening of the capital account requires weighing the consequences of cross-border capital flows. Therefore, the degree of openness of the capital market is closely related to the maturity of the domestic financial system and regulatory capacity. However, due to problems such as the insufficient variety of financial products, imperfect risk identification mechanisms, and the lack of experience of domestic enterprises in participating in international investment and financing activities, there are still concerns about further promoting the free convertibility of the renminbi. Third, cross-border financial infrastructure. The Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), launched in 2015, has taken initial shape, but it lags behind the US CHIPS and the eurozone’s TARGET2 by about 50 and 20 years, respectively, and there is a clear gap compared with mature cross-border settlement systems in terms of participants and usage efficiency. The central bank digital currency bridge based on digital currency technology still requires a process of exploration in terms of technical architecture and regulatory models, and it remains unknown when it can truly challenge the already mature SWIFT system and form its own network effects. Fourth, the renminbi exchange rate. An increase in the renminbi exchange rate is a prerequisite for promoting RMB internationalization, as a higher exchange rate helps enhance the currency’s creditworthiness and acceptance. However, for a long time in the past, in order to maintain the competitiveness of the export sector, the renminbi exchange rate remained at a low level. If the renminbi is allowed to appreciate, it will inevitably sacrifice some interests of the export sector, which in turn may affect the renminbi’s international status. For example, in the 1980s, after Japan signed the Plaza Accord [25]25 The Plaza Accord was a 1985 agreement among the finance ministers and central bank governors of five major economies (the US, Japan, West Germany, France, and the UK) to depreciate the US dollar relative to the Japanese yen and the German mark, leading to a sharp appreciation of the yen and subsequent economic difficulties for Japan., it pushed for a radical appreciation of the yen, leading to a rapid decline in foreign trade and forcing the suspension of yen internationalization. If the renminbi is to be internationalized, this dilemma must be properly handled. From the perspective of political power, China’s political stability and a series of diplomatic achievements in recent years are important supports for promoting RMB internationalization, but some risks and challenges also need to be faced squarely. These mainly include: First, geopolitical challenges. In recent years, the United States has continuously promoted a “de-Sinicization” policy in the fields of technology and finance, using various alliances in an attempt to exclude the renminbi from mainstream financial networks, causing increased volatility in the renminbi exchange rate. In response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the United States has also rallied Indo-Pacific countries to pressure countries along the route. After all, the renminbi comes from an emerging market economy, and for many countries along the Belt and Road, its economic and financial foundations for becoming an international currency still need further testing. Many countries have long-term path dependence on the US dollar, and shaking this inertia is no easy task. For economies such as the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Japan, they are also trying to seize the opportunity presented by the rise of digital finance and the relative decline of US power to seek economic power, which makes it more difficult for the renminbi to find support from more partners. Second, the imbalance of power in international financial organizations. International financial organizations are important platforms for seeking consensus and formulating international financial rules, but there is still a significant imbalance in the power comparison between developed and developing countries within them. For example, the SWIFT association, which should be neutral, has become a US-dominated financial institution largely because the vast majority of its board members come from the United States and its allied countries. In the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the United States still retains veto power over major issues, and the president of the World Bank has always been nominated by the United States, which makes reforming the US dollar-centered international monetary system fraught with obstacles. Third, security risks. Security is a fundamental condition for the cross-border circulation of the renminbi. On the one hand, China needs to face new technological risks in the era of digital fiat currency, such as data and asset security, legal risks, and cyberattacks. On the other hand, it must also confront the conventional military deterrence of the hegemonic power. The United States has long ranked first in the world in military strength, with 800 military bases distributed in more than 70 countries or regions, and has a precedent of launching wars to maintain the hegemony of the US dollar. Once the renminbi is accepted by more countries, it cannot be ruled out that the United States might again resort to extreme measures or instigate proxy wars to sanction renminbi partner countries. Under the conditions where China advocates peaceful development and is unwilling to engage in direct military confrontation with the United States, China needs to formulate other plans that can effectively counter the United States; otherwise, it will greatly damage the confidence of partner countries in holding the renminbi.

