The Implications of the New Materialism of Practice

*Theses on Feuerbach* is the manifesto of Marx’s new materialism. In this text, Marx achieved a dual critique and creative synthesis of both old materialism and idealism, proposing a new materialism that takes practice as its mode of thinking and theoretical principle, thereby truly restoring the dignity and authority of materialism. Rethinking what new materialism is and how it can transcend old materialism and idealism is not a meaningless simple repetition, but a return to the source of Marx’s philosophical revolution, in order to reveal the secret of new materialism.

《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》是马克思新唯物主义的宣言。在这一文本中，马克思实现了对旧唯物主义与唯心主义的双重批判与创造性综合，提出以实践为思维方式和理论原则的新唯物主义，真正恢复唯物主义的尊严和权威。重思何谓新唯物主义以及新唯物主义何以能够超越旧唯物主义与唯心主义等经典问题，不是无意义的简单重复，而是在源头处对马克思哲学革命的回访，以揭示新唯物主义的秘密。

The Evolution of the Concept of Practice

实践概念的嬗变

The key to understanding and grasping the characteristics of new materialism lies in elucidating the implications of practice as a mode of thinking, comprehending and grasping practice at the theoretical height of a new worldview, and thereby clarifying the fundamental distinctions between new materialism, old materialism, and idealism. New materialism advocates proceeding from practice and opposes the priority of consciousness and ideas. When new materialism is grasped in the sense of the priority of practice, people either vulgarize practice or absolutize it. The former causes new materialism to regress to natural thinking, while the latter plunges new materialism once again into metaphysics. The degree of people’s understanding of practice directly determines the degree of their understanding of the thinking characteristics of new materialism.

理解和把握新唯物主义的特质，关键在于阐明实践的思维方式意蕴，在新世界观的理论高度理解和把握实践，进而阐明新唯物主义与旧唯物主义、唯心主义的根本性区别。新唯物主义主张从实践出发，反对意识、观念的优先性。当在实践优先的意义上把握新唯物主义时，人们或者把实践庸俗化，或者把实践绝对化。前者使新唯物主义退回到自然思维，后者使新唯物主义再度陷入形而上学。人们对实践的理解程度，直接决定了对新唯物主义思维特质的认识程度。

In the history of Western philosophy, Aristotle was the first to elevate practice to a philosophical category, regarding practice as an activity whose end is itself, and holding that practice includes political activities and ethical activities. However, in Aristotle’s view, theoretical activity and the contemplative life were the higher activities and the true life of human beings. Aristotle’s understanding of “practice”—discussing the issue of “practice” within the ethical domain and viewing practice as a purposive activity running through the entirety of life—influenced the subsequent exploration of practice by Western philosophers. Until Kant, people’s understanding of practice had not completely broken free from the Aristotelian tradition, still excluding productive-technical activity from practice. In Kant’s view, moral practice based on the law of freedom was the true manifestation of practice, while productive activity based on the law of nature did not belong to practice. Kant believed that practice was an autonomous ethical act in accordance with moral law, representing the essence of human freedom, and was that which is possible through freedom. Kant’s understanding of practice differed from modern philosophy’s conception of practice as a natural concept, instead endowing practice with the determination of freedom. Fichte, building on Kant’s distinction between theoretical reason and practical reason, defined human practical rational activity as creative activity.

在西方哲学史上，亚里士多德最早把实践提升为哲学范畴，把实践看作以自身为目的的行为，认为实践包括政治活动和伦理活动。但在亚里士多德看来，理论活动、沉思的生活才是人的高级活动与真正生活。亚里士多德对“实践”的理解，即在伦理领域内讨论“实践”问题，把实践看作一个贯穿生命始终的目的性活动，影响此后西方哲学家对实践的探讨。直到康德，人们对实践的认识都没有完全摆脱亚里士多德的传统，依然把生产—技术活动排除在实践之外。在康德看来，以自由因果律为依据的道德实践是实践的真正表现，以自然因果律为依据的生产活动不属于实践。康德认为，实践是合乎道德法则的、具有自主性的伦理行为，表征的是人的自由本质，是通过自由而可能的东西。康德对实践的理解不同于近代哲学把实践作为自然概念的认识，而是赋予实践以自由性规定。费希特在康德区分理论理性与实践理性的基础上，把人的实践理性活动规定为创造性活动。

