The Historical Dimension in *Theses on Feuerbach*

The year 1845 was a critical period for the formation of Marx’s historical materialism. However, throughout the entire *Theses on Feuerbach* (hereinafter referred to as the *Theses*), there is, on the surface, a great deal of discussion on materialism, especially on “practice.” Thus, whether the historical dimension exists and how it is presented constitute the basic dimension of the study of historical materialism. In the *Theses*, Marx completed his intellectual construction through his critique of Feuerbach. This benefited from Feuerbach’s materialist “inversion” of Hegelian philosophy, which in turn brought about a transformation in the framework for understanding objects. While Feuerbach achieved this “inversion,” he also discarded Hegel’s socio-historical dimension. On the basis of Feuerbach, Marx further realized the socio-historical turn of materialism. This is Marx’s new materialism, or what we commonly call historical materialism. This turn was accomplished in the *Theses*.

1845年，是马克思历史唯物主义成型的关键时期。但在整个《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》（以下简称《提纲》）中，从字面上看，有大量关于唯物主义的论述，尤其是关于“实践”的论述。那么，历史的维度是否存在以及如何呈现出来，构成了对历史唯物主义研究的基本维度。马克思在《提纲》中通过批判费尔巴哈完成了思想的建构，这得益于费尔巴哈实现了对黑格尔哲学的唯物主义“倒转”，进而实现了对对象理解框架的转变。费尔巴哈实现“倒转”的同时，却抛弃了黑格尔的社会历史维度。马克思在费尔巴哈的基础上又实现了唯物主义的社会历史转向，这就是马克思的新唯物主义，或者我们惯常所说的历史唯物主义。这个转向就是在《提纲》中完成的。

The Prominence of the Socio-Historical Dimension

社会历史维度的凸显

First, in the first thesis, Marx criticizes the mode of understanding objects in the form of intuition or as objects. In fact, Marx reveals Feuerbach’s deficiency in the socio-historical dimension from two aspects: from the aspect of the subject, intuition is without history; from the aspect of the pure object, the object is without history. This is because the socio-historical dimension can only be truly manifested in the mutual relationship between subject and object. This relationship is directly expressed in the third thesis of the *Theses*: “The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice.” What is emphasized here is the dimension of “change,” the dimension of “revolutionary practice,” which is precisely the socio-historical dimension. In fact, this discussion can be seen as the dimension of Marx’s ontology: the social existence of human beings is their activity or self-change. This is also what is meant by saying that people’s social existence is their actual life process itself. This process is manifested in the change of people and circumstances and the connotation of their coincidence. In other words, our understanding of human beings themselves is also obtained within this socio-historical dimension. In the sixth thesis of the *Theses*, Marx states, “the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its actuality it is the ensemble of the social relations.” And social relations themselves are continuously constructed in the process of socio-historical development. Therefore, the social existence of human beings has a strong socio-historical dimension.

首先，在第一条中马克思批判了以直观的或客体的形式来理解对象的模式。实际上，马克思是从两个维度揭示了费尔巴哈在社会历史维度上的缺失：从主体的维度，直观是无历史的；从纯客体的维度，对象是无历史的。因为社会历史维度只有在主体与对象的相互关系中才能得到真正的体现。这种关系直接表现为《提纲》中的第三条，即“环境的改变和人的活动或自我改变的一致，只能被看作并合理地理解为革命的实践”。这里强调的是“改变”的维度、“革命的实践”维度，其实就是社会历史维度。其实，这个讨论可以看成马克思存在论的维度，人的社会存在就是人的活动或自我改变。这也就是所谓的，人们的社会存在就是他们的现实生活过程本身。这种过程表现为人与环境的改变及其一致性内涵。换言之，我们要去理解人本身，也是在这种社会历史维度中获得的。在《提纲》第六条中，马克思就说，“人的本质不是单个人所固有的抽象物，在其现实性上，它是一切社会关系的总和”。而社会关系本身就是在社会历史进程中不断被建构起来的。因此，人的社会存在具有强烈的社会历史维度。

Second, this socio-historical dimension can be understood from the epistemological dimension, which is expressed in the second thesis of the *Theses*. Regarding epistemology, Marx criticizes the scholastic type of epistemology as being detached from the socio-historical process. Regardless of what changes occur in the socio-historical process and social practice, its knowledge is confined to the study of scriptural principles and religious rituals. Actual social practice and its changes are the basis of knowledge and become the fundamental basis for judging whether knowledge is correct. The objective truth of knowledge changes with the vicissitudes of socio-history. This theme has been developed in the field of epistemology into social epistemology. The general understanding of Marxist epistemology is based on the relationship between practice and knowledge. But if one stops here, it remains at the same level as modern epistemology, i.e., a structural epistemology. Marx himself did not discuss the problem in this way; rather, he placed knowledge within the historical process. It is not a matter of discussing the possibility of knowledge within the pure relationship between the knowing subject, the known object, and the subject-object structure—this is a problem already clarified by modern philosophical epistemology. The key point is that as socio-historical conditions change, the forms and content of knowledge will also change accordingly. In these changes, it may be less a problem of the structure of knowledge and more a problem of how to reach the object of knowledge itself. Engels once pointed out that to truly know an object, one must first strip away these luxuriant and tangled ideologies [1]1 “Luxuriant and tangled ideologies” is a translation of the Chinese phrase 繁茂芜杂的意识形态, which Engels used to describe the complex and obscuring ideological layers that must be stripped away to reach reality. before one can face the real object and engage in the activity of knowledge.