从经济权力的角度来看，最主要的问题来自以下几个方面：一是贸易质量方面。中国是全球最大贸易国，从1994年开始，中国长期保持经常项目顺差。但对于货币国际化而言，贸易的质量要比规模更加重要。因为在美元霸权下，顺差国不仅通过输送商品稳定了逆差国的货币价值，其产生的大量外汇储备还会被用于积累美国金融资产，客观上起到了强化美元并使自身成为弱势货币的效果。此外，我国的贸易结构虽然近年来一直在不断优化，但高新产品的占比仍不算高。2023年中国出口额3.38万亿美元，其中高新技术产品8425.42亿美元，约占1/4。这导致我国虽拥有明显的贸易数量优势，但并未充分转化为人民币的计价结算优势。只有通过贸易质量的提升形成更加丰富的稀珍商品结算权，才能为人民币的国际化提供更强大的助力。二是金融市场方面。可兑换性和货币回流能力是货币国际化的必要条件，但资本项目的开放需权衡资本跨境流动的后果。因此，资本市场的开放程度与国内金融体系的成熟度和监管能力密切相关。但由于目前金融市场中存在的产品种类不丰富、风险识别机制不健全、国内企业参与国际投融资活动经验不足等问题，进一步推动人民币可自由兑换还存在隐忧。三是跨境金融基础设施方面。2015年上线的人民币跨境支付系统（CIPS）虽已初具规模，但较美国的CHIPS和欧元区的TARGET2分别晚了约50年和20年，在参与者和使用效率方面与成熟的跨境结算系统相比还有着明显差距。而基于数字货币技术的央行数字货币桥在技术架构与监管模式方面还需要一个探索的过程，何时能真正挑战早已成熟的SWIFT体系、形成自身的网络效应尚是未知之数。四是人民币汇率方面。人民币汇率的提升是推动人民币国际化的前提条件，汇率提升有利于增强本币信用和接受度。但在过去很长一段时间内，为了保持出口部门的竞争力，人民币汇率长期处于低位。若推动人民币升值，必然要牺牲部分出口部门的利益，反过来也可能影响人民币的国际地位。譬如20世纪80年代，日本在签订《广场协议》后推动日元激进升值，导致对外贸易迅速衰退，日元国际化的步伐也被迫中止。人民币若要国际化，必须妥善处理好这一两难问题。从政治权力的角度来看，中国的政治稳定性和近年来所取得的一系列外交成就都是推动人民币国际化的重要倚靠，但一些风险挑战也需要正视，主要包括：一是地缘政治挑战。近年来，美国在科技与金融领域不断推动“去中国化”政策，运用各种同盟妄图将人民币排斥在主流金融网络之外，引发人民币汇率波动加剧。而针对中国的“一带一路”倡议，美国同样拉拢印太国家对沿线国家进行施压。人民币毕竟来自新兴市场经济体，对于很多“一带一路”沿线国家来说仍需进一步检验其成为国际货币的经济和金融基础，很多国家对美元还有着长期的路径依赖，动摇这种惯性并非易事。而对于欧盟、英国、日本等经济体来说，其同样试图抓住数字金融兴起、美国国力相对衰落的机遇期谋求经济权力，这就为人民币寻找更多伙伴支持带来了难度。二是国际金融组织中的力量不平衡。国际金融组织是寻求各方共识、制定国际金融制度的重要载体，但其中发达国家与发展中国家间的力量对比还存在显著的不平衡。譬如本应中立的SWIFT协会之所以成为美国主导的金融机构，在很大程度上是因为其绝大多数董事会成员都来自美国及其同盟国家。而在世界银行和国际货币基金组织中，美国对于重大问题依然保有否决权，世界银行的行长也一直由美国提名，这令改革以美元为中心的国际货币制度阻力重重。三是安全风险。安全是人民币跨境流通的基础性条件，中国一方面需要面对数字法币时代新的技术风险，譬如数据和资产安全、法律风险、网络攻击等，另一方面还需面对霸权国的常规军事威慑。美国的军事实力常年居于世界首位，有800个军事基地分布在70多个国家或地区，并有着出于维护美元霸权而发动战争的先例。一旦人民币被更多国家接纳，不排除美国有可能再次采取极端手段或挑起代理人战争以制裁人民币伙伴国。在中国倡导和平发展、不愿与美国发生直接军事对抗的条件下，中国需制定出对美国形成有效反制的其他方案，否则将极大损害伙伴国的持有信心。