Hegel’s understanding of practice surpassed that of Aristotle, Kant, and Fichte, holding that practice is a concept that has been mediated or become mediated. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel pointed out that practice is the realization of reason’s self-consciousness in the object through its own activity, regarding practice as something higher than “observing reason”; in the *Science of Logic*, he placed practice within the “cognition” link of the doctrine of the concept, pointing out that cognition proceeds from the theoretical activity in which the subject simply receives the object, to the practical activity in which the subject actively transforms the object, emphasizing that practice overcomes the alienness of the object to the subject and unifies subject and object. Hegel not only incorporated productive-technical activity into practice but also understood practice in the sense of the unity of subject and object, viewing practice as the objectifying activity of self-consciousness. However, the practice understood by Hegel was merely a link in the self-knowledge and self-realization of the absolute idea, a pure distinction within the idea itself, and could not escape its logical framework. Hegel’s concept of practice was abstract and speculative, a concept stripped of material factors and real foundations.

黑格尔对实践的认识超越了亚里士多德、康德、费希特，认为实践是经过中介或者中介化了的概念。黑格尔在《精神现象学》中指出，实践是理性的自我意识通过其自身的活动而实现于客体之中，把实践看作比“观察的理性”更高的东西；他在《逻辑学》中把实践置于概念论的“认识”环节，指出认识是从主体单纯接纳客体的理论活动，过渡到主体能动地改造客体的实践活动，强调实践克服了客体对主体的异己性，使主客统一起来。黑格尔不仅把生产—技术活动纳入实践中，而且在主客统一的意义上理解实践，把实践看作自我意识的对象化活动。但黑格尔所理解的实践只是绝对理念自我认识、自我实现的环节，是理念在它自身内的纯粹区别，无法摆脱其逻辑学架构。黑格尔的实践概念是抽象的、思辨的，是剥除了物质因素、现实基础的概念。

The Metaphysical Thinking of Old Materialism and Idealism

旧唯物主义与唯心主义的形而上学思维

Marx’s understanding of “practice” fully appropriated the intellectual achievements of Aristotle, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and others, incorporating elements such as purposiveness, freedom, creativity, and mediation into his understanding of “practice.” In Marx’s view, practice does not merely refer to activities in the ethical, political, and other spheres, but also includes actual activities in the economic sphere and all other spheres. However, Marx’s concept of practice is by no means a mere jumble of the various determinations of previous concepts of practice. Practice, as sensuous human activity, as objective activity, constitutes the foundation of human history and the content of human existence, and is the primordial mode of human existence. More importantly, through practice, Marx provides us with a new mode of thinking for understanding the relationship between humans and the world, as well as all philosophical problems. Mr. Gao Qinghai [1]1 Gao Qinghai (1930–2004) was a prominent Chinese Marxist philosopher known for his work on the “mode of thinking from the standpoint of practice” as a key to interpreting Marx’s new materialism. summarized the mode of thinking of new materialism as the “mode of thinking from the standpoint of practice.” The “mode of thinking from the standpoint of practice” grasps the standpoint of practice as a mode of thinking, emphasizing that proceeding from practice, the relationship between humans and the world is grasped as a relation of negative unity. This mode of thinking thoroughly transcends the intuitive thinking of old materialism and the speculative thinking of idealism, truly completing the task of modern philosophy.

马克思对“实践”的理解充分占有了亚里士多德、康德、费希特和黑格尔等人的思想成果，把目的性、自由性、创造性、中介性等要素统摄到对“实践”的理解中。在马克思看来，实践不单指向伦理、政治等领域中的活动，而且包括经济领域和其他一切领域中的实际活动。但马克思的实践概念绝不是对以往实践概念诸规定的杂糅。实践作为感性的人的活动、对象性的活动，构成人类历史的基础和人存在的内容，是人的本源性存在方式。更为重要的是，马克思透过实践为我们理解人与世界以及认识全部哲学问题提供了崭新的思维方式。高清海先生把新唯物主义的思维方式概括为“实践观点的思维方式”。“实践观点的思维方式”是把实践观点把握为一种思维方式，强调从实践出发把人与世界的关系把握为否定性统一关系。这种思维方式彻底超越了旧唯物主义的直观思维与唯心主义的思辨思维，真正完成了近代哲学的任务。