其次，可以从认识论的维度来理解这种社会历史维度，这表现在《提纲》的第二条。关于认识论，马克思批判经院哲学式的认识论是脱离了社会历史进程。不论社会历史进程、社会实践发生了什么变化，其认识都是囿于经文原理和宗教仪式性的研究。现实的社会实践及其变化是认识的基础，并成为判断认识是否正确的基本依据。认识的客观真理性是随着社会历史的变迁而变化的。这个主题在认识论的领域被发展成为社会认识论。一般的对马克思主义认识论的理解都是基于实践与认识的关系，但如果仅停留于此，那与近代以来的认识论，即一种结构性的认识论是处在相同的水平。马克思本人并没有这样讨论问题，而是将认识置于历史进程中。不是在纯粹的认识主体、认识客体，以及主客体之间的结构关系中讨论认识可能的问题，这是近代以来的哲学认识论已经澄清了的问题。关键在于，社会历史条件在发生变化，认识的形式和内容也将随之变化。在这些变化中，可能更多不是认识结构的问题，而是如何触及认识对象本身的问题。恩格斯曾指出，要真正认识对象，首先要掀开这些繁茂芜杂的意识形态，才能面对真实的对象，也才能有认识的活动。

And these luxuriant and tangled ideologies are continuously created in the socio-historical process. In *The German Ideology* (hereinafter referred to as the *Ideology*), Marx points out that history appears as the history of ideas precisely because history itself has become the history of various ideologies. Therefore, to achieve knowledge of history and of the object, one must first realize the critique of ideology within the socio-historical dimension before one can truly enter the link of knowledge. This returns to what Marx calls in the *Ideology* “the higher philosophical intuition,” [2]2 “Higher philosophical intuition” refers to a concept in *The German Ideology* where Marx contrasts a superficial, contemplative intuition with a deeper understanding that grasps things in their historical and practical context. allowing things to reveal themselves truthfully within a socio-historical dimension. Thus, Marx believes that as long as things are understood according to their actual circumstances and the conditions of their emergence, any profound philosophical problem can be very simply reduced to some empirical fact.

而繁茂芜杂的意识形态，就是在社会历史进程中不断被创造出来的。马克思在《德意志意识形态》（以下简称《形态》）中就指出，历史表现为观念的历史，是因为历史本身变成了各种意识形态的历史。所以，要实现对历史、对对象的认识，首先要在社会历史维度实现意识形态的批判，才能真正进入认识的环节。这又回到了马克思在《形态》里所说的“高级的哲学直观”，在一种社会历史维度中，让事情真实地展示出来。因此，马克思认为，只要这样按照事物的真实面目及其产生情况来理解事物，任何深奥的哲学问题都可以十分简单地归结为某种经验的事实。

Critique of the “End of History” Thesis

对“历史终结论”的批判

The ninth thesis of the *Theses* states: “The highest point reached by intuitive materialism, that is, materialism which does not comprehend sensuousness as practical activity, is the contemplation of single individuals and of civil society.” Intuitive materialism can at most achieve the contemplation of “civil society,” but achieving the contemplation of “civil society” only means attaining a basic understanding of modern society. Why is this understanding insufficient? Marx’s early intellectual trajectory tells us that, especially when understanding the topics of law and the state, he had not yet achieved the contemplation of “civil society.” This is why, in the Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, when recalling the past, he emphasizes that only from the perspective of civil society can law and the state be truly understood. This means that achieving the contemplation of civil society to a certain extent is already walking on the path of historical materialism. Why does Marx still criticize this state? The reason is that civil society is not the end of history. For Hegel, in a certain sense, civil society is the end of history. Although the state attempts at the ethical level to correct the defects of particularity and egoism in civil society, this itself means perpetuating these defects. Marx’s critique of the contemplation of civil society lies in its distinct future dimension; this historical dimension means that civil society is not the end of history, but is to move toward “human society” or “social humanity.”