(II) Steadily and Prudently Promoting RMB Internationalization

（二）稳慎扎实推动人民币国际化

Although many challenges remain, after the 2008 financial crisis, with the rapid improvement of China’s economic and technological strength, the credit support for the US dollar and the renminbi has shifted in relative terms, and the potential for further promoting RMB internationalization has become increasingly apparent. Even many foreign scholars acknowledge that the renminbi “has an irresistible strength.” In the future, it is necessary to be adept at seizing opportunities while fully considering risks, adhere to the simultaneous development of growth and stability, and steadily and prudently advance RMB internationalization.

尽管还存在着诸多挑战，但在2008年金融危机后，随着中国经济和科技实力的快速提升，美元与人民币的信用支撑此消彼长，进一步推动人民币国际化的潜力愈发显现，甚至很多国外学者也承认，人民币“具有势不可挡的实力”。未来既要善于抓住时机，又要充分考虑风险，坚持发展与稳定并举，稳慎扎实地推进人民币国际化。

First, continuously promote high-quality development and advance high-standard opening up. High-quality economic development will consolidate the fundamentals of RMB internationalization while creating new advantages for China’s trade. At present, the shift from “importing high-end products and exporting low-end products” to “importing low-end products and exporting high-end products” is crucial for the development of RMB internationalization. This can not only create a lock-in effect based on high-end technology products and enhance the RMB’s voice in pricing and settlement, but also strengthen economic ties with partner countries, increasing the international reserves of the RMB through imports denominated in RMB. In addition, high-end products can boost the competitiveness of China’s export sector, providing more ample room for the appreciation of the RMB. It is necessary to accelerate breakthroughs in core technologies and produce more locally made high-tech products with international competitiveness. At the same time, it is essential to diversify trade partners, gradually reduce export dependence on the United States, resolve the huge stockpile of US dollar reserves, deepen development cooperation in the Belt and Road Initiative and the RCEP [26]26 The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a free trade agreement among fifteen Asia-Pacific countries, signed in 2020 and entered into force in 2022., actively promote local currency settlement, and continuously consolidate partnerships conducive to the development of the RMB.

第一，持续推动经济高质量发展，促进高水平对外开放。经济的高质量发展将夯实人民币国际化的基本面，同时形成中国贸易的新优势。当前，从“进口高端产品并出口低端产品”向“进口低端产品并出口高端产品”的转变对于人民币国际化的发展至关重要。这不仅可以形成基于高端技术产品的锁定效应并提升人民币在计价结算方面的话语权，还可以强化与伙伴国间的经济联系，通过以人民币进口增加人民币的国际储备。此外，高端产品还可以增进中国出口部门的竞争力，为人民币的升值提供更充分的空间。必须加快核心技术攻关，产出更多具备国际竞争力的本土高科技产品。同时，还要推动贸易对象多元化，逐步减少对美国的出口依赖，化解巨额美元储备，深入推进“一带一路”、RCEP等的发展合作，积极推行本币结算，不断夯实有利于人民币发展的伙伴关系。