Overcoming the split and opposition between the phenomenal world and the world of ideas, between this shore and the other shore, was the task and project of modern philosophy. Faced with the problem of how to unify thinking and being, subject and object, idealism achieved this unification by determining being and object through thinking and subject. Hegel, as the culmination of idealism, overcame the dualistic opposition between thinking and being, subject and object in a speculative manner, emphasizing that thought is not only the thought in our heads but also the determination of the thing itself. Specifically, Hegel’s idealism grasps and achieves the unity of subject and object through the self-differentiation and self-negation of spirit. As Marx said, idealism abstractly developed the active side. Idealism regards “objects, reality, sensuousness” as constructs or manifestations of the functions of human consciousness, viewing the world as a world represented by consciousness, thereby forming a mode of thinking that regards the world from the principle of activity. This mode of thinking embodies the activity of consciousness and the historicity of the thinking process, but what it achieves is only the concrete of thought determinations. Adorno pointed out that idealism, in the process of abstraction, discards what is abstracted, excluding it from thought. Idealism’s disregard for “objects, reality, sensuousness,” especially the abstractness of its mode of thinking, provoked the protest of materialists represented by Feuerbach.

克服现象世界与理念世界、此岸和彼岸的分裂与对立，是近代哲学的课题与任务。面对如何统一思维与存在、主体与客体的问题，唯心主义以思维、主体规定存在、客体，以此实现统一。黑格尔作为唯心主义的集大成者，以思辨的方式克服思维与存在、主体与客体的二元对立，强调思想不仅是我们头脑中的思想，而且是事物本身的规定。具体来说，黑格尔的唯心主义是在精神的自我分化和自我否定中把握和实现主体与客体的统一。如马克思所言，唯心主义抽象地发展了能动的方面。唯心主义把“对象、现实、感性”看作是人的意识机能的构造物、显现物，把世界看作为意识所表象的世界，形成了以活动性原则看待世界的思维方式。这种思维方式体现了意识的能动性和思维过程的历史性，但它所达到的只是思维规定的具体。阿多诺指出，唯心主义在抽象的过程中丢掉了被抽象的东西，在思想中排除了被抽象的东西。唯心主义对“对象、现实、感性”的漠视，特别是其思维方式的抽象性，引起了以费尔巴哈为代表的唯物主义者的抗议。

Materialism in modern philosophy was closely linked to the struggle against metaphysics. Marx pointed out in *The Holy Family* that the metaphysics defeated by 18th-century French materialism experienced a “victorious and content-rich restoration” in 19th-century German philosophy. Faced with the abstract thinking of idealism and the conflict between thinking and sensuousness, Feuerbach appealed to sensuousness, emphasizing the understanding of “objects, reality, sensuousness” from the objective or intuitive form, granting priority to sensuous natural existence, and rejecting the “supersensible” and “supernatural” metaphysical presuppositions of idealism. However, Feuerbach only engaged in a simple, static intuition of the world, understanding “objects, reality, sensuousness” as something ready-made, given, and existing outside us, without regarding the sensuous world as a world created by humans and in which humans participate. Although old materialism acknowledged the indissolubility of the object, emphasizing the objectivity of the object and the givenness of consciousness, due to the immediacy and unmediated nature of its thinking, it failed to grasp the mediatedness of the object, lacked the dimension of history and activity, and fell far short of the height of Hegel’s “clever idealism.”

近代哲学中的唯物主义是与对形而上学的斗争紧密联系的。马克思在《神圣家族》中指出，18世纪法国唯物主义所击败的形而上学在19世纪的德国哲学中又迎来了“胜利的和富有内容的复辟”。面对唯心主义的抽象思维，以及思维与感性的冲突，费尔巴哈诉诸感性，强调从客体的或直观的形式去理解“对象、现实、感性”，赋予感性的自然存在以优先地位，拒斥唯心主义“超感性”“超自然”的形而上学设定。但是，费尔巴哈仅对世界作单纯的、静止的直观，把“对象、现实、感性”理解为某种现成的、既定的、在我们之外的客观存在，没有把感性世界看作由人创造的、参与其中的世界。旧唯物主义虽承认客体的不可消解性，强调对象的客观性和意识的被给予性，但因其思维的直接性和无中介性，它们没有把握到客体的被中介性，缺少历史和活动的维度，远没有达到黑格尔“聪明的唯心主义”的高度。

Although old materialism and idealism understood and grasped “objects, reality, sensuousness” through different modes of thinking, they both proceeded from abstract principles, seeking an ultimate, absolutely certain understanding of the sensuous world, and were both metaphysical modes of thinking based on the principle of identity.