《提纲》第九条 “直观的唯物主义，即不是把感性理解为实践活动的唯物主义，至多也只能达到对单个人和市民社会的直观”。直观的唯物主义只能达到对“市民社会”的直观，但达到了对“市民社会”的直观，只意味着实现了对现代社会的基本理解。那为什么这种理解是不够的？马克思早年的思想历程告诉我们，尤其是在理解法、国家的论题时，其实还没有达到对“市民社会”的直观，这才有在《〈政治经济学批判〉序言》中回忆过往时，强调只有在市民社会的视域中才能真正理解法和国家。这意味着，在一定程度上实现了对市民社会的直观，已经是走在历史唯物主义的道路上了。马克思为什么还是要批判这种状态？原因在于，市民社会不是历史的终结。在黑格尔那里，在一定的意义上，市民社会就是历史终结。虽然有国家在伦理层面试图矫正市民社会中的特殊性和利己主义的缺陷，但这本身就意味着让这种缺陷永恒化。而马克思批判对市民社会的直观，在于其有鲜明的未来向度，这种历史维度意味着市民社会不是历史的终结，而是要走向“人类社会”或“社会的人类”。

This means that civil society cannot be perpetuated through the form of the state, but must be thoroughly transformed through a kind of “revolutionary practice.” This is what is meant by “the standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the standpoint of the new materialism is human society or social humanity.” To contemplate civil society is to explain the world (civil society) from the standpoint of civil society. Marx’s historical materialism, on the one hand, explains the world and civil society from the standpoint of civil society, and on the other hand, explains and transforms civil society from the standpoint of human society or social humanity, i.e., later socialism. In this regard, merely achieving the contemplation of civil society is insufficient; what is more important is to realize the transformation of civil society on this basis.

这意味着不能通过国家的形式来让市民社会永恒化，而是要通过一种“革命的实践”来彻底改造这种“市民社会”。这也就是所谓“旧唯物主义的立脚点是市民社会，新唯物主义的立脚点是人类社会或社会的人类”。对市民社会的直观，就是站在市民社会的立场上来解释世界（市民社会）。而马克思的历史唯物主义既是站在市民社会的立场上来解释世界、解释市民社会，而且是站在人类社会、社会的人类即后来的社会主义的立场来解释市民社会和改造市民社会。就此而言，仅仅达到了对市民社会的直观是不够的，更加重要的是基于此而实现对市民社会的改造。

The “Historical” Dimension of the *Theses* and the Philosophical Revolution

《提纲》的“历史”维度与哲学革命

Whether one discusses problems in the context of abstract concepts and their speculative discourse, or in the context of actual socio-historical movements, touches upon the basic attitude toward philosophy. Traditional philosophy, especially Hegel’s philosophy, places the social and historical dimensions into the framework of “philosophy,” while Marx places “philosophy” into the framework of society and history, thereby completing a philosophical revolution against traditional philosophy. This means that Marx completely reversed the basic framework and field for discussing philosophical problems.

在抽象的概念及其思辨语境中讨论问题，还是在现实的社会历史运动中讨论问题，触及对于哲学的基本态度。传统的哲学，尤其是黑格尔的哲学，是将社会、历史维度装进“哲学”的框架中，而马克思则将“哲学”装进社会和历史的框架中，从而完成了对传统哲学的哲学革命。这意味着马克思彻底扭转了讨论哲学问题的基本框架和领域。

Engels said that the fundamental question of all philosophy, especially modern philosophy, is the relationship between thinking and being. Whether in ontology or epistemology as discussed earlier, Marx transforms philosophical questions into socio-historical questions, which means that the fundamental question of philosophy is no longer discussed within the realm of ideas. What is human existence? Marx calls it the sum of social relations. How is the accuracy of cognition determined? A socio-historical dimension of thinking must be introduced. All of this means that the fundamental question of philosophy is led into the field of social reality, leaving the traditional domain of speculative philosophy.

恩格斯说，全部哲学问题，尤其是近代以来的哲学，思维与存在的关系是哲学的基本问题。无论是前面讲到的存在论还是认识论，马克思都将哲学问题转化为一个社会历史问题，这意味着不再在观念内部讨论哲学的基本问题。何为人的存在？马克思称之为社会关系的总和；如何确定认识的准确性？必须引入社会历史维度的思考。所有这些都意味着哲学基本问题被导入社会现实领域，而离开了传统的思辨哲学的场域。

In *The German Ideology* [3]3 *The German Ideology* (1845–1846) is a foundational text of historical materialism co-authored by Marx and Engels, in which they systematically critique the Young Hegelians and Feuerbach while elaborating their own materialist conception of history., in Marx’s basic exposition of historical materialism, concepts and categories such as “real individuals,” class, productive forces and forms of intercourse, relations of ownership, and community are used to re-interpret the fundamental question of philosophy, namely being, consciousness, society, and history. In this regard, *Theses on Feuerbach* already displays this philosophical revolution, or is precisely the starting point of this philosophical revolution.

在《形态》中，在马克思对历史唯物主义的基本阐释中，以“现实的个人”、阶级、生产力与交往方式、所有制、共同体等概念范畴重新展开对哲学基本问题即存在、意识、社会、历史的解释。就此而言，《提纲》中已经展示出这种哲学革命，或正是这种哲学革命的发端处。

(The author is a professor at the School of Marxism, Fudan University)

（作者系复旦大学马克思主义学院教授）

Online editor: Tongxin

网络编辑：同心