Second, promote the construction of a financial market system centered on the bond market, enhancing the liquidity and attractiveness of the RMB. As a necessary condition for RMB internationalization, the key to financial market construction lies in properly handling the contradiction between openness and security. On this basis, bond market construction can be taken as a breakthrough in the current stage of financial modernization. This is because, on the one hand, the bond market combines profitability, liquidity, and security; it can not only meet the allocation needs of various investors but also mainly involves institutional investors in over-the-counter transactions, making the associated financial risks relatively controllable. On the other hand, due to the decline in the creditworthiness of the US dollar in recent years, international investors have also developed a demand for new safe assets. At present, China’s bond market has become the second largest in the world and has been fully included in the three major global bond indices. The confidence of overseas investors in the RMB continues to strengthen, all of which provide conditions for the further development of the bond market. Therefore, efforts should be made to promote the construction of the RMB bond market, facilitating the transformation of the RMB from a pricing currency to a reserve currency.

第二，推动以债券市场为核心的金融市场体系建设，增强人民币的流动性与吸引力。作为人民币国际化的必备条件，金融市场建设的关键在于处理好开放与安全间的矛盾。基于此，可以将债券市场建设作为当前阶段金融现代化建设的突破口。这是因为，一方面，债券市场兼具收益性、流动性和安全性，不仅能满足各类投资者的配置需求，还多以场外交易机构投资者参与为主，其所带来的金融风险相对可控。另一方面，由于近年来美元的信用下跌，国际投资者也产生了寻求新的安全资产的需求。而当下中国的债券市场规模已位居全球第二，并已悉数纳入全球三大主流债券指数，境外投资者对人民币的信心不断增强，这些都为债券市场的进一步发展提供了条件。因此，应当着力推动人民币债券市场建设，促进人民币由计价货币向储备货币转变。

Third, further advance the research, development, and pilot work of financial technologies such as digital legal tender, seizing the main track of cross-border digital finance. In the field of digital legal tender, China has a significant first-mover advantage. In the long run, the widespread adoption of digital legal tender is an inevitable trend. The leading edge in digital technology and financial technology will help China form network effects first and gain a voice in the formulation of international rules. In practical operations, a development model of “running on two legs” in both domestic and international markets should be formed. Domestic financial stability is a prerequisite for financial technology to participate in international competition. Pilot work should first be promoted in regions and industries with sound financial foundations, gradually expanding it, and promptly addressing the technical risks that emerge. In the international market, special attention should be paid to cooperation with major economies, friendly countries, and international organizations, promoting the “going global” of China’s digital legal tender interface standards, technical frameworks, and governance rules, as well as the cross-border connection of financial infrastructure. Vigorous efforts should be made to advance the construction of a central bank digital currency bridge, eliminating concerns about digital RMB risks in these countries through significant technological advantages and the establishment of a governance community, thereby enhancing the accessibility and convenience of cross-border use of the RMB.

第三，进一步推动数字法币等金融科技研发与试点工作，抢占跨境数字金融主赛道。在数字法币领域，中国具有重要的先发优势。从长远来看，数字法币的通行是大势所趋，在数字技术、金融科技领域的领先优势将帮助中国率先形成网络效应并在国际规则制定方面争取到话语权。在实践操作中，要形成国内和国际市场“双腿跑”的发展模式。国内金融稳定是金融科技参与国际竞争的前提，应该先在金融基础良好的地区和行业推动并逐步扩大试点工作，及时解决所暴露出的技术风险。在国际市场上，尤其要注意与主要经济体、友好国家和国际组织的合作，促进我国数字法币的接口标准、技术框架和治理规则“走出去”，以及金融基础设施的跨境连接，大力推动央行数字货币桥的建设，通过显著的技术优势和治理共同体的搭建消除这些国家对数字人民币风险的担忧，增强人民币跨境使用的可获得性和便利性。