旧唯物主义和唯心主义虽以不同的思维理解和把握“对象、现实、感性”，但它们都是从抽象原则出发，寻找对感性世界的终极的、绝对确定的理解，是以同一性为原则的形而上学思维方式。

The Transformation of the Mode of Thinking in New Materialism

新唯物主义的思维方式变革

The new materialism re-establishes the principle of objectivity, emphasizing the priority of the object. The priority of the object refers to acknowledging and respecting the object’s alienness and non-identity. Idealism emphasizes the necessity and objectivity of the thought process, dissolving the object through the self-identity of thought, thereby obscuring the objectivity of “objects, reality, and sensuousness.” The new materialism holds that the thought process should not be simply opposed to the real process; rather, it excavates the objective elements contained within “objects, reality, and sensuousness,” grasping the substantive things in people’s actual life process. People’s practical activities and modes of interaction constitute insurmountable, given material conditions and a real foundation, overcoming unrealistic subjective one-sidedness, and delimiting the possible space and boundaries of practice.

新唯物主义重新确立了客体性原则，强调客体的优先性。客体的优先性是指承认和尊重客体的异己性与非同一性。唯心主义强调思维过程的必然性与客观性，以思维的自我同一消解客体，遮蔽了“对象、现实、感性”的客观性。新唯物主义认为不能把思维过程同现实过程简单地对立起来，而是挖掘“对象、现实、感性”中所包含的客观要素，把握人们现实生活过程中的实体性东西。人们的实践活动、交往方式构成了不可超越的既定的物质条件与现实基础，克服了不切实际的主观片面性，规定着实践的可能空间与边界。

The new materialism understands “objects, reality, and sensuousness” from the perspective of human beings’ own activity of negation, not from nature or the supernatural outside human activity. In Marx’s view, “objects, reality, and sensuousness,” as the confirmation of human essential forces, are the products of human purposive activity, historical activity, and creative activity. Through practice, people negate the one-sidedness of the objective world in its self-existing form, making the world a human world. Therefore, “objects, reality, and sensuousness” are not beings external to humanity, nor are they the externalization of consciousness, but rather “the history of industry and the already existing objective existence of industry.” [2]2 This phrase is a reference to Marx’s concept in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, where he argues that industry and the objects it produces reveal the objective existence of human essential powers. Practice, as a human activity of negating the world, possesses the power to change the world and constitutes the foundation of the entire existing sensuous world.

新唯物主义从人自身的否定性活动去理解“对象、现实、感性”，不是从人的活动之外的自然或超自然出发去理解感性世界。在马克思看来，“对象、现实、感性”作为人的本质力量的确证，是人的目的性活动、历史性活动、创造性活动的产物。人们经由实践否定了自在形态的客观世界的片面性，使世界成为属人的世界。因此，“对象、现实、感性”不是外在于人的在者，也不是意识的外化，而是“工业的历史和工业的已经生成的对象性的存在”。实践作为一种人对世界的否定性活动，具有改变世界的力量，构成整个现存的感性世界的基础。

The new materialism contains a revolutionary character and a future-oriented dimension. It not only refreshes people’s understanding of the unity-in-negation between humanity and the world, but also transcends that kind of word-based intellectual activity, reshaping people’s value attitudes and value pursuits, and guiding people to devote themselves to revolutionary practice. The new materialism holds that humanity, through practice, can step out of inner consciousness and change the world.

新唯物主义蕴含着革命性品格与未来性向度。它不仅刷新人们对人与世界否定性统一关系的认识，而且超越那种词句式的思想活动，重塑人们的价值态度与价值追求，引导人们投身于革命的实践。新唯物主义主张人类经由实践可以走出内在的意识而改变世界。

(The author is an associate professor in the Department of Marxism at Northeast Normal University.)

（作者系东北师范大学马克思主义学部副教授）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心