Fourth, continuously enrich the toolkit for safeguarding monetary sovereignty while actively promoting reform of the international monetary system. The internationalization of the RMB requires both seizing opportunities and taking the initiative, as well as consolidating gains and advancing step by step. This necessitates a richer set of policy tools, backed by solid economic security, national defense security, and stronger international political influence. In response to the economic sanctions and military deterrence that the United States has already launched or objectively exists, it is necessary to continuously enhance the resilience and security level of industrial and supply chains, weaken the substantive impact of US sanctions and technology blockades, and ensure the smooth flow of land, sea, air, and network trade channels through improvements in national defense technology, thereby boosting the confidence of China and its partner countries in the face of military deterrence. On the international stage, it is also necessary to seize the opportunities arising from the overdraft of US dollar credit and the rise of the “de-dollarization” wave, unite forces to promote institutional changes in relevant international organizations, and urge them to truly play their public role. This will effectively reduce the preference for and habitual use of the US dollar, promote the diversified allocation of international assets by countries, and help the world monetary system centered on the US dollar gradually evolve toward a multipolar monetary system.

第四，不断丰富维护货币主权的工具体系，同时积极推动国际货币制度改革。人民币的国际化既要抓住机遇、主动出击，又要守住成果、步步为营，这便需要更加丰富的政策工具，以稳固的经济安全、国防安全和更加强大的国际政治影响力为后盾。针对美国已经展开或客观存在的经济制裁和军事威慑，应当不断提升产业链和供应链的韧性和安全水平，削弱美国的制裁和技术封锁带来的实质性冲击，并通过国防科技水平的提升确保陆海空和网络贸易渠道的畅通，增进我国和伙伴国家面对军事威慑的底气。而在国际舞台上，也要抓住美元信用透支、“去美元化”浪潮兴起的机遇，团结力量推动相关国际组织进行体制变革，促使其真正发挥自身的公共属性。这将有效降低美元的持有偏好和使用惯性，促进各国多元化配置国际资产，助推以美元为核心的世界货币体系逐渐向多极化货币体系演进。

In summary, based on Marx’s theory of world money and related ideas, this paper analyzes the generative logic and economic role of world money in the era of sovereign credit currency. It is not difficult to see that, even as the forms of money continue to change, the basic viewpoints and methods of Marx’s study of monetary issues still possess the most fundamental explanatory power for understanding the mechanisms of power and contradiction behind contemporary world money. For China at present, it is necessary to deeply understand the significance of RMB internationalization, seize the strategic opportunity period provided by the new technological revolution, and enhance the country’s comprehensive strength through a “combination punch” of reforms and innovations in trade, finance, and diplomacy, continuously creating favorable conditions for the international competition of the RMB. At the same time, it is also necessary to fully recognize the challenges and costs involved in the process of internationalizing a national currency, and not to form a concept of internationalization for the sake of internationalization. The internationalization of the RMB will be a gradual process requiring a relatively long period; it is essential to strengthen internal capabilities and seize opportunities adeptly. With the accelerated layout of strategies such as building a strong trading nation and a strong financial nation, and the accelerated construction of a new development pattern, the RMB will inevitably become an increasingly important force in promoting the transformation of the current world monetary system.

综上所述，基于马克思的世界货币理论及其相关思想，本文对主权信用货币时代世界货币的生成逻辑与经济作用进行了剖析，不难看到，即便货币形式不断变迁，马克思研究货币问题的基本观点、方法对我们认识当下世界货币背后的权力与矛盾运动机制依然具有最根本的解释力。对于目前的中国而言，既要深入理解人民币国际化的重要意义，抓住新技术革命提供的战略机遇期，通过在贸易、金融、外交等方面改革创新的“组合拳”提升国家综合实力，为人民币的国际竞争不断创造利好条件；也要充分认识到一国货币国际化过程中存在的挑战和付出的成本，不能形成为了国际化而国际化的观念。人民币的国际化将是一个需要较长时期的渐进过程，必须练好内功、善抓机遇。随着贸易强国、金融强国等战略的加速布局和新发展格局的加快构建，人民币必将成为推动现行世界货币体系变革过程中愈发重要的力量。

Online editor: Tong Xin

网络编辑：